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Abstract  iii 
Abstract 
 
This doctoral thesis discusses the theory behind IPRs in PTAs and finds that there 
exist ambiguous rationales. Whilst some argue for more stringent regulation of IPRs 
through PTAs, others oppose it. Both rationales are based on the assumption that their 
approach is most beneficial for a countries’ economy, growth and welfare. To test which 
rationales prevail beyond the theoretical debate, this thesis follows three research ques-
tions: what countries do, why they do it and if their decisions matter. Therefore, I map 
the content of IPRs in PTAs, analyses their design and its variations, as well as study their 
effects. 
To map the content of IPRs in PTAs, I compiled a systematic and comprehensive 
dataset on IPRs in PTAs, that covers 86 IPR variables for 724 PTAs. Additionally, I cre-
ated a T+PTA dataset in collaboration with Morin (Morin and Surbeck 2019), which in-
cludes 90 variables on TRIPS-plus provisions in PTAs. The datasets allow mapping the 
IPR content of PTAs across time and regions. The descriptive statistics demonstrate that 
there are different strategies when it comes to regulating IPRs through PTAs. While some 
countries seem to have a consistent strategy, others show an immense variation of IPRs 
depending on the PTA. In order to better understand why there is such variation intra- 
and inter-countries, I focus on the design of IPRs in PTAs. 
For the analysis of the design of IPRs in PTAs, I look at the explanatory factors of 
economic power asymmetry, domestic interests, political pressure, veto players, endoge-
neity effect of PTAs, regime preference, and path dependency. I find that all of the ex-
planatory factors have a significant effect on the IPR design, yet the most distinct effect 
can be observed for economic power asymmetry and domestic interests. The direction of 
the relationship varies depending on the design feature. This suggests that countries act 
based on their interest and apply the rationale of IPRs only selectively. 
Furthermore, I examine if the design of IPRs in PTAs matters and leads to observable 
effects. The effects are analysed by looking at the legal-institutional effects as well as the 
economic effects. For the analysis of the legal-institutional effects, I look at the effect that 
precision and delegation have on implementation, compliance and effectiveness. The 
analysis shows that the effect of the IPR multilateral coherence commitments in PTAs 
operationalised through precision and delegation have a marginal negative effect on the 
implementation of the PTA, and significantly positive effects for both the compliance, as 
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well as effectiveness. The design of IPRs in PTAs thus impacts the domestic accession to 
IPR multilateral agreements. 
The economic effects analysis explores if the design of IPRs in PTAs matters. To this 
end, I focus on five factors derived from the rationale of IPRs, namely investment in 
R&D, FDI and licensing, innovation, technology transfer, and growth. Theory suggests a 
positive effect of IPRs on these factors, yet the regression analysis shows that the effects 
are predominately significantly negative, especially for stringent IPR provisions. The 
only consistently positive effects can be observed for TRIPS-plus enforcement provisions 
on the investment in R&D and specific IPR provisions on technology transfer. For the 
most commonly analysed factor FDI, my analysis shows no significant effects. As previ-
ous research has shown that the effects of IPRs vary according to the development level 
of countries, I additionally check the results of the economic effects for low-income, 
lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income and high-income countries. Hereby, the re-
sults show some variation according to the development level of countries, yet no clear 
division across income levels. However, the number of significant results suggest that 
high-income countries are affected the most by IPRs in PTAs. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
The connection between trade agreements and intellectual property rights (IPRs) is 
relatively new. For centuries, trade agreements focused mainly on tariffs and other direct 
forms of trade regulation, and only in the last century, trade agreements began to include 
other trade-related elements. Trading partners became aware that tariffs might be the most 
visible and direct trade regulation instrument, yet for a successful trade regime, there are 
also other relevant factors that are worth considering. For example, the regulation of the 
access to a market, the settlement of disputes, the regulation of investments or services, 
and newer areas such as labour, environment or intellectual property rights. To ensure an 
optimal regulation of trade, it is beneficial if other aspects besides tariffs are included and 
enforceability measures are established to make sure that trading partners adhere to com-
mitments in their trade agreements. Furthermore, the spread and segmentation of supply 
chains mean that many products are not produced in one country and exported as a final 
product into another one. Instead, a single product is designed, produced, assembled, mar-
keted, and sold in multiple locations, making an efficient trading system between coun-
tries evermore crucial. With this increasing globalisation of supply chains, those new el-
ements of trade agreements became far more important to guarantee an efficient and ef-
fective trade regulation regime. By including a trade-related provision such as intellectual 
property rights in trade agreements, countries can protect their interests more broadly than 
import and export tariffs. Newer trade agreements, therefore, try to encompass more than 
just the classic parts of trade regulations and aim to harmonise trade regulations. One 
leverage point to reduce less obvious trade restrictions are the so-called non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) to trade or more generally non-tariff measures (NTMs). NTMs can take many 
forms, and one of them is intellectual property rights, which are the focal point of this 
study. So why is it important to take a closer look at NTMs and especially IPRs in trade 
agreements? 
One prominent agreement trying to tackle NTMs was the Transatlantic Trade and In-
vestment Partnership (TTIP) between the United States of America (US) and the Euro-
pean Union (EU). Even though both trading partners might seem similarly developed and 
culturally aligned there are many differences in their way of regulating trade and trade-
related areas. To illustrate the issue of NTMs more clearly, the car industry serves as a 
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good example as the EU and US differ in a substantial number of their regulations for 
cars. For example, in the area of car safety regulations, there is considerable variation, 
and minor things such as car side mirrors are regulated differently. In Europe, side mirrors 
have different optical properties than in the US, and side mirrors in the US require the 
etched text “Objects in mirror are closer than they appear” (see Verband der Automo-
bilindustrie 2015). These are tiny variations in regulations, but in sum, for one product or 
an entire industry, the adaption to those differences in regulations lead to substantial ad-
ditional cost. 
For IPRs in particular, the key issue is that IPRs are territorial-based, meaning that 
every country has slightly up to massively different regulation on intellectual property. 
Besides the costs for producers to get acquainted with the highly-specialised IPR law of 
each possible trading country, the adaption to these regulations is cost-intensive. For in-
stance, a company would like to export a pharmaceutical. Before exporting it, the phar-
maceutical company provided test data that has been gathered over approximately three 
to five years in clinical trials to provide proof of the pharmaceuticals effectiveness and in 
turn to gain domestic market access. Depending on the foreign market, the pharmaceuti-
cal might be allowed to the market abroad based on this test data acquired in the domestic 
market (acceptance of foreign test data). However, more commonly the pharmaceutical 
company will have to run another test data study in the market abroad the get market 
access for this specific market. This means another couple of years to provide the test 
data for the market access broad for the same pharmaceutical already tested domestically 
over years. Besides theses time and finance barriers to exporting pharmaceuticals, there 
are additional hurdles such as regulatory delays after applying for marketing approval 
stretching over several years and the legal and political expertise required (Donnelly and 
Manifold 2011). Moreover, the barriers to trade for pharmaceuticals are often not a bur-
den to the company alone but shared with the market abroad through higher prices of the 
pharmaceutical. The negative economic effects are thus shared between domestic and 
foreign markets, and both could gain from reducing such NTMs. According to Francois 
et al. (2015), the reduction of NTMs would have accounted for 80% of the total gains of 
TTIP, as their harmonisation decreases the costs of double regulation, administrative ex-
penses and bureaucracy. As tariffs are already on an all-time low level, the impact of 
reducing the cost of NTMs becomes more and more critical (World Trade Organization 
2012, 37). 
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Trade agreements play a key role in reducing such NTMs and harmonising trade reg-
ulations. The number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs; for a more detailed descrip-
tion of the term see 2.1.1 Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs)) has steadily risen over 
the last decades, and most recent PTAs include regulations of NTMs in some form or 
another. One NTM that has been often discussed in relation to trade are intellectual prop-
erty rights. Ever since the establishment of the agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS) during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in 1994, there has been a debate on how to best regulate IPRs and to what 
degree this should be done via trade agreements. The World Trade Report 2012 (World 
Trade Organization 2012, 112–13) lists intellectual property rights under the top five 
problem reported by US exporters and EU firms, and states that IPRs pose at least a “pro-
cedural obstacle” for all firms participating in the ICT business survey (World Trade Or-
ganization 2012, 120). Regulating IPRs through trade agreements could have already be-
come the way of mapping the content of regulation, which leads me to the research gap 
and relevance of this study. 
1.1 Research Gap 
The key issue in analysing IPRs in PTAs so far is that there is no data mapping the 
intellectual property content of trade agreements in a comprehensive manner. This means 
that there is no clear picture of how IPRs are regulated through PTAs and the previous 
analysis shows mostly fragments of the international development. The main theories are 
thus mostly based on case studies and might not reflect a generalisable approach to ex-
plain IPRs in PTAs, and it was impossible to create a comprehensive content analysis and 
effect analysis of IPRs in PTAs.  
There are small-scale approaches such as case studies or in-depth analyses yet no ex-
tensive data that allows an overview as well as a comparison across countries. For exam-
ple, there are plenty of studies focusing in detail on one specific agreement, researching 
a specific IPR area such as patents or analysing all trade agreements and their IPR content 
of a specific country such as the US or a region such as South Asia. However, there are 
very few datasets comprehensively collecting the IPR content of PTAs. Most databases 
are selective either on the IPR content by being restricted to certain IPR areas such as 
patents, copyrights, and trademarks, or they only cover a limited amount of trade agree-
ments by looking either at single agreements, countries, or regions. This makes general 
assumptions and comparisons more difficult. 
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This data gap might be due to the fact that the topic of intellectual property rights in 
trade agreements predominately has been analysed by legal and economic scholars. In 
discussion with peers from different disciplines, I often encountered two strands of 
thought: either that a comprehensive dataset on IPRs in PTAs will be too detailed or not 
detailed enough. The latter I have encountered whilst debating with legal scholars. Their 
main concern with a comprehensive dataset on IPRs in PTAs was that a binary codebook 
could not reflect the nuances in the legal language. The legal framework tends to be de-
tailed as their core element of analysis is the legal language of a PTA. This, in turn, means 
that it is hard to create a scheme where for example different PTAs can be compared to 
one another, and if such a framework is created legal scholars aware of the refined dis-
tinctions and their legal consequences are reluctant to convert this into a binary code due 
to the loss of information. A “shall adhere to” can have a fundamentally different meaning 
than a “make every possible effort to”, which is hard to reflect in binary terms. 
The feedback from economic scholars was not that it is unfeasible to create a dataset 
on IPRs, but rather than the cost of creating a more detailed dataset far outweighs its 
benefits. To code agreements is time-intensive and in the area of IPR calls for legal advice 
and expertise, which makes it a long-term project. As economic analysis often works with 
models and variables that are hard to measure or where there is a lack of data, it is com-
mon to use proxies for such cases as IPR in PTAs. The approach for analysing the effects 
of IPRs in PTAs has thus been for example to approximate IPRs in PTAs by using the 
existence of an IPR chapter within an agreement or taking one specific IPR area such as 
patent in a PTA as a proxy for IPR in general. This would serve as a valid proxy to analyse 
the effects of IPRs in PTAs. 
The issue with those two arguments is that they make a comprehensive analysis of the 
design and its effect unlikely. Without a detailed coding of IPRs in PTAs, it is impossible 
for countries and policymakers to know what other countries are agreeing to in PTAs. 
Beyond the depth of legal language, the terminology of IPRs in PTAs can serve as a 
common denominator that makes IPRs in PTAs comparable. For example, it is very clear 
if a PTA protects patents or not, and if there are more specific provisions such as a specific 
duration of patent protection. Even though such coding lacks the bindingness of said pro-
visions, it makes PTAs comparable on a minimum legal level. Moreover, such coding is 
far more informative than the binary coding of IPRs being in the PTA or not. This, of 
course, would be important when negotiating PTAs, looking for best-practices and learn-
ing from PTA design. So far, the design can only be compared on a small case basis, and 
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the effects cannot be traced back to specific IPR provisions. By coding the IPR content 
in more detail, countries preferences for specific IPR areas can be visualised such as if 
there is a strong preference for protecting copyrights and if this preference for copyrights 
is included consistently across all its PTAs. 
A key hurdle to overcome when creating a dataset on IPRs in trade agreements was 
thus to find a balance between the two points of argument to ensure that the data will be 
relevant to a broader research community. In this manner, this study aims to create a data 
collection scheme that fits all trade agreements and allows a reflection of their actual 
content on IPR. A dataset that can be used to analyse and compare IPR policies made 
through trade agreements and be the basis for effects analysis. Moreover, this dataset 
should prove to be a valuable asset for different disciplines besides political science such 
as economics and law. 
A comprehensive dataset on IPRs in PTAs is thus the first step for analysing the status 
quo. Only then can the reasons behind the design of IPRs in PTAs as well as their effects 
be taken into account. So far, there has been mostly theoretical research on why countries 
choose certain design variations of IPRs in PTAs and if at all only cases studies on the 
effects such IPR provisions in PTAs have, for instance on FDI and innovation. By provid-
ing the foundation through creating a comprehensive dataset on IPRs in PTAs and con-
ducting analyses on both the design as well as the effects of IPRs in PTAs, my research 
can thus highlight the state of play, the reasoning behind the variations in the design as 
well as if the variations have any legal or economic effects. 
1.2 Relevance 
The dataset on IPRs in PTAs and its study is relevant in various regards. Foremost, 
the dataset gives an overview of the IPR content regulated in PTAs, and the study on the 
dataset shows how the data can be understood and used to explain the design of IPRs in 
PTAs, and the effects of IPR provisions beyond PTAs. This can thirdly assist in testing 
the theoretical assumptions behind including IPRs in PTAs and ultimately the effect of 
IPRs. 
Both trade agreements, as well as intellectual property rights, are nowadays more de-
bated than they have been in the past few decades. Recent developments put trade agree-
ments back on the forefront of political discussion, and political actors have discovered 
trade agreements as a topic to unify voters for a common cause. The political spectrum 
from left to right has shown an increased interest in trade agreements and their content 
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and possible impacts. From the Greenpeace-leak of the TTIP and the implied the negative 
impacts feared out of entering TTIP, to the current American President, Donald Trump, 
listing two preferential trade agreements as top priorities in his 100-day action plan: The 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP). In his plan, Trump stated to renegotiate or withdraw from NAFTA, and his inten-
tion to withdraw from TPP, because they are “bad deals” (see Trump 2016). Multilateral 
agreements such as TPP, TTIP or the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement 
(CETA) have also been in the news because of resistance of civil society and specific 
stakeholders against specific terms in those agreements. So, when the US withdrew from 
TPP, the remaining countries decided to keep the treaty under the new name Comprehen-
sive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and it entered 
into force after some amendments were made. Some of the fundamental changes from 
TPP to CPTPP were in the chapter on intellectual property rights, where many of the 
stringent IPR provisions were dropped after the US pulled out of the agreement. This 
brings back arguments raised after TRIPS entered into force: do IPRs belong in preferen-
tial trade agreements? And if so, should they lead to more stringent protection of IPR? Or 
would it be better not to define IPRs through trade agreements, but use PTAs to set some 
ground rules, guarantee specific freedom rights and grant exceptions? After all, is it not 
true that IPRs protect mostly the interests and inventions of Western IPR producing econ-
omies such as the US? 
 
“Intellectual property is an important legal and cultural issue. Society as a whole has com-
plex issues to face here: private ownership vs. open source, and so on.”  
Tim Berners-Lee, inventor of the World Wide Web (Knuth et al. 2011, 44) 
 
For a society facing the issue of how to regulate IPRs in an efficient manner, there is 
a need for more information on the current status of IPR regulation through PTAs. So far, 
the research on intellectual property rights in trade agreements has been widely left to 
legal scholars and economists. However, the topic of IPRs should be more intensively 
discussed in social science and political science specifically. The protection of intellectual 
property rights has broad social implications that target for example consumers in their 
everyday life such as in the regulation by downloading music, bringing back trademarked 
souvenirs from their holidays or the purchasability of genetically modified food. The reg-
ulation of intellectual property impacts almost every area in some form or another. For 
example, in the educational system it influences the availability and price of educational 
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material, software and research; for the health system it is crucial for the allowance of 
generic drugs; in the agricultural sector it decides on the patentability of plants or seed 
protection; and in the industry, in general, it can give protection via trade secrets, indus-
trial design protection or trademarks. Even so, research in political science has mostly 
focused on a particular topic in regard to IPRs: the pirate party. The pirate party is a 
relatively new political party that can be found across the globe, has many different man-
ifestations, but often represents a more deliberate and less regulated approach towards 
intellectual property rights. By analysing IPRs on a broader scale than the pirate party, 
social science can assist to give a more balanced view of the benefits and shortcomings 
of IPRs. This would add a social science and evidence-based perspective to the predom-
inantly existing legal and economic research. By providing a comprehensive database, 
the scientific community can overcome the disciplinary hurdles and provide more accu-
rate and fine grained analysis of the current situation, developments and impacts of IPRs 
in PTAs. 
In academia, it can be used to further the research on both trade agreements as well as 
intellectual property rights. For example, legal scholars can use the data to identify inter-
esting cases for in-depth analysis such as outlier cases or use it as a basis for more fine-
grained coding of the legal text. The academic findings will also lead to a broader and 
more informed society. If people should support trade agreements, there should be suffi-
cient and evidence-based information on what PTAs de facto include on intellectual prop-
erty rights. This study also informs the IPR-consumers about their rights and duties, that 
their countries agree to and that they, in turn, have in the PTA-member countries. The 
same is true for IPR-producers, which can use this study to learn more about their rights 
at home and abroad. Furthermore, the content of IPR in PTAs is relevant for a multitude 
of actors. Policymakers can use the dataset to learn about the IPR strategy of their own 
as well as other countries and for example, use the gained knowledge in negotiations or 
to create an IPR strategy. Overall, it will allow policymakers to make evidence-based 
decisions and to justify their actions towards their constituency. 
The following paragraph briefly describes the structure of this doctoral thesis. Chap-
ter 2: Theoretical Context of IPRs in PTAs describes the terminologies, rationales, theo-
retical debates and previous research of PTAs, IPRs and IPRs in PTAs. This is followed 
by Chapter 3: Dataset on Intellectual Property Rights in PTAs that includes the descrip-
tion of the datasets, the concepts used, a description of the coding approach, followed by 
descriptive statistics. Chapter 4: Design of Intellectual Property Rights in PTAs focuses 
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on the design by first looking at the theory of treaty design, then explaining the data and 
analysis. Chapter 5: Effects of Intellectual Property Rights in PTAs focuses on the legal 
and economic effects of IPRs in PTAs. Chapter 6: Overarching Summary and Conclusion 
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Chapter 2:  Theoretical Context of IPRs in PTAs 
Before starting to code IPRs in PTAs, it was crucial to understanding the theoretical 
debates and mechanisms behind trade agreements, intellectual property rights as well as 
IPRs in PTAs. This chapter details the terminologies and the logic behind these concepts 
by looking at the economic rationales of IPRs in PTAs. Furthermore, it elaborates on the 
key theories of global political economy (GPE) that can explain the inclusion of IPRs in 
PTAs and were considered for the creation of the IPRs in PTAs dataset and its study. 
Subsequently, the previous research on IPRs in PTAs is described and the overarching 
research questions portrayed. 
2.1 Terminologies 
Around the term of trade agreements there still exists a debate on how to categorise 
them and which label describes their aim and content most precisely. The following sub-
chapter will thus first elaborate on the term preferential trade agreements (PTAs) used in 
this doctoral thesis and distinguish it from other terminologies. Afterwards, the term of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) is described in more detail. 
2.1.1 Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) 
Trade regulation describes the legal rules of trading and knows many forms. Trade 
regulation can be differentiated along the line of the number of countries involved – uni-
lateral, bilateral, multilateral, international – as well as the form of trade legislation. 
Firstly, trade can be regulated through domestic legislation such as subsidies for own 
goods or quotas for imported goods, and unilateral actions such as Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP; see 2.1.1 Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs)), thus countries de-
fine their own rules of trade regulation within the domestic sphere and towards other 
countries. Secondly, countries can enter into trade agreements with one or more partners 
in order to define reciprocal and or preferential trade rules such as equal or preferential 
tariffs for goods (see Snorrason 2012). Thirdly, countries can form a free trade area such 
as NAFTA, in which countries can still decide individual on their external tariffs (beyond 
the members of the free trade area), but share a common internal tariff. Fourthly, countries 
can enter a customs union such as the EU or the Southern Africa Customs Union, whereby 
countries additionally to forming a free trade area also share a common external tariff 
(see Clausing 2000). Thus, preferential trade agreements represent only one part of trade 
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regulation. However, PTAs are the “most prominent and important governance instru-
ment of our times for regulating trade and investment flows” (Dür and Elsig 2015, 1). In 
the literature on trade agreements, there are numerous terminologies for trade agreements 
and the understanding of those terms is not homogenous. I will therefore firstly define the 
three most common terminologies and explain why I use the term preferential trade agree-
ments. 
The three most common terms to label trade agreements more specifically are free trade 
agreements (FTAs), regional trade agreements (RTAs) and preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs). 
Free trade agreement is a term often used for trade agreements with highly liberalising 
tariff schedules. The “free” in FTA implies a trade regime free from barriers, yet the term 
FTA is mostly used in connection to tariffs. Thus, trade agreements that lower tariffs or 
eliminate them substantially are often named FTAs, where the “free” refers to “free from 
tariffs”. The term “free” is inaccurate on one hand because in practice FTAs often lower 
tariffs, yet do not eliminate them or include at least a short list of products with a tariff. 
On the other hand, the term “free” can be misleading as it revolves around the under-
standing that tariffs are the only barriers to trade and by reducing or eliminating tariffs, 
the trade will be “free”. Nevertheless, trade agreements include various other factors that 
can hinder trade such as quotas, subsidies and other NTMs like intellectual property 
rights. The term FTA thus instead indicates the aim and market perspective of the corre-
sponding trade agreement than their actual content. 
Another term that is widely used is regional trade agreements. As the name suggests, 
these agreements have a geographical aspect and focus on regional partners. This has 
been an accurate term for many years as countries mostly traded with their neighbouring 
countries and partners within the same region (World Trade Organization 2011, 44). But 
nowadays, countries also enter trade agreements beyond their closer or broader region, 
e.g. the trade agreements signed between India and Chile (2006), Australia and Japan 
(2014) or China and Switzerland (2014). The term “regional” would thus either mean 
excluding many of the more recent trade agreements or be misleading as the trading part-
ners range beyond a regional scope. In their World Trade Report 2011, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) adopted the terminology of PTAs rather than RTAs and showed that 
the term RTA is out-dated as more than half of the PTAs in force at that time were not 
bound to common WTO regions (World Trade Organization 2011, 58). Before this deci-
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sion, the WTO had a different definition of PTAs, namely that these are unilateral pref-
erential decisions from one country towards another, so-called Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP). This equation of PTAs and GSP is highly uncommon and is not how 
the term will be applied in this study. 
The term preferential trade agreements is “defined as agreements that liberalize trade 
between two or more countries but that do not extend this liberalization to all countries 
(or at least to a majority of countries)” (Dür and Elsig 2015, 1). As the term states, these 
trade agreements include preferential provisions among members of the treaty. These 
PTA members can be from the same or different regions and their approach to eliminate 
tariffs is secondary as long as they include some form of trade liberalisation. The PTA-
terminology has the benefit that it is semantically the closest to the actual content of trade 
agreements and fits most of the bilateral or multilateral trade agreements with some lib-
eralisation content.  
2.1.2 Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) 
“Intellectual property rights” is an umbrella term that refers to many different forms 
of intangible property and their corresponding rights. In general, IPRs protect creations 
of the mind, which can take a variety of forms. These forms often have their correspond-
ing protection called IPRs such as copyright for books and patents for inventions. This 
leads to a broad variety of IPRs on many levels such as their name, duration, character, 
and purpose. Therefore, the general conception of IPRs needs to be broken down into 
which rights are included in its definition.  
For this doctoral thesis, the focus lies on IPR categories that are most commonly found 
in PTAs, be it in a general article defining the term IPR or in a specific for example 
regulating the term of protection. Valdés and Tavengwa (2012) performed the thus far 
most extensive analysis of IPRs in PTAs and have also identified these eleven forms of 
IPRs to be relevant for their analysis (see 3.1.2 Variables on Intellectual Property Rights, 
3.1.2.2 IPR Scope Variables). I therefore only focus on the subsequent eleven forms of 
IPRs: copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications (GIs), industrial design, patents, 
undisclosed information, layout-designs of integrated circuits, new plant varieties, tradi-
tional knowledge and genetic resources (TK & GR), encrypted program-carrying satel-
lites, and domain names. Table 1: Forms of IPR briefly describes those eleven forms of 
IPRs and informs about their duration and purpose of protection (own table based on 
information of the World Intellectual Property Organization, 2018). 
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Table 1: Forms of IPR 
IPR Form Example of Manifestations Duration  Rationale 
Copyrights  Protect work of authorship such as books, mov-
ies, video games. 
Often includes “related rights” derived from 
copyright protection such as performances or 
broadcasts. 
Often indicated by the symbol ©. 
Often for life of the 
author plus 50 




Trademarks Protect designs, signs, and expression such as 
brand names or logos (e.g. “Coca-Cola”). 
Often indicated by the symbol ™ or ® for reg-
istered trademarks. 










Protect names bound to a product (mostly food 
or handicrafts) of a certain geographical region 
such as Champagne wines from France. 
Often indicated by labels such as DOC (e.g. for 












Protect ornamental or aesthetic features that 
make a product distinguishable such as Lego 
figures or a Mini Cooper. 
Also referred to as “design patents”. 
Often 15 years, i.e. 





Patents Protect technical inventions resulting in prod-
ucts or processes with functional aspects such 
as the iPhone, the 3-D printer, the Global Posi-
tioning System or Bluetooth. 
Often require an inventive and novel step. 







Protect undisclosed business information such 
as trade secrets like the formula of a beverage. 
Also referred to as “confidential information”. 
Often indefinite Incentive for 
innovation 
Layout-Designs 
of Integrated  
Circuits 
Protect layout designs of integrated circuits 
(chips, microchips) such as silicon chips for 
electronic equipment like SIM cards. 
Also referred to as topographies of semi-con-
ductor (silicon) circuits. 




New Plant  
Varieties 
Protect plant varieties in both their propagating 
forms such as seeds and their harvested form 
such as fruit.  
Often required to be novel, distinct, stable, and 
uniform. 
Also referred to as “plant breeder’s rights”. 
Often 20 years, ex-
cept 25 years for 






& Genetic  
Resources 
Protect traditional knowledge such as cultural 
heritage, skills and practices and genetic re-
sources such as medicinal products or animal 
breed passed on over generations in local and 
indigenous communities. 
TK often includes traditional cultural expres-
sions of folklore (TCEs) such as characteristic 
signs and symbols. 
Often indefinite Overcome  
information 
asymmetries 
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Protect program-carrying satellite signals (au-
ral/visual) that are encrypted. 
Often refers to prohibition of broadcasting with-
out the authorisation of the broadcasting organ-
isation, e.g. news, music, or sports transmission 
on television. 
Often indefinite Incentive for 
innovation 
Domain Names Protect internet domain names such as country 
abbreviations like “.fr”, “.me” (ccTLDs), or ge-
neric terms such as “.info”, “.jobs”, “.travel” 
(gTLDs). 




The IPRs listed in Table 1: Forms of IPR include those areas of IPRs, which are prom-
inently featured in research such as copyright, patent, trademarks and more recently also 
traditional knowledge and genetic resources. The other listed forms might not be repre-
sented to the same extent in research contributions, yet they are included in PTAs, and it 
is, therefore, necessary to include them in a systematic dataset on IPRs in PTAs.  
The duration of protection varies not only across IPR forms but also among countries. 
Where some countries grant copyright protection for 50 years after the death of the author, 
other countries grant 70-90 years of protection after the death of the creators. In Table 1, 
the duration displayed accounts for the most commonly granted protection according to 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) website (World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization 2018c). 
The purpose of protection is simplified in this table, but generally, the different IPR 
forms can be categorised based on their purpose: an incentive for innovation or to over-
come information asymmetries. To achieve their purpose, different intellectual properties 
are protected by corresponding IPRs. Those that are intended to give an incentive for 
innovation are usually definite and granted for a limited period, whereas those IPRs that 
should overcome an information asymmetry are often granted for an unlimited period or 
renewable for multiple times making them quasi-indefinite. For example, patents are sup-
posed to give an incentive for creators of IP to produce further innovations. The end result 
being protected by a patent might be simple to copy if one has the design or reverse en-
gineers the final product. The patent thus gives a limited amount of exclusive protection 
in turn for disclosed the patented intellectual property such as technology behind an in-
vention after the protection term has ended. The disclosure facilitates the advancement of 
the intellectual property and spurs future innovation. Whereas, for example, trademarks 
are protected quasi-indefinite – trademarks can expire if they are not used – and are not 
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protected to increase innovation per se. The protection of trademarks such as Coca Cola 
helps consumers to easily identify brands and be sure that what they are being is not a 
counterfeit, maybe even harmful good. Trademark owners are therefore also encouraged 
to invest in the quality and development of their products as the trademark allows them 
to differentiate their products from others. The concrete rationale of protecting intellec-
tual property with IPRs is explained in more detail in subchapter 2.2.1.2 Rationale of 
IPRs. 
2.2 Economic Rationales and Global Political Economy Theories 
In the following subchapters, I will discuss the two main theoretical cornerstones that 
explain why countries include IPRs in PTAs: economic rationales and global political 
economy theories. 
Firstly, I describe the economic rationale by looking at the rationale of PTAs, and 
subsequently the rationale of IPRs. It is important to differentiate between the two as their 
intentions might seem diametrically opposite, as PTAs aim to reduce trade barriers and 
IPRs impose (quasi-)monopolies. Concludingly, I derive the rational of IPRs in PTAs.  
Secondly, I draw from the theories of global political economy to explain IPRs in 
PTAs by looking at the four main theories of realism, liberalism, social-constructivism 
and modern marxism. This theoretical debates are followed by an overview of the previ-
ous research on IPRs in PTAs. 
2.2.1 Economic Rationales 
According to economic rationales, countries act rationally when entering PTAs. The 
subsequent sections describes the economic rationale behind countries entering PTAs, the 
economic logic of protecting intellectual property with IPRs, and subsequently, the eco-
nomic motivations of governments to include IPRs in PTAs. 
2.2.1.1 Rationale of PTAs 
The surge of trade regulation through preferential trade agreements has led to a broad 
discussion of why countries enter PTAs and how preferential conditions affect trade. 
Classical trade theory is founded on the base assumption that countries have to trade on 
the one hand to satisfy the domestic consumer demand not covered by domestic produc-
ers, and on the other hand to provide a market for the supply of domestic producers that 
go beyond domestic demand. These scenarios are solved by trade, i.e. importing goods 
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(satisfy domestic consumer demand) and exporting them (meet domestic producer sup-
ply) (see Myint 1958, 318). 
In theory, the optimal trading system has free markets in every country, and there are 
no barriers to trade. Through opening trade, countries can specialise in areas, where they 
are most productive, and their quality-price structure is more efficient in established in-
dustries. With a liberal market and free trade, products will thus be produced by the coun-
tries with the highest comparative advantage, which improves the efficiency of produc-
tion, lowers prices for consumers and has an overall positive effect on welfare. Centuries 
ago, David Ricardo and Adam Smith already argued that trade should be free from barri-
ers such as tariffs or otherwise trade will be distorted. Viner (1950) developed these as-
sumptions further and derived that by lifting such trade barriers, trade can either be cre-
ated or diverted.  
In reality, most countries impose barriers to regulate trade due to political, economic 
or social reasons. For example, to gain votes for political elections, protect agricultural 
products from cheaper imports or enable infant industries to grow in a protected environ-
ment. The most common trade policy instruments are tariffs, export subsidies and import 
quotas (Krugman, Obstfeld, and Melitz 2012, 241). All of them aim to give domestic 
producers an additional advantage: Tariffs reflect the imposition of a tariff on an imported 
good; export subsidies are often payments from the government to a specific exporting 
firm; import quotas limit the number of imports.  
In the following sections, I will display the effects of trade distortion, trade creation 
and trade diversion on the domestic market in Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3 to illustrate 
why countries enter PTAs (based on Krugman, Obstfeld, and Melitz 2012, 226 et seqq.). 
The figures show the effects on trade of the oldest form of trade policy: tariffs. According 
to Krugman et al. (2012, 223) tariffs have been a vital revenue factor for countries and 
serve beside their government income function the goal of protecting specific sectors in 
the domestic market. Tariffs, unlike export subsidies, are usually applied for the whole 
market, and unlike import quotas, do not have a threshold on the quantity of imported 
products. This makes tariffs the most comparable form of trade policy to the effects that 
IPRs have on trade (for more detail on this argument see 2.2.1.3 Rationale of IPRs in 
PTAs). 
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Figure 1: Trade Distortion and Trade Creation 
 
 
Table 2: Trade Distortion and Trade Creation Effects (Figure 1) 
Effects on the 
Domestic Market 
Trade Distortion 
Imposing a Tariff 
Trade Creation 
Lifting a Tariff 
Consumer Surplus – (a + b + c + d) (a + b + c + d) 
Producer Surplus a – a 
Government Revenue c – c 
Domestic Welfare – (b + d) b + d 
Domestic Effects Negative: – (b + d) Positive: b + d 
 
 
On the left-hand side of Figure 1 and Table 2: Trade Distortion and Trade Creation 
Effects (Figure 1), the case of trade distortion is illustrated. In the domestic market, a 
product used to be sold at the world price for a good (PW). Now, the country decides to 
impose a tariff (T) on said product and therefore increases the price by that tariff (PW+T). 
This increase in price means that more domestic producers will be able and willing to 
supply that product (increase in domestic supplied quantity from Q1 to Q2) and less do-
mestic consumers will be able and willing to demand it (decrease in domestic demanded 
quantity from Q4 to Q3). The positive effects for the domestic market are the domestic 
producer surplus (a) and the government revenue through the tariff collection (c). How-
ever, in comparison to the consumer loss (–(a+b+c+d)) the overall effect on domestic 
welfare is negative (–(b+d)), as through the imposition of the tariff both production is 
distorted (–b) and consumption is distorted (–d). Accordingly, regulating trade by impos-






a c d 




a c d 
PW+T 
PW 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
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On the right-hand side of Figure 1 and Table 2: Trade Distortion and Trade Creation 
Effects (Figure 1), the matter of trade creation is illustrated. Regarding tariffs, trade cre-
ation describes the opposing effect of trade distortion and in theory, is associated with the 
elimination or at least a reduction of a trade barrier such as a tariff. For example in Figure 
1, this means that in the domestic market, policymakers decide to eliminate a tariff (T) 
and the price falls from the price including the imposed tariff (PW+T) to the world price 
(PW). Due to the decrease in the domestic price fewer of the domestic producers will be 
able and willing to supply this product (decrease in domestic supplied quantity from Q2 
to Q1), but more domestic consumers will be able and willing to demand it (increase in 
domestic demanded quantity from Q3 to Q4). Here, the positive effect for the domestic 
market is the consumer surplus (a+b+c+d), whereas the negative effects are the loss of 
domestic producers (–a) and the loss of government revenue due to the loss of tariff in-
come (–c). The overall effect for the domestic market here is positive (b+d), as the elim-
ination of the tariff leads to a creation of production (b) and consumption (d). The dereg-
ulation of trade by eliminating the tariff thus creates trade. 
Following that logic, the best-case scenario would be for countries to remove all bar-
riers to trade, such as tariffs entirely. The issue with this theory is that all countries would 
have to abide by it and remove their tariffs, as otherwise, the comparative advantages 
could not play freely. In such an arbitrary situation, those countries with free markets 
would be at a disadvantage, as they probably could not profit from their comparative 
advantage. They would be faced with tariffs upon exporting their goods, be faced with 
import quotas or export subsidies, whilst allowing others to enter their market without 
any barriers. Thus, in practice, countries are reluctant to remove tariffs and even more 
hesitant to eliminate tariffs for all other trading partners. So as countries aim to improve 
their market situation and know about the negative effect of market barriers, they draw 
on other options to improve their trading conditions besides eliminating tariffs. In order 
to liberalise trade without making their markets completely open, countries can act uni-
laterally, bilaterally or multilaterally.  
The multilateral approach was very successful in the last century and in 1948 led to 
the GATT and General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), which in 1994 re-
sulted in the foundation of the WTO. The aim was to reduce trade barriers and harmonise 
the trading system on a global scale. Some of the key accomplishments are Article 1 of 
GATT and Article 2 of GATS, that grant members most-favoured-nation treatment 
(MFN). MFN means that no other country can be treated worse than the country with the 
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most beneficial conditions, i.e. everybody is treated equally to the most-favoured country. 
These conditions only apply to WTO members and they imply, that every condition 
agreed to – even after GATT and GATS – has to be granted on a non-preferential basis 
to other WTO members. If a domestic market thus decides to reduce a tariff, the MFN 
clause implies that the reduction is not granted preferentially but rather to all WTO mem-
bers. An example of trade policy derogating from the MFN principle is the recent addi-
tional tariffs on steel applied by the US on imports from certain countries (Miles 2018). 
The MFN clause was imposed to enable trade without discrimination and getting closer 
to a most-efficient trading system, where comparative advantages can unfold their wel-
fare benefits. However, GATT includes possible exemptions from the MFN-clause, for 
example for unilateral trade liberalisation tools such as GSPs and bilateral resp. multilat-
eral trade liberalisation policies such as PTAs.  
GSPs are preferential unilateral reductions of tariffs, usually granted by a developed 
country towards a least-developed country (LDC), as GSPs are used as a development 
tool to assist LDC increasing their exports. They are exempted from MFN as they aim to 
level the playing field and thereby to give LDCs a chance to catch-up and develop their 
comparative advantages. Besides GSPs, unilateral approaches to liberalise trade are often 
unattractive to WTO members as it means that one gives away leverage (market access) 
to everyone within the WTO for free, i.e. without negotiating anything in return. Today, 
most countries are members of the WTO, making the implications of unilateral liberali-
sation of WTO members almost global. 
Much more popular to liberalise trade is thus the other exemption from the MFN 
clause granted to customs unions, free trade areas and PTAs. The legal basis for PTAs 
has a far less prominent position within GATT than the MFN clause and is only granted 
in Article XXIV (GATS already in Article V), implying that the overall and global aim 
should be to adhere to the MFN principle and only exceptionally to derogate from it. 
Countries should thus stick to the global approach that does not discriminate among WTO 
members, yet they are given the possibility to circumvent it by negotiating PTAs. More-
over, the number of PTAs signed has increased substantially and keeps on rising. Even 
some LDCs prefer to negotiate PTAs over GSPs granted to them (Acharya et al. 2011, 
37). This development is at least partially influenced by the loss of momentum of the 
multilateral approach of trade liberalisation after the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) that 
led to the formation of the WTO. The Ministerial Conferences held by the WTO members 
have still an essential multilateral influence on the trading system, yet the rounds on trade 
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negations have not done so well. The Doha Development Round started in 2001, yet ne-
gotiations broke down in 2008 and since had not been revived. Still, the number of mem-
bers in the WTO has increased from 123 in 1994 to 164 members in 2018 so far, which 
means the MFN principle is applicable even more broadly now although no new rounds 
were successfully concluded. The multilateral approach has thus not stopped but com-
pared to the development and coverage of PTAs at least slowed down. PTAs have surged, 
especially after the WTO was concluded and the rationale for signing PTAs is the same 
as with entering the WTO: to improve the domestic welfare by facilitating trade. In the 
subsequent section, I will describe the rationale of entering a PTA by looking at the pref-
erential reduction of tariffs and the effects on the domestic market in more detail.  
A preferential tariff can have three different effects on global welfare. These are dis-
played in the following two figures. Figure 2 shows the positive PTA-effect of trade cre-
ation and Figure 3 the negative and positive PTA-effects of trade diversion. 
The outset is the same for both effects shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3. The domestic 
market enters into a PTA with country A, and they decide to reduce tariffs in the domestic 
market preferentially. Thus, in the domestic market, tariff (T) is preferentially reduced for 
country A (from PA+T to PA+TPTA). For the other trading parties outside of the agreement, 
represented by country B, the initial tariff still applies (PB+T). The trade effect alters 
depending on the trading partner, country A. If the trading partner is the most efficient 
producer of a good, then trade will be created and if another trading partner outside of the 
agreement is the most efficient producer than trade is diverted. The mechanisms for both 
scenarios are explained in more detail in the following paragraphs. 
In Figure 2 and Table 3: PTA-Effect of Trade Creation (Figure 2), one of the possible 
trade effects of a PTA is displayed: trade creation. The direction of the effect is the same 
as illustrated above in Figure 1 (right graph), yet on a smaller scale as tariffs are not being 
eliminated. In this scenario, country A was the more efficient trading partner even before 
the PTA entered into force (PA<PB resp. PA+T<PB+T). The preferential tariff granted to 
country A thus does not change the comparative advantage of country A yet amplifies it 
(PA+TPTA<PA+T<PB+T). Same as in Figure 1, the decrease in the domestic price means 
that fewer of the domestic producers will be able and willing to supply this product (de-
crease in domestic supplied quantity from Q2 to Q1), but more domestic consumers will 
be able and willing to demand it (increase in domestic demanded quantity from Q3 to Q4). 
The negative effects are the loss of domestic producers (–a) and a loss of government 
revenue due to a loss of tariff income (–c), whereas the positive effect for the domestic 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Context of IPRs in PTAs  20 
market is the consumer surplus (a+b+c+d). But unlike in Figure 1, here, the government 
still applies a preferential tariff and not the entire tariff revenue is lost (only –c is lost, f 
remains). Through the creation of trade, additional tariff revenue is generated (e+g). 
Hence the overall effect for the domestic market is also positive (b+d+e+g), as the elim-
ination of the tariff leads to a creation of production (b), consumption (d) and leads to 
additional tariff revenue (e+g). The deregulation of trade by reducing the tariff preferen-
tially thus creates trade. 
 
Figure 2: PTA-Effect of Trade Creation 
 
 
Table 3: PTA-Effect of Trade Creation (Figure 2) 
Effects on the  
Domestic Market 
PTA-Effect: Trade Creation 
Scenario 1: Reducing a Tariff for the most Efficient Producer 
Consumer Surplus (a + b + c + d) 
Producer Surplus – a 
Government Revenue – c + e + g 
Domestic Welfare b + d + e + g 
Domestic Effect Positive: b + d + e + g 
 
 
In Figure 3 and Table 4: PTA-Effect of Trade Diversion (Figure 3) I will show another 
scenario that illustrates the other possible trade effect of a PTA: trade diversion. Trade 
diversion can have either a negative or a positive domestic effect. In both cases, the do-
mestic market enters a PTA with country A and grants them a preferential tariff treatment. 
Here, country B was the producer with the comparative advantage (PB<PA resp. 
b 
a c d 
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PB+T<PA+T), but with the new applied preferential tariff for country A, trade is diverted 
from the more efficient producer, country B, towards the one with the better tariff condi-
tions (PA+TPTA<PB+T<PA+T), country A. Here, the effect of the PTA leads to an effi-
ciency loss as the comparative advantage of country B is overpowered by trade regulation 
through preferential tariffs for country A. Same as in the figures before, the decrease in 
the domestic price means that fewer of the domestic producers will be able and willing to 
supply this product (decrease in domestic supplied quantity from Q2 to Q1), but more 
domestic consumers will be able and willing to demand it (increase in domestic demanded 
quantity from Q3 to Q4).  
The positive effect for the domestic market is the consumer surplus (a+b+c+d) and 
the additional government income (e+g), whereas the negative effects are the loss of do-
mestic producers (–a) and a loss of government revenue due to a loss of tariff income (–
(c+h)). Partial tariff revenue (–f) lost due to the trade distortion is replaced in full by the 
preferential tariff from country A (f). The overall domestic welfare can thus have a posi-
tive or a negative effect, depending on the balance between the net loss (–h) and the net 
surplus (b+d+e+g). In Figure 3, the left graph displays a trade diversion scenario with a 
negative domestic effect (–h>(b+d+e+g)), whereas the right graph illustrates a trade di-
version scenario with a positive domestic effect (–h<(b+d+e+g)): 
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Table 4: PTA-Effect of Trade Diversion (Figure 3) 
Effects on the 
Domestic Market 
PTA-Effect: Trade Diversion 
Scenario 2: Reducing a Tariff yet not for the most Efficient Producer 
Consumer Surplus a + b + c + d 
Producer Surplus – a 
Government Revenue – c + e + g – h 
Domestic Welfare b + d + e + g – h 
Domestic Effect Negative: (b + d + e + g) < – h Positive: (b + d + e + g) > – h 
 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates that it is crucial for countries to carefully evaluate the concrete 
effects that they want to achieve through the PTA and take into consideration their trading 
preferences with countries in and outside of the PTA. Generally, policymakers will aim 
to enter a PTA that either creates trade (Figure 2) or diverts trade with a positive impact 
on the domestic welfare (Figure 3, graph on the right). Of course, countries sign PTAs to 
increase their domestic welfare and will aim to avoid trade diversion effect with negative 
implications for their domestic welfare (Figure 3, graph on the left). It might seem, that 
the rationale of PTAs that aims to reduce trade barriers in a beneficial manner for domes-
tic welfare follows a different logic than the one for IPRs, which are commonly associated 
as being a barrier to trade. In the following subchapters, I will therefore firstly elaborate 
on the rationale of protecting IP by IPRs (2.2.1.2) and in the subsequent subchapter build 
the bridge to the rationale of including IPRs in PTAs (2.2.1.3). 
2.2.1.2 Rationale of IPRs 
According to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), there are two 
main rationales for protecting intellectual property: moral rights and economic incentives 
(World Intellectual Property Organization 2008, 3). 
The moral right rationale derives from the idea that if one has created something 
through mental capabilities, the benefits arising through said creation should be awarded 
to its creator. For example, if an author writes a book then the author should benefit from 
its sales and others should be restricted from doing the same. In this regard, John Locke’s 
theory on property often serves as a cornerstone of the IP argument: 
 
“Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a 
property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, 
and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of 
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the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to 
it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from 
the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that 
excludes the common right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable property 
of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where 
there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.” 
John Locke, Second Treaties of Government (1967 Chapter V, Article 27) 
 
Locke’s argument for property rights is often extended to IP, arguing that adding in-
tellectual labour applied to a good is the modern version of physical added labour to a 
good. Subsequently, intellectual property created through mental labour should be pro-
tected by IP rights, same as property by property rights. 
The economic incentive rationale is based on the assumption that IP has the same 
characteristics as a public good. Public goods are characterised by being non-rivalrous 
and non-excludable (Maskus 2012, 6). Regarding IP, this refers for example to the fact 
that by consuming a book its value is not diminished in quantity or quality (non-rival-
rous), and others cannot be excluded from reading it as well (non-excludable). The issue 
with public goods is the cost of providing that good and extended to IP the costs of cre-
ating intellectual property. Furthermore, others are non-excludable entails that the prob-
lematic of free rider, i.e. people benefit without contributing. It is only logical then that 
rational actors rather copy or consume instead of being creative themselves, as usually 
copying or consuming is cheaper than inventing something novel. In the case of computer 
programs, it can take years to design a fitting algorithm or code, and it will only take 
seconds to copy and paste it. This, in turn, means that the benefits for the producers of IP 
drop until there is no more or at least not enough incentive to create IP anymore, also 
referred to as a market failure. Protecting IP by IPRs can serve as a remedy for this free 
rider problem and the resulting market failure. IP can be made excludable by IPR law 
defining the terms of accessing IP, at least temporarily. Another part of the economic 
incentive rationale is the utilitarian justification of IP: the temporary restriction of the use 
of IP leads to an incentive to create IP and after the protection ends to the dissemination 
of knowledge. 
Following this argument, there is a need for the government to correct the natural IP 
situation to avoid market failure. In the case of intellectual property, the economic incen-
tive rationale states that without protection there is no incentive to be creative and inno-
vate. This means that without government intervention and the imposition of IPRs, there 
is no innovation and hence no growth potential for an economy. By regulating intellectual 
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property, the government thus improves the overall welfare (Williams, 2015, p. 54). Over 
time, the economic rationale has expanded and nowadays many more effects are associ-
ated with intellectual property and its protection such as foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and research and development (R&D). Furthermore, IPRs are not only used as a tool to 
incentivise innovation, yet also to overcome information asymmetries in terms of char-
acteristics, reputation, and quality. The different forms of IPR and their intent are listed 
in Table 1: Forms of IPR.  
To illustrate the rationale of IPR in more detail, I use the concept of a logic model 
(see Sager and Rüefli 2005, 107 et seqq.) and structure the different logic steps of IP 
protection along the features of input, output, outcome and impact in Figure 4. 
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The input describes the problem to be resolved by political intervention. In the case 
of IP, it is the question of how to create a climate where innovation and creativity can 
prosper even if the products of IP might be easily copiable. The aim is to foster creativity 
and innovation to avoid market failure of intellectual property. The output is the policy 
result aimed to resolve the input problem and change the behaviour of actors. For IP it is 
the protection of intellectual property by IPRs such as patents and trademarks. The spe-
cific IPR forms and their protection can be highly divergent but can roughly be distin-
guished into two categories of monopoly and quasi-monopoly. Certain IPR forms grant 
the IP owners a monopoly right with mostly indefinite protection such as trademarks, 
whilst others also grant monopolies with a clear time limitation on the protection granted 
such as patents. 
The outcome describes the indented effect on the groups targeted by the policy and 
reflects the mid-term goals of the policy. IPRs are associated with ideally a combination 
of preferred outcomes. IPRs intend to reward creativity and incentives investment in 
R&D. Furthermore, IPRs aim to create a secure, reliable legal framework that is attractive 
to FDI and licensing. The intended outcomes of IPRs are to create reliability for consum-
ers, improve the quality of the product through the resulting need to protect one’s reputa-
tion and to overcome information asymmetries. By protecting for example trademarks, 
consumers can better orientate themselves in the market, as they have more information 
and can quickly identify and differentiate products. For producers of IPR it means that it 
is worth to invest in the quality of the product as customer preferences, their margins and 
reputation are built on it. Thanks to the IPRs people can easily differentiate products, e.g. 
McDonald’s from Burger King or Channel from H&M. Also, consumers can rely on the 
authenticity of products if IPRs are protected, i.e. that Coca-Cola is Coca-Cola and not 
Pepsi. This might sound benign, yet in the case of pharmaceuticals, it can be essential if 
one consumes the original or an imitation (see Bunker 2007). The strict and sometimes 
indefinite protection of the moral rationale is applied mainly for undisclosed information 
such as trade secrets and in a restricted form to trademarks. Often there is a time limit on 
the trademark protection, yet it is multiple (endless) times renewable. The IPR forms with 
a definite dimension have some additional traits. After the term of protection has ended 
the products can still exist, yet there is an obligation to disclose the protected information. 
This creates a lagged competition that after disclosure rises at a fast pace. For example, 
in the case of a pharmaceutical drug, the patent needs to be filled, and in the patent appli-
cation, the patentable information such as the process of making a drug has to be included. 
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After the patent runs out, the protected patented part of the information on the process of 
making a drug has to be disclosed, and the information will be shared, meaning that ge-
neric producers can relatively expeditiously enter the market after the patent term runs 
out. 
The impact describes the overall effectiveness and refers to the effects on the broader 
society, besides and including the intended target groups. The impact reflects the overall 
effects and long-term goals of the policy. Based on the outcomes and taking into account 
the entire economy, IPRs should lead to innovation, technology transfer, growth, and in-
creased welfare. Innovation should prosper as there is an incentive to innovate by the 
additional or eternal gains a product can reap; technology transfer refers to the obligation 
to disclose for time-limited IPRs and the consequential disclosure of protected infor-
mation; IPRs are the safeguards of innovation and thus necessary to maintain growth (see 
Hassan, Yaqub, and Diepeveen 2010). 
As Figure 4 depicts the rationale of IPRs, i.e. why countries protect IP by IPRs, it 
leaves aside the unintended outcomes and impacts of IPRs such as an overprotection of 
intellectual property hindering or delaying technology transfer through extended protec-
tion terms. These situations will be discussed in more detail in the following subchapter.  
And even though the rationale of IPRs might suggest that rationally behaving coun-
tries should protect IPRs, that is not necessarily the case. For instance, it is often criticised 
by developed countries that developing countries lack a sufficient domestic IPR regula-
tion, especially regarding the enforcement of IPRs. However, a developing country will 
have more pressing concerns and areas in need of financial development than IPRs. Be-
sides the capital-intensiveness required for protecting IPRs such as trained patent office 
employees or additional customs control, the IPR protects goods stem mostly of foreign 
IPR producers. Thus the developing countries are expected to invest their scarce resources 
into IPR protection even though the benefits are predominately yielded abroad. Park 
(2005, 2), for instance, names costs arising from more stringent IP protection such as “ 
infrastructural costs (of rewriting national laws and providing the means for enforcement 
and administration), static deadweight losses (in terms of the deviation of markets from 
competitive structures), and rent transfers (from consumers and rival producers to rights 
holders)”. 
Moreover, even developed countries are selective on when to uphold the rationale of 
IPRs. For example, Switzerland employs an ambiguous regime of copyright regulation 
based on arguments of social interest trumping the IPR rationale of IPRs as necessary 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Context of IPRs in PTAs  27 
market intervention. In Switzerland, the streaming, downloading, personal as well as ed-
ucational use and dissemination of copyrighted material is allowed as long as the pro-
tected material does not concern software. Software being the one domain where Swit-
zerland is an economically relevant producers of IPR and where the domestic market 
would be harmed without effective IPR protection (Eidgenössisches Justiz- und 
Polizeidepartement EJPD 2011). Therefore, the rationale of IPRs might be abandoned 
where the market intervention is not in favour of the domestic market and the reduction 
of trade barriers serves the economy better. Consequently, the protection of IPRs and the 
inclusion of IPRs in PTAs has become a politicised topic that not always follows the 
rationale of IPRs. The next subchapter will therefore combine the two concepts of the 
rationale of PTAs and the rationale of IPRs to follow up on the question why countries 
want to include IPRs, commonly seen as a barrier to trade, in a PTA, aiming to reduce 
trade barriers. 
2.2.1.3 Rationale of IPRs in PTAs 
IPRs and PTAs might sound like an odd combination. On the one hand, policymakers 
enter PTAs to reduce trade barriers in order to avoid trade distortion and increase domes-
tic welfare (see 2.2.1.1 Rationale of PTAs). On the other hand, policymakers try to avoid 
a market failure and foster an innovative environment for IP by implement IPRs, which 
are considered to be barriers to trade (see 2.2.1.2 Rationale of IPRs). So, if IPRs are un-
derstood as barriers to trade and PTAs as a mean to overcome barriers to trade: why do 
countries regulate IPRs through PTAs and thus include trade barriers in trade agreements 
with the purpose of reducing trade barriers? 
According to Snorrason (2012), there are four main reasons why it makes sense to 
regulate trade by imposing barriers. Firstly, countries impose barriers to affect the world 
price (PW) and improve the terms of trade. Secondly, countries impose barriers to improve 
and optimise the income distribution in the domestic market. Thirdly, countries impose 
barriers to “achieve exogenously given targets for trade, production or domestic con-
sumption” (Snorrason 2012). Fourthly, countries impose barriers to counterbalance a 
market failure. This last point is one of the key arguments to protect intellectual property 
by IPRs and is the reason IPRs are included in PTAs: to avoid market failure. Even though 
the combination might be contradictory on the surface the connection between IPRs and 
PTAs becomes clear once looked at more closely. 
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First of all, it is a matter of coherent regulation as IPRs are trade-related. Besides the 
IPR rationale (Figure 4: Rationale of IPRs) and the traits associated with IPR such as 
innovation, technology transfer, growth and increased welfare, there are other clear rela-
tions of IPR and trade, making the inclusion of IPRs in trade agreements consequential. 
Nowadays, vertically integrated supply chains have mostly transformed into global ones. 
With products not only produced in one country but also divided geographically, the out-
sourcing of production can become a risk if the IP behind the goods is not protected 
abroad as well. Exporters are thus faced with the decision to either keep the IP protected 
steps within the domestic market or only invest in a market where their IPR standards are 
met (Chopra and Sodhi 2000, 57). When negotiating PTAs and setting the basis for trade 
rules, it makes sense to include IPRs as well. Furthermore, domestic IPR law affects the 
regulation of imports, yet has no control over IPR protection of exports and transitional 
goods. By including IPRs in PTAs countries can thus regulate IP beyond the domestic 
border and build a secure legal framework for their exporting producers. 
Secondly, as countries see IPRs as a necessity for a growing market and domestic 
welfare, countries will not try to abolish the trade barriers posed by IPRs, and instead try 
to harmonise and thus reduce them as far as possible and reasonable. This implies that 
countries can both try to include more stringent or less stringent IPR regulation in PTAs, 
as long as it harmonises the domestic and foreign IPR regulation. In order to impact more 
than just the domestic IPR regulation, countries turn to bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments. As Helfer (2009, 39) put it, IPR regulation is “composed of a dense thicket of 
linkages and relationships among treaties, international organisations, and multilateral, 
regional and bilateral negotiating venues.” Figure 5: Fora of IPR Regulation shows the 
different fora of IPR regulation on the domestic and the international level, the actors 
involved and some examples for each category. 
At the core, IPRs are territorial-based rights, and the main forum for IPR regulation 
is, therefore, the domestic level. This can become problematic for the economy once pro-
ducers want to export their goods and have to abide by other standards than the ones in 
their domestic market. Every adaption due to differing regulation increases the costs of 
exportation and constitutes a barrier to trade. For example, if a patent was granted in the 
domestic market for a pharmaceutical drug, and producers had to provide a clinical study, 
i.e. test data, to prove the functionality of their drug. Now they would like to get a patent 
abroad and are required to provide novel test data for the same drug due to differences in 
the patent regulation abroad. This is not only time-intensive but also very costly. As every 
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country has their legislation on IPRs such as patent law, copyright law or trademark law, 
it is almost impossible for exporters to adapt their products to all export markets individ-
ually. So early on, countries turned to bilateral and multilateral venues to ensure a broad, 
coherent regulation of intellectual property. 
 
Figure 5: Fora of IPR Regulation 
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organisations in regard to multilateral IPR regulation. IPR conventions mostly focus on a 
specific area of IPR such as copyright and seldom provide a holistic IPR regulation 
scheme. TRIPS was thus a major step from a patchwork of different IPR conventions 
towards a harmonised IPR system.  
To this day, TRIPS is by far the most important multilateral IPR agreement on the 
international level. It is substantially based on the Paris Convention, but additionally in-
cludes provisions on copyrights, topographies of integrated circuits, undisclosed infor-
mation, and new plant varieties. With TRIPS came a whole bundle of IPR regulations 
Maskus (1997, p. 684) covering a multitude of IPR areas and TRIPS includes two major 
regulation milestones for IPR: it grants most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment in TRIPS 
Article 4 and national treatment (NT) in TRIPS Article 3. NT prohibits discrimination 
between domestic and foreign nationals regarding IPRs, whereas MFN grants the most 
favourable IP rights granted to one foreign country also to all other countries. This means 
that every country that is part of the WTO and has ratified TRIPS must grant IPR provi-
sion non-preferentially. IPR rules apply to domestic or foreign producers alike, and there 
is no differentiation between different foreign countries as the domestic law applies to all 
in the same manner. Another benefit of TRIPS is the inclusion of specific enforcement 
mechanisms that make the IP rights more feasible. TRIPS is governed by the WTO, the 
other major multilateral organisation involved in IPR regulation. After TRIPS, many 
other IPR conventions were signed such as WIPO internet treaties consisting of the WIPO 
copyright treaty (WCT) and the WIPO performance and phonograms (WPPT) in 1996.  
Besides the IPR conventions and agreements, there are also treaties that have a differ-
ent emphasis, yet also include IPR regulation. An example of such an IPR-related con-
vention is the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) signed in 1992, which focuses 
on biodiversity, yet also encompasses IPR regulation on traditional knowledge and ge-
netic resources. These IPR-related conventions often include only one or a few forms of 
IPRs and do not encompass comprehensive IPR regulations. There have been attempts to 
conclude other far-reaching multilateral IPR agreements, yet so far, they were unsuccess-
ful. For example, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) signed in 2011, 
which has not entered into force yet due to a lack of the required ratification of at least 
six member countries. It is aimed to create more stringent universal enforcement mecha-
nisms for IPRs, yet ACTA faced many critics especially from the public, lost international 
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support and is unlikely to enter into force any time soon. With the stagnation of negotia-
tions of new multilateral IPR agreements, countries have also turned to IPR-related bilat-
eral, sometimes multilateral, agreements. 
Regarding IPR-related agreements, there are two primary forms: PTAs and bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs). PTAs focus on trade regulation and BITs regulate various as-
pects of investment. BITs rarely include specific articles on IPRs, yet some of them do 
include IP in their definition of investment. This means that all further provisions regu-
lating investment also apply to IP and can be considered as IPR regulation. PTAs on the 
other hand often have a specific article or an entire chapter on IPRs, mostly encompasses 
multiple IPR forms and provide a broader IPR regulation than BITs. PTAs often include 
references or obligations towards other IPR conventions. Therefore, PTAs also ensure a 
certain degree of multilateral coherence on IPR besides setting new standards. And since 
other multilateral approaches for IPR regulation have come to a halt, PTAs have become 
an essential forum of bilateral and multilateral IPR regulation. 
According to trade theory, the benefit of regulating trade in a multilateral manner such 
as the WTO is that by applying the provisions (almost) globally, trade is not diverted, 
whereas PTAs run the risk of diverting trade with a positive or even negative effect on 
the domestic economy (Cottier, Sieber-Gasser, and Wermelinger 2015, 465). At this, the 
rationale of trade theory relies on tariffs that are granted an exemption from the MFN 
clause in GATT and can be applied preferentially through trade agreements. These pref-
erential tariffs can result in trade diversion, whereas the MFN approach ensures a level 
playing field for all trade actors (see 2.2.1.1 Rationale of PTAs). This exemption of the 
MFN clause does not extend to IPRs, and after the ratification of TRIPS, countries cannot 
grant IPRs preferentially any longer. IPR provisions in PTAs are thus non-discriminatory 
(Fink 2011, 389). For example, if a domestic market signs a PTA with country A and 
includes a provision to extend copyright protection to 70 years after the death of the au-
thor, this provision is implemented in the copyright law of both the domestic market and 
the market of country A. This law then applies not only to members of the PTA, i.e. the 
domestic market and country A but to all non-PTA members from other countries as well. 
So even if country B is not a member of the PTA, its copyrighted work will be protected 
in the domestic market as well as country A for 70 years after the death of the author as 
well. This means that IPRs in PTAs have an MFN character even if not mentioned ex-
plicitly in the PTA if the members have ratified the TRIPS agreement.  
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Besides the positive aspects of the MFN regulation granted to IPR provisions, it also 
has a downside. Due to the MFN character of IPRs granted in PTAs, these IPR provisions 
have a wide-reaching effect and PTAs can become the tool to set IPR standards. PTAs 
are based on bilateral or sometimes multilateral negotiations that have a different power 
ratio than significant multilateral agreements such as TRIPS or GATT. The inclusion of 
IPRs in PTAs can thus lead to a global spread of IPR regulation based on bilateral, some-
times multilateral, negotiations. For example, if the US signs multiple PTAs including 
IPR provision with different countries. These provisions then apply in the US and their 
PTA-partner countries, and if those countries sign other PTAs, they most likely will in-
clude similar provisions on IPR. This will spread the IPR regulation of the US PTAs and 
might not reflect the same IPR provisions negotiated in bigger multilateral agreements. 
Once these PTAs enter into force, the included IPR provisions become domestic law, 
applicable to domestic and foreign nationals alike (see also TPP and CPTPP in 1.2 Rele-
vance). MFN in PTA can lead to a quasi “multilateralisation” of bilateral concessions.  
Nevertheless, as other venues of IPR regulations have stagnated, IPRs In PTAs are 
currently one of the most promising fora for IPR regulation beyond the domestic market, 
and at least due to their MFN characteristic, IPRs will not lead to trade diversion, as they 
are not preferential (according to the Rationale of PTAs). Rather IPRs in PTAs can lead 
to either trade distortion or trade creation. From a PTA-perspective, IPRs are barriers to 
trade and will lead to trade distortion (Figure 1, left graph), whereas according to the IPR 
rationale there is no IP without IPRs, thus including IPRs in PTAs leads to trade creation 
(Figure 1, right graph). The rationale for including IPRs in PTAs is a bit different as it 
combines both rationales for PTAs and IPRs: either trade is created by ensuring a market 
for intellectual property by guarantying (a certain level of) IPR protection (Figure 6, left 
graph), or trade is created by harmonising IPR standards (Figure 6, right graph). 
On the left-hand side of Figure 6, a market is created through IPR protection in PTAs. 
Beforehand, the IPR protection in the domestic market was too inefficient (or non-exist-
ent), and through IPR in PTAs the market of intellectual property becomes functional and 
creates trade. On the right-hand side of Figure 6, trade is created through the harmonisa-
tion of IPRs through PTAs and the concomitant reduction of trade barriers. When export-
ing producers are assured that their IPR is protected abroad, they are more willing to 
supply to those markets or invest in them. Furthermore, if producers have the same or at 
least similar IPR regulations in their domestic as their export market, their harmonisation 
costs are reduced. Thus, IPRs in PTAs protect the domestic market yet also make the 
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markets abroad more reliable and attract trading and investment partners. It is thus ex-
pected that the non-preferential IPR regulations in PTAs lead to trade creation by ensuring 
and harmonising IPR regulation (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: Trade Creation Through IPRs in PTAs 
 
 
According to Fink (2011, 388), IPRs have another dissimilarity to tariffs that needs to 
be considered for the rationale of IPRs in PTAs. The trade rationale argues for free trade, 
i.e. the more liberalised the trading system is, and the lower tariffs are, the better. As 
demonstrated above, the rationale of including IPRs in PTAs takes the opposite direction 
and calls for more regulation. So here, IPRs defer from tariffs as it cannot be conclusively 
said that more stringent regulation of IPRs has a positive effect on trade (Fink 2011, 388). 
It comes as no surprise that the discussion nowadays is less about if IPR should be in-
cluded in PTAs and more about what level of protection should be granted, bearing in 
mind the standard setting impact of IPRs in PTAs beyond the PTA members. The debate 
on the appropriate level of IPR protection in PTAs is not new, and generally, there are 
two strands: one voting for a shift towards more stringent IPR protection, the other for 
less stringent IPR protection. Even tough TRIPS is often referred to as the minimum 
standard of IPR protection, that term is only accurate from a particular perspective. Before 
TRIPS, there were intense discussions among countries on universally applicable IPRs. 
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to protect their business interests. They lobbied their countries for inclusion of IPRs in GATT 
(the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) negotiations, hence the signing of the TRIPS 
Agreement by WTO member states in 1994.” Wekesa (2009, 5) 
 
So even before TRIPS entered into force there was a discussion about the optimal 
level of IPR protection, where most developing countries argued for less stringent pro-
tection and developed countries for more stringent protection. The result was the TRIPS 
agreement, which until today, is the main standard of IPR protection, and to some coun-
tries, it represents a minimum standard and to others a maximum standard of IPR protec-
tion. Mostly those countries with IPR industries worth protecting consider the TRIPS 
agreement to be a minimal standard of IPR protection. They thus aim for more stringent 
IPR protection and a move towards a maximum standard of IPR protection in PTAs. On 
the other end of the spectrum are those countries without big IPR industries, that saw 
TRIPS already as the maximum standard of IPR protection that they were willing to con-
cede to and now would rather move towards a minimum standard of IPR protection (see 
Halbert 2011). Figure 7 illustrates the diverging ideals of IPR standards and the opposing 
sides of the rationale of how stringent IPRs should be regulated through PTAs. 
The diverging ideals of IPR protection in PTAs shown in Figure 7 are based on the 
rationale countries give more weight to. Countries that see TRIPS as a minimum standard 
and aim for a maximum standard of IPR protection in PTAs give more weight to the 
rationale of IPRs and argue that more stringent IPR leads to more innovation and growth. 
IPRs are thus necessary trade barriers that can still be harmonised upwards without dis-
torting the market, and the balance between public goods and private good is still tilted 
towards the public. This should be corrected by including more stringent IPRs in PTAs 
and harmonise towards a maximum standard of IPR protection. On the other hand, some 
countries give more weight to the rationale of PTAs and aim to minimise the trade barriers 
posed by IPRs. Unlike the time before TRIPS came into force, countries currently mostly 
do not want to abolish IPRs entirely and instead aim to reduce the barriers that IPRs pose 
to trade. This can be done by keeping or extending the flexibilities granted under TRIPS 
and by further agreeing to less stringent, flexible IPRs in PTAs. This will lower the trade 
barriers and enable innovation and growth. The underlying argument here is that the scale 
between private and public goods has already lost its balance and the public side needs to 
regain weight.  
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Today, the differentiation between developing and developed countries is falling short 
in categorising countries demand for a maximum or minimum IPR standard. The subse-
quent two paragraphs will highlight why both developing and developed countries should 
have ambiguous preferences towards IPR regulation. 
With the rise of more stringent IPR regulation in some countries, some downsides of 
stringent IPR regulation have surfaced, most prominently in the area of public health and 
access to medicines. In TRIPS, patent protection was so stringent that soon after TRIPS 
entered into force, some countries feared for their fair access to medicines, with a focus 
on the pandemic of HIV/AIDS at that time. With TRIPS, the access to generic drugs 
became more limited and especially developing countries were aware of the impact on 
their public health situation (Coriat and Orsenigo 2014, 230). The collective effort and 
organisation of developing countries led to the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS and Public 
Health in 2001, that reinforced countries rights to circumvent the patent law in order to 
protect public health and ensure the access to medicines (Roffe and Spennemann 2014, 
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443–44). This improved the conditions for developing countries, e.g. for the effective use 
of compulsory licensing to import generic and hence cheaper drugs. Still, there is concern 
that some TRIPS provisions were not balanced enough and even more worries that by 
including more stringent provisions in PTAs, the flexibilities granted in TRIPS will di-
minish. This is rooted in the assumption that by raising the level of IPR protection ever 
higher, the intended outcome of IPRs will come undone. If IPRs are too stringent than 
they become barriers to trade as well as innovation and technology transfer and thus de-
feat their purpose of enabling a creative environment.  
Furthermore, many creations are not absolute novelties but rather built upon previous 
ideas and inventions. When IPR protection becomes too rigorous, then the market for new 
intellectual property shrinks immensely. Indications for such a trend can be identified for 
example in the area of patents. Fink (2011, 388) argues that a balance can be found by 
limiting the duration of IPRs and granting exceptions. However, in PTAs, the duration of 
protection of patents is often extended, which means that competition is lagged further, 
consumers have to pay a higher price even longer, and technology transfer will happen 
later. Moreover, patent owner can draw on other ways to extend the protection for patents 
such as “evergreening”, i.e. prolonging term by obtaining multiple patents for the same 
product or related subject matter, or “product-hopping”, i.e. changing the sold product 
and receive a new patent for basically the same product (Lemley 2008, 30; Love 2012, 
1351), or “patent trolls”, i.e. a description of non-inventive firms that buy patents not in 
order to produce or create something novel, yet “to force third parties to purchase li-
censes” (Chan and Fawcett 2005, 1). These extremes of misusages of the IPR ideals are 
detrimental for the competition and consumers alike, making the welfare effect of too 
stringent IPRs negative. Making a move towards a minimum standard no longer only a 
concern of developing countries. 
On the other hand, there are also globally acknowledged arguments to move towards 
a maximum standard of IPR protection. First, the most significant multilateral IPR agree-
ment TRIPS is out-dated. It has already been over 20 years since it has been negotiated 
and, in many ways, our trading system has changed and evolved. The digital development 
and the rise of the Internet have fundamentally changed our everyday life, from the way 
that goods are traded, i.e. e-commerce, to the way we gain knowledge and share our ideas. 
IPRs are affected in a multitude of forms by the internet not covered in TRIPS, and some 
countries have agreed to the WIPO internet treaties WCT and WPPT in order to regulate 
some of the shortcomings of TRIPS in regard to copyright (Taubman 2012, 308). It has 
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become effortless to copy paste and share copyrighted material across the globe and in-
creasingly hard to enforce copyrights, as the infringer and the infringed are often not in-
habitants of the same country and thus not regulated by the same domestic copyright 
regulation. Besides entering multilateral conventions such as WIPO internet treaties, 
countries aim to protect their intellectual property in the digital age also through PTAs. 
The US with a significant entertainment industry is especially afflicted by the new ways 
of circumventing copyright protection and therefore includes stronger technological pro-
tection measures for copyrights in their agreements with almost no flexibility to circum-
vent copyright (Roffe and Spennemann 2014, 454–55). The digitalisation has also in-
creased globalisation and the spread of counterfeit goods. This is not only critical for IPR 
producers and the infringement of their rights, yet also for consumers buying counterfeit 
products. In the case of counterfeit medicine, there have been international approaches to 
increase the enforcement for example by the Council of Europe’s Convention on Coun-
terfeiting of Medical Products and Similar Crimes Involving Threats to Public Health 
(MEDICRIME Convention), signed in 2010. The negative impacts of counterfeit goods 
have only a marginal impact on the markets in developed countries, yet a huge one on the 
markets of predominantly developing countries. According to Keitel (2012, 138) “many 
countries in Africa and parts of Asia and Latin America have areas where more than 30 
per cent of the medicines on sale can be counterfeit, while in many of the countries of the 
former Soviet Union the proportion of falsified/ counterfeit medicines is over 20 per cent 
of market value.” These means that a substantial part of the population is affected by 
counterfeit medicine, which needs to be corrected by more stringent IPR enforcement 
mechanisms. 
So, both strands of the argument have legitimate claims, and the main issue is to find 
an efficient balance for IPR regulation that leads to positive net welfare. The question 
remains if there is a universal balance and thus a one-fits-all rationale for IPRs in PTAs.  
2.2.2 Global Political Economy Theories 
Of course, there are also other theories besides economic rationales explaining inter-
national relations and that could be helpful in explaining IPRs in PTAs. In the following 
section, I will briefly describe the four main theories of global political economy (GPE) 
to provide alternative rationales behind a country’s choice of entering into a trade agree-
ment and deciding upon the regulatory standards such as IPRs. The four major GPE the-
ories are 2.2.2.1 Realism, 2.2.2.2 Liberalism, 2.2.2.3 Social-constructivism, and 2.2.2.4 
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Modern Marxism. Even though none of these theories offer forthright explanations on 
IPRs in PTAs, they at least indicate possible drivers of countries behaviour. At the end of 
each GPE theory section, I added the conclusions drawn for the rationale of IPRs in PTAs 
based on the particular GPE theory. 
2.2.2.1 Realism 
Realism has been the dominant theory in international relations and traces back to 
works of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau (Dunne and Schmidt 2008, 92). 
The main actor in realism theory is the state, which is driven by power relations (Frieden 
and Lake 2003a). How the state formulates its behaviour follows three main theoretical 
streams in realism: classical realism, structural realism and neoclassical realism.  
Classical realism centres around the assumption that states are the central actors in 
international relations and their behaviour can be derived from human nature. The state, 
which is under constant threat of anarchy, acts in order to guarantee security for the state, 
is driven by the human desire to dominate others and strives for power (Morgenthau 
1948). International relations are thus the logical consequence of human natures preser-
vation of self-interest and aim for power, and are defined by power politics (Dunne and 
Schmidt 2008, 95). Or according to Watson (2014, 32): “States will always act in a way 
that enhances their immediate power resources within the world economy because those 
power resources are crucial to shaping further bilateral and multilateral economic ne-
gotiations to their advantage.” 
Structural realism agrees with the notion of international relations being a power 
struggle. However, it argues that this cannot be derived from human nature and that the 
state’s behaviour rather is the result of a systemic deficiency. As power is unequally dis-
tributed among states, countries have to struggle to defend their interest as there is no 
supranational authority. Therefore, all international political outcomes can be explained 
by the power distributions at that given time, whereby countries can be ranked according 
to their power impact on the overall system and the structure of the system is determined 
by the number of highly powerful states. Only by a bipolar distribution of great powers 
within the system – such as seen during the Cold War with the two opposite poles of the 
US and Soviet Union – some form of stability can be achieved (Dunne and Schmidt 2008, 
98). Furthermore, structural realism can be divide into defensive realism and offensive 
realism. The former stresses that states aim to maximise security, whilst the latter argue 
that states aim to maximise power (Dunne and Schmidt 2008, 100). 
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Neoclassical realism doubts that the power distribution can sufficiently explain the 
behaviour of countries. Instead neoclassical realism theory assumes that domestic factors 
also influence international relations. Dunne and Schmidt (2008, 99) argue that “while 
systemic factors are recognized to be an important influence on the behaviour of states, 
so are factors such as the perceptions of state leaders, state-society relationships, and the 
motivation of states.” Furthermore, the impact of these domestic factors on a states be-
haviour depends on the state’s capacity to deal with these influences. Thus, in neoclassical 
theory, not all countries have the same starting point in power politics (Dunne and 
Schmidt 2008, 99). Nevertheless, the state remains the central actor in international be-
haviour, “has expanded its power to effectively manage the process of globalization” 
(Lamy 2008, 136) and thinks beyond the short-term effects of actions. By considering the 
possible negative consequences of actions such as trade retaliation on the domestic econ-
omy, states adapt their actions to ensure power beyond the immediate future (Watson 
2014, 32). 
Applied to trade, realism generally assumes that states act based on their national in-
terests and out of a competitive trade understanding where each country tries to optimise 
its exports and imports (Cohn 2016, 169). Hereby, countries operate based on economic 
rationales, compare their cost and benefits (Frieden and Lake 2003b, 12), and are focused 
on the relative gains in trade negotiations (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 2000, 6). 
Power relations drive a states behaviour and in the case of neoclassical realism can be 
influenced by domestic constraints. Correspondingly, the role of multilateral institutions 
is limited as they are only relevant as long as they represent the interest of the state (Cohn 
2016, 89). 
In relation to IPRs in PTAs, there are no explicit assumptions of realism, yet it can be 
assumed that realism would expect countries to maximise their power by including strin-
gent IPR provisions that reflect and protect the domestic interests. Hereby, the weaker 
party to an agreement would be assumed to surrender to the stronger party due to the 
power imbalance. Drezner (2009, 67), for example, argues that “negotiating the myriad 
global governance structures and treaties requires considerable amounts of legal trai-
ning and technical expertise related to the issue area at hand. Although these transaction 
costs might seem trivial to great powers with large bureaucracies, specialized human 
capital is a relatively scarce resource in much of the developing world.” Intellectual prop-
erty rights are one of these areas, where expertise is required and is therefore cost-inten-
sive, which gives more powerful countries an advantage over less powerful countries in 
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PTA negotiations. Additionally to power relations, the inclusion of IPRs in PTAs could 
be influenced by domestic political factors following the neoclassical argument. How-
ever, countries might also prefer to regulate IPRs through other fora then PTAs, depend-
ing on which forum better represents their domestic interests. 
2.2.2.2 Liberalism 
Liberalism is based on the economic liberal theory, that roughly can be divided into 
three main strands: the orthodox liberals alias the Chicago School including the ideas of 
John Locke, Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Milton Friedman, the interventionist liber-
als including the ideas of John Stuart Mills, John Maynard Keynes and Joseph Stiglitz, 
and the more recent institutional liberals (Allen 2011, 11; Cohn 2016, 77 et seqq.).  
Orthodox liberals propose that countries should intervene and regulate as little as pos-
sible as the free market provides the optimal self-regulation conditions for efficient eco-
nomic outputs. Interventionist liberals see a need for the state to intervene and regulate 
where necessary to secure stability and ensure economic efficiency as well as political 
and social objectives (Allen 2011, 11; Cohn 2016, 77 et seqq.). Institutional liberals also 
support a free market, yet same as the interventionist liberalist see the need for regulatory 
intervention and hereby “favor strong international institutions such as the WTO, IMF, 
and World Bank” (Cohn 2016, 78). 
Depending on the liberal standpoint in GPE, states are thus seen as a tool for interests 
to develop or additionally as regulators to correct certain market inefficiencies such as 
unemployment (Cohn 2016, 78). While orthodox liberalists argue that the markets should 
be as free from regulation as possible, interventionist liberals argue that states are to a 
certain degree required to regulate to ensure competition in the market. In any case, the 
state focuses more on the system of states interaction than merely on its domestic inter-
ests. For example, liberalism assumes that states do not only consider the immediate gains 
of a trade agreement to the own domestic market but to the trade system overall and over 
time. Thus, realism focuses on the state, whereas liberalism focuses on the interdepend-
ence between states (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 2000, 6). 
At the core of liberalism in GPE theory lies the assumption that states are interde-
pendent and trade is perceived as a positive-sum game that is beneficial to all countries. 
This is based on game theory and the prisoners’ dilemma situation, where both prisoners 
are better off if they cooperate than if they act unilaterally (Cohn 2016, 85 et seqq.). The 
situation can also be applied to trade theory, where according to the liberal rationale, both 
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countries are better off cooperating through an agreement than for example unilaterally 
increasing tariffs. By engaging in international relations, countries can thus improve the 
conditions of all involved actors (Cohn 2016, 169). Unlike in realism, where the key in-
fluence on regime formation such as trade agreements are power relationships, in liberal-
ism, the formation of trade agreements can be explained by interest constellations. Alt-
hough actors are also seen as rational actors, they aim to maximise the absolute gains, 
whereas realism argues for relative gains as motivators (Hasenclever, Mayer, and 
Rittberger 2000, 6). In liberalism, states are thus seen as facilitators of international rela-
tions for their domestic actors (see Cohn 2016, 80). Furthermore, institutional liberals 
see clear advantages of regulating certain areas through multilateral institutions, whereas 
realists see the benefit of institutions only as long as they reflect the domestic interests 
(Cohn 2016, 89). 
Based on liberalism theories and their recognition of PTAs as important tool in inter-
national relations, I would assume that countries aim to avoid market failure of IPRs and 
therefore would regulate IPRs through PTAs. Yet not in general, i.e. in each of their trade 
agreements, but targeted, i.e. in PTAs with those countries that share their interests in IPR 
protection. Based on this interest constellation assumption of liberalism, countries could 
also prefer more specialised fora of IPR regulation to PTAs such as IPR specific agree-
ments (see Figure 5: Fora of IPR Regulation). Especially, if countries act according to 
the institutional liberal argument and prefer strong multilateral institutions. Therefore, 
PTAs could also include no references to IPRs or merely be used to reinforce other fora, 
for example, by requiring accession to IPR conventions or reaffirming them. 
2.2.2.3 Social-constructivism 
Social-constructivism is based on ideas by Immanuel Kant, yet emerged as a GPE 
theory only later in the 1980ie as a reaction to the perceived shortcoming of the existing 
realist, liberalist and marxist GPE theories explaining international relations. Social-con-
structivism opposes the idea that countries are mere rational actors and assumes instead 
that countries are contextually embedded and influenced by normative factors such as 
their history, ideas, knowledge, values, norms and identities. Cohn (2016, 116) names as 
an example for constructivism the concept of the gross domestic product (GDP), that 
“seem to be a “material fact” that measures the output of goods and services, it is also a 
“social fact,” because shared values determine what is included and not included. 
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Whereas goods and services with market values are included in the GDP, economic ac-
tivities within households are excluded.” Constructivism revaluates what other theories 
might accept as facts and explains international relations using social contextual factors. 
The social environment constructs the choices of countries, for example, where leading 
experts take a unified position, they can alter countries preferences (Cohn 2016, 115). As 
an illustrative example for the influence of ideology on the global political economy, one 
could imagine the different impact on the global political economy if states are led by 
either Mahatma Gandhi or Osama Bin Laden (Barnett 2008, 164).  
In social-constructivism, states are seen as agents that can influence the international 
structure, yet the international structure can also alter countries perception of itself and 
its norms (Cohn 2016, 114). Barnett (2008) shows how these assumptions of social-con-
structivism can explain changes in the structure of the global political economy:  
 
“Although the structure of the cold war seemingly locked the United States and the Soviet 
Union into a fight to the death, leaders on both sides creatively transformed their relations 
and, with it, the very structure of global politics.” Barnett (2008, 163) 
 
The meta-theoretical orientation of social-constructivism is sociological and not based 
on absolute rational actions, rather actions are rationality bound by the social context of 
its actors. Therefore, states act not to achieve a certain rational goal such as protecting 
domestic producers, but rather act to represent a particular ideal (Barnett 2008, 162; Has-
enclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 2000, 6). Barnett (2008, 163) describes this as actors 
following a logic of appropriateness, i.e. acting based on legitimacy concerns, instead of 
a logic of consequences, i.e. acting based on a cost-benefit analysis. Unlike power rela-
tions in realism, and interest constellations in liberalism, social-constructivism postulates 
that trade agreements are formed based on shared ideas, knowledge dynamics and com-
munication. When states thus decide to enter into a trade agreement, it is likely that they 
share the norms of their trading partners. 
For IPRs in PTAs, this could mean that specific countries or even regions are embed-
ded in a similar social context and therefore have shared approaches in IPR regulation. 
Again, a common assumption therefore is the north-south divide, where developing coun-
tries are anticipated to support a minimal IPR standard and developed countries a maxi-
mum IPR standard (see 2.2.1.3 Rationale of IPRs in PTAs). Furthermore, it suggests that 
countries are conscious about trading partners with opposing views on IPRs and might 
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either only agree on general IPR provisions with these partners, or even prefer to enter 
into PTAs only with those trading partners that share their IPR ideals. 
2.2.2.4 Modern Marxism 
The ideas of modern marxism theories stems from marxism theory, the debate of the 
struggle of classes defined by the cleavage between labour and capital, and are based on 
the works of Karl Marx (Frieden and Lake 2003b, 10). In marxism, politics and the econ-
omy are defined by classes, i.e. “an exploiting nonproducing class and an exploited class 
of producers” (Cohn 2016, 103). The state is seen as a representation of the capital that 
enables the exploitation of labour. Only by eliminating the divide among classes, the state 
will represent all its inhabitants (Cohn 2016, 104). Marxism focuses on country-internal 
classes, and only marginally explains international relations. It is aware of the systemic 
perspective and categories countries into capitalism versus socialism along the divide of 
capital and labour, yet the international perspectives mostly argue that both ideologies 
want to enforce a systemic change towards their ideals (Hobden and Jones 2008, 146–
47). 
Based on marxism, many modern theories adding to marxism and for example trying 
to explain international relations developed such as the dependency theory, the world-
systems theory, and neo-marxism (see Cohn 2016, 149 et seqq. see Hobden and Jones 
2008, 108 et seqq.). 
Besides marxism, dependency theory is also based on Latin American structuralism 
developed amongst others by Raul Prebisch (Cohn 2016, 108). The key argument of de-
pendency theory is that southern countries depend on northern countries more than vice 
versa because primary goods are predominately produced in southern countries and are 
more easily substitutable than finished goods, which are primarily produced in northern 
countries. Thus whereas marxism focused on the division of labour versus capital, the 
dependency theory sees the cleavage between core and peripheral states, or as Frieden 
and Lake (2003b, 11) state: “the global system is stratified into a wealthy area (the 
“core,” or First World) and a region of oppression and poverty (the “periphery,” or 
Third World). International capitalism, in this [marxist] view, exploits the periphery and 
benefits the core, just as capitalists exploit workers within a single country.” The depend-
ency of southern countries gives northern countries the upper hand and tilts the balance 
towards the developed countries even more, especially since northern countries have no 
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benefits of changing the system. Dependency theory thus subsumes that developed coun-
tries have no interest in assisting southern countries in their development process (Cohn 
2016, 109). 
The world-system theory has been developed most prominently by Immanuel Waller-
stein (Hobden and Jones 2008, 147 et seqq.) and like the dependency theory, it focuses 
on the relationship between “core” and “peripheral” states, yet defines them more 
broadly. In the world-system theory, core states are democratic regimes that import raw 
materials, export manufactured goods, provide welfare services and provide high wages, 
whereas peripheral states are the exact opposite on each of these factors. However, there 
is a third category of states, which are called semi-peripheral states. These semi-periph-
eral states have authoritarian governments, export and import manufactured goods as well 
as raw materials, have low wages and low welfare services (Hobden and Jones 2008, fig. 
8.2). The key driver of the international system according to the world-system theory is 
capitalism and similar to the dependency theory, the assumption of the world-system the-
ory is that the core states benefit more than the other states, and that over time the dis-
crepancy between core and peripheral states steadily increases (Hobden and Jones 2008, 
148–49). 
Neo-marxism is the theory most closely relying on marxism and has been most prom-
inently developed by Justin Rosenberg and Benno Teschke (Hobden and Jones 2008, 
155). Rosenberg argues that realism so far has left out the historical context in explaining 
international relations, and the development of world politics cannot be explaining with-
out considering the social context. According to Rosenberg, the relationship between 
states can be derived from the relations of production such as the relationship between 
production ownership and production manufacturers – capital and labour (Hobden and 
Jones 2008, 155). Teschke, on the other hand, states that international relations can best 
be described by looking at the social property relations, i.e. adding to the production re-
lation the analysis of the “forms of exploitation, and control of the means of production” 
(Hobden and Jones 2008, 156). 
All of these forms of modern marxism assume that countries are clearly divided in 
their constitutional core and that this impacts their international relations. As seen in 
2.2.1.3 Rationale of IPRs in PTAs, the divide of interest into north and south made by 
dependency theory is a reoccurring argument to explain why countries include IPRs in 
PTAs. It might, therefore, be that stringent IPRs are predominately found in PTAs be-
tween northern and southern countries. Furthermore, the argument has been raised that 
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IPR producers are those that press for the inclusion of stringent IPR provisions, which 
would fall in line with the argument of the world-system theory. Hereby, it can be argued 
that the core, IPR producing countries use their power to protect IPR through PTAs 
abroad and thereby expand their lead in IPR production. Also, based on neo-marxism, the 
domestic situation of the production of IPR could influence IPRs in PTAs. 
 
GPE theories thus provide a multitude of possible explanations how and why coun-
tries choose to include IPRs in PTAs. Previous research has already tested some of these 
assumptions, yet so far has been inconclusive on what are the drivers behind IPRs in 
PTAs. With the clear and comprehensive mapping of IPR in PTAs, this doctoral thesis 
will provide some needed insight into countries preferences and IPR regulation ap-
proaches. But first, the next subchapters will recap the previous research on IPRs in PTAs 
and lay out the overarching research questions. 
2.3 Previous Research on IPRs in PTAs 
In the last few decades, there was an increase in research in preferential trade agree-
ment as the number of PTAs has increased immensely (Acharya et al. 2011). This, in turn, 
led to a heightened interest for PTAs from both policymakers as well as academia. IPRs 
in PTAs have entered the spotlight after TRIPS came into force in 1995, due to the fact 
that allegedly many subsequent PTAs also included provisions on IPRs. So far, there have 
been different approaches to make the recent developments visible. For a long time, the 
tendency was for legal scholars to look at the IPR content and legal implications of spe-
cific agreements and compare for example PTAs of a single country or a specific region. 
Economic scholars on the other hand often focused on the effects of IPRs in PTAs by 
either taking one specific PTA or strongly simplifying the IPR content for multiple PTAs 
for a broader effect analysis. The following section gives an overview of the previous 
research on IPRs in PTAs that can roughly be categories into three categories: descriptive 
studies, systematic studies with a small case selection, and systematic, comprehensive 
studies. 
Most of the previous research falls into the first category and consists of descriptive 
studies. Shortly after NAFTA came into force, Maskus (1997) analysed the diverging 
implications of the multilateral approach by the WTO, i.e. TRIPS signed in 1994, and a 
preferential agreement, i.e. NAFTA signed in 1992. He saw the PTA approach of IPR 
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regulation as implementing more stringent IPR protection compared to the WTO ap-
proach. This line of argumentation was followed by many other scholars, that often com-
pared the IPR content of PTAs to the TRIPS agreement.  
Most descriptive studies looked at the IPR content of a single PTA or multiple PTAs 
of one country, draw comparisons to TRIPS or looked at specific issue areas such as 
access to medicine. For example, Kang and Stone (2005) focused on the IPR provisions 
of the trade agreement between Singapore and the US signed in 2003, which was the first 
US trade agreement with an Asian country. The authors found that the PTA substantially 
increased the IPR protection for all forms of IPR and were especially stringent for copy-
right. Furthermore, the PTA also increased the regulation on IPR enforcement compared 
to the TRIPS provisions. Price (2004, 848) looked at the Bahrain-US PTA signed in 2004, 
noticed the stringent IPR regulations and remarked that the enforcement mechanisms 
were seen as representing US interests and going against the market interest of Bahrain 
and that Bahrain might lack the necessary resources to enforce such detailed IPR provi-
sions. In the same year, Roffe (2004) analysed the Chile-US PTA signed in 2003 for 
TRIPS-plus provisions, i.e. provisions that go beyond the TRIPS agreement (see 3.1.2.5 
TRIPS-plus Variables (T+PTAs dataset)). He stated that the agreement does not regulate 
IPRs as stringently as other US PTAs with Singapore or Bahrain, but that it set a more 
stringent standard on certain provisions that most likely would serve as a precedent for 
future PTAs (Roffe 2004, 49). Correa (2004b) also took a closer look at the Chile-US 
agreement and focused on the public health framework in it. He compared it to the US 
PTA with Jordan that he determined to be much more stringent on IPRs, and to the US 
PTA with Singapore, that he saw on a comparably stringent level as the one with Chile. 
Correa (2004b, 8) argued that the agreement comes with negative effects for Chile’s pub-
lic health sector and unlike Singapore, Chile has not the necessary economic development 
to “face the costs derived from higher levels of protection”. 
In the same year Correa (2004a, 352) also published an analysis of the effect of IPR 
regulations in BITs and PTAs on the issuing of compulsory licenses and highlighted that 
at least theoretically the inclusion of IPR in the investment definition could be used as 
leverage by IPR holders against countries thinking about issuing a compulsory license. 
Drahos (2003) analysed the US approach and fora shift from bilateral, to regional, multi-
lateral and back towards a bilateral approach, subsuming it as a cycle of alternating fora 
of IPR regulation, depending on which forum is most efficient in reflecting the US do-
mestic interests. Abbott (2006) also focused on the US approach of IPR regulation 
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through PTAs and concluded that the stringent regulations on IPR might overthrow the 
welfare balance into the detriment of the public both in PTA member as well as the US 
market. One of the US PTAs often referred to as a template in regards to IPR regulation 
is the Jordan-US agreement signed in 2000. Malkawi (2006) found in his analysis of the 
Jordan-US PTA, that the agreement should not serve as a template, at least in regard to 
Arab countries, as it is too stringent for certain aspects with a negative impact on the 
Jordan market and lacks certain forms of IPRs such as traditional knowledge which would 
be beneficiary for the Jordan. He saw the main shortcoming in the lack of provisions on 
the dissemination and transfer of technologies (Malkawi 2006). El-Said and El-Said 
(2007) looked at the same agreement, yet from the angle of TRIPS-plus provisions and 
their effect on the access to medicines. They showed that the benefits of the PTA for 
Jordan were over-, and the costs underestimated, especially regarding the access to med-
icines.  
Bernieri (2006) also looked at US PTAs and focused on their anticipated effects on 
Latin America, and briefly compared it to the regulation approach by the EU. In the di-
verse approaches of IPR regulation by the EU and US, she saw a possible risk of frag-
mentation in IPR regulation. Seuba and Garcia (2010) analysed the agreement between 
the EU, Colombia and Peru before it was signed in 2012, and found that it includes IPR 
provisions that are more stringent on enforcement than Colombia and Peru have agreed 
to in their agreements with the US. Furthermore, they found that there are substantial 
changes from the initial IPR proposal made by the EU towards the final negotiation round, 
suggesting that Colombia and Peru were able to influence the IPR chapter in their favour. 
Roffe and Spennemann (2014) analysed mainly US PTAs and described specific cases 
where PTAs go beyond TRIPS regulation such as the extension of the patent term pro-
tection or the restriction of circumventions for technological measures (copyright).  
Biadgleng and Maur (2011) focused on US and EU PTAs and analysed how their IPR 
provisions are implemented into domestic law in developing countries. They found that 
the implementation poses a problem for developing countries for example due to the ex-
tent that changes or creations of IPR regulations take in an environment with less estab-
lished and otherwise preoccupied administrative capacity (Biadgleng and Maur 2011, 
26). As shown above, the descriptive analysis of IPRs in PTAs are tilted towards analys-
ing US PTAs and comparing their content to TRIPS or in some more recent studies to 
other US PTAs or even non-US PTAs. In order to generate more generally applicable and 
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universal stands on how IPRs are being regulated through PTAs and how their effects 
might vary, it is beneficial to take a more systematic approach. 
More recently, there have also been systematic studies with a small case selection, i.e. 
comparing IPR provisions in PTAs according to a specific list of provisions that are ap-
plied to all PTAs. For example, Fink and Reichenmiller (2005) systematically compared 
recent US PTAs on their TRIPS-plus provisions on patents, copyrights and enforcement, 
and found that the there exists a US template, yet it is not entirely fixed, and there are 
adaptions based on the trading partners. Roffe et al. (2007) focused on the element of 
technical assistance in the area of IPRs in PTAs and coded ten TRIPS-plus provisions 
across five US PTAs. They found that developing countries cannot be expected to bear 
the costs of implementing and enforcing such stringent IPR provisions alone and that 
IPRs should leave enough room for “dynamic competition through the acquisition and 
local development of technology in an environment that is conducive to growth” (Roffe, 
Vivas, and Vea 2007, 13). Krikorian and Szymkowiak (2007) conducted a text analysis 
of patents and data protection in 14 US PTAs and compared it to TRIPS and among the 
PTA sample. They showed an evolution of ever more stringent IPR regulation through 
PTAs and a clear US strategy of IPR regulation. Also, Cottier et al. (2015) systematically 
analysed CAFTA signed in 2004, CETA signed in 2014, and TPP signed in 2015, for 
TRIPS-plus provisions for copyrights, GIs, trademarks and patents, and found that all 
three PTAs include more stringent IPR provisions than TRIPS. These studies are inter-
esting as they allow going into detail about specific IPR regulations in PTAs as well as 
comparing them to one another. However, they also fall short on painting a holistic pic-
ture of the current situation of IPRs in PTAs. 
There are also a handful of systematic and comprehensive analyses, i.e. studies that 
cover more PTAs than just the ones of a specific country and include more than a few 
IPR provisions. The UNCTAD International Investment Arrangement Monitor (2007) 
analysed 158 PTAs and concluded that more than half of them include TRIPS-plus pro-
visions and thus show a move towards a maximum IPR standard. The monitor showed 
that the US and EU PTAs are substantially different, as the US PTAs include highly spe-
cific IPR regulation dedicating entire chapters to IPR, whilst the EU PTAs have a less 
consistent approach and sometimes include only limited provisions (United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2007, 6). Lindstrom (2010) examined 
the TRIPS-plus content of almost 100 PTAs in the Asia-Pacific region and argued that 
this form of regulating IPRs is not ideal. She showed her comparison of PTAs from the 
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US, EFTA (i.e. the trade association of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) 
and Japan with Asian-Pacific countries, and found that the US includes the most compre-
hensive IPR provisions, PTAs with Japan are far less extensive, yet centrally feature pro-
tection for new plant varieties, and EFTA mostly includes accession requirements to IPR 
conventions in their PTAs (Lindstrom 2010, 928). Seuba (2013) examined the IPR con-
tent of 256 PTAs and focused on the IPR forms of copyright, patents, trademarks, indus-
trial designs, geographical indications and undisclosed information, as well as provisions 
on IPR enforcement divided into the categories of civil, criminal, digital and border en-
forcement. He found that more than 55% of all analysed PTAs regulate IPRs substantially 
yet with a broad diversity on how specific IPRs are regulated (Seuba 2013, 251 et seqq.). 
The most substantive analysis of IPRs in PTAs has been conducted by Valdés and 
Tavengwa (2012) and the revised version of the same study by Valdés and McCann 
(2014). Their report for the WTO represents the first systematic and comprehensive da-
taset on IPRs in PTAs freely available. Valdés and Tavengwa (2012) coded 195 PTAs 
for 30 IPR provisions consistent of eight general IPR provisions such as MFN treatment 
or border measures for IPRs, as well as eleven IPR forms mentioned in PTAs, and eleven 
specific pharma-related provisions such as patenting of life forms or compulsory licens-
ing. In the revised and updated version, Valdés and McCann (2014) extended the coding 
to a total of 245 PTAs and added one new variable on investment-related IPRs and one 
on dispute-settlement for non-violation claims. Their data proofed that the number of 
PTAs including IPR provision has accelerated, especially after TRIPS entered into force 
in 1995, and they found that the number of IPR provision varies widely across PTAs with 
covering mostly general and less often also specific IPR provisions. Furthermore, they 
identified three main countries that most often include a more stringent level of IPR pro-
tection: the US, EU, and EFTA. According to Valdés and McCann (2014), there is an IPR 
convergence in those countries having joined a PTAs with one of these three countries. 
As shown above, there already exists substantive research on IPRs in PTAs, yet so far 
there is a lack of a genuinely comprehensive dataset. So far, the most extensive dataset 
covers 245 PTAs, yet according to Dür et al. (2014) over 700 PTAs have already been 
concluded. The most extensive dataset on IPRs in PTAs thus only covers around a third 
of all PTAs. Furthermore, as the variety of previous research shows, there is much more 
IPR content in PTAs than could be covered by 32 variables. My dataset thus strongly 
relies on the previous research and extends to fill those gaps for example regarding the 
inclusion of IPR conventions in PTA and more detailed enforcement mechanisms. Before 
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going into detail about the dataset (Chapter 3: Dataset on Intellectual Property Rights in 
PTAs), the following subchapters provides an overview of the overarching research ques-
tions that are at the core of this study. 
2.4 Overarching Research Questions 
Based on the previous research and the rationales behind IPRs in PTAs, this study sets 
out to shed some light on three main questions briefly described in the next paragraphs. 
The chapters are structured following those four research questions. 
Firstly, what is the state of play? The primary gap in previous research on intellectual 
property rights in preferential trade agreements is that there is no systematic, comprehen-
sive data on IPRs in PTAs. To answer the first question, I created a dataset including 86 
coded IPR provisions for over 700 PTAs that encompasses general IPR coding such as 
MFN requirements, the scope of the eleven different forms of IPR (Table 1) found in 
PTAs, their enforcement mechanisms and the multilateral IPR coherence of PTAs by in-
cluding IPR-related treaties referenced in them. Chapter 3: Dataset on Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights in PTAs describes the making of the dataset, the content and methodology, 
and presents descriptive statistics. The dataset on IPRs in PTAs has led to several follow-
up datasets that allow the analysis of the overarching research questions. Depending on 
the focus in question, the data has been transformed and enhanced. 
Secondly, what can explain the status quo? After creating the dataset, it becomes vis-
ible how countries regulate IPRs through PTAs. The dataset makes it possible to take a 
closer look at the design of IPRs in PTAs and compare what countries include, at what 
time and with which PTA-partners. This allows for a broader analysis of countries ra-
tionale to enter PTAs including varying degrees of IPR provisions. Chapter 4: thus anal-
yses possible explanations for the variation in the design of IPRs in PTAs. 
Thirdly, does it matter? The big question with IPRs, in general, is if they have the 
intended impact. As seen in 2.2.1.2 Rationale of IPRs, IPRs are associated with a bundle 
of positive effects, whereas the effects of IPRs in PTAs are seen ambiguously (2.2.1.3 
Rationale of IPRs in PTAs). Furthermore, there have been questions if developing coun-
tries have the administrative capacity to implement the IPR standards agreed to in PTAs. 
It is hence essential to look at the effects of IPRs in PTAs. Chapter 5: Effects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights in PTAs looks at the legal and economic effects of IPRs in PTAs and 
analyses if there are any changes from the pre-PTA to the post-PTA status. 
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These overarching research questions are analysed by looking at the previous research 
on IPRs in PTAs, combining them with the political science methodology of data collec-
tion and an interdisciplinary approach of PTA content analysis. The next chapter will 
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Chapter 3:  Dataset on Intellectual Property Rights in PTAs 
This chapter addresses the creation and content of the dataset on IPRs in PTAs con-
structed in the process of this PhD. The dataset covers 86 IPR variables for 724 PTAs 
(see Appendix 2: Codebook of IPRs in PTAs Dataset for the complete codebook). Addi-
tionally, I coded 90 TRIPS-plus variables in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric Morin (Uni-
versité Laval, Canada), which compose our T+PTA dataset (see Appendix 3: Codebook 
of T+PTA Dataset for the entire codebook). My research enhances the case selection and 
extends the coding scheme on IPRs compared to previous research. This allows a system-
atic and comprehensive analysis of IPRs in PTAs for example in regard to global devel-
opments, the development over time, various forms of IPR, IPR enforcement, references 
to other IPR regulations such as IPR conventions or IPR-related conventions, and TRIPS-
plus provisions. 
The first part of this chapter is dedicated to the selection of PTAs and IPR variables. 
Here, I explain which previous research served as a source and how the variables selection 
for the IPR provisions developed and how the variables were operationalised. The second 
part describes the different coding steps, from preprocessing to the codebook and dataset, 
as well as the indexes developed, and the validity and reliability checks performed. In the 
third part of this chapter, I illustrate some of the key findings of the dataset and elaborate 
on selective descriptive statistics to show the situation of IPR regulation through PTAs. 
3.1 PTAs and IPR Variables Selection 
When analysing intellectual property and trade agreements, there are varying defini-
tions in use. Some talk about IPRs yet only refer to copyrights, patents or trademarks, and 
others refer to trade agreements whilst excluding multilateral agreements or agreements 
not notified to the WTO. The research aims to be as comprehensive as possible whilst 
remaining focused on capturing IPRs in PTAs.  
In the course of preparing a comprehensive dataset on intellectual properties in pref-
erential trade agreements, I analysed other datasets on IPRs, PTAs as well as IPRs in 
PTAs. In the subsequent sections, I will describe the development of my dataset in more 
detail by elaborating on the PTAs used and the IPR variable selection process. 
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3.1.1 Selection of Preferential Trade Agreements 
The selection of PTAs is based on the Design of Trade Agreements Dataset (DESTA), 
which is one of the most comprehensive datasets on trade agreements (Dür, Baccini, and 
Elsig 2014). Using DESTA instead of other trade agreement databases is a huge ad-
vantage as DESTA includes far more relevant PTAs than other datasets. In previous stud-
ies, researchers mostly relied on the WTO to determine which PTAs to code. The WTO 
provides two databases on trade agreements: one for RTAs and the other one for PTAs. 
As described in the terminology section for PTAs (2.1.1 Preferential Trade Agreements 
(PTAs)), the WTO used to have a different definition of PTAs that does not fit the com-
monly used terminology and instead of capturing preferential trade agreements mostly 
focuses on GSPs. Most previous research thus does not draw on the WTO PTA database, 
but the other WTO database on RTAs, which includes 287 agreements that are currently 
in force and notified to the WTO (World Trade Organization 2018). DESTA builds on 
the WTO database, but goes further and includes over 700 PTAs.  
According to the DESTA codebook’s explanatory notes, DESTA includes “all agree-
ments that have the potential to liberalize trade. Partial scope agreements thus are in-
cluded as soon as they liberalize at least some trade, whereas framework agreements 
(with very few exceptions), trade and cooperation agreements, etc. are excluded” (“Ex-
planatory Notes” on DESTA 2017). DESTA also includes agreements that are no longer 
in force, for example, if they have been replaced by an updated version such as TPP that 
was signed, never entered into force and was replaced by CPTPP; or versions of the same 
PTAs that have had changed in the legal text in the course of accessions such as the Cen-
tral European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) for the accession of Slovenia, Romania, 
Bulgaria and Croatia. DESTA has no language border and predominantly includes trade 
agreements in English, followed by PTAs in Spanish, very few in Arabic, French or Ger-
man. With its broad range, DESTA is ideal to establish a comprehensive dataset on IPRs 
in PTAs. 
For the different parts of the analysis, I will draw upon different PTA dates. Briefly 
stated, PTAs have three main categories of dates that are relevant for my analysis: the 
signature date, the ratification date and the date of entry into force (see Niebruegge 2007). 
After the treaty negotiations between representative delegations of the treaty members 
are concluded, a state representative such as the minister of foreign affairs signs the PTA. 
The signature date shows when a treaty was signed and indicates the willingness of a state 
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to comply with the treaty text. Yet in order for the treaty to become binding, it has to be 
ratified according to the domestic legislation, i.e. parliament ratification (e.g. in the Neth-
erlands), parliament consent and presidential ratification (e.g. in the US it needs the con-
sent by the Senate), ratification by the Federal Council (e.g. in Switzerland it needs the 
consent by parliament) or the dual ratification of parliament and president (e.g. in India). 
The treaty only becomes binding after the ratification date. The time in-between signature 
and ratification date is often used to establish and adjust the domestic legal framework to 
match the obligations of the PTA and gain domestic political support for the signed PTA 
in order to ensure actual ratification. One prominent recent example is the TPP agreement. 
This multilateral agreement was signed by the US and eleven other states, yet after the 
alteration in the oval office of the US, it lost support, the signature of the USA was with-
drawn, and TPP will not be ratified by the US. 
Whereas the signature date shows the intention to be bound by a treaty and the ratifi-
cation date states the legal obligation to be bound by it, the date of entry into force marks 
the effective date from when on the obligations become legally binding (Niebruegge 
2007, 355). There is no universal rule on how the date of entry into force of a PTA is set. 
It can be bound directly to the ratification date; a critical number of ratifications of the 
PTA by PTA members; connected to an exchange of notifications; based on a predefined 
elapsed period; or a specific date in the calendar year such as the 1st of a month. For some 
treaties, a considerable time passes in-between the signature date and date of entry into 
force, whereas others sign, ratify, and put a PTA into force in next to no time. 
Each date – signature, ratification, entry into force – has different implications, and 
for my research, I focus on the date of signature and entry into force. For the effect anal-
ysis, I will use the date of entry into force as not all treaties, which were signed also 
entered into force (yet) and the effects can only be measured after the PTA actually moves 
from intention to a binding legal obligation. 
Even though my PTA selection is based on DESTA, my IPRs in PTAs dataset includes 
some deviations from the most current DESTA version, as I started coding IPRs in PTAs 
in 2014 with the DESTA version of said year. Over time, DESTA has further developed 
and improved the PTA selection. I have adopted my codebook to match the most current 
DESTA version, where there were new PTAs or changes to existing PTAs. Yet there were 
also some PTAs that in hindsight were dropped from DESTA because they did not match 
the DESTA definition of PTAs any longer. At that point, I had already coded those PTAs 
for IPRs and decided to keep those PTAs within my dataset even if they were not included 
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in DESTA anymore. This concerns 26 PTAs, from 1955 until 2014, and all of them are 
identifiable within my IPR in PTAs dataset by the variable DESTA ID set to ‘X’. Table 
5 shows the 26 PTAs that were dropped from DESTA over time, yet are coded for IPRs 
within my dataset. 
 
Table 5: PTAs Divergent from DESTA 
PTAs included in IPRs in PTAs dataset, 
dropped from DESTA until July 2018 
Year of 
Signature 
Argentina Mexico Additional Protocol to MERCOSUR-Mexico agreement 2002 
Australia Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1955 
Cameroon EU 2009 
Bangladesh India 2006 
Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) 2010 
Compact of Free Association Marshall Islands I 1983 
Compact of Free Association Marshall Islands II 2003 
Compact of Free Association Micronesia I 1982 
Compact of Free Association Palau 1986 
EU Fiji Papua New Guinea 2007 
EU Maastricht (25) Enlargement 2003 
EU Maastricht (27) Enlargement 2005 
EU Maastricht (28) Enlargement 2011 
EU Nice (28) Enlargement 2011 
EU PLO 1997 
EFTA PLO 1998 
PLO Turkey 2004 
Indonesia Pakistan 2012 
Compact of Free Association Micronesia II 2003 
Eastern and Southern African States Interim (ESASI) EU EPA 2009 
EU Iraq 2012 
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (Treaty of Izmir revised) 1996 
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (Treaty of Izmir) 1977 
Pacific Alliance Additional Protocol 2014 
Portugal Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1958 
South Africa Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1955 
 
These PTAs were excluded from DESTA for various reasons. For example, they are 
interim agreements such as the PTAs with the Palestinian Authority, or PTAs with tiny 
islands as member states such as the Marshall Islands or Tuvalu (see “Explanatory notes” 
on DESTA 2017). I kept them in the IPRs in PTAs dataset as I had already coded them 
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for IPRs. In general, I will not include them in the analysis as they were dropped from 
DESTA due to eligible justifications. For illustrative purposes, they are included in some 
of the descriptive tables as well as the codebook, however, always in comparison to the 
data without them. 
My dataset on IPRs in PTAs thus includes 724 PTAs, respectively 698 PTAs without 
the dropped PTAs. For the TRIPS-plus variables, the coding of only one PTA is dropped, 
namely the TRIPS-plus provisions of EU Maastricht (28) Enlargement agreement signed 
in 2011. My dataset includes 435 bilateral PTAs and 289 multilateral ones (more than 
two member countries) out of the 724 coded agreements, respectively 425 bilateral PTAs 
and 273 multilateral ones out of the 698 agreements used for the analysis. Table 6 shows 
the distribution of the PTAs within my dataset using the regional classifications of north-
north (NN), north-south (NS) and south-south (SS) PTAs and the intra- and interconti-
nental categories provided in DESTA (Dür, Baccini, and Elsig 2014). It shows that PTAs 
go well beyond a broad regional scope (221/206 are intercontinental) and that a majority 
of PTAs have been signed without the Northern countries being involved (458/448 are 
SS). An overview of the number of PTAs per country covered by my dataset can be found 
in Appendix 1: List of PTAs per Country. 
 
Table 6: Regional Classification of PTAs 
Region PTAs Description 
724 698  
NN 58 54 North: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, 
US, Western European countries 
South: all other countries 
NS 208 196 North: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, 
US, Western European countries 
South: all other countries 
SS 458 448 North: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, 
US, Western European countries 
South: all other countries 
Region only Africa 40 39 All PTA members are from Africa 
Region only Americas 171 169 All PTA members are from the Americas 
Region only Asia 85 81 All PTA members are from Asia 
Region only Europe 199 195 All PTA members are from Europe 
Region only Intercontinental 221 206 PTA members are from different continents 
Region only Oceania 8 8 All PTA members are from Oceania 
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3.1.2 Variables on Intellectual Property Rights 
For the selection of the IPR variables, I looked at the previous research and other 
datasets on IPRs in PTAs. My initial selection of variables is based on the dataset by the 
World Trade Organization by Valdés and Tavengwa (2012) and the revised version by 
Valdés and McCann (2014). Their dataset is highly systematic and is not exclusive to-
wards certain IPR areas. So for my first coded PTAs, I used the same variables as Valdés 
and Tavengwa (2012) resp. Valdés and McCann (2014) and also coded the IPR variables 
previously included in DESTA.  
After coding some agreements, I realised that the variable selection was not broad 
enough to reflect the actual content of PTAs. The thing with IPRs in PTAs is, that if there 
actually are IPR provisions within a PTA, the variation on their length, precision and 
content varies immensely. I thus started by reading and comparing several PTAs, and 
subsequently grouping their content into broad IPR categories. Overall, I identified five 
main categories: general IPR, IPR scope, IPR enforcement, IPR multilateral coherence 
and TRIPS-plus. In total, I coded 86 variables for the first four categories and another 90 
for the TRIPS-plus category. The entire dataset includes besides the coded variables also 
calculated indexes and dummy variables, which will be discussed in the subchapter 3.2 
Codebook and Dataset Development. In the following subchapters, I will elaborate on 
each variable category and the selection process for the coded variables. 
3.1.2.1 General IPR Variables 
The general IPR category is a compound of various IPR variables. The aim of this 
category is to identify which PTAs include general IPR provisions and to what extent. 
For example, PTAs include IPRs not only in the general or a specific IPR section but also 
in the investment chapter. As those provisions in the investment chapter are not inherently 
on IPR, yet concern IPRs and might have wide-ranging implications, these variables are 
included in the general category. Concretely, the general IPR category includes the sub-
sequent twelve coded variables: 
 
Table 7: General IPR Variables (N=12) 
Variable Description 
ipr_mentioned Does the treaty mention IPRs? 
ipr_mentioned_exception Are IPRs mentioned as general exceptions in the agreement? 
ipr_1_article Is there an article specifically on IPRs? 
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Variable Description 
ipr_more_than_1_article Are there more than one article specifically on IPRs? 
ipr_word_count What is the word count on IPR articles, chapters, and annexes? 
ipr_mfn Is most-favoured-nation treatment granted in relation to IPRs 
(without considering investment chapters)? 
ipr_nt Is national treatment (NT) granted in relation to IPRs (without con-
sidering investment chapters)? 
ipr_as_investment Are IPRs defined as investment? 
ipr_investment_mfn If IPR defined as investment: Is most-favoured-nation treatment 
granted in relation to IPRs in investment chapters? 
ipr_investment_nt If IPR defined as investment: Is national treatment granted in rela-
tion to IPRs in investment chapters? 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination Is there assistance/cooperation/coordination agreed upon in rela-
tion to IPR? 
ipr_transition_period  Is there a transition period agreed upon for accession to IPR provi-
sion (such as IPR agreements/conventions)? 
 
First of all, it is essential to code if a PTA mentions IPRs at all (ipr_mentioned). Some 
PTAs have somewhere in the agreement in a subparagraph for example in the investment 
chapter IPR mentioned as an exception (ipr_mentioned_exception). In certain PTAs, this 
is the only place where IPRs are mentioned, and most likely the intention of these provi-
sions is not to protect IPRs per se, especially as the exceptions usually entail IPRs being 
excluded from a certain regulation. Those exception provisions seem out of place and 
rather are due to copy-paste of previous PTAs than an intentional inclusion of IPRs. Those 
PTAs, where I only found this variable on IPRs being an exception, are not considered to 
include IPR provisions. 
To quantify the content of IPRs in PTAs, I started coding when there was an article 
on IPRs (ipr_1_article) and when there was a chapter on IPRs. The latter has proven to 
be subjective, as the categories of articles and chapters vary across time and PTAs. What 
some PTAs label as an article, other call chapters. Therefore, I replaced said variable on 
IPR chapters by a variable coding if there is more than one article on IPRs 
(ipr_more_than_1 _article) and added a variable counting the number of words in the IPR 
provisions in PTAs (ipr_word_count). This variable does not include those sections, 
where IPR was only mentioned as an exception or where the IPR provision was in the 
investment chapter. Besides those agreements that have no IPR provisions, the word 
count ranges from 20 in the PTA between Jordan and Singapore signed in 2004, to 56’242 
words in PTA between the EU and Ukraine signed in 2014, which indicates how much 
the regulation of IPRs in PTAs can vary across PTAs. 
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Two other general variables are the ones on the MFN (ipr_mfn) and national treatment 
(ipr_nt) granted in the IPR section of a PTA. After 1994, these variables are a mere rep-
etition of TRIPS for those countries already members to TRIPS. Nevertheless, they are a 
common feature in the IPR section of PTAs. As stated above, I also coded if intellectual 
property is defined as investment (ipr_as_investment) and ipso facto also if MFN and NT 
are granted for investment (ipr_investment_mfn resp. ipr_investment_nt).  
Some PTAs also include general statements to assist each other, cooperate and coor-
dinate about IPR regulation (ipr_assistance_coop_coordination) or grant special transi-
tional periods for certain IPR provisions, i.e. additional time until resp. a specific point in 
time when the IPR provisions need to enter into force (ipr_transition_period). The latter 
has also been included in TRIPS, where developed countries had to comply with TRIPS 
by 1 January 1996, developing countries were granted transitional periods until 2000 
(with additional transition period for new patent products), and LDCs until 2006 (with 
possible additional transition periods). The maximum transition period granted for IPRs 
in PTAs was thirteen years in the CARIFORUM EU agreement signed in 2008 (Article 
140 lit. b). 
The dataset also includes a category for specific IPR variables, but this category does 
not include uniquely coded variables. It consists of an index created out of scope and 
enforcement variables that are categorised as specific. This index will be elaborated fur-
ther in the subchapter 3.2 Codebook and Dataset Development. 
3.1.2.2 IPR Scope Variables 
After coding the general variables, I was looking for a way to code the scope of IPRs 
in PTAs, i.e. how many IPR areas are covered in a PTA. The aim here is not to evaluate 
the content but rather to take score of which areas are covered by IPRs (see Table 1: 
Forms of IPR). Hereby, I relied on the IPR areas identified by Valdés and Tavengwa 
(2012) respectively Valdés and McCann (2014), that also reflect the eleven IPR catego-
ries I found in PTAs: copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications (GIs), industrial 
design, patents, undisclosed information, layout-designs of integrated circuits, new plant 
varieties, traditional knowledge and genetic resources (TK & GR), encrypted-program-
carrying satellites, and domain names (for more detailed information on these areas see 
2.1.2 Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs)). 
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 PTAs differ regarding their scope of IPR areas and as well as how these areas are 
covered. Whilst some simply mention which areas of IPR are included, e.g. in their defi-
nition of IPRs or make general statements on IPR areas, other PTAs include tangible and 
detailed provisions for several IPR areas. To reflect this nuance, I coded each area of IPR 
twice: once as IPR scope mentioned (m) and once as IPR scope tangible (t). 
 
Example for IPR Scope Mentioned (m) 
Singapore Taiwan 2013 
Chapter 13 Article 13.1 
1. The Parties, recognising the importance of intellectual property as a factor of each Party’s 
economic competitiveness in the global economy, undertake to develop and promote mutually 
beneficial cooperation between the Parties in this area. 
2. Recalling the contributions achieved in the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights, the areas of the cooperation may include: 
(a) copyright and related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, 
patents, layout-designs (topographies) of integrated circuits, protection of undisclosed infor-
mation, and control of anti-competitive practices in contractual licences; 
[…] 
 
In some cases, the mentioned IPR scope is listed in a definition such as in the example 
PTA between Singapore and Taiwan signed in 2013 above. Other PTAs include a defini-
tion of the covered IPR areas in the investment chapter, or include articles on the IPR 
areas protected by the PTA. The tangible IPR scope is conditioned by the mentioned IPR 
scope variable, meaning that whenever an IPR area is coded as tangible, it is also coded 
as mentioned. The tangible IPR scope identifies those PTAs that include more detailed 
provisions for IPR areas and is a specification of the mentioned IPR scope variable. The 
example PTA between Singapore and Turkey signed in 2015 shows an excerpt of the 
copyright provisions included in the PTA. Besides mentioning copyright as being covered 
by the IPR regulations in the PTA, it entails tangible copyright commitments such as 
related IPR conventions or the term of protection. 
 
Example for IPR Scope Tangible (t) 
Singapore Turkey 2015 
Chapter 15  
[…] Copyright and related rights 
Article 15.3 Protection Granted 
The Parties shall comply with the rights and obligations set out in the Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (of 9 September 1886, as last revised at Paris 
on 24 July 1971), the WIPO Copyright Treaty (adopted in Geneva on 20 December 1996), 
the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (adopted in Geneva on 20 December 1996), 
and the TRIPS Agreement. The Parties may provide for protection of performers, producers 
of phonograms and broadcasting organisations in accordance with the relevant provisions 
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of the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms 
and Broadcasting Organisations (done at Rome on 26 October 1961). 
Article 15.4 Term of Protection 
1. Each Party shall provide, where the term of protection of a work is to be calculated on the 
basis of the life of the author, that the term shall be not less than the life of the author and 70 
years after the author’s death. 
2. In the case of a work of joint authorship, the term referred to in paragraph 1 shall be 
calculated from the death of the last surviving author. 
3. The term of protection of cinematographic works shall be not less than 70 years after the 
work has been made available to the public with the consent of the author or, failing such an 
event within 50 years from the making of such a work, at least 70 years after the making. 
4. The term of protection to be granted to producers of phonograms under this Agreement 
shall last, at least, until the end of a period of 50 years computed from the end of the year in 
which the phonogram was published, or failing such publication within 50 years from fixation 
of the phonogram, 50 years from the end of the year in which the fixation was made. 
5. The term of protection for rights in broadcasts shall be not less than 50 years after the first 
transmission or making of the broadcast. 
6. The terms laid down in this Article shall be calculated from the first of January of the year 
following the event which gives rise to them. 
 […] 
 
 The scope variables do not assess the content of the IPR provisions nor rate them 
according to their implications. The aim is to differentiate between those PTAs that do 
not define IPRs, those that define IPRs on a general level, and those that go further and 
include tangible obligations regarding the defined IPR areas. In total, I coded 22 scope 
variables, eleven for both mentioned and tangible scope provisions for each identified 
area of IPR. Table 8 shows all IPR scope variables, starting on top with the mentioned 
category (m) and followed by the tangible category (t). 
 
Table 8: IPR Scope Variables (N=22) 
Variable Description 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights Does the IPR definition/chapter mention copyrights and/or related 
rights? 
ipr_m_trademarks Does the IPR definition/chapter mention trademarks? 
ipr_m_geo_indications Does the IPR definition/chapter mention geographical indications? 
ipr_m_industrial_designs Does the IPR definition/chapter mention industrial design? 
ipr_m_patents Does the IPR definition/chapter mention patents? 




Does the IPR definition/chapter mention layout-designs (topogra-
phies) of integrated circuits? 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties Does the IPR definition/chapter mention new plant varieties? 
ipr_m_trad_knowledge_ge-
netic_resources 
Does the IPR definition/chapter mention traditional knowledge 
and/or genetic resources? 




Does the IPR definition/chapter mention encrypted program-carry-
ing satellite signals? 
ipr_m_domain_names Does the IPR definition/chapter mention domain names? 
ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights Does the IPR definition/chapter include tangible commitments on 
copyrights and/or related rights? 
ipr_t_trademarks Does the IPR definition/chapter include tangible commitments on 
trademarks? 
ipr_t_geo_indications Does the IPR definition/chapter include tangible commitments on 
geographical indications? 
ipr_t_industrial_designs Does the IPR definition/chapter include tangible commitments on 
industrial design? 
ipr_t_patents Does the IPR definition/chapter include tangible commitments on 
patents? 
ipr_t_undisclosed_information Does the IPR definition/chapter include tangible commitments on 
undisclosed information (including knowhow)? 
ipr_t_layout_design_integ_ 
circuits 
Does the IPR definition/chapter include tangible commitments on 
layout-designs (topographies) of integrated circuits? 
ipr_t_new_plant_varieties Does the IPR definition/chapter include tangible commitments on 
new plant varieties? 
ipr_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_ 
resources 
Does the IPR definition/chapter include tangible commitments on 
traditional knowledge and/or genetic resources? 
ipr_t_encrypted_program_ 
carrying_satellite_signals 
Does the IPR definition/chapter include tangible commitments on 
encrypted program-carrying satellite signals? 
ipr_t_domain_names Does the IPR definition/chapter include tangible commitments on 
domain names? 
 
Out of these eleven IPR areas, seven are included in the TRIPS agreement: copyrights, 
trademarks, GIs, industrial designs, patents, layout design of integrated circuits and un-
disclosed information. Under the patent section, TRIPS also requires protection of new 
plant varieties, yet TRIPS does not include tangible provisions on the regulation of new 
plant varieties. Thus, the inclusion of (tangible) provisions on new plant varieties, tradi-
tional knowledge and genetic resources (TK & GR), encrypted-program-carrying satel-
lites, and domain names can already be classified as TRIPS-plus. The coding of the 
TRIPS-plus provisions is described in more detail in the subchapter 3.1.2.5 TRIPS-plus 
Variables (T+PTAs dataset). 
Generally, the areas of IPR are not used to subset other variables, as the dataset aims 
to be systematic and comprehensive, which could be undermined by only coding for cer-
tain IPR areas. However, for the TRIPS-variables, we focused on the areas of patents, 
copyrights and trademarks for enforcement and exhaustion based on the PTAs actual fo-
cus on these IPR areas (see 3.1.2.5 TRIPS-plus Variables (T+PTAs dataset)). 
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3.1.2.3 IPR Enforcement Variables 
As all provisions in trade agreements, IPR provisions ultimately need enforcement 
measures to ensure that infringements of the IPR regulation have consequences. I divided 
the enforcement variables into the categories of general or specific. In total my dataset 
includes 14 enforcement variables, composed of seven variables for both general as well 
as specific enforcement. Table 9 shows all IPR enforcement variables, starting with the 
seven general enforcement variables on top, and followed by the seven specific enforce-
ment variables. 
 
Table 9: IPR Enforcement Variables (N=14) 
Variable Description 
ipr_general_enforcement Is there a general statement on IPRs enforcement? 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism Is there an explicit dispute settlement mechanism directly related 
to IPRs (without considering investment chapters)? 
ipr_investment_dispute_settle-
ment_mechanism 
If IPR defined as investment: Is there an explicit dispute settle-
ment mechanism? 




If IPR defined as investment: is there an exception for expropri-
ation for compulsory licenses/intellectual property rights? 
ipr_implementation Is there a general statement on IPRs implementation? 
ipr_border_measures Is there a general statement on border measures related to IPRs? 
ipr_special_requirements_related_ 
border_measures 
Are there special requirements related to border measures for the 
enforcement of IPRs? 
ipr_civil_administrative_proce-
dures_remedies 
Are there any civil and administrative procedures and remedies 
defined for the enforcement of IPRs? 
ipr_provisional_measure Are there any provisional measures defined for the enforcement 
of IPRs? 
ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies Are there any criminal procedures and remedies defined for the 
enforcement of IPRs? 
ipr_service_provider_liability Is there a service provider liability defined for the enforcement of 
IPRs? 
ipr_committee Is there an IPR Committee monitoring implementation/enforce-
ment/administration of IPRs? 
ipr_transparency Is there a statement on transparency defined to ensure the en-
forcement of IPR protection? 
 
The category of general enforcement covers variables that state a general intention to 
enforce IPRs, usually without being more specific on how to enforce them. This category 
includes a general statement to enforce IPRs (ipr_general_enforcement) and a special 
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mentioning of a dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) for IPRs (ipr_dispute_settle-
ment_mechanism). Of course, if IPRs are included in a PTA than the PTA’s DSM also 
covers them, yet this variable codes only if there are DSMs directly linked to intellectual 
property. And if IPRs are defined as investment, I included an additional variable coding 
the DSM for investment (ipr_investment_dispute_settlement_mechanism). Investment 
chapters often include an investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanism whereas other 
chapters such as intellectual property rights are covered by a state-to-state dispute settle-
ment mechanism. With an investor-to-state DSM, investors can seek compensation for 
expropriation whilst the general PTA dispute settlement reaction often results in punitive 
trade sanctions from one state to the other (Fink & Reichenmiller, 2005: 7). The differ-
entiation between the locations of the DSM can thus have broader implications. In certain 
cases, IPRs are explicitly excluded from DSM, to avoid both an investor-to-state as well 
as a state-to-state DSM (ipr_excluded_from_dsm). In other cases when IPRs are defined 
as investment, PTAs grant an exception from expropriation for intellectual property 
rights, i.e. in the case of compulsory licenses (ipr_investment_expropriation_exception). 
Under the category general enforcement, I also coded if the PTA ensures to the imple-
mentation of the IPR provisions (ipr_implementation) and mentions border measures in 
regard to IPR enforcement (ipr_border_measures). 
For the category of specific enforcement, I looked at those enforcement provisions 
that go beyond general statements and set specific standards on the enforcement of IPRs. 
First of all, I coded if there were special requirements in relation to the enforcement of 
border measures (ipr_special_requirements_related_border_measures). This can be, for 
example, the suspension of infringing goods, a requirement to provide information at the 
border, or even that suspended goods are being destroyed. Further, I coded if there are 
any predefined civil administrative procedures or remedies for example that judicial au-
thorities can order infringers to pay damages, order the seizure or destruction of counter-
feit goods (ipr_civil_administrative_procedures_remedies), or if provisional measures 
are granted such as that authorities can act on requests for relief inaudita altera parte (e.g. 
ex parte search and seizure orders) expeditiously (ipr_provisional_measure). Subse-
quently, I coded if there were provision on concrete criminal procedures or remedies such 
as penalties for wilful counterfeiting on a commercial scale for example penalties like 
imprisonment or monetary fines (ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies) and if the agree-
ments regulated the liability of service providers such as legal incentives for service pro-
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viders to cooperate with copyright owners in deterring the unauthorised storage and trans-
mission of copyrighted material (ipr_service_provider_liability). Finally, some PTAs set 
in place an IPR specific committee (ipr_committee) or grant transparency to ensure the 
enforcement of IPR regulations (ipr_transparency).  
In TRIPS, some of these specific enforcement variables are already included. More 
specifically, Article 41 to 61 in TRIPS cover the first four specific variables ipr_spe-
cial_requirements_related_border_measures, ipr_civil_administrative_procdures_rem-
edies, ipr_provisional_measure as well as ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies. This was 
considered during the coding process and when a PTA reaffirmed specific articles of 
TRIPS on enforcement, the corresponding specific enforcement variables were coded as 
well. Usually PTAs include more than a TRIPS references on these variables. However, 
this is a common feature for example in EFTA agreements: 
 
EFTA Philippines 2016 
Annex XVIII Article 16 
The Parties shall provide in their domestic laws, rules and regulations for 
enforcement provisions for rights covered by Article 1 (Subject Matter) that shall at 
least be of the same level as that provided in the TRIPS Agreement, in particular 
Articles 41 to 61thereof. 
 
The enforcement variables play an important role in the regulation of IPRs as they 
give the necessary edge the IPR provisions and set a clear path for all PTA members on 
how the IPR provisions should be implemented and in what way any infringement ought 
to be dealt with. 
3.1.2.4 IPR Multilateral Coherence Variables 
Within the IPR chapter, there are often references to other international IPR regulation 
fora such as the TRIPS agreement, the Rome Convention, or the Patent Law Treaty 
(PLT). I started with a preset list of the most common IPR conventions, then used an 
inductive approach to code the IPR regulation fora and added those conventions to the 
codebook, which were found in a PTA. 
Table 10 shows their category, the abbreviations of the coded IPR regulations, the 
concerned IPR area as well as the IPR regulation fora. The categories are divided into 
WTO agreements, followed by the WIPO Convention establishing the WIPO, WIPO ad-
ministrated conventions and classifications and Conventions not governed by the WIPO. 
The convention and abbreviations are described in more detail in the codebook of my 
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dataset (Appendix 2: Codebook of IPRs in PTAs Dataset). Each convention has a corre-
sponding IPR area that it predominantly covers such as the Trademark Law Treaty (TLT) 
regulates trademarks; except for TRIPS, which covers multiple IPR areas. The last row 
lists the fora of IPR regulation, and most of the referenced agreements are classified as 
IPR conventions principally regulating IPRs (see Figure 5: Fora of IPR Regulation). The 
WIPO Convention is an exception, as it does not regulate IPRs per se, however, consti-
tutes the IPR governing World Intellectual Property Organization. 
 
Table 10: Multilateral IPR Regulation References in PTAs 
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All these 32 conventions are coded as a separate variable under the category of mul-
tilateral coherence. When PTAs only include own IPR standards without considering the 
already existing global settings and other fora of IPR regulation they run the risk of further 
fragmenting the regulation on IPRs. By including and referencing other IPR agreements 
and conventions, and IPR-related agreements and conventions, PTAs can ensure a certain 
level of coherence with the other fora of IPR regulation. Even though some PTAs go 
beyond the WTO commitments, there are also many PTAs that embed and reaffirm and 
thus reinforce the status quo of IPR regulation. The references to other multilateral fora 
of IPR regulation thus ensure a certain degree of multilateral coherence. 
At first, I coded the identified multilateral coherence variables binary (0/1), yet soon 
realized that this would mean losing the differentiation between those PTAs that merely 
reference an IPR convention up to those reaffirming it. This, of course, is a general prob-
lem when coding legal text, as it is often a challenge to translate the nuances of the legal 
language into a binary codebook. After seeking advice from legal experts, I decided to 
code the level of regulation categorically. Now all multilateral coherence variables are 
coded on a scale ranging from 0-5 to reflect the level of commitment and bindingness of 
provisions. The coded multilateral coherence variables were coded using the subsequent 
gradations: 
 
0: not included 
1: reference 
2: reaffirmation of certain parts (articles, paragraphs) 
3: recommendation, e.g. make every possible effort (non-binding, non-commitment, 
intention) "will favourably consider acceding to", "express their attachment to ob-
serving the obligations flowing from the following multilateral conventions", "shall 
apply to accede" 
4:  accession, e.g. shall accede/ratify, e.g. "shall undertake to obtain their adherence" 
5:  reaffirmation & compliance, are already part of IPR treaty (e.g. 260_Croatia Mol-
dova_2004: "The Contracting Parties confirm the importance they attach to the 
obligations arising from the following multilateral conventions") 
NA:  PTA was signed before IPR treaty. 
 
Additionally, there is a special category ‘NA’ for those PTAs that were signed before 
the IPR convention in question was signed. In those cases, a classification into categories 
of multilateral coherence would not have been meaningful and would have tilted the num-
ber unjustifiably towards the ‘0’ occurrences.  
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In total, I coded 38 variables for the category of multilateral coherence, out of which 
32 are for the IPR conventions listed above. The maximum score within a single agree-
ment is 24 achieved in the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) signed in 
2006, i.e. it references 24 of the agreements listed in Table 10. For one of these conven-
tions, UPOV, there are four additional variables coded, each according to the UPOV ver-
sion the PTA references. UPOV is a special case, as there have been a number of revisions 
with severe consequences for the stringency of IPR regulation. For example, with the 
revision in 1991, the convention grants more stringent rights for plant breeders (IPR right 
holders) and thus compared to the precedent version is more stringent on the regulation 
of new plant varieties. Of course, not every PTA includes a specific note to which UPOV 
version it is referring to. Yet for those that do, the differentiation is reflected in these four 
additional UPOV sub-variables. 
Furthermore, I included one variable on the convention deadline as some PTAs grant 
a specific transitional period until the multilateral coherence variables have to be imple-
mented, i.e. a deadline until a specific convention has to be ratified. The last variable in 
this category takes care of the fact, that certain PTAs include a statement in the IPR sec-
tion, that all IPR agreements, to which both or all PTA members are party to, are being 
reaffirmed. In those cases where I found such a statement, I recoded all other multilateral 
convention variables according to the membership of the PTA members at the time of the 
PTA signature. Table 11 lists all coded variables for the multilateral coherence category 
and the corresponding coding question: 
 
Table 11: IPR Multilateral Coherence Variables (N= 38) 
Variable Description 
ipr_trips_1994 How does the treaty include the TRIPS agreement? 
ipr_doha_2001 How does the treaty include the Declaration on the TRIPS 
agreement and public health? 
ipr_wipo_1967 How does the treaty include the WIPO Convention? 
ipr_rome_1961 How does the treaty include the Rome Convention? 
ipr_paris_1883 How does the treaty include the Paris Convention? 
ipr_bern_1886 How does the treaty include the Bern Convention? 
ipr_wipo_copyright_1996 How does the treaty include the WCT? 
ipr_wipo_phono_1996 How does the treaty include the WPPT? 
ipr_phonograms_geneva_1971 How does the treaty include the Convention for the Protection 
of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplica-
tion of Their Phonograms? 




How does the treaty include the Beijing Treaty? 
ipr_trademarks_singapore_2006 How does the treaty include the Singapore Treaty? 
ipr_trademark_law_treaty_ge-
neva_1994 
How does the treaty include the TLT? 
ipr_patent_law_treaty_2000 How does the treaty include the PLT? 
ipr_prog_carr_signals_trans_satel-
lite_brussels_1974 
How does the treaty include the Brussels Convention? 
ipr_olympic_symbol_nairobi_1981 How does the treaty include the Nairobi Treaty? 
ipr_patents_budapest_1977 How does the treaty include the Budapest Treaty? 
ipr_industrial_design_hague_1925 How does the treaty include the Hague Agreement? 
ipr_appellation_origin_lisbon_1958 How does the treaty include the Lisbon Agreement? 
ipr_marks_madrid_1891 How does the treaty include the Madrid Agreement? 
ipr_protocol_marks_madrid_1989 How does the treaty include the Protocol of the Madrid 
Agreement? 
ipr_patent_cooperation_treaty_1970 How does the treaty include the PCT? 
ipr_marks_nice_1957 How does the treaty include the Nice Agreement? 
ipr_patent_classification_stras-
bourg_1971 
How does the treaty include the Strasbourg Agreement? 
ipr_figurative_elements_marks_vi-
enna_1973 
How does the treaty include the Vienna Agreement? 
ipr_classifiaction_industrial_de-
signs_locarno_1968 
How does the treaty include the Locarno Agreement? 
ipr_european_patent_connven-
tion_1973 
How does the treaty include the EPC? 
ipr_new_varieties_plants_upov_1961 How does the treaty include the UPOV? 
ipr_upov_1968 Does this treaty refer to the 1968 version of UPOV? 
ipr_upov_1972 Does this treaty refer to the 1972 version of UPOV? 
ipr_upov_1978 Does this treaty refer to the 1978 version of UPOV? 
ipr_upov_1991 Does this treaty refer to the 1991 version of UPOV? 
ipr_international_plant_protection_con-
vention_1951 
How does the treaty include the IPPC? 
ipr_cbd_biodiversity_1992 How does the treaty include the CBD? 
ipr_universal_copyright_conven-
tion_geneva_1952 
How does the treaty include the UCC (Geneva, 1952)? 
ipr_universal_copyright_conven-
tion_paris_1971 
How does the treaty include the UCC (Paris, 1971)? 
ipr_uniform_do-
main_name_res_udrp_1991 
How does the treaty include the UDRP? 
ipr_convention_deadline Is there a deadline to accede/implement to those treaties? 
ipr_both_parties Does the treaty mention (generally) binding multilateral 
agreements to which both are party? 
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Only within the EU agreements, I found references to domestic IPR fora, i.e. EU Di-
rectives on IPR regulation. These are not listed as individual variables but were consid-
ered for the coding of the other IPR variables. Whenever there was such a reference with 
a reaffirming commitment of a Directive, the coding was adapted according to the content 
of the Directive, and a comment was added in the dataset. The comment states which 
coding of what category was affected by which Directive, for example, for the agreement 
between the EU and Serbia signed in 2008 the coding of the enforcement variables were 
affected by the Directive 2004/48/EC. The Directives did not always lead to an adaption 
of the coding as some provisions were already coded based on the PTA text. In total, the 
domestic IPR fora provision of the EU impacted the coding of 14 PTAs. 
3.1.2.5 TRIPS-plus Variables (T+PTAs dataset) 
When looking at IPRs in PTAs, there is no getting around TRIPS-plus provisions. 
According to Vivas-Eugui (2003, 4) “TRIPS-plus refers to commitments that go beyond 
what is already included or consolidated in the TRIPS Agreement.” He distinguishes three 
categories of TRIPS-plus agreements or commitments: new areas of IPRs are included, 
more extensive standards of protection are granted such as an extension of the term of 
protection, or certain options granted under TRIPS are eliminated or reduced (Vivas-Eu-
gui 2003, 4). Some go further when differentiating TRIPS-plus and would call the first 
category by Vivas-Eugui TRIPS-extra, as it regulates new, additional areas of IPR previ-
ously not regulated in TRIPS such as domain names. Moreover, whilst TRIPS-plus stands 
for more stringent IPR provisions, some distinct it from TRIPS-minus provisions that 
stand for less stringent IPR regulation than the ones included in TRIPS (Cimoli et al. 
2014, 508 et seqq.). One example of TRIPS-minus provisions is the regulation of IPR 
exhaustion, i.e. how to handle parallel imports. TRIPS grants members that they are free 
to decide on how they want to regulate the exhaustion of IPRs and it is explicitly not 
regulated (TRIPS Article 6). However, PTAs include provisions regulating the exhaus-
tion of IPRs by either leaving it at the TRIPS level (free to decide), regulating it more 
stringently by binding exhaustion to the regional or national level (TRIPS-plus), or grant-
ing international exhaustion, i.e. loosening the regulation on the exhaustion of IPRs 
(TRIPS-minus). As shown with exhaustion, the nuances on what constitutes TRIPS-plus 
provisions are subtle and require a certain level of expertise. Thus, the main problem with 
compiling a TRIPS-plus dataset is that it is difficult to identify TRIPS-plus variables and 
even harder to assess their importance. 
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The basic approach to recognise TRIPS-plus variables is to compare the text of TRIPS 
to the IPR provisions in PTAs and look at the differences in the legal texts. As TRIPS 
alone consists of 32 pages of provisions and some of the PTAs include more than 50’00 
words on IPRs, the approach of simply comparing textual overlays proved to be unpro-
ductive. Luckily enough, there was a team of researchers in Canada with extensive legal 
expertise preparing a dataset on the TRIPS-plus regulation on the domestic level (Gold, 
Morin, and Shadeed 2019; Morin and Gold 2014), that was looking for a matching coding 
for TRIPS-plus in PTAs. Out of said team, Jean-Frédéric Morin joined forces with me, 
and we adapted their TRIPS-plus codebook for the domestic level to match TRIPS-plus 
provisions in PTAs. The result is our T+PTA dataset on TRIPS-plus variables in PTAs 
(Morin and Surbeck 2019). 
For our T+PTA dataset, we decided not to differentiate TRIPS-plus any further and 
also included some provisions that can fall into the TRIPS-extra, yet no the TRIPS-minus 
category. Besides the variables based on the domestic IPR coding (Gold, Morin, and 
Shadeed 2019; Morin and Gold 2014), “we added some variables following an inductive 
exploration of the PTAs. We only excluded TRIPs-plus variables that were highly specific 
to a particular agreement, were subject to wide range of interpretations, or had limited 
potential economic or social impacts” (Morin and Surbeck 2019). Moreover, we added 
and adapted PTA specific TRIPS-plus variables identified in previous research (Cottier, 
Sieber-Gasser, and Wermelinger 2015; M. El-Said 2005; Fink and Reichenmiller 2005; 
Lindstrom 2010). For example from Fink and Reichenmiller (2005), we added two vari-
ables: one on the test data exclusivity for new uses of registered products and one on 
foreign test data exclusivity for accepted, approved and or submitted applications. Fur-
thermore, I added seven variables based on the textual comparison of TRIPS to PTAs 
such as if the term of industrial design is more than ten years or if the PTAs include 
specific lists on protected GIs. Besides those variables, not all our TRIPS-plus variables 
were new, as we reused four variables of my IPRs in PTAs dataset. Namely, we used the 
protection of encrypted program-carrying satellite signals, the protection of domain 
names on the Internet (scope category), the variable on service provider liability (enforce-
ment category) and the UPOV coding for accession and reaffirmation (multilateral co-
herence category). The origin of each variable can be identified within the codebook (see 
Appendix 3: Codebook of T+PTA Dataset). The PTA selection for the coding of the 
TRIPS-plus variables is based on my IPRs in PTAs dataset. We coded all those PTAs that 
included either specific enforcement variables and or tangible IPR provisions (see Index 
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IPR specific described in 3.2.3 Dataset Development), which left us with 165 respectively 
159 PTAs to code. In total, we coded 90 TRIPS-plus variables consisting of mainly spe-
cific provisions for each IPR area as well as enforcement and exhaustion provisions. Ta-
ble 12 shows the distribution of TRIPS-plus variables across the different categories. 
 
Table 12: TRIPS-plus Variables (N=90) 
Category Number of Variables 
IPR areas 57 
Copyright 6 
Trademarks 9 
Geographical indications 8 
Industrial design 1 
Patents 9 
Undisclosed information 7 
Layout-designs of integrated circuits (semiconductors) 1 
New plant varieties 2 
Traditional knowledge & genetic resources 12 
Encrypted program-carrying satellite signals 1 




Our variables cover the same eleven areas of IPR as my IPRs in PTA dataset. The 
quantity of variables is not randomly selected but reflects the content of TRIPS-plus we 
found in PTAs. Those IPR areas with only a few variables simply are not regulated by 
many TRIPS-plus provisions. For example, industrial design is often regulated through 
PTAs, yet usually repeats TRIPS, and we found only one provision where it goes beyond 
TRIPS, which is the extension of the term of protection. 
For this doctoral thesis, I only use Index variables based on the TRIPS-plus variables 
(see 3.2.3 Dataset Development), and I will not go into detail on the specific TRIPS-plus 
variables for each IPR area. Instead, I highlight some examples for each category in the 
subsequent paragraph. The entire codebook including coding instructions can be found in 
Appendix 3: Codebook of T+PTA Dataset. 
On copyrights, we coded, for example, if the term of protection is more than the 50 
years granted in TRIPS and if PTAs are more stringent when it comes to the anti-circum-
vention of technology measures. So far, it is still debatable if such provisions also cover 
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the circumvention of geblocks (blocked copyrighted material due to the geographical lo-
cation) such as VPNs. For trademarks we coded amongst others extended scope variables 
if a trademark can protect a single colour like “Nivea Blue”. On geographical indications, 
we coded, for example, if a country’s name can be protected as GI and if the PTAs include 
specific lists on which GIs are protected through the PTA. As stated before, for industrial 
design we only identified one variable on the term of protection granted in the PTA (more 
than ten years equals TRIPS-plus). We also coded if there is a term extension for patents 
or, for example, if selection or second-use patents are granted. Both selection patents, 
which claim a subclass of a previously granted patent for a feature not included in the 
initial patent, as well as second-use patents, that claim a new use from a previously exist-
ing patent, run the risk of leading to the evergreening of patents (see page 36 “evergreen-
ing”). On undisclosed information, we coded variables such as if test data exclusivity is 
granted for a specific timeframe, new uses, or foreign test data. Test data constitutes a 
large share of the R&D costs, that can be compensated by granting exclusivity. On the 
other hand, test data exclusivity means that e.g. in the case of pharmaceuticals generic 
producers have to reproduce test data, which prolongs the time until generic product can 
access a market and might impact the prices of generic products. 
For the layout-designs of integrated circuits (semiconductors), we determined one 
TRIPS-plus variable, namely if compulsory licenses are not permitted for semiconduc-
tors. On new plant varieties, we coded a variable for an accession or reaffirmation com-
mitment to the UPOV Convention and one coding when the tangible provisions on new 
plant varieties go beyond the content of the UPOV Convention. Similar to the multilateral 
coherence variables, we coded the traditional knowledge and genetic resources variables 
as categorical variables according to their legal commitment. The twelve variables for TK 
and GR are actually three individual variables coded in a binary manner for binding and 
non-binding commitments, once for TK and once for GR. For example, the variable about 
a government enforced equitable benefits sharing mechanism is coded four times: accord-
ing to its legal bindingness (binding/non-binding) twice for traditional knowledge and 
twice according to its legal bindingness for genetic resources. For both IPR areas of en-
crypted program-carrying satellite signals and domain names, we coded one variable, 
concretely if those IPR areas are protected through the PTA. 
For enforcement, most of our TRIPS-plus variables are distinguished by their corre-
sponding IPR category. This is due to the fact that most PTAs reference specifically pa-
tents, copyrights and trademarks in their TRIPS-plus enforcement variables. For example, 
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in the PTA between Australia and Chile 2008, the TRIPS-plus enforcement variable 
granting ex parte search and seizure procedures refers only to trademarks and copyrights. 
Moreover, certain provisions are only TRIPS-plus for a specific area of IPR as TRIPS 
already includes enforcement measures for the other areas. For example, the variable on 
criminal sanctions is only TRIPS-plus for patents as TRIPS already grants this for copy-
rights and trademarks (TRIPS Article 61).  
The enforcement variables could have wide-ranging implications, for example, the 
variable on injunctions codes if the burden of proof shifted from patent holder to generic 
producer. This can entail that production can be stopped or products can be destroyed 
without checking the validity of the patent first. Or the variables on border measures can 
denote that even transiting goods can be seized if they infringe on copyrights. This can 
affect, for example, legally produced generic goods stopping in transiting countries, 
where they infringe IPRs even though they are not intended to enter the market of the 
transiting country. A classic example would be the case of a shipment of generic medicine 
from India to Venezuela, that transited through the Netherlands, where it was seized due 
to infringements of patents and containing counterfeit goods (Sell 2013, 55). 
Regarding exhaustion, we coded for regional and national exhaustion of patent, trade-
marks, and copyrights. Usually, these are the three categories referred to explicitly re-
garding exhaustion. If there was a general statement on the exhaustion of IPRs without 
indicating an area, then all three areas were coded positively.  
National exhaustion means that the first sale exhausts (ends) the rights of IPR holders 
(importation and or distribution) on a product nationally. However, with national exhaus-
tion IPR holders can control the importation and for example deny parallel imports, which 
can lead to domestic protectionism. According to Vivas-Eugui (2003, 18), the blocking 
of imports can limit the accessibility of goods such as pharmaceuticals at lower prices. 
National exhaustion is inconsistent with the NT provision as foreign exporters can buy 
the same products but do not have the same conditions in the market because they need 
to ask for the consent of domestic IPR holders before importing their goods. It is not an 
issue in regard to MFN as all other nations are discriminated. 
Regional exhaustion means that within a predefined region – usually composed of 
PTA member states – parallel importation is allowed. It is still more stringent than TRIPS 
as it removes the countries flexibility to decide on how to regulate exhaustion. Moreover, 
it contradicts MFN as countries within the defined region receive beneficial treatment and 
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equal rights to domestic IPR holders, whilst countries outside of the region – usually non-
PTA members – are still denied parallel importation. 
3.2 Codebook and Dataset Development 
As the previous sections described the PTA selection and coded variables, the follow-
ing sections give more detail on the development of both the codebook and the dataset. 
First, I will describe the preprocessing of the data, the coding process, and the codebook 
development, and second, the content of the dataset as well as data validity and reliability. 
The codebooks and datasets for both data collections – IPRs in PTAs and T+PTA – are 
available on the DESTA homepage (DESTA 2017). 
3.2.1 Preprocessing and Coding of PTAs 
Besides the list of PTAs, I was also able to use the pdf-hardcopies of trade agreements 
of the DESTA collection. However, the DESTA pdf-copies mostly include the main 
treaty body and do not include any annexes or joint declarations. Not all PTAs are struc-
tured in the same manner and not every PTA section is included alike. For example, 
EFTA treaties include in their main bodies only a short paragraph on IPRs and reference 
the annex or protocols for more detailed provisions. And within those additional docu-
ments are mostly highly substantive provisions regulating IPR. Thus, for the purpose of 
coding IPRs, I added annexes and protocols where they were available and evidently re-
quired, i.e. referred to in the base treaty in relation to IPRs. The completed legal docu-
ments were coded manually and converted into a numerical dataset. In general, all varia-
bles are coded in a binary manner, i.e. ‘0’ stands for cases where the variable was not 
found in the PTA, and ‘1’ where the variable was found. Exceptions are the variables for 
the word count of IPR content (ID 9), variables for multilateral coherence (ID 72-103), 
and the transitional periods for IPR provisions (ID 18) and multilateral coherence (ID 
104). 
All coded variables of both my dataset on IPRs in PTAs as well as the TRIPS-plus 
variables of the T+PTA dataset are double-coded. This means that all agreements were 
coded by myself and afterwards by another coder. For all instances where there was a 
difference in coding, I looked at the PTA text again, analysed the reasons for the discrep-
ancy and adjusted the coding and where necessary specified the coding instructions in the 
codebook. Where an adjustment in the coding instructions was necessary, the previously 
coded agreements were revised as well to ensure a consistent coding approach. 
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Most agreements are available in English, and a substantial number is available only 
in Spanish. Very few of the agreements are in German, French or Arabic. Where neces-
sary, I consulted with native speakers of the corresponding language for translations and 
coding. The codebook includes besides the variable names the coding instructions, and 
for certain TRIPS-plus variables the respective keywords in Spanish. 
3.2.2 Codebook Development 
The codebook started with the variables coded by Valdés and Tavengwa (2012) resp. 
Valdés and McCann (2014) and the previous DESTA IPR variables, and were continu-
ously adapted based on the findings and insights of the analysis of IPRs in PTAs. Besides 
the variable names and coding instructions, the codebook contains several other indica-
tions disperse across eight columns: ID, Category, Variable, Description, Note, Range, 
Occurrence, and Mode. 
The ID is a number assigned to all variables of the IPR in PTAs codebook, and ranges 
from ‘1’ to ‘151’. The numbers were assigned in descending order to the coded and cal-
culated variables. The Category identifies to which coding category the variables belong 
to such as “IPR general” or “Index IPR specific enforcement”, and the Variable column 
equals the variable name in the dataset. The Description represents the coding question 
and can be further explained by a Note, for example, the consideration for the calculated 
variables. Where applicable, the Range indicates the minimum and maximum value of 
the variables, and the Occurrence identifies in how many PTAs the variable was found. 
The Occurrence is listed twice: once for all coded PTAs (724) and once for all PTAs used 
in the analysis (698). Finally, the Mode labels the variable according to their origin, i.e. 
if the variable was coded, calculated, or a base variable from DESTA. The complete 
codebooks of the IPRs in PTAs dataset and the T+PTA dataset can be found in the ap-
pendix (Appendix 2: Codebook of IPRs in PTAs Dataset resp. Appendix 3: Codebook of 
T+PTA Dataset). 
3.2.3 Dataset Development 
As stated in subchapter on the selection of PTAs (3.1.1 Selection of Preferential Trade 
Agreements), DESTA is a dynamic dataset, and I adapted my PTA selection to match the 
DESTA base. This means that other DESTA variables can be easily added from the new-
est DESTA version by the DESTA ID variable included in both datasets. Generally, the 
PTA name should be identical to the one in DESTA. For example, PTAs of the European 
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Union are listed in DESTA under the abbreviation of EC for Economic Community, 
which is the same in my dataset. Besides the matching ID and PTA names, I also added 
new PTAs according to updated versions of DESTA until July 2018. This left me with a 
broad range of covered years, as the oldest PTA in my dataset was signed in 1948 and the 
most recent in 2018. 
In order to make my variables more accessible and quantifiable, I added indexes on 
each category summarising or binary identifying the coded variables across categories. 
For the TRIPS-plus variables I also added indexes to generalise the coded variables. In 
total, I coded 86 variables, created 40 dummy variables and 25 index variables. The dis-
persion across categories is shown in Table 13. 
 
Table 13: Variables in Dataset (N=189) 
Category Number of Variables 
Coded variables 86 
IPR general 12 
IPR scope mentioned 11 
IPR scope tangible 11 
IPR general enforcement 7 
IPR specific enforcement 7 
IPR multilateral coherence 38 
Dummy Variables 40 
IPR general dummy 2 
IPR general enforcement dummy 2 
IPR multilateral coherence dummy 36 
Indexes  29 
Index IPR general 2 
Index IPR specific 2 
Index IPR scope mentioned 4 
Index IPR scope tangible 5 
Index IPR general enforcement 2 
Index IPR specific enforcement 2 
Index IPR enforcement 2 
Index IPR multilateral coherence 10 
TRIPS-plus (T+PTA) 34 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus 34 
Total of Variables in Dataset 189 
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I created dummies, i.e. binary recoding of coded variables, to simplify the content of 
connected or categorical variables. There are two dummy variables falling into the cate-
gory of IPR general dummy. The first one entails if the PTA grants either MFN and or 
NT in the IPR section without considering the investment chapter. The second one does 
the same but includes the coding of MFN and NT in the investment chapter. This way it 
can be easily identified if the TRIPS standards are being repeated, at least partially, with-
out having to analyse multiple variables. There are also two IPR general enforcement 
dummy variables. The first one considers the dispute settlement coding of both the IPR 
as well as the investment chapter, to quickly identify if the PTA includes an IPR specific 
DSM. The second variable is a conditional variable: if IPRs are defined as investment 
and if IPRs are not exempted from expropriation this variable is coded as ‘1’. This dummy 
variable helps to identify if IPR rights holder could challenge the issuance of a compul-
sory license even in the case of a national emergency as an act of investment expropria-
tion. 
The Multilateral coherence dummy variables code for each of the conventions if the 
multilateral coherence variables were coded regardless of the bindingness of their com-
mitment (values higher than 0). Thus, for each of the coded multilateral conventions, I 
created a dummy variable showing if the convention was included in any manner in the 
PTA.  
Besides the dummy variables, I created indexes that assist in identifying the overall 
IPR content of the PTAs. Table 14 describes the indexes for each category. However, for 
more detail on the calculation and composition see Appendix 2: Codebook of IPRs in 
PTAs Dataset. For this doctoral thesis, I will only use the TRIPS-plus indexes and not the 
individual coding of TRIPS-plus variables. As my aim is to make general statements on 
IPRs in PTAs, I will mostly use the TRIPS-plus dummy variables, which do not put 
weight on single variables. Furthermore, Morin and I (Morin and Surbeck 2019) have 
created subindexes for patents, copyrights and trademarks that balance the variables in 
the respective IPR area according to their importance and make them comparable 
amongst one another (see Appendix 3: Codebook of T+PTA Dataset, ID I_43, I_44, I_45). 
For most of the following descriptive statistics, I will use the indexes listed on the subse-
quent page. 
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Table 14: Description of Indexes 
Index Categories Descriptions 
Index IPR general Indexes combining the general variables on IPR such as MFN and 
NT treatment as well as general enforcement variables (not incl. 
multilateral coherence variables) 
– Sum 
– Dummy 
Index IPR specific Indexes combining tangible IPR scope variables and specific IPR  
enforcement variables (not incl. multilateral coherence variables) 
– Sum 
– Dummy 
Index IPR scope mentioned Indexes on the mentioned IPR scope variables 
– Sum 
– Dummy 
– Dummy if TRIPS areas covered 
– Dummy if TRIPS-plus areas covered 
Index IPR scope tangible Indexes on the tangible IPR scope variables 
– Sum 
– Dummy 
– Dummy if TRIPS areas covered 
– Dummy if TRIPS-plus areas covered 
– Degree of tangible IPR coverage 
Index IPR general enforcement Indexes on the general IPR enforcement variables 
– Sum 
– Dummy 
Index IPR specific enforcement Indexes on the specific IPR enforcement variables 
– Sum 
– Dummy 
Index IPR enforcement Indexes on the general and specific IPR enforcement variables 
– Sum of general and specific enforcement 
– Degree of general and specific enforcement 
Index IPR multilateral coherence Indexes on the IPR multilateral coherence variables 
– Dummy for WIPO governed conventions 
– Level of WIPO and WTO embeddedness 
– Number of NAs within level of WIPO and WTO embed-
dedness 
– Level of WIPO and WTO embeddedness, corrected by NAs 
– Level of treaty embeddedness, excluding TRIPS, Doha, 
WIPO Convention and European Patent Convention 
– Level of treaty embeddedness, categorized 
– Sum of all multilateral coherence variables incl. bindingness 
– Dummy of all multilateral coherence variable incl. binding-
ness 
– Sum of all multilateral coherence variables excl. bindingness 
– Dummy of all multilateral coherence variable excl. binding-
ness 





Indexes on the TRIPS-plus variables (T+PTA dataset) 
– Sum of TRIPS-plus variables per PTA 
– Sum for each IPR area 
– Sum for enforcement 
– Sum for exhaustion 
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Index Categories Descriptions 
Index TRIPS-plus (cont.) – Dummy for all TRIPS-plus variables 
– Dummy for each IPR area 
– Dummy for enforcement 
– Dummy for exhaustion 
– Subindex on patents 
– Subindex on copyrights 
– Subindex on trademarks 
– Sum of all patent variables incl. enforcement and exhaustion 
– Sum of all copyright variables incl. enforcement and exhaus-
tion 
– Sum of all trademark variables incl. enforcement and exhaus-
tion 
 
3.2.4 Validity and Reliability Checks 
The codebook used both an inductive approach by including the findings in PTAs as 
well as relying on the insights of previous research. This combination makes sure that the 
most important variables for a systematic and comprehensive dataset on IPRs in PTAs 
are covered. Of course, there can be still more fine-grained coding and as PTAs develop 
the codebook will have to be updated as well. 
To ensure the reliability of the coded variables, all PTAs and variables were coded 
twice, once by myself and once by another coder. The only variable single-coded is the 
variable on the word count as it is based on IPR excerpts of the PTA and generated auto-
matically by the software word. For the coding process, the coder used the instructions in 
the codebook, and after a block of coded PTAs, we compared our coding. Where there 
were errors or imprecisions in the codebook, we made the necessary adjustments and 
recoded all concerned variables individually before comparing our coding output again. 
For the final version of the dataset, I ruled over each discrepancy and decided on the 
correct coding after consulting with my coder. 
For both datasets, the intercoder reliability (IRR) is high, indicating that the codebook 
and its instructions lead to reliable results. For the IPRs in PTAs dataset, I achieved an 
unweighted Cohen’s kappa of k = 0.945, and for the T+PTA we achieved an unweighted 
Cohen’s kappa of k = 0.881 (see Appendix 4: Cohen’s Kappa for 2 Coders (Weights: 
unweighted) – IRR). 
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3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
For the descriptive statistics, I will only use those coded agreements also included in 
DESTA, which leaves me with a total of 698 PTAs. The PTAs range from 1948 to 2018, 
and half of the covered agreements were signed before 1997. The dataset covers PTAs 
for 202 countries. On average, countries are members of 21 PTAs, for example, India, 
South Korea, and Nicaragua. Other countries are only members to one PTA, for example, 
Andorra and Mongolia. By far party to the most agreements are the EU member states, 
headed by France with 106 PTAs, followed by for example, Germany and the Netherland 
with each 105 PTAs. The dataset includes 425 bilateral, and 273 multilateral PTAs, 
whereof the multilateral PTAs have on average twelve members countries (median = 9). 
The results show that far more PTAs include regulations on IPRs than anticipated. 
Figure 8 shows the distribution of IPRs across the dataset along the indexes of general 
IPR, specific IPR and TRIPS-plus. Out of the 698 PTAs utilised in the analysis, the ma-
jority (378, 54% of all PTAs) includes at least general IPR provisions. About half of them 
include beside general IPR provisions also specific IPR provision (159, 23% of all PTAs). 
And most of the agreements including specific IPR provisions contain IPR provisions 
that go beyond the regulations in TRIPS (136, 19% of all PTAs). The percentages remain 
unchanged if all 724 coded PTAs are used. 
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Out of the 202 countries that have signed a PTA in the DESTA database, 195 countries 
have at least one PTA that includes IPR provisions and there are only seven countries that 
have no IPR in any of their PTAs; namely Andorra, Bangladesh, Bhutan, North Korea, 
Maldives, Monaco and Nepal. Also, there are 47 countries, which include no specific IPR 
provisions in their PTAs, including Azerbaijan, Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Ni-
geria, Syria and Zambia. This also concludes that 155 countries include specific IPRs in 
their PTAs. Moreover, there are 110 countries, which have signed PTAs that go beyond 
TRIPS and only 92 countries that have not signed a PTAs including TRIPS-plus provi-
sions. The majority of the countries in my dataset has thus signed at least one agreement 
including TRIPS-plus provisions. 
A closer look at the dissemination of the PTAs including IPRs shows a more differ-
entiated picture. Graph 1 illustrates the number of PTAs (cumulative) per year and the 
count of PTAs including IPRs (cumulative) according to the indexes of general IPR, spe-
cific IPR and TRIPS-plus across the coded period (1948-2018). Graph 1 shows that when 
the surge of PTAs began, the regulation of IPRs through PTAs was insignificant. Only in 
the early 90ies, general IPR provisions began to be included, whilst the regulation of 
specific IPR and TRIPS-plus provisions seem like a more recent phenomenon with an 
upwards trend.  
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The steep increase of the number of PTAs goes hand in hand with a similar develop-
ment for the inclusion of general IPR provisions. The dataset shows that the inclusion of 
IPR provision is indeed a recent phenomenon, yet also that IPRs have been included long 
before TRIPS achieved a WTO-wide established connection between trade and intellec-
tual property. 
The first trade agreement to include at least general provisions on IPRs was the agree-
ment between EC and Syria signed in 1977 (European Community comprising Belgium, 
Italy, Luxembourg, France, Netherlands, West Germany, Denmark, Ireland, and the 
United Kingdom). The IPR provision focused on the parties agreeing to cooperate on 
patents (EC Syria 1977, Title I, Article 4.1). From there on, more and more trade agree-
ments started to include IPRs, at least in a general manner. For example, the third PTA to 
include IPR provisions, between Israel and the US signed in 1985, already dedicates an 
entire Article to IPRs:  
 
“The parties reaffirm their obligations under bilateral and multilateral agreements relating 
to intellectual property rights, including industrial property rights, in effect between the par-
ties. Accordingly, national and companies of each Party shall continue to be accorded na-
tional and most favoured nation treatment with respect to obtaining, maintaining and enforc-
ing patents of invention, with respect to obtaining and enforcing copyrights, and with respect 
to rights in trademarks, service marks, tradenames, trade labels, and industrial property of 
all kinds.” PTA Israel US 1985, Article 14 
 
The first PTAs to include more than just general IPR provision were EFTA Turkey 
1991, EFTA Israel 1992, Estonia Switzerland 1992, the Agreement on European Eco-
nomic Area (EEA) 1992 and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 1992. 
After NAFTA was signed in 1992, Mexico included specific IPR provisions in their soon 
following agreements with countries from Central and South America, e.g. Costa Rica 
1994, Bolivia 1994, Group of Three 1994, Nicaragua 1997 and Chile 1998.  
Many, yet not all the agreements including specific IPR provisions, also include 
TRIPS-plus provisions. This is even true for agreements signed before TRIPS such as the 
specific agreements listed in the previous paragraph. The earliest detection of TRIPS-plus 
provisions also lies in 1991 with the EFTA Turkey agreement, and the inclusion of 
TRIPS-plus provision has become ever more popular after TRIPS entered into force. For 
the display of the development of IPR provisions in PTAs, time seems to play an im-
portant role. According to M. Kim (2015, 31 et seqq.) there are specific historical patterns 
in international economic agreements for the time covered by the IPRs in PTAs dataset: 
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the Post-World War II period (1947-1990), the Post-Cold War period (1991-2000) and 
the Post-information revolution period (2001-today). For the first period (1947-1990), 
M. Kim (2015, 41) sees mostly regional agreements, often with a multilateral character, 
as states looked for a geographically close market to expand their sales opportunity after 
the second world war and increase their economies of scale. The second period (1991-
2000), marks the end of the political blocks of the cold war, the area of the Internet, rise 
of information technology and a change in the value chains due to facilitation and reduced 
costs of transportation leading to global supply chains, which goes hand in hand with an 
increase of bilateral trade agreements (M. Kim 2015, 43). For the third period (2001-
today), Kim notes an intensified organisation of global value chains (faster, bigger, 
deeper, longer), that is not matched by global trade regulation endeavours such as the 
failure of the Doha Round and a “resurgence of regionalism”, i.e. multilateralism of eco-
nomic agreements (M. Kim 2015, 47). 
The IPRs in PTAs dataset provides some support for these categories based on the 
membership form of the agreements and the ratio trends between multilateral and bilateral 
agreements. For the first period (until 1990), there are 86 bilateral and 81 multilateral 
PTAs (-1990), followed by a shift in balance to 159 bilateral and 90 multilateral PTAs 
(1991-2000), that relative remains the same until today with 180 bilateral and 102 multi-
lateral PTAs (2001-today). So, from a period, where bilateral and multilateral PTAs bal-
anced each other, there is a move towards a preference of bilateral PTAs that persists. 
Regarding IPRs, a pivotal moment was TRIPS signed in 1994 and its entry into force 
in 1995. Based on the distribution of IPRs in PTAs shown in Graph 1 and the knowledge 
drawn from M. Kim (2015, 31 et seqq.), the data is divided into the time before specific 
IPR provisions appeared in PTAs (before 1991), followed by five-year intervals (1991-
1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010) and concluded by the last few years included 
in the dataset(2011-2018). To reflect the development over time Graph 2: Sum of PTAs 
with IPR Provisions by Time Cohorts and Graph 3: Percentage of PTAs with IPR Provi-
sion by Time Cohorts display the number of general IPR, specific IPR and TRIPS-plus 
provisions over time. Same as in Graph 1, the variables are based on the count of the 
indexes (dummy) per PTA per year, not the sum of provisions per PTA. This reflects if 
there is something included on the respective index without looking at how many provi-
sions are covered. 
Graph 2 shows how many PTAs were signed in each timeframe, and how many of 
them included general IPR, specific IPR and TRIPS-plus provisions (count of dummy 
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indexes). In the period around the TRIPS agreements (1991-1995), there were by far the 
most PTAs signed over a five-year period. When looking at the IPR content, it appears 
that as the number of PTAs decreases, the count of PTAs with a general IPR content rises 
and PTAs with specific IPRs and TRIPS-plus provisions has multiplied.  
 
Graph 2: Sum of PTAs with IPR Provisions by Time Cohorts 
 
 
Graph 3: Percentage of PTAs with IPR Provision by Time Cohorts 
 
 
Graph 3 reflects the same data as Graph 2 and shows it in the form of percentages to 













Number of PTAs 167 132 117 117 89 76
General IPR 4 65 82 93 64 70
Specific IPR 0 15 15 30 38 61























Share of PTAs 23% 18% 16% 16% 12% 10%
General IPR 2% 49% 70% 79% 72% 92%
Specific IPR 0% 11% 13% 26% 43% 80%
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and the subsequent lines show the share of PTAs including general IPR, specific IPR and 
TRIPS-plus provisions. 
The data section of Graph 3 illustrates that the share of PTAs including IPRs has risen 
substantially. Before 1991, only 2% of the PTAs included at least general provisions on 
IPRs, out of the PTAs signed between 1991-1995 almost half of them (49%) included 
general IPRs and already 11% specific as well as TRIPS-plus provisions. The share of 
IPR provisions in PTAs has risen over time and that for the most recent cohort (2011-
2018) almost all PTAs (92%) include at least general IPR provisions. Moreover, a major-
ity of PTAs also includes specific IPR provisions (80%) as well as TRIPS-plus provisions 
(68%). 
Of course, not all variables in the dataset have the same impact on these statistics. For 
example, the variable coding for IPRs being excluded from the dispute settlement mech-
anism (ipr_excluded_from_dsm) was only found in five PTAs, whereas the mentioning 
of IPRs (ipr_mentioned) was coded for 377 PTAs, and the mentioning of copyrights as 
part of IPRs (ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights) for 261 PTAs. For the TRIPS-plus da-
taset, there are also variables which only occurred in a single PTA such as punitive dam-
ages granted for patents (enforcement_punitive_damages_patent) coded for the PTA be-
tween Morocco and the US signed in 2004 (Article 15.11.7).  
The most reoccurring TRIPS-plus variable coded for 84 PTAs is the enforcement var-
iable on the border measures for exporting and transiting goods (enforcement_bor-
der_measures_importing_exporting_transiting_goods). In order to shed some light on the 
dissemination of all coded variables, the following subchapters give a description of the 
dataset for the variable categories (3.3.1 for general IPR, 3.3.2 for IPR Scope, 3.3.3 for 
IPR enforcement, 3.3.4 IPR multilateral coherence, 3.3.5 TRIPS-plus) and shows the 
scope preferences according to the PTA member regions (3.3.6). Afterwards, the indexes 
based on the coded variables are used to show the IPR content in PTAs for selected coun-
tries relevant for the regulation of intellectual property (3.3.7). 
3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics General IPR 
There are 422 agreements that include at least one of the twelve variables coded for 
the category of general IPR variables (see subchapter 3.1.2.1). However, out of these 422, 
there are 45 PTAs that only mention IPR as an exception to a certain provision, meaning 
that factually only 377 PTAs include general IPR provisions. This is almost congruent 
with the index on general IPR listing 378 PTAs, yet taking into account besides the coded 
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general variables also the general enforcement and mentioned IPR scope variables (see 
Figure 8: IPR Content of PTAs). The concrete coding of each coded variable in the gen-
eral IPR category across all 698 PTAs is displayed in Graph 4. 
As stated in the paragraph following Graph 3, the most commonly coded variable in 
the dataset is the mentioning of IPRs (377 PTAs), followed by the count variables (one 
article in 346 PTAs, or more than one article in 299 PTAs), the commitment to assist, 
coordinate and cooperate in regard to IPRs (273 PTAs), and IPRs being mentioned as an 
exception (228 PTAs). The reaffirmation of MFN (103 PTAs) and NT (100 PTAs) are 
far less common and similarly prevalent are the variables on IPR being defined as invest-
ment (94 PTAs) and the connected variables on investment being covered by MFN (84 
PTAs) or NT provisions (91 PTAs). Around thirteen per cent of all PTAs grant a transi-
tion period for IPRs (93 PTAs), that is among those awarding it is on average three-and-
a-half years (maximum thirteen years). The transition period can mostly be found in 
agreements between north-south (50 PTAs) and south-south (40 PTAs) trade agreement 
members. 
 
Graph 4: Occurrence of General IPR Variables 
 
 
The word count variable was compiled for 326 PTAs out of all that mention IPRs. It 
has only been coded if the PTA contained an article specifically on IPRs. So, for example, 
if the general IPR statement was part of another article such as an article on general WTO 
disciplines, and intellectual property was mentioned as a subcategory also targeted by 
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words not specifically regulating IPRs. On average, those PTAs that have a word count 
include around 2’776 words. 
 
Table 15: Word Count by Region 
Word Count NN NS SS 
Average 135 2’097 445 
Maximum 11’552 56’242 9’663 
 
Table 15 shows that both absolutely as well as relatively the north-south PTAs include 
the most words on IPR regulation. The variance is lowest for south-south PTAs and sub-
stantial for north-north PTAs. Thus, even though the north-north PTAs have the lowest 
average of words on IPRs, their maximum wordiness (11’552) surpasses the one of south-
south PTAs (9’663). Of course, the word count is not a perfect indicator of the stringency 
and content of IPR regulations, but it allows insight to space and weight given to IPRs 
within the PTA regulation framework. Besides the general IPR provisions, it is thus im-
portant to look at the scope of IPRs. 
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics IPR Scope 
The category of IPR Scope includes elven variables each for IPR areas mentioned and 
tangible provisions on these areas (see 3.1.2.2). Out of all PTAs there are 291 PTAs that 
mention at least one of the elven IPR areas, and 146 PTAs include tangible IPR provi-
sions. The first PTA mentioning an area of IPR is the agreement between Canada New 
Zealand signed in 1981 that refers to IPRs and mentions copyright protection. For the 
tangible IPR provisions, the first PTA was the one between EFTA and Turkey signed in 
1991 that includes tangible provisions on industrial designs and patents. As shown in 
Graph 1, the development of the indexes for general and specific IPR takes off around 
the early 90ies. Comparably, Graph 5 illustrates the development of the cumulative sum 
of provisions for mentioned IPR scope variables and tangible IPR scope variables. The 
tangible IPR scope variables are further differentiated into two categories: those that reg-
ulate areas already included in TRIPS such as patents and trademarks, and other areas 
that were not tangibly covered in TRIPS, namely new plant varieties, TK and GR, en-
crypted program-carrying satellite signals, and domain names. The graph ranges from the 
year before the first PTA mentions one of the eleven IPR areas until today (1980-2018). 
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Graph 5: Development of IPR Scope (cumulative) 
 
 
For the scope variables, the development goes upwards, however not linear for both 
codings of scope variables. Graph 5 shows that PTAs mention far more IPR areas than 
they regulate by including tangible provisions on them. The slope for mentioned IPRs is 
not only absolutely higher but also has a steeper increase than the slope for tangible IPRs. 
Furthermore, the mentioning of IPRs started on a broader scale in the early 90ies and had 
increased steadily, whilst the inclusion of tangible provisions started after TRIPS in 1994 
to be broader included but linger for another ten years before continuously increasing 
until now. Graph 3 supports the same claim for both specific IPR provisions and TRIPS-
plus provisions and shows that before 2006 they were only present in a minority of agree-
ments (26% resp. 23% of PTAs signed in between 2001-2005).  
For the period from 2011-2018, four out of five PTAs include specific IPR provisions, 
and out of the 76 PTAs signed in that time, there are 63 PTAs mentioning one of the elven 
IPR areas (83%) and 58 PTAs that include tangible IPR provisions (76%). To illustrate 
the occurrence of the individual areas of IPR, Graph 6 shows the occurrence for each of 
the 22 coded variables of the IPR areas.  
Unlike in Graph 5, here the count and not the sum of the variables across all PTAs in 
the dataset are displayed. As Graph 6 illustrates, PTAs tend to mention many IPR areas 
that are not necessarily matched by the tangible provisions on these areas. Only for the 
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matches the tangible provisions on them. The most occurring variables are the one men-
tioning one of the IPR areas already included in TRIPS lead by copyrights (261 PTAs), 
trademarks (255 PTAs), geographical indication (251 PTAs), patents (241 PTAs) and 
closely followed by industrial designs (215 PTAs), undisclosed information (209 PTAs) 
and layout-designs of integrated circuits (199 PTAs). New plant varieties were already 
mentioned in TRIPS but are far less represented in PTAs (110 PTAs). The other men-
tioned TRIPS-plus IPR areas TK and GR are in 43 PTAs, encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals in 34 PTAs and domain names only mentioned in 19 PTAs.  
 
Graph 6: Occurrence of IPR Scope Variables 
 
 
There is far less variance between the occurrence of variables regarding the tangible 
provisions of the IPR scope. The IPR area with the fewest tangible provisions is by far 
the one on layout-designs of integrated circuits (8 PTAs), followed by the tangible 
TRIPS-plus IPR area variables for new plant varieties (15 PTAs), domain names (17 
PTAs), TK and GR (27 PTAs), and encrypted program-carrying satellite signals (28 
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PTAs) and or industrial designs (62 PTAs). The leading areas with tangible provisions 
are in ascending order patents (80 PTAs), copyrights (84 PTAs), trademarks (91 PTAs), 
and on top geographical indication (105 PTAs). Subchapter 3.3.7 gives some insight on 
the extent of the sum of mentioned and tangible IPR scope for selected countries in com-
parison to other indexes. 
3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics IPR Enforcement 
There are two divisions of general and specific enforcement for the fourteen coded 
variables of the category of IPR enforcement (3.1.2.3). Overall, 298 PTAs include either 
general (294 PTAs) and or specific IPR enforcement provisions (137 PTAs). The agree-
ment between EFTA and Turkey signed in 1991 was the first agreement to include spe-
cific enforcement measures by reaffirming TRIPS articles 41 to 61 (see 3.1.2.3). Graph 
7 illustrates the distribution of IPR enforcement variables across all PTAs.  
 
Graph 7: Occurrence of IPR Enforcement Variables 
 
 
The most common enforcement variable by a long way is the general mentioning of 
IPR enforcement (253 PTAs), all other enforcement variables are twice as unlikely to be 
included in a PTA. The second most common variable is the general variable on border 
measures (124 PTAs), followed by the specific variable on special requirements for bor-
der measures (107 PTAs), general provisions to implement the enforcement variables 
(101 PTAs), specific provisions on civil administrative procedures and remedies (96 
PTAs), on criminal procedures and remedies (91 PTAs), on provisional measures (88 
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agreements include provisions on transparency (55 PTAs) or refer to a committee respon-
sible for IPR matters (54 PTAs). Moreover, each 29 PTAs contain a provision on service 
provider liability or an IPR specific dispute settlement mechanism, and only five PTAs 
exclude IPRs from the DSM altogether. 
The two calculated variables for this category apply to 103 PTAs. Overall, there are 
97 PTAs including an IPR-related DSM (ipr_comprehensive_dispute_settlement_mech-
anism_dummy) and 27 PTAs allow that compulsory licenses can be challenged even in 
the case of a national emergency (ipr_investment_expropriation_implication). For more 
information on these two variables see 3.2.3 Dataset Development. 
Both scope and enforcement categories follow an upward trend over time. Graph 8 
shows the development of general and specific IPR provisions over time and displays the 
percentage of PTAs including enforcement provisions per year (dummy indexes for gen-
eral and specific enforcement). 
 
Graph 8: Sum of PTAs with IPR Enforcement Provisions by Time Cohorts 
 
 
For the time before 1991, the agreements included next to none IPR enforcement pro-
visions, neither general nor specific. Afterwards, there was a steep increase in general 
enforcement provisions with the result that beginning only six years later (1996-today), a 
majority of PTAs includes at least general enforcement provisions on intellectual prop-













Share of PTAs 23% 18% 16% 16% 12% 10%
IPR general enforcement 1% 33% 51% 63% 63% 78%
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lagged the inclusion of general IPR enforcement. Only for the last cohort (2011-2018), 
the specific IPR enforcement provisions can be found in a majority of PTAs. 
3.3.4 Descriptive Statistics IPR Multilateral Coherence 
Across all PTAs, there are 306 PTAs (44%) that include at least one reference to an 
IPR multilateral coherence convention, and 255 (37%) that include at least one accession 
or reaffirmation commitment (coded value of ‘4’ or ‘5’). The agreement including by far 
the most binding commitments is CEFTA making binding commitments on 23 out of 24 
referenced conventions (see 3.1.2.4 IPR Multilateral Coherence Variables). On average, 
PTAs include binding commitments on three multilateral coherence conventions. Table 
16 focuses on the binding IPR multilateral coherence commitments coded for the most 
and least number of PTAs. The agreement with the most binding references is TRIPS 
agreement (ipr_trips_1994) coded for 183 PTAs, and the two conventions coded bind-
ingly only for five the Nairobi Treaty on the Protection of the Olympic Symbol (ipr_olym-
pic_symbol_nairobi_1981) and the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations 
of Origin and their International Registration (ipr_appellation_origin_lisbon_1958). 
 
Table 16: Binding References of IPR Multilateral Coherence Variables 
IPR Multilateral Coherence Variable Binding Commitment 
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These extremes are comparable to the references regardless of their bindingness dis-
played in Graph 9. It shows the occurrence of the coded variables for multilateral con-
ventions across all PTAs. Same as shown for the binding commitments, the least common 
multilateral conventions coded for only five PTAs are the Nairobi Treaty on the Protec-
tion of the Olympic Symbol and the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations 
of Origin and their International Registration. Besides the clear leader TRIPS, which is 
referenced in 220 PTAs, the Paris Convention (204 PTAs), the Bern Convention (202 
PTAs), the WIPO Convention (160 PTAs) and the Rome Convention (151 PTAs) are 
referenced most often in PTAs. 
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The convention deadline average across all PTAs including a reference to an IPR 
multilateral convention is one year, and among those including a deadline the average 
lies at four years. The development of multilateral coherence is shown in subchapter 3.3.6 
according to the regions and the distribution of multilateral coherence variables for se-
lected countries in subchapter 3.3.7. 
3.3.5 Descriptive Statistics TRIPS-plus 
The descriptive statistics are based on the indexes of the coded TRIPS-plus variables. 
The indexes summarise the TRIPS-plus variables coded per category, i.e. either the in-
dexes range over all variables coded on TRIPS-plus provisions (ipr_tripsplus_per_ 
pta_dummy) or are summarized per IPR area, enforcement, and exhaustion (see 3.1.2.5). 
For more details on the coded variables see Appendix 3: Codebook of T+PTA Dataset. 
In the dataset, there are 136 PTAs (20%) that include at least one TRIPS-plus provi-
sion. As shown in Graph 3: Percentage of PTAs with IPR Provision by Time Cohorts, 
there are no PTAs including TRIPS-plus provisions before 1991, and their share in new 
PTAs constantly remains low. Only since the post-information revolution period (2001-
today, see M. Kim 2015, 31 et seqq.), the number of PTAs including TRIPS-plus provi-
sions clearly starts to rise, and today (2011-2018) 68% of PTAs include TRIPS-plus reg-
ulations. Graph 10 on the following page illustrates, which TRIPS-plus categories are 
regulated most often by at least one coded TRIPS-plus variable in PTAs. 
Most often regulated in PTAs on a TRIPS-plus level are IPR enforcement (92 PTAs), 
geographical indications (90 PTAs) and new plant varieties (90 PTAs). In around 10% of 
all PTAs, there are TRIPS-plus provisions on trademarks (70 PTAs), followed by regu-
lations on copyrights (59 PTAs), patents (52 PTAs), industrial designs (52 PTAs) and 
undisclosed information (46 PTAs). There are fewer agreements including TRIPS-plus 
provisions on encrypted program-carrying satellite signals (29 PTAs), TK and GR (24 
PTAs) or domain names (17 PTAs). And only a handful of agreements regulates exhaus-
tion (6 PTAs) and layout-designs (topographies) of integrated circuits (3 PTAs). 
Those PTAs that include TRIPS-plus provisions on average include regulations on 14 
different variables. A majority of PTAs with TRIPS-plus content regulates trademarks 
(51%), GIs (66%), new plant varieties (66%) and enforcement (68%) on a TRIPS-plus 
level. The following subchapters illustrate the TRIPS-plus development for different re-
gions (3.3.6) and selected countries (3.3.7). 
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Graph 10: Occurrence of TRIPS-plus Variables 
 
 
3.3.6 Descriptive Statistics Grouped by Region 
As shown in the previous subchapters, the dissemination of IPR variables varies over 
time and possibly also by region (see Table 15: Word Count by Region). Therefore, this 
subchapter groups some of the indexes according to their regional affiliation. DESTA 
provides two different forms of regional classifications based on the PTA member states 
(see Table 6: Regional Classification of PTAs). First, the graphs divide the PTAs into the 
categories of north-north (NN), north-south (NS), and south-south (SS) agreements 
(Graph 10). Afterwards, the PTAs are compared according to their continental embed-
dedness, i.e. if all member states are located on the same continent (intracontinental) or 
if the agreement spans across continents and is intercontinental (Graph 12 and Graph 13). 
For the display of NN, NS and SS PTAs in Graph 10, I use the indexes for general 
IPR (ipr_general_sum), specific IPR (ipr_specific_sum), TRIPS-plus (ipr_tripsplus_ 
per_pta) and multilateral coherence (ipr_multilateral_coherence_dummy_sum) (see Ap-
pendix 2: Codebook of IPRs in PTAs Dataset). The indexes are displayed cumulatively 
for different periods relative to the number of PTAs signed by each region per year. The 
graphs start for each index in the year before the first occurrence (index > 0). The first 
general IPR is included in 1977 (graph ranges from 1976-2018); the first specific IPR and 
TRIPS-plus provisions are included in 1991 (graphs range from 1990-2018); the first 
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IPR multilateral coherence index shows if any of the multilateral coherence agreements 
was referenced regardless of the bindingness of the commitment. 
 
Graph 11: Development of IPR Provisions by Region (NN-NS-SS) 
 
 
The graph on general IPR shows that north-south PTAs include general IPR provi-
sions before both north-north and south-south PTAs. The NS and SS agreements start to 
increase their provisions later and until 2010 regulate on a similar level. After that, the 
SS PTAs take off and even surpass the NS agreements with their regulation of general 
IPRs. Specific IPRs are included on a much lower level than general IPRs and are almost 
congruent with the inclusion of TRIPS-plus provisions. Both specific and TRIPS-plus 
provisions show the same regional trends. North-south PTAs include early on already 
specific as well as TRIPS-plus provisions and are the ones with the steepest increase over 
time. North-north PTAs are and remain at a low level and are superseded by south-south 
agreements in 2016. By taking into consideration the number of PTAs per region and the 
sum of provisions on general IPR, IPR specific and TRIPS-plus provision over time, it 
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becomes clear that north-south PTAs include the most specific and TRIPS-plus provi-
sions. South-south agreements are catching up and have already surpassed them in re-
gards to general IPR provisions, whilst north-north agreements remain on a low level of 
regulation. 
The graph on IPR multilateral coherence shows comparable developments on a higher 
level, as far more PTAs include some form of reference to IPR conventions than on other 
IPR regulations (see range of axes of the four graphs). Again, north-south agreements 
include by far the most provisions on IPR multilateral coherence. However, south-south 
PTAs also show a steep increase in references to IPR conventions. And same as for the 
other graphs, north-north agreements operate on a much lower level than NS and SS 
PTAs.  
An alternative way to differentiate PTAs is according to the continent base of PTA 
members for example if all PTA members are from Africa. Graph 12 and Graph 13 on 
the next pages illustrate the occurrence of tangible commitments on the eleven coded IPR 
areas according to the continental region of the PTA members.  
The PTAs within the regions of Africa resp. Oceania includes no tangible IPR scope 
variables and are therefore not displayed in a graph. Graph 12 shows the occurrence of 
tangible IPR scope provisions in PTAs of the Americas and Asia as a percentage of all 
PTAs for the respective region. 
PTAs between countries from the American continent have no IPR area that is in-
cluded in a majority of PTAs. Their preferred IPR areas to protect by tangible provisions 
are encrypted program-carrying satellite signals (43% of PTAs) and domain names (41% 
of PTAs). Their least common IPR area protected by tangible regulations in PTAs are 
new plant varieties (7% of PTAs) and industrial design (8% of PTAs). The agreements 
between Asian countries, on the other hand, include tangible provisions in fewer PTAs 
than the Americas. Unlike the Americas, the highest scoring and thus mostly represented 
IPR area in Asian PTAs are new plant varieties (20% of PTAs). Also, Asian PTAs have 
slightly more PTAs including industrial design (10% of PTAs) than the Americas (8% of 
PTAs). However, they do not regulate layout-designs of integrated circuits nor domain 
names on a tangible level through their PTAs (0% of PTAs). The following Graph 13 
illustrates the occurrence of tangible IPR scope provisions in PTAs of Europe and be-
tween intercontinental PTA members. 
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Europe’s PTAs include in every second PTA tangible provisions on layout-designs of 
integrated circuits (50% of PTAs), yet no tangible regulations for traditional knowledge 
and genetic resources, encrypted program-carrying satellite signals nor domain names. 
The inclusion of new plant varieties in PTAs among European countries is as likely as in 
Asian PTAs (20% of PTAs). Moreover, Europe’s PTAs protect industrial design more 
than the other continental regions (31% of PTAs). 
All intracontinental regions include less tangible IPR provisions than the interconti-
nental PTAs. The only IPR area, where intercontinental provisions are less frequent than 
intra-regionals are the topographies of integrated circuits (38% of intercontinental PTAs; 
50% of Europe’s PTAs), which is the least common IPR provision in intercontinental 
PTAs. By far the most common one in PTAs between European members are traditional 
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Graph 12 and Graph 13 show that PTAs with partners from different continents con-
tain more often tangible IPR provisions than intracontinental agreements. Altogether 
missing from the graphs are intracontinental agreements for Africa and Oceania. Hence, 
if countries from Africa or Oceania include tangible provisions, then it must be in inter-
continental agreements. To see, if there is a comparable variation among countries, the 
next subchapter illustrates the inclusion of IPR along the different indexes. 
3.3.7 Descriptive Statistics Grouped by Selected Countries 
As seen in the previous subchapter, there exists substantial variation on the IPR con-
tent of PTAs according to the regional composition of PTA members. But how is the 
situation for individual countries? In order to show the variation across countries, the 
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Included in the comparison are the index on the general IPR content based on the 
general IPR, general enforcement and the mentioned IPR scope variables (ipr_gen-
eral_sum); the index on the specific IPR content based on the specific enforcement and 
tangible IPR scope variables (ipr_specific_sum); the index on general enforcement 
(ipr_general_enforcement_sum) and specific enforcement (ipr_specific_enforce-
ment_sum); the mentioned IPR scope (ipr_scope_mentioned_sum) and tangible IPR 
scope variables (ipr_scope_tangible_sum); the index on IPR multilateral coherence vari-
ables regardless of their bindingness (ipr_multilateral_coherence_dummy_sum); the 
overall index of TRIPS-plus variables (ipr_tripsplus_per_pta) as well as the index of 
TRIPS-plus variables on enforcement (ipr_tripsplus_enforcement) and exhaustion 
(ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion). For more detailed information on the calculation see Appen-
dix 2: Codebook of IPRs in PTAs Dataset. 
The decision on which countries should be displayed out of the 202 covered in the 
IPRs in PTAs dataset, is primarily based on groups and countries related to specific IPR 
characteristics identified by Maskus (2012). For the descriptive statistics, there are twelve 
countries resp. country consortiums – namely the EU and EFTA – that lend themselves 
for the analysis of IPR regulation. These twelve are grouped into three blocks based on 
different IPR criteria (see Maskus 2012). 
The first block of countries represents those that are the obvious choice for IPR anal-
ysis: western countries and consortiums with a large market and a high interest of pro-
tecting their innovation. These are the US, EU, EFTA, and Japan, whereby most previous 
analysis has concentrated on PTAs by the US, the EU and Japan. However, the EFTA 
members are also at the forefront of negotiating PTAs leading to 42 EFTA PTAs covered 
by the IPRs in PTAs dataset, which is almost twice as many as the US represented with 
23 PTAs in the dataset (see Table 18 for the number of PTAs for this category). Further-
more, these are the countries prominently arguing for more stringent IPR protection such 
as by initiating the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) signed in 2011. That 
these countries tend to include more on IPRs in PTAs has already been shown in the so 
far most comprehensive coding of IPRs in PTAs by Valdés and McCann (2014) (see 2.3 
Previous Research on IPRs in PTAs, 36). The first block is labelled as “classic IPR lead-
ers”.  
For the other two blocks of countries, I draw on the analysis by Maskus (2012). In his 
analysis of the Ginarte-Park index on patent rights – that is often used to identify the 
domestic IPR regulation and compare it internationally – Maskus (2012) shows that India 
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(265%), China (207%), Taiwan (198%), Mexico (186%) and Brazil (181%) percentage-
wise have seen a vast rise in patent protection. Furthermore, he creates two groups of 
countries: countries recently increasing their IPR protection for various reasons, and 
countries that “have achieved major increases in per capita incomes and have trans-
formed their economies into producers and developers of high-technology goods and so-
phisticated business services” (Maskus 2012, 29–30). 
The second block of countries consists of those countries that have seen a strong in-
crease of patent protection over time and have a substantial market, which are Brazil, 
China, India, and Mexico. Going forward, this block of countries is called “recent IPR 
regulators” (see Table 19 for the number of PTAs for this category).  
The third block is termed “new IP producers and developers” and consists of Israel, 
South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, that today all have stringent IPR protection in place 
(see Table 20 for the number of PTAs for this category). Table 17 summarises the country 
selection based on Maskus (2012) according to their IPR-relevant grouping. These blocks 
of countries are used for the following graphs in this subchapter. 
 
Table 17: IPR Country Selection Criteria 
Country Classification 
US Classic IP leaders 
EU Classic IP leaders 
EFTA Classic IP leaders 
Japan Classic IP leaders 
Brazil Countries with a high increase of patent protection 
China Countries with a high increase of patent protection 
India Countries with a high increase of patent protection 
Mexico Countries with a high increase of patent protection 
Israel New IP producers and developers 
South Korea New IP producers and developers 
Singapore New IP producers and developers 
Taiwan New IP producers and developers 
 
 
The subsequent graphs will show the summarised descriptive statistics for each se-
lected block. The detailed PTA-level scores on the indexes are listed for each country in 
the appendix (Appendix 5 to Appendix 16).  
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Graph 14 illustrates the sum for the indexes for the classic IP leaders the US, EU, 
EFTA, and Japan.  
 
Graph 14: IPR Indexes by Classic IP Leaders 
 
 
It shows that there is an immense variation between the IP leaders’ preferences of IPR 
regulation. Whilst the EU and EFTA by far spread the most general IPR provisions 
through PTAs, the US is the country scoring highest on the overall TRIPS-plus index and 
TRIPS-plus enforcement index. This implies that the US is the country including most 
consistently and to the largest extent provisions that go beyond the TRIPS requirements 
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IPR multilateral coherence, whereas EFTA scores highest on the specific IPR index sum-
marising the index on tangible IPR scope and specific enforcement. The EU is thus con-
sistently promoting other fora of IPR regulation through PTAs, whilst the EFTA members 
are including specific regulations in their PTAs. Japan scores lowest on all indexes except 
on the index of TRIPS-plus enforcement, where it is undercut by EFTA. Graph 14 shows 
that even among this small group of countries with supposedly similar intentions for IPR 
regulations the manner of including them in PTAs varies substantially. 
Bearing in mind that Graph 14 draws on the sum of provisions across the dataset 
without considering the number of PTAs per country, it becomes evident that even though 
the US has only around half of the number of EFTA’s PTAs and a fourth of the EU’s 
PTA, the US ranks highest on the overall TRIPS-plus and the TRIPS-plus enforcement 
index. The sum of indexes allows to visualise the global impact of each country group. 
However, it might distort the actual content of PTAs from the specific countries as their 
quantity of PTAs varies substantially. Thus, Table 18 shows the average on the indexes 
taking into account the number of PTAs per country. 
 
Table 18: IPR Indexes by Classic IP Leaders (average per PTA) 
Sum of Indexes  









ipr_general_sum 15 6 13 17 
ipr_specific_sum 9 2 5 8 
ipr_general_enforcement_sum 3 1 2 3 
ipr_specific_enforcement_sum 4 1 3 4 
ipr_scope_mentioned_sum 6 3 7 7 
ipr_scope_tangible_sum 5 1 3 4 
ipr_multilateral_coherence_2 10 5 7 10 
ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 23 5 5 11 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement 12 2 1 7 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion 0 0 0 0 
 
This changes the picture somehow as unlike in Graph 14 both the US and Japan score 
highest for all indexes when looking at the average IPR content per PTA. The only index 
where the score of Japan is equalled by EFTA is the mentioned scope of IPR areas, where 
on average both Japan and EFTA include seven IPR areas. Out of these four country 
groups, the US is very clearly the country regulating TRIPS-plus the most and on average 
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includes 23 TRIPS-plus provisions per PTA. This reflects the same results for TRIPS-
plus as seen in Graph 14. 
These differences in Graph 14 and Table 18 have a number of implications. Firstly, 
they suggest that Japan and the US have a more consistent strategy on IPR regulations 
than the EU and EFTA. Even though the EU and EFTA agreements sum-wise include the 
most on certain IPR regulations (Graph 14) that is not the case when looking at it rela-
tively to their number of PTAs (Table 18). This implies that EFTA and the EU have more 
variation across their PTAs regarding the IPR regulation. Secondly, Table 18 shows that 
both Japan and especially the US are moving towards a maximum standard of IPR pro-
tection well beyond TRIPS (see Figure 7: Diverging Ideals of IPR Standards). 
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Looking at the second group of countries with a high increase in patent protection in 
Graph 15, it is clear, that they include much less IPR provisions than the first block of 
countries. They continually score lower than the IPR leaders except for Mexico on 
TRIPS-plus provisions compared to Japan. And none of these countries contains provi-
sions on TRIPS-plus exhaustion matters. Among Brazil, China, India and Mexico, there 
are mostly China and Mexico including a substantial sum of IPR provisions in their PTAs. 
When looking at their PTA-relative IPR regulation in Table 19, the relations remain 
stable as still China and Mexico dominate each index. However, the PTA average shows 
that the IPR regulations of China and Mexico are much more like the ones of the previous 
block than anticipated based on Graph 15, especially to the EU. Brazil includes next to 
none IPR provisions in its PTAs, and the PTA average is thus rendered to nil. India in-
cludes similarly few IPR provisions, yet contrary to Brazil tends to include at least general 
provisions on IPRs. Both China and Mexico generally include TRIPS-plus provisions, 
and although they tend to include only one provision on general and specific enforcement, 
they both include multiple TRIPS-plus enforcement provisions. Nevertheless, the en-
forcement provisions for all four countries seem particularly low at one per average PTA 
besides the TRIPS-plus enforcement provisions. 
 
Table 19: IPR Indexes by Recent IPR Regulators (average per PTA) 
Sum of Indexes  









ipr_general_sum 0 9 2 6 
ipr_specific_sum 0 3 0 3 
ipr_general_enforcement_sum 0 1 1 1 
ipr_specific_enforcement_sum 0 1 0 1 
ipr_scope_mentioned_sum 0 4 0 3 
ipr_scope_tangible_sum 0 2 0 2 
ipr_multilateral_coherence_2 0 6 0 3 
ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0 4 0 6 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement 0 2 0 3 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion 0 0 0 0 
 
Graph 16 shows that the third block of new IP producers and developers scores higher 
than the second group on the IPR indexes, yet lower than the first block of classic IPR 
leaders. Out of the countries in this group, South Korea and Singapore score highest on 
all indexes. Taiwan scores constantly low except for the index IPR general, whereas Israel 
Chapter 3: Dataset on Intellectual Property Rights in PTAs  108 
additionally has a substantial sum on the mentioned IPR scope. South Korea and Singa-
pore score relatively high on the IPR multilateral coherence, the overall TRIPS-plus and 
the TRIPS-plus enforcement index, even though their sum of tangible IPR provisions is 
low compared to the countries out of the first block. This is astonishing as Graph 11: 
Development of IPR Provisions by Region (NN-NS-SS) shows that specific IPRs – con-
sisting partially out of the tangible IPR scope variables – and TRIPS-plus provisions fol-
low a highly similar development over time. 
 
Graph 16: IPR Indexes by New IPR Producers and Developers 
 
 
Table 20 highlights that South Korea and Taiwan score highest on the IPR indexes 
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besides South Korea the highest sums of IPR provisions. South Korea scores exception-
ally high on TRIPS-plus provisions and includes in an average PTA nine TRIPS-plus 
provisions, followed by Singapore with five provisions and Taiwan with three provisions 
per PTA. South Korea also scores comparatively high on the IPR multilateral coherence 
index and includes on average references to seven IPR conventions. On average, none of 
these countries includes anything on TRIPS-plus exhaustion, yet the detailed coding 
shows that Taiwan includes a national exhaustion provision for copyrights in the agree-
ment between Panama and Taiwan signed in 2003. 
 
Table 20: IPR Indexes by New IPR Producers and Developers (av. per PTA) 
Sum of Indexes  









ipr_general_sum 7 12 10 16 
ipr_specific_sum 0 5 3 4 
ipr_general_enforcement_sum 1 3 2 4 
ipr_specific_enforcement_sum 0 3 1 2 
ipr_scope_mentioned_sum 4 4 4 6 
ipr_scope_tangible_sum 0 2 2 3 
ipr_multilateral_coherence_2 1 7 4 3 
ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0 9 5 3 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement 0 4 2 0 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion 0 0 0 0 
 
The three blocks illustrate that there is substantial variation in-between countries ap-
proach on regulating IPRs (shown in the tables) and their global reach through the sheer 
amount of PTAs they sign (shown in the graphs). Whilst some have a consistent strategy 
and score high or low on both charts, others appear to have either less reach than antici-
pated by only being part to a couple of agreements or an inconsistent strategy on IPR 
regulation lowering their average score through their variation across PTAs. To explore 
the reasons for these variations, the next chapter analyses the design of IPRs in PTAs in 
more detail. 
The following chapters use the dataset to analyse the variation in the design, and the 
effects of IPRs in PTAs. Depending on each topic, the dataset is adapted, and additional 
data added. More details on the data used for each analysis can be found in the respective 
subchapter. 
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Chapter 4:  Design of Intellectual Property Rights in PTAs 
The dataset shows that there is significant variation in the way countries regulate IPRs 
through PTAs. The term design circumscribes the variation of the content of intellectual 
property provisions in trade agreements, i.e. how the IPR provisions in PTAs are drafted. 
While some agreements include no provisions on IPRs, others include general regula-
tions, specific provisions or even go beyond the comprehensive IPR regulation standard 
of TRIPS in their regulation efforts. The design of IPRs in PTAs thus focuses on the 
variations in the IPR commitments through PTAs and this chapter on the analysis of the 
causes of the broad differences in IPR provisions. 
There already has been substantial research on the design of PTAs focusing on fea-
tures such as dispute settlement and investment (Allee and Elsig 2015; Baccini and Dür 
2015), and research classifying the design of PTAs according to, for example, the level 
of detail and the overall obligation of provisions, i.e. the depth of the PTAs (Dür, Baccini, 
and Elsig 2014), or the flexibilities of provisions (Kucik 2012).  
The design of IPRs in PTAs has been analysed in detail, yet predominately from the 
angle of creating descriptive statements for small-n comparisons, and thereby mostly ze-
roing in on the PTAs of one country. While the descriptive analyses and case studies are 
useful to study specific PTAs, they fall short in generating findings that can be general-
ized and allow reliable comparisons of the approaches of IPR regulations across coun-
tries. Besides the descriptive studies, the few empirical analyses mostly draw on an over-
simplified IPR content of PTAs such as the existence or absence of an IPR chapter in the 
PTA. This used to be a common approach for the analysis of trade agreements: 
 
“A substantial proportion of the existing literature on PTAs consists of either case studies 
that fail to put the key features of a specific PTA into a broader context or quantitative studies 
that operationalise PTAs in the form of a dichotomous variable, that is, a variable that only 
captures the presence or absence of a PTA.” Dür und Elsig (2015, 2) 
 
The usage of the binary approach to reflect the IPR content of a PTA is in thus far 
problematic as the design of IPRs in PTAs shows high variation, which suggests that it 
matters to countries what IPR provisions are included or excluded from PTAs. Without 
more detailed information on the IPR content, the reasons for the differences cannot be 
analysed and explained. Furthermore, studies on the effects of IPRs in PTAs might be 
skewed or biased as without detailed coding the observable effects about correlations will 
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be unprecise (see Chapter 5: Effects of Intellectual Property Rights in PTAs). The previ-
ous analyses thus lack the tools for a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the design 
of IPRs in PTAs. Now that we have a systematic dataset on IPRs in PTAs, it is essential 
to understand the mechanisms behind these variations in design and try to explain what 
influences the variations in the design of IPRs in PTAs. 
There exist plenty of assumption and expectations on the design of intellectual prop-
erty rights in PTAs. For example, a reoccurring argument ever since the TRIPS negotia-
tions is, that industrialised countries with major IPR industries strong-armed other coun-
tries into accepting more stringent IPR regulation in trade agreements. Another one is that 
developing countries concur to more stringent IPR provisions only if they gain market 
access rights in return.  
Yet another argument postulates, that the preferences for the design of IPRs in PTAs 
does not only depend on the development stage of a country but is rather based on the 
specific country’s preferences. For example, Deere (2009, 114–15) states that after 
TRIPS was signed, “major economic powers shared many objectives. Both the United 
States and the European Union wanted, for instance to extend TRIPS patent protection 
to plant biotechnology, plants, and animals. But the major powers also had some distinct 
priorities. While the European Union favoured the extension of protection for geograph-
ical indications beyond wines and spirits, the United States and Australia opposed this 
agenda. Further, Canada, which like developing countries was a net importer of IP, was 
the only developed country that actively intervened to defend some particular TRIPS flex-
ibilities.” To analyse how accurate such statements on countries preferences can predict 
the design of IPRs in PTAs, it is important to have a comprehensive dataset on IPRs in 
PTAs to test them. Furthermore, it is necessary to analyse the design of IPRs in PTAs 
from a broad theoretical perspective as there are diverging theoretical expectations lead-
ing to multiple and ambiguous explanations for the rationale of including IPRs in PTAs. 
A comprehensive theoretical approach allows to better understand the main drivers and 
identify different types of rationales, which makes it possible to explain why similar coun-
tries act differently resp. dissimilar countries behave alike. 
As elaborated in 2.2.1.3 Rationale of IPRs in PTAs, there are different theories on the 
reasons for countries to include IPRs in PTAs. Of course, countries might include IPRs 
based on the rationale of IPRs, i.e. to avoid a market failure, foster an innovative envi-
ronment and spur growth and welfare (see 2.2.1.2 Rationale of IPRs), or the rationale of 
PTAs, i.e. to decrease trade barriers and harmonise regulations (see 2.2.1.1 Rationale of 
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PTAs). Hence, countries might act based on the rationale of IPRs in PTAs and either aim 
to reinforce a minimum or maximum standard of IPR protection through including IPRs 
in PTAs (see 2.2.1.3 Rationale of IPRs in PTAs). Furthermore, there might be other fac-
tors derived from GPE theories explaining a country’s IPR design choice.  
This chapter focuses on the connection between the rationale of IPRs in PTAs, GPE 
theories and the measurable factors on design variations. The focus lies on allocating 
general patterns for the rationale of IPRs in PTAs based on domestic characteristics. How-
ever, this chapter will not take into account attitudinal factors such as attitudes of PTA 
negotiators or the public towards IPRs or PTAs at a given time having a possible impact 
on the PTA. This chapter centres around the domestic trade-related aspects and proven 
reliable predictors of PTA design as found in the GPE literature. 
The analysis of the design of IPRs in PTAs is especially important as their design 
impacts not only the PTA members but due to the non-preferential nature of IPRs in 
PTAs, the variation in the design of IPRs in PTAs also has global consequences. Thus 
even though PTAs are negotiated only among PTA members and reflect bilateral or mul-
tilateral preferences, their implications have international characteristics and influence 
IPR regulation beyond the group of PTA members. It is thus necessary to analyse what 
drives the design of IPRs in PTAs in order to understand why and in what direction global 
IPR regulation is heading. So the question remains, why countries prefer to include a 
certain IPR commitments over another and what level of IPR protection they are willing 
to include in PTAs. The design analysis can thus improve both the academic research 
approach by looking at the mechanisms behind design preferences and moving beyond 
the effect analysis, as well as provide policy makers with evidence-based arguments. 
In the previous chapter, I provided descriptive statistics based on my dataset, which 
provides insights on the content of IPRs in PTAs, whilst in this chapter, I provide some 
explanations on the design preferences. Firstly, I draw on GPE theories, the rationale of 
IPRs in PTAs, and more general PTA and IPR arguments for treaty design to derive hy-
potheses on design choices of IPRs in PTAs. Secondly, I use the dataset of IPRs in PTAs, 
use the coded variables as well as create new indexes that allow to test the hypotheses. 
Thirdly, I analyse the data and discuss the findings for the hypotheses and discuss how 
well the hypotheses hold. Lastly, I conclude and summarise by reflecting on the central 
insights gained on the design of IPRs in PTAs. 
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4.1 Design: Theoretical Context and Hypotheses 
The basic assumption behind the design of IPRs in PTAs is that countries aim to in-
clude those provisions that reflect their IPR rationale. Following the rationale of IPRs in 
PTAs shown in subchapter 2.2.1.3, I expect to find different patterns as some countries 
are in favour of more stringent IPR protection through PTAs whilst others are in favour 
of less IPRs in PTAs. 
In theory, it is assumed that countries have a clear preference for IPR regulation and 
either aim towards a minimum or maximum standard of intellectual property regulation 
in PTAs. The underlying assumption is that countries voluntarily enter PTAs, and that 
negotiations happen between equal trading partners. Accordingly, it would be expected 
that the design of IPRs in PTAs follows a logical categorisation, which elaborate in the 
following two paragraphs. 
Firstly, when PTA members with diverging ideals on IPRs enter into a PTA, then the 
design should reflect the middle ground between members aiming for a minimum IPR 
standard as well as other members reaching for a maximum IPR standard, assuming that 
PTA partners have an equal influence on the PTA design. Therefore, when PTA members 
with opposing ideal enter a PTA, the IPR design will most likely range between general 
to some few specific IPR provisions and steer a middle course of both rationales. 
Secondly, if countries pursuing similar IPR ideals enter into a PTA together, there are 
two anticipated scenarios. On the one hand, when partners striving for a minimum IPR 
standard sign a mutual PTA, then it is likely that the PTA will include predominately 
general IPR provisions, for example, repeating flexibilities granted in TRIPS, or these 
PTAs might not include any IPR provisions. In this instance, the overall level of IPR 
protection is anticipated to be kept on a very low level reflecting the preference of a min-
imum IPR standard. On the other hand, if both PTA members endeavour to establish a 
maximum IPR standard, then the design of IPRs is expected to be distinguished by spe-
cific IPR provisions or even TRIPS-plus provisions, as both partners aim for more strin-
gent IPR protection and a maximum IPR standard. Table 21 on the next page summarises 
these basic assumptions on the anticipated IPR design variations assuming that countries 
have a distinct preference for either a minimum or maximum IPR standard, and design 
the IPR section in PTAs according to their IPR ideals (see Figure 7: Diverging Ideals of 
IPR Standards). 
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Table 21: Expected Design Variations Based on IPR Ideals 
IPR Ideals of Members Direction of IPR Standard IPR Provisions in PTA 
Diverging IPR ideals Mediocre IPR standard General, few specific IPR provisions 
Similar IPR ideals 
Minimum IPR standard None or only general IPR provisions 
Maximum IPR standard Specific IPR and TRIPS-plus provisions 
 
However, these are not the scenarios reflected in the data on IPRs in PTAs. For ex-
ample, the US aims towards a maximum IPR standard, yet negotiates its agreements pre-
dominately with countries that presumably fall into the opposing category of the IPR 
ideal. If countries negotiated strictly based on their IPR ideals and can negotiate PTAs 
freely and equally, I would expect that IPR is regulated in the middle of both ideals when 
countries are preferring a minimum IPR standard sign a PTA with the US reaching for a 
maximum standard. Such agreements with the US are, nevertheless, not as general on 
IPR regulation as I would expect when countries with diverging ideals negotiate an agree-
ment. Moreover, the US agreements seem to follow an apparent, consistent path on IPR 
regulation according to the IPR preferences of the US, seemingly regardless of the PTA 
members. 
 On the other hand, agreements with PTA members that likely have the same ideal on 
IPR regulation also do not reflect these similarities in the design of IPRs in PTAs. Indus-
trialised countries tend to prefer a maximum standard of IPR protection as the citation 
from Deere (2009, 114–15) implies above whereas countries of the south category are 
said to be pursuing a minimum IPR standard due to their small domestic IPR production. 
This goes hand in hand with the reoccurring argument that the preference of IPR ideals 
follows the north-south divide (see 2.2.1.3 Rationale of IPRs in PTAs). According to these 
assumptions on north-south ideals and the relationships laid out in Table 21, north-north 
PTAs would be expected to include specific and TRIPS-plus IPR provisions as both PTA 
members aim for a maximum standard of IPR protection. South-south PTAs, on the other 
hand, would be anticipated to include none or only general IPR provisions as both PTA 
members pursue a minimum standard of IPR protection.  
Nevertheless, the data shown in subchapter 3.3.6 Descriptive Statistics Grouped by 
Region likewise shows a different picture for these cases. For example, north-north agree-
ments score notoriously low on IPR regulation and only nine out of 54 NN PTAs even 
Chapter 4: Design of Intellectual Property Rights in PTAs  116 
include any specific IPR provisions. Contrary, recent south-south agreements often in-
clude specific IPR provisions (so far 53 SS PTAs, about as many as NN PTAs). This 
implies that either the regional classification into south PTA members aiming for a min-
imum IPR standard and north PTA members aiming for a maximum IPR standard is out-
dated, or that countries do not consequently follow their IPR ideals through PTAs. It fur-
ther suggests that there might be other factors for countries to decide upon the design of 
IPRs in PTAs. 
So, if countries do not regulate IPRs in PTAs according to their anticipated IPR ideals, 
what could explain a countries preference? The general theory laid out in 2.2.1.3 Ra-
tionale of IPRs in PTAs falls short in explaining the actual outcomes and decision making 
of countries according to the dataset on IPRs in PTAs. Therefore, it is necessary to draw 
on alternatives theories to explain the design of IPRs in PTAs. In international relations, 
the theories of global political economy (GPE) have concerned itself with explaining in-
ternational behaviour and proved to score high on explanatory power for explaining PTA 
negotiations and outcomes (see 2.2.2 Global Political Economy Theories).  
The four main GPE theories predict countries behaviour based on different assump-
tions along of the two main lines of either international relation theories such as realism 
or in the tradition of focusing on domestic factors, influenced by neo-classical economics 
and interest group politics. Firstly, realism focuses on states’ interests and assumes that 
power relations play an important role in international relations such as creating trade 
agreements (see 2.2.2.1 Realism). Secondly, liberalism assumes that countries are inter-
dependent and therefore prone to coordinate and cooperate if they want to protect their 
interests efficiently (see 2.2.2.2 Liberalism). Thirdly, social-constructivism postulates 
that (social) norms such as ideas and identity influence international relations and trade 
agreements are not only defined by power relations or domestic interests (see 2.2.2.3 So-
cial-constructivism). And fourthly, modern marxism states that countries are driven by a 
class struggle, that in international relations is represented by the north-south divide 
whereby developed countries aim to protect their interest and further their economic dom-
inance (see 2.2.2.4 Modern Marxism).  
These theoretical GPE arguments have been used to explain PTAs and further devel-
oped to give some insights to countries preferences on the design of PTAs. In subchapter 
2.2.2 Global Political Economy Theories, I laid out the possible implications for IPRs in 
PTAs, and in the subsequent section, I will elaborate on these GPE explanations to ex-
plain the design of IPRs in PTAs. Additionally, I draw on other existing theoretical and 
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empirical findings on PTAs, IPRs and IPRs in PTAs that could shed some light on coun-
tries’ design preferences. However, the arguments are not always exclusively used by a 
specific GPE theory, but by multiple ones and often differ only by the underlying as-
sumption of the behavioural mechanism of countries. Simplified, an argument can be 
made by realism arguing countries act a certain way based on a power rationale, liberal-
ism would argue it is due to their interests, marxism based on a class-struggle, and social-
constructivism due to ideas. Furthermore, certain arguments are not revisited as there 
exist no comprehensive data to analyse the postulated effects. For example, there is no 
domestic data on attitudes or beliefs on intellectual property, making assumptions about 
ideas and beliefs and thus social-constructivism difficult to analyse. The following argu-
ments are thus largely based on previous research and only include measurable factors. 
One of the key explanatory factors provided by GPE realist-type theory to explain a 
countries preference in international relations is power respectively power asymmetries 
(realism). For trade relations, the most apparent characterisation of power is the economic 
capacity of a country. However, PTAs are formed in a negotiating process that includes 
economic power and go beyond it. Dür and Mateo (2010, 565) deduct that the “bargain-
ing power in international negotiations stems from three sources: (1) the overall power 
resources of a country, (2) the best alternative to negotiated agreement (BATNA) and (3) 
the constraints imposed upon governments by domestic ratification requirements.” Ac-
cording to Dür and Mateo (2010, 565), the PTA negotiations process can thus be de-
scribed by realism arguments (argument 1 and 2), as well as liberalism arguments of do-
mestic interests and their constraints (2, 3). These arguments could also prove to be ex-
planatory for the design of IPRs in PTAs. 
 In the following subchapters, I will, therefore, explore the effect on the design of 
IPRs of economic and political power by looking at Economic Power Asymmetry (4.1.1) 
and Political Pressure (US-specific) (4.1.2). Furthermore, I will analyse the BATNA ar-
gument by looking at the way countries use PTAs instead of other fora of IPR regulation 
under the label of Regime Preference (4.1.6), that finds support in both the realism and 
institutional liberalism theory. Subsequently, I will test the influence of domestic con-
straints by looking at Veto Players (4.1.4) on the design of IPRs in PTA which is also 
associated with the liberalism. 
Besides the power argument, regime preferences and domestic constraints, the next 
key factor in explaining the design of IPRs in PTAs are domestic interest. As the inter-
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ventionist liberal theory suggests, domestic interests are a key factor for countries to in-
tervene in the market and regulate through trade agreements (liberalism). I will thus ana-
lyse how Domestic Interests are likely to shape the design of IPRs in PTAs (4.1.3). 
Of course, there are also IPR specific assumptions on countries preferences of PTA 
regulation. Biadgleng and Maur (2011, 3 et seqq.) allocate six reasons why countries 
choose to regulate IPRs through PTAs. In the following paragraphs, I describe these six 
arguments and connect them, where possible to a GPE theory and the argument I focus 
on for the analysis of IPR design. For those arguments not used in my analysis, I elaborate 
later on why they are not considered for the theoretical background. 
Firstly, PTAs are an ideal forum for innovation, i.e. a forum ideally suited for new 
regulatory approaches as the bilateral compared to the multilateral approach allows for 
possible amendments and later adaptions through comparably easier bilateral renegotia-
tions (liberalism). I include this argument in the discussion on Regime Preference (4.1.6). 
Secondly, PTAs are attractive as in some cases there is a substantial asymmetry be-
tween PTA members, which allows the stronger PTA member to pursue their regulatory 
preferences. Moreover, PTAs allow a more systematic and agenda-setting approach on 
the member selection than international fora (realism, marxism). The few numbers of 
PTA members simplifies the negotiations on IPR regulations (collective action argument 
by liberalism). These arguments are included in the analysis of Economic Power Asym-
metry (4.1.1), Political Pressure (US-specific) (4.1.2) and Veto Players (4.1.4). 
Thirdly, PTAs include trade-offs, i.e. PTA members have a broader palette of possible 
concessions in turn for their preferred IPR regulation through the bargaining processes 
on different topics (realism; see Baccini, Dür, and Elsig 2015). This argument is part of 
the Economic Power Asymmetry (4.1.1). 
Fourthly, PTAs sometimes include specific provisions to regulate cases of non-com-
pliance by a “withdrawal of concessions”. Thus PTAs sometimes offer more options to 
deal with the consequences of not implementing or enforcing IPR provisions and espe-
cially in the cases of a trade-off on IPRs, PTAs provide effective trade retaliation means 
through the possibility of nullifying other concessions (realism).  
Fifthly, PTAs offer an alternative form of dispute settlement and depending on the 
perspective might offer more or less attractive DSMs than other fora. Sixthly, PTAs give 
space to use soft law, i.e. include IPR commitments that leave certain flexibility on the 
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concrete implementation (liberalism). Such commitments are less binding, but also ac-
ceptable to a broader audience than stringent IPR provisions (see Biadgleng and Maur 
2011, 3 et seqq.). 
These assumptions made by Biadgleng and Maur (2011) are similar to the generalised 
bargaining power theory by Dür and Mateo (2010), that already postulate the influence 
on the design of IPRs in PTAs by power and the forum-choice of IPR regulation. Another 
of the additional arguments by Biadgleng and Maur (2011) on trade-offs is already part 
of the explanation in the argument of the Economic Power Asymmetry (4.1.1). The other 
factors are not included due to individual incompatibilities laid out in the following par-
agraphs. 
The fourth argument by Biadgleng and Maur (2011) on the influence of withdrawal 
provisions has no corresponding variable in my dataset, and I have not encountered any 
article directly relating IPR with withdrawal rights during my coding process. Rather, the 
possibility to use withdrawal as a bargaining chip in disputes is related to the choice of 
PTA as a regulation forum for IPRs and cannot per se explain the design of IPRs. Of 
course, IPR retaliation is notably useful for countries being faced by trade discrimination 
of a more powerful and IPR producing PTA partner. There are already a couple of exam-
ples, where countries used the suspension of IPR protection for copyright, industrial de-
sign and geographical indications to country trade discrimination such as Ecuador against 
the EU preferential banana import regulation (WTO Dispute Settlement (DS) Case 27), 
Brazil against the US cotton subsidies (DS 267) and Antigua against the US cross-border 
gambling regulation (DS 285) (Maskus 2012, 110–11). However, as an argument for de-
sign features such as stringent IPR provisions, it holds little explanatory power. The 
choice of PTAs a preferred forum of IPR regulation is already covered through the 
BATNA argument by Biadgleng and Maur (2011) (see 4.1.6 Regime Preference). 
The fifth argument by Biadgleng and Maur (2011) on DSM seems not particularly 
relevant for IPR regulation. Few agreements include IPR-specific DSM provisions (29 
PTAs out of 724 resp. 689 PTAs). Indirect DSM protection through the investment defi-
nition, i.e. where IPR is defined as investment and the investment chapter includes pre-
dominately an investor-state DSM, can be found more often (88 PTAs out of 724 PTAs 
resp. 86 out of 689 PTAs), but their enforceability has so far not been tested in practical 
cases. It remains to be seen how the legal system would deal with such cases and the 
argument of a deliberate inclusion of such indirect DSMs in order to include more bene-
ficial DSMs is so far merely theoretical.  
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For their sixth argument on soft law and flexibility (Biadgleng and Maur 2011), my 
dataset does not include any matching variables as I refrained from coding the legal layers 
of the specific provisions. However, adding the legal bindingness to the coded commit-
ments should be considered by future researchers. 
Summarising, I use the theoretical arguments made by Dür and Mateo (2010) and the 
assumptions made by Biadgleng and Maur (2011) to allocate at least one argument per 
GPE theory. As previously stated, some of the arguments can be categorised for multiple 
theories, depending on the postulated underlying rationale. I only list the most apparent 
connections between theory and argument. 
For realism, I include arguments on economic power asymmetry and political pres-
sure. For liberalism, I cover arguments on domestic interests and veto players. For marx-
ism, I mainly include the argument of political pressure, but some of the other factors 
such as domestic interest could also be looked at from a class perspective. For social-
constructivism, I look at the argument of regime preference, which is most likely to rep-
resent a shared belief by pursuing a multilateral IPR regulation approach through PTAs 
or refraining from it. 
Besides the theoretical arguments developed above, there are two more logical con-
sequence of policymaking. The first one is, that if countries can agree on stringent provi-
sions in the PTA than this will also be true for the IPR chapter. The more common ground 
PTA members have, the more likely it is that they can also agree on stringent IPR stand-
ards. The design of IPR provisions would thus be a reflection of the overall PTA com-
mitments and result from a PTA endogeneity effect. I follow up on this arguments and 
analyse the possible effects of Endogeneity (4.1.5). The second argument is that countries 
base the design of IPR provisions on their previous experience and include those provi-
sions that have proven to be adequate and that they deem necessary to repeat. I will, 
therefore, include the analysis of the impact of Path Dependency (4.1.7). As regime pref-
erence and path dependency both use IPR provisions – either on commitments to other 
IPR fora or IPR provisions overall – they are understood as specific forms of endogeneity, 
and therefore follow in the order of argument after endogeneity. 
Summarising the theory discussed here, the following subchapters analyse the influ-
ence on the design of IPRs in PTAs of Economic Power Asymmetry (4.1.1), Political 
Pressure (US-specific) (4.1.2), Domestic Interests (4.1.3), Veto Players (4.1.4), Endoge-
neity (4.1.5), Regime Preference (4.1.6) and Path Dependency (4.1.7). 
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4.1.1 Economic Power Asymmetry 
The first factor in explaining the design of IPRs in PTAs is the economic power 
asymmetry of PTA members. It is an argument repeatedly used to explain why countries 
without a substantial domestic IP industry enter into trade agreements including stringent 
IPR provisions and can be derived from the GPE realism theory (see 2.2.2.1 Realism). 
The idea is that powerful countries strongarm less powerful countries into accepting their 
ideals of IPR protection. This power in PTA negotiations can be defined as the “conces-
sions that an actor makes or, more loosely speaking, the ‘influence’ that the negotiation 
partner exerts” (G. Schneider 2005, 672). Countries aiming for a maximum IPR standard, 
and thus highly stringent IPR protection, select PTA members that are less powerful than 
them in order to reinforce their ideal IPR regulation.  
 
Hypothesis 1.1: The higher the economic power asymmetry between PTA mem-
bers, the more stringent IPR provisions are included in PTAs. 
 
However, besides conceptualising power through power asymmetry as the main ex-
planatory power in trade negotiations, there are two other realist-type arguments why 
countries are expected to agree to more stringent IPR provisions if there exists a big 
enough power asymmetry between PTA members: market access and financial contribu-
tions. 
Firstly, less powerful countries are required to accept more stringent IPR provisions 
in turn for access to the more powerful trading partners’ market. According to the under-
standing of Roffe and Spennemann (2014, 439), “developing countries tend to be de-
mandeurs of PTAs mainly to gain better access for their goods and services to more af-
fluent markets, but developed-country partners are those that push for the incorporation 
of strong IP rules in the belief that this is the way of reaffirming their technological com-
petitive advantages.” Biadgleng and Maur (2011, 4) argue that this was the case during 
the TRIPS negotiations, where “for developing countries […], there was a clear bargain 
between accepting TRIPS rules as part of a package offering further market access in 
agriculture and labour-intensive goods.” The result of accepting more stringent IPR pro-
visions than domestically preferred is thus not per se coercion as stated in the realism 
argument, but rather a trade-off: countries striving for a minimum IPR standard agree to 
stringent IPR provisions in turn for preferential access to economically powerful partners’ 
market. Concerning IPR protection, the economically powerful countries are those most 
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likely to aim for stringent IPR protection as there is a strong correlation between eco-
nomic power and the cost-intensive IPR production. It is expected that PTAs with eco-
nomically powerful partners offering a substantial tariff commitment are more likely to 
include stringent IPR provisions. 
 
Hypothesis 1.2: The higher the economic power asymmetry between PTA mem-
bers and the existence of substantial tariff commitments in the 
PTA, the more stringent IPR provisions are included in PTAs. 
 
Secondly, it can also be the case that economically powerful PTA members use their 
economic contribution such as FDI or aid payments as leverage when negotiating PTAs. 
In line with this assumption, Manger (2009) found that FDI is a strong motivator for 
developing countries to negotiate PTAs and agree to stringent provision on, for example, 
IPRs pushed by financially more powerful trading partners. For instance, US FDI was 
already present before NAFTA came into force and Manger (2009, 70 et seqq.) stated 
that US FDI providers played a crucial role in shaping the NAFTA negotiations. Moreo-
ver, the dependency of Chile on FDI has led to stringent IPR protection in the agreement 
with the US (Manger 2009, 182) as well as the PTA with EU, targeting, for example, 
stringent regulations on geographical indications (Manger 2009, 233). The trade-off 
hereby is between stringent IPR provisions in turn for continuing financial investment. It 
is expected that regardless if the trade-off results in market access or financial contribu-
tion, the key factor is the economic power asymmetry between PTA members. Thus, the 
more significant the economic power asymmetry in combination with financial contribu-
tions, the more likely are stringent IPR provisions in the PTA. 
 
Hypothesis 1.3: The higher the economic power asymmetry and the financial com-
mitments between PTA members, the more stringent IPR provi-
sions are included in PTAs. 
 
The influence of trade-offs is an endogenous factor of the PTA and in this section only 
discussed in relation to economic power asymmetry. The isolated effect of PTA-endoge-
nous factors is discussed further in subchapter 4.1.5 Endogeneity. 
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4.1.2 Political Pressure (US-specific) 
The second factor in explaining the design of IPRs in PTAs is political pressure. 
Unlike other countries, the US very clearly postulates their opinion on the IPR regula-
tions, situations and developments in other countries. Since 1989, the office of the United 
States Trade Representatives (USTR) annually releases its assessment of other countries 
IPR regulation and classifies countries according to their alleged endangerment of intel-
lectual property protection and enforcement in their “Special 301 Report” (Office of the 
United States Trade Representative 2018b). Depending on the release year, the report 
includes a different additional classification for example on monitoring or notorious mar-
kets, yet in general, the report list countries that are on the watch list or even the priority 
watch list by the US. For example, in the 2018 report, there are 24 countries on the watch 
list such as Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and Thailand, and twelve countries are on the pri-
ority watch list including China, Canada and Chile. Switzerland has only been on the 
watch list since 2016, whereas Chile has been either on the watch list or the priority list 
for all reports years except from 1993. The declared intention of the Special 301 Report 
by the US is to expose those countries that are not conducting themselves on IP measures 
according to the US interests, or as stated in the executive summary of the Special 301 
Report 2018, it “reflects the resolve of this Administration to call out foreign countries 
and expose the laws, policies, and practices that fail to provide adequate and effective IP 
protection and enforcement for U.S. inventors, creators, brands, manufacturers, and ser-
vice providers” (Office of the United States Trade Representative 2018a, 5). Further-
more, for all countries that have been on the priority watch list, the USTR develops ac-
tions plans that include benchmarks on adapting the IPR protection according to US in-
terest. If those countries fail to meet these US benchmarks the US “President may take 
appropriate action” (Office of the United States Trade Representative 2018a, 82). 
The US government uses the Special 301 Reports to put political pressure on countries 
to reform their IPR protection to be suitable to US interests. Assuming that it is no coin-
cidence that the trade department is in control of the Special 301 Report, these reports are 
expected to have an influence on the design of IPRs in PTAs with the US. For instance, 
the Special 301Report of 2018 states that Thailand has been moved from the priority 
watch list to the watch list due to its commitments made on IPR regulation in the negoti-
ations of the trade and investment agreement between the US and Thailand (Office of the 
United States Trade Representative 2018a, 10). The hypothesis for political pressure thus 
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assumes that by including countries in the Special 301 Report, the US puts pressure on 
countries to comply with their domestic IPR interests. This pressure results in stringent 
IPR provisions in all US PTAs where one of the PTA members is on included in the 
Special 301 Report. 
 
Hypothesis 2: If one of the PTA members are listed in the Special 301 report, the 
more stringent IPR provisions are included in PTAs with the US. 
 
This hypothesis can only be tested reliably for the US as it is the only country con-
sistently reporting its opinion on other countries’ IPR regulation. 
4.1.3 Domestic Interests 
The third factor in explaining the design of IPRs in PTAs are domestic interests. 
When countries design their PTAs, they are expected to include provisions that protect 
and enforce their domestic interests. This is an argument that all GPE theories support 
except from social-constructivism (which sees not interest but a shared understand-
ing/consensus as driver of a countries behaviour). For all other theories, countries are 
seen as either power-maximiser and therefore aiming to protect their economic interests 
and power through any means necessary (see 2.2.2.1 Realism); or countries see regulation 
as a key form to represent and facilitate domestic interests (see 2.2.2.2 Liberalism); or 
countries cooperate with those partners that share their ideals of regulation (see 2.2.2.3 
Social-constructivism); or countries are used by IPR producers to strengthen their influ-
ence beyond the domestic borders and entrench their dominant position (see 2.2.2.4 Mod-
ern Marxism). Consequently, we would expect countries that have a strong IPR industry 
to protect these interest in PTAs. The argument reflects the IPR ideals and provides an 
alternative classification to the north-south divide for countries aiming for a minimum or 
maximum IPR standard. The motivation of countries remains the same as shown in Table 
21: Expected Design Variations Based on IPR Ideals, only the underlying mechanism is 
allocated to derive from domestic interest and not a necessary ideological motivation of 
countries. Following this categorisation, there are two main hypotheses. 
It can be assumed, that the more distinct the domestic interests are of PTA members, 
the more general IPR provisions characterise the IPR design. Same as in Table 21, it can 
be assumed that both PTA members will be able to meet in the middle of their IPR inter-
est, which will result in general provisions on IPR and maybe a few specific provisions. 
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It can thus also be argued that the more similar the domestic interest are among PTA 
members, the more extreme towards a minimum or maximum standard are the IPR pro-
visions. Depending on the formulation of the domestic IPR interest, the corresponding 
IPR design will either be stringent for strong domestic IPR interests and less stringent or 
non-existent for those PTA members with weak domestic IPR interests. The underlying 
assumption is that states cannot be forced into acting against their interests and both PTA 
members influence the PTA design. However, as the similarity and dissimilarity of do-
mestic interest across countries is a science in itself, valid hypotheses can only be posed 
on the measurable aspects of domestic interests. And seeing as the data suggest that – at 
least in the case of the north-south divide – IPR ideals might not be suitable to predict 
IPR design, it is important to consider an alternative explanation how domestic interests 
might shape the design of IPRs.  
Based on the GPE structural realism and marxism arguments, countries could also be 
more impacted by the power of the domestic interests than assumed above. If the domestic 
interests are strong enough, then they could be able to force their home country into in-
cluding certain provisions, that the other country must accept if they want to enter the 
PTA. Unlike with the economic asymmetry, there is not necessarily a trade-off between 
PTA members as structural realism assumes that power asymmetry itself suffices to ex-
plain international relations and marxism assumes that policymakers represent the will of 
producers. To reflect this for the analysis of PTA design, domestic interests are commonly 
represented by the opposed interests of exporters and importers. Exporters are expected 
to be lobbying for a PTA as they will gain improved access to a (new) market by entering 
a trade agreement, and importers against it as they are faced with additional competition 
from abroad by lowering the domestic barriers through a trade agreement. For instance, 
Kucik (2012) analysed the impact of domestic interest-groups on the flexibility in PTAs 
and found that the PTA design is influenced by the import-export constellation of interest 
groups in the domestic markets. He concluded that “export-dependent (import-compet-
ing) markets enter into significantly more rigid (flexible) PTAs as their market power 
increases” (Kucik 2012, 115). This illustrates that exporters are significantly more prone 
to stringent regulation in PTAs than importers. Also, it can be expected that the design of 
IPRs in PTAs is influenced by these findings as well. The first hypothesis for domestic 
interests assumes that where the domestic IPR exporting industry among PTA members 
is substantial, the more likely it is that the PTA includes stringent IPR provisions. 
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Hypothesis 3.1: The stronger the domestic IPR exporting interests are among PTA 
members, the more likely the PTA includes stringent IPR provi-
sions. 
 
Moreover, domestic IPR interests can also be analysed autonomously of trade flows 
and it can be assumed that already established IPR markets will lobby to expand their IPR 
rights into other markets via PTAs. Countries that already have strong IPR interest are 
more likely to also protect these interests in PTAs more stringently. For example, coun-
tries with a substantial number of registered trademarks or payments received for copy-
rights will try to ensure these rights or at least similar ones abroad through IPRs in PTAs. 
Similarly, countries encouraging or even subsidising research and development are more 
likely to protect these interest in intellectual property in trade agreements. The second 
hypothesis for domestic interest thus states that with increasing strong IPR interests of 
the PTA partners, the stringency of IPR provisions in the PTA also increases. 
 
Hypothesis 3.2: The stronger the domestic IPR interests are among PTA members, 
the more likely the PTA includes stringent IPR provisions. 
 
Both hypotheses include the underlying assumptions that strong domestic interests in 
IPRs would also increase the likelihood of general IPR provisions being included in 
PTAs. 
4.1.4 Veto Players 
The fourth factor in explaining the design of IPRs in PTAs is the political influence 
of veto players on PTAs. The concept of veto players is a common concept used in po-
litical science to account for the domestic constraints on a countries decision-making pro-
cess. 
 
“Veto players are individual or collective actors whose agreement (by majority rule for 
collective actors) is required for a change of the status quo. Two categories of veto play-
ers are identified in the article: institutional and partisan. Institutional veto players (pres-
ident, chambers) exist in presidential systems while partisan veto players (parties) exist 
at least in parliamentary systems. Westminster systems, dominant party systems and sin-
gle-party minority governments have only one veto player, while coalitions in parliamen-
tary systems, presidential or federal systems have multiple veto players. The potential for 
policy change decreases with the number of veto players, the lack of congruence (dissim-
ilarity of policy positions among veto players) and the cohesion (similarity of policy po-
sitions among the constituent units of each veto player) of these players.”  
Tsebelis (1995, 289) 
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This initial definition of veto players was mainly used to classify political systems 
based on the importance and number of actors, and thereby adding information in the 
cross-country comparison of democratic political systems. Over time, the concept of veto 
players was extended to reflect all relevant players besides institutional and partisan ac-
tors that influence the political decision-making process (see Allee and Elsig 2017, 538). 
The central concept used is the one developed by Henisz (2002), who groups veto players 
into the executive, legislative, judiciary and sub-federal units. Moreover, the number of 
veto players in a country is defined as the “distribution of decision-making power among 
these actors and the extent to which their preferences diverge” (E. D. Mansfield, Milner, 
and Pevehouse 2007, 404). The influence of domestic constraint represented by veto play-
ers on international relations is derived from the neoclassical realism argument and states 
that the domestic power relations influence, for example, trade negotiations (see 2.2.2.1 
Realism). 
In regard to PTAs, the number of veto players has an effect on multiple stages of the 
negotiation process such as the design, signature, ratification, entry into force and imple-
mentation of PTAs. Generally, the veto player theory assumes that more veto players lead 
to a preservation of the status quo as it is more difficult to find a consensus among many 
actors than only a few (see Allee and Elsig 2017, 538). The underlying argument is that 
the number of veto players represents the diverging and not similar interests, and the 
rising number of veto players thus leads to a balance of interest around the status quo and 
not a concentration of power at an extreme position. Regarding the impact of veto players 
on PTAs, E. D. Mansfield, Milner and Pevehouse (2007) found in their analysis of PTAs 
of 194 countries that the probability of PTA decreases with the number of veto players in 
the PTA member countries, i.e. that more veto players among PTA members make PTAs 
less likely. Allee and Elsig (2017) went a step further and focused on the connection 
between the design of PTAs and veto players, and found that more veto players between 
PTA members lead to less ambitious provisions and especially less stringent dispute set-
tlement provisions in PTAs. 
This assumption is also adaptable to the design of IPRs in PTAs. By accommodating 
multiple preferences of veto players with opposing interests on IPR, the content of PTAs 
is presumably less stringent insomuch as consensus-based. As shown in Table 21: Ex-
pected Design Variations Based on IPR Ideals, it is expected that PTAs among PTA 
members with opposing IPR ideals are more likely to include provisions reflecting the 
middle ground between PTA members. Applied to veto players representing a multitude 
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of interests, it is assumed that more veto players among PTA members lead to general 
IPR provisions in the PTA. 
 
Hypothesis 4.1: The more veto players there are among the PTA members, the 
more general IPR provisions are included in the PTA. 
 
For stringent IPR provisions, an alternative argument and causal mechanism might be 
better suited to explain their design. The more diverging IPR ideals exist in negotiations 
due to a high number of veto players, the more general are the anticipated IPR provisions 
and the less likely are stringent IPR provisions. Kim et al. (2016, 331) argue that stringent 
PTAs “reduce the decision-making power of certain veto players (such as domestic leg-
islature), increase the adjustment cost and the portion of society affected, and attenuate 
the ability of domestic groups to lobby the government.” Therefore, I expect that with an 
increase in the number of veto players, the amount of stringent IPR provisions decreases. 
 
Hypothesis 4.2: The more veto players there are among the PTA members, the 
fewer stringent IPR provisions are included in the PTA. 
 
However, when there are only a few veto players among PTA members then the de-
sign of IPRs in PTAs should also be distinctive. The fewer veto players the IPR design 
has to encompass, the easier it should be to find a consensus among those that prefer a 
maximum or a minimum IPR standard. Those PTAs with a low number of veto players 
are thus expected to lean towards either a minimum or maximum IPR standard, depending 
on the prevailing IPR ideal among veto players. For instance, if there are only a few veto 
players and a clear majority supports a maximum standard of IPR protection then the 
PTA most likely will include stringent IPR provisions and vice versa. 
 
Hypothesis 4.3: The fewer veto players there are among the PTA members, the 
clearer the trend towards a maximum or minimum standard of 
IPR protection. 
 
Furthermore, the number of veto players can have an impact on the included DSM 
provisions. E.D. Mansfield and Milner (2012, 18) argue that “more integrative arrange-
ments have more pronounced distributional consequences. Equally, the inclusion of DSM 
bolsters a trade arrangement’s enforcement capacity. As the number of veto players rises, 
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there is a growing likelihood that at least one such player will be adversely affected by 
greater integration and enforcement within the arrangement, reducing the likelihood that 
a country marked by a large number of veto players will enter a highly integrative ar-
rangement or one with a DSM.” As stated above, Allee and Elsig (2017) already tested 
this theory and found that there is a negative relationship between the number of veto 
players and dispute settlement mechanisms in PTAs. I will test this hypothesis for the 
DSM as well as enforcement of IPR in PTAs. The hypotheses state that the more veto 
players can be found among the PTA members, the less likely the PTA include DSM 
respectively enforcement provisions for IPRs. 
 
Hypothesis 4.4: The more veto players there are among the PTA members, the 
fewer specific IPR DSM provisions are included in the PTA. 
 
Hypothesis 4.5: The more veto players there are among the PTA members, the 
fewer IPR enforcement provisions are included in the PTA. 
 
4.1.5 Endogeneity 
The fifth factor in explaining the design of IPRs in PTAs is the endogeneity effect of 
PTAs. As already shown before, IPR provisions might be influenced by PTA external 
factors such as economic power asymmetries or domestic interests. However, it cannot 
be ruled out that the IPR provisions are influenced by other factors within the PTA, seeing 
that IPR provisions are only a small part of the overall PTA. The design of IPRs might, 
therefore, be influenced by other stringent commitments made in the PTA. 
 
“Many modern regional trade agreements (RTAs) go beyond traditional trade issues, such as 
the liberalization of tariffs and quotas, and thereby represent examples of what has been 
coined “deep integration”. These RTAs include trade issues that were incorporated in the 
multilateral trading system at the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds, such as services, government 
procurement, intellectual property rights, sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), and 
technical barriers to trade (TBTs). But some more recent agreements also extend to cover 
new trade-related policy areas that are, at least in part, on the Doha Development Agenda 
established at the Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Qatar in 
November 2001. In the WTO context, these policy areas are often referred to as the Singapore 
issues, because they were discussed at the 1996 WTO Ministerial in Singapore, and include 
transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation, investment and competition.” 
Reiter (2003, 62) 
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Nowadays, the “depth” of PTAs refers to both the expanded scope of topics in PTAs 
such as investment, competition or services, as well as the inclusion of a more stringent 
provision on existing standards such as substantial tariff cuts. Thereby the “depth” of a 
PTA is defined by the required changes resulting out of entering the PTA such as sub-
stantial reduction of tariffs or alterations through including IPR provisions compared to 
the status quo without entering the PTA (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996, 383).  
If countries can agree on entering a “deep” PTA and thereby agreeing to substantial 
commitments, the probability that the PTA members can also agree on more “deep” IPR 
provisions increases. The stringent IPR provisions might thus result out of the overall 
consensus of PTA members and be endogenous to the PTA. The first hypothesis thus 
assumes that deeper PTAs are more likely to include stringent IPR provisions. 
 
Hypothesis 5.1: The deeper the overall PTA, the more stringent IPR provisions 
are included in the PTA. 
 
As stated for the hypothesis on economic power asymmetry (4.1.1), countries might 
agree to more stringent IPRs in turn for other commitments in the PTA. Hereby, the key 
argument is that countries agree to stringent IPR provisions in turn for improved market 
access. Unlike the assumption made for the economic power asymmetry (4.1.1), here, the 
economic situation is not taken into account as the driving force is assumed to reside 
within the PTA and not power asymmetry. The inclusion of “deep” market access provi-
sions is thus expected to increase the likelihood of stringent IPR provisions. 
 
Hypothesis 5.2: The deeper the market access provisions are in the PTA, the more 
stringent IPR provisions are included in the PTA. 
 
Moreover, the previous analysis of endogeneity of PTA design has shown that other 
PTA-internal factors can impact the design of PTAs. For instance, Baccini, Dür and Elsig 
(2015) find that there is a high correlation between enforcement variables and the “depth” 
of the PTA, suggesting that countries prefer to include stringent provisions in combina-
tion with enforcement provisions. Applied to IPRs in PTAs, this implies that PTAs with 
IPR enforcement provisions are more likely to include stringent IPR provisions as well. 
After all, enforcement provisions give countries more regulatory certainty as they make 
the protection of IPR more likely and make the circumvention of IPRs less likely.  
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Hypothesis 5.3: The more IPR enforcement provisions are in the PTA, the more 
stringent IPR provisions are included in the PTA. 
 
At the same time, specific enforcement provisions imply decreased flexibilities for 
countries legislation and increased implementation costs. According to Fink (2011, 396), 
“the enforcement of intellectual property rights can be a costly exercise in terms of both 
budgetary outlays and the employment of skilled personnel. For developing countries that 
face many institutional deficiencies, there is a risk that stronger enforcement of IPRs 
would draw away financial and human resources from other development priorities.” 
Assuming that at least one of the PTA members agrees to new provisions by including 
specific IPR enforcement provisions, this PTA partner will bear additional costs of im-
plementing these provisions. Such provisions are therefore better suited where specific 
interest are protected as well. For example, the stringent provision on copyright enforce-
ment are likely to be combined with stringent provisions on copyright protection. Thus, 
the nature of the enforcement provisions might also influence the stringency of the IPR 
commitments. Besides testing the effect of overall IPR enforcement on stringent IPR pro-
visions, I will also test the effect of specific IPR enforcement provisions on stringent IPR 
provisions. 
 
Hypothesis 5.4: The more specific IPR enforcement provisions are in the PTA, the 
more stringent IPR provisions are included in the PTA. 
 
There are also other endogenous factors that can influence the design of IPRs in PTAs 
that are based on two main different assumptions: firstly, countries act based on their 
regime preference, and secondly, countries learning from each other or of their previous 
experiences with regulating IPRs through PTAs. As these arguments are based on inde-
pendent theoretical debates, I will list them in separate subchapters, even though they are 
technically also endogenous factors. The first one is covered in subchapter 4.1.6 Regime 
Preference, and the second in subchapter 4.1.7 Path Dependency. 
4.1.6 Regime Preference 
The sixth factor in explaining the design of IPRs in PTAs is that countries act based 
on their regime preference. Countries can influence IPR law internationally by including 
IPRs in PTAs and states are able to establish their standards beyond their domestic bor-
ders by spreading IPR provisions through PTAs. Thereby, countries can choose, which 
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forum they prefer to regulate IPRs (see Figure 5: Fora of IPR Regulation) and the moti-
vation behind this choice is expected to have an impact on the design of IPRs in PTAs. I 
will refer to a countries choice of the legal forum as their ability to act based on their 
regime preference. 
First of all, countries might choose not to regulate IPRs through PTAs. If countries do 
not want to regulate IPR, or if countries prefer a different fora of IPR regulation than 
PTAs, one option is not to include any IPRs in PTAs. The other option is to reinforce 
other fora of IPR regulation by including provisions in the PTA that reaffirm these other 
fora. For example, this can be achieved by including a commitment to accede to or reaf-
firm another IPR convention such as the Trademark Law Treaty or the UPOV Convention 
(see 3.1.2.4 IPR Multilateral Coherence Variables). This is a tactic predominately asso-
ciated with PTAs negotiated by the EU. Roffe and Spennemann (2014, 440), for example, 
state that in the EU agreements “by and large there was an emphasis on reinforcing the 
existing international IP architecture by committing parties to adhere to multilateral IP-
related agreements.” Furthermore, Allee et al. (2017 Table 5) even found that on average 
around 10.1% of the IPR content in PTAs is copy-pasted from the TRIPS agreement. This 
suggests that IPRs in PTAs are used as alternative device to spread and strengthen multi-
lateral IPR regulation. 
This line of decision making can be explained by the institutional liberalist argument, 
whereby stronger multilateral approaches of regulation are preferred over PTAs as the 
strengthen the international system of interests and thereby go beyond the short-term in-
terests of countries (see 2.2.2.2 Liberalism). After all, IPRs in PTAs are based on the 
negotiations between the PTA members and only represent this small group of countries, 
whereas, for instance, IPR conventions are negotiated in an international manner and rep-
resent a broader spectrum of international interest. By supporting and preferring such IPR 
conventions over IPRs in PTAs, the IPR regulation is based on a broader consensus than 
when countries create new IPR regulations on IPRs and include them in PTAs. For those 
PTAs where the PTA members prefer other fora of IPR regulation, it is thus expected that 
these PTAs will not include any stringent IPR provisions that would set a new, not inter-
nationally consensus-based IPR standard. 
However, when countries decide to use PTAs for IPR regulation than there are two 
underlying theoretical assumptions: countries either act as “forum shoppers” or there has 
been a “regime shift” from other fora towards PTAs. When countries opportunistically 
switch between fora depending on where they can more efficiently include their ideal of 
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IPR protection, their behaviour is called “forum shopping” (see Allee and Elsig 2016). 
For instance, if a country is not satisfied with international negotiations on an IPR con-
vention, it might choose to specifically target countries and regulate their preferred IPR 
regulations through PTAs instead. The same country might also want to achieve a broader 
standard of IPR protection for a specific area such as plant varieties and prefer to regulate 
IPRs for these topics through an international IPR agreement. This country thus switches 
between the different fora of IPR regulation depending on the prospect of achieving its 
own goals, and not per se prefers one forum over another. This argument can be derived 
from the classical realism theory, whereby institutions such as PTAs are mere mean to 
maximise own benefits, further own power and protect own interests (see 2.2.2.1 Real-
ism). According to Drezner (2004, 486, 2009, 67), the US and European countries applied 
this approach in regards to IPR protection online. In 1996, they pushed the two IPR WIPO 
conventions WCT and WPPT (see 3.1.2.4 IPR Multilateral Coherence Variables), which 
include stringent IPR regulations and protect IPRs online. At the same time, the US and 
European countries include stringent IPR provisions targeting online matters within their 
PTAs. Such PTAs by forum shopping countries are thus expected to include stringent 
IPRs that countries were not able to regulate through other fora, and as these countries 
still value other fora of IPR regulation, it is anticipated that their PTAs will include a 
commitment to other IPR fora through IPR multilateral coherence commitments as well. 
Besides switching between IPR fora, other theoretical research also suggests that there 
has been a general forum shift from international IPR regulation fora to regulating IPRs 
through PTAs (Helfer 2009). The assumption hereby is that countries, in general, are 
dissatisfied with the state of international IPR regulation and see more possibilities in 
negotiating IPRs among fewer member states. These countries, therefore, have turned 
their back on other fora of IPR regulation and now clearly prefer PTAs to regulate intel-
lectual property. It is thus expected that these PTAs made by countries choosing to shift 
forums are more likely to include stringent IPR provisions and less likely to include any 
references to IPR multilateral conventions. Figure 9 summarises these assumptions on 
the regime preference regarding the design of IPRs in PTAs. The following hypotheses 
are derived based on each of the predicted paths to be taken according to regime prefer-
ence laid out in Figure 9. The assumption hereby is that these arguments reveal the rela-
tion between the level of IPR multilateral coherence and other IPR provisions in the PTA. 
The data will show, which argument is most reliable to predict the design of IPRs in 
PTAs. 
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Figure 9: IPR Design Motivations of Regime Preference 
 
 
Firstly, countries might prefer not to regulate IPRs, or at least not through PTAs. This 
would concern IPR multilateral variables as much as other IPR variables. It is thus ex-
pected that the fewer IPR multilateral coherence variables go hand in hand with less other 
IPR variables in the PTA. 
 
Hypothesis 6.1: The lower the commitment to IPR multilateral coherence in PTAs, 
the fewer IPR provisions are included in PTAs. 
 
Secondly, there might be other preferred fora of IPR regulation and PTAs are used as 
a means to reinforce these other IPR regulation fora. According to this line of argument, 
PTAs thus include strong commitments on other IPR fora such as IPR conventions and 
are unlikely to include other stringent IPR provisions. Instead countries prefer to regulate 
stringently through other fora and will refrain from creating an alternative, possibly con-
flicting regulations through stringent IPR provisions in PTAs. Hence, if countries prefer 
other fora to PTAs, it is expected that higher commitments to IPR multilateral coherence 
mean that the PTA includes fewer stringent IPR provisions. 
 
No demand for international IPR regulation
- IPR regulation undesirable in PTAs
- Neither IPR multilateral coherence nor other IPR provisions in PTAs
Preference of other fora of IPR regulation
- PTAs used to strengthen other fora of IPR regulation
- No other substantial efforts on IPR regulation inn PTAs
Forum shopping
- PTAs used to strengthen other fora of IPR regulation
- PTAs used to regulate IPR more stringently
Regime shift towards PTAs
- PTAs used to regulate IPR more stringently
- No substantial efforts to enforce multilateral coherence
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Hypothesis 6.2: The higher the commitment to IPR multilateral coherence in 
PTAs, the fewer stringent IPR provisions are included in PTAs. 
 
Thirdly, for those countries that act as forum shoppers, I assume that their PTAs will 
include stringent provisions on both IPR multilateral commitments because they still 
deem these fora as valuable, as well as stringent IPR commitments, which they no success 
in regulating through other IPR fora. Such PTAs would thus imply a positive correlation 
between provisions on IPR multilateral coherence and other stringent IPR provisions. 
 
Hypothesis 6.3: The higher the commitment to IPR multilateral coherence in 
PTAs, the more stringent IPR provisions are included in PTAs. 
 
Fourthly, there has been a shift in the regime of IPR regulation when countries have 
turned from other fora of IPR regulation and now explicitly prefer PTAs to regulate IPRs. 
These PTAs should have a minimal amount of references to other IPR regulation fora, 
which are no longer relevant due to the regime shift. Moreover, these PTAs aim to be the 
new tools to set IPR regulation standards and are expected to include highly stringent IPR 
provisions. I expect that if a regime shift can explain the design of IPRs in PTAs, that 
PTAs with low commitments to IPR multilateral coherence include more stringent IPR 
provisions. 
 
Hypothesis 6.4: The lower the commitment to IPR multilateral coherence in PTAs, 
the more stringent IPR provisions are included in PTAs. 
 
4.1.7 Path Dependency 
The seventh factor in explaining the design of IPRs in PTAs is path dependency. 
Haas (1990, 24) defines policy learning as a process where “organization's members are 
induced to question earlier beliefs about the appropriateness of ends of action and to 
think about the selection of new ones, to ‘revalue’ themselves”, which then leads to a 
change in their behaviour. Whereas Haas (1990) applies policy learning primarily to the 
learning from others, I argue that for trade agreements, countries are most likely to learn 
from own previous experiences of PTAs. 
The underlying assumption is that there is a path-dependency of PTAs, i.e. that the 
first PTA serves as some form of theoretical or even practical basis for the subsequent 
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PTAs and that every follow-up PTA increases the basis of a countries PTA toolkit. PTAs 
are not drafted in a vacuum and the previous experiences influence the newer PTAs. For 
example, Kim and Manger (2017) concluded that there is a path-dependency for the lib-
eralisation approach countries chose in PTAs, and Postnikov and Bastiaens (2014, 929) 
found that Chile has learned from previous policies on labour made in their agreement 
with the EU and applied it to their PTA with South Korea. 
Applied to IPRs, countries thus are expected to repeat those IPR provisions that they 
already included in a previous PTA and that have proven themselves, so-called best-prac-
tice provisions (see Lundvall and Rodrigues 2002). Besides repeating these best-practice 
commitments due to their merit and the want to enforce these provisions with other PTA 
members, the underlying motivation could also be that these repetitive commitments 
come at no cost. As they have already been included in a previous PTA, they should be 
already implemented into the domestic legislation of the country repeating a previous IPR 
commitment and due to the nature of IPR commitments is granted on an MFN basis to all 
other countries. There are no required adjustments and cost of including the same provi-
sion again for at least one of the PTA members. Allee and Elsig (n.d.) refer to this phe-
nomenon of repeating PTA provisions as copy-pasting and show that this is a common 
approach for PTA design features. They find up to a 99% overlap compared to the most 
similar treaty and for intellectual property in PTAs an average PTA design overlap of 
72% amongst 218 tested PTAs. However, this number of IPR copy-pasting is probably at 
least slightly skewed because of their data selection, which partially excludes the appen-
dixes of PTAs. The appendixes are sometimes the main bodies of IPR regulation, whilst 
the PTA only contains general statements, for instance for EFTA agreements (see 3.2.1 
Preprocessing and Coding of PTAs). For example, the list on geographical indications of 
EU PTAs might seem comparable to tariff concession list and not comparable, yet they 
are necessary for identifying TRIPS-plus commitments. By partially excluding them, 
some of the variation in the IPR design is lost and the overlap might be overestimated. 
Nevertheless, the study by Allee and Elsig (n.d.) shows that PTAs are not constructed in 
a vacuum and there is most likely a substantial degree of copy-pasting happening for the 
IPR provisions. 
What both motivations, be it best-practice or low-costs copy-pasting, have in common 
is that they replicate the previous design of IPRs in PTAs. Countries learn from their 
previous international policies, which I will refer to as “intra-country path dependency”. 
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The first hypothesis thus assumes that provisions, which a country has already included 
in one of its previous PTAs, are more likely to be included again in a later PTA. 
 
Hypothesis 7.1: If the IPR provisions have been included in a previous PTA of at 
least one PTA member, the more likely these provisions are to be 
repeated in follow-up PTAs. 
 
Moreover, it is anticipated that countries are more likely to repeat their general IPR 
commitments as these bear a lower implementation cost the other PTA member(s) than 
stringent IPR provisions. This might be also due to the assumption that general provisions 
are more likely to pass through the negotiations with new PTA members than stringent 
IPR provision (see 4.1.4 Veto Players). However, such general provisions are less likely 
to have an identifiable effect than stringent IPR provisions and countries are thus most 
likely not acting based on a best-practice approach. Accordingly, the second hypothesis 
postulates that the less stringent and general the IPR provisions are in PTAs, the higher 
is the probability of them to be repeated in a PTA signed by the same country at a later 
stage. 
 
Hypothesis 7.2: If general IPR provisions have been included in a previous PTA 
of at least one PTA member, the more likely these general provi-
sions are to be repeated in follow-up PTAs. 
 
Furthermore, countries are anticipated to learn not only from their experience but to 
draw from the experience of other countries. Path dependency can thus not only be re-
stricted to domestic experiences and own PTAs. Rather countries can learn of the policies 
that other countries have made by including IPRs in PTAs and compare it to their own 
experience with IPR regulation, so-called “learning by comparing“ (Lundvall and Ro-
drigues 2002, 203). Countries can learn from other previous international policies, which 
I will refer to as “international path dependency”. However, I expect that this international 
path dependency would only take place in the case of specific IPR commitments, because 
the effect of general IPR provisions most likely is harder to replicate than the one of 
specific IPR provisions considering that even stringent provisions have to be adapted to 
the domestic legal context. If countries thus decide to repeat IPR provisions of previous 
PTAs based on their best-practice character, then these provisions are expected to be 
stringent IPR provisions. Therefore, where a stringent IPR provision has been included 
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in any previous PTA, other countries can learn from this experience, and if the practice 
of including said provision has proven reliable, other countries might follow and include 
the same specific IPR provision in their PTA. 
 
Hypothesis 7.3: If specific IPR provisions have been included in a previous PTA, 
the more likely these specific provisions are to be repeated in a 
later PTA. 
 
4.1.8 Summary of Design Hypotheses 
Based on the theoretical debate laid out above, I derived 22 hypotheses to explain the 
development of the design of IPRs in PTAs for the seven explanatory factors of Economic 
Power Asymmetry, Political Pressure (US-specific), Domestic Interests, Veto Players, 
Endogeneity, Regime Preference, and Path Dependency. Table 22 lists all hypotheses for 
the different theoretical foci and summarises the impact on the corresponding IPR content 
of PTAs. The relation is always assumed to be either positive, i.e. that when the explan-
atory factor increase the corresponding IPR design factor increases, or negative, i.e. that 
when the explanatory factor increase the corresponding IPR design factor decreases. 
 







H1.1 The higher the economic power asymmetry between PTA 




 H1.2 The higher the economic power asymmetry between PTA 
members and the existence of substantial tariff commitments 




 H1.3 The higher the economic power asymmetry and the financial 
commitments between PTA members, the more stringent IPR 





H2 H2: If one of the PTA members are listed in the Special 301 
report, the more stringent IPR provisions are included in PTAs 





H3.1 The stronger the domestic IPR exporting interests are among 











H3.2 The stronger the domestic IPR interests are among PTA mem-




Veto Players H4.1 The more veto players there are among the PTA members, the 
more general IPR provisions are included in the PTA. 
Positive on 
general IPR 
 H4.2 The more veto players there are among the PTA members, the 
fewer stringent IPR provisions are included in the PTA. 
Negative on 
stringent IPR 
 H4.3 The fewer veto players there are among the PTA members, the 





 H4.4 The more veto players there are among the PTA members, the 
fewer specific IPR DSM provisions are included in the PTA. 
Negative on 
IPR DSM 
 H4.5 The more veto players there are among the PTA members, the 




Endogeneity H5.1 The deeper the overall PTA, the more stringent IPR provisions 
are included in the PTA. 
Positive on 
stringent IPR 
 H5.2 The deeper the market access provisions are in the PTA, the 
more stringent IPR provisions are included in the PTA. 
Positive on 
stringent IPR 
 H5.3 The more IPR enforcement provisions are in the PTA, the 
more stringent IPR provisions are included in the PTA. 
Positive on 
stringent IPR 
 H5.4 The more specific IPR enforcement provisions are in the PTA, 





H6.1 The lower the commitment to IPR multilateral coherence in 
PTAs, the fewer IPR provisions are included in PTAs. 
Positive 
 H6.2 The higher the commitment to IPR multilateral coherence in 




 H6.3 The higher the commitment to IPR multilateral coherence in 
PTAs, the more stringent IPR provisions are included in PTAs. 
Positive on 
stringent IPR 
 H6.4 The lower the commitment to IPR multilateral coherence in 





H7.1 If the IPR provisions have been included in a previous PTA of 
at least one PTA member, the more likely these provisions are 
to be repeated in follow-up PTAs. 
Positive 
 H7.2 If general IPR provisions have been included in a previous 
PTA of at least one PTA member, the more likely these gen-
eral provisions are to be repeated in follow-up PTAs. 
Positive on 
general IPR 
 H7.3 If specific IPR provisions have been included in a previous 
PTA, the more likely these specific provisions are to be re-
peated in a later PTA. 
Positive on 
stringent IPR 
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In the following subchapter, I will show how the hypotheses are operationalized and 
what data is used to test them. In the subsequent subchapter, the hypotheses are analysed 
and tested for their explanatory power. 
4.2 Design: Data 
This chapter focuses on the variation in the design of IPRs, and the core of the analysis 
builds on the IPRs in PTAs dataset (Chapter 3: Dataset on Intellectual Property Rights 
in PTAs). The unit of analysis are the PTAs and the additionally added external data is 
based on the year of signature of the PTA. This is the time when an agreement was 
reached on the design of the PTA provisions, and the year of signature most accurately 
reflects the relationships between and in the member countries at the time of the design 
finalisation. For the analysis of the design, the year of entry into force would bias the 
results as there might be substantial time passing between the finalisation of the PTA 
design and the entry into force.  
For the analysis, I dropped those PTAs signed in years before the first PTA included 
IPRs not further to inflate the number of PTAs including zero IPRs, namely all before 
1977 (EC Syria signed in 1977). This means that 92 PTAs were dropped and the analysis 
of the design of IPRs in PTAs includes 606 PTAs ranging from 1977 to 2018. 
As shown in the summary of the hypotheses in Table 22, the dependent variables are 
IPR design features and based on the IPR indexes. The explanatory variables vary de-
pending on the theoretical focus and hypothesis. The PTA external variables are matched 
to the PTA level according to the country-level data of the PTA members. The subsequent 
paragraphs describe how the hypotheses are operationalised, what data is used and how 
the analysis is structure. 
4.2.1 Design: Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables reflect the design of IPRs in PTAs and are primarily based 
on the IPR variables and indexes of the IPRs in PTAs dataset (see Chapter 3: Dataset on 
Intellectual Property Rights in PTAs). The detailed coding measures for the variables and 
the composition of each index can be found in Appendix 2: Codebook of IPRs in PTAs 
Dataset for the IPR variables, and in Appendix 3: Codebook of T+PTA Dataset for the 
TRIPS-plus variables. 
Table 23 summarises the dependent concepts matched to the explanatory factors as 
well as the targeted hypotheses and direction of the proposed relation to IPR design (see 
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4.1 Design: Theoretical Context and Hypotheses and Table 22: Design Hypotheses Over-
view). 
 
Table 23: Overview of IPR Design Features, Explanatory Factors and Hypotheses 









































IPR DSM Veto Players  H4.4 
IPR Enforcement Veto Players  H4.5 
 
The variables used for the analysis of the design are binary, whereas the indexes are 
ordinal except the measure for the IPR DSM. The IPR DSM is a dummy variable com-
prising two variables of the category “IPR general enforcement dummy” (see 3.2.3 Da-
taset Development) and summarising the IPR specific DSM within the PTA (ipr_com-
prehensive_dispute_settlement_mechanism_dummy). It is based on the two binary vari-
ables coding for a DSM specifically related to IPR (ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism), 
and IPR being defined as investment and covered by the DSM of the investment chapter 
(ipr_investment_dispute_settlement_mechanism). The other ordinal indexes are predom-
inately based on the binary IPR coding and summarise the dichotomous IPR variables. 
However, the IPR multilateral coherence index is not based on binary coding as it 
measures the level of bindingness of IPR commitments ranging from zero to five (see 
3.1.2.4 IPR Multilateral Coherence Variables). 
The IPR enforcement is analysed by looking at the three IPR enforcement indexes. 
Firstly, the index for general enforcement (ipr_general_enforcement_sum) to allocate if 
countries can agree on at least general IPR enforcement provisions. Secondly, the index 
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summarising the specific enforcement variables (ipr_specific_enforcement_sum), which 
allows seeing if countries are willing to include detailed provisions on IPR enforcement. 
Thirdly, I look at the overall enforcement index (ipr_enforcement_sum) that combines 
the above two indexes and shows the complete picture of IPR enforcement. 
When the hypotheses state a relation to general IPR, I use a number of different in-
dexes to capture the effect on the design more precisely. Firstly, I use the summary index 
of general IPR variables (ipr_general_sum) to measure the overall impact on general IPR 
variables in PTAs. Secondly, I look at the summary index of general IPR enforcement 
variables (ipr_general_enforcement_sum) to see if the effect focuses on general IPR en-
forcement. Thirdly, I take the summary index of IPR forms mentioned in the PTA 
(ipr_scope_mentioned_sum) as well as the variables for the individual IPR forms 
(ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights, ipr_m_trademarks, ipr_m_geo_indications, ipr_m_in-
dustrial_designs, ipr_m_patents, ipr_m_undisclosed_information, ipr_m_layout_de-
sign_integ_circuits, ipr_m_new_plant_varieties, ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources, ipr_m_encrypted_program_carrying_satellite_signals, ipr_m_domain_names). 
This allows to analyse if the explanatory variables have an effect on the general scope of 
IPRs in PTAs or impact the design of IPR forms such as patents or copyrights. Fourthly, 
I take into account the effect on multilateral coherence variables and use the summary 
index on IPR multilateral coherence, which stands for the sum of treaties included regard-
less of the bindingness of the commitment (ipr_multilateral_coherence_dummy_sum). 
This allows analysing the general effect of IPR multilateral coherence. 
For those hypotheses postulating an effect on the stringent IPR provisions, I apply 
multiple indexes as well. The argument hereby is that there might be an overall effect on 
stringent IPR variables or an effect with a specific design target. The degree of impact 
can also vary depending on the design feature. Firstly, I use the summary index of specific 
IPR variables (ipr_specific_sum) to analyse the broader effect on specific IPR variables, 
and the TRIPS-plus summary index based on the TRIPS-plus variables of the T+PTA 
dataset (ipr_tripsplus_per_pta) to focus on the overall effect on TRIPS-plus provisions. 
Secondly, I look at the effect on tangible IPR provisions using the summary index of 
tangible IPR commitments (ipr_scope_tangible_sum) and the individual tangible IPR 
scope variables (ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights, ipr_t_trademarks, ipr_t_geo_indicati-
ons, ipr_t_industrial_designs, ipr_t_patents, ipr_t_undisclosed_information, ipr_t_layout 
_design_integ_circuits, ipr_t_new_plant_varieties, ipr_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources, ipr_t_encrypted_program_carrying_satellite_signals, ipr_t_domain_names). 
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Again, this allows insights into general effects on the tangible IPR scope as well as iso-
lating effects for specific tangible IPR forms such as trademarks or geographical indica-
tions. Thirdly, I use the summary indexes for the TRIPS-plus categories to identify if 
there are targeted effects on, for example, TRIPS-plus undisclosed information provisions 
or IPR exhaustion (ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights, ipr_tripsplus_trademarks, ipr 
_tripsplus_geo_indications, ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design, ipr_tripsplus_patents, ipr_ 
tripsplus_undisclosed_information, ipr_tripsplus_layout_design, ipr_tripsplus_new_ 
plant_varieties, ipr_tripsplus_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources, ipr_tripsplus_encrypt-
ed_program_carrying_satellite_signals, ipr_tripsplus_domain_names, ipr _tripsplus_en-
forcement, ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion). Fourthly, I apply the summary index on specific 
IPR enforcement provisions (ipr_specific_enforcement_sum) to identify if the design var-
iations are mainly targeting specific IPR enforcement. Fifthly, I focus on the summary 
index on IPR multilateral coherence reflecting the bindingness of these commitments 
(ipr_multilateral_coherence_bindingness_sum). 
The usage of different indexes is essential to narrow down the target of IPR regulation. 
However, they cannot be included in the same model as the indexes have a high correla-
tion and sometimes overlap on the inclusion of coded variables, for example, the specific 
IPR index includes the specific enforcement index. Moreover, the general, specific and 
TRIPS-plus indexes are interdependent, as there is no TRIPS-plus PTA without specific 
IPR provisions, and no specific PTA without general IPR. I will, therefore, run the models 
for all the dependent variables indicated above to ensure a comprehensive IPR design 
analysis. Before describing the models for the analysis (4.2.5 Design: Models of Analy-
sis), the next subchapters describe the operationalisation of the explanatory and control 
variables, followed by a subchapter on descriptive statistics for both dependent and inde-
pendent variables. 
4.2.2 Design: Explanatory Variables 
The explanatory variables include data from external sources as well as IPR variables 
of the IPRs in PTAs dataset (see Chapter 3: Dataset on Intellectual Property Rights in 
PTAs). To illustrate the operationalisation of the 23 hypotheses and data sources clearly, 
the description is segmented according to the seven theoretical foci described further in 
subchapter 4.1 Design: Theoretical Context and Hypotheses. 
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4.2.2.1 Data for Economic Power Asymmetry 
The economic power asymmetry has been one of the main explanatory factors for the 
design of IPRs in PTAs. Economic power itself has already been used to explain other 
PTA design features such as human rights provisions. For example, Hafner-Burton (2009) 
argues that economic asymmetry between PTA members can explain human rights pro-
visions in PTAs measured by their absolute difference in GDP. 
To operationalise economic power asymmetry and its impact on the design of IPRs in 
PTAs, I slightly adapt the measure and argue that the main argument when looking at the 
design of IPRs is that there is one PTA member with substantially more power than the 
other PTA member(s), which allows for this particularly strong PTA member to design 
the IPR in PTAs to its liking. Therefore, I look at the share of the GDP of the most pow-
erful PTA member (maximum GDP) and relate it to the overall economic power among 
PTA members (sum of GDP). The economic power asymmetry is thus measured by the 
maximum GDP divided by the sum of GDP among PTA members (see Morin and Sur-
beck 2019). I also apply the same calculation to the GDP per capita (GDPpc) to account 
for the GDP in relation to the population of the countries. I use the GDP data provided by 
the World Bank database (World Bank 2018a) ranging from 1960 until 2017 and match 
it to the year of PTA signature. 
Whilst the economic power asymmetry suffices for hypothesis H1.1, I create an inter-
action term for each of the other two economic power asymmetry hypotheses. I build an 
interaction term between the economic power asymmetry measured as described above 
and multiply it by the occurrence of substantial tariff cuts within the PTA for H1.2. The 
argument states that the economic power asymmetry only becomes relevant for the design 
of IPRs if the smaller PTA partner also benefits from the PTA, i.e. if there is a trade-off 
between PTA members. The data for the existence of a substantial commitment on tariffs 
is taken from the DESTA database, which includes an additive “depth” index “that com-
bines seven key provisions that can be included in PTAs […]. The first provision captures 
whether the agreement foresees that all tariffs (with limited exceptions) should be re-
duced to zero (that is, whether the aim is to create a full free trade area). The other six 
provisions capture cooperation that goes beyond tariff reductions, in areas such as ser-
vices trade, investments, standards, public procurement, competition and intellectual 
property rights. For each of these areas, we code whether the agreement contains any 
substantive provisions. A substantive provision, for example, is a national treatment 
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clause in the services chapter. A statement that the contracting parties desire to open 
their services markets, by contrast, does not count as a substantive provision” (Dür, Bac-
cini, and Elsig 2014, 358–59). For the interaction term, I only need the first provision of 
the additive index, which codes if there is substantial tariff reduction through the PTA. 
This binary coding of the substantial tariff reduction is multiplied with the economic 
power asymmetry. 
For H1.3, I create two separate interaction terms multiplying the economic power 
asymmetry measures by the FDI respectively the share of aid payments received by PTA 
members. The data for both FDI and aid payments is also taken from the World Bank 
database (World Bank 2018a). The reasoning to include FDI into the economic power 
argument is that economically powerful countries can convince other PTA members to 
increase FDI outflows into PTA member countries in turn for more stringent IPR provi-
sions, i.e. more stringent protection for their investment. The impact of economic power 
thus increases with the FDI outflow magnitude of PTA members. I will therefore multiple 
the measure for economic power asymmetry by the sum of FDI outflows amongst PTA 
members.  
The reasoning regarding aid contributions is that if PTA members are financially de-
pendent on aid payments by economically powerful PTA members, they might be accept-
ing donor’s interests more willingly in turn for continued aid payments. Thus the impact 
of economic power asymmetry can be intensified by the amount of aid received, i.e. an 
interaction term multiplying the GDP asymmetry by the sum of official development as-
sistance and official aid received among PTA members. Moreover, the World Bank da-
tabase (World Bank 2018a) provides data on the bilateral aid flows received by 29 donors 
from the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as well as the total aid re-
ceived by the DAC donors. I will, therefore, include an additional explanatory interaction 
term that accounts for the DAC aid received by PTA members in relation to the total aid 
received by DAC donors to account for the importance of PTA members’ aid donations 
and their financial power over other PTA members. 
4.2.2.2 Data for Political Pressure 
The data to measure the political pressure is based on the “Special 301 Reports” avail-
able on the United States Trade Representatives (USTR) website (Office of the United 
States Trade Representative 2018b). I transformed the reports into a binary coding on the 
country-level for each reported year to reflect which countries were covered by the report 
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in which year. This was mapped to the PTA-level dataset according to the sum of PTA 
members on the “Special 301 Reports” per PTA. The data ranges from 1989 to 2018, 
resulting in a loss of the 155 PTAs signed before 1989. The data on political pressure is 
thus available for a total of 543 PTAs. 
4.2.2.3 Data for Domestic Interests 
There are multiple ways to operationalise domestic interests, and depending on the 
IPR form focused on, some are more fitting than others. For example for patents, the 
investment in R&D is expected to be especially important whereas it is far less relevant 
for geographical indications. Whilst R&D expenditure thus is a good indicator for some 
IPR interests it will not capture others. In the following section, I will elaborate on the 
measures tested for my analysis, which are not exhaustive, yet represent a broad measure 
across different IPR forms and are the ones with material data available for most coun-
tries. Namely, I operationalise domestic interests by the charges received for the use of 
intellectual property such as license payments, the number of IPR applications available 
for patents, trademarks, industrial design, two R&D measures, and IPR trade volumes 
according to a sectoral division of traded goods. The first three factors are used for the 
hypotheses H3.2, whereas the IPR trade values are applied for H3.1 postulating an impact 
of domestic IPR exporting interests. 
Firstly, the domestic interests can be characterised by charges received for the use of 
IP. These charges can be received for the authorised use of intellectual property such as 
copyrights, trademarks, undisclosed information, patents and industrial designs, and li-
censing fees for goods protected by copyrights and related rights such as television and 
satellite broadcast (World Bank 2018a). The more recipients of such IPR charges are 
within a country, the better those IPRs are already represented domestically and the more 
likely it is that these domestic interests were able to influence domestic politics to repre-
sent their interest also in international negotiations. Thus, I expect that countries receiving 
more payments for IPR usage will opt for a more stringent IPR standard in PTAs in order 
to protect and improve their IPR interests. The data for IPR charges is downloadable from 
the World Bank database (World Bank 2018a) and available on a country level. I use the 
sum of all PTA partners received charges for IP usage as the first measure for domestic 
IPR interests. 
Secondly, I look at the number of IPR applications for patents, trademarks, and indus-
trial designs, as for these IPR forms there exists data in a comprehensive and comparable 
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manner for the majority of countries. So far, there are no comparable datasets available 
for the other forms of IPRs across countries. I will look at the impact of domestic IPR 
applications from two perspectives. On the one hand, I look at the applications filed by 
residents to reflect the domestic interests for the respective IPR areas and use this as a 
proxy representing domestic IPR interests in general. On the other hand, I will look at the 
share of applications filed by residents from PTA members in comparison to the total 
applications filed to reflect the interest of the PTA members relative to their impact in the 
foreign PTA member market. The data is provided by the WIPO Intellectual Property 
Statistics Data Center (World Intellectual Property Organization 2018a) and is available 
on a dyadic country-level basis, i.e. the data included how many applications are received 
by which countries residents. Thereby, I use the number of applications summed per PTA 
members and year, as well as their cumulative value over time, as the domestic interests 
might be reflected more accurately considering the development over time. 
Thirdly, domestic interests are measured by two R&D factors. On the one hand, I look 
at the number of researchers working in the area of research and development. This shows 
how many employees are involved in the production of intellectual property and have an 
interest in protecting their work and its results domestically and abroad. According to the 
World Bank database (World Bank 2018a), their measure of researchers includes “pro-
fessionals who conduct research and improve or develop concepts, theories, models tech-
niques instrumentation, software of operational methods. R&D covers basic research, 
applied research, and experimental development.” The data is provided annually per 
country, which is matched to the PTA members per year of signature. On the other hand, 
I use the R&D expenditure of countries to represent the domestic interests in IPR protec-
tion. Countries with high investments in research and development (R&D) or a large 
number of personnel working in R&D are more likely to be those with a substantial IPR 
production sector (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
2010, 11). These countries will aim to protect their interest abroad either by harmonising 
or implementing IPR regulation to match the stringent IPR regulation in their home mar-
ket. The R&D expenditures cover the business, government, higher education and private 
non-profit sectors and are provided by the World Bank database (World Bank 2018a). I 
use the maximum percentage reached among PTA members as well as their average R&D 
expenditures. This allows determining if the driving force for stringent IPR protection is 
rather one country with the most dominant interests to protect, or can be found in the 
PTAs, where countries share the same interests. 
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Fourthly, the domestic IPR interests can be operationalised by looking at the trade 
volumes. Within IPR literature, these the trend is to specifically look at goods that have 
a high-technology intensiveness. For example, patent-protected goods are assumed to be 
predominantly highly technological such as clockworks or pharmaceuticals. However, 
there can be also the argument made that IPRs affect more than high-technology products 
as IPRs themselves are not uniform. For example, the protection of trademarks can affect 
not only high-technology goods but also low-technology or medium-technology goods 
such as clothes or food products. Most likely, the categorisation of IPRs is not general-
isable to one main sector of traded goods and rather varies according to the form of IPR 
protected (see Table 1: Forms of IPR). 
Table 24 is based on a report by the UN, which maps IPRs to those sectors most 
affected by IPR protection (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2010, 
fig. 1). For those categories not in the UN report, I added the sectors, which are anticipated 
to be impacted by IPR protection.  
 
Table 24: IPR Forms and Impacted Sectors 
IPR Form Impacted Sectors 









Industrial Designs Clothing 
Automobiles 
Electronics, etc. 
Patents Chemical and pharmaceutical industry 
Mechanical industry 
Electronic sector  
Industrial control 
Scientific equipment 
Undisclosed Information Across all sectors 
Layout-Designs of  
Integrated Circuits 
Microelectronics 
New Plant Varieties Agriculture 
Food products 
Traditional Knowledge  
& Genetic Resources 
 
Chemical and pharmaceutical industry 
Agriculture 
Food products 
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IPR Form Impacted Sectors 
Traditional Knowledge  
& Genetic Resources (cont.) 
Handicrafts 
Services 











Table 24 shows that goods at all kinds of levels of technology-intensiveness are ex-
pected to be affected by IPRs (see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) 2010, 11). Therefore, I expand the sector analysis beyond the scope of high-
technology goods and include trade flows more broadly. Concretely, I use the classifica-
tion of goods into high-technology to low-technology products of the JRC European 
Commission Report by Loschky (2010). 
Table 25 repeats the categories by Loschky (2010, 10 Table 1: Classification of In-
dustries Based on Technology Intensity) and the corresponding International Standard 
Industrial Classification (ISIC) Revision 3 categories of their economic activities. 
 
Table 25: Nomenclature for Technology Intensiveness of Goods 
Categories of  
Technology Intensiveness 
Nomenclature ISIC Revision 3 
High-technology  
products (htp) 
2423 Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical 
products 
30 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery 
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and ap-
paratus 
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and 
clocks 
353 Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft 
Medium-high-technology 
products (mhtp) 
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
352 Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock 
359 Manufacture of transport equipment n.e.c. 
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Categories of  
Technology Intensiveness 
Nomenclature ISIC Revision 3 
Medium-low-technology 
products (mltp) 
21 Manufacture of paper and paper products 
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 
241 Manufacture of basic chemicals 
2421 Manufacture of pesticides and other agro-chemical products 
2422 Manufacture of paints, varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink and 
mastics 
2424 Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing prepara-
tions, perfumes and toilet preparations 
2429 Manufacture of other chemical products n.e.c. 
243 Manufacture of human-made fibres 
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
272 Manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals 
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equip-
ment 
351 Building and repairing of ships and boats 




15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 
17 Manufacture of textiles 
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, sad-
dlery, harness and footwear 
20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furni-
ture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 
271 Manufacture of basic iron and steel 
 
The data is downloaded from the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solutions 
(WITS) database (World Bank 2018b), which provides the import data for each category 
defined in Table 25. The import data is differentiated according to the country of origin, 
which allows mapping sector specific imports according to the respective PTA members. 
I match the sum of these exports by PTA members at the date of the PTA signature to 
reflect the value according to the goods category of technology intensiveness ranging 
from high-technology products (htp), medium-high-technology products (mhtp), me-
dium-low-technology products (mltp), to low-technology products (ltp). Moreover, these 
effects could be dependent on the share these exports by PTA members hold on the over-
all imports in the respective categories. Thus, I also include a measure reflecting the share 
of PTA members in the total imported htp, mhtp, mltp and ltp sectors. The effects are 
expected to vary across these classifications and IPR forms. However, high-technology 
products could also prove to be the main explanatory factor for IPR protection. 
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4.2.2.4 Data for Veto Players 
The data for veto players is taken from the POLCON project developed by Henisz 
(2000), which measures the political constraints in more than 200 countries. I use the 
“POLCONV” index that includes two factors for 157 countries: firstly, the independent 
(institutional) veto players influencing the policy outcome, and secondly, how the pref-
erences of these veto players are distributed (Henisz 2000). The “POLCONV” index thus 
represents how much influence domestic veto players have over policy outcomes such as 
trade agreements. The index ranges from ‘0’ to ‘0.894’, whereby ‘0’ on the index repre-
sents the absence of checks for the executive power and the higher the value on the index 
get the more substantial veto power over executive decisions on policy changes are held 
by veto players.  
The assumption of more veto players in hypothesis H4.1, H4.2, H4.4, H4.5 thus cor-
relates with a higher score on the “POLCONV” index, whereas the hypothesis H4.3 pos-
tulates fewer veto players and correlates with a lower score on the “POLCONV” index. 
The covered years of “POLCONV” generally range from 1960 to 2017. To match the 
range of years of the PTAs coded for their IPR content, the data for 2018 was extrapolated 
based on the values of “POLCONV” for 2017, assuming that number of veto players has 
remained constant over the last year. 
Furthermore, the data for the veto players was transformed from its country-level sta-
tus to match the PTA-level analysis by adding the score of “POLCONV” across PTA 
members. This means that the veto players value for the analysis of the design consists of 
the sum of all veto players among PTA members at the time of the PTA signature. 
4.2.2.5 Data for Endogeneity 
The data for the endogeneity covers two different aspects: firstly, the endogeneity of 
the PTA besides IPR measures, and secondly, the endogeneity of IPR enforcement 
measures. 
The first aspect covering the PTA besides the IPR content is taken from the DESTA 
dataset’s additive “depth” index (see 4.2.2.1 Data for Economic Power Asymmetry). I 
employ the depth index in two manners: for hypothesis H5.1, I use the additive “depth” 
index and remove the previously included IPR factor. This gives the overall stringency 
of the PTA besides IPR measures and can highlight if stringent IPR provisions might only 
result in combination with an otherwise stringent PTA. For hypothesis H5.2, I only devote 
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the part of the additive “depth” index accounting for substantial tariff cuts. The data co-
vers almost all PTAs except for 51 PTAs that are mostly newer additions to DESTA or 
multilateral PTAs such as Pan-Arab Free Trade Area (PAFTA). 
The second aspect of IPR enforcement is taken from the IPRs in PTAs dataset and is 
endogenous to the IPR data. For the analysis of both the IPR enforcement measures, the 
dependent variables were altered accordingly to avoid double inclusion by a deduction of 
the particular enforcement measures from the dependent indexes. For example, for H5.4 
that analyses the effect of specific IPR enforcement on stringent IPR measures, the de-
pendent variable represented by the “index IPR specific” normally includes the entire 
specific enforcement index. The dependent variables were therefore altered and the spe-
cific IPR enforcement index deducted from the original dependent index. As the enforce-
ment measures are part of the IPRs in PTAs dataset, there were no “NA” for these factors. 
4.2.2.6 Data for Regime Preference 
For the analysis of the underlying motivation of regime preference, I use the IPR mul-
tilateral coherence variables of my IPRs in PTAs dataset. Thereby, I apply the summary 
index over the IPR multilateral coherence variables that also accounts for the bindingness 
of the commitments (see Table 14: Description of Indexes). The higher the value on this 
index, the more IPR multilateral coherence variables are included in the PTA and the 
more binding are these commitments (see 3.1.2.4 IPR Multilateral Coherence Variables). 
The index ranges from ‘0’ to ‘112’, with a maximum of 24 included IPR multilateral 
coherence references per single PTA. On average, countries score around 15 on this index 
over all PTAs, and amongst those PTAs including IPR multilateral coherence references, 
the average score lies at 35 for this index. There are no missing values for this index as it 
is integral part of the IPRs in PTAs dataset. 
4.2.2.7 Data for Path Dependency 
Similar to the data for second factors of the endogeneity measure, the data for path 
dependency is also derived from the IPRs in PTAs dataset. I apply two different measures 
to account for the effect of path dependency: the first one is based on an “intra-country 
path dependency”, whilst the other focuses on the “international path dependency”. The 
“intra-country path dependency” measure reflects what countries could learn from their 
previous signed PTA templates and which variables have been included in one of their 
previous PTAs. To measure this factor, I coded if the same provision has been included 
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in any previous PTA by the same country. This means that for the first PTA per country, 
there is always a zero account for this measure as there has not been any own predating 
PTA that the country could have learned from. 
The assumption for the “international path dependency” measure is that countries 
learn from one another and, for example, would learn from best-practices of other coun-
tries. To calculate this measure, I compared if each variable included in a PTA has been 
previously included in predating PTA across the entire dataset. 
To measure the path dependency, I added summary indexes matching those for the 
coded variables on general and specific IPR, general and specific enforcement, mentioned 
and tangible IPR scope, binding and binary IPR multilateral coherence, and TRIPS-plus 
path dependency. For the TRIPS-plus index, I created a new index summarising the bi-
nary measure of a country’s path dependency from TRIPS-plus commitments on one of 
the eleven scope categories, enforcement or exhaustion. Besides the indexes, I also look 
at the path dependency for the binary scope variables, both mentioned and tangible, as 
well as the binary learning from TRIPS-plus protection for the IPR scope, enforcement 
and exhaustion categories. Instead of summarising the coded variables, they summarise 
those instances, where countries have either learned from their previous experiences (la-
belled as ‘pd’ for path dependency) or from another country’s PTA (labelled as ‘pdw’ for 
path dependency worldwide). For the global learning, there are two measures: one meas-
uring the impact after a PTA has been signed (‘pdw s’) and the other after it has entered 
into force (‘pdw f’). It is anticipated that both can influence the path dependency of coun-
tries. 
4.2.3 Control Variables 
Additionally to the baseline model, I include a number of control variables that have 
proven to be explanatory for the analysis of PTAs and could also impact the design of 
IPRs. These are the domestic political context, specific countries being part of the PTAs, 
the absolute economic power of PTA partners, and the geographic distance between PTA 
members. The subsequent paragraphs describe how and why these control variables are 
included. 
First of all, the domestic political context can influence trade agreements. Besides the 
veto players argument, political research on trade agreements has successfully shown that 
the political structure defined by the level of democracy among PTA members influences 
the likelihood of countries entering PTAs together (E. D. Mansfield and Milner 2012). 
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Thereby, it seems more likely that democracies enter into a trade agreement with each 
other than autocracies amongst each other or with democracies. As trade agreements are 
seen as a way to improve the trading conditions between partners and increase the welfare 
of the PTA members, their intention should be positively acknowledged by voters in dem-
ocratic systems and rewarded with political support, whereas autocratic regimes have less 
accountability and (political) incentive to enter into PTAs (see Baccini 2019). This effect 
of voter accountability could also extend beyond the mere entrance into PTAs and affect 
specific topics such as the regulation of IPRs through PTAs. Therefore, I include the av-
erage score of PTA members on the “Polity 2” index by the Polity IV Project, which 
includes data on the characteristics and transitions of political regimes ranging from 1800 
to 2017 (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2018). A higher score on the index stands for a more 
democratic regime, which is more likely to be held accountable for its actions. In line 
with the previous research, I will assume that there is a positive correlation between at 
least general IPR provisions in PTAs. For stringent IPR provisions, the effect could be 
ambiguous as too stringent IPR protection might not be deemed beneficial by all voters 
in democratic societies. To match the data of the IPRs in PTAs dataset, the data for 2018 
was extrapolated based on the values of 2017 to avoid the loss of the most current agree-
ments signed in 2018. 
Secondly, I check certain countries are influencing the design of IPRs in PTAs. For 
example, there have been contributions claiming that countries use a specific PTA tem-
plate as “negotiators do not ‘reinvent the wheel’ when they bargain over the provisions 
included in PTAs. Rather, they choose from a limited menu of principal models, specifi-
cally a Southern model, an EU model and a NAFTA model”(Baccini, Dür, and Haftel 
2015, 190). For IPRs in PTAs, the data shows that even the IPR leaders do not consist-
ently stick to their template (see 3.3.7 Descriptive Statistics Grouped by Selected Coun-
tries). Moreover, the case of TPP and its predecessor CPTPP show that the IPR design 
features vary according to the PTA members. Previous research without a comprehensive 
dataset on IPRs in PTAs has often argued that there are certain countries such as the US 
designing the provisions on IPRs to PTAs or that the north-south differentiation explains 
the design variations. To check the impact of countries on the IPR design, I will use the 
alternative classification of countries with a possible interest in protecting IPR and repre-
senting a more fitting differentiation than the north-south divide (see Table 17: IPR Coun-
try Selection Criteria). 
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Table 26: Country Blocks as Design Control Variables 
Blocks Classification Countries 
1 Classic IP leaders US, EU, EFTA, Japan 
2 Countries with a high increase of patent protection Brazil, China, India, Mexico 
3 New IP producers and developers Israel, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan 
 
Each block of countries shown in Table 26 will be used as a control variable, high-
lighting if the PTA membership of the selected countries distinctively alters IPR design. 
All blocks are expected to positively correlate with more stringent IPR protection, 
whereby for block 2 this effect could be accentuated for patent protection. 
Thirdly, I include the economic capacity of PTA members in a more general manner 
than with the economic power asymmetry (see 4.1.1 Economic Power Asymmetry). As 
the countries’ economic capacity could also indicate how much they can invest on IPR 
and IPR protection and, thus, their willingness to include more stringent IPR protection, 
I add as control variable the logarithmised average of GDP (ln GDP) and GDP per capita 
(lnGDPpc) amongst PTA members. The GDP and GDPpc data is taken from the World 
Bank database (World Bank 2018a). 
Fourthly, I use a proven indicator for the formation of trade agreements: geographic 
distance between PTA members. The argument is that due to the closer geographic dis-
tance between PTA members, their transportation costs are lower and they are more likely 
to benefit from a PTA (Baier and Bergstrand 2004). For IPRs in PTAs, this would mean 
that lower geographic distance would increase the inclusion of stringent IPR provisions 
in order to harmonise the IPR regulation with the closest trading partners. This way, the 
low transportation costs are matched by low adaption costs to foreign IPR standards and 
might even guarantee similar IPR enforcement mechanisms. Moreover, PTA members 
with a low geographical distance to each other are expected to be more aware of the sit-
uation on non-trade areas in neighbouring or at least close countries (see Lechner 2016) 
and might even share similar attitudes towards political issues such as IPR ideals (see 
Figure 7: Diverging Ideals of IPR Standards). I include the average geographic distance 
between PTA members for those countries with more than two members. The data for the 
geographic distance is provided by the Centre d'Études Prospectives et d'Informations 
Internationales (CEPII) dataset on geographic distance (Mayer and Zignago 2011). 
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4.2.4 Design: Descriptive Statistics 
Before discussing the models used for the analysis, I illustrate the descriptive statistics 
for the variables of the analysis in Table 27. The table begins with the dependent variables 
according to their category stated in the hypotheses and continues by listing the explana-
tory categories and their operationalisation. The metric values such as GDP and FDI are 
transformed to logarithmic values (ln) to make them comparable to the other measures in 
the model.  
 
Table 27: Descriptive Statistics for the Design Data 
Variables NAs Min Max Median Mean Std.Dev. 
Dependent Variables       
General IPR       
Index IPR general (sum) 0 0 24 5.00 7.04 7.11 
Index IPR scope mentioned (sum) 0 0 11 0 3.03 3.57 
Binary variables for IPR scope mentioned see Appendix 2: Codebook of IPRs in PTAs Dataset 
Index IPR general enforcement (sum) 0 0 6 0 1.09 1.46 
Index IPR multilateral coherence dummy (sum) 0 0 24 1.00 4.10 6.05 
Stringent IPR       
Index IPR specific (sum) 0 0 15 0 1.79 3.67 
Index IPR scope tangible (sum) 0 0 9 0 0.93 1.98 
Binary variables for IPR scope tangible see Appendix 2: Codebook of IPRs in PTAs Dataset 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0 0 7 0 0.86 1.81 
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0 0 112 1 17.63 26.89 
Index TRIPS-plus (sum) 0 0 42 0 3.07 7.89 
Additive variables for TRIPS-plus categories see Appendix 3: Codebook of T+PTA Dataset 
IPR DSM       
Index IPR DSM (dummy) 0 0 1 0 0.16 0.37 
IPR Enforcement       
Index IPR general enforcement (sum) 0 0 6 0 1.09 1.46 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0 0 7 0 0.86 1.81 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0 0 13 0 1.95 3.07 
Independent Variables       
Economic Power Asymmetry       
GDP asymmetry (max/sum) 35 0.14 1.00 0.74 0.69 0.26 
GDPpc asymmetry (max/sum) 35 0.08 0.99 0.59 0.55 0.25 
GDP asymmetry * substantial tariff cuts 81 0 1.00 0.57 0.49 0.37 
GDPpc asymmetry * substantial tariff cuts 81 0 0.98 0.41 0.41 0.33 
GDP asymmetry * ln FDI 67 0.25 26.95 14.37 14.13 6.19 
GDPpc asymmetry * ln FDI 67 0.24 25.76 10.86 11.21 5.92 
GDP asymmetry * lnofficial development assistance and 
official aid received 
48 0.19 21.91 14.42 12.92 6.01 
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Variables NAs Min Max Median Mean Std.Dev. 
GDPpc asymmetry * lnofficial development assistance 
and official aid received 
48 0.11 21.31 11.24 10.49 5.60 
GDP asymmetry * (DAC aid received by PTA members/ 
DAC aid received) 
121 -1.9 0.78 0 0.02 0.12 
GDPpc asymmetry * (DAC aid received by PTA mem-
bers/ DAC aid received) 
121 -1.1 0.75 0 0.01 0.08 
Political Pressure       
PTA members on Special 301 Reports (sum) 0 0 27.00 1.00 2.03 3.89 
Domestic Interests       
ln Charges for the use of IP, receipts (sum) 0 0 25.9 17.72 16.28 7.51 
ln Resident applications for patents (sum) 0 0 14.08 7.80 7.83 3.37 
ln Resident applications for trademarks (sum) 0 0 14.43 10.17 9.71 2.91 
ln Resident applications for industrial design (sum) 0 0 13.40 7.28 6.86 3.20 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumulative, sum) 0 0 17.01 10.21 10.25 3.62 
ln Resident applications for trademarks (cumulative, 
sum) 
0 0 16.85 12.40 11.93 3.20 
ln Resident applications for industrial design (cumulative, 
sum) 
0 0 15.67 9.52 9.21 3.52 
Applications for patents by PTA members /                    
total applications for patents 
0 0 3.77 0 0.19 0.56 
Applications for patents by PTA members /                   
total applications for patents 
0 0 9.19 0 0.52 1.44 
Applications for patents by PTA members /                   
total applications for patents 
0 0 6.77 0 0.34 1.01 
Applications for patents by PTA members /                   
total applications for patents (cumulative) 
0 0 0.02 0 0 0 
Applications for patents by PTA members /                   
total applications for patents (cumulative) 
0 0 0.32 0 0.03 0.06 
Applications for patents by PTA members /                   
total applications for patents (cumulative) 
0 0 0.51 0 0.02 0.06 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) 0 0 11.50 4.77 4.13 4.09 
R&D expenditure (sum) 0 -4.5 3.82 0 0.29 1.12 
Imports of htp by PTA members (sum) 0 -1.6 17.14 7.29 6.23 5.39 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members (sum) 0 0 18.54 8.08 6.89 5.91 
Imports of mltp by PTA members (sum) 0 -1.6 16.64 6.95 6.12 5.41 
Imports of ltp by PTA members (sum) 0 -1.8 15.92 4.17 5.31 5.40 
Imports of htp by PTA members /                                   
total htp imports 
0 0 0.42 0 0.01 0.03 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members /                                
total mhtp imports 
0 0 0.47 0 0.01 0.04 
Imports of mltp by PTA members /                                
total mltp imports 
0 0 0.17 0 0 0.01 
Imports of ltp by PTA members /                                    
total ltp imports 
0 0 0.14 0 0 0.01 
Veto Players       
Veto players (sum) 
 
0 0 26.29 1.36 2.98 4.78 
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Variables NAs Min Max Median Mean Std.Dev. 
Endogeneity       
PTA depth 50 0 6.00 2.00 2.45 1.83 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) 50 0 1.00 1.00 0.74 0.44 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0 0 13 0 1.95 3.07 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0 0 7 0 0.86 1.81 
Regime Preference       
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0 0 112 1 17.63 26.89 
Path Dependency       
Index IPR general pd (sum) 0 0 796 30.00 68.00 124.43 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope mentioned pl See Appendix 18 
Index IPR general enforcement pd (sum) 0 0 179 4.00 12.27 25.13 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pl (dummy sum) 0 0 839 20.00 57.14 133.93 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible pl See Appendix 18 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible pdw s See Appendix 18 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible pdw f See Appendix 18 
Index IPR specific enforcement pd (sum) 0 0 231 4.00 15.33 34.17 
Index IPR specific enforcement pdw s (sum) 0 0 7 0 0.86 1.81 
Index IPR specific enforcement pdw f (sum) 54 0 7 0 0.90 1.84 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pd (sum) 0 0 839 20.00 57.14 133.93 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pdw s (sum) 0 0 24 1.00 4.10 6.05 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pdw f (sum) 54 0 24 1.00 4.29 6.09 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus categories pd See Appendix 18 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus categories pdw s See Appendix 18 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus categories pdw f See Appendix 18 
Control Variables       
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 5 -10 10.00 7.50 5.15 4.89 
Classic IP leaders 0 0 2 0 0.24 0.43 
Countries with a high increase of patent protection 0 0 3 0 0.15 0.39 
New IP producers and developers 0 0 2 0 0.12 0.35 
ln GDP (mean) 5 18.5 29.8 25.57 25.44 1.84 
ln GDPpc (mean) 5 5.53 11.36 8.61 8.74 1.29 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 24 4.11 9.84 7.50 7.56 0.99 
 
The descriptive statistics of the binary scope variables are already listed in the code-
book (see Appendix 2: Codebook of IPRs in PTAs Dataset for the mentioned and tangible 
scope variables, Appendix 3: Codebook of T+PTA Dataset for the TRIPS-plus scope, 
enforcement and exhaustion variables, and Appendix 18: Descriptive Statistics of the In-
dexes Based on Binary and Additive Variables (Design Data) for the path dependency 
scope and TRIPS-plus variables). 
Table 27 shows that the dependent variables are not normally distributed. This is due 
to a common problem of count data: an excess of zeros. The probability of the coded 
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variables to be coded positively, i.e. to be included in a PTA or not, more often than 
normal are zero. The combination of the binarily coded variables in the indexes can no 
fully remedy this issue. Table 28 lists the occurrences of zero and count values for the 
dependent variables besides the binary scope and TRIPS-plus variables. Table 28 illus-
trates that for all indexes besides the index measuring the general IPR content of PTAs, 
there is are slightly or even substantially more zero occurrences than positively coded 
values. 
 
Table 28: Zero Occurrences Among Dependent Variables 
Variables N = 606 
Dependent Variables 0 > 0 
General IPR   
Index IPR general (sum) 228 378 
Index IPR scope mentioned (sum) 315 291 
Index IPR general enforcement (sum) 312 294 
Index IPR multilateral coherence dummy (sum) 300 306 
Stringent IPR   
Index IPR specific (sum) 447 159 
Index IPR scope tangible (sum) 460 146 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 469 137 
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 300 306 
Index TRIPS-plus (sum) 470 136 
IPR DSM   
Index IPR DSM (dummy) 509 97 
IPR Enforcement   
Index IPR general enforcement (sum) 312 294 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 469 137 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 308 298 
 
This excess of zeros in the dependent variables affects the model choice for the anal-
ysis of the design of IPRs in PTAs described further in the next subchapter. 
4.2.5 Design: Models of Analysis 
So far, most research working with substantial PTA design data has focused on the 
effects the PTA design and its variations unfolds. Often used for the effect of PTA design 
is the gravity model, which will be further discussed in subchapter 5.2.3 Economic Ef-
fects: Analysis. However, there has been comparatively little research that aims to explain 
the variations in the design of PTAs such as Lechner (2016) or Raesch et al. (2018) (for 
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an overview of previous research on PTAs see Baccini 2019). I will fill the gap for the 
design of IPRs in PTAs and test the explanatory power of economic power asymmetry, 
political pressure, domestic interests, veto players, endogeneity effects, regime preference 
and path dependency on the variations in IPR regulation through PTAs. 
The focus of the design analysis lies on the IPR indexes which are either binary vari-
ables (DSM and scope variables) or ordinal variables formed out of the binary IPR vari-
ables (see 3.2.3 Dataset Development). As illustrated in Table 28, the dependent variables 
show an inflation of the category ‘0’, i.e. PTAs do not include these variables and are 
coded as zero. According to Zeileis et al. (2008, 1) this is a common phenomenon for 
coded variables and there are two central two-stage approaches that efficiently deal with 
the zero-inflation of the count variables: hurdle models and zero-inflated models. 
Both models have two stages to deal with the excess of zeros in the dependent varia-
bles. The hurdle model follows the underlying assumptions that on stage one, the cases 
are either zero or greater than zero, and on stage two, the values are always greater than 
zero (Zeileis, Kleiber, and Jackman 2008). According to Mullahy (1986, 345), “the idea 
underlying the hurdle formulations is that a binomial probability model governs the bi-
nary outcome of whether a count variate has a zero or a positive realization. If the real-
ization is positive, the ‘hurdle’ is crossed, and the conditional distribution of the positives 
is governed by a truncated-at-zero count data model.” Zero-inflated models (ZI), on the 
other hand, assume that there can be zeros on the first as well as on the second stage of 
the model (Rose et al. 2006). Thereby, zero-inflated models assume that the data structure 
and not probability causes some cases to be zero on the first stage (Hu, Pavlicova, and 
Nunes 2011). For example, if countries are not part of a PTA, they can also not opt for 
IPRs in PTAs. This in turn would lead to a zero for the first stage measure regardless of 
their preference of IPRs in PTAs. As my dataset on IPRs in PTAs only includes those 
cases where countries have entered a PTA and by including only those cases beginning 
in the year of the first appearance of IPRs in PTAs, every PTA potentially could include 
IPRs.  
Theoretically, both model fit for the analysis of my indexes depending on which index 
is analysed. For the index IPR general, the data should not have any structural drivers 
leading to a zero account on both stages of the two stage model. Instead, the hurdle model 
allows to distinguish between “first a choice of whether to form an alliance, and condi-
tional on that choice, a choice of design features” (see Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds 2015, 
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976). Applied to the index IPR general this means that the model on the first stage com-
pares those PTAs that include no IPRs to those that do include IPR. After the model has 
passed this first hurdle, the second stage looks at the variation among those PTAs that do 
included general IPRs. The first stage of the model thus looks at all PTAs of the dataset 
(‘0’ or ‘>0’), and describes why countries do or do not choose to include IPRs in PTAs. 
The second stage is only applied once the first stage of the hurdle model is crossed, and 
analyses the subset of PTAs positively scoring on the index IPR general (‘>0’). The focus 
of the second stage lies not on the zero occurrences, but on the count data and explains 
why countries choosing to include IPRs in PTAs vary in their level of IPR regulation. 
However, for the other indexes the argument can be made that there actually can be 
two drivers of the zero occurrences. If a country has no general IPR included in a PTA 
then there is per definition of the coded variables also no specific IPR in the PTA. The 
driver of a zero occurrence of specific variables can thus be firstly, that there is no IPR in 
the PTA, and secondly, that the PTA includes IPR yet no specific IPR provisions. Applied 
to a two stage model, the first stage remains the same as in the hurdle model and reflects 
the decision to include or exclude IPRs in the PTA (‘0’ or ‘>0’). However, on the second 
stage of, for instance, the specific index, the decision can be either to rest on general IPR 
regulation equalling a zero score on the specific index, or regulating beyond the general 
level and score higher than zero on the specific IPR index (‘0’ or ‘>0’). This argument 
also fits the binary dependent variables better. Here, the first stage can be represented by 
the general inclusion of IPR in the PTA as a precondition to scoring on, for example, the 
binary IPR scope variables such as the mentioning of copyright. The assumption of zero 
occurrence on both stages of the model can be fitted by an zero-inflated model instead of 
a hurdle model. 
To test these theoretical arguments on the model fit and ensure the best fit for the data, 
I check the robustness by running both hurdle as well as ZI models with Poisson and 
negative binomial distribution for all dependent variables (HP, HNB, ZIP, ZINB). More-
over, I also apply single-stage model specifications to the data to ascertain that a two-
stage model indeed is to be preferred over a single-stage model. Therefore, I run several 
forms of regressions, namely ordinary least squares (OLS), ordered probit (OP), Poisson 
(P) and negative binomial (NB) regression. The regression formula are built based on the 
hypotheses for the design variables listed in Table 22 respectively Table 23. The model 
further varies depending on the explanatory variables. For the 15 variables of general 
IPR, the index on IPR dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) and the three indexes for 
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IPR enforcement the approach was the same, unlike for the variables of stringent IPR. 
Figure 10 shows the approach for general IPR, IPR DSM and IPR enforcement, whilst 
Figure 11 and Figure 12 illustrate it for stringent IPR. For the categories of dependent 
variables (DVs) shown in Figure 10, all of the explanatory variables assumed to have an 
impact on the respective dependent variables were included in the regression formula and 
run for each model specification, i.e. for the four single-stage models OLS, OP, P and NB 
as well as the four two-stage models HP, HNB, ZIP, ZINB. 
 
Figure 10: Design Model Specifications I 
 
 
The model specifications had to be adapted for the stringent IPR DVs due to the in-
cluded explanatory variables. Figure 11 shows the first of two additional alterations. 
Firstly, the sheer number of explanatory variables required for the analysis of the 
stringent IPR DVs meant that not all of them could be included in one formula per DV. 
However, creating models per theoretical categories would have been too restrictive, so 
as illustrated in Figure 11 shows, I created blocks for those categories that included the 
most operationalised variables: economic power asymmetry, domestic interests and path 
dependency. I created separated models for all different measures of path dependency, 
due to the obviously high correlation of the path dependency variables. For example, the 
path dependency from others (pdw) is differentiated according to the date of PTA signa-
ture (pdw s) and entry into force of the PTA (pdw f). It can be assumed that the variations 
between pdw s and pdw f are highly correlated with the date of the PTA and not per se its 
content. Thus, the 29 dependent variables representing stringent IPR were analysed sep-
arately for economic power asymmetry, domestic interest as well as the seven path de-
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Figure 11: Design Model Specifications IIa 
 
Secondly, the explanatory variables for stringent IPRs include the category of endoge-
neity operationalised by the four variables of PTA depth, PTA depth substantial tariff 
cuts, the index IPR enforcement (sum), and the index IPR specific enforcement. As the 
second one is a subset of the first variable, and the fourth is a subset of the third one, they 
could not be included in the same model. Hence, the nine explanatory variable categories 
were analysed in four different constellations. PTA depth is included in one model with 
the index IPR enforcement (sum), and in another model with the index IPR specific en-
forcement. The same applies to PTA depth substantial tariff cuts. Thus, for each of the 
nine explanatory variable categories, I made a further model alteration to account for the 









1) Economic Power Asymmetry (epa)
2) Domestic Interests (di)
Path           
Dependency 
3) General Path Dependency (pdg)
4) Specific Path Dependency (pds)
5) TRIPS-plus Path Dependency (pdtp)
6) Specific World Path Dependency (Signature) (pdwss)
7) TRIPS-plus World Path Dependency (Signat.) (pdwstp)
8) Specific World Path Dependency (Force) (pdwfs)
9) TRIPS-plus World Path Dependency (Force) (pdwftp)
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Besides these selective steps for the economic power asymmetry, domestic interest, 
path dependency and endogeneity variables, all other explanatory variables are included. 
For each of these stringent IPR model specifications the same eight models were run as 
for general IPR: four single-stage models OLS, OP, P and NB as well as four two-stage 
models HP, HNB, ZIP, ZINB. For example, the stringent IPR variable Index IPR scope 
tangible (sum) was testes for each of the nine categories such as economic power using 
the four different endogeneity combinations such as PTA depth and the index IPR en-
forcement (sum) for the four single-stage models such as Poisson as well as the four two-
stage models such as the hurdle with negative binomial distribution for the count data. 
The second model specification is illustrated in Figure 12. 
 




For the two stringent IPR DVs Index IPR specific (sum) and Index IPR specific en-
forcement (sum), I created only two endogeneity models per explanatory variable cate-
gory as these variables include either a subset or the entire measure of the enforcement 

























OLS, OP, P, NB
HP, HNB, ZIP, ZINB
PTA Depth Substantial Tariff Cuts
OLS, OP, P, NB
HP, HNB, ZIP, ZINB
Index IPR Enforcement (Sum)
OLS, OP, P, NB
HP, HNB, ZIP, ZINB
Index IPR Specific Enforcement
OLS, OP, P, NB
HP, HNB, ZIP, ZINB
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Table 29: Model Overview for Design Analysis 
Variables Number 
of DVs 




Dependent Variables (DVs) 48  8216  
General IPR     
Index IPR general (sum) 1 8 8 m1 
Index IPR scope mentioned (sum) 1 8 8 m2 
Binary variables for IPR scope mentioned 11 8 88 m3a-m3k 
Index IPR general enforcement (sum) 1 8 8 m4 
Index IPR multilateral coherence dummy (sum) 1 8 8 m5 
Stringent IPR     
Index IPR specific (sum) 1 9x2x8 144 m6 
Index IPR scope tangible (sum) 1 9x4x8 288 m7 
Binary variables for IPR scope tangible 11 9x4x8 3168 m8a-m8k 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 1 9x2x8 144 m9 
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 1 9x4x8 288 m10 
Index TRIPS-plus (sum) 1 9x4x8 288 m11 
Additive variables for TRIPS-plus categories 13 9x4x8 3744 m12a-m12m 
IPR DSM     
Index IPR DSM (dummy) 1 8 8 m13 
IPR Enforcement     
Index IPR general enforcement (sum) 1 8 8 m14a 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 1 8 8 m14b 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 1 8 8 m14c 
 
Beside varying the model specifications, I checked for multicollinearity amongst the 
explanatory variables. In most models, at least some of the explanatory variables do cor-
relate significantly amongst each other. For each model I, thus, calculated the variance 
inflation factor (VIF), which identifies “sampling variance affected by correlation among 
the explanatory variables” (Wooldridge 2013, 860). I calculate the VIF for each explan-
atory variable according the formula 𝑉𝐼𝐹𝑗 =  
1
1−𝑅𝑗
2 (Wooldridge 2013, 98). In economic 
analysis, the VIF should ideally take a score below ‘10’ to ensure that multicollinearity 
is not a problem among the explanatory variables. However, if some variables that are 
necessary for the theoretical argument indicate a high VIF score, these variables can still 
be kept in the model: 
 
“If we think certain explanatory variables need to be included in a regression to infer causality 
of xj, then we are hesitant to drop them, and whether we think VIFj is “too high” cannot really 
affect that decision. If, say, our main interest is in the causal effect of x1 on y, then we should 
ignore entirely the VIFs of other coefficients. Finally, setting a cutoff value for VIF above 
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which we conclude multicollinearity is a “problem” is arbitrary and not especially helpful. 
Sometimes the value 10 is chosen: If VIFj is above 10 (equivalently, R
2
j is above .9), then we 
conclude that multicollinearity is a “problem” for estimating bj. But a VIFj above 10 does not 
mean that the standard deviation of ̂j is too large to be useful because the standard deviation 
also depends on s and SSTj, and the latter can be increased by increasing the sample size.” 
Woolridge (2013, 98) 
 
Therefore, I do exclude those variables with a high VIF value, but also keep some 
variables that are beyond the threshold of ten and are necessary to test a theoretical argu-
ment. For example, where there are multiple variables to measure an explanatory argu-
ment such as with domestic interests and these variables have a high correlation amongst 
each other, I do exclude those with the highest VIF if they are not statistically significant. 
Those explanatory arguments operationalised by only one variable such as veto players 
are always kept within the model as otherwise their exclusion could introduce an explan-
atory bias. 
Because the path dependency variables might have a high correlation, I also tested if 
there are linearly dependent variables amongst the seven different path dependency vari-
able groups included for stringent IPR (see Figure 11). The tests showed that the variables 
for TRIPS-plus copyrights and TRIPS-plus trademarks for the path dependency from the 
world for both date of signature of the PTA (plw_s_ipr_tripsplus_trademarks) as the en-
try into force of the PTA (plw_f_ipr_tripsplus_trademarks) are aliases and that the trade-
mark variables should be dropped. Therefore, none of the models will include this varia-
ble as its effects are represented by the copyright variable. 
Across all tested models per DV, I display the regression tables of the ones that fit the 
data best. This entails that only one of the endogeneity variable combinations is displayed. 
I will illustrate the model selection for one of the general IPR indicators: the index IPR 
general (sum). For the model selection, I follow the path developed by Kleiber and Zeileis 
(2016), which compare the goodness of the model fit for count data regressions using 
rootograms and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC).  
Firstly, I compute a rootogram that graphically displays the goodness of the model fit 
and is especially useful when dealing with count data affected by an excess of zeros. 
Usually when looking at regressions, one of the main indicators of the fit are the residuals 
or a comparison of the fitted towards the observed values by plotting them. However, if 
the dependent variable has considerably more zeros than assumed under a normal distri-
bution, the residuals will be skewed by this excess of zeros, and the impact on the count 
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data, i.e. those PTAs including IPRs, cannot be predicted accurately. The rootograms are 
an alternative way to display the fitted and observed values. Similarly to a histogram, the 
rootogram displays the bars of the observed respectively a line for the expected frequen-
cies (Kleiber and Zeileis 2016, 297 et seqq.). I will use the so-called hanging rootograms, 
whereby the bars of the observed frequencies start below the line of the fitted frequencies, 
i.e. hang from it. The hanging rootograms have the benefit that their interpretation and 
comparison is clearer than for other forms of rootograms (see Kleiber and Zeileis 2016 
for standing and suspended rootograms). 
Graph 17 on the following page displays the hanging rootograms for the dependent 
variable of the index IPR general (ipr_general_sum) using the Poisson regression model 
(Poisson), the negative binomial regression model (Negative binomial), the hurdle model 
using Poisson distribution for the count data on the second stage of the model (Hurdle 
Poisson), the hurdle model using negative binomial distribution for the count data on the 
second stage of the model (Hurdle Negative Binomial), the zero-inflated model using a 
Poisson distribution for the count data on the second stage of the model (ZI Poisson), and 
the zero-inflated model using a negative binomial distribution for the count data on the 
second stage of the model (ZI Negative Binomial). The benefit of the rootogram is that 
besides showing the goodness of a model fit, it becomes obvious which count values are 
fitted well and which values are under- or overfitted. The closer the bars in the rootogram 
are to the horizontal reference line, the better do the fitted frequencies match the observed 
ones. Those bars that do not reach the horizontal reference line are overfitted by the model 
and those that exceed the horizontal reference line are underfitted. In a perfect model, all 
bars would therefore assemble close along the horizontal reference line. If the data in-
cludes an excess of zeros for the dependent variable, then the rootogram should indicate 
that for counts of ‘0’ the single-stage regression models are underfitted. 
Graph 17 shows that for the single-stage regression models the zero count is mas-
sively underfitted as it reaches far beyond the horizontal reference line. The two-stage 
models have much better fit, whereby the zero-inflated models seem to fit slightly better 
than the hurdle models and the models using negative binomial distribution slightly better 
than those using a Poisson distribution. For all two-stage models the count of ‘1’, ‘2’, 
‘12’, ‘13’, ‘16’ and ‘21’are underfitted and the counts of ‘7’-‘11’ overfitted. Even though 
the fit is not perfect, the two-stage models clearly have the better goodness of fit than the 
single-stage regression models. 
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Graph 17: Rootograms for Index IPR General (Range: 0-24) 
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Secondly, Kleiber and Zeileis (2016) suggest to compare the relative performance of 
the tested models by using the BIC of the model types. Additionally to the BIC, I also 
include the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and compare both criterions. The lower 
the AIC and BIC value of a model, the better is the relative fit of the model. Most often 
in my analysis, both AIC and BIC identify the same model with the best fit, and do so 
very clearly. In a few cases, the AIC and BIC indicate different models having the best 
fit. In these instances, I display both models scoring highest on the information criterions. 
Table 30 lists the AIC and BIC for the index IPR general and shows that out of the single-
stage models, the order probit score best (lowest) on both AIC and BIC. From the two-
stage models, the zero-inflated negative binomial model is the one scoring best on the 
AIC and BIC.  
 
Table 30: AIC & BIC Comparison for Index IPR General Models 
Index IPR General AIC df BIC df 
OLS 3'249.3 36 3'405.9 36 
Ordered Probit 2'296.0 58 2'548.4 58 
Poisson 3'716.5 35 3'868.8 35 
Negative Binomial 2'961.2 36 3'117.8 36 
Hurdle Poisson 2'417.9 70 2'722.5 70 
Hurdle Negative Binomial 2'383.2 71 2'692.1 71 
ZI Poisson 2'418.3 70 2'722.8 70 
ZI Negative Binomial 2'364.9 71 2'673.8 71 
 
To test the goodness of fit across different models, previous studies have also applied 
the Vuong test. However, Wilson (2015). argues that the Vuong test is misused and sta-
tistically not applicable for testing zero-inflation. I follow his rationale, do not apply the 
Vuong test and rely on the comparison between AIC and BIC to test the goodness of fit 
for all dependent variables. These AIC and BIC tables are displayed in Appendix 19: 
Model Fit of . Unlike stated in my theoretical argumentation, the AIC and BIC compari-
son taken together with the illustration of the rootograms shows that the ordered probit 
and the zero-inflated model using negative binomial distribution fit the data better for the 
index IPR general than all other model types, even hurdle models.  
Over all DVs, there is not a particular model type that always fits best. Often, the 
ordered probit models show the best fit according to the AIC and BIC. However, the 
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ordered probit can less accurately describe the variation in the design than a two-stage 
model, which allows to draw conclusions on the variation amongst those PTAs that in-
clude something on the DV on the second stage of the model. Therefore, I also display 
the best fitting two-stage models where applicable. In the following subchapter, I display 
the regression tables of the best fitting models for all dependent variables and analyse 
their results. The model specifications are based on Table 29: Model Overview for Design 
Analysis, whereby the model number indicates the dependent variable followed by the 
regression specification such as ‘op’ for ordered probit or ‘zinb’ for zero-inflated negative 
binomial. 
4.3 Design: Analysis 
The order for the analysis of the design of IPRs in PTA follows the dependent varia-
bles, starting with the operationalisation of general IPR (4.3.1), followed by stringent IPR 
(4.3.2), IPR dispute settlement mechanisms (4.3.3) and concluded by IPR enforcement 
(4.3.4). In the subsequent subchapter (4.3.5), I summarise the most significant results of 
the regression analysis and provide an overview matching the postulated hypotheses to 
the results of the regression analysis (Table 51). 
All regression tables follow the same structure. The first column shows the explana-
tory variables used to explain the dependent variable of the respective subchapter and 
table caption. The following columns include the results of the regression for the best 
fitting models, whereby the type of model is described in the last three rows of the table, 
followed by the number of observations. For the two-stage models, the regression table 
displays two columns. The first column shows the results for the second stage and thus 
the count data, and following column illustrates the estimates for the first stage of the 
model. 
The OLS and ordered probit models can be interpreted by looking at the estimates and 
interpreting their positive or negative impact on the dependent variable. However, the 
coefficients of the other models have to be exponentiated (exp(estimates)) in order to 
draw conclusions on their impact (see Gelman and Hill 2006, 111). Besides this interim 
stage for the coefficient interpretation, the zero data of the hurdle and ZI models follow 
a different logic. Whilst a hurdle model shows the odds of non-zeros for the zero data 
(positive scores on the DV), the zero data of the ZI model shows the odds of (structural) 
zeros in the DV (Loeys et al. 2012, 170; Zeileis, Kleiber, and Jackman 2008, 19). Hence, 
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the logic of interpretation is inverted for the zero data of hurdle and ZI models. The esti-
mate for the zero data of the ZI indicates the log odds of being an excessive zero. Hence, 
a positive estimate on the zero data in the ZI model shows the log odds of not scoring on 
the DV, whereas a positive estimate on the zero data in the hurdle model shows the odds 
of including the DV. For the count data, the difference between hurdle and ZI models is 
that the count data of hurdle model shows only those cases that include something on the 
DV (score > 0), whereas the ZI models also include PTAs that do not include anything 
on the DV (score ≥ 0). The description of the indexes used as dependent variables can be 
found in subchapter 3.2.3 Dataset Development. 
4.3.1 General IPR Design Analysis 
The subsequent subchapters display the regression tables for each of the dependent 
variables capturing general IPR. The postulated explanatory factors for general IPRs are 
domestic interests (H3.1, H3.2) veto players (H4.1, H4.3), regime preference (H6.1) and 
path dependency (H7.1, H7.2) (see Table 23: Overview of IPR Design Features, Explan-
atory Factors and Hypotheses).  
For all of these factors, the regression analyses show significant results. Yet, the gen-
eral IPR design features are influenced the most by domestic interests variables. 
4.3.1.1 Index IPR General (sum) 
The regression analysis for the Index IPR general is displayed in Table 31 on the 
following pages. It shows that some of the domestic interests variables, the veto players, 
the regime preference, and some of the path dependency variables as well as some of the 
control variables have a significant effect on the general IPR variables in PTAs. As to be 
expected, not all of the tested variables for the categories of domestic interests and path 
dependency show the same level of significance. Similarly, the direction of the effects 
also is sometimes positive and negative for the explanatory variables, depending on the 
used measure. 
Domestic interests have both significantly positive as well as negative effects on the 
general IPR content of PTAs. However, most of the included variables for domestic in-
terest have a minimal impact on general IPR (estimates < 1). For example, a significantly 
positive effect can be observed for the received charges for the use of IP (0.028) and the 
number of researchers in R&D (0.054), whereas R&D expenditure (-0.159) have a sig-
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nificantly negative effect on the general IPR content. A more sizeable impact can be ob-
served for the industrial design applications by PTA members in relation to the total ap-
plications for industrial designs (cumulative), which has a significantly positive effect on 
the zero stage of the two-stage model. The log odds of being an excessive zero increase 
by 27.955 for every one-unit change in the total applications for industrial designs (cu-
mulative). This means that with an increased share that PTA members have amongst the 
industrial design applications of another PTA member, they are more likely not to include 
general IPR provisions in their PTAs.  
Amongst the domestic interest measures, the technology-intensiveness variables have 
the highest estimates and show a significant effect on the general IPR content of PTAs. 
They show that an increase in the share of PTA members imports of medium-high-tech-
nology products has a significantly negative effect on the general IPR content of the PTAs 
(-13.97). More so, the expected change in log(index general IPR) for a one-unit increase 
in imports of low-technology products (ltp) by PTA members as a share of the total ltp 
imports is -25.43 holding all other variables constant. This means that the more of the 
total lt products are imported from PTA partners, the less general IPR content is within 
the PTAs. A positive effect can be observed for medium-low-technology products (mltp). 
Hereby, the expected change in log(index general IPR) for a one-unit increase in imports 
of mltp by PTA members as a share of the total mltp imports is 32.71 holding all other 
variables constant, respectively 31.471 for the OP model. This indicates that the higher 
the share of PTA members imports of mlt products, the more general IPR content the 
PTA includes. 
Veto players have a significantly negative effect on the Index IPR general. This means 
that the more veto players there are amongst PTA members, the lower the general IPR 
content of the PTA. This is along the line of the theoretical assumptions about veto play-
ers, yet the significant estimate is comparatively low (-0.172). However, the low estimate 
also reflects that the analysis concerns general IPR, which might be less conflictual 
amongst veto players than more specific provisions. 
Regime preference also has a significantly positive impact on the general IPR content 
of PTAs, yet on a shallow level (estimate < 0.04). The zero stage of the two-stage model 
shows that regime preference has a significantly negative impact on the PTAs chances of 
not including any general IPR (-2.019). And the second stage implies that the more IPR 
multilateral coherence references a PTA includes, the higher is also the general IPR con-
tent of the PTA (exp(0.009)= 1.009). 
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Table 31: Design Regression – Index IPR General (sum) 







   
ln Charges for the use of IP, receipts (sum) 0.028*     
(0.011) 
0.008     
(0.007) 
-0.038*     
(0.019) 
ln Resident applications for patents (sum) -0.082     
(0.071) 
-0.105*     
(0.047) 
-0.037     
(0.118) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(sum) 
0.085     
(0.077) 
0.103.     
(0.053) 
-0.005     
(0.102) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
0.105     
(0.069) 
0.124**     
(0.041) 
0.062     
(0.122) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(cumulative, sum) 
-0.118     
(0.079) 
-0.183***     
(0.052) 
0.027     
(0.115) 
Applications for patents by PTA members / 
total applications for patents 
0.474.     
(0.263) 
-0.137     
(0.115) 
-3.896.     
(2.019) 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks 
0.077     
(0.165) 
0.101     
(0.079) 
-0.395     
(0.488) 
Applications for patents by PTA members /                   
total applications for patents (cumulative) 
-44.789     
(44.143) 
-36.21     
(22.43) 
-59.491     
(252.831) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs (cumulative) 
-1.898     
(1.6) 
0.157     
(0.716) 
27.955*     
(11.133) 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) 0.054**     
(0.018) 
0.014     
(0.009) 
0.022     
(0.047) 
R&D expenditure (sum) -0.159*     
(0.075) 
-0.005     
(0.038) 
-0.046     
(0.211) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members (sum) 0.071*     
(0.036) 
0.024     
(0.017) 
-0.194.     
(0.108) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members (sum) -0.027     
(0.037) 
0.005     
(0.017) 
0.165     
(0.119) 
Imports of htp by PTA members /                                   
total htp imports 
2.514   
(3.771) 
-3.163     
(1.957) 
-4.006     
(14.244) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members /                                
total mhtp imports 
-13.97***     
(3.686) 
-4.367*     
(2.058) 
16.548     
(11.528) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members /                                
total mltp imports 
31.471.     
(19.067) 
32.71***     
(9.87) 
-19.644     
(80.147) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members /                                    
total ltp imports 
-11.811     
(14.122) 
-25.43***     
(7.447) 
20.596     
(75.116) 
Veto Players 
   
Veto players (sum) -0.172***     
(0.051) 
-0.047     
(0.028) 
0.156     
(0.114) 
Regime Preference 
   
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.032***     
(0.002) 
0.009***     
(0.001) 
-2.019***     
(0.605) 
Path Dependency 
   
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – copyrights 
-0.012     
(0.131) 
-0.237***     
(0.064) 
-1.074**     
(0.343) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – trademarks 
0.164*     
(0.067) 
0.069*     
(0.033) 
-0.216     
(0.253) 
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Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – geographical indications 
-0.067     
(0.138) 
0.216**     
(0.066) 
1.04*     
(0.425) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
-0.009     
(0.102) 
-0.044     
(0.052) 
-0.627*     
(0.29) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – new plant varieties 
-0.064*     
(0.032) 
-0.015     
(0.015) 
0.507*     
(0.256) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – encrypted program-carrying sat-
ellite signals 
-0.088*     
(0.039) 
-0.013     
(0.017) 
-0.632*     
(0.261) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
-0.019     
(0.089) 
-0.018     
(0.038) 
-0.742.     
(0.419) 
Index IPR general enforcement pd (sum) 0.033***     
(0.01) 
0.011**     
(0.004) 
0.162*     
(0.08) 
Control Variables 
   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.05***     
(0.014) 
0.017*     
(0.008) 
-0.034     
(0.027) 
Classic IP leaders 0.418*     
(0.2) 
0.124     
(0.082) 
0.792     
(0.771) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.225     
(0.173) 
0.255**     
(0.093) 
1.149*     
(0.497) 
New IP producers and developers 0.487**     
(0.166) 
0.12.     
(0.071) 
0.112     
(0.646) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.042     
(0.065) 
0.012     
(0.036) 
-0.092     
(0.148) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.291***     
(0.071) 
0.055     
(0.038) 
-0.244.     
(0.137) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.079     
(0.062) 
-0.014     
(0.031) 
0.183     
(0.14) 
Intercept – 1.582*     
(0.718) 
3.906     
(2.965) 
log(theta) – 2.606***     
(0.203) 
– 






Observations 573 573 573 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
Path dependency has significantly positive as well as negative effects on general IPR 
provisions. The estimates are comparatively low (< 1.08). Those PTA members already 
mentioned copyrights, new plant varieties and encrypted program-carrying satellite sig-
nals in their previous PTAs include a little less general IPR provisions in their PTAs 
compared to those that did not mention them in previous PTAs. And those PTA members 
that mentioned trademarks or general enforcement provisions in their PTAs include a 
little more general IPR provisions compared to those members that did not include such 
provisions in their previous PTAs. 
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Control variables have a significantly positive impact on general IPR in PTAs, which 
is comparatively minor (estimates < 1.2). The most substantial positive effect is observed 
if the classic IP leaders (0.418) or new IP producers and developers (0.487) are part of 
the agreement. This means that if the US, EU, EFTA, or Japan resp. Israel, South Korea, 
Singapore or Taiwan are amongst the PTA members, the general IPR content increases. 
4.3.1.2 Index IPR Scope Mentioned (sum) 
The second operationalisation of general IPR content is the index IPR scope men-
tioned, which codes how many of the eleven IPR forms are covered by the PTA. Its re-
gression analysis is displayed in Table 32 for the ordered probit and ZIP model. The ex-
planatory factor with the highest significant impact on the IPR scope mentioned in PTAs 
are the domestic interests. 
Domestic interests have significantly negative and positive effects on the IPR scope 
mentioned in PTAs. Similar to the effects observed for the index IPR general, the imports 
divided according to their technology intensiveness have a strong effect on the DV. The 
larger the import share of ht, mht and lt products by PTA members, the fewer IPR forms 
are included. The most significant effect can be observed for medium-low-technology 
products (mltp), whereby the expected change in log(index IPR scope mentioned) for a 
one-unit increase in imports of mltp by PTA members as a share of the total mltp imports 
is 46.94 holding all other variables constant. However, the index IPR scope is affected 
the most by the cumulative share of applications for patents by PTA members. The ex-
pected change in log(index IPR scope mentioned) for a one-unit increase in the cumula-
tive share of applications for patents by PTA members is -96.02 holding all other varia-
bles constant. This means that the more patent applications PTA members make in a PTA 
member countries, the fewer IPR forms are mentioned in PTAs. This effect is mostly 
driven by the relationship with the mentioning of industrial designs, patents, undisclosed 
information, layout designs of integrated circuits and domain names as part of the index 
IPR scope mentioned (see Appendix 20: Design Regression Tables of the Binary Varia-
bles for IPR Scope Mentioned). 
Veto players have a significantly negative effect on the scope of IPRs mentioned in 
PTAs, yet the odds ratio are only decreased by -0.113. This means that an increase in the 
number of veto players has a minor negative effect on the number of IPR forms being 
mentioned in a PTA.  
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Table 32: Design Regression – Index IPR Scope Mentioned (sum) 







   
ln Charges for the use of IP, receipts (sum) 0.046***     
(0.014) 
0         
(0.01) 
-0.091***     
(0.02) 
ln Resident applications for patents (sum) -0.143.     
(0.08) 
-0.104.     
(0.059) 
0.048     
(0.109) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(sum) 
0.179.     
(0.106) 
0.097     
(0.066) 
-0.313.     
(0.173) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (sum) 
-0.025     
(0.053) 
0.061.     
(0.034) 
0.131.     
(0.073) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
0.246**     
(0.077) 
0.084.     
(0.047) 
-0.273*     
(0.111) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(cumulative, sum) 
-0.281**     
(0.099) 
-0.163*     
(0.065) 
0.446**     
(0.161) 
Applications for patents by PTA members /                    
total applications for patents 
0.341    
(0.219) 
0.182.     
(0.108) 
0.14     
(0.415) 
Applications for patents by PTA members /                   
total applications for patents (cumulative) 
-63.065     
(40.846) 
-96.02**     
(30.09) 
-22.511     
(64.841) 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) 0.039*     
(0.018) 
0.009     
(0.009) 
-0.05.     
(0.029) 
Imports of htp by PTA members (sum) -0.066     
(0.041) 
0.02     
(0.022) 
0.161*     
(0.068) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members (sum) 0.096*     
(0.039) 
0.003     
(0.022) 
-0.165*     
(0.065) 
Imports of htp by PTA members /                                   
total htp imports 
2.01  
(4.225) 
-9.566***     
(2.596) 
-38.337***     
(10.193) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members /                                
total mhtp imports 
-11.147**     
(3.728) 
-2.419     
(2.28) 
16.072*     
(6.262) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members /                                
total mltp imports 
25.53    
(19.782) 
46.94***     
(11.97) 
96.167**     
(36.653) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members /                                    
total ltp imports 
-12.336     
(15.203) 
-34.68***     
(9.576) 
-73.073**     
(25.671) 
Veto Players 
   
Veto players (sum) -0.113*     
(0.044) 
0.028     
(0.028) 
0.317***     
(0.082) 
Regime Preference 
   
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.023***     
(0.002) 
0.004***     
(0.001) 
-0.074***     
(0.01) 
Path Dependency 
   
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – copyrights 
-0.072     
(0.06) 
-0.122***     
(0.033) 
-0.114     
(0.103) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – patents 
0.155**     
(0.06) 
0.102**     
(0.035) 
-0.054     
(0.098) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – new plant varieties 
-0.094**     
(0.031) 
-0.011     
(0.016) 
0.134*     
(0.056) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – encrypted program-carrying sat-
ellite signals 
-0.077.     
(0.041) 
0.001     
(0.018) 
0.201**     
(0.076) 
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Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
-0.099     
(0.093) 
-0.042     
(0.043) 
0.153     
(0.201) 
Index IPR general enforcement pd (sum) 0.034***     
(0.01) 
0.002     
(0.004) 
-0.078***     
(0.023) 
Control Variables 
   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.023     
(0.014) 
0.01     
(0.008) 
-0.023     
(0.021) 
Classic IP leaders -0.142     
(0.204) 
0.03     
(0.09) 
-0.214     
(0.469) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.175     
(0.183) 
0.055     
(0.111) 
0.367     
(0.3) 
New IP producers and developers 0.113     
(0.169) 
0.117     
(0.081) 
0.438     
(0.281) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.192**     
(0.071) 
0.016     
(0.045) 
0.238*     
(0.115) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.384***     
(0.079) 
0.087*     
(0.044) 
-0.381**     
(0.117) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.047     
(0.068) 
-0.101**     
(0.038) 
-0.085     
(0.097) 
Intercept – 1.514.     
(0.836) 
-0.505     
(2.186) 






Observations 573 573 573 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
Regime preference shows a positive effect on the index IPR scope mentioned varia-
ble, but on an even lower level (0.023) than veto players. There is a positive correlation 
between including references to other IPR multilateral agreements and the number of IPR 
forms mentioned in PTAs, yet the other independent variables hold more explanatory 
power. 
Path dependency effects the index IPR scope mentioned both positively and nega-
tively. Additionally to the negative effects observed for the path dependency measures 
copyrights, new plant varieties, encrypted program-carrying satellite signals in the anal-
ysis of the index IPR general, here, also path dependency for domain names has a negative 
impact on the IPR scope mentioned in PTAs. Positive impacts have the path dependency 
measures for patents and enforcement, whereas path dependency for trademarks has no 
significant effect. Again, all effects take place on a low estimate level and are surpassed 
by the explanatory power of the domestic interest variables. 
Control variables have a significant effect on the DV. A higher average GDP (log) 
amongst PTA members has a negative effect on the scope of IPR mentioned in the PTA, 
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whereas the average GDP per capita (log) has a positive impact. The expected change in 
log(DV) for a one-unit increase in the geographical distance (log) is -0.101 holding all 
other variables constant. This means that the further apart PTA members are the fewer IP 
scope variables they include in their PTAs. Again, the control variables have a compara-
tively low-level impact next to the domestic interest variables. 
4.3.1.3 Binary Variables for IPR Scope Mentioned 
Besides testing the scope by regressing the index, I also analysed the results for the 
eleven individual IPR forms. Their regression Tables can be found in Appendix 20: De-
sign Regression Tables of the Binary Variables for IPR Scope Mentioned. 
The analysis shows that the previously observed dominant effect of domestic interests 
is far less pronounced for copyrights and traditional knowledge & genetic resources. Veto 
players have a mostly significantly negative effect, most pronounced for copyrights (-
0.218) and geographical indication (-0.253). This means that the more veto players there 
are amongst PTA members, the less likely it is that they mention copyrights or geograph-
ical as being protected by IPRs. The effect for regime preference remains mostly the 
same as for the index IPR scope mentioned and is most pronounced for geographical 
indications (0.05). 
Path dependency varies more broadly across the different scope variables. The indi-
vidual regression tables show that not all forms of PTAs repeat previously mentioned IPR 
forms. For example, there is no significant effect of path dependency of copyrights for 
the dependent variable on copyright mentioned. The postulated significantly positive ef-
fect of path dependency can only be observed for geographical indications, patents, tra-
ditional knowledge & genetic resources. The significantly positive effect of the policy 
variable for enforcement shown for the overall IPR scope mentioned is mainly driven by 
domain names (0.527) as the other IPR forms achieve much lower estimates.  
Control variables show that for some DVs, there is a significantly positive effect of 
democratisation, and for most DVs, a significantly positive effect of GDPpc (log). The 
other control variables mostly show no significantly positive effects except patents is 
positively affected if classic IP leaders are part of the agreement (0.698) or encrypted 
program-carrying satellite signals are positively affected if new IP producers and devel-
opers are members of the PTA (1.327). A significantly negative effect can be observed 
for GDP (log) and geographical distance for most DVs.  
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For the binary variables, the domestic interests are also the independent variables with 
the highest explanatory power. 
4.3.1.4 Index IPR General Enforcement (sum) 
The general enforcement measure is taken as a proxy for general IPR and is addition-
ally analysed as a proxy for IPR enforcement with a focus on veto players (4.3.4 IPR 
Enforcement Design Analysis). Here, as a proxy for general IPR, the analysis includes 
also the other explanatory factors besides veto players. 
Table 33 displays the OP and ZIP models for the index IPR general enforcement. The 
most distinct explanatory factor is domestic interests, thus, following the impression from 
the previous measures for general IPR. 
Domestic interests have both significantly positive and negative effects on the general 
IPR enforcement provisions in PTAs. Similar to the other measures for general IPR, the 
technology intensiveness of the imported products has the most effect on the DV. The 
share of import of mltp has a positive effect (51.215), whereas the mhtp (-16.525) and ltp 
(-53.801) share of imports by PTA members have a negative effect on the general IPR 
enforcement content of PTAs. Thus, when a large share of the mltp imports come from 
PTA members, then the PTA includes more general IPR enforcement provisions, and less 
the higher the share of imports of mhtp and ltp is by PTA members. 
Veto players have a significantly negative effect on general IPR enforcement (-0.173), 
meaning that there are fewer general IPR enforcement measures in a PTA, the more veto 
players there are amongst PTA members. The effect of regime preference is significantly 
positive (0.029), meaning that the more and the more binding IPR multilateral agreements 
are referenced, the more general enforcement provisions are in a PTA. Same as with the 
previous measures for general IPR, the effect only has a low estimate, meaning that the 
impact of a one-unit change is limited. 
Path dependency shows significantly positive as well as negative effects. The path 
dependency for general IPR, i.e. the overall scope as the enforcement measures are de-
ducted, and the path dependency from patents have both a significantly positive effect on 
the index IPR general enforcement. This means that those PTAs, where PTA members 
already mention IPR forms and especially patents, are more likely also to include general 
IPR enforcement provisions. However, the path dependency for layout-design of inte-
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grated circuits is negative. Thus, when PTA members mentioned layout-design of inte-
grated circuits in their previous PTAs, they are less likely to include general IPR enforce-
ment provisions in their current PTAs. 
 
Table 33: Design Regression – Index IPR General Enforcement (sum) 







   
ln Resident applications for patents (sum) -0.071     
(0.089) 
-0.051     
(0.082) 
14.646.     
(8.066) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(sum) 
0.177     
(0.13) 
0.016     
(0.107) 
-42.145.     
(21.975) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (sum) 
0.109.     
(0.061) 
-0.035     
(0.063) 
-16.179*     
(8.088) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
-0.024     
(0.08) 
-0.075     
(0.071) 
-18.731.     
(10.27) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(cumulative, sum) 
-0.199.     
(0.115) 
0.113     
(0.106) 
53.592.     
(27.801) 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) 0.047*     
(0.02) 
0.026     
(0.019) 
-2.489.     
(1.321) 
R&D expenditure (sum) -0.16*     
(0.08) 
-0.061     
(0.072) 
-2.361     
(4.585) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members (sum) 0.055**     
(0.021) 
0.034*     
(0.016) 
-1.48     
(1.319) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members (sum) 0.02     
(0.019) 
-0.011     
(0.013) 
-4.297     
(2.86) 
Imports of htp by PTA members /                                   
total htp imports 
0.204   
(4.008) 
-0.371     
(3.976) 
-278.8     
(205.348) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members /                                
total mhtp imports 
-16.525***     
(4.119) 
-6.264.     
(3.426) 
715.734*     
(361.466) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members /                                
total mltp imports 
51.215*     
(22.914) 
15.408     
(18.715) 
-361.513     
(647.598) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members /                                    
total ltp imports 
-53.801**     
(20.006) 
-11.188     
(16.37) 
324.64     
(365.092) 
Veto Players 
   
Veto players (sum) -0.173***     
(0.046) 
0.028     
(0.052) 
28.405*     
(14.314) 
Regime Preference 
   
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.029***     
(0.002) 
0.01***     
(0.002) 
-4.935*     
(2.49) 
Path Dependency   
 
  
Index IPR general pd (sum) 0.017*     
(0.007) 
0.004     
(0.004) 
-4.192*     
(2.121) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – copyrights 
-0.061     
(0.099) 
0.009     
(0.082) 
17.804.     
(9.241) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – patents 
0.295***     
(0.073) 
0.018     
(0.067) 
-26.624.     
(15.815) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
-0.199.     
(0.109) 
-0.07     
(0.085) 
8.389     
(9.065) 
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Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
-0.014     
(0.02) 
0.004     
(0.014) 
11.653*     
(5.364) 
Control Variables   
 
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.107***     
(0.018) 
0.035*     
(0.015) 
-4.347.     
(2.335) 
Classic IP leaders 0.333     
(0.212) 
0.324*     
(0.15) 
69.011.     
(38.382) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.361.     
(0.192) 
-0.136     
(0.155) 
6.81     
(5.239) 
New IP producers and developers 0.858***     
(0.172) 
0.31**     
(0.117) 
-49.342.     
(27.366) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.217**     
(0.075) 
0.151*     
(0.076) 
13.318     
(8.373) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.014     
(0.084) 
-0.049     
(0.074) 
-15.432.     
(8.514) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.072     
(0.07) 
0.072     
(0.06) 
19.623*     
(9.753) 
Intercept – -4.593***     
(1.363) 
-337.86.     
(191.834) 






Observations 573 573 573 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
All of the control variables have a significant effect on some part of the models. The 
most distinct one is the positive effect of new IP producers and developers. Thus, if Israel, 
South Korea, Singapore or Taiwan are members of the PTA, then the odds ratio of the 
PTA including general IPR enforcement variables increases by 0.858. Across the other 
control variables, democratisation, classic IP leaders and the average GDP (log) have a 
positive effect and the others a negative effect on the Index IPR general enforcement. 
4.3.1.5 Index IPR Multilateral Coherence Dummy (sum) 
Table 34 illustrates the regression analysis for the index IPR multilateral coherence 
dummy. The term ‘dummy’ refers to the fact that the measure only accounts for reference 
of an IPR multilateral agreement and disregards the bindingness of the commitment (see 
3.2.3 Dataset Development). 
Domestic interests have both positive and negative effects on the DV. Like for the 
other general IPR variables, there are multiple significant effects, yet many with a com-
paratively low estimate. For example, the number of researchers in R&D (0.11) has a 
significantly positive and the R&D expenditure (-0.202) a significantly negative effect on 
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the number of IPR multilateral agreements referenced in PTAs. The most substantial ef-
fect can be observed for htp and mhtp imports. Whereas for the other general IPR 
measures, the effect is highest for mltp and ltp import shares, and here, the htp and mhtp 
shares have the highest impact. The share of imports of htp by PTA (6.697) has a signif-
icantly positive and the share of imports of mhtp by PTA (-10.289) a significantly nega-
tive effect on the index IPR multilateral coherence. This means that the higher the share 
of htp imports from PTA members and the lower the share of mhtp imports from PTA 
members, the more IPR multilateral agreements are referenced in the PTA. 
 
Table 34: Design Regression – Index IPR Multilateral Coherence Dummy (sum) 




ln Resident applications for patents (sum) -0.124     
(0.086) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(sum) 
0.039     
(0.085) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (sum) 
0.2*     
(0.087) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
0.235*     
(0.092) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(cumulative, sum) 
0.003     
(0.105) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (cumulative, sum) 
-0.126     
(0.1) 
Applications for patents by PTA members /                    
total applications for patents 
-0.563*    
(0.261) 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks 
0.598***     
(0.175) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs 
-0.228     
(0.149) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs (cumulative) 
-0.818     
(1.991) 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) 0.11***     
(0.019) 
R&D expenditure (sum) -0.202*     
(0.079) 
Imports of htp by PTA members (sum) 0.02     
(0.038) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members (sum) 0.054     
(0.037) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members (sum) -0.048**     
(0.017) 
Imports of htp by PTA members /                                   
total htp imports 
6.697.     
(3.541) 
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Imports of mhtp by PTA members /                                
total mhtp imports 




Veto players (sum) -0.184***     
(0.056) 
Path Dependency   
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – undisclosed information 
-0.106     
(0.11) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0.129     
(0.106) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – new plant varieties 
-0.064.     
(0.033) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – encrypted program-carrying sat-
ellite signals 
-0.019     
(0.04) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
0.229**     
(0.089) 
Index IPR general enforcement pd (sum) 0.035***     
(0.01) 
Control Variables   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.044**     
(0.015) 
Classic IP leaders 0.542**     
(0.209) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.099     
(0.18) 
New IP producers and developers -0.113     
(0.167) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.213*     
(0.09) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.191*     
(0.082) 





Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
Veto players have a significantly negative effect on the number of IPR multilateral 
agreements included in PTAs (-0.184). Thus, the more veto players there are amongst 
PTA members, the fewer IPR multilateral coherence agreements are mentioned in PTAs. 
Path dependency has only a few significant effects. The effect is significantly nega-
tive for new plant varieties (-0.064) and significantly positive for domain names (0.229) 
and general IPR enforcement (0.035). This means that if countries included new plant 
varieties in their previous PTAs it slightly decreases the odds of referencing IPR multi-
lateral agreement in their current PTAs. So, those countries, that have mentioned domain 
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names or general IPR enforcement are more likely to include references to IPR multilat-
eral agreements in their present PTAs. 
Control variables have mostly positive effects on the index IPR multilateral coher-
ence. Democratisation (0.044), classic IP leaders (0.542) and the average GDPpc (log; 
0.191) all have a significant positive effect on IPR multilateral coherence. This is mostly 
in line with the results for the other general IPR measures. For the classic IPR leaders, 
this means that if the US, EU, EFTA or Japan are part of the PTA, the PTA is more likely 
to include a reference to an IPR multilateral agreement. The average GDP (log) is the 
only control variable with a significantly negative effect on the DV (-0.213). Geograph-
ical distance, which has shown significant effects on the other general IPR measures, has 
no significant effect on the index IPR multilateral coherence, i.e. the referenced IPR mul-
tilateral agreements in PTAs. 
4.3.2 Stringent IPR Design Analysis 
To explain the dependent variables used for stringent IPR, all of the postulated ex-
planatory factors are tested: economic power asymmetry (H1.1, H1.2, H1.3), political 
pressure (H2), domestic interests (H3.1, H3.2), veto players (H4.2, H4.3), endogeneity 
(H5.1, H5.2, H5.3, H5.4), regime preference (H6.1, H6.2, H6.3, H6.4) and path depend-
ency (H7.1, H7.3) (see Table 23: Overview of IPR Design Features, Explanatory Factors 
and Hypotheses). 
The explanatory factors for economic power asymmetries (model abbreviation: epa), 
domestic interests (di), and seven different operationalisations of policy analysis (pdg, 
pds, pdtp, pdwss, pdwstp, pdwfs, pdwftp) are tested in separate models (see Figure 11: 
Design Model Specifications IIa). Every subchapter will start with those variables not 
included in all regression models, namely, economic power asymmetry, domestic inter-
ests and path dependency. Afterwards, I summarise the results for political pressure, veto 
players, endogeneity, regime preference and the control variables, which are included in 
all models. Not all nine models per dependent variable are displayed in the following 
subchapters, only those of particular interest. Those models not displayed are referenced 
in the text and included in the appendix. 
As for the results, the regression models for stringent IPR show significant results for 
all the tested explanatory factors. However, the economic power asymmetry variables 
have the highest significant effect on stringent IPR provisions. However, the data availa-
bility is considerably lower than for all other measures, and the number of observations 
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drops from 529 for the other models to 392 for the epa models. Thus, significant amounts 
of the PTAs are not covered in the epa regression models. 
4.3.2.1 Index IPR Specific (sum) 
For the index IPR specific, I display the model for economic power asymmetry in 
Table 35, the model for domestic interests in Table 36 as well as the model for specific 
path dependency from worldwide TRIPS-plus provisions in PTAs by the time of signa-
ture (pdwstp) in Table 37. 
Economic power asymmetry has a significant effect on the index IPR specific. The 
expected change in log(index IPR specific) for a one-unit increase in GDP asymmetry is 
68.302 resp. -57.034 for GDP per capita asymmetry, holding all other variables constant. 
Thus, PTAs with a greater GDP asymmetry between PTA partners include more specific 
IPR provisions and PTAs with an increased asymmetry of the living standards between 
PTA partners contain less specific IPR provisions. Accordingly, it is more likely that 
countries with similar living standards include specific IPRs in their PTAs, especially if 
one of these countries has a considerably larger GDP than the other. 
A significantly negative effect can also be observed for the interaction term of GDP 
asymmetry with substantial tariff cuts. The expected change in log(index IPR specific) 
for a one-unit increase in the interaction term is -29.033 holding all other variables con-
stant. The log odds of being an excessive zero decrease immensely for a one-unit increase 
in the interaction term, by -435.832. As substantial tariff cuts are a binary variable, the 
one-unit change is bound to the PTA either including substantial tariff cuts or not. Thus, 
those PTAs including a substantial tariff cut are much less likely to be in the excessive 
zero group, and with the additional increase of the GDP asymmetry, the PTAs are less 
likely to include specific IPR provisions. This means that in combination with substantial 
tariff cuts in the PTA, the GDP asymmetry has an inverted effect on specific IPR com-
mitments. There are no significant effects for the same interaction terms with GDP per 
capita asymmetry. 
The interaction term of GDP asymmetry with FDI (log) has a significantly negative 
effect on specific IPR provisions (-1.518) and the interaction term of GDP per capita 
asymmetry and FDI (log) a significantly positive effect (1.416). Both are only significant 
for the count data of the ZINB model and not the OP model. Thus, the combination of 
high GDP asymmetry and high FDI most likely affects how many IPR provisions are 
included then the decision if they are included or not.  
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The interaction term of GDP asymmetry with official development assistance and of-
ficial aid received (log) as well as its GDP per capita counterpart show no significant 
effects on the index IPR specific. However, the interaction term of GDP asymmetry with 
the share of DAC aid received by PTA members of the total DAC aid received has a 
significantly negative effect (-20.958) and the GDP per capita interaction term a positive 
one (18.437). It is the only effect of the economic power asymmetry variables on the 
index IPR specific with significant estimates for both the OP and the ZINB epa model. 
The effect shows that an increase of the GDP asymmetry in combination with the share 
of DAC aid received by PTA members of the total DAC aid received leads to less specific 
IPR commitments in PTAs, whereas in combination with the GDP per capita, the effect 
is positive. 
 
Table 35: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific (sum)  Economic Power Asymmetry 






Economic Power Asymmetry 
   
GDP asymmetry (max/sum) 2.631     
(8.29) 
68.302***     
(17.093) 
359.11     
(310.322) 
GDPpc asymmetry (max/sum) -7.187     
(9.925) 
-57.034***     
(14.863) 
-77.382     
(524.894) 
GDP asymmetry * substantial tariff cuts 1.667     
(1.736) 
-29.033.     
(15.034) 
-435.832.     
(250.831) 
GDPpc asymmetry * substantial tariff cuts -1.643     
(1.985) 
17.826     
(11.206) 
110.53     
(81.106) 
GDP asymmetry * ln FDI 0.206     
(0.249) 
-1.518***     
(0.327) 
-40.53     
(29.168) 
GDPpc asymmetry * ln FDI -0.086     
(0.28) 
1.416***     
(0.376) 
15.606     
(17.447) 
GDP asymmetry * lnofficial development 
assistance and official aid received 
-0.395     
(0.328) 
-0.085     
(0.302) 
52.498     
(52.537) 
GDPpc asymmetry * lnofficial develop-
ment assistance and official aid received 
0.497     
(0.413) 
0.164     
(0.382) 
-24.755     
(47.208) 
GDP asymmetry * (DAC aid received by 
PTA members/ DAC aid received) 
-20.958**     
(6.981) 
-15.467*     
(6.121) 
86.229     
(141.219) 
GDPpc asymmetry * (DAC aid received by 
PTA members/ DAC aid received) 
18.437**     
(6.885) 
20.69**     
(6.944) 
144.993     
(153.424) 
Political Pressure 
   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.092**     
(0.033) 
-0.02     
(0.028) 
2.149     
(1.45) 
Veto Players 
   
Veto players (sum) 0.121**     
(0.044) 
0.032     
(0.035) 
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Endogeneity 
PTA depth 0.386***     
(0.077) 
– – 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – 11.235**     
(4.187) 
236.081.     
(133.524) 
Regime Preference 
   
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.018***     
(0.004) 
0.019***     
(0.004) 
-0.871     
(0.536) 
Control Variables 
   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.016     
(0.031) 
0.022     
(0.028) 
-0.506     
(0.768) 
Classic IP leaders 1.203***     
(0.336) 
1.79***     
(0.317) 
43.478.     
(24.932) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.357     
(0.26) 
-0.248     
(0.29) 
-13.446     
(9.437) 
New IP producers and developers -0.657*     
(0.285) 
0.426     
(0.263) 
23.036     
(16.636) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.073     
(0.147) 
0.23     
(0.145) 
3.552     
(5.301) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.118     
(0.17) 
-0.275     
(0.176) 
0.811     
(5.692) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.321*     
(0.154) 
0.312*     
(0.152) 
-12.956     
(8.069) 
Intercept – -17.496**     
(5.712) 
-235.844     
(171.591) 












Observations 392 392 392 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
Domestic interests are illustrated in the following regression table and represented by 
23 variables out of which eleven have a significant effect on the index IPR specific. How-
ever, most significant domestic interests variables show a very low estimate. 
On the one hand, the expected change in log(index IPR specific) for a one-unit in-
crease in the resident applications for patents (log) is -0.878 holding all other variables 
constant. Thus, instead of patent holders representing their interest and pushing for more 
specific protection in PTAs, an increase of patent applications by residents has a negative 
effect on the number of specific IPR provisions in PTAs. On the other hand, the effect for 
resident applications for trademarks (log) and industrial designs are both positive (0.56; 
0.47). For these two IPR forms, the residents are thus more likely to represent their inter-
est in PTAs. Besides the application rates per year, the cumulative rates give an insight 
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into the development over time. Here, the effects are inverted, and the cumulative appli-
cations by residents for patents show a significantly positive effect (0.813) and a negative 
one for trademarks (-0.424) and industrial designs (-0.392). 
 
Table 36: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific (sum)  Domestic Interests 







   
ln Charges for the use of IP, receipts (sum) -0.017     
(0.025) 
-0.008     
(0.021) 
0.025     
(0.037) 
ln Resident applications for patents (sum) -0.212     
(0.166) 
-0.878***     
(0.25) 
-0.096     
(0.37) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(sum) 
0.56*     
(0.22) 
0.115     
(0.121) 
-0.718     
(0.483) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (sum) 
-0.15     
(0.143) 
0.47*     
(0.204) 
0.415     
(0.285) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
-0.171     
(0.191) 
0.813**     
(0.262) 
0.794*     
(0.382) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(cumulative, sum) 
-0.032     
(0.216) 
-0.424*     
(0.191) 
-0.221     
(0.42) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (cumulative, sum) 
0.07     
(0.187) 
-0.392.     
(0.207) 
-0.491     
(0.323) 
Applications for patents by PTA members / 
total applications for patents 
0.712.     
(0.422) 
-0.181     
(0.209) 
-1.664.     
(0.977) 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks 
-0.434     
(0.318) 
-0.403*     
(0.176) 
0.6     
(0.837) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs 
-0.253     
(0.268) 
0.066     
(0.15) 
0.142     
(0.688) 
Applications for patents by PTA members / 
total applications for patents (cumulative) 
-61.338     
(84.059) 
-97.71.     
(57.54) 
-24.445     
(139.492) 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks (cu-
mulative) 
-8.637.     
(5.118) 
1.33     
(3.612) 
11.77     
(8.543) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs (cumulative) 
4.506     
(4.789) 
0.945     
(3.651) 
-0.439     
(9.425) 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) -0.048     
(0.041) 
-0.03     
(0.033) 
0.03     
(0.061) 
R&D expenditure (sum) 0.038     
(0.144) 
0.111     
(0.108) 
-0.043     
(0.224) 
Imports of htp by PTA members (sum) -0.02     
(0.065) 
-0.001     
(0.034) 
0.118     
(0.107) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members (sum) 0.121     
(0.079) 
-0.058     
(0.048) 
-0.294*     
(0.125) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members (sum) -0.015     
(0.077) 
0.066     
(0.045) 
0.048     
(0.117) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members (sum) -0.017     
(0.031) 
0.01     
(0.014) 
0.08     
(0.072) 
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Imports of htp by PTA members /                                   
total htp imports 
0.542   
(8.134) 
-2.561     
(4.629) 
-19.606     
(13.238) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members /                                
total mhtp imports 
-10.277     
(6.456) 
4.274     
(4.439) 
13.837     
(11.883) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members /                                
total mltp imports 
29.512     
(32.403) 
19.4     
(23.95) 
34.866     
(61.715) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members /                                    
total ltp imports 
0.358   
(25.263) 
-25     
(20.12) 
-23.816     
(39.875) 
Political Pressure   
  
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.069.     
(0.04) 
-0.018     
(0.027) 
0.097     
(0.071) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) 0.119*     
(0.058) 
0.144***     
(0.039) 
-0.079     
(0.136) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.318***     
(0.07) 
-0.011     
(0.048) 
-0.569***     
(0.141) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.029***     
(0.004) 
0.013***     
(0.002) 
-0.036***     
(0.008) 
Control Variables 
   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.015     
(0.027) 
-0.017     
(0.016) 
-0.01     
(0.047) 
Classic IP leaders 1.769***     
(0.351) 
0.226     
(0.215) 
-2.292**     
(0.705) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.021     
(0.245) 
-0.144     
(0.168) 
-0.477     
(0.404) 
New IP producers and developers 0.264     
(0.236) 
0.163     
(0.136) 
-0.129     
(0.379) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.262*     
(0.128) 
0.398***     
(0.1) 
0.246     
(0.246) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.227     
(0.146) 
-0.015     
(0.103) 
-0.492.     
(0.251) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.138     
(0.112) 
0.027     
(0.064) 
-0.043     
(0.175) 
Intercept – -5.954**     
(2.247) 
6.517     
(5.185) 






Observations 529 529 529 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
The share of applications for patents by PTA members on the total share of applica-
tions have a positive effect on the index IPR specific scope (0.712). This means that the 
stronger the interests of PTA members are in the patent market of their PTA members, 
the more likely the PTA also contains specific IPR provisions. Yet the same effect for 
trademarks is significantly negative (-0.403), meaning that if PTA members hold a large 
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share of the total trademarks applications in a PTA member market, then the PTA is less 
likely to include specific IPR.  
The cumulative measure for both of these significant effects shows for both patents 
as well as trademarks significantly negative effects (-97.71; -8.637). Thus, if the PTA 
members already hold a substantial share of IPRs on patents or trademarks in one of the 
other PTA member markets, then their interest in protecting IPR by specific commitments 
in PTAs decreases significantly. 
Neither the number of researchers nor the R&D expenditure of countries have a sig-
nificant effect on specific IPR. Moreover, out of the import measures differentiated by 
their technology-intensiveness, only the mhtp show a significant effect, yet only for the 
zero stage of the ZIP di model. The log odds of the PTA being in the excessive zero group 
decreases by -0.294 for every additional one-unit increase in the imports of mhtp by PTA 
members. This means that with an increase of mhtp imports by PTA members, the PTAs 
are more likely to be in the group containing specific IPR provisions. 
Political pressure has a significantly negative effect on stringent IPR provisions. The 
most distinct and significant estimate can be found in the model for general path depend-
ency (pdg; -0.121). However, the effect is not significant for all models, especially the 
path dependency models (pdwss, pdwstp, pdwfs, pdwftp). The negative effect is contrary 
to the theoretical argument, which assumes that political pressure by the US on at least 
one of the PTA members has a positive effect on stringent IPR provisions in PTAs. 
 As the variable represents the political pressure exerted by the US, I checked for all 
dependent variables, how the effects are for the subset of US PTAs. Because the US is 
only part of 23 PTAs, a regression analysis will not yield reliable results for the subsample 
of US PTAs. Moreover, one of these PTAs – the Canada US Automotive Products Trade 
Agreement (APTA) – was signed before 1977 and is, therefore, not included in the anal-
ysis (see 4.2 Design: Data). The subsequent analysis thus includes a total of 22 US PTAs. 
Indeed, when looking at the agreements by the US, the picture is in reverse, and political 
pressure does have a positive effect on the index IPR specific. The relation is displayed 
in Graph 18, which shows the jittered scatter plot of the regression Index IPR Specific ~ 
Political Pressure for the US PTAs. 
To see the PTA distribution more distinctly, I use a jitter plot, which adds some ran-
dom noise that makes those PTAs with identical scores identifiable. Besides the scores, 
the plot also includes the regression line and shows a positive relationship between polit-
ical pressure and the index IPR specific. The higher the score on political pressure, the 
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more PTA members are mentioned in the “Special 301 Reports” (see 4.2.2.2 Data for 
Political Pressure). 
 
Graph 18: Jittered Scatter Plot: Index IPR Specific ~ Political Pressure (US PTAs) 
 
 
The plot shows that the when the US signs a PTA with countries on their “Special 301 
Reports”, these PTAs almost exclusively score above ten on the index IPR specific (for 
values per PTA see Appendix 23: List of US PTAs: Stringent IPR Indexes & Political 
Pressure I). This means that for the US PTAs, the political pressure asserted by the US 
has a positive effect on the stringent IPR content of the PTAs. 
Veto players have a significantly positive effect on stringent IPRs for the model in-
cluding economic power asymmetry and domestic interest, whereby the higher estimate 
is found in the economic power asymmetry model (0.121). The effect is not significant 
for most of the path dependency models, namely the pdg, pds, pdtp, pdwss, pdwstp, and 
pdwfs models. Moreover, the effect is significantly negative for the path dependency 
model pdwftp (-0.059). The effects are thus not identical for the tested models, and only 
significant for one-third of the models, whereby a majority of these suggest that the more 
veto players are involved amongst PTA members, the more specific IPR provisions are 
included in their PTA. The theoretical assumptions would suggest the effect is negative 
for all models. Thus, the results go against the hypothesis. The other dependent variables 
will show if the effect remains ambiguous and mostly contrarily to the postulated hypoth-
esis or not. 
Endogeneity shows a significantly positive effect for the index IPR specific. I only 
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PTA depth or PTA depth substantial tariff cuts and or the index IPR enforcement or the 
index IPR specific enforcement (see Figure 12: Design Model Specifications IIb). The 
regression tables show that the effect on the specific IPR provisions of PTA depth is 
significantly positive (0.386), and the effect is even higher for substantial tariff cuts 
(11.235). This means that if the PTA includes substantial tariff cuts (binary variable), the 
PTA is much more likely to include specific IPR provisions. The effect of PTA depth is 
much lower, indicating that a large part of it might be attributable to substantial tariff cuts. 
Regime preference has a significantly positive effect on the index IPR specific, where 
the most distinct estimate is found in the model for domestic interests (0.029). This means 
that the odds ratio of specific IPR commitments in the PTA increases the more resp. the 
more binding IPR multilateral coherence provisions are included. But the effect is not 
significant for some of the path dependency models, namely pdwss, pdwstp and pdwftp. 
Moreover, the estimates are even for the most pronounced effects only marginal. 
Path dependency has a significant effect on the index IPR specific, and I highlight 
only the significant and most distinct ones. 
For the pdg model, the most pronounced effects can be observed for industrial designs 
(1.148) and patents (-1.206). This means that is one of the PTA members already men-
tioned industrial design in their previous PTAs and has continued this policy, their PTA 
is more likely to include specific IPR provisions, whereas the effect is inverted for pa-
tents. For the pds and the pdtp models, the effects are significant, yet on a very low scale. 
However, for path dependency worldwide, the effects are the more pronounced. For the 
pdwss model, all of the elven tangible IPR forms, as well as the enforcement path de-
pendency variables, show a significantly positive effect on the index IPR specific. This 
means that if there already exists another PTA signed with tangible commitments or spe-
cific IPR enforcement provisions, and these provisions are also included in the PTA, then 
the index IPR specific is increased. This was to be expected, as the index IPR specific 
covers the tangible commitments on the IPR forms and the specific IPR enforcement. 
However, the effect is not significant for path dependency from exhaustion measures. 
The effect shows more variation for the path dependency from TRIPS-plus provisions in 
Table 37. As the pdwstp model illustrates, the path dependency for industrial designs 
(2.623), patents (0.965), undisclosed information (1.13) and new plant varieties (1.338) 
are the most distinct ones. This means PTAs repeating TRIPS-plus provisions on indus-
trial designs, patents, undisclosed information and new plant varieties already included 
in other PTAs, are more likely to include specific IPR provisions.  
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For the pdwfs and the pdwftp models, the effects are as to be expected almost identical 
to the one of the pdwss resp. the pdwstp models, showing slightly lower estimates for the 
significant effects of the pdwftp than the pdwstp model. 
 
Table 37: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific (sum)  Path Dependency (world, signa-
ture, TRIPS-plus) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.04     
(0.03) 
-0.02     
(0.019) 
-0.043     
(0.07) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) -0.038     
(0.03) 
-0.012     
(0.011) 
-0.007     
(0.081) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.307***     
(0.071) 
0.042     
(0.041) 
0.422***     
(0.12) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.004     
(0.005) 
0.001     
(0.002) 
0.002     
(0.01) 
Path Dependency   
  
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – copyrights 
-0.79     
(0.735) 
0.03     
(0.235) 
-4.076     
(707.8) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – geographical indications 
0.293     
(0.506) 
0.02     
(0.183) 
0.502     
(3734) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – industrial designs 
2.623***     
(0.378) 
1.293***     
(0.344) 
9.221     
(2926) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – patents 
0.965**     
(0.371) 
0.187     
(0.139) 
1.539     
(3588) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – undisclosed information 
1.13**     
(0.407) 
0.526***     
(0.159) 
-1.984     
(3977) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – layout-designs of integrated 
circuits 
-0.257     
(0.277) 
0       
(0.115) 
-1.202     
(2862) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – new plant varieties 
1.338***     
(0.336) 
0.362**     
(0.12) 
0.548     
(1575) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
0.234     
(0.387) 
-0.014     
(0.142) 
0.766     
(3233) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
0.671.     
(0.381) 
-0.104     
(0.143) 
0.66     
(3920) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – domain names 
-0.165     
(0.904) 
-0.214     
(0.295) 
-0.629     
(6240) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – enforcement 
0.239     
(0.305) 
0.117     
(0.125) 
-0.576     
(1743) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – exhaustion 
0.214     
(0.331) 
0.096     
(0.126) 
-0.842     
(2232) 
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Control Variables 
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.017     
(0.028) 
0.012     
(0.016) 
0.021     
(0.039) 
Classic IP leaders 1.233***     
(0.308) 
0.459***     
(0.128) 
0.082     
(0.66) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.141     
(0.275) 
-0.051     
(0.142) 
0.486     
(0.397) 
New IP producers and developers 0.03     
(0.229) 
0.034     
(0.104) 
-0.039     
(0.371) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.068     
(0.099) 
0.066     
(0.052) 
-0.189     
(0.165) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.12     
(0.14) 
-0.122.     
(0.073) 
0.249     
(0.248) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.381**     
(0.121) 
0.027     
(0.061) 
0.48*     
(0.209) 
Intercept – -1.157     
(1.342) 













Observations 529 529 529 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
Control variables have a significant effect on the index IPR specific. The classic IP 
leaders – US, EU, EFTA and Japan – have a significantly positive effect on the specific 
IPR content of PTAs (1.769). However, the ZINB epa model shows a significantly posi-
tive effect of the classic IP leaders for the count data (1.79), which would still lead to a 
similar conclusion, yet also for the zero data (43.478). This means that amongst those 
PTAs that might include specific IPR provisions, classic IPR leaders have a positive ef-
fect on the number of provisions (count data effect). But classic IPR leaders have a highly 
more pronounced positive impact on the fact that PTAs fall into the excessive zero cate-
gory and will not include any specific IPR provisions (zero data effect). Further, for the 
ZIP di model, the effect is inverted and significantly negative for the zero stage (-2.292). 
The effect of classic IPR leaders has to be interpreted prudently.  
The average GDP (log) has a significantly positive effect (0.262), whereas the average 
GDP per capita (log) shows a significantly negative effect for count data of the HP pdg 
model (-0.171). This indicates that a higher average GDP amongst PTA members has a 
positive effect, and an increased GDP per capita has a negative effect on the amount of 
specific IPR provisions in a PTA. For the average geographic distance (log) the effect is 
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also significantly positive (0.381), meaning that the further away PTA members are from 
one another, the more specific IPR provisions are in the PTA. 
The other path dependency regression models are included in Appendix 29: Design 
Regression – Index IPR Specific (sum)  Path Dependency (general), Appendix 30: De-
sign Regression – Index IPR Specific (sum)  Path Dependency (specific), Appendix 31: 
Design Regression – Index IPR Specific (sum)  Path Dependency (TRIPS-plus), Appen-
dix 32: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific (sum)  Path Dependency (world, signa-
ture, specific), Appendix 33: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific (sum)  Path De-
pendency (world, force, specific), and Appendix 34: Design Regression – Index IPR Spe-
cific (sum)  Path Dependency (world, force, TRIPS-plus). 
4.3.2.2 Index IPR Scope Tangible (sum) 
Table 38 display the model for domestic interests and Table 39 the model for path 
dependency world by from TRIPS-plus provisions after the entry into force of PTAs 
(pdwftp) for the regression analysis of the index IPR scope tangible, i.e. the additive index 
of the tangible provisions on the eleven forms of IPR found in PTAs. 
Economic power asymmetry has no significant effects on the index IPR scope tangi-
ble. The number of specific IPR forms covered by a PTA is thus not affected by economic 
power asymmetry measures. The regression table for economic power asymmetry is dis-
played in Appendix 35: Design Regression – Index IPR Scope Tangible (sum)  Economic 
Power Asymmetry. 
Domestic interests do have a significant effect, yet only due to three out of the 23 
domestic interest measures. Firstly, the zero data of the HP di model shows a significantly 
negative effect of the cumulative share of applications for trademarks by PTA members 
of the total applications for trademarks (-39.567). This means that the more of the total 
trademark applications are made by PTA members, the fewer tangible IPR provisions are 
included in the PTA. The estimate shows the most pronounced significant effect on the 
index, indicating that for the number of specific IPR forms in PTAs domestic interests 
have a mostly negative effect. 
Secondly, the zero data of the HP di model suggests a significantly positive effect of 
the imports of mhtp by PTA members (0.614). This shows that with an increase of the 
medium-high-technology product imports by PTA members, the PTA is more likely to 
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include tangible IPR provisions. However, this effect is much less distinct than the first 
significant one. 
Thirdly, the count data of the HP di model shows a significantly negative effect of the 
share of imports of htp by PTA members on the total htp imports (-12.28). This means 
that those PTAs which include tangible provisions are less likely to tangibly cover mul-
tiple forms of IPRs the higher the htp share of PTA members. 
 
Table 38: Design Regression – Index IPR Scope Tangible (sum)  Domestic Interests 







   
ln Charges for the use of IP, receipts (sum) -0.019     
(0.028) 
-0.001     
(0.034) 
-0.15     
(0.109) 
ln Resident applications for patents (sum) -0.215     
(0.194) 
-0.222     
(0.467) 
0.21     
(1.292) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(sum) 
0.251     
(0.209) 
0.018     
(0.175) 
0.673     
(1.376) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (sum) 
-0.168     
(0.158) 
-0.115     
(0.39) 
-0.851     
(0.578) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
-0.311     
(0.237) 
-0.025     
(0.478) 
-1.261     
(1.244) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(cumulative, sum) 
0.188     
(0.242) 
-0.453     
(0.32) 
2.173     
(1.349) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (cumulative, sum) 
0.084     
(0.196) 
0.213     
(0.381) 
0.042     
(0.743) 
Applications for patents by PTA members / 
total applications for patents 
-0.391     
(0.421) 
-0.182     
(0.301) 
-0.527     
(2.621) 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks 
0.536     
(0.351) 
-0.234     
(0.286) 
1.436     
(2.202) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs 
0.007     
(0.289) 
0.25     
(0.219) 
-0.203     
(1.375) 
Applications for patents by PTA members / 
total applications for patents (cumulative) 
39.939     
(91.929) 
-51.29     
(94.94) 
483.129     
(402.809) 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks (cu-
mulative) 
-7.619     
(5.719) 
2.04     
(5.212) 
-39.576.     
(23.324) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs (cumulative) 
0.481     
(5.376) 
-1.637     
(5.419) 
5.561     
(19.254) 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) -0.043     
(0.048) 
0.038     
(0.05) 
-0.088     
(0.205) 
R&D expenditure (sum) 0.053     
(0.157) 
0.065     
(0.147) 
0.105     
(0.667) 
Imports of htp by PTA members (sum) 0.004     
(0.072) 
0.023     
(0.054) 
-0.234     
(0.297) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members (sum) 0.034     
(0.089) 
-0.007     
(0.078) 
0.614.     
(0.359) 
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Imports of mltp by PTA members (sum) 0.041       
(0.09) 
0.015     
(0.068) 
-0.294     
(0.348) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members (sum) -0.018     
(0.032) 
-0.004     
(0.022) 
-0.116     
(0.146) 
Imports of htp by PTA members /                                   
total htp imports 
-11.537     
(9.111) 
-12.28.     
(7.4) 
31.545     
(31.122) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members /                                
total mhtp imports 
-3.543     
(7.983) 
1.515     
(7.372) 
-54.405     
(33.886) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members /                                
total mltp imports 
42.907     
(38.044) 
40.89     
(37.84) 
-25.59     
(182) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members /                                    
total ltp imports 
-16.678     
(29.705) 
-30.04     
(32.23) 
116.409     
(124.52) 
Political Pressure   
  
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.063     
(0.047) 
0.07.     
(0.036) 
-0.061     
(0.192) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) -0.072     
(0.072) 
0.083     
(0.066) 
-0.179     
(0.536) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.353***     
(0.08) 
– – 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – -0.437     
(0.432) 
2.112     
(1.496) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0.707***     
(0.077) 
0.238***     
(0.053) 
1.738***     
(0.355) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.009.     
(0.005) 
0.006     
(0.004) 
0.081***     
(0.024) 
Control Variables 
   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.019     
(0.029) 
-0.034     
(0.025) 
0.258.     
(0.151) 
Classic IP leaders 1.245**     
(0.396) 
0.325     
(0.342) 
2.85.     
(1.731) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.29       
(0.291) 
0.169     
(0.252) 
-0.329     
(1.271) 
New IP producers and developers 0.021     
(0.284) 
0.08     
(0.21) 
1.378     
(1.065) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.282.     
(0.157) 
0.495**     
(0.189) 
-0.327     
(0.83) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.173     
(0.166) 
-0.079     
(0.159) 
1.78*     
(0.822) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.288*     
(0.131) 
-0.072     
(0.103) 
0.955     
(0.619) 
Intercept – -5.059     
(3.886) 
-39.078*     
(19.688) 






Observations 529 529 529 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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Political pressure has a significantly positive effect on the index IPR scope tangible. 
For example, the effect is positive for the count data of the epa model (0.071) indicating 
that amongst those that do include tangible commitments on IPR scope, there is a positive 
effect of political pressure. This means that if PTAs with members on the “Special 301 
Reports” do include tangible provisions, they tend to include them on multiple IPR forms. 
This effect is again tested for the subset of US PTAs and plotted in Graph 19: 
 
Graph 19: Jittered Scatter Plot: Index IPR Scope Tangible ~ Political Pressure (US PTAs) 
 
 
The plot shows that those PTAs that include members on the “Special 301 Reports” 
score always score positively on the index IPR scope tangible, i.e. that PTAs with mem-
bers under political pressure by the US always include tangible IPR provisions, mostly 
on six IPR forms or more (for values per PTA see Appendix 23: List of US PTAs: Strin-
gent IPR Indexes & Political Pressure I). 
Veto players have a significantly negative effect on the index IPR tangible scope. In 
the economic power asymmetry hurdle model, the count data shows that out of those 
PTAs that include tangible IPR provisions, the veto players have a negative effect on how 
many IPR forms are covered (-0.085). However, veto players have no significant effect 
in the other eight regression models for the index IPR tangible scope. 
Endogeneity has a significantly positive effect on the index IPR scope tangible. The 
two most distinct estimates are found for PTA depth (0.497) and index IPR specific en-
forcement (0.707). This means that the deeper the PTA resp. the more specific IPR en-
forcement provisions are included in the PTA, the more tangible IPR scope commitments 
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Regime preference has a significantly positive effect on the index IPR scope tangible, 
and the most distinct effect can be found in the epa and di model (0.009). Additionally, 
the zero stage of the HP model also shows a highly significant effect of regime preference 
(0.081). This means that PTAs including IPR multilateral provisions are more likely to 
also include tangible IPR scope provisions. However, the effect is not significant for the 
path dependency models pdwstp, pdwfs and pdwftp. 
Path dependency has a significant effect on the tangible IPR provisions. The pdg 
model shows the most distinct significant effects for industrial designs (2.237) as well as 
patents (-2.374). This means that if PTA members repeat general provisions on industrial 
design in their PTAs, their PTAs are also more likely to include specific IPR provisions. 
The effect is inverted for general patent commitments, which lead to a decrease of specific 
IPR commitments in PTAs. Again, the pds and pdtp model only show significant effects 
on a very low impact level. Unsurprisingly, the pdwss and pdwfs models show a signifi-
cantly positive effect of path dependency of 1 for all eleven forms of IPR as the index 
tangible scope captures the additive commitments to the tangible IPR forms. 
For the pdwstp model, the most pronounced effects are all significantly positive and 
are found for path dependency from TRIPS-plus provisions on industrial designs (2.752), 
undisclosed information (1.588), domain names (1.721) and exhaustion (1.307). Thus, if 
a PTA repeats provisions on these TRIPS-plus areas already covered in another agree-
ment worldwide then the PTA is more likely to cover more IPR forms in a tangible man-
ner. The pdwftp model is displayed in Table 39 and shows highly similar effects on the 
index IPR tangible scope as the pdwstp model with more distinct estimates in the pdwftp 
model. This means that the path dependency effect of TRIPS-plus provisions for the tan-
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Table 39: Design Regression – Index IPR Scope Tangible (sum)  Path Dependency (world, 
force, TRIPS-plus) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.097*     
(0.038) 
0.048.     
(0.026) 
0.417     
(0.495) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) -0.069.     
(0.037) 
-0.025     
(0.018) 
-0.5     
(0.718) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.268**     
(0.092) 
0.119.     
(0.067) 
0.34     
(0.258) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0.359***     
(0.098) 
0.172**     
(0.061) 
0.086     
(0.401) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) -0.008     
(0.006) 
-0.004     
(0.004) 
0.006     
(0.022) 
Path Dependency   
  
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – copyrights 
-0.109     
(0.792) 
0.178     
(0.352) 
-3.373     
(2248) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – geographical indications 
0.064     
(0.601) 
-0.252     
(0.313) 
7.602     
(3629) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – industrial designs 
2.835***     
(0.391) 
0.733     
(0.713) 
5.184*     
(2.062) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – patents 
-0.247     
(0.428) 
-0.023     
(0.242) 
2.896     
(8345) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – undisclosed information 
1.668***     
(0.457) 
0.551*     
(0.229) 
2.059     
(7220) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – new plant varieties 
0.8*            
(0.4) 
0.173     
(0.204) 
11.56     
(1798) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
-0.312     
(0.412) 
-0.11     
(0.226) 
0.881     
(18540) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
0.979*        
(0.4) 
0.054     
(0.204) 
1.741     
(18640) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – domain names 
2.264*     
(1.107) 
0.304     
(0.411) 
-15.8     
(19860) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – enforcement 
0.33        
(0.331) 
0.24         
(0.2) 
3.516     
(3235) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – exhaustion 
1.502***     
(0.403) 
0.404*     
(0.201) 
-0.95     
(4235) 
Control Variables   
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.033     
(0.038) 
0         
(0.024) 
0.188     
(0.155) 
Classic IP leaders 0.314     
(0.402) 
0.035     
(0.277) 
1.526     
(1.378) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.436     
(0.353) 
-0.196     
(0.234) 
0.124     
(0.846) 
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New IP producers and developers -0.429     
(0.295) 
-0.159     
(0.173) 
0.338     
(0.831) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.203     
(0.132) 
0.041     
(0.078) 
-0.434     
(0.423) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.139     
(0.176) 
-0.097     
(0.099) 
0.044     
(0.653) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.385**     
(0.149) 
-0.021     
(0.099) 
1.969**     
(0.65) 
Intercept – -1.043     
(2.195) 













Observations 484 484 484 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
Control variables show significant inconsistent effects on the index IPR scope tangi-
ble that vary across models. The effects found in almost all models are a significantly 
positive effect for classic IP leaders and geographical distance. Classic IP leaders – US, 
EU, EFTA and Japan – have a positive effect (1.245), which is even more distinct for the 
zero stage of the HP di model (2.85). For the average geographic distance (log) the picture 
is similar with a positive effect for the OP model (0.685) and even more so for the zero 
data of the HP epa model (1.951). This means that if one or more of the classic IP leaders 
are PTA members resp. the more distance lies between PTA members, the more tangible 
IPR commitments are included in the PTA. The other country blocks also show signifi-
cant results for some of the models, whereby the countries with a high increase of patent 
protection – Brazil, China, India and Mexico – are more likely to include more tangible 
IPR provisions in their PTAs (0.568), and the new IP producers and developers – Israel, 
South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan – tend to include less stringent provisions (-0.8). For 
the average democratisation, the effect is also positive, yet only for the zero data of the 
HP di model (0.258).  
The directions of the effects on tangible IPR scope provisions are ambiguous for the 
GDP control variables. The average GDP (log) has a significantly negative effect in the 
epa model (-0.289) and the effect is even more distinct for the zero stage of the HP epa 
model (-0.789), whereas the di model suggests the opposite effect (0.282), which is even 
more pronounced for the count data of the HP di model (0.495). On the other hand, the 
average GDP per capita (log) shows a positive effect for the OP epa model (0.354) and 
for the zero data of the HP di model (1.78), yet a negative effect for the count data of the 
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HP pdg model (-0.283). This means that GDP and GDP per capita can have both positive 
or negative effects and might not be the most reliable predictors for the scope of tangible 
IPR commitments in PTAs. 
The regression tables for the other path dependency variables are included in Appen-
dix 36: Design Regression – Index IPR Scope Tangible (sum)  Path Dependency (gen-
eral), Appendix 37: Design Regression – Index IPR Scope Tangible (sum)  Path De-
pendency (specific), Appendix 38: Design Regression – Index IPR Scope Tangible (sum) 
 Path Dependency (TRIPS-plus), Appendix 39: Design Regression – Index IPR Scope 
Tangible (sum)  Path Dependency (world, signature, specific), Appendix 40: Design 
Regression – Index IPR Scope Tangible (sum)  Path Dependency (world, signature, 
TRIPS-plus), and Appendix 41: Design Regression – Index IPR Scope Tangible (sum)  
Path Dependency (world, force, specific). 
4.3.2.3 Binary Variables for IPR Scope Tangible 
The index IPR scope tangible is the additive index on the binary coding of the eleven 
forms of IPRs found in PTAs. In order to allocate a particular form of IPR drives the 
results for the index, I analyse the effect for each form in a separate model. The regression 
tables are not displayed in this subchapter, but can be found in Appendix 21: Design Re-
gression Tables of the Binary Variables for IPR Scope Tangible. 
Economic power asymmetry only has a significant effect on the tangible commit-
ments of a couple of IPR forms, namely industrial design, layout-designs of integrated 
circuits, TK & GR, encrypted program-carrying satellite signals and domain names. As 
there are only a few significant effects of the epa measures, I describe all of them. 
First of all, GDP per capita asymmetry has a significantly positive effect on domain 
names (1.238), which means that PTAs with GDP-wise different PTA partners are more 
likely to include tangible provisions on domain names. Secondly, the interaction term of 
GDP asymmetry with substantial tariff cuts is significantly positive for tangible commit-
ments on encrypted program-carrying satellite signals (0.191), whereas the same interac-
tion term with GDP per capita is significantly negative for industrial design (-0.302) and 
layout-designs of integrated circuits (-0.126). For instance, PTAs that have an increased 
GDP asymmetry amongst PTA members and contain substantial tariff cuts are more 
likely to include specific provisions on encrypted program-carrying satellite signals. 
Thirdly, the interaction term of GDP asymmetry with FDI (log) has a significantly 
positive effect on TK & GR (0.019) and domain names (0.016), where the interaction 
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term of GDP per capita asymmetry and FDI (log) has a significantly negative effect on 
TK & GR (-0.027). This means that when PTA partners have an increased asymmetry 
between their GDPs and or an increased FDI flow, the PTAs are more likely to include 
specific provisions on TK & GR as well as domain names. However, the effect is de-
creased for TK & GR if there is also an increased asymmetry of the living standards 
amongst PTA members. 
Domestic interests have many significant effects on the binary tangible IPR variables. 
There are too many to describe them all, and I only list the most distinct ones. 
The resident applications for patents (log) show a significantly negative effect on the 
zero data of the HP di model for copyrights (-1.146). This means that an increase in the 
resident patent applications decreases the likelihood of the PTA to be in the excessive 
zero group regarding tangible IPR commitments. For the resident applications for trade-
marks (log) the effect is positive for the zero data of the HP di model for copyrights 
(1.708), which means that with an increase of resident trademarks applications the PTA 
is more likely to be in the excessive zero group for tangible copyright provisions. 
The cumulative share of applications for patents by PTA members on the total appli-
cations for patents has a significantly positive effect on tangible IPR provisions for geo-
graphical indications (41.047) and domain names (11.13). This means that the higher the 
cumulative share of patent applications by PTA members, the more likely the PTA in-
cludes specific provisions on geographical indications resp. domain names. The cumula-
tive share of applications for trademarks by PTA members on the total applications for 
trademarks shows a significantly negative effect for geographical indications (-1.168) and 
more distinctly for the zero data of the HP di model for geographical indications (-32.76), 
as well as a positive effect for the zero data of the HP di model for patents (24.491). This 
means that a larger share of trademark applications by PTA members decreases the like-
lihood of the PTA including specific GI provisions and increases it for tangible patent 
commitments. The cumulative applications for industrial designs by PTA members on 
the total applications for industrial designs also have a significantly negative effect for 
geographical indications (-1.397), likewise decreasing the likelihood of the PTA includ-
ing tangible GI provisions. 
The share of imports of htp by PTA members on the total htp imports shows a signif-
icantly negative effect for tangible provision on copyrights (-1.784), trademarks (-1.971), 
patents (-1.638) and TK & GR (-1.742). This means that the more of the overall high-
technology products are imported by PTA members, the fewer specific provisions on 
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copyrights, trademarks, patents and TK & GR are included in the PTA. For the share of 
imports of mhtp by PTA members on the total mhtp imports the effect is significantly 
positive for the HP di model for tangible copyright provisions (42.74) and for the zero 
data of the HP di model for specific geographical indication commitments (-30.98). This 
means that with a higher share of mhtp imports by PTA members, PTAs are much more 
likely to include specific copyright provisions and less likely to be in the excessive zero 
group for tangible GI provisions. And the share of imports of mltp by PTA members on 
the total mltp imports has a significantly positive effect on tangible provisions on en-
crypted program-carrying satellite signals (6.069) and domain names (4.274). This means 
that if the share of mltp imports by PTA members increases, the PTA is more likely to 
include tangible commitments on encrypted program-carrying satellite signals and do-
main names. 
Political pressure has significantly positive as well as negative effects on the different 
IPR forms. The highest significant estimates show positive effects for copyrights (0.009), 
trademarks (0.015), undisclosed information (0.475), layout-designs of integrated circuits 
(0.475), new plant varieties (0.014), TK & GR (0.008), encrypted program-carrying sat-
ellite signals (0.008), domain names (0.007), and a negative effect only for industrial de-
signs (-0.018). This means that where countries mentioned in the “Special 301 Reports” 
are amongst the PTA members, these PTAs are more likely to include tangible provisions 
on copyrights, trademarks, undisclosed information, layout-designs of integrated circuits, 
new plant varieties, TK & GR, encrypted program-carrying satellite signals and domain 
names. However, for most of these IPR forms the effect is highly minor, and only if mul-
tiple PTA members are on the US list (multiple-unit increase on the variable political 
pressure), the impact becomes relevant. This includes the only significantly negative ef-
fect for industrial designs, which suggests that the more countries amongst PTA members 
are on the US list the less likely tangible provisions on industrial designs are included in 
the PTA. 
To check the effects for the PTAs signed with the US as a member state, I plot each 
of the eleven forms of IPRs tangible provisions regressed on political pressure in Graph 
20. I use conditional density plots as due to the binary nature of the dependent variables, 
the jittered scatter plots would be less informative. There is no plot for tangible provisions 
on new plant varieties, as none of the US PTA includes such provisions. 
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The lighter area of the plots represent the scores of ‘1’ on the dependent variable and 
the darker area the results of ‘0’. The scale on the right-hand axis indicates the probability 
of the shaded areas. The higher the dark shaded area, the more likely the DV is equal to 
zero. The lower the light shaded area is, the more likely is the DV equal to one. For 
example, the first plot for tangible provisions on copyrights shows that if none of the PTA 
members are mentioned in the “Special 301 Reports”, the chance of the PTA including 
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tangible copyright provisions. With one member on the US list, the likelihood of includ-
ing tangible copyright provision increases to approximately 82%, and if there are two or 
more countries on the list, it is almost guaranteed that the PTA includes tangible copyright 
provisions. A similar picture can be observed for trademarks, patents, encrypted program-
carrying satellite signals, and on a lower level also for geographical indications and do-
main names. All of these plots thus show a positive effect of political pressure on the 
respective tangible IPR provision. 
The plots also show that the effects of industrial design and undisclosed information 
are similar. The probability of including tangible provisions is low for those PTAs with-
out political pressure, increase when one PTA member is on the US list, is zero if there 
are two or three PTA members on the list and increases rapidly if more than three PTA 
members are on the US list. The effect for tangible provisions on layout-designs of inte-
grated circuits starts the same, yet remains at zero after at least 2 PTA members are on 
the US list. 
Tangible provisions on traditional knowledge and genetic resources (TK & GR) fol-
low an entirely different pattern and are not included in any of the US PTAs, where there 
are less than four PTA members mentioned in the “Special 301 Reports”. In fact, this is 
only the case for one PTA, the TPP, which has not entered into force. Thus, none of the 
US PTAs that was implemented into domestic law includes any tangible provisions on 
TK & GR nor new plant varieties (for values per PTA see Appendix 24: List of US PTAs: 
Stringent IPR Indexes & Political Pressure II and Appendix 25: List of US PTAs: Strin-
gent IPR Indexes & Political Pressure III). 
Veto players have both a significantly negative or significantly positive effect on the 
various forms of tangible IPR provisions. The effects are significantly positive for tangi-
ble commitments on copyrights (0.015) and geographical indications (0.01). Depending 
on the model, they are significantly positive or negative for industrial design (0.009; -
0.013), new plant varieties (0.008; -0.006) and traditional knowledge and genetic re-
sources (0.01; -0.004). The effects are significantly negative for patents (-0.007), undis-
closed information (-0.016), layout-designs of integrated circuits (-0.008), encrypted pro-
gram-carrying satellite signals (-0.012) and domain names (-0.009). Hereby, the effect is 
especially pronounced for the zero stage of the layout-designs of integrated circuits hurdle 
model (-0.617), which means that veto players have a significantly negative effect on 
whether the PTA includes tangible provisions on layout-designs of integrated circuits or 
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not. For all other forms of IPR, the effect is only marginal for an increase of veto players. 
For trademarks, veto players have no significant effect. 
Endogeneity has a significantly positive and negative effect on the tangible IPR com-
mitments. For PTA depth, the most distinct estimate is found for geographical indications 
(0.052). There are also distinct significant effects for the zero stages of various HP models 
such as copyrights (0.584) and geographical indications (0.602), meaning that deeper 
PTAs are more likely to include tangible provisions on these IPR forms. For the measure 
of substantial tariff cuts, there are significant positive effects, most distinctly for industrial 
design (0.241), and significantly negative effects for encrypted program-carrying satellite 
signals (-0.115) and domain names (-0.11). Whilst substantial tariff commitments in-
crease the odds ratio of most tangible IPR commitments, they decrease the likelihood of 
specific provisions on encrypted program-carrying satellite signals and domain names. 
The index IPR enforcement also shows a significantly positive effect, that is most pro-
nounced for copyrights (0.099). This effect might be attributed to some extent to the index 
IPR specific enforcement, which also shows highly significant effects on the tangible IPR 
provisions. The most distinct estimates can be found for patents (0.149). This effect is 
also confirmed by the significantly positive estimates for the zero stages of the HP model 
for patents (0.868), indicating as well that PTAs are more likely to include tangible patent 
provisions if the PTA also includes specific IPR enforcement commitments. Overall, the 
endogeneity measures show a mostly positive significant effect on tangible IPR commit-
ments. 
Regime preference has either a significantly positive or negative effect on the eleven 
binary IPR tangible scope variables. The most distinct significantly positive effects are 
found for copyrights (0.001), trademarks (0.002), geographical indications (0.004) and 
traditional knowledge and genetic resources (0.003), whereas the significantly negative 
effect are shown for industrial design (-0.002), patents (-0.002), undisclosed information 
(-0.001), layout-designs of integrated circuits (-0.001), encrypted program-carrying sat-
ellite signals (-0.001) and new plant varieties (-0.001). For example, an increase of com-
mitments on IPR multilateral coherence also increases the odds of specific provisions on 
geographical indications resp. decreases the odds of specific provisions on patents. All of 
the direction s of the effects are consistent across models, yet not all of them are signifi-
cant in each model. Further, regime preference has no significant effect on domain names. 
So, even the significant effects are on a low-impact level, therefore reducing the explan-
atory power of regime preference for the tangible IPR scope variables. 
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Path dependency has a significant effect on the binary tangible variables, and I high-
light the most distinct and significant effects for the seven path dependency models per 
IPR form. 
There are some significant effect for the pdg model, yet on a very low scale and only 
have a minor impact on the tangible IPR commitments. For the pds model, there are many 
significant effects of various variables on multiple IPR forms. Concretely, path depend-
ency from copyrights has a negative effect on the zero data of the HP pds model for 
copyrights (-1.127). This means that PTAs, which repeat copyright variables already in-
cluded in one of their members previous PTA, are less likely to include tangible copyright 
measures. This indicates that the path dependency from including the tangible copyright 
provisions was unfavourable for these provisions, and the path dependency leads to a 
direct negative effect on tangible copyright provisions. There is an additional negative 
path dependency from trademarks that has a negative effect on the zero data of the HP 
pds model for copyrights (-3.044). Thus, PTAs with PTA members that included tangible 
trademarks provisions in their previous PTAs and repeat these provisions are also less 
likely to contain tangible copyright provisions. However, there are also positive effects 
of path dependency for copyrights: by path dependency from GIs (zero data of the HP 
pds model for copyrights: 0.964), by layout-designs of integrated circuits (zero data of 
the HP pds model for copyrights: 2.125) and by encrypted program-carrying satellite sig-
nals (zero data of the HP pds model for copyrights: 1.786). This means that for PTAs, 
where the PTA members included in their previous PTAs tangible provisions on GIs, 
layout-designs of integrated circuits and or encrypted program-carrying satellite signals, 
and repeat these commitments, these PTAs are more likely to include tangible provisions 
on copyrights. Thus, most of the distinct path dependency effects focus on tangible pro-
visions on copyrights.  
Further, the regression analysis shows path dependency effects from domain names 
on tangible provision on undisclosed information (zero data of the HP pds model: -1.199) 
and on layout-designs of integrated circuits (zero data of the HP pds model: -1.199). This 
suggests that if PTA members included tangible commitments on domain names in their 
previous PTAs and repeat these commitments, their PTAs are less likely to include spe-
cific provisions on undisclosed information and or layout-designs of integrated circuits. 
The pdtp model shows a path dependency effect from layout-designs of integrated 
circuits on the zero data of the HP pdtp model for copyrights (5.044), from encrypted 
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program-carrying satellite signals on the zero data of the HP pdtp model also for copy-
rights (-3.004) and from domain names on the zero data of the HP pdtp model as well for 
copyrights (2.45). Thus, for PTAs, where the PTA members repeat TRIPS-plus provi-
sions on layout-designs of integrated circuits and or domain names, the PTA is more 
likely to include tangible copyright provisions. This effect is vice versa for path depend-
ency from TRIPS-plus provisions on encrypted program-carrying satellite signals. 
The pdwss and pdwfs models show as to be expected a highly significant effect of 
path dependency for each form of IPR with the respective binary IPR variable. This 
simply shows that the path dependency for the tangible commitments is only coded if that 
provision is included (again) in a PTA, thus leading to a significantly positive estimate of 
1 for all IPR forms. The cross effects from path dependency by other forms are in some 
cases significant, yet on a highly marginal level (estimates < 0.000). 
For the pdwstp model, path dependency from layout-designs of integrated circuits has 
a positive effect on the zero data of the HP pdwstp model for geographical indications 
(3.756) and path dependency from domain names has a positive effect on layout-designs 
of integrated circuits (0.937). This suggests that where PTAs repeat pre-existing PTA 
TRIPS-plus provisions on layout-designs of integrated circuits resp. domain names, the 
PTAs are more likely to include tangible provisions on geographical indications resp. 
layout-designs of integrated circuits. 
The pdwftp model shows similar and different effect compared to the pdwstp model. 
For path dependency from new plant varieties, there is a positive effect on industrial de-
signs (0.804), and for path dependency from domain names, there is a positive effect on 
undisclosed information (0.806) and on layout-designs of integrated circuits (0.93). 
Moreover, path dependency from exhaustion has a positive effect on TK & GR (0.791). 
This means, for example, that PTAs, which repeat TRIPS-plus exhaustion provisions 
from PTAs that have already entered into force are more likely to include tangible com-
mitments on traditional knowledge and genetic resources. 
Control variables significantly affect the binary variables for IPR scope tangible, and 
I highlight the most distinct positive and or negative effects per control variable. 
Starting off, average democratisation has the most distinct and significant effect on 
tangible provisions regarding geographical indication (0.004) as well as copyrights and 
trademarks (-0.004). The effect is marginal, thus the effect of democratisation is signifi-
cantly, yet benign. 
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For the country blocks, the classic IP leaders – US, EU, EFTA and Japan – are the 
ones that have a significant effect on most IPR forms, whereby the effect is both positive 
and negative. It is, for example, positive for tangible provisions on patents (0.261) and 
negative for geographical indications (-0.173), meaning that PTAs with at least one of the 
classic IP leaders as member are more likely to include tangible provisions on patents and 
less likely to include them on geographical indications. For the other country blocks, the 
effects are also significantly positive and negative, whereby countries with a high increase 
of patent protection – Brazil, China, India and Mexico – have the most distinct measures 
on the inclusion of tangible commitments on industrial design (0.1) and the exclusion of 
domain names (-0.061). This means that if one or more of these countries are PTA mem-
bers, the PTA is more likely to contain tangible provisions on industrial design and less 
likely on domain names. New IP producers and developers – Israel, South Korea, Singa-
pore and Taiwan – have the most pronounced effects for traditional knowledge and ge-
netic resources (0.093) and encrypted program-carrying satellite signals (-0.089). Thus, 
if they are part of an agreement, their PTA is more likely to cover tangible provisions on 
TK & GR and less likely on encrypted program-carrying satellite signals. 
Both of the GDP variables affect tangible provisions on copyrights and industrial de-
signs the most, yet to a reversed end. Where the average GDP (log) shows a positive 
effect for tangible commitments on copyrights (0.049) and a negative one for industrial 
designs (-0.056), the average GDP per capita (log) has a positive effect on industrial de-
sign (0.066) and a negative one on copyrights (-0.041). The positive effect for the average 
GDP (log) is even more pronounced for the zero stage of the HP di model (2.218). This 
means that a higher average GDP increases the likelihood of the PTA covering tangible 
copyright provisions and decreases it for industrial design provisions. And for the average 
GDP per capita, the effect is vice versa. 
The average geographic distance (log) has a positive effect on tangible provisions on 
geographical indications (0.057) and negatively affects commitments on industrial de-
signs (-0.026), which is even more distinctly visible for the zero stage of the HP di model 
(-6.127). This means that PTA members, which are further apart from one another, are 
more likely to contain tangible provisions on GIs and less likely ones on industrial de-
signs. 
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4.3.2.4 Index IPR Specific Enforcement (sum) 
For the index IPR specific enforcement, the most distinct effects can be found for 
economic power asymmetry in Table 40, for domestic interests in Table 41 and path de-
pendency (pdwftp) in Table 42. 
 
Table 40: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific Enforcement (sum)  Economic Power 
Asymmetry 






Economic Power Asymmetry 
   
GDP asymmetry (max/sum) 7.586           
(9.069) 
-14.301           
(12.382) 
-49.087           
(37.881) 
GDPpc asymmetry (max/sum) -15.463           
(11.032) 
2.436           
(14.26) 
33.652           
(35.303) 
GDP asymmetry * substantial tariff cuts 1.899           
(2.242) 
26.484***           
(7.978) 
47.883           
(39.147) 
GDPpc asymmetry * substantial tariff cuts -1.435           
(2.467) 
-26.183**           
(8.162) 
-48.226           
(38.313) 
GDP asymmetry * ln FDI 0.191           
(0.274) 
-0.602.           
(0.322) 
-1.603.           
(0.911) 
GDPpc asymmetry * ln FDI 0.034           
(0.313) 
0.847*           
(0.389) 
1.918           
(1.174) 
GDP asymmetry * lnofficial development 
assistance and official aid received 
-0.641.           
(0.359) 
0.225           
(0.317) 
2.143*           
(0.895) 
GDPpc asymmetry * lnofficial develop-
ment assistance and official aid received 
0.781.           
(0.461) 
0.016           
(0.411) 
-1.723.           
(0.996) 
GDP asymmetry * (DAC aid received by 
PTA members/ DAC aid received) 
-27.806***           
(8.213) 
-9.302.           
(5.156) 
29.383*           
(13.507) 
GDPpc asymmetry * (DAC aid received by 
PTA members/ DAC aid received) 
26.068***           
(7.839) 
11.654.           
(6.086) 
-24.173.           
(12.72) 
Political Pressure 
   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.116**           
(0.036) 
-0.074*           
(0.034) 
0.175.           
(0.102) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) 0.176***           
(0.052) 
0.039           
(0.032) 
-0.255.           
(0.15) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.235**           
(0.082) 
0.024           
(0.066) 
-0.085           
(0.197) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.02***           
(0.004) 
-0.009*           
(0.004) 
-0.086***           
(0.025) 
Control Variables 
   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.01           
(0.035) 
0.116***           
(0.031) 
0.219*           
(0.104) 
Classic IP leaders 0.882*           
(0.348) 
-0.124           
(0.289) 
-1.292           
(0.859) 
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Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.256           
(0.278) 
-0.493.           
(0.291) 
-2.801**           
(1.072) 
New IP producers and developers -0.57.           
(0.302) 
0.055           
(0.255) 
1.31.           
(0.745) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.005           
(0.159) 
0.247.           
(0.147) 
0.089           
(0.386) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.082           
(0.184) 
0.359*           
(0.173) 
0.393           
(0.464) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.043           
(0.166) 
0.273.           
(0.147) 
0.059           
(0.354) 
Intercept – -11.381**     
(3.762) 
-5.108     
(9.631) 






Observations 392 392 392 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
Economic power asymmetry has a significant effect on the index IPR specific en-
forcement. The GDP asymmetry and GDP per capita asymmetry variables have no sig-
nificant effects on the number of specific IPR enforcement variables in PTAs. However, 
in combination with other PTA elements, they have a significant effect. In combination 
with substantial tariff cuts, GDP asymmetry has a significantly positive (26.484) and 
GPD per capita a significantly negative effect (-26.183) on the number of specific IPR 
enforcement provisions in the PTA. This means that PTAs including substantial tariff 
cuts and are additionally signed amongst countries with more unequal living standards 
are less likely to include specific IPR enforcement provisions, whereas if the PTA mem-
bers have additionally very asymmetrical GDPs they are more likely to include specific 
IPR enforcement provisions. 
This affect is inverted for the interaction term with FDI, where GDP asymmetry has 
a significantly negative effect (-0.602), and GDP per capita asymmetry shows a positive 
effect (0.847). The direction of the effect remains the same for the remaining economic 
asymmetry variables. GDP asymmetry has a significantly negative effect in combination 
with official development assistance and official aid received (log) (-0.641) resp. with the 
share of DAC aid received by PTA members of the total DAC aid received (-27.806), 
where GDP per capita asymmetry has a significantly positive effect in combination with 
official development assistance and official aid received (log) (0.781) resp. with the share 
of DAC aid received by PTA members of the total DAC aid received (26.068). The effects 
with the share of DAC aid received by PTA members of the total DAC aid received are 
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the ones showing significant results for both the OP as well as both stages of the ZINB 
epa model. On the one hand, the results show that an increase in GDP asymmetry in 
combination with FDI or aid has a negative impact on the number of specific IPR en-
forcement provisions in the PTA. On the other, the analysis also indicates that a PTA 
between countries with a more dissimilar living standard and in combination with FDI or 
aid increase the number of specific IPR enforcement provisions. 
Domestic interests have a significant effect on the specific IPR enforcement measures 
in PTAs, whereby the impact can be both positive as well as negative. 
The count data of the ZIP di model shows a significantly negative effect for resident 
applications for patents (log) (-1.261) and a positive one for resident applications for in-
dustrial designs (0.816). For the cumulative measures, the effects are both inverted (pa-
tents: 1.048; industrial designs: -0.566). So, for the resident applications for trademarks 
(log) the effect is significantly positive (0.384). This means that if in the year of PTA 
signature, resident applications for patents are increased then the PTA will include less 
specific IPR enforcement provisions unless the resident applications have already been 
strong over the years (cumulative effect). This effect is the opposite for industrial design 
applications and for the year of PTA signature also inverted for trademark applications. 
Moreover, looking at the share that applications for patents by PTA members hold on 
the total applications for patents, the zero data of the ZIP di model shows a significant 
and pronounced negative effect (-147.03). This suggests that the larger the share of PTA 
member applicants for patents in the year of PTA signature, the less likely the PTA will 
fall into the excessive zero group. Yet, looking at the development of the share of appli-
cations for patents by PTA members on the total applications for patents the count data 
of the ZIP di also shows a significant and even more pronounced effect (-219.1). This 
indicates that if PTA members are main contributors to patent applications, they are much 
less likely to include specific IPR provisions in the PTA. A similar and smaller scale 
effect can be observed for the share of applications for trademarks by PTA members on 
the total applications for trademarks (-0.562). 
The imports differentiated according to their technology-intensiveness also have sub-
stantial significant effects on the specific IPR enforcement in PTAs. First off, the only 
significantly positive effect can be observed for the imports of mhtp by PTA members 
(0.209). This means that the more medium-high-technology goods are imported by PTA 
members, the more specific IPR enforcement provisions are included in the PTA. How-
ever, the estimate suggests the effect to be on a comparatively low scale.  
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Looking at the share of imports of htp by PTA members on the total htp imports, the 
zero data of the ZIP di model suggest a significantly negative effect (-967.638), indicating 
that these PTAs are much less likely to be in the excessive zero group. For the share of 
imports of mhtp by PTA members on the total mhtp imports the effect is significantly 
negative (-13.88). This suggests that if countries are mainly importing mhtp products by 
their PTA members, then they are less likely to include specific IPR provisions in their 
PTAs. Thus, the effect for imports by PTA members is inverted, the higher the share of 
mhtp by PTA members is on the total mhtp imports. The effect is also significantly neg-
ative for the share of imports of ltp by PTA members on the total ltp imports shown in 
the count data of the ZIP di model (-46.42). 
 
Table 41: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific Enforcement (sum)  Domestic Interests 







   
ln Charges for the use of IP, receipts (sum) -0.016     
(0.027) 
-0.036     
(0.031) 
-0.991     
(0.899) 
ln Resident applications for patents (sum) -0.106     
(0.187) 
-1.261***     
(0.313) 
-28.438     
(23.629) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(sum) 
0.384.     
(0.228) 
0.232     
(0.18) 
-9.111     
(7.959) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (sum) 
-0.139     
(0.159) 
0.816***     
(0.233) 
26.328     
(22.314) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
-0.158     
(0.206) 
1.048**     
(0.325) 
48.235     
(38.181) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(cumulative, sum) 
0.033     
(0.228) 
-0.115     
(0.221) 
-8.411     
(11.083) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (cumulative, sum) 
0.107     
(0.211) 
-0.566*     
(0.249) 
-27.877     
(23.392) 
Applications for patents by PTA members / 
total applications for patents 
0.66     
(0.434) 
-0.372     
(0.281) 
-147.03.     
(76.12) 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks 
-0.562.     
(0.332) 
-0.259     
(0.242) 
28.761     
(19.701) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs 
-0.22     
(0.307) 
-0.055     
(0.206) 
45.819     
(39.121) 
Applications for patents by PTA members / 
total applications for patents (cumulative) 
-83.59     
(91.6) 
-219.1*     
(94.29) 
7.745   
(23351.397) 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks (cu-
mulative) 
-5.009     
(5.567) 
0.764     
(5.087) 
-221.098     
(195.718) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs (cumulative) 
1.184     
(5.679) 
4.893     
(5.463) 
440.24     
(276.89) 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) -0.05     
(0.044) 
-0.066     
(0.042) 
0.558     
(1.376) 
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R&D expenditure (sum) 0.041     
(0.161) 
0.178     
(0.151) 
-1.267     
(3.139) 
Imports of htp by PTA members (sum) -0.061     
(0.07) 
0.045     
(0.047) 
10.642     
(9.194) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members (sum) 0.209*     
(0.086) 
-0.081     
(0.066) 
-15.563     
(13.243) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members (sum) -0.1     
(0.081) 
0.03     
(0.061) 
6.171     
(6.203) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members (sum) 0.009     
(0.033) 
0.011     
(0.02) 
-3.478     
(4.015) 
Imports of htp by PTA members /                                   
total htp imports 
12.16   
(8.589) 
-2.708     
(6.627) 
-967.638*     
(413.811) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members /                                
total mhtp imports 
-13.88*    
(6.896) 
5.317     
(6.328) 
807.435     
(783.528) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members /                                
total mltp imports 
14.19    
(36.05) 
39.72     
(32.23) 
305.159     
(1522.554) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members /                                    
total ltp imports 
9.516   
(28.02) 
-46.42.     
(26.04) 
-278.561     
(712.623) 
Political Pressure   
  
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.103*     
(0.042) 
-0.099*     
(0.048) 
3.102     
(3.258) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) 0.153*     
(0.062) 
0.107*     
(0.049) 
-2.632     
(3.011) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.201**     
(0.075) 
-0.001     
(0.064) 
-18.261     
(17.409) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.03***     
(0.004) 
0.009**     
(0.003) 
-1.53     
(1.242) 
Control Variables 
   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.001     
(0.029) 
0.043*     
(0.022) 
4.272     
(3.739) 
Classic IP leaders 1.242***     
(0.349) 
0.377     
(0.269) 
-18.793     
(12.428) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.119     
(0.259) 
-0.406*     
(0.202) 
-26.399     
(19.071) 
New IP producers and developers 0.347     
(0.245) 
0.229     
(0.177) 
7.396     
(2225.059) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.23.     
(0.138) 
0.314*     
(0.128) 
9.731.     
(5.914) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.271.     
(0.153) 
-0.012     
(0.14) 
-24.242     
(17.733) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.01     
(0.116) 
0.017     
(0.094) 
2.786     
(3.321) 
Intercept – -9.519**     
(2.911) 
55.328     
(119.968) 






Observations 529 529 529 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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Political pressure has a significantly negative effect on the index IPR specific en-
forcement, whereby the highest estimate can be found in the pdg model (-0.148). This 
means that with every additional PTA member mentioned in the “Special 301 Reports”, 
the score on the index IPR specific enforcement decreases. Of course, the expected rela-
tion would be inverted. Graph 21 plots the relation for the subset of US agreements to 
see if this is different for the PTAs with US involvement. 
 




Indeed, the regression line in the plot shows a clear positive relationship between po-
litical pressure and the index IPR specific enforcement. All US PTA except one show 
that when at least one PTA member is on the US list, the PTA includes four or more 
specific IPR enforcement provisions. For those agreements including more than one PTA 
member, the score on the index IPR specific enforcement is even higher (for values per 
PTA see Appendix 23: List of US PTAs: Stringent IPR Indexes & Political Pressure I). 
Veto players have a significantly positive effect on the index IPR specific enforce-
ment, whereby the most distinct effect is displayed in the economic power asymmetry 
model (0.176). Thus, the more veto players there are amongst PTA members, the more 
specific IPR enforcement provisions are included in the PTA. The effect is less pro-
nounced for the domestic interest model, yet also significantly positive. For both these 
explanatory factors, the effect of veto players is significantly negative for the zero stage 
of the zero-inflated models, meaning that with every additional veto player amongst PTA 
members the odds ratio of the PTA being in the excess-zero group decreases and the PTA 
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opposite the anticipated one and shows that with an increase of veto players, the need for 
specific enforcement provisions increases as well. Yet, this effect is not generalisable, as 
veto players show no significant effect on the seven path dependency models. 
Endogeneity has as significant positive effect on the index IPR specific enforcement, 
whereby the most distinct estimate is the one for PTA depth (0.243). This means that the 
deeper the PTA, the more specific IPR enforcement provisions are included in the PTA. 
Regime preference has a significantly positive as well as negative effect, whereby the 
most pronounced estimate can be found in the di model (0.03). Further, the two-stage 
model ZIP shows for the zero data a significantly negative effect (-0.086), indicating that 
the more and the more binding IPR multilateral coherence references can be found in 
PTAs, the less likely the PTA falls in the excess zero group for IPR specific enforcement. 
Path dependency also has a significant effect on the specific IPR enforcement provi-
sions in a PTA, whereby even the path dependency from general provision has a signifi-
cant effect. For the pdg model, the most pronounced variables are found for the path 
dependency of general provisions on industrial designs (1.142) and patents (-0.937). This 
is consistent with the effects observed for specific IPR enforcement and the tangible IPR 
scope, and means that the more PTA members repeat provisions on industrial designs, 
the more likely the PTA also contains specific IPR commitments. The path dependency 
from specific IPR and TRIPS-plus commitment shown in the pds and pdtp model have a 
significant effect, yet once more on a fairly low impact level. For the pdwss and the pdwfs 
model, the effect is now significantly positive for enforcement and shows an estimate of 
1, accounting for the dependent variable being specific IPR enforcement. 
 
Table 42: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific Enforcement (sum)  Path Dependency 
(world, force, TRIPS-plus) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.085*         
(0.034) 
-0.061.         
(0.035) 
-0.038         
(0.056) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) -0.03         
(0.033) 
-0.005         
(0.019) 
0.037         
(0.067) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.233**         
(0.075) 
0.038         
(0.06) 
0.326**         
(0.108) 
Regime Preference   
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Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.008.         
(0.005) 
-0.001         
(0.003) 






Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – copyrights 
-0.555         
(0.65) 
-0.034         
(0.345) 
-4.273         
(1208) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – geographical indications 
0.64         
(0.573) 
0.303         
(0.363) 
4.84         
(1357) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – industrial designs 
1.648***         
(0.291) 
1.116*         
(0.467) 
1.06**         
(0.395) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – patents 
0.74.         
(0.407) 
0.186         
(0.218) 
5.459         
(991.7) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – undisclosed information 
0.714.         
(0.41) 
0.376         
(0.23) 
4.841         
(583.9) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – new plant varieties 
1.218***         
(0.348) 
0.363.         
(0.187) 
7.063         
(911.6) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
0.575         
(0.397) 
-0.026         
(0.211) 
0.5         
(2114) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
-0.243         
(0.378) 
-0.209         
(0.212) 
-0.648         
(2119) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – domain names 
-2.122*         
(0.935) 
-0.63         
(0.472) 
-6.509         
(4854) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – enforcement 
0.16         
(0.317) 
0.037         
(0.183) 
0.572         
(0.726) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – exhaustion 
-0.439         
(0.356) 
-0.183         
(0.204) 
5.742         
(1032) 
Control Variables   
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.012         
(0.028) 
0.024         
(0.024) 
-0.014         
(0.034) 
Classic IP leaders 0.998**         
(0.325) 
0.457.         
(0.266) 
-0.416         
(0.585) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.027         
(0.296) 
0.083         
(0.24) 
0.195         
(0.37) 
New IP producers and developers 0.187         
(0.239) 
0.069         
(0.172) 
0.13         
(0.337) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.124         
(0.101) 
0.081         
(0.081) 
0.111         
(0.148) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.114         
(0.138) 
-0.044         
(0.109) 
-0.041         
(0.209) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.189         
(0.125) 
0.089         
(0.098) 
0.075         
(0.181) 
Intercept – -3.111     
(2.294) 













Observations 484 484 484 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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For the pdwstp model, the most pronounced effects can be observed for the TRIPS-
plus categories of industrial design (1.986), new plant varieties (1.354) and domain names 
(-1.986). This means that PTAs repeating TRIPS-plus provisions on industrial design and 
or new plant varieties already found in other PTAs are more likely also to include specific 
IPR enforcement commitments. So, the opposite effect can be observed for path depend-
ency from TRIPS-plus domain names provisions. In Table 42, I display the regression 
analysis for the pdwftp model, which shows the same significant effects as the pdwstp 
model, yet with even more distinct estimates. This suggests that the path dependency for 
TRIPS-plus provision increases after a PTA has entered into force. 
Control variables have a significant effect on the index IPR specific enforcement. 
The most consistent and most distinct effect can be observed for the classic IP leaders – 
US, EU, EFTA and Japan. If one of these countries is a PTA member, the score on the 
index IPR specific enforcement increases (1.242), i.e. their PTAs are more likely to in-
clude specific enforcement provisions on IPR. On the other hand, new IP producers and 
developers – Israel, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan – have a less distinct and signif-
icantly effect on specific IPR enforcement provisions (-0.57). The effect of the third coun-
try group is less conclusive than for the other country groups. Countries with a high in-
crease of patent protection – Brazil, China, India and Mexico – show the most distinct 
effect in the count data of ZIP epa model (-0.493) and zero data of ZIP epa model (-
2.801). This means that countries with a high increase of patent protection are much less 
likely to be in the excessive zero group (zero data effect) and thus potentially could in-
clude something on specific IPR enforcement. However, they tend to include less on spe-
cific IPR enforcement in their PTAs (count data effect). 
A similar effect can be observed for the average democratisation, which scores most 
distinctly in count data of ZIP epa model (0.116) and zero data of ZIP epa model (0.219). 
Hereby, the positive value on the zero data means that the more democratised PTA mem-
bers are on average, the more likely they include nothing on IPR specific enforcement 
due to structural issues (zero stage). Yet amongst those PTAs that possibly could include 
such provisions, the ones with a higher score on the Polity 2 index also are more likely to 
include specific enforcement provisions. 
The other control variables all have a significantly positive effect on the score of IPR 
specific enforcement: average GDP (log) (0.23), average GDP per capita (log) (0.271) 
and average geographic distance (log), which only shows a positive effect for the two-
stage models such as the count data of ZIP epa model (0.273). 
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The other regression tables are included in Appendix 42: Design Regression – Index 
IPR Specific Enforcement (sum)  Path Dependency (general), Appendix 43: Design Re-
gression – Index IPR Specific Enforcement (sum)  Path Dependency (specific), Appen-
dix 44: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific Enforcement (sum)  Path Dependency 
(TRIPS-plus), Appendix 45: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific Enforcement (sum) 
 Path Dependency (world, signature, specific), Appendix 46: Design Regression – Index 
IPR Specific Enforcement (sum)  Path Dependency (world, signature, TRIPS-plus), and 
Appendix 47: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific Enforcement (sum)  Path De-
pendency (world, force, specific). 
4.3.2.5 Index IPR Multilateral Coherence (sum) 
The explanatory factors with the most effect on the index IPR multilateral coherence 
are economic power asymmetry displayed in regression Table 43, domestic interests in 
Table 44 and path dependency world entry into force (pdwfs, pdwftp) Table 45. 
Economic power asymmetry has a significant effect on the index IPR multilateral 
coherence, whereby the most distinct effect can be observed for GDP asymmetry and 
GDP per capita asymmetry. For the former, the effect is negative (-19.913) and for the 
latter positive (23.076). This means that countries with a higher GDP asymmetry are less 
likely to include references to IPR multilateral agreements, whereas countries with more 
asymmetrical living standards are more likely to do so. This effect is inverted for the 
interaction term substantial tariff cuts, where in combination with GDP asymmetry the 
effect is significantly positive (4.341) and with GDP per capita asymmetry negative (-
4.466).  
The same direction of effects can also be observed for the interaction term of GDP 
asymmetry with official development assistance and official aid received (log) (0.893) 
resp. the same interaction term with GDP per capita asymmetry (-1.099). This means that 
an increase in GDP asymmetry in combination with substantial tariff cuts or aid has a 
positive effect on the number and or bindingness of IPR multilateral coherence commit-
ments in PTAs and vice versa for GDP per capita. For example, if a PTA includes sub-
stantial tariff cuts and the GDP amongst PTA member is highly different, then the PTA 
is more likely to include more (binding) references to IPR multilateral agreements. 
No significant effect can be observed for the interaction terms with FDI nor the share 
of DAC aid received by PTA members of the total DAC aid received. 
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Table 43: Design Regression – Index IPR Multilateral Coherence (sum)  Economic Power 
Asymmetry 






Economic Power Asymmetry 
   
GDP asymmetry (max/sum) -6.873     
(5.129) 
-19.913*     
(8.051) 
11.226     
(18.156) 
GDPpc asymmetry (max/sum) 5.765     
(6.336) 
23.076*     
(9.849) 
-16.054     
(22.807) 
GDP asymmetry * substantial tariff cuts 0.724     
(0.818) 
4.341*     
(1.821) 
3.416     
(2.636) 
GDPpc asymmetry * substantial tariff cuts 0.351     
(1.025) 
-4.466.     
(2.381) 
-4.489     
(3.429) 
GDP asymmetry * ln FDI -0.097     
(0.093) 
-0.133     
(0.166) 
0.317     
(0.292) 
GDPpc asymmetry * ln FDI 0.104     
(0.108) 
0.132     
(0.201) 
-0.421     
(0.375) 
GDP asymmetry * lnofficial development 
assistance and official aid received 
0.48.     
(0.251) 
0.893*     
(0.362) 
-1.149     
(1.151) 
GDPpc asymmetry * lnofficial develop-
ment assistance and official aid received 
-0.414     
(0.316) 
-1.099*     
(0.462) 
1.377     
(1.413) 
GDP asymmetry * (DAC aid received by 
PTA members/ DAC aid received) 
1.684     
(2.837) 
3.305     
(4.001) 
38.823     
(99.047) 
GDPpc asymmetry * (DAC aid received by 
PTA members/ DAC aid received) 
-2.596     
(3.511) 
-4.266     
(4.354) 
-65.759     
(180.701) 
Political Pressure 
   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.066*     
(0.028) 
0.009     
(0.031) 
-0.193     
(0.125) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) 0.015     
(0.025) 
-0.04     
(0.03) 
-0.07     
(0.146) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.156*     
(0.061) 
0.098     
(0.079) 
-0.368*     
(0.186) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.221***     
(0.035) 
0.141***     
(0.036) 
-2.182***     
(0.567) 
Control Variables 
   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.057***     
(0.017) 
0.01     
(0.026) 
-0.071*     
(0.035) 
Classic IP leaders 0.008     
(0.263) 
0.368     
(0.294) 
0.286     
(1.252) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.235     
(0.213) 
0.308     
(0.336) 
0.747     
(0.523) 
New IP producers and developers -0.298     
(0.194) 
-0.345     
(0.252) 
0.096     
(0.447) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.184*     
(0.084) 
0.105     
(0.127) 
0.462.     
(0.253) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.462***     
(0.11) 
-0.175     
(0.172) 
-0.861*     
(0.342) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.155.     
(0.09) 
-0.181     
(0.131) 
0.051     
(0.219) 
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Intercept – 3.4     
(2.549) 
-0.535     
(3.707) 














Observations 392 392 392 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
Domestic interests have a significant effect on IPR multilateral coherence, yet most 
of the variables only have a low-scale impact. The main drivers are the share of applica-
tion on industrial design, respectively mhtp and ltp imports by PTA members.  
A significantly negative effect can be observed for the resident applications for patents 
(log) (-0.166) and for trademarks (log) in the count data of the ZINB di model (-0.442) 
and its zero data (-0.862). This means that with an increase of patent or trademark appli-
cations by residents, the content of IPR multilateral coherence in the PTA decreases. The 
opposite effect can be observed for the resident applications for industrial designs (log), 
which have a positive effect (0.236) on the index IPR multilateral coherence. Looking at 
the development over time and the cumulative effects, the resident applications for pa-
tents (0.239) and trademarks (count data of the ZINB di model: 0.38) have a significantly 
positive effect on multilateral coherence commitment in PTAs, whereas the resident ap-
plications for industrial designs show a negative effect for the count data of the ZINB di 
model (-0.459). Thus, an increase of the cumulative resident applications has a positive 
effect for patents and trademarks on the number and bindingness of IPR multilateral com-
mitments whilst the effect is inverted for cumulative residential applications for industrial 
designs Looking at the share of applications by PTA members on the total applications, 
the effect is significantly negative for patents (-0.537) and industrial designs (count data 
of the ZINB di model: -0.335), yet positive for trademarks (0.942). The effect of trade-
mark shares is not reinforced by looking at the cumulative data, as the zero data of the 
ZINB di model shows that the log odds of being an excessive zero increase by 13.18 for 
an increase of the share of applications for industrial designs by PTA members on the 
total applications for industrial designs. Subsumed, if PTA members make up a large 
share of the total applications for patents and industrial design, the PTA contains fewer 
and or less binding commitments on IPR multilateral coherence. The effect is inverted 
for the share of trademark applications. 
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Table 44: Design Regression – Index IPR Multilateral Coherence (sum)  Domestic Inter-
ests 







   
ln Charges for the use of IP, receipts (sum) 0.012          
(0.014) 
-0.005          
(0.02) 
-0.037           
(0.023) 
ln Resident applications for patents (sum) -0.166.          
(0.094) 
-0.2          
(0.181) 
-0.03           
(0.201) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(sum) 
0.132          
(0.123) 
-0.442*          
(0.196) 
-0.862*           
(0.364) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (sum) 
0.236*          
(0.099) 
0.338*          
(0.165) 
-0.093           
(0.175) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
0.239*          
(0.099) 
0.544***          
(0.162) 
0.001           
(0.203) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(cumulative, sum) 
-0.043          
(0.135) 
0.38*          
(0.188) 
0.434           
(0.376) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (cumulative, sum) 
-0.137          
(0.112) 
-0.459**          
(0.161) 
0.041           
(0.209) 
Applications for patents by PTA members / 
total applications for patents 
-0.537*          
(0.268) 
-0.329          
(0.3) 
1.709.           
(0.965) 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks 
0.942***          
(0.215) 
0.616**          
(0.229) 
-1.224.           
(0.716) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs 
-0.174          
(0.168) 
-0.335.          
(0.19) 
-0.447           
(0.631) 
Applications for patents by PTA members / 
total applications for patents (cumulative) 
55.479          
(51.424) 
36.03          
(49.78) 
-113.7           
(120.5) 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks (cu-
mulative) 
0.894          
(2.053) 
-2.973          
(2.693) 
-1.932           
(5.56) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs (cumulative) 
-2.523          
(2.808) 
3.825          
(3.422) 
13.18.           
(7.073) 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) 0.117***          
(0.023) 
0.008          
(0.034) 
-0.16***           
(0.043) 
R&D expenditure (sum) -0.182*          
(0.082) 
-0.029          
(0.107) 
0.366.           
(0.194) 
Imports of htp by PTA members (sum) 0.019          
(0.042) 
0.088          
(0.057) 
-0.019           
(0.093) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members (sum) 0.032          
(0.05) 
-0.093          
(0.064) 
-0.147           
(0.126) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members (sum) 0.004          
(0.048) 
0.006          
(0.056) 
0.249.           
(0.147) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members (sum) -0.063*          
(0.025) 
-0.027          
(0.029) 
-0.086           
(0.084) 
Imports of htp by PTA members /                                   
total htp imports 
1.691        
(5.71) 
-10.97          
(6.805) 
-11.46           
(13.22) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members /                                
total mhtp imports 
-1.348          
(3.924) 
13.65*          
(5.963) 
20.78*           
(9.362) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members /                                
total mltp imports 
-10.259          
(20.634) 
-4.78          
(26.32) 
51.34           
(36.68) 
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Imports of ltp by PTA members /                                    
total ltp imports 
7.585        
(15.76) 
-12.97          
(20.93) 
-85.94**           
(32.05) 
Political Pressure   
  
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.008          
(0.03) 
0          
(0.033) 
-0.036           
(0.072) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) -0.208***          
(0.052) 
-0.101.          
(0.058) 
0.367*           
(0.165) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.253***          
(0.051) 
0.118.          
(0.065) 
-0.393**           
(0.126) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.278***          
(0.029) 
0.14***          
(0.028) 
-1.838***           
(0.332) 
Control Variables 
   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.022          
(0.016) 
-0.008          
(0.021) 
-0.018           
(0.031) 
Classic IP leaders -0.039          
(0.253) 
-0.069          
(0.275) 
-0.109           
(0.706) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.049          
(0.199) 
0.125          
(0.275) 
0.492           
(0.461) 
New IP producers and developers -0.393*          
(0.186) 
-0.714***          
(0.197) 
-0.798           
(0.531) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.44***          
(0.098) 
-0.227.          
(0.124) 
0.851**           
(0.28) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.184*          
(0.091) 
-0.004          
(0.124) 
-0.384.           
(0.208) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.107          
(0.071) 
0.054          
(0.091) 
-0.202           
(0.153) 
Intercept – 5.802*     
(2.563) 
-10.32*     
(4.31) 












Observations 529 529 529 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
The number of researchers in R&D also shows a positive effect on the index IPR 
multilateral coherence (0.117), where the R&D expenditure has a negative one (-0.182). 
This means that PTA members investing more in R&D are less likely to reference IPR 
multilateral agreements in their PTAs, whereas PTA members with more researchers 
working in R&D are more likely to include such provisions. 
The imports of mltp by PTA members show a positive effect for the zero data of the 
ZINB di model, meaning that the log odds of being an excessive zero increases by 0.249 
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for an increase in mltp imports by PTA members. Thus, the more mltp are imported by 
PTA members, the less likely the PTA will include IPR multilateral coherence provisions. 
Another, yet the minor-scale negative effect can be observed for the imports of ltp by 
PTA members (-0.063). The share of imports of mhtp by PTA members on the total mhtp 
imports shows a significantly positive effect for the count data of the ZINB di model 
(13.65) as well as the zero data (20.78). This means that with a larger share of mhtp im-
ports by PTA members, the PTAs are more likely to include no IPR multilateral coher-
ence (zero data effect), but if they do, than they are more likely to cover either a greater 
number and or to be more binding (count data effect). So, the share of imports of ltp by 
PTA members shows a significantly negative effect for the zero data of the ZINB di 
model (-85.94), meaning that these PTAs are less likely to be in the excessive zero group. 
Political pressure shows significantly positive effects on the index IPR multilateral 
coherence for most models, with the most distinct estimate in the pdg model (0.137). 
Graph 22 displays the jittered scatter lot for the subset of the US PTAs and shows that 
there is a significantly positive effect of political pressure on the index IPR multilateral 
coherence. All US PTAs besides one agreement score at least 20 or more if at least one 
PTA member is mentioned in the “Special 301 Reports” (for values per PTA see Appen-
dix 23: List of US PTAs: Stringent IPR Indexes & Political Pressure I). This means that 
if the US signs an agreement, the PTA is more likely to include references to other IPR 
multilateral agreements if the PTA members are on the US list. 
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Veto players have a significantly negative effect on the index IPR multilateral coher-
ence, which is most distinctively shown in the pdg model (-0.285). This means that the 
more veto players there are amongst PTA members, the lower the score on the index IPR 
multilateral coherence. This can entail either that fewer IPR multilateral agreements are 
mentioned with an increased number of veto players or that the commitments are less 
binding. There is no significant effect for veto players in the economic power asymmetry 
model. 
Endogeneity has a significantly positive effect on the index IPR multilateral coher-
ence. The most pronounced effects are observed for PTA depth (0.307), substantial tariff 
cuts (0.895), and the index IPR enforcement (0.29). Looking at the two-stage HNB pdwftp 
model, both the count data (1.206) and zero data (0.77) show a significantly positive ef-
fect of substantial tariff cuts. This means that if a PTA includes substantial tariff cuts, it 
is more likely to include provisions on IPR multilateral agreements (zero data effect) and 
that it increases the number and or bindingness of these provisions (count data effect). 
Overall, the endogeneity variables are significantly and positively influenced by the en-
dogeneity factors. This means that the more that PTA members are willing to agree upon 
regard depth and IPR enforcement, the more IPR multilateral coherence references are 
included in their PTAs 
Regime preference is not included for the dependent variable of index IPR multilat-
eral coherence, because regime preference is operationalised using the IPR multilateral 
coherence index (see 4.2.2.6 Data for Regime Preference), i.e. both measures are identi-
cal. 
Path dependency has some significant effects on the index IPR multilateral coher-
ence, yet different ones than on the previously analysed dependent variables. For the pdg 
and pdtp models, there are only significant effects on a minor impact level. So, for the 
pds model, there is one noteworthy effect for tangible commitments on domain names, 
which shows for the zero data of the ZINB model a distinctly positive effect (1.087). This 
suggests that PTAs repeating commitments on domain names already included in their 
previous PTAs, are more likely to be in the excessive zero group for the index IPR mul-
tilateral coherence, and are thus less likely to include any references to IPR multilateral 
agreements. 
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Table 45: Design Regression – Index IPR Multilateral Coherence (sum)  Path Dependency 
(world, force) 








Political Pressure  
   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.001     
(0.026) 
0.082***          
(0.023) 
0.064*          
(0.031) 
0.156*           
(0.069) 
Veto Players     
  
Veto players (sum) -0.056*     
(0.022) 
-0.019          
(0.025) 
-0.038          
(0.033) 
-0.025           
(0.076) 
Endogeneity     
  
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) 0.257***     
(0.057) 
0.895***          
(0.179) 
1.206***          
(0.298) 
0.77.           
(0.411) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) -0.048     
(0.079) 
0.273***          
(0.041) 
0.078.          
(0.043) 
2.027***           
(0.26) 
Path Dependency Specific     
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – copyrights 
-0.299     
(0.353) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – trademarks 
-1.226***     
(0.363) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – geographical indications 
-0.314     
(0.229) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – industrial designs 
-0.173     
(0.379) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – patents 
-0.447     
(0.358) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f  – undisclosed information  
0.844**     
(0.312) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
1.672**     
(0.544) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f  – new plant varieties 
0.644.     
(0.387) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
-0.387     
(0.35) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – encrypted program-carrying satel-
lite signals 
0.517     
(0.403) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – domain names 
-3.745***     
(0.569) 
– – – 
Index IPR specific enforcement pdw f 
(sum) 
0.129     
(0.133) 
– – – 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pdw f 
(sum) 
1.215***     
(0.058) 
– – – 
Path Dependency TRIPS-plus  
   
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – copyrights 
– 0.21          
(0.204) 
-0.232          
(0.22) 
0.655           
(0.529) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – geographical indications 
– 0.237          
(0.48) 
0.352          
(0.588) 
-1.013           
(7540) 
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Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – industrial designs 
– 0.237          
(0.246) 
0.028          
(0.256) 
18.43           
(2293) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – patents 
– 0.055          
(0.37) 
0.499          
(0.345) 
-4.365           
(12710) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – undisclosed information 
– -0.102          
(0.379) 
0.139          
(0.38) 
-4.32           
(13650) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – new plant varieties 
– -0.446          
(0.281) 
-0.153          
(0.286) 
-0.892           
(6056) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
– -0.52          
(0.357) 
-0.153          
(0.336) 
-3.444           
(6041) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
– -0.34          
(0.34) 
-0.642*          
(0.325) 
-0.53           
(6438) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – domain names 
– 0.614          
(0.846) 
0.167          
(0.868) 
-0.39           
(15460) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – enforcement 
– 0.949***          
(0.273) 
0.718**          
(0.254) 
0.77           
(3338) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – exhaustion 
– 0.395          
(0.306) 
0.315          
(0.296) 
-1.802           
(5568) 
Control Variables –   
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.043**     
(0.017) 
0.034*          
(0.014) 
0.004          
(0.02) 
0.027           
(0.036) 
Classic IP leaders -0.93***     
(0.262) 
-0.354          
(0.236) 
0.456.          
(0.257) 
-0.5           
(0.782) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.218     
(0.21) 
-0.154          
(0.198) 
0.154          
(0.29) 
-0.823           
(0.624) 
New IP producers and developers -0.081     
(0.18) 
-0.304.          
(0.165) 
-0.538**          
(0.187) 
0.474           
(0.467) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.047     
(0.064) 
-0.072          
(0.058) 
-0.05          
(0.076) 
-0.271.           
(0.148) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.061     
(0.091) 
0.194*          
(0.079) 
-0.055          
(0.107) 
0.205           
(0.195) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.097     
(0.075) 
-0.069          
(0.069) 
-0.046          
(0.09) 
0           
(0.182) 
Intercept – – 3.619**     
(1.375) 
2.523     
(2.824) 


















Observations 484 484 484 484 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
For the pdwss model, the most pronounced effects can be found for tangible commit-
ments on trademarks (-1.029), layout-designs of integrated circuits (1.738), domain 
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names (-3.532) and multilateral coherence (1.21). This means that PTAs repeating tangi-
ble commitments on trademarks and or domain names decrease the likelihood of the PTA 
containing IPR multilateral coherence references. The effect functions vice versa for path 
dependency from layout-designs of integrated circuits and IPR multilateral agreements. 
For the pdwstp model, the most distinct effects of TRIPS-plus path dependency is ob-
served for the enforcement category (1.146). This means that the PTAs including TRIPS-
plus enforcement provisions already included in another PTA, increase the likelihood of 
the PTA including IPR multilateral coherence commitments. 
Table 45 displays the regression analysis of the pdwfs and pdwftp models. The pdwfs 
model shows the same effects as the pdwss model, yet predominately on a higher impact 
level. Especially the negative path dependency effects are more pronounced after the PTA 
has entered into force. The pdwftp model also shows a significant effect of TRIPS-plus 
enforcement, however, on a slightly lower scale than in the pdwstp model. Overall, the 
path dependency effects are highly alike for the signature and the entry into force models. 
Nevertheless, the estimates of the path dependency variables range on a far lower scale 
than the epa or di variables, which relativises their explanatory power. 
Control variables show a significant effect on the score on the index IPR multilateral 
coherence. The average democratisation has a marginal positive impact (0.057), and 
whereas the average GDP (log) has s clear negative effect on the IPR multilateral coher-
ence commitments in PTAs (-0.44), the average GDP per capita (log) shows a clear pos-
itive effect (0.462). The average geographic distance (log) has a negative impact on the 
IPR multilateral coherence score (-0.155), meaning that countries that are further apart 
are less likely to include references to IPR multilateral agreements than those in closer 
proximity. 
The country groups all show significant effects as well. Classic IP leaders – US, EU, 
EFTA and Japan – show ambiguous effects. The positive effect can only be found for the 
count data of the two-stage models such as the ZINB pds model (0.477). Moreover, the 
pdwss and pdwfs models suggest a significantly negative effect (-0.791; -0.93). Similarly, 
countries with a high increase of patent protection – Brazil, China, India and Mexico – 
show only for the count data of the two-stage models such as ZIP pdtp model a positive 
effect (0.2). The only clear results is the one of new IP producers and developers – Israel, 
South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan – that show a significantly negative effect on IPR 
multilateral coherence provisions (-0.393). Only the latter one can be generalised, and the 
effects for the classic IP leaders and countries with a high increase of patent protection 
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have to be interpreted cautiously as they are only significant for the two-stage model with 
the less good fit for the data. 
The remaining path dependency regression tables can be found in Appendix 48: De-
sign Regression – Index IPR Multilateral Coherence (sum)  Path Dependency (general), 
Appendix 49: Design Regression – Index IPR Multilateral Coherence (sum)  Path De-
pendency (specific), Appendix 50: Design Regression – Index IPR Multilateral Coher-
ence (sum)  Path Dependency (TRIPS-plus), and Appendix 51: Design Regression – 
Index IPR Multilateral Coherence (sum)  Path Dependency (world, signature). 
4.3.2.6 Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) 
The models with the most distinct estimates for the index IPR TRIPS-plus are the 
economic power asymmetry model in Table 46, domestic interests model in Table 47 and 
path dependency models (pdwss, pdwstp) in Table 48. 
Economic power asymmetry has a significant effect on the index IPR TRIPS-plus, 
yet unlike for the previous dependent variables, only the following three epa measures 
show a significant effect.  
 
Table 46: Design Regression – Index TRIPS-plus (sum)  Economic Power Asymmetry 






Economic Power Asymmetry 
   
GDP asymmetry (max/sum) -12.547     
(9.258) 
-12.739     
(11.555) 
-4.369     
(24.914) 
GDPpc asymmetry (max/sum) 16.494     
(11.278) 
21.925.     
(12.927) 
11.437     
(30.869) 
GDP asymmetry * substantial tariff cuts 2.968     
(2.308) 
8.128     
(6.82) 
2.42     
(6.097) 
GDPpc asymmetry * substantial tariff cuts -4.042     
(2.558) 
-9.295     
(7.005) 
-1.617     
(8.392) 
GDP asymmetry * ln FDI 0.08     
(0.235) 
-0.178     
(0.359) 
0.26     
(0.812) 
GDPpc asymmetry * ln FDI -0.089     
(0.243) 
-0.042     
(0.401) 
-0.703     
(1.002) 
GDP asymmetry * lnofficial development 
assistance and official aid received 
0.444     
(0.399) 
0.49     
(0.308) 
-0.249     
(0.766) 
GDPpc asymmetry * lnofficial develop-
ment assistance and official aid received 
-0.609     
(0.514) 
-0.654     
(0.422) 
0.417     
(0.949) 
GDP asymmetry * (DAC aid received by 
PTA members/ DAC aid received) 
5.77     
(6.161) 
10.392.     
(5.539) 
-8.56     
(24.214) 
GDPpc asymmetry * (DAC aid received by 
PTA members/ DAC aid received) 
-12.436     
(8.33) 
-12.984*     
(6.589) 
18.174     
(42.57) 
 
   
Chapter 4: Design of Intellectual Property Rights in PTAs  231 
Political Pressure 
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.044     
(0.039) 
-0.032     
(0.028) 






Veto players (sum) 0.053     
(0.04) 
-0.002     
(0.037) 
0.082     
(0.108) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.412***     
(0.091) 
0.127*     
(0.058) 
-0.485*     
(0.234) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0.672***     
(0.086) 
0.25***     
(0.05) 
-1.956***     
(0.533) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.018***     
(0.005) 
0.005     
(0.004) 
-0.039**     
(0.013) 
Control Variables 
   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.034     
(0.035) 
-0.018     
(0.03) 
0.001     
(0.087) 
Classic IP leaders -0.246     
(0.401) 
-0.037     
(0.333) 
1.184     
(1.042) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.016     
(0.327) 
-0.509.     
(0.276) 
0.683     
(0.844) 
New IP producers and developers -0.603.     
(0.354) 
-0.313     
(0.275) 
-0.517     
(0.795) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.154     
(0.18) 
0.35*     
(0.147) 
0.149     
(0.452) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.043     
(0.202) 
-0.192     
(0.246) 
0.492     
(0.576) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.232     
(0.188) 
-0.018     
(0.148) 
-1.266*     
(0.556) 
Intercept – -6.367     
(5.148) 
5.903     
(8.74) 














Observations 392 392 392 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
First off, GDP per capita asymmetry has a significantly positive effect (21.925) on the 
number of TRIPS-plus provisions in PTAs. The other two effects can be observed for the 
interaction term of GDP asymmetry with the share of DAC aid received by PTA members 
of the total DAC aid received (10.392) and the same interaction term GDP asymmetry 
per capita (-12.984). In combination with aid, the GDP per capita asymmetry changes the 
direction of its effect and becomes negative, i.e. the PTA is less likely to include TRIPS-
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plus provisions. So, if GDP asymmetry in combination with the share of DAC aid re-
ceived by PTA members of the total DAC aid received increases, the PTA is more likely 
to include TRIPS-plus provisions. For example, if the GDP asymmetry between PTA 
members increases and or the PTA members make up for a substantial part of the DAC 
aid, then the PTA is more likely to include provisions that go beyond the TRIPS standard. 
Domestic interests also have a significant effect on the index IPR TRIPS-plus. The 
first di measure with a significant effect is the received charges for the use of IP (log), 
which show a positive effect for the count data of the ZIP di model (0.037). This means 
that with an increase of the charges received for the use of IP across PTA members, the 
PTA is also more likely to contain TRIPS-plus provisions. Another positive effect on the 
TRIPS-plus content is observed for the resident applications for trademarks (log) (0.656), 
whereas the cumulative Resident applications for patents (log) (-0.563) and the count data 
of the ZIP di model for trademarks (log) (-0.352) have a significantly negative effect on 
how many TRIPS-plus provisions are included in PTAs. 
Looking at the share of applications for trademarks by PTA members on the total 
applications for trademarks, the count data of the ZIP di model shows a significant nega-
tive effect (-0.424). This means that an increase of the share of applications by PTA mem-
bers on the total applications decreases the number of TRIPS-plus provisions in the PTA, 
which is opposite to the effect observed for IPR multilateral coherence. Moreover, the 
cumulative share of applications on the total applications has a significantly positive ef-
fect for patents (188.8) and for the zero data of the ZIP di model of trademarks (31.392). 
The latter indicates that the higher the share of PTA members on the cumulative trade-
mark applications, the more likely their PTAs are in the excess zero group. The former 
means that the higher the share of PTA members on the total patent applications, the 
substantially more likely the PTA includes TRIPS-plus provisions. 
The imports of mhtp by PTA members show for the count data of the ZIP di model a 
significantly negative effect (-0.083) where the imports of mltp by PTA members indicate 
a positive effect of the count data of the ZIP di model (0.077). Additionally, the imports 
of ltp by PTA members suggest a positive effect on the zero data of the ZIP di model 
(0.154). Thus, with higher imports of ltp by PTA members, PTAs are more likely to be 
in the excessive zero group, not including TRIPS-plus provisions. So, with an increase of 
the mhtp imports by PTA members, the PTA is less likely to include TRIPS-plus com-
mitments respectively vice versa for mltp imports by PTA members. 
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The share of imports by PTA members on the total imports has a significantly positive 
effect on one hand for the count data of the ZIP di model for mhtp (6.689) and on the 
other hand for ltp (47.1). This means that the higher the share of mhtp and or ltp imports 
by PTA members, the higher is also the likelihood of the PTA including TRIPS-plus 
commitments. 
 
Table 47: Design Regression – Index TRIPS-plus (sum)  Domestic Interests 







   
ln Charges for the use of IP, receipts (sum) 0.004     
(0.031) 
0.037.     
(0.021) 
0.047     
(0.056) 
ln Resident applications for patents (sum) -0.258     
(0.269) 
-0.178     
(0.256) 
-0.457     
(0.685) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(sum) 
0.656*     
(0.258) 
0.223*     
(0.096) 
-0.218     
(0.788) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (sum) 
-0.2     
(0.189) 
-0.279     
(0.213) 
0.033     
(0.316) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
-0.563.     
(0.308) 
-0.092     
(0.266) 
0.91     
(0.653) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(cumulative, sum) 
0.344     
(0.281) 
-0.352*     
(0.169) 
-1.031     
(0.836) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (cumulative, sum) 
-0.149     
(0.226) 
0.136     
(0.214) 
-0.139     
(0.461) 
Applications for patents by PTA members / 
total applications for patents 
0.243     
(0.402) 
0.101     
(0.141) 
0.546     
(1.826) 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks 
-0.042     
(0.362) 
-0.424**     
(0.151) 
-2.265     
(1.648) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs 
0.065     
(0.283) 
0.133     
(0.113) 
0.271     
(1.009) 
Applications for patents by PTA members / 
total applications for patents (cumulative) 
188.8*     
(92.35) 
14.397     
(40.064) 
-267.094     
(272.235) 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks (cu-
mulative) 
-4.808     
(5.98) 
3.598     
(3.006) 
31.392.     
(17.225) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs (cumulative) 
-1.711     
(5.212) 
-1.129     
(2.9) 
-4.08     
(15.831) 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) -0.021     
(0.051) 
0.004     
(0.029) 
0.075     
(0.125) 
R&D expenditure (sum) 0.073     
(0.166) 
0.129     
(0.085) 
0.286     
(0.324) 
Imports of htp by PTA members (sum) 0.008     
(0.071) 
0.025     
(0.029) 
-0.109     
(0.17) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members (sum) -0.134     
(0.092) 
-0.083*     
(0.041) 
-0.07     
(0.194) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members (sum) 0.175.     
(0.092) 
0.077*     
(0.036) 
-0.065     
(0.176) 
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Imports of ltp by PTA members (sum) 0        
(0.033) 
-0.008     
(0.011) 
0.154.     
(0.089) 
Imports of htp by PTA members /                                   
total htp imports 
1.11  
(9.483) 
-3.848     
(3.819) 
-13.857     
(20.274) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members /                                
total mhtp imports 
6.153   
(7.862) 
6.689*     
(3.34) 
-7.635     
(23.742) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members /                                
total mltp imports 
-48.81     
(39.13) 
-18.137     
(17.83) 
150.519     
(115.186) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members /                                    
total ltp imports 
47.1.  
(28.62) 
20.199     
(15.451) 
-90.992     
(71.908) 
Political Pressure   
  
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.124*     
(0.049) 
-0.042.     
(0.024) 
0.165     
(0.152) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) 0.131.     
(0.074) 
0.16***     
(0.037) 
0.426     
(0.365) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.314***     
(0.086) 
-0.003     
(0.043) 
-0.383.     
(0.196) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0.792***     
(0.081) 
0.138***     
(0.029) 
-1.313***     
(0.31) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.025***     
(0.005) 
0.011***     
(0.002) 
-0.037**     
(0.013) 
Control Variables 
   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.032     
(0.033) 
-0.026*     
(0.012) 
-0.035     
(0.073) 
Classic IP leaders 1.108**     
(0.408) 
0.019     
(0.195) 
-1.5     
(1.127) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.637.     
(0.326) 
-0.019     
(0.152) 
1.192     
(1.045) 
New IP producers and developers 0.418     
(0.302) 
0.175.     
(0.106) 
0.402     
(0.714) 
ln GDP (mean) 1.012***     
(0.193) 
0.763***     
(0.102) 
0.871     
(0.582) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.05     
(0.176) 
-0.1     
(0.084) 
-0.528     
(0.435) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.076     
(0.134) 
0.01     
(0.056) 
-0.02     
(0.293) 
Intercept – -13.338***     
(2.052) 
-3.982     
(10.377) 






Observations 529 529 529 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
Political pressure has a significantly negative effect on the index IPR TRIPS-plus, 
where the pdwfs model shows the most pronounced effect (-0.17). To analyse if the effect 
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is different for US PTAs, Graph 23 plots the regression of the index IPR TRIPS-plus on 
political pressure. Same as with the previous plots, the effect for the US subset is inverted 
and shows a positive effect. This means that if at least one of the US PTA members is on 
the US list, then the PTA includes more than 20 TRIPS-plus provisions (expect from one 
PTA). For those PTAs with more PTA members mentioned in the “Special 301 Reports”, 
the score on the index IPR TRIPS-plus is even higher (for values per PTA see Appendix 
23: List of US PTAs: Stringent IPR Indexes & Political Pressure I). 
 
Graph 23: Jittered Scatter Plot: Index IPR TRIPS-plus ~ Political Pressure (US PTAs) 
 
 
Veto players have a significantly positive effect on the index IPR TRIPS-plus, show-
ing the most distinct estimate for the pdwfs model (0.197). This means that an increase in 
the number of veto players also increases the number of TRIPS-plus provisions included 
in a PTA, which is contrary to the postulated hypothesis. However, there is not a signifi-
cant effect across all models. Namely, there is no significant effect for the regression 
models of economic power asymmetry, pdg and pds. 
Endogeneity has a significantly positive and negative effect on the index IPR TRIPS-
plus. For PTA depth, the effect is mainly significantly positive (0.412). Yet, the HP model 
for pdg shows for PTA depth a significantly negative effect for the count data (-0.098). 
This means that even though there is no negative effect on the likelihood of the PTA 
including TRIPS-plus provisions, an increase on the PTA depth scale has a negative effect 
on the number of TRIPS-plus provisions in PTAs. The same effect can be observed for 
the pdwfs model. The regression analysis also shows a significant positive effect of both 
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IPR specific enforcement (0.792). This means that the more IPR enforcement provisions 
are included in the PTA, the more likely the PTA also includes TRIPS-plus provisions. 
Endogeneity thus has a positive effect on the TRIPS-plus content of the PTA, yet it can 
also curb the number of TRIPS-plus provisions included in the PTA. 
Regime preference has a significantly positive impact on the index IPR TRIPS-plus, 
where the most distinct estimates are displayed in the di model (0.025). The two-stage 
models also show a significantly positive effect for the count data stage and negative 
effect on the zero stage of the ZIP di model (0.011; -0.039). Therefore, it can be assumed 
that with an increase of the IPR multilateral coherence content of PTAs, the amount of 
TRIPS-plus variables increases as well. 
Path dependency has s significant effect on the TRIPS-plus variables in PTAs. The 
pdg model shows the most distinct and significant effects for the PTAs repeating the 
mentioning of geographical indications (zero data of the ZINB model: -4.789), industrial 
designs (1.125) and patents (-1.368). The effect of GIs shows that the log odds of the PTA 
being an excessive zero decreases by -4.789. The positive effect of industrial designs and 
the negative effect of patents reaffirm the relations observed for the index IPR specific, 
index IPR tangible scope and index IPR specific enforcement. Thus, a PTA that repeats 
mentioning of patents in their PTAs is less likely to include specific IPR as well as TRIPS-
plus provisions. For the pds model only shows significant effects with a very low impact 
level. The pdtp model contains one distinct and significant positive effect for TRIPS-plus 
path dependency of layout-designs of integrated circuits (1.044). This means that the rep-
etition of TRIPS-plus provisions on layout-designs of integrated circuits that have been 
included in a PTA member previous PTA increases the likelihood of the PTA including 
additional TRIPS-plus commitments. Astonishingly, the other TRIPS-plus categories 
show no significant path dependency effect. 
Table 48 shows the effects on the pdwss and pdwstp models. The pdwss model shows 
only significantly positive effects of path dependency on the index IPR TRIPS-plus, 
namely for the tangible provisions on copyrights (2.581), geographical indications 
(2.755), industrial designs (1.613), layout-designs of integrated circuits (1.011), en-
crypted program-carrying satellite signals (1.605) and domain names (2.475). Interest-
ingly enough, the pdwstp model shows no distinct effects of TRIPS-plus path dependency 
on the TRIPS-plus index. The same effects are observed for the pdwfs and the pdwftp 
models, yet on a lower impact level. 
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Table 48: Design Regression – Index TRIPS-plus (sum)  Path Dependency (world, signa-
ture) 









   
 
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.168***     
(0.038) 
-0.074***     
(0.019) 
-0.052     
(0.218) 
-0.039*     
(0.017) 
Veto Players   
  
  
Veto players (sum) 0.193***     
(0.028) 
0.062***     
(0.008) 
0.133     
(0.141) 
0.026***     
(0.008) 
Endogeneity   
  
  
PTA depth -0.073     
(0.095) 
-0.098*     
(0.04) 
0.555     
(0.442) 
0.072     
(0.307) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.323**     
(0.113) 
0.061     
(0.038) 
0.312     
(0.481) 
0.044*     
(0.02) 
Regime Preference   
  
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.03     
(0.019) 
0.013*     
(0.005) 
0.025     
(0.182) 
0.007***     
(0.002) 
Path Dependency Specific   
  
 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – copyrights 
2.581***     
(0.402) 
0.65***     
(0.133) 
8.238     
(1757) 
– 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – trademarks 
-0.433     
(0.407) 
0.142     
(0.143) 
-0.483     
(1.746) 
– 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – geographical indications 
2.755***     
(0.31) 
0.417***     
(0.099) 
5.316**     
(1.778) 
– 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – industrial designs 
1.613***     
(0.419) 
0.177.     
(0.105) 
13.38     
(1533) 
– 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – patents  
-0.062     
(0.385) 
0.033     
(0.108) 
0.799     
(2008) 
– 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s  – undisclosed information  
-0.402     
(0.316) 
0.044     
(0.084) 
4.782     
(2578) 
– 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
1.011.     
(0.578) 
0.167     
(0.14) 
8.314     
(8282) 
– 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s  – new plant varieties 
-0.631     
(0.393) 
0.022     
(0.107) 
-5.446     
(6556) 
– 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
0.355     
(0.36) 
0.153     
(0.109) 
3.352     
(2333) 
– 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – encrypted program-carrying satel-
lite signals 
1.605***     
(0.425) 
0.517***     
(0.113) 
-0.816     
(2727) 
– 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – domain names 
2.475***     
(0.647) 
0.449**     
(0.161) 
-4.447     
(5115) 
– 
Index IPR specific enforcement pdw s 
(sum) 
-0.02     
(0.178) 
-0.056     
(0.049) 
-0.047     
(1.008) 
– 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pdw s 
(sum) 
-0.063     
(0.093) 
-0.029     
(0.029) 
-0.002     
(0.907) 
– 
Path Dependency TRIPS-plus     
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – copyrights 
– – – 0.204     
(0.153) 
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Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – geographical indications 
– – – 0.13     
(0.122) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – industrial designs 
– – – 22.43     
(1218) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – patents 
– – – 0.081     
(0.113) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – undisclosed information 
– – – 0.539***     
(0.134) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – layout-designs of integrated 
circuits 
– – – 0.173.     
(0.095) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – new plant varieties 
– – – -0.156.     
(0.09) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
– – – 0.472***     
(0.106) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
– – – 0.057     
(0.123) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – domain names 
– – – 0.282     
(0.254) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – enforcement 
– – – 0.106     
(0.104) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – exhaustion 
– – – 0.138     
(0.084) 
Control Variables 
   
 
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.045     
(0.032) 
-0.01     
(0.012) 
-0.124     
(0.107) 
-0.009     
(0.012) 
Classic IP leaders -0.148     
(0.354) 
-0.031     
(0.108) 
-2.638     
(2.824) 
0.208.     
(0.108) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.031     
(0.326) 
-0.036     
(0.108) 
-0.709     
(1.871) 
-0.053     
(0.118) 
New IP producers and developers -0.59.     
(0.314) 
-0.035     
(0.087) 
-0.156     
(1.427) 
-0.076     
(0.078) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.328**     
(0.116) 
0.119**     
(0.041) 
0.632     
(0.678) 
0.142**     
(0.044) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.014     
(0.159) 
-0.066     
(0.06) 
-1.145     
(1.001) 
-0.287***     
(0.06) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.259*     
(0.13) 
-0.139**     
(0.053) 
-0.17     
(0.787) 
-0.035     
(0.052) 
Intercept – -0.355     
(1.036) 

















Observations 529 529 529 529 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
Control variables have a significant effect on the Index IPR TRIPS-plus, whereby the 
majority of variables show a negative effect. For average democratisation, the effect can 
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only be found for count data of the two-stage models such as the ZIP di model (-0.026), 
yet for the average GDP per capita (log) (-0.329) and the average geographic distance 
(log) (-1.266), the effect is found in the models fit the best fit for the data. The same 
applies to the average GDP (log) (1.012), which has a significantly positive effect. For 
instance, PTA members that are further away from one another are less likely to include 
TRIPS-plus provisions in their PTAs than those in closer proximity. 
For the country groups, the effect of classic IP leaders – US, EU, EFTA and Japan – 
is significantly positive (1.108), and the effect for countries with a high increase of patent 
protection – Brazil, China, India and Mexico – (-0.716) and new IP producers and devel-
opers – Israel, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan – (-0.614) are significantly negative. 
This means that the latter two are less likely to include TRIPS-plus provisions in their 
PTAs, whereas classic IP leaders are more likely to do so. 
Those regression tables for path dependency not displayed here can be found in Ap-
pendix 52: Design Regression – Index TRIPS-plus (sum)  Path Dependency (general), 
Appendix 53: Design Regression – Index TRIPS-plus (sum)  Path Dependency (spe-
cific), Appendix 54: Design Regression – Index TRIPS-plus (sum)  Path Dependency 
(TRIPS-plus), and Appendix 55: Design Regression – Index TRIPS-plus (sum)  Path 
Dependency (world, force). 
4.3.2.7 Additive Variables for TRIPS-plus Categories 
The index IPR TRIPS-plus is based on the coding of the thirteen TRIPS-plus catego-
ries copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial design, patents, undis-
closed information, layout-designs of integrated circuits, new plant varieties, traditional 
knowledge and genetic resources, encrypted program-carrying satellite signals, domain 
names, enforcement and exhaustion (for detailed coding see Appendix 3: Codebook of 
T+PTA Dataset). In this subchapter, I will take a closer look if the TRIPS-plus regulations 
on any category drive the effects observed for the index IPR TRIPS-plus. The regression 
tables can be found in Appendix 22: Design Regression Tables of the Additive Variables 
for the TRIPS-plus Categories. 
Economic power asymmetry has only a significant effect on selected TRIPS-plus cat-
egories. GDP per capita asymmetry has a significantly positive effect on domain names 
(1.238), which is the identical effect as for tangible domain names provisions (see 4.3.2.3 
Binary Variables for IPR Scope Tangible). Even though the following effects are also 
similar, only those for domain names remain unchanged for the TRIPS-plus categories. 
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Further, the interaction term of GDP asymmetry with substantial tariff cuts has a pos-
itive effect on encrypted program-carrying satellite signals (0.2), and the same term com-
bined with GDP per capita asymmetry has a significantly negative effect on industrial 
designs (-0.371) and layout-designs of integrated circuits (-0.099). This means that PTAs 
including substantial tariff cuts and have and or an increased GDP asymmetry between 
PTA members are more likely to include TRIPS-plus provisions on encrypted program-
carrying satellite signals. Moreover, the effect is negative for TRIPS-plus provisions on 
industrial design and layout-designs of integrated circuits if the PTA includes nest to sub-
stantial tariff cuts an increased GDP per capita asymmetry amongst PTA members. 
The interaction term of GDP asymmetry with FDI (log) has a significantly positive 
effect on patents (1.798) and domain names (0.016). This means that an increase in the 
GDP asymmetry and or the FDI amongst PTA members increases the likelihood of 
TRIPS-plus provisions on patents and domain names in their PTAs. An even more pro-
nounced effect is found for the interaction term of GDP asymmetry with the share of 
DAC aid received by PTA members of the total DAC aid received, which has a signifi-
cantly positive effect on undisclosed information (73.33). This effect turns negative for 
domain names if the GDP asymmetry per capita is included instead of the GDP asym-
metry (-122.8). Accordingly, the GDP asymmetry in combination with the share of DAC 
aid received by PTA members of the total DAC aid received increases the likelihood of 
a PTA containing TRIPS-plus provisions on domain names, whereas the likelihood is 
decreased for the same interaction term with the GDP asymmetry per capita. 
Domestic interests have both significantly positive as well as negative effects on the 
TRIPS-plus categories and in the subsequent paragraphs, I only highlight the most distinct 
ones. The resident applications for trademarks (log) have a significantly positive effect 
on TRIPS-plus on trademarks (1.571) and patents (2.211). This means that the more trade-
mark applications are made by residents, the more likely the PTA includes TRIPS-plus 
provisions on trademarks as well as patents. The cumulative resident applications for pa-
tents (log) have a significantly negative effect on the TRIPS-plus provision on copyrights 
(-1.352) and for the zero data of the HP di model for geographical indications (-1.438). 
Thus, with an increase of the cumulative patent applications by residents, the likelihood 
of a PTA containing TRIPS-plus commitments on copyrights decreases and the PTAs are 
less likely to be in the excessive zero group for TRIPS-plus provisions for GIs. 
The cumulative resident applications for trademarks (log) shows a significantly posi-
tive effect for tangible TRIPS-plus provisions for the count data of the HP di model for 
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geographical indications (1.226), the zero data of the HP di model for geographical indi-
cations (1.275) and undisclosed information (1.623). This means that an increase of trade-
mark applications by residents increases the likelihood of TRIPS-plus provisions on GI 
and undisclosed information. The cumulative resident applications for industrial design 
(log) have a significant effect on copyrights (1.241), patents (-1.173) and undisclosed 
information (-1.091). This means that the likelihood of the PTA including TRIPS-plus 
provisions on copyrights increases, the higher the applications for industrial designs by 
residents. This effect is inverted for patents and undisclosed information. 
Besides the effects of resident applications, the applications by PTA members also 
show a highly significant effect. Firstly, the share of applications for patents by PTA 
members on the total applications for patents shows a significantly negative effect for 
TRIPS-plus provisions on trademarks (-2.16) and a positive one for enforcement (1.938). 
This means that the more of the overall patent applications are made by PTA members, 
the more likely the PTA include TRIPS-plus provisions on enforcement and the less likely 
ones on trademarks. Looking at its cumulative effect, the share of patent applications has 
a significantly positive effect for TRIPS-plus provisions on domain names (11.13). Sec-
ondly, the share of applications for trademarks by PTA members on the total applications 
for trademarks has a significantly negative effect on TRIPS-plus provisions on copyrights 
(-1.486) and a positive one for geographical indications (1.562) and its zero data of the 
HP di model (2.616). For the cumulative share, the effect turns significantly negative for 
GIs (-21.73) and for its zero data of the HP di model (-40.148). Thirdly, the share of 
applications for industrial designs by PTA members on the total applications for industrial 
designs has a significantly negative effect for TRIPS-plus provisions on copyrights (-
2.478) and a positive one on patents (1.344), whereas the cumulative share show inverted 
effect for copyrights (32.93) as well as patents (-26.531). 
There is also a significant positive effect of R&D expenditure on TRIPS-plus provi-
sions on copyrights (0.856), trademarks (0.944) and undisclosed information (0.887). 
This means that PTAs signed amongst countries with a higher investment in R&D are 
more likely to include TRIPS-plus commitments on copyrights, trademarks and undis-
closed information.  
Furthermore, the share of imports of htp by PTA members on the total htp imports 
has a significant effect for TRIPS-plus provisions on trademarks (-73.96) and geograph-
ical indications (19.57), which is even more pronounced for the zero data of the HP di 
model for TRIPS-plus provisions on geographical indications (43.201). This means that 
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the more high-technology products are imported by PTA members, the more likely the 
PTA contains TRIPS-plus commitments on trademarks and GIs. For the share of imports 
of mhtp by PTA members on the total mhtp imports there is only a significantly negative 
effect observed for the zero data of the HP di model for TRIPS-plus provisions on geo-
graphical indications (-34.782), suggesting the effect of htp imports is inverted for mhtp 
imports for TRIPS-plus provisions on GIs. 
The share of imports of mltp by PTA members on the total mltp imports is signifi-
cantly positive for TRIPS-plus provisions on trademarks (234.3), layout-designs of inte-
grated circuits (1.961), encrypted program-carrying satellite signals (5.747) and domain 
names (4.274), as well as significant negative for TRIPS-plus enforcement (-106.9). This 
means that with an increase of the share of imports of medium-low-technology products, 
a PTA is more likely to include fewer TRIPS-plus provisions on enforcement and sub-
stantially more on trademarks, layout-designs of integrated circuits, encrypted program-
carrying satellite signals and domain names. Finally, the share of imports of ltp by PTA 
members on the total ltp imports has a significantly negative effect for TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on undisclosed information (-58.04) and a significantly positive effect on TRIPS-
plus enforcement (94.45). Thus, with a higher share of ltp imports by PTA members, a 
PTA is more likely to include TRIPS-plus provisions on enforcement and less likely ones 
on undisclosed information. 
Political pressure has both significantly positive as well as negative effects on the 
additive IPR TRIPS-plus indexes. The most distinct significantly positive effects for 
TRIPS-plus additive indexes are on copyrights (0.015), trademarks (0.204), TK & GR 
(1.882) and encrypted program-carrying satellite signals (0.008), where the most pro-
nounced significantly negative effects for TRIPS-plus additive indexes are observed for 
geographical indications (-0.174), industrial design (-0.019), patents (-0.381), undis-
closed information (-0.011), layout designs of integrated circuits (-0.002), new plant va-
rieties (-0.019) and enforcement (-0.358). However, for some of these categories, the sig-
nificant effect varies across models and shows s significantly positive effect for one 
model whilst a significantly negative effect for the next model. 
Graph 24 on the following page displays the plots for each of the additive TRIPS-
plus indexes regressed on political pressure for the subset of US PTAs. 
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Graph 24: Jittered Scatter Plot: Additive Variables for TRIPS-plus Categories ~ Political 
Pressure (US PTAs) 
 
 
Unlike for the index IPR scope tangible, here, new plant varieties can be displayed. 
Even though the US PTAs do not include any specific provisions on new plant varieties, 
they do go beyond the TRIPS regulation by including specific conditions on the UPOV 
convention. However, there is no plot for traditional knowledge and genetic resources 
provisions, as the US PTAs do not include any TRIPS-plus provisions on this topic. For 
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meaning that with an increase of the number of PTA members mentioned in the “Special 
301 Reports”, the probability of them including TRIPS-plus provisions on the corre-
sponding category increases. The effect is less pronounced for geographical indications 
as only two of the US PTAs include TRIPS-plus provisions on said category (for the 
distinct values per PTA see Appendix 26: List of US PTAs: Stringent IPR Indexes & Po-
litical Pressure IV, Appendix 27: List of US PTAs: Stringent IPR Indexes & Political 
Pressure V and Appendix 28: List of US PTAs: Stringent IPR Indexes & Political Pres-
sure VI). 
However, there are also some categories that show a negative relation, namely indus-
trial designs, layout-designs of integrated circuits and exhaustion. This effect might be 
explained if one looks at the positive scores on these categories, which are very rare, This 
might indicate that these categories are not a priority for the US and, therefore, not a 
category on which the US would focus its political pressure. 
Veto players have significantly positive as well as negative effects on the different 
TRIPS-plus categories. The effects are significantly positive for enforcement (0.264) re-
spectively negative for trademarks (-0.102), encrypted program-carrying satellite signals 
(-0.012) and domain names (-0.009). for half of the analysed categories, the effect is am-
biguous: copyrights (0.553; -0.014), geographical indications (0.144; -0.195), industrial 
design (0.006; -0.019), undisclosed information (0.008; -0.017), new plant varieties 
(0.006; -0.01), traditional knowledge and genetic resources (0.444; -3.869), and domain 
names (0.007; -0.009). For example, for geographical indications the effect is signifi-
cantly and distinctly negative for the zero stage of HP model (-0.532), which means that 
with every additional veto player the likelihood of the PTA including TRIPS-plus provi-
sions on geographical indications decreases. For patents, layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits and exhaustion, the regression tables show no significant effects of veto players. 
Endogeneity has both significantly positive and or negative effects for the TRIPS-
plus variables. PTA depth shows the most distinct significantly positive estimates for tra-
ditional knowledge and genetic resources (4.731) and significantly negative for new plant 
varieties (-0.025) and domain names (-0.017). For substantial tariff cuts, the effects can 
also be significantly positive, most pronounced for geographical indications (1.706), and 
negative, most distinctly for patents (-3.748). This means that the endogeneity effect of 
the PTA depth and substantial tariff cuts are linked to the specific IPR form. Whilst deeper 
PTAs have a positive effect on the TRIPS-plus content on TK & GR and other IPR forms, 
the effect is marginally negative for TRIPS-plus provisions on new plant varieties and 
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domain names. So, substantial tariff cuts do not automatically lead to more TRIPS-plus 
provisions. PTAs including substantial tariff cuts are more likely to include TRIPS-plus 
provisions on geographical indications yet less likely patents. The endogeneity measures 
for enforcement show consistently positive effects, where the most distinct effect for the 
index IPR enforcement as well as for the index IPR specific enforcement is found for 
trademarks (0.803; 1.301). Thus, the more IPR enforcement provsions are include in the 
PTA, the more TRIPS-plus provisions can be expected for the different IPR forms. 
Regime preference has a significantly positive and or negative effect on the TRIPS-
plus categories. The most distinct positive effects are observed for the categories of trade-
marks (0.022), geographical indications (0.067), new plant varieties (0.004), traditional 
knowledge and genetic resources (0.118) and enforcement (0.051), and the most distinct 
negative effects for industrial design (-0.004), patents (-0.122), undisclosed information 
(-0.012) and encrypted program-carrying satellite signals (-0.001). For the category of 
copyrights, the effect of regime preference is both significantly positive as well as nega-
tive (0.002; -0.005). However, these effects take place on a very low level, and there are 
no significant effects of regime preference for the categories layout-designs of integrated 
circuits, domain names and exhaustion. 
Path dependency has multiple significant effects on the TRIPS-plus categories and in 
the subsequent paragraphs, I focus on the significant effects, which are most distinct for 
each of the seven path dependency models. 
For the pdg model, the regression analysis shows a path dependency effect from men-
tioned copyright provisions on TRIPS-plus provisions about patents (2.192), from trade-
marks on TRIPS-plus provisions regarding TK & GR (-9.779), from GIs on TRIPS-plus 
provisions about TK & GR (2.865) and from domain names on TRIPS-plus provisions 
regarding TK & GR (-1.18). For instance, this means that PTAs, where its members re-
peat previously mentioned provisions on trademarks and or domain names, are less likely 
to include TRIPS-plus provisions on TK & GR, whereas the effect is positive for path 
dependency from geographical indications. Thus, the general path dependency also af-
fects the design of TRIPS-plus provisions in PTAs. 
The pds model shows significant effects of path dependency from trademarks on 
TRIPS-plus provisions about patents (-1.278) and undisclosed information (-0.915), path 
dependency from industrial designs on TRIPS-plus provisions regarding patents (1.549), 
and path dependency from encrypted program-carrying satellite signals on TRIPS-plus 
provisions about enforcement (0.967). This means that, for example, the specific path 
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dependency from trademarks has a negative effect on patent and undisclosed TRIPS-plus 
provisions. Moreover, PTAs, where the PTA members repeat their previous specific pro-
visions on encrypted program-carrying satellite signals, are more likely to include TRIPS-
plus provisions on enforcement. 
For the pdtp model, there are more distinct effects to be observed. This is to be ex-
pected, as the effects on the TRIPS-plus variables should be most pronounced for the path 
dependency out of PTA members own TRIPS-plus provisions in PTAs analysed by the 
variables in the pdtp model. It shows that there is a significant negative path dependency 
effect from copyrights on TRIPS-plus provisions about trademarks (-0.507; zero data of 
the HP pdtp model: -0.972), patents (-1.218), undisclosed information (-0.916), and TK 
& GR (-2.984). This means that PTAs, where PTA members repeat TRIPS-plus provi-
sions on copyrights from their previous PTA, are less likely to include TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on trademarks, patents, undisclosed information and traditional knowledge. 
Further, the model displays a positive path dependency effect from patents on TRIPS-
plus provisions regarding undisclosed information (1.21), and TK & GR (3.527) as well 
as from undisclosed information on TRIPS-plus provisions about TK & GR (1.128). This 
means that that if PTA members repeat patent resp. undisclosed information TRIPS-plus 
provisions from their previous PTAs, their PTAs are more likely to also include TRIPS-
plus provisions on undisclosed information and or TK & GR. Moreover, the path depend-
ency from layout-design of integrated circuits has a significantly positive effect on 
TRIPS-plus provisions regarding trademarks (3.228), patents (1.869), undisclosed infor-
mation (2.136), and enforcement (1.928). This suggests that PTA members, which repeat 
TRIPS-plus commitments on layout-design of integrated circuits from their previous 
PTAs, are more likely to include TRIPS-plus provisions on trademarks, patents, undis-
closed information and enforcement in their PTAs.  
The model also shows that the path dependency from encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals has a significantly negative effect on TRIPS-plus provisions about trade-
marks (-2.088), undisclosed information (-1.064), TK & GR (-4.918), and enforcement 
(-0.922), whereas the path dependency from domain names has a significantly positive 
effect on TRIPS-plus provisions regarding trademarks (2.012), patents (1.376), and en-
forcement (0.92). This means that whilst PTAs, where PTA members repeat their TRIPS-
plus commitments on encrypted program-carrying satellite signals, are less likely to in-
clude TRIPS-plus provisions on the indicated categories, the repetition of commitments 
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on domain names has a positive effect on TRIPS-plus provisions regarding trademarks, 
patent and enforcement. 
The pdwss model displays the most distinct and significant path dependency effect on 
the TRIPS-plus categories. All of the specific path dependency variables have a signifi-
cant effect, whereas only the ones for IPR multilateral coherence are not distinct enough 
to be highlighted. In the subsequent paragraph, I describe the effects in order of the ex-
planatory variables. 
Path dependency from specific copyright provisions has a significant effect on 
TRIPS-plus provisions about geographical indications (1.33), patents (2.212), TK & GR 
(-2.869), and enforcement (1.942). This means that PTAs repeating specific provisions 
on copyrights, which were already included in another signed PTA, are more likely to 
include TRIPS-plus provisions on GIs, patents and or enforcement, yet less likely TK & 
GR TRIPS-plus commitments. 
Path dependency from trademarks has a significantly negative effect on TRIPS-plus 
provisions regarding geographical indications (-1.689), and enforcement (-1.013), where 
the path dependency from geographical indications has a significantly positive effect on 
TRIPS-plus provisions about geographical indications (4.11), patents (1.715), and en-
forcement (1.102). This means that PTAs repeating specific provisions on trademarks are 
more likely to lead to a decrease of TRIPS-plus provisions and vice versa for specific GI 
provisions.  
Also, a consistently positive effect on TRIPS-plus commitments can be observed for 
path dependency from industrial designs on TRIPS-plus provisions regarding geograph-
ical indications (1.846), TK & GR (6.561), and enforcement (1.061). This means that 
PTAs repeating specific industrial design commitments are more likely to include TRIPS-
plus provisions on GIs, TK & GR and enforcement. A substantial negative effect on TK 
& GR TRIPS-plus provisions can be observed for the path dependency from patents (-
5.748). This suggests that PTAs, which repeat specific patent provisions are less likely to 
include TRIPS-plus provisions on TK & GR. Another positive effect on TK & GR 
TRIPS-plus provisions is visible for path dependency from undisclosed information 
(5.045). 
Path dependency from layout-design of integrated circuits has a significant effect on 
TRIPS-plus provisions about trademarks (1.334), patents (1.831), TK & GR (10.225), 
Chapter 4: Design of Intellectual Property Rights in PTAs  248 
and enforcement (-1.433). PTAs that repeat specific provisions on layout-design of inte-
grated circuits are thus more likely to include TRIPS-plus provisions on trademarks, pa-
tent and TK & GR, as well as less likely TRIPS-plus enforcement commitments. 
Path dependency from new plant varieties shows a significantly negative effect on 
TRIPS-plus provisions regarding geographical indications (-1.835), where the path de-
pendency from TK & GR significantly affect TRIPS-plus provisions about geographical 
indications (-1.144), patents (-1.652), and TK & GR (6.397). The former shows that re-
peated specific provisions on new plant varieties are less likely included in the same PTA 
as GI TRIPS-plus provisions, whilst the latter states the same effect for specific TK & 
GR provisions and GI as well as patent TRIPS-plus commitments. Unsurprisingly, the 
effect of PTAs repeating specific TK & GR provisions is positive for TRIPS-plus provi-
sions on TK & GR. Path dependency from encrypted program-carrying satellite signals 
shows a significantly positive effect on TRIPS-plus provisions regarding patents (1.351), 
encrypted program-carrying satellite signals (0.95), and enforcement (2.12). This means 
that PTAs, which repeat specific provisions on encrypted program-carrying satellite sig-
nals, are more likely to include TRIPS-plus commitments on patents, encrypted program-
carrying satellite signals and enforcement. 
There are positive and negative effects of path dependency from domain names, 
namely on TRIPS-plus provisions about copyrights (0.988), geographical indications (-
1.645), patents (3.423), domain names (1), and enforcement (1.132). Thus, PTAs repeat-
ing specific domain name provisions are more likely to include TRIPS-plus provisions 
on copyrights, patents, domain names and enforcement, and less likely GI TRIPS-plus 
commitments. 
Lastly, path dependency from enforcement has a significantly negative effect on 
TRIPS-plus provisions regarding TK & GR (-1.548). This means that PTAs repeating 
specific enforcement provisions are less likely to include TRIPS-plus commitments on 
traditional knowledge and genetic resources. 
For the pdwstp model, there are fewer distinct effects. This is in so far astonishing, as 
the pdwstp model shows the analysis of path dependency from TRIPS-plus provisions in 
worldwide PTAs, i.e. beyond the scope of PTA members. However, the regression anal-
ysis shows much more significant effects for the pdwss model than the pdwstp model. 
The pronounced effects for the pdwstp model are limited to TRIPS-plus path dependency 
from copyright, patents, new plant varieties, encrypted program-carrying satellite signals, 
domain names and enforcement. The only negative effect can be observed for the path 
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dependency from copyrights on TRIPS-plus provisions about trademarks (-1.795). This 
means that if PTAs repeat TRIPS-plus provisions on copyrights that were already in-
cluded in another PTA, the PTA is less likely to include TRIPS-plus provisions on trade-
marks. The other path dependency effects are all positive: from patents on TRIPS-plus 
provisions regarding copyrights (1.138), from new plant varieties on TRIPS-plus provi-
sions about industrial designs (1), from encrypted program-carrying satellite signals on 
TRIPS-plus provisions regarding undisclosed information (1.633), from domain names 
on layout-design on TRIPS-plus provisions about integrated circuits (1), and from en-
forcement on TRIPS-plus provisions regarding new plant varieties (1.118). This means 
that if the PTA repeats one of these TRIPS-plus provisions, which has previously been 
contained in another PTA, the PTA is more likely to contain TRIPS-plus provisions on 
the indicated categories. 
For the pdwfs model, there are fewer effects to be observed than for the pdwss model, 
indicating that the signed PTAs have a stronger path dependency effect on the TRIPS-
plus categories than the PTAs, which have entered into force. The effects of the pdwfs 
model are slightly more pronounced, yet show other no new relations. However, the effect 
on TK & GR TRIPS-plus provisions is far less pronounced for the path dependency from 
PTAs that have entered into force. 
The pdwftp model shows highly similar effects as the pdwstp model: a positive effect 
of path dependency from patents on TRIPS-plus provisions about copyrights (1.119), 
from new plant varieties on TRIPS-plus provisions about industrial designs (1), from en-
crypted program-carrying satellite signals on TRIPS-plus provisions regarding undis-
closed information (1.615), from domain names on TRIPS-plus provisions about layout-
designs of integrated circuits (1), and from enforcement on TRIPS-plus provisions re-
garding new plant varieties (1.112). However, the negative effect of TRIPS-plus path 
dependency from copyrights on trademarks is not significant for the pdwftp model, 
whereas there is a distinct negative effect of the path dependency from undisclosed infor-
mation on TRIPS-plus provisions regarding geographical indications (-1.281). This 
means that for those PTAs, which repeat TRIPS-plus provisions of PTAs that have al-
ready entered into force, are less likely to include TRIPS-plus commitments on geograph-
ical indications. 
Conclusively, the learning from other PTAs specific IPR and TRIPS-plus commit-
ments often increases the TRIPS-plus content of PTAs. Put another way, PTAs repeating 
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specific IPR and TRIPS-plus provisions are prone to cover additional TRIPS-plus cate-
gories as well. 
Control variables all show a significant effect on the various forms of TRIPS-plus 
categories, and I highlight the most pronounced and significant impacts per control vari-
able.  
For the average democratisation, the most distinct positive and negative effect can be 
observed for the TRIPS-plus provisions on geographical indications (0.136), which is 
even higher for the zero stage of the HP di model (0.29), and traditional knowledge and 
genetic resources (-0.992). This means, for instance, that the more democratic PTA mem-
bers are on average, the less TRIPS-plus provisions on TK & GR such as benefits sharing 
are included in their PTAs. The country groups show the highest estimates amongst the 
control variables. Classic IP leaders – US, EU, EFTA and Japan – have a positive effect 
on TRIPS-plus commitments on undisclosed information (1.579) and a negative one on 
trademarks (-1.811). Countries with a high increase of patent protection – Brazil, China, 
India and Mexico – are more likely to include TRIPS-plus provisions on traditional 
knowledge and genetic resources (3.308) and less likely copyrights (-2.197) in their 
PTAs. So, new IP producers and developers – Israel, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan 
– prefer TRIPS-plus provisions on patents (1.159) over commitments on TK &GR (-
4.562). Thus, whilst the latter are less highly unlikely to include TK & GR in their PTAs, 
countries with a high increase of patent protection are much more prone to it. 
The average GDP (log) shows a positive effect on TRIPS-plus provisions on trade-
marks (1.533) and a negative one for TK & GR (-1.992), where the average GDP per 
capita (log) has a positive effect on TRIPS-plus provisions on geographical indications 
(1.123) and also a negative effect TK & GR (-2.251). This means that with an increased 
wealth across PTA partners, the PTAs are less likely to include TRIPS-plus provisions 
on TK & GR. Additionally, the average geographic distance (log) has a positive effect on 
TRIPS-plus commitments on TK & GR (1.018) and a negative one on copyrights (-0.76). 
This implies that countries, which are further apart, are more likely to include TRIPS-
plus provisions in their PTAs than those geographically closer to one another. 
4.3.3 IPR DSM Design Analysis 
The postulated explanatory factor for the IPR dispute settlement mechanism is veto 
players (H4.4; see Table 23: Overview of IPR Design Features, Explanatory Factors and 
Hypotheses). The regression Table 49 shows that veto players indeed have a significantly 
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negative effect on the IPR DSM in PTAs, i.e. that with every additional veto player a 
PTA is less likely to include a DSM provision on IPRs. However, the estimate is only 
significant for the OLS regression and indicates a minor impact on the index IPR DSM 
(-0.011). 
 
Table 49: Design Regression – Index IPR DSM (dummy) 







   
Veto players (sum) -0.011**     
(0.004) 
-0.833     
(272.222) 
-0.016     
(0.019) 
Control Variables 
   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.008**     
(0.003) 
1.308     
(234.725) 
0.075**     
(0.024) 
Classic IP leaders -0.001     
(0.051) 
2.258     
(570.251) 
-0.37     
(0.268) 
Countries with a high increase of patent  
protection 
-0.118**     
(0.038) 
-0.402     
(779.872) 
-0.459*     
(0.215) 
New IP producers and developers 0.193***     
(0.041) 
0.119     
(633.456) 
0.686***     
(0.197) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.048***     
(0.013) 
0.345     
(190.208) 
0.301***     
(0.083) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.011     
(0.017) 
0.315     
(419.246) 
0.021     
(0.118) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.089***     
(0.016) 
-2.494     
(276.202) 
0.435***     
(0.1) 
Intercept -1.847***     
(0.237) 
-16.721     
(3628.519) 
-12.785***     
(1.649) 






Observations 573 573 573 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
Both the OLS as well as the hurdle model show that the control variables have highly 
significant effects on the DSM provisions, which is positively affected by democratisa-
tion, new IP producers and developer, the average GDP (log) and the geographical dis-
tance (log). Whereas the lowest impact in the OLS model is observed for changes in the 
democratisation measure (0.008), new IP producers and developer show the highest im-
pact on the inclusion of a DSM in a PTA. Thus, if Israel, South Korea, Singapore or 
Taiwan are part of the agreement, then the score for IPR DSM increases by 0.193. The 
opposite effect is observed for countries with a high increase in patent protection, which 
Chapter 4: Design of Intellectual Property Rights in PTAs  252 
negatively affect the IPR DSM provisions. This means that if either one of the countries 
of this group – Brazil, China, India, Mexico – is part of the PTA, the score of the IPR 
DSM variables decreases by -0.118. 
The zero data of the hurdle model shows the odds of those PTAs including IPR DSM 
versus those that do not include any IPR specific DSM. As the dependent variable is 
binary, there is no variation in the design, and the hurdle model shows correspondingly 
no significant effects for the count data. The zero data shows significant relations for the 
same variables as the OLS model except for veto players, for which the effect is not sig-
nificant in the hurdle model.  
Even though the absolute coefficients are small, the impact of the control variables 
and especially the country groups are substantial, seeing as the dependent variable is bi-
nary. The control variables can play an important part in accounting for IPR specific dis-
pute settlement mechanisms in the PTAs. Veto players, on the other hand, have a com-
paratively minor negative effect on the IPR DSM provisions in PTAs. 
4.3.4 IPR Enforcement Design Analysis 
The IPR enforcement design analysis covers three measures as dependent variables: 
the index IPR general enforcement, the index IPR specific enforcement and the index IPR 
enforcement. All of them are run in separate models and same as for IPR DSM, the pos-
tulated explanatory factor are veto players (H4.5; see Table 23: Overview of IPR Design 
Features, Explanatory Factors and Hypotheses). 
The regression analysis for both the index IPR general enforcement as well as the 
index IPR specific enforcement show no significant effects for veto players. Instead, the 
control variables have a significant effect for both the general as well as the specific en-
forcement measure. Both regression tables can be found in the appendix (Appendix 23 
Design Regression Table 1: Index IPR General Enforcement (sum), Appendix 23 Design 
Regression Table 2: Index IPR Specific Enforcement (sum)). 
For the general enforcement index, the effect is significantly positive for democrati-
sation, the average GDP (log), and the geographical distance (log). Hence, PTAs amongst 
countries that score higher on the Polity 2 index and are considered to be more democratic 
also include more general enforcement provisions. The expected effect on log(index IPR 
general enforcement) by a one-unit increase in the average GDP amongst PTA members 
is 0.152 holding all other variables constant, respectively 0.366 for geographical distance. 
Interestingly, the effect of the geographical distance is also positive for the zero data of 
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the two-stage model, showing that the log odds of being an excessive zero increase by 
1.113 for every increase in the geographical distance (log). This means that the geograph-
ical distance, on the one hand, increases the odds of PTAs not including any general IPR 
enforcement provisions. On the other hand, a greater distance amongst PTA members 
that are not in the excess zero group increases the number of general IPR enforcement 
provisions. 
The effect of the control variables is significantly negative for countries with a high 
increase of patent protection. The expected change in log(index IPR general enforcement) 
for a one-unit increase of countries with a high increase of patent protection is 0.361 
holding all other variables constant. Thus, a PTA includes a little less general IPR en-
forcement provisions if Brazil, China, India or Mexico are part of the agreement. 
For the specific enforcement index, the effect is significantly positive for the classic 
IP leaders, the average GDP (log), GDP per capita (log) and the geographical distance 
(log). The last two are only significant for the ordered probit model and the first stage of 
the two-stage model. This implies that GDP per capita and the geographical distance 
mainly impact the decision if specific IPR measures are included in the PTA, yet have no 
significant effect on how many specific enforcement provisions are included (not signif-
icant for count data). The classic IP leaders, on the other hand, have a significant effect 
only for the count data stage of the two-stage model and impact how many specific en-
forcement provisions are included. GDP shows a significant effect for the ordered probit 
and both stages of the two-stage model, and thus positively effects the decision to include 
specific enforcement provisions as well as how many provisions. 
Although veto players show no significant effect for the general nor the specific en-
forcement index, they have a significantly negative effect for the combined index of gen-
eral and specific enforcement. The OP model in Table 50 shows that every additional 
veto player decreases the odds ratio of overall IPR enforcement by -0.023 (p<0.05). The 
effect of veto players on enforcement provision is significantly negative, yet as the esti-
mate is very small it is not the best predictor for IPR enforcement provisions in PTAs.  
All of the control variables show a higher effect, both on the significance-level as for 
the size of the estimates. Democratisation, classic IP leaders, new IP producers and de-
velopers, the average GDP (log), the average GDP per capita and the average geograph-
ical distance all positively affect the index IPR enforcement. The only negative impact is 
observed for countries with a high increase in patent protection. This effect is also ob-
served for the index IPR general enforcement, yet is more pronounced when taking into 
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consideration all of the IPR enforcement provisions by regressing the index IPR enforce-
ment (-0.502). 
 
Table 50: Design Regression – Index IPR Enforcement (sum) 







   
Veto players (sum) -0.023.     
(0.013) 
0.005     
(0.011) 
-0.016     
(0.017) 
Control Variables 
   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.071***     
(0.013) 
0.028     
(0.02) 
0.09***     
(0.015) 
Classic IP leaders 0.217     
(0.177) 
0.404*     
(0.18) 
-0.176     
(0.226) 
Countries with a high increase of patent  
protection 
-0.502**     
(0.158) 
0.221     
(0.199) 
-0.553**     
(0.183) 
New IP producers and developers 0.375*     
(0.146) 
0.148     
(0.161) 
0.44*     
(0.186) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.224***     
(0.049) 
0.195***     
(0.056) 
0.136*     
(0.057) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.214**     
(0.07) 
0.086     
(0.088) 
0.296***     
(0.081) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.053        
(0.06) 
0.37***     
(0.082) 
-0.096     
(0.068) 
Intercept – -8.224***     
(1.2) 
-5.758***     
(1.089) 
log(theta) – 0.862***     
(0.255) 
– 






Observations 573 573 573 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
The analysis shows that the veto players have a significantly negative effect on IPR 
enforcement. However, the effect has very little impact due to its low estimates. The con-
trol variables can explain more of the variance of enforcement variables in a significant 
manner than the veto players measure. 
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4.3.5 Summary of Design Analysis 
The design analysis has shown that all of the independent variables play a significant 
role in explaining the IPR design features. The most distinct and significant effects on the 
general IPR features have the domestic interest variables, whereas for the stringent IPR 
measures the highest impact additionally to the domestic interests is observed for the 
economic power asymmetry variables. The analyses for the IPR dispute-settlement mech-
anism and IPR enforcement show that veto players have a significant effect, yet that the 
control variables explain a larger share of the IPR DSM respectively IPR enforcement 
design feature. Table 51 lists the postulated hypotheses and shows the relation found in 
the regression analysis. 
 
Table 51: Conclusion Overview for the Design Hypotheses 
Theoretical  
Argument 







H1.1 The higher the economic power asym-
metry between PTA members, the more 





 H1.2 The higher the economic power asym-
metry between PTA members and the ex-
istence of substantial tariff commitments 
in the PTA, the more stringent IPR provi-




 H1.3 The higher the economic power asym-
metry and the financial commitments be-
tween PTA members, the more stringent 






H2 If one of the PTA members are listed in 
the Special 301 report, the more stringent 






set of US PTAs) 
Domestic  
Interests 
H3.1 The stronger the domestic IPR exporting 
interests are among PTA members, the 








 H3.2 The stronger the domestic IPR interests 
are among PTA members, the more likely 
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Theoretical  
Argument 






H4.1 The more veto players there are among 
the PTA members, the more general IPR 




 H4.2 The more veto players there are among 
the PTA members, the fewer stringent 
IPR provisions are included in the PTA. 
Negative on 
stringent IPR 
Positive/ negative  
 H4.3 The fewer veto players there are among 
the PTA members, the clearer the trend 
towards a maximum or minimum stand-








 H4.4 The more veto players there are among 
the PTA members, the fewer specific IPR 




 H4.5 The more veto players there are among 
the PTA members, the fewer IPR enforce-







H5.1 The deeper the overall PTA, the more 





 H5.2 The deeper the market access provisions 
are in the PTA, the more stringent IPR 




 H5.3 The more IPR enforcement provisions are 
in the PTA, the more stringent IPR provi-




 H5.4 The more specific IPR enforcement pro-
visions are in the PTA, the more stringent 






H6.1 The lower the commitment to IPR multi-
lateral coherence in PTAs, the fewer IPR 
provisions are included in PTAs. 
Positive General IPR:  
positive  
Stringent IPR:  
positive 
 H6.2 The higher the commitment to IPR multi-
lateral coherence in PTAs, the fewer 





 H6.3 The higher the commitment to IPR multi-
lateral coherence in PTAs, the more strin-




 H6.4 The lower the commitment to IPR multi-
lateral coherence in PTAs, the more strin-
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Theoretical  
Argument 






H7.1 If the IPR provisions have been included 
in a previous PTA of at least one PTA 
member, the more likely these provisions 
are to be repeated in follow-up PTAs. 
Positive General IPR:  
positive/ negative 
Stringent IPR:  
positive/ negative 
 H7.2 If general IPR provisions have been in-
cluded in a previous PTA of at least one 
PTA member, the more likely these gen-





 H7.3 If specific IPR provisions have been in-
cluded in a previous PTA, the more likely 
these specific provisions are to be re-






Economic power asymmetry shows a high effect on the various stringent IPR 
measures except for the index IPR tangible scope, i.e. the number of IPR forms covered 
by specific provisions. For H1.1 – concerning the first two epa variables – the effects are 
inverted for the GDP asymmetry and the GDP per capita asymmetry. GDP asymmetry 
has a significantly positive effect on specific IPR provisions and a negative one on IPR 
multilateral coherence. This means that PTAs indeed include more specific IPR provi-
sions with an increase in the economic power asymmetry, yet the effect is inverted for 
commitments on IPR multilateral agreements. Moreover, the GDP per capita asymmetry 
has a significantly positive effect on all indexes except the index IPR specific, where it 
has a negative effect, and the index IPR tangible scope, which is not significantly affected 
by the epa variables. H1.1 can thus be cautiously accepted, as it has mostly positive ef-
fects on stringent IPRs. 
The analysis of the variables for H1.2 shows mostly significantly positive effects for 
GDP asymmetry and only significantly negative effects for GDP per capita asymmetry. 
The interaction term of GDP asymmetry and substantial tariff cuts only has a negative 
effects on the number of specific IPR commitments in PTAs. The effect is only signifi-
cantly positive for specific provisions on domain names. This is in so far astonishing, as 
the trade-off effect of substantial tariff cuts in a combination of pressure by an economi-
cally more powerful state is often used as a theoretical argument why PTAs include spe-
cific IPR or even TRIPS-plus provisions. Yet the regression analysis shows that the effect 
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is inverted. However, the positive effect of the combination of GDP asymmetry and sub-
stantial tariff cuts proves true for specific IPR enforcement provisions and IPR multilat-
eral agreements. H1.2 can thus be accepted for the interaction term including GDP asym-
metry leaving aside the inverted effect on the index IPR specific, and H1.2 is overturned 
for the GDP per capita asymmetry. 
H1.3 also shows that GDP asymmetry and GDP per capita asymmetry result in in-
verted effects for the interaction terms. Firstly, the interaction term including FDI and 
GDP asymmetry shows a significantly negative effect for specific IPR as well as specific 
IPR enforcement provisions, as well as some minor positive effects on specific IPR forms. 
This means that an increase of GDP asymmetry in combination with FDI has a negative 
impact on specific IPR commitment in PTAs, which goes against H1.3. Yet, the effect is 
significantly positive for the same interaction term with GDP per capita asymmetry. 
Secondly, for the official development assistance and official aid received interaction 
term with GDP asymmetry, there is a significantly negative effect on IPR enforcement 
and a positive effect on IPR multilateral coherence. Again, the impact of GDP per capita 
asymmetry is opposed to the one of GDP asymmetry. 
Thirdly, GDP asymmetry in combination with the share of DAC aid received by PTA 
members of the total DAC aid received has a significantly negative effect on specific IPR 
as well as specific IPR enforcement and a significantly positive effect for TRIPS-plus 
provisions. Thus, PTAs that have an increased effect for this interaction term are more 
likely to include TRIPS-plus provisions and less likely to include specific IPR provisions 
including such on enforcement. Overall, H1.3 can only be partially accepted. 
As the last point on economic power asymmetry, it is necessary to bear in mind that 
the data availability for the economic power asymmetry measures is fragmented and one-
third of the coded PTAs are lost due to missing data and therefore not represented in the 
analysis. 
Political pressure shows for the majority of measures for stringent IPR a significantly 
negative effect and, thus, H2 postulating a positive effect is overturned. However, by 
looking at the subset of the 22 US PTAs, the effect becomes positive. Seemingly, the US 
can use its political pressure to increase the number of stringent IPR provisions in its 
PTAs. As the number of observations is too small for the US subset, they have no statis-
tical significance but indicated that it might be of interest to test the political pressure 
asserted by other countries. 
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Domestic interests have a significant effect on the IPR content of PTAs. The export-
ing interests show both positive as well as negative effects on the various general and 
stringent IPR indexes. The imports of mhtp by PTA members as a positive effect on the 
number of general and specific IPR forms and specific IPR enforcement covered in PTAs, 
whereas for ltp imports by PTA members there is a significantly negative effect on the 
references to IPR multilateral agreements and TRIPS-plus provisions. The more market 
share the PTA members hold in the respective technology-intensive import groups, the 
more likely the PTA does not include more tangible IPR and specific IPR enforcement 
provisions. Namely, with a higher share of the total htp imports by PTA members, the 
PTA is more likely to include fewer tangible IPR commitments, where for mhtp and ltp 
imports the PTAs are less likely to include specific IPR enforcement provisions. It seems 
that with a larger share of PTA members mhtp and ltp imports, the PTA members see less 
need for including specific IPR enforcement provisions in their PTAs. This might indi-
cate, that they already enjoy sufficient IPR protection in regards to enforcement. How-
ever, there is also a significant positive effect of the share of mhtp and ltp imports by PTA 
members: the higher their share is, the more TRIPS-plus provisions are included in the 
PTA. Hereby, it can be assumed that the PTA members further increase the protection for 
their already substantial market shares by heightening the TRIPS-plus protection through 
PTAs. Hence, H3.1 can be accepted for certain measures and has to be overturned for 
others. 
H3.2 looks at domestics interests more broadly and finds significantly positive as well 
as negative effects on general and stringent IPRs. The more resident applications were 
made on patents and trademarks, the more stringent IPR provisions can be found in PTAs. 
This effect is inverted for the cumulative resident applications for industrial designs. 
Where the PTA members hold a large share of applications, the effects on stringent IPR 
are mostly negative and PTAs include fewer stringent IPR provisions. The number of 
researchers in R&D shows a positive effect on references to IPR multilateral agreements 
and TRIPS-plus provisions in PTAs, whereas the opposite impact can be observed for the 
PTA members expenditure on R&D. Thus, there are certain domestic interests, for which 
H3.2 can be accepted and others, for which it has to be rejected. 
Veto players have both a significant effect on general as well as stringent IPR. The 
effect for general IPR is significantly negative and H4.1 assuming a positive effect is 
overturned. For stringent IPR, the relation towards veto players is ambiguous, and H4.2 
can be partially accepted. Veto players have a significantly negative effect on the scope 
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of tangible IPR scope provisions (only for the epa model) and on the level of IPR multi-
lateral coherence mentioned in PTAs. For the other stringent IPR measures, the regression 
tables show mixed results, i.e. both significantly positive or negative effects. For specific 
IPR enforcement provisions, H4.2 is overturned as the regression analysis shows positive 
effects. This is contrary to the results observed in the reduced model focusing on veto 
players (4.3.4 IPR Enforcement Design Analysis). H4.3 assumes that fewer veto players 
result in a more extreme effect on general or stringent IPR, whereby the effect can be 
positive or negative. Yet, the results only show marginal effects of veto players on both 
the general and stringent IPR variables, overturning H4.3. 
The effect on the IPR DSM is as postulated significant and negative, yet on a low 
scale and surpassed by the effect of the control variables on the IPR DSM. Nevertheless, 
H4.4 is accepted based on the significant results of the regression analysis. 
For general and specific IPR enforcement, there is no significant effect of veto play-
ers, yet for the overall enforcement, veto players have a significantly negative effect. 
Same as for the IPR DSM variables, the effect of the control variables is more pronounced 
than the one of the veto players. H4.5 can thus be accepted for the overall IPR enforce-
ment measure. 
Endogeneity has a predominately positive effect on the stringent IPR content. Only 
for the more detailed analysis considering the IPR forms and TRIPS-plus categories, the 
effect turns significantly negative. H5.1 and H5.2 can both be accepted for most stringent 
IPR measures, yet not for all IPR forms. For example, the theoretical trade-off between 
substantial tariff cuts in turn for TRIPS-plus provisions on patents such as a longer term 
of protection is inverted. Those PTAs including substantial tariff cuts are significantly 
less likely to include TRIPS-plus provisions on patents, overturning H5.2 for patents. 
However, the trade-off is positive for geographical indications and confirms H5.2 for 
geographical indications. The endogeneity effect is consistently positive for both the IPR 
enforcement measures and, hence, H5.3 and H5.4 are accepted. Overall, endogeneity has 
a positive effect on stringent IPR. 
Regime preference has a significantly positive effect on general as well as stringent 
IPR and, hence, H6.1 can be accepted for both general as well as stringent IPR. H6.2 and 
H6.4 postulate a negative regime preference effect and are, therefore, are overturned. 
H6.3 assumes a positive regime preference effect and can also be accepted. The results 
thus suggest that countries do not prefer one fora of IPR regulation over the other and if 
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they commit to IPR multilateral agreements in PTAs, they simultaneously also increase 
the general as well as the stringent IPR content of the PTA. 
Path dependency has significantly positive and negative effects on both general as 
well as stringent IPR. H7.1 concerns general and stringent IPR, and for the latter refers 
to the models pdg, pds and pdtp. For these models, path dependency is attributed to the 
learning from own PTAs and not PTAs by non-PTA members. H7.2 assumes that the 
effects can especially be observed for general IPR provisions and is therefore based on 
the general IPR analysis. H7.3 assumes that path dependency can take beyond PTA-mem-
bers PTAs and only concerns the stringent IPR regression models looking at the path 
dependency worldwide: pdwss, pdwstp, pdwfs and pdwftp. 
All three hypotheses can only hesitantly be accepted. Firstly, the effects are mostly 
marginal, i.e. show low estimates that are surpassed by more influential, significant ef-
fects in each model. Secondly, the effects show no consistent relation, i.e. are both posi-
tive as well as negative, depending on the measure for path dependency. Countries thus 
seem to learn from their own previous policies as well as those made by other countries. 
The effect of this path dependency can go either way: either countries prefer to include 
these provisions again resp. as well, or they refrain from including them in their PTAs. 
Interestingly, the analysis of the binary IPR tangible scope variables and the additive 
TRIPS-plus categories shows that the effects are often not one-directional. For instance, 
a path dependency effect from copyrights has not only (if at all) an effect on copyright 
provisions. For the analysis of stringent IPR, the effects of path dependency from world-
wide provisions and more specifically TRIPS-plus provisions shows the most pronounced 
and significant effects (pdwstp resp. pdwftp models). Generally, the path dependency is 
more distinct for the PTAs that have already entered into force (pdw f models), yet not 
for the path dependency effects on the TRIPS-plus categories, where the models for the 
PTA signature show more distinct effects. Hereby, time might play an important factor, 
as some of the TRIPS-plus heavy PTAs have not yet entered into force. 
Even though there are no hypotheses postulated on the control variables, their effects 
are highly significant across most models and must be reflected as well. For general IPR, 
their estimates often surpass the ones of the tested explanatory factors. 
Average democratisation has a significantly positive effect on the tangible IPR provi-
sions and IPR multilateral agreements, whereas the effect on IPR enforcement is mixed 
and for TRIPS-plus provisions negative. This means that the more democratic the PTA 
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members are, the more likely they include specific provisions on IPR forms and refer-
ences to other IPR multilateral agreements, some of them might even include IPR en-
forcement measures, yet they are less likely to include TRIPS-plus commitments. 
Classic IP leaders – US, EU, EFTA and Japan – have a significantly positive effect 
on all indexes including the index IPR specific, whereby the IPR multilateral coherence 
is in some instances also affected negatively. This indicates that if one of these countries 
is part of the PTA, it includes more on all IPR indexes. Countries with a high increase of 
patent protection – Brazil, China, India and Mexico – show a more marbled picture. These 
countries have a positive effect on tangible IPR provisions and IPR multilateral coher-
ence, a mixed effect for enforcement and a negative one for the TRIPS-plus index. Their 
PTAs are thus likely to contain specific provisions on certain IPR forms and IPR multi-
lateral agreements, might include some specific IPR enforcement provisions, yet are un-
likely to include provisions that go beyond TRIPS. New IP producers and developers – 
Israel, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan – show a significantly negative effect for tan-
gible IPR provisions, specific IPR enforcement, IPR multilateral coherence and TRIPS-
plus measures. If one of these countries is thus a PTA member, the agreement is less 
likely to score (high) on these stringent IPR indexes. 
The average GDP (log) and average GDP per capita (log) often have inverted signif-
icant effects, namely for the index IPR specific (positive/ negative), index IPR multilat-
eral coherence (negative/ positive) and the index IPR TRIPS-plus (positive/ negative). 
For the index IPR tangible, they both show mixed effects, and they both have a positive 
effect on the index IPR specific enforcement. 
The average geographic distance (log) has a significantly positive effect on the spe-
cific IPR content and both its sub-indexes, index IPR tangible scope and IPR specific 
enforcement. This means that the further apart PTA members are, the more likely they 
will include specific provisions in their PTAs. However, the average geographic distance 
(log) also has a significantly negative effect on the index IPR multilateral coherence and 
IPR TRIPS-plus. This means that a greater geographical distance between PTA members 
makes it less likely that their PTAs contain references to IPR multilateral agreements or 
TRIPS-plus provision. 
Conclusively, the GPE theories provide adequate arguments for the analysis of IPRs 
in PTAs, yet there might be a need to add on the operationalisation of the variables as 
many of the control variables show a consistently significant effect on the design. Not-
withstanding, the most explanatory power is observed for the variables of economic 
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power asymmetry and domestic interests derived from the GPE theories of realism, lib-
eralism, social-constructivism and modern marxism (see 2.2.2 Global Political Economy 
Theories).  
4.4 Design: Conclusion 
The design analysis aims to show that there are measurable factors besides negotiation 
circumstances that shape the design of a PTA. Based on the GPE theories, I looked at the 
seven explanatory factors of economic power asymmetry, domestic interests, political 
pressure, veto players, endogeneity, regime preference and path dependency.  
Next to accounting for several explanatory variables, I argue that PTA design should 
not be considered as being one-dimensional. Preferably, the PTA design includes multi-
ple measures that can be affected to a different extent by the explanatory factors. Thus, I 
divide my data into two broad categories of general IPR and stringent IPR and operation-
alise each category by using several subsets. For example, the categories look separately 
at the IPR content, IPR scope, IPR enforcement and IPR multilateral coherence. 
The results of the regression analysis show that all of the tested factors have a signif-
icant effect on the design of IPRs in PTAs, yet some of the tested factors show a fairly 
low impact whilst others have a more substantial effect. Overall, the most distinct effects 
can be observed for the variables of economic power asymmetry and domestic interests. 
As repeatedly argued by realism theory, the analysis shows that economic power asym-
metry between PTA members has a significant impact on the inclusion of specific IPR 
provisions in PTAs. And as theory suggests, the effect is often positively correlated with 
a trade-off. Thus, when a higher economic power asymmetry exists between countries 
and the PTA includes substantial tariff cuts, the PTA is also more likely to include strin-
gent IPR commitments. Interestingly, the effect of domestic interests on IPRs seems in-
deed not to focus on high-technology products. The most pronounced effects for domestic 
interest were found for medium-high-technology products (negative effect on general IPR 
design and TRIPS-plus provisions) and medium-low-technology products (positive effect 
on general IPR design and TRIPS-plus provisions). However, this effect is generally not 
observed for stringent IPR, where most specific IPR features are impacted positively by 
domestic interest on medium-high-technology products. The differentiation of IPRs 
across sectors and levels of technology-intensiveness is thus necessary and should be pur-
sued further. 
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Moreover, the analysis shows that the impact of the explanatory variables varies de-
pending on the regressed subset of IPR categories. For instance, veto players show a sig-
nificantly positive effect on the IPR specific enforcement and TRIPS-plus measures, 
whereas their effect is significantly negative on IPR multilateral coherence. It is thus in-
deed necessary to capture multiple dimensions of the PTA design in order to explain it. 
Advanced studies could even acquire a more detailed coding of IPR design features or 
apply a similar approach to other agreement features. This would assist in reflecting the 
underlying mechanisms of more detailed respectively other PTA design features. 
Further, the results show that not all of the postulated effects occur in the anticipated 
direction. Hence, it is necessary to further investigate the mechanisms behind the design 
of IPRs in PTAs. Future research should take a deeper interest in the evolution of PTA 
design and see if there are additional explanatory factors as well as test the here presented 
factors for other design features. As economic power asymmetry factors and domestic 
interests play the most pronounced role in explaining IPR design features, these factors 
should also receive a particular focus in advanced studies. 
Moreover, the analysis also shows a consistent effect of path dependency and it might 
be worthwhile to analyse the copy-paste and diffusion on IPRs in PTAs in more detail. 
Hereby, on can build on the research by Allee and Elsig (n.d.) and ideally enhance it with 
domestic IPR regulation to enrich the path dependency discussion. 
Overall, by understanding the design better, research assists in giving the discourse 
an evidence-based foundation instead of relying predominately on theoretical assump-
tions and case-specific arguments. Furthermore, the existing theoretical arguments on 
IPR could be analysed in more detail. For instance, future research could also analyse 
another uniqueness of IPR commitments: IPR concession can only be used as a bargain-
ing chip in one PTA, whereas preferential tariffs can be granted to multiple trading part-
ners (Fink 2011, 389). Such research can build on my analysis and conduct a case study 
on the PTAs of one country or a group of countries and look at the consistency of their 
IPR design features for their subset.  
 
“In the typical grand bargain under a North-South PTA, the developing country makes a 
non-preferential commitment on IPRs in exchange for preferential market access to northern 
markets for agricultural or manufactured goods. The latter, however, may be temporary be-
cause the value of trade preferences diminishes if the northern PTA partner signs additional 
PTAs with third countries or reduces tariffs on an MFN basis in the context of a multilateral 
trading round.” Fink (2011, 389) 
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Correspondingly, the focus of such a study could lie on developing countries, which 
have already signed multiple agreements, and compare their IPR content as well as pos-
sible connected concessions. Aside from focusing on a subgroup of PTAs and performing 
a more in-depth analysis, future research can also analyse certain IPR areas in PTAs in 
more detail. For example, the connection between IPR and investment is only marginally 
covered by my analysis and could be expanded on further. So, another topic not covered 
by my analysis is the diffusion resp. copy-pasting of PTA texts over time and countries. 
This could shed some light on design trends over time and maybe even best-practice IPR 
provisions. 
In addition to enhancing the design analysis, the data and results can be used to look 
at the other end of PTA analysis: the effects of PTA design. I start this research in the 
following chapter and conduct an analysis of the legal-institutional and economic effects 
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Chapter 5:  Effects of Intellectual Property Rights in PTAs  
The effect analysis aims to provide answers to the questions if IPRs in PTAs have an 
effect and to what extent the variation in the IPR design features matter.  
Already, the effect of IPRs is difficult to measure. According to the rationale of IPRs 
(see Figure 4: Rationale of IPRs), the protection of intellectual property serves several 
goals and, for instance, more stringent IPR protection supposedly increases innovation as 
well as FDI. Yet, FDI and innovation, as well as the other factors target by IPR regulation, 
are not merely influenced by IPR regulations. Similarly, the effects of PTAs usually affect 
areas that are not solely influenced by PTAs. Thus, the effect analysis of IPRs in PTAs is 
hampered by biases related to endogeneity and the allocation of adequate instruments, 
which means that the overall results need to be qualified regarding the impact of IPR 
design in PTAs on domestic factors. Nevertheless, there should be some patterns visible, 
especially for analysis with my dataset, which provides a multitude of observations for 
various countries over time. After all, the design of IPRs in PTAs should show some of 
the postulated effects of IPR, as otherwise, there would be no reason for any IPR design 
variations across PTAs. In the next few paragraphs, I briefly summarise the focus of re-
search of the effects of PTAs, IPRs, and IPRs in PTAs, highlight what I find to be the 
main hurdles for their analysis and conclude by my research approach for the effect anal-
ysis. 
For the analysis of the effects of PTAs, there already exist plenty of literature with a 
strong focus on the effects of trade agreements on trade flows. Hereby, the most common 
statistical approach is applying a gravity model of trade to analyse the effect of PTAs on 
trade flows (see Kepaptsoglou, Karlaftis, and Tsamboulas 2010 for an overview of pre-
vious economic studies). In brief, the gravity model of trade assumes that the trade vol-
ume between trading partners is based on their economic size and the geographic distance 
between them. The model can be enhanced depending on the research focus and common 
denominators added to the gravity model are the existence of trade agreements, a common 
language between trading partners, and their colonial relationships (Kepaptsoglou, Kar-
laftis, and Tsamboulas 2010). There have also been more recent studies, expanding the 
focus of effects of PTAs (see Baccini 2019 for an overview of effects of PTAs). For 
example, there are studies analysing the effects of PTAs on FDI, welfare and reforms in 
developing countries (Baccini 2019). 
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In general, the effect analysis of PTAs encounters two main problems: there is limited 
knowledge about the ex-ante and ex-post domestic regulation. For most studies, there is 
no systematic data available across time on the domestic regulation before the PTA was 
signed (ex-ante) as well as after the PTA has entered into force (ex-post).  
The lack of ex-ante information is in so far problematic as the PTA design features 
most likely cover not only new regulation but also repeat existing regulations, for at least 
one PTA member. Thus, the effect should only be visible for those PTA members, which 
have to change their status quo due to the PTA. So far, research generally assumes that 
PTAs are exogenous and that observable effects can be attributed to the PTAs resp. PTA 
design for all countries. Most studies analysing the effects of PTAs make no differentia-
tion between countries having already in place similar provisions in the PTA domestically 
before the PTA entered into force and rather assume that the PTA includes novel provi-
sions for all PTA members. This assumption might be valid for tariffs and other prefer-
ential PTA features, yet is problematic for IPRs in PTAs. For instance, the US PTAs 
generally repeat IPR provisions already implemented domestically in the US. One the 
one hand, this repetition of IPR standards should not lead to any effects for the US as they 
are not required to change their domestic IPR regulation based on the PTA. On the other 
hand, the PTA partners are more likely to have to adapt their domestic regulation based 
on the IPR provisions in PTAs with the US, and the postulated positive effects of IPRs in 
PTAs are expected to be observable for these countries.  
The ex-post issue describes the missing information on the implementation of the PTA 
regulation. The basic assumption with PTAs is that by the time of entry into force or the 
transition period determined in the PTA, the regulations are implemented into domestic 
law. However, there is no systematic data matching PTA provisions in regards to domes-
tic implementation. Of course, this is not only a problem for PTAs, but multilateral agree-
ments in general. For example, even after TRIPS entered into force, not all of the coun-
tries had implemented the agreed-upon regulations: 
 
 “From 1995, representatives of leading multinational pharmaceutical, agrochemical, seed, 
entertainment, manufacturing, and software companies called on their respective govern-
ments in the United States. European Union, and Japan to ensure swift and full implemen-
tation of TRIPS, to eliminate the loopholes and ambiguities in the Agreement, and to ensure 
that its interpretation by developing countries protected their interests. Industry represent-
atives worried that actions in one developing country might influence others."  
 Deere (2009, 114) 
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According to Deere (2009, 151 et seqq.), there are two key factors influencing the 
implementation of TRIPS: ideational as well as economic pressure. On the one hand, 
there was ideational pressure to implement TRIPS, for instance, through knowledge com-
munities (media, experts, politicians, etc.), by strategically framing and counter-framing 
the debate on IPR regulation, as well as through monitoring resp. surveilling the imple-
mentation of TRIPS (e.g. through the “Special 301 Report”). On the other hand, there 
was economic pressure exerted by developed countries in the form of trade sanctions, 
withdrawal or reduction of aid, and the negotiations of new trade agreements to reinforce 
TRIPS as well as go beyond it. Or in certain PTAs, countries specifically are required to 
implement resp. require the implementation of the PTA provisions before the PTA enters 
into force. For example, the US requires that PTA members adapt their domestic IPR 
regulation according to the IPR provisions in the PTA in a so-called certification process 
before the PTA enters into force (Biadgleng and Maur 2011, 9). 
Due to the lack of information on these ex-ante and ex-post factors, I will simply 
assume that the PTAs change the status quo of at least one PTA member and that coun-
tries implement the PTA provisions by the time of entry into force respectively the ex-
tensional deadline defined in the PTA. 
Heretofore, there have also been studies analysing the effects of IPRs. Most studies 
focus on the effect that IPRs have on FDI, licensing and trade flows (for example Fink 
and Primo Braga 2005; Maskus and Penubarti 1995; Smith 1999). The results of these 
studies are, however, highly ambiguous. For instance, some studies of the effect of IPR 
on FDI find no effect, others find positive effects or even negative effects of higher IPR 
protection (see Fink 2011; Maskus 2005). One of the caveats with the analysis of IPR is 
that there is no comprehensive data on the domestic IPR regulation. There exist measures 
quantifying the level of protection, for example, for patents, whereby the most used one 
is the Ginarte-Park index (Ginarte and Park 1997). Yet, the index only provides data 
ranging from 1960-2005, meaning that the rise of IPRs in PTAs cannot be matched to the 
index. Moreover, patents are only one off the elven forms of IPR covered by PTAs, and 
general statements about the effects based on the analysis of patents might be oversim-
plifying the effects. 
Another issue of the analysis of the effects of IPRs is that the effects are expected to 
be non-linear. This means that there is a tipping point for intellectual property regulation 
after which the previously positive effects of more stringent IPR protection are reversed. 
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For instance, too stringent regulation can restrict developing countries in reverse engi-
neering or imitating innovation in other manners and “thereby making technological 
catching up more difficult than before” (United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment (UNCTAD) 2010, 14). For example, the OECD study “Pharmaceutical innova-
tion and access to medicines” (OECD 2018) lists among other issues that there has been 
a steady increase of medicine prices and that one of the main principles to correct the 
system is to foster competition for goods with and without a valid patent. The OECD 
study shows that the incentive to innovate has its limits, especially regarding the effects 
on social welfare. Besides the high costs of the health systems partially due to the high 
prices for patent-protected medicine and restrictive exhaustion regimes forbidding the 
parallel importation of medicine, the innovative focus of pharmaceutical companies lies 
on those diseases with many possible patients, whilst rare diseases are too unlucrative to 
invest in. Albeit this being a rational decision for companies, the implications on the 
overall market and society are not optimal. Some fields deemed unlucrative such as anti-
biotics or dementia are lacking an appropriate amount of R&D reflecting the social im-
portance of these fields (OECD 2018, 90 et seqq.). Even more, for rare diseases, there is 
very limited R&D, and if there are new treatments available, they tend to be very cost 
intensive. The discrepancy between the rationale of IPR and the pharmaceutical sector 
becomes even more apparent when looking at the profitability of the pharmaceutical sec-
tor. The OECD study shows that compared to other R&D intensive industries, the phar-
maceutical one has remained profitable: “Since 2007, the R&D- based pharmaceutical 
industry has consistently made economic profits and has been more profitable than some 
other R&D-intensive industries, such as aerospace and defence, information technology 
(IT) hardware, or other healthcare technology” (OECD 2018, 94). Consequently, less 
stringent patent protection should be economically manageable for pharmaceutical com-
panies and might be beneficial for competition, innovation and social welfare. 
Moreover, the historic developments show that there might not be a single approach 
of IPR regulation for all countries. For example, Japan has gone from “imitator” to “im-
prover” to “inventor” and along the way increased its patent regulation. The counterex-
ample is South Korea, which imposed a very stringent IPR standard as a developing coun-
try and has had a highly positive economic development (Goldstein et al. 2009). Besides, 
the roles can change over time. China used to be a leader in manufacturing porcelain with 
its typical blue and white colour set, which soon was copied by Japan and European coun-
tries. Nowadays, these products are often considered to be a national specialty such as 
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Spanish and Portuguese tiles (“Azulejos”), Dutch porcelain objects and figures (“Delft-
ware”; “Delft pottery”) or German porcelain (“Meissen China”) (Finlay 1998). And in 
more recent history, China has been accused of imitating products, then implemented 
substantive IPR regulations, followed by more rigours IPR enforcement, and nowadays 
is one of the leading patent applicants. Even these country examples are ambiguous, as 
there are countries that seem to have benefitted from early on stringent IPR protection 
such as South Korea and others that have built their initial growth on low IPR regulation 
such as Japan. Furthermore, some countries are still reluctant to protect IPR areas, where 
their industries do not have a comparative advantage. In the EU, many countries fought 
a more stringent copyright protection, and Switzerland still allows downloading and 
streaming of copyrighted material, as the main negative impact of piracy does not impact 
the domestic industry. It thus an reasonable argument that countries disguise their interest 
as globally beneficiary IPR provision. As shown in the design analysis chapter, domestic 
interest of and economic power asymmetries between the PTA members drive most of 
the IPR regulation in PTAs.  
Additionally to the issues faced for the effect analysis of PTAs respectively IPRs, 
there is another major difference of the analysis of the effects of IPRs in PTAs compared 
to other PTA effect measures: the MFN treatment of IPRs in PTAs. The IPR provisions 
in PTAs underlie the MFN principle, and IPR commitments are granted not only to the 
PTA members, but across-the-board because PTA members are obliged to extend the 
PTA commitments to all (non-PTA) WTO members. This means that IPR provisions in 
PTAs are not preferential and can be used as a bargaining chip only once (see also the 
elaboration on IPR provisions being used as a bargaining chip for hypothesis 1.2 in the 
design chapter). This includes that a commitment in a PTA is supposedly implemented 
into domestic law once the PTA enters into force. By including the same commitment in 
another PTA, the countries make a non-commitment, as they repeat the existing status 
quo (Biadgleng and Maur 2011, 11). This makes the effect analysis difficult, as not all 
IPR commitments in PTAs change the domestic status quo and henceforth, should have 
no domestic effect. 
Consequently, there have only been few studies analysing the effects of IPRs in PTAs. 
The difficulty in statistically allocating a connection between the effects of PTAs resp. 
IPRs and their anticipated factors such as growth and FDI is amplified through the linkage 
of IPRs in PTAs, let alone identifying causalities. Hereby, it is even harder to distinguish 
if it is the effect of IPRs in PTAs, the PTA itself or other factors that lead to a change in 
Chapter 5: Effects of Intellectual Property Rights in PTAs  272 
the analysed factors. Most of the few studies on IPRs in PTAs use a dummy variable for 
PTAs including IPRs (or not) and do not go further into detail on the design aspects. Only 
recently, there have been some studies using PTA design as an explanatory variable. The 
most substantial study by Maskus and Ridley (2016) analyses the effect of IPRs on PTAs 
on the aggregate trade flows of PTA members, and find that the IPR design of PTAs 
indeed affects the sectoral trade of PTA members. Their study looks at the PTAs of the 
US, EU and EFTA and their content of specific patent, copyright, trademark and enforce-
ment provisions. However, their treaty sample is relatively low, with 50 PTAs out of 
which 24 include specific IPR provisions (Maskus and Ridley 2016, 5). 
I build on these previous studies on the effects of IPR, PTAs, and IPRs in PTAs, and 
use my comprehensive dataset to make some further differentiation between the effects 
of the IPR design factors. In the following two subchapters, I focus on two effect 
measures in order to analyse if IPRs in PTAs respectively their design matter, namely 
legal-institutional effects and economic effects.  
The legal-institutional effect analysis focuses on the concrete legal consequences of 
PTAs and looks into issues of the PTA analysis: do countries make commitments in 
PTAs, which require them to change their status quo? If they make such commitments, 
do they follow up on them and change their domestic regulation? Can these decisions to 
comply with the IPR commitments in PTAs be explained by PTA design factors? Or 
might these effects be driven by PTA members exerting their power to increase IPR pro-
tection? The economic effects, on the other hand, aim to find trends for the rationale of 
IPRs: Does more stringent IPR protection in PTAs show any of the postulated positive 
effects? Do the IPR forms matter for the effect analysis? Is there an obvious tipping point 
of IPR protection such as TRIPS-plus regulation? 
However, as there has not been a substantive amount of research on the effects of IPR 
in PTAs, the two subchapters should be considered as fundamental research and hold no 
claim of comprehensiveness. Rather, the idea is to point out what the PTA design data 
and analysis can be used for, and at best, will be used as building blocks for further re-
search. 
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5.1 Legal-institutional Effects 
The analysis of the legal effects of IPRs in PTAs encompasses various effects, which 
can be observed, for example, for domestic legislation, the outcome for those addressed 
by the regulations, the judicators, and the intended and unintended impact on society. As 
such factors would require substantial additional data collection of domestic factors, I 
refrain from covering them in my research. However, there is a highly specific, yet com-
parably feasible measure of legal effects that I can cover based on my data on IPRs in 
PTAs and some additional domestic data. This particular legal effect focuses on the ref-
erences to IPR multilateral agreements in PTAs.  
As shown in the data and design chapter, the commitments to IPR multilateral agree-
ments play a significant role in PTAs. My dataset shows that 63% of the PTAs signed 
after TRIPS include references to IPR multilateral agreements, and out of those signed 
since 2010 the share rises to 86%. Thus, a vast majority of PTAs signed nowadays con-
tains references to other fora of IPR regulation. And there are new IPR multilateral agree-
ments negotiated as well as existing ones further developed. For example, in 2019 the EU 
and other countries such as Switzerland have announced that they are aiming to ratify 
another IPR multilateral agreement: the Geneva Act to the Lisbon Agreement (Eidgenö-
ssisches Institut für Geistiges Eigentum 2019; Europäischer Rat 2019). The Geneva Act 
further protects geographical indications and will enter into force after the ratification by 
five WIPO members, which will be already achieved if a fifth of the EU members ratify 
it. At the same time, both the EU and Switzerland have signed further PTAs including 
IPR multilateral coherence commitments, which are not yet covered in my dataset, for 
example, the PTA between the EU and Japan, or the PTA between Switzerland and In-
donesia. These examples show that IPR multilateral agreements, as well as the commit-
ments on them in PTAs, will continue to play an important role for IPR regulation. 
My dataset provides insights on which IPR multilateral agreements are included in 
PTAs, to what extent and by which countries, and the subsequent step is to analyse if 
these PTA provisions have an effect on countries commitments to the IPR multilateral 
agreements. I refer to the effects of IPR multilateral coherence provisions as the legal-
institutional effects, which I define in the subsequent subchapter. I describe the legal the-
ories, apply these theories to the concept of IPR multilateral coherence, derive four hy-
potheses on the expected legal-institutional effects of the IPR multilateral commitments 
in PTAs and test them in a regression anlaysis. 
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5.1.1 Legal-institutional Effects: Theory 
The puzzle of why and if countries comply with international law has been of interests 
not only for legal but also scholars of political scientists and international relation. So far, 
there has been a variety of theoretical international relations research on the effects of 
international institutions and international law such as Elsig (2015) and von Stein (2017), 
yet only few empirical studies of their legal effects.  
I derive my theory of legal-institutional effects from the theory of legal effects of 
international regulations as described by Raustiala (2000), which is due to its lean and 
straightforward concepts is ideally suited for this kind of fundamental research. Accord-
ing to Raustiala (2000), there are three main concepts describing the legal effects of agree-
ments: implementation, compliance and effectiveness (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13: Legal Effects of International Regulations 
 
 
Each of these three concepts shown in Figure 13 describes an effect of international 
regulations. Implementation stands for the conversion of international regulation into do-
mestic law. Compliance refers to the relation of the regulation and the behaviour of its 
addresses, and is given when the norms and specified rules of an agreement are reflected 
in the behaviour of actors. Effectiveness specifies these instances, where the regulation 
requires a behavioural change and does not merely statutorily regulate the status quo 
(Raustiala 2000).  
Raustiala applies these concepts to the content of regulations. For the case of a regu-
lation by quotas, this would entail analysing if countries implement quotas into domestic 
legislation (implementation), comply with these quotas (compliance) and check if these 
quotas effectively change actors behaviour or simply translate common practice into legal 
norms (effectiveness). Raustiala (2000) stresses that the differentiation between these 
Implementation
EffectivenessCompliance
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three concepts is detrimental for the analysis of legal effects, especially if the effects anal-
ysis implies causality: 
 
“Compliance refers to conformity between behavior and a specified rule. Compliance has 
many causes, and can be inadvertent, coincidental, or an artifact of the legal standard. Con-
sequently, the sheer fact of compliance with a given commitment tells us little about the im-
pact of that commitment. Effectiveness refers to observable changes in behavior that result 
from a specified rule. Thus, to say an accord is effective is necessarily to make a causal 
claim, whereas to say that a state is in compliance with an agreement entails no causal 
claim.” Raustiala (2005, 610) 
 
For example, when regulation is implemented and the addresses are complying with 
this newly implemented regulation, one cannot draw a conclusion on the effectiveness of 
this regulation. If this regulation writes into law the pre-existing behaviour of its ad-
dresses, then it is not effective according to the legal effects theory as it is not resulting 
in a behavioural change of the regulations’ addresses. Furthermore, it might very well be 
that a norm has not been implemented, yet there is already compliance or effectiveness, 
or both. Thus, the three concepts of implementation, compliance and effectiveness should 
not be considered as sequential and are not necessary conditions for one another. 
For my analysis of the commitments made to IPR multilateral agreements in PTAs, I 
simplify Raustiala’s concept by focusing on the specific commitments made to IPR mul-
tilateral agreements and not looking at the content of these agreements in PTAs. For ex-
ample, I apply the concept to the commitment of a country to accede to the Patent Law 
Treaty, yet I will not analyse the implementation, compliance and effectiveness of the 
content of the Patent Law Treaty, i.e. the domestic regulation of patents. As I focus on 
the commitments made in the PTAs towards other legal institutions, I use the term “legal-
institutional effects”. 
As described in the beginning, the concepts of international regulations are often used 
in the analyses of international law. However, some researchers would argue that the 
terms have a different meanings than described by Raustiala. For example, von Stein 
(2017) argues that compliance should not be considered dichotomously and rather can be 
placed on a continuum, whereby the level of compliance with both rules and rulings 
should be taken into account. Furthermore, von Stein argues that effectiveness is condi-
tional to the PTA, i.e. the domestic changes in the status quo need to be connected to the 
PTA itself to be labelled as effective. If the compliance is brought on by PTA-exogenous 
conditions, then the observed effect is not effectiveness, which can only be observed 
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when the PTA changes the domestic behaviour. Von Stein’s definition is thus broader for 
compliance and more restrictive for effectiveness, which hampers their measurement as 
well as empirical analysis. For this fundamental research, I, therefore, solely rely on the 
concept definition of Raustiala for my analysis of the legal-institutional effects. 
For the legal-institutional effects, the regulation is the commitment made about an 
IPR multilateral agreement within a PTA. Applied to the concept of legal effects, I define 
for the legal-institutional effects the implementation as the entry into force of the PTA. 
This is the time when the PTA becomes part of the binding law for the PTA-member 
countries. Under compliance, I understand the ratification of the IPR multilateral agree-
ments referenced in the PTA because it stands for the time when the IPR multilateral 
agreement becomes legally binding for the acceding country. For effectiveness, I consider 
those PTA members that had not ratified an IPR multilateral agreement at the time of the 
PTA signature, referenced it in the PTA and by the time of entry into force (or a prede-
fined convention deadline) have acceded to the IPR multilateral agreement.  
I argue that there are two forms of effectiveness for legal-institutional effects. Firstly, 
on the domestic level for countries individually, and secondly, on the PTA level for the 
group of PTA members. The domestic effect means that a specific country adapts its 
behaviour, whereas the PTA-member effect entails that only some of the PTA members 
change their behaviour. For example, some PTA members were already part of the IPR 
multilateral agreement before signing the PTA, or some PTA members do not comply 
with the PTA provisions. However, there might be at least partial effectiveness on the 
PTA-level as long as some of the PTA members comply with the PTA provisions and 
have to adjust their behaviour. These assumptions on the concepts of legal-institutional 
effects are displayed in Figure 14: 
 
Figure 14: Legal-Institutional Effects of IPR Multilateral Coherence Commitments 
 
Implementation
Entry into force of the PTA
Effectiveness
Domestic: change of status quo
PTA-members: change of status quo
Compliance
Ratification of IPR multilateral 
agreement
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PTAs represent a legally binding regulation once they have entered into force. How-
ever, the variation in the legal formulations of references to IPR multilateral agreements 
suggests that not all references will lead to the same domestic action. For example, in the 
agreement between China and Switzerland signed in 2013, the countries reaffirm a num-
ber of IPR multilateral agreements such as the Paris and Berne Convention ” (Chapter 11 
Article 11.3.1), and state that “each Party shall make all reasonable efforts to ratify or 
accede to the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances” (Chapter 11 Article 11.3.2). 
This differentiation between the forms of bindingness indicates that the effect on the 
domestic action might be different as well and that IPR agreements included in the reaf-
firmation part are more likely to be ratified than the Beijing Treaty. Thus, my assumption 
is that the legal-institutional effects are driven by the bindingness of the IPR multilateral 
commitments. According to legal theory, the legal bindingness of commitments can be 
described by the three dimensions of legalisation: obligation, precision and delegation. as 
Figure 15 illustrates this concept and is a marginally modified version of the figure by K: 
W. Abbott et al. (2000, 404 fig. 1): 
 
Figure 15: The Dimensions of Legalisation 
 
 
Obligation refers to the level of the legal bindingness of the norms, that can range 
from non-binding towards binding law. Precision stands for to the room for interpretation 
due to the specification of a regulation. Thereby, a highly general statement is considered 
to be less binding than a highly precise provision. Delegation accounts for the level of 
relegated authority such as diplomacy or investor-state dispute settlement mechanism (K. 
W. Abbott et al. 2000). Legalisation can range on each dimension from a non-binding, 
soft legalisation towards a binding, hard legalisation.  
The dimensions are independent of one another and can be combined in different 
ways, i.e. scoring more to the left on one dimension whilst scoring more to the right on 
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the other dimensions. For example, the TRIPS agreements scores on the right side of the 
continuum of all three dimensions. Shaffer and Pollack (2013, 201) argue that the multi-
dimensionality of this concept of legalisation is its strength and that the more common 
binary differentiation of soft vs. hard law loses much of its explanatory power. I will 
therefore apply all three dimensions in a feasible manner to the reference of IPR multi-
lateral agreements in PTAs. 
Firstly, my analysis focuses on the commitment to the IPR multilateral provisions and 
not their content. Thereby, the obligation can be considered to score towards the right 
side and be binding one the PTA enters into force: 
 
“The fundamental international legal principle of pacta sunt servanda means that the rules 
and commitments contained in legalized international agreements are regarded as obligatory, 
subject to various defenses or exceptions, and not to be disregarded as preferences change. 
They must be performed in good faith regardless of inconsistent provisions of domestic law.” 
K. W. Abbott et al. (2000, 409) 
 
Secondly, I use my coding of the degree of bindingness for the IPR multilateral co-
herence variables (see 3.1.2.4 IPR Multilateral Coherence Variables) for the precision 
dimension. For example, statements that are not explicit such as “shall endeavour” acces-
sion provisions score much more to the left on the precision dimension (see K. W. Abbott 
et al. 2000, 412). Such commitments are assigned a lower score for my IPR multilateral 
coherence variables than those references which require accession to an IPR multilateral 
agreement. Thirdly, I differentiate for the delegation dimension between those agree-
ments that are administrated by the WIPO and are assumed to assign more delegation, 
whereas those agreements not assigned to the WIPO are considered for scoring more on 
the left of the delegation dimension. For my analysis, I test how well the dimensions of 
legalisations can explain the legal-institutional effects. As the dimension of obligation is 
the same for all cases, i.e. all refer to PTAs, I do not derive a specific hypothesis for this 
dimension. The legalisation dimension with the most variation is the precision dimension, 
which I will use for most of my hypotheses. 
For the legal-institutional effect of implementation, I assume that the impact of the 
precision dimension is irrelevant. The PTA includes not only many other more precise, 
obliging and delegating provisions on IPR besides IPR multilateral coherence references. 
Rather IPR itself makes up only a small part of the overall PTA. Thus, the effect of the 
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more or less binding commitments on IPR multilateral coherence is less than likely to 
significantly influence the entry into force of the PTA. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The bindingness of IPR multilateral coherence commitments in the 
PTA has no significant effect on their implementation. 
 
However, the precision of the commitments is expected to have a positive effect on 
their compliance. This means that a PTA including a specific provision of reaffirmation 
or accession towards an IPR multilateral agreement is assumed to have a stronger positive 
effect on the ratification of the respective IPR multilateral agreement opposed to PTAs 
simply referencing the IPR agreement. An underlying assumption is, that countries also 
choose PTAs to reinforce or repeat their pre-existing commitments to IPR multilateral 
agreements. For example, if a country has already ratified an agreement it is more likely 
to include a precise commitment on the agreement in the PTA as it will not require any 
adaption cost. In these cases, the country is already compliant with the provisions before 
the PTA. Nevertheless, this would result in compliance with the PTA provisions regard-
less of the impact on the status quo. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The bindingness of IPR multilateral coherence commitments in the 
PTA increases their compliance. 
 
Unlike the measures for compliance, the effectiveness calls for a change in the status 
quo. Hereby, I assume that mostly highly precise and therefore more binding provisions 
lead to a change of the status quo and therefore effectiveness. For instance, where a coun-
try was not part of an IPR multilateral agreement at the time of PTA signature, it will only 
agree to precise provisions such as the reaffirmation of the IPR multilateral agreement if 
it intends to oblige with the PTA provisions. Therefore, I assume that there is also a pos-
itive relation between the bindingness of the IPR multilateral coherence provisions and 
the effectiveness of these provisions.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The bindingness of IPR multilateral coherence commitments in the 
PTA increases their effectiveness. 
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The effect for effectiveness might be less significant than the legal-institutional effect 
for compliance, as the latter commitment can also be made without resulting in any adap-
tion costs.  
As for the legal-institutional effect of delegation, I expect that IPR multilateral agree-
ments under the auspice of the WIPO score more to the right of the delegation dimension. 
For instance, WIPO negotiates and develops new IPR multilateral agreements and is fi-
nancially not dependent on the contributions of its members and mostly financed by the 
fees for their administered treaties (World Intellectual Property Organization 2015, 8). 
Therefore, I expect that those IPR multilateral agreements administered by the WIPO 
have a stronger legal-institutional effect. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The effect of WIPO-administered IPR multilateral agreements is 
stronger than the effect of other IPR multilateral agreements. 
 
5.1.2 Legal-institutional Effects: Data 
The basis for the legal-institutional effects data is the IPRs in PTAs dataset, namely 
the variables on IPR multilateral coherence (3.1.2.4 IPR Multilateral Coherence Varia-
bles), which I transformed from a PTA-level to a country-level format. Thus, the trans-
formed dataset includes a data entry for each year a PTA was signed per country. As it is 
based on the IPRs in PTAs dataset it also covers 202 countries and the years range from 
1948-2018 (see 3.3 Descriptive Statistics). 
Additionally, I created another dataset based on these multilateral IPR agreements 
mentioned in PTAs. This dataset matches the PTA commitments on multilateral coher-
ence to the ratifications of these multilateral agreements by countries. However, two con-
ventions included in PTAs are excluded from the analysis, namely the Doha Declaration 
and the uniform domain name resolution (UDRP). Both could not be included as it is 
unclear in which year countries have complied with the respective regulation and it is 
therefore not possible to construct the dependent variables. Moreover, I did not differen-
tiate between the various versions of the UPOV Convention (1968, 1972, 1978 and 1991). 
The data thus covers the information on the legal-institutional effects of 30 IPR multilat-
eral agreements mentioned in PTAs. I downloaded the raw data from the WIPO website 
(2018b) and compiled a country-level dataset comprising an overview of countries ratifi-
cation of IPR multilateral agreements over time. Hereby, the data entries are ‘0’ for years 
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where a country has not yet ratified an IPR multilateral agreement and ‘1’ for the year it 
has as well as all the consecutive years.  
Finally, I merged the two country-level datasets containing the PTA-specific and do-
mestic information. The used the PTA-specific data for the explanatory variables and the 
information of this domestic ratification dataset for the construction of the dependent var-
iables. Both operationalisations are described in the next subchapters, followed by the 
control variables, some descriptive statistics and the models of analysis. 
5.1.2.1 Legal-institutional Effects: Dependent Variables 
I analyse the three dependent variables, which are based on the concept of legal-insti-
tutional effects: implementation, compliance and effectiveness (Figure 14). 
Implementation measures if a PTA has become legally binding and is operationalised 
by a binary variable differentiating those entries for PTAs, which have entered into force 
(‘1’) and those that have not entered into force (yet; ‘0’). 
Compliance describes those cases where a reference to an IPR multilateral agreement 
was made in a PTA and this commitment was fulfilled, i.e. the PTA members ratified the 
IPR multilateral agreement. The compliance variable thus codes the domestic ratification 
of an IPR multilateral agreement by the time of entry into force of the PTA or where 
applicable the extended deadline for the treaty accession. Of course, countries can also 
be compliant if the already ratified the IPR multilateral agreement before the PTA was 
signed. The measure is calculated for each of the IPR multilateral agreements as a binary 
variable (‘1’ for compliant, ‘0’ for not compliant). Subsequently, I created two indexes 
based on these binary variables. The first one is additive and gives an overview of the 
number of IPR multilateral agreement commitments a country has complied with per 
PTA. The second one represents the average score of compliance per PTA, i.e. the aver-
age compliance over the number of total references to IPR multilateral commitments.  
Effectiveness describes those instances where countries comply with their commit-
ments made in PTAs, and this compliance leads to a change in the status quo. I opera-
tionalise effectiveness as countries that had not ratified the IPR multilateral agreement at 
the time of the PTA signature (compliance equals ‘0’) and that have ratified it by the time 
predefined in the PTA, i.e. either by the time of entry into force or an extended deadline 
(compliance equals ‘1’). The effectiveness variable is coded as ‘1’ where these to condi-
tions are met and ‘0’ otherwise. Same as for the compliance variable, the effectiveness 
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variable is first measured for the specific IPR multilateral agreements (binary) and sub-
sequently for the overall effectiveness of the PTA provision on IPR multilateral coher-
ence (sum resp. average per PTA). 
However, not all of the references to IPR multilateral agreements require ratification. 
Only the references I categorised with a bindingness score of ‘4’ and ‘5’ (see 3.1.2.4 IPR 
Multilateral Coherence Variables) strictly require the accession and ratification of the 
referenced agreements. Yet, the referencing could also indicate a countries’ intent to com-
ply with the respective agreement regardless of the legal bindingness stated in the PTA. 
Therefore, I differentiate between strict compliance, which is legally required by the PTA 
(score of ‘4’ or ‘5’) and broad compliance (score higher than ‘0’), meaning that any of 
the IPR multilateral agreements is mentioned regardless of the bindingness of the provi-
sion. Furthermore, I apply the categorisation of strict and broad also to the measure of 
effectiveness, which is based on the compliance measure. Table 52 on the following page 
summarises all of the compliance and effectiveness measures used in the following anal-
ysis. 
 
Table 52: Strict and Broad Compliance and Effectiveness Measures 
 
Strict 
IPR multilateral coherence 
commitments > 3 
Broad 
IPR multilateral coherence 
commitments > 0 
Compliance 
Compliance sum strict 
Compliance average strict 
Compliance sum broad 
Compliance average broad 
Effectiveness 
Effectiveness sum strict 
Effectiveness average strict 
Effectiveness sum broad 
Effectiveness average broad 
 
 
There are also cases where the measures of compliance and effectiveness are not ap-
plicable (‘NA’). For example, where a PTA does not include any references to an IPR 
multilateral agreement, there also can be no compliance with an agreement. The same is 
true if the PTA includes no references scoring higher than ‘3’ and can therefore not score 
positively on the strict compliance score. Moreover, where the PTA has not entered into 
force, the provisions are not legally binding, and the compliance cannot be attributed to 
the PTA. Moreover, where countries are not compliant with an reference to an IPR mul-
tilateral agreement, yet the extended deadline for ratification has not been reached yet 
(i.e. it lies in the future). 
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5.1.2.2 Legal-institutional Effects: Explanatory Variables 
I use the IPR multilateral coherence variables from my IPRs in PTAs dataset as ex-
planatory variables (3.1.2.4 IPR Multilateral Coherence Variables). Derived from the 
theory of legal-institutional effects, I define the measures for obligation, precision and 
delegation for the IPR multilateral coherence variables. 
For the obligation dimension, all variables have the same score because the measure 
for obligation is represented by their legal form: PTAs. Thus, I will disregard this dimen-
sion for the analysis. For the precision dimension, I use the bindingness coding of the IPR 
multilateral coherence variables. Besides using the scale ranging from 0-5, I also use each 
category of the range as a binary variable in order to identify if any category has a spe-
cifically significant effect (3.1.2.4 IPR Multilateral Coherence Variables). For the dele-
gation dimension, I make a binary differentiation between WIPO-administrated IPR mul-
tilateral agreements vs. those agreements not administered by the WIPO. So far, there has 
been no research on the legal-institutional effects of IPR multilateral coherence in PTAs. 
As my research is foundational research, I focus only on the theoretical concepts and 
refrain from adding more explanatory variables. However, I include some control varia-
bles described in the next subchapter. 
5.1.2.3 Legal-institutional Effects: Control Variables 
To control for other explanatory variables that could influence the legal-institutional 
effects, I draw back on some of the control variables used for the design analysis (4.2.3 
Control Variables).  
Firstly, I include the predefined country blocks with a specific interest in IPRs: classic 
IP leaders, countries with a high increase of patent protection and new IP producers and 
developers (3.3.7 Descriptive Statistics Grouped by Selected Countries). Each block in-
cludes four countries that represent particular IPR interests (Table 17: IPR Country Se-
lection Criteria). It could be that these countries show an increased interest in multilateral 
IPR protection due to their domestic interest in IPR. In order to protect their interests, 
they could pursue multiple strategies of IPR regulation and make sure that the PTA pro-
visions are complied with. These three country blocks could thus positively affect com-
pliance or even effectiveness. Secondly, I control for the economic capacity of countries 
at the time of PTA signature and include the logarithmised GDP (lnGDP) and GDP per 
capita (lnGDPpc). In order to protect IPR, countries need a certain level of resources to 
spare and especially in regards to IPR a substantial amount of domestic knowledge to 
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implement the ratified IPR multilateral agreements. It is thus expected that a higher GDP 
and GDPpc have a positive effect on compliance. Thirdly, the geographical distance be-
tween countries could affect compliance as well as effectiveness. Hereby, I expect that 
countries closer to their trading partners are more likely to comply with their IPR multi-
lateral agreement commitments, as they are more likely to interact with PTA members 
regularly, which increase control as well as dependency factors. The geographical dis-
tance is thus expected to have a negative impact on compliance as well as effectiveness. 
5.1.2.4 Legal-institutional Effects: Descriptive Statistics 
The data includes a total of 4179 data entries containing the country-level information 
of the IPR multilateral coherence commitments per PTA. Out of these 4179 entries, there 
are 1859 including broad IPR multilateral coherence provisions, i.e. with a positive bind-
ingness score, as well as 1637 including strict commitments (bindingness score higher 
than ‘3’). Figure 16 on the next page shows the legal-institutional effects for those data 
entries that do include strict resp. broad IPR multilateral coherence provisions. 
 




The implementation box highlights that 95% of PTAs including strict commitments 
on IPR multilateral coherence made in PTAs entered into force. The share of broad com-
mitments is with 93% slightly lower and indicates that stricter IPR multilateral coherence 
commitments are not hindering PTAs from entering into force. 
The compliance box shows that the average compliance for strict provisions is 84%. 
This means that out of the binding commitments made in PTAs, 84% are followed 
 
0 1038 63% 1256 68%
1 368 22% 475 26%
NA 231 14% 128 7%
BroadStrict
 
0 29 2% 22 1%
1 1377 84% 1709 92%




0 82 5% 128 7%
1 1555 95% 1731 93%
BroadStrict
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through by the time agreed upon in the PTA. Surprisingly, the overall compliance with 
IPR multilateral commitments represented by the broad score is with 92% even higher. 
This could indicate that countries even comply with commitments where the legal bind-
ingness does not require them to, or that countries references mostly those IPR multilat-
eral agreements which they are already complying with, even it is in a non-binding form. 
The effectiveness box illustrates that the effectiveness of strict commitments is 22%. 
This means that in approximately every fifth case, a country agrees upon strict IPR mul-
tilateral agreements that require a change of the status quo and then follows through on 
its commitment. In relation to the compliance score, this suggests that out of those that 
are compliant with the strict commitments made in PTAs, only every fourth adjusts their 
status quo (22%/84%) and the others already ratified the IPR multilateral agreement be-
fore signing the PTA. This suggests that only in one-third of all PTAs, the strict commit-
ments to IPR multilateral agreements require a change of the status quo and are ratified. 
Moreover, the effectiveness for broad commitments is 26%, meaning that the broad com-
mitments are not only more often complied, but also are more likely to lead in a change 
of the domestic status quo than the strict commitments. A stricter level of bindingness is 
thus not necessarily the best approach to achieve higher overall compliance and effec-
tiveness with PTA commitments. 
Of course, compliance and effectiveness levels vary immensely across countries. The 
EU members have not only the highest number of agreement, but their agreements also 
include many (strict) references to IPR multilateral agreements. Graph 25 shows the top 
five countries of the absolute score of strict compliance, and all of them are EU members, 
namely France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, and Italy. France includes in its 106 
PTAs a total of 510 references to IPR multilateral agreements out of which 408 are strict 
commitments. It complies with 320 out of these 408 strict commitments, and only 27 of 
these strict commitments complied with France required a changed in the status quo. The 
scores for the other countries are highly similar and slightly lower. 
Graph 25 suggests that the EU agreements do include many strict commitments to 
IPR multilateral agreements across their PTAs, yet that these commitments mostly do not 
request them to change their status quo. This could mean that the request the change from 
their PTA members as well as them reinforcing their existing commitments to IPR mul-
tilateral coherence through PTAs. However, there are also some strict commitments with-
out compliance, which in combination with the low number of effectiveness, that EU 
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members are less willing to follow through on commitments if they require a change in 
their status quo. 
 
Graph 25: Top 5 Countries for Strict Compliance (absolute) 
 
 
Graph 26 on the next page shows the top five countries for relative strict compliance 
per PTA, i.e. the share of strict commitments implemented by the date set in the PTA. 
Here, the top-scoring countries are Georgia, Russia, Uruguay, Armenia and Kazakhstan. 
Of course, their absolute number of PTAs, as well as strict commitments, is considerably 
lower than for the EU members. But they all show a perfect score on the share of com-
pliance, which means that they follow through on all their commitments made. For ex-
ample, 86% of all IPR multilateral commitments made in PTAs with Georgia are strict 
commitments, and it has ratified all of these IPR multilateral agreements by the time 
agreed upon in the PTA. Armenia and Kazakhstan show a lower share of strict commit-
ments amongst all the mentioned IPR multilateral coherence in their PTAs, but also show 
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Graph 26: Top 5 Countries for Strict Compliance (relative) 
 
 
Albeit these perfect scores, the effectiveness share in Graph 26 indicates that except 
for Russia, the perfect score is solely due to a repetition of commitments to previously 
ratified IPR multilateral agreements. 
Graph 27 on the following page illustrates the five countries, which have changed 
their status quo most often by complying to new IPR multilateral agreements. Again, the 
countries are exclusively EU members, namely Portugal, Greece, Belgium, Ireland and 
the Netherlands. For all five top-scoring countries on absolute effectiveness, their overall 
score of IPR multilateral references is 510 out of which 408 are strict commitments. Ex-
cept for the Netherlands, these EU countries score lower on absolute compliance, having 
complied with fewer agreements than the top five countries. However, out of those that 
they have complied with, Portugal shows the highest number of effectiveness. This means 
that at the time of PTA signature, Portugal had not ratified the IPR multilateral agreement, 
yet had done so by the time set in the PTA. Graph 27 also shows that countries sign 
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gal (‘49’) is higher than the total number of IPR multilateral agreements (‘30’). For in-
stance, Portugal makes the same commitment to the WCT and WPPT in the PTAs Chile 
EC 2002, EC Montenegro 2007 and EC Serbia 2008. Portugal ratified the WCT and 
WPPT in 2010, thus after the date of signature of the PTAs and within the timeframe set 
in all three PTAs. This shows that countries also repeat their previous IPR multilateral 
commitments in PTAs before they have complied to them. 
 
Graph 27: Top 5 Countries for Strict Effectiveness (absolute) 
 
 
Graph 28 on the next page shows the effectiveness score relative to the overall strict 
commitments made by countries and shows that Oman, Liberia, Tuvalu, Bahrain and Vi-
etnam are the countries with the highest share of strict effectiveness per PTA. This means 
that these five countries are the ones that most often follow up on strict commitments 
made in PTAs even if these commitments require them to change the status quo. 
For example, Oman has an overall of nine strict commitments and an absolute strict 
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countries shown in Graph 27, but on average includes a larger share of strict IPR multi-
lateral commitments in their PTAs that requires them to change the status quo and follows 
up on them. 
 
Graph 28: Top 5 Countries for Strict Effectiveness (relative) 
 
 
When looking at the legal-institutional effects from a PTA perspective, the data shows 
that out of the PTAs including strict commitments, there are 91% which show compliance 
by at least one PTA member and 32% which show some level of effectiveness (strict IPR 
multilateral commitments: 255 PTAs, strict compliance: 233 PTAs, strict effectiveness: 
82 PTAs). Thus only every third PTA requesting a change in the status quo of at least one 
PTA member leads to an effective change in the domestic ratification of an IPR multilat-
eral agreement. 
Expectedly, there are certain IPR multilateral agreements scoring much higher resp. lower 
on compliance as well as effectiveness. The IPR multilateral agreements with the highest 
score for strict compliance are the CBD (99.7%), Paris Convention (99.3%), Berne Con-
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compliance are observed for the Singapore Treaty (63.6%), PLT (58.8%), Brussels Con-
vention (52.4%), Vienna Agreement (45.5%) and the Beijing Convention (0%). Hence, 
the Beijing Convention is the only one with no compliance, so far. As it has only been 
signed in 2012 and is, therefore, a reasonably young agreement, this number is likely to 
rise in the upcoming years.  
For strict effectiveness, the scores per IPR multilateral agreement are much lower, but 
also show substantial preferences. The top five IPR multilateral agreements leading to a 
change in the status quo are seen for strict commitments to the Protocol to the Madrid 
Agreement (27.4%), the PLT (20.6%), WPPT (17.6%), WCT (16.5%) and the Nairobi 
Treaty (12.5%). The five agreements with the lowest effectiveness score are the Madrid 
Agreement, WIPO Convention, UCC Geneva, UCC Paris and the Beijing Convention, 
which all have a 0% effectiveness. Except for the Beijing Convention, all were signed in 
the last century and could show at least some level of effectiveness. Especially since the 
WIPO Convention, UCC Geneva and UCC Paris score very high for compliance (89% 
and higher). However, theses IPR multilateral agreements seem to be just a repetition of 
the status quo of their PTA members and never lead to change. The complete lists for the 
compliance and effectiveness scores per IPR multilateral agreement are displayed in Ap-
pendix 57: Compliance per IPR Multilateral Coherence Agreements resp. Appendix 58: 
Effectiveness per IPR Multilateral Coherence Agreements. 
As the descriptive data shows, there is substantial variation in the results of the legal-
institutional effects depending on the used compliance and effectiveness measures. I will, 
therefore, vary the dependent variables in the subsequent analysis and run multiple mod-
els for the measure variations. 
5.1.2.5 Legal-institutional Effects: Models of Analysis 
The regression models are simplified and focus on the postulated relations between 
the dimensions of legalisation and legal-institutional effects. As the aim of this analysis 
is to conduct fundamental research, there might be other influences that are not captured 
in these models. However, the selected variables should provide an adequate overview of 
the legal-institutional effects. 
Similar to the design analysis, the dependent variables here also show an excessive 
number of zeros (see Figure 16: Descriptive Statistics for the Legal-institutional Effects). 
I will thus apply the same model specifications as for the design analysis (4.2.5 Design: 
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Models of Analysis), namely the single stage OLS, OP, P, NB regression as well as the 
two-stage HP, HNB, ZIP, ZINB models: 
 
Figure 17: Legal-Institutional Effects Model Specifications 
 
 
The dependent variables are the binary measures for implementation (model names 
starting with m1), the additive and average index for compliance (beginning with m2) as 
well as the additive and average index for effectiveness (commencing with m3). For com-
pliance and effectiveness, I differentiate between strict and broad commitments to IPR 
multilateral agreements (see Table 52: Strict and Broad Compliance and Effectiveness 
Measures). In total, I test 480 models: for each of the five dependent variables, I run the 
eight models once for the summary measure of IPR multilateral coherence as well as for 
the five binary measures bindingness of IPR multilateral coherence for strict as well as 
broad measures. The model fit for the compilable models is displayed in Appendix 59: 
Model Fit of Legal-Institutional Effects Analysis (AIC & BIC). In the next chapter, I dis-
play and describe the best fitting models in order of the dependent variables. 
5.1.3 Legal-institutional Effects: Analysis 
The following analysis shows that the tested explanatory variables have a significant 
effect on the legal-institutional effects. Thereby, the best fitting models are exclusively 
one-stage models and predominately achieved with OLS or NB regressions. I display the 
models for each of the legal-institutional effects before summarising the results and draw 


























Single-Stage Models: OLS, OP, P, NB
Two-Stage Models: HP, HNB, ZIP, ZINB
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5.1.3.1 Implementation Legal-institutional Effects Analysis 
I expected that the implementation of PTAs is not necessarily connected to the bind-
ingness of IPR multilateral agreements as there are multiple other factors in a PTA that 
can affect the entry into force of a PTA. Nevertheless, the results of the regression anal-
ysis displayed in Table 53 on the following page show that the overall bindingness of IPR 
multilateral agreements in PTAs has a significantly negative effect on the implementation 
of PTAs. The effect is only marginal (-0.001), and the model shows other significant 
effects with a higher impact. First off, the delegation variable accounting for the treaties 
administrated by the WIPO has a strong positive effect on the implementation of the PTA 
(0.092). Thus, with every additional WIPO administrated IPR agreement referenced in 
the PTA, the more likely the PTA enters into force. 
 









WIPO 0.092***     
(0.017) 
Control Variables  
Classic IP leaders 0.014     
(0.011) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.021*     
(0.01) 
New IP producers and developers 0.05***     
(0.013) 
ln GDP (mean) 0                   
(0) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.                       
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0                   
(0) 





Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
Out of the control variables, the country blocks have diverging effects. Whereas the 
classic IP leaders show no significant effect on implementation, the countries with a high 
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increase of patent protection have a significantly negative effect (-0.021) and new IP pro-
ducers and developers a significantly positive effect on implementation (0.05). This 
means that if PTAs are signed by Brazil, China, India or Mexico, they are less likely to 
enter into force, and the effect is inverted for PTAs by Israel, South Korea, Singapore and 
or Taiwan. Of course, the effect is intensified if more than one of the countries per block 
are members of the PTA. Further, the GDP per capita (log) also shows a significantly 
positive effect on implementation, yet on a marginal level. 
In order to see if the level of bindingness of the IPR multilateral agreements matters 
for the implementation measure, I run the model with the binary factors of the levels of 
bindingness ranging from ‘1’ to ‘5’. The results displayed in Table 54 show that the level 
of bindingness indeed matters for the legal-institutional effect of implementation.  
 













    
   Level of Bindingness 1 2 3 4 5 
IPR multilateral agreements -0.082***     
(0.008) 
-0.028***     
(0.005) 
0.005*     
(0.003) 
-0.001     
(0.002) 




    
WIPO 0.092***     
(0.011) 
0.061***     
(0.011) 
0.041***     
(0.011) 
0.049***     
(0.011) 
0.06***     
(0.014) 
Control Variables      
Classic IP leaders 0.01             
(0.01) 
0.021*     
(0.011) 
0.015     
(0.011) 
0.016     
(0.011) 
0.013     
(0.011) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.029**             
(0.01) 
-0.025*     
(0.01) 
-0.021*     
(0.01) 
-0.021*     
(0.01) 
-0.021*     
(0.01) 
New IP producers and developers 0.059***             
(0.013) 
0.06***     
(0.013) 
0.049***     
(0.013) 
0.05***     
(0.013) 
0.049***     
(0.013) 
ln GDP (mean) 0                         
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                
(0) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0**                              
(0) 
0*                     
(0) 
0*               
(0) 
0*                
(0) 
0*              
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0                              
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                         
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Intercept 0.92***     
(0.008) 
0.912***     
(0.008) 
0.915***     
(0.008) 
0.915***     
(0.008) 
0.916***     
(0.008) 
Model m1.1_ols m1.2_ols m1.3_ols m1.4_ols m1.5_ols 
Observations 3602 3602 3602 3602 3602 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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The more binding commitments a PTA includes that are low on the bindingness score, 
the less likely the PTA enters into force. Namely, for the precision category ‘1’ and ‘2’, 
the effects are significantly negative (-0.082; -0.028). The effect becomes significantly 
positive for the subsequent category ‘3’ (0.005), yet on a marginal level. This means that 
the more IPR multilateral agreements are included with provisions such as “shall make 
every possible effort to accede to” the more likely this PTA will enter into force. And 
more importantly, for the legally binding commitments represented by the categories ‘4’ 
and ‘5’, there is no significant effect observed for implementation, meaning that strict 
commitments neither significantly hinder nor enable the entry into force of PTAs. 
The direction of the other effects remains constant for the various levels of binding-
ness. Only for the bindingness of ‘2’ a significant additional effect can be observed. For 
PTAs which include IPR multilateral commitments which reaffirm certain parts of said 
IPR agreements are more likely to enter into force if one or more of the PTA members 
are the classic IP leaders, i.e. the US, EU, EFTA and or Japan. 
The analysis shows that the bindingness of the IPR multilateral agreements has some 
significant effects on the implementation of PTAs. However, these effects are only ob-
served for the legally non-binding commitments, and their significance might be circum-
stantial. Theoretically, it seems unlikely that non-binding PTA commitments have the 
power to stop a PTA from entering into force. Moreover, the other effects in the model 
have a higher impact on implementation than the bindingness of IPR commitments, which 
suggest that the IPR multilateral coherence design features have no substantial impact on 
the legal-institutional effect of implementation. 
5.1.3.2 Compliance Legal-institutional Effects Analysis 
The analysis of the legal-institutional effect of compliance shows that it is indeed af-
fected positively by the level of bindingness of the IPR multilateral agreements. Thereby, 
the effects are more pronounced for the additive than for the average compliance scores. 
Table 55 on the next page displays the strict and broad compliance regression results for 
the best fitting models. 
The effects for the explanatory variable have the same direction, regardless of whether 
the compliance is measured strictly or broadly. Precision has a positive effect on the sum 
of compliance, which is more pronounced for strict measures (0.098) than for the broad 
measure (0.018). Thus, with an increase of the precision of the commitments to IPR mul-
Chapter 5: Effects of Intellectual Property Rights in PTAs  295 
tilateral agreements, the compliance with these commitments increases, especially for le-
gally binding commitments. This positive effect cannot be observed for the average meas-
ure of strict compliance and is only marginal for the average of broad compliance. This 
suggests that the effect of bindingness is tied to the number of agreements a country com-
plies by and less the average compliance per PTA. 
 
Table 55: Legal-Institutional Effects Regression – Compliance I 
 Compliance Sum Compliance Mean 












IPR multilateral agreements 0.098***     
(0.003) 
0.018***                                
(0) 
0                
(0) 





WIPO 0.903***     
(0.142) 
1.205***     
(0.059) 
-0.032.     
(0.018) 
-0.145***     
(0.017) 
Control Variables     
Classic IP leaders -0.019     
(0.082) 
0.09***     
(0.027) 
0.027.     
(0.014) 
-0.008     
(0.013) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.359*     
(0.154) 
-0.115*     
(0.054) 
0.066*     
(0.026) 
0.085***     
(0.023) 
New IP producers and developers -0.657***     
(0.096) 
0.044     
(0.034) 
-0.019     
(0.016) 
-0.044**     
(0.015) 
ln GDP (mean) 0***                                    
(0) 
0***                                    
(0) 
0***                                    
(0) 
0**                                    
(0) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0                                        
(0) 
0**                                      
(0) 
0**                                        
(0) 
0***                                    
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0***                                      
(0) 
0***                                      
(0) 
0                                      
(0) 
0***                                     
(0) 
Intercept – 0.102.     
(0.056) 
0.881***     
(0.015) 
0.944***     
(0.013) 
Model m2ss_op m2bs_p m2sm_ols m2bm_ols 
Observations 1203 1474 1203 1474 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
Furthermore, with an increase of WIPO-administrated treaties referenced in the PTA, 
the odds of compliance rise as well. The effect is significant for all measures, yet positive 
for both measures of the sum of compliance (0.903; 1.205) and negative for the average 
compliance measures (-0.032; -0.145). This indicates that the more WIPO-administrated 
treaties are referenced in a PTA, the higher the compliance in absolute numbers of IPR 
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multilateral agreements referenced in the PTA, but also the lower is the compliance com-
pared to all the references of such agreements in the PTA.  
For the control variables, the effects are more divergent. The classic IP leaders have 
only a significantly positive effect on the sum of compliance towards broad IPR multilat-
eral coherence and the average compliance for strict commitments. This means that PTAs, 
where the US, EU, EFTA and or Japan are members, are more likely to include references 
to IPR multilateral agreements, where PTA members comply to these references even 
without a legally binding commitment in the PTA. On the other hand, their PTAs are also 
more likely to achieve a higher strict compliance average, which means that out of all the 
strict commitments made per PTA, there will be more likely compliance to these com-
mitments if one of these countries is a PTA member. However, this positive effect could 
also be related to the matter that, for instance, the EU and EFTA PTAs mention many 
IPR multilateral agreements, which have already been ratified by most of their members. 
The countries with a high increase of patent protection have mostly a significantly 
positive effect on compliance, except for the sum of compliance with broad commit-
ments, where a significantly negative effect is observed (-0.115). Thus, if Brazil, China, 
India and or Mexico are PTA members, the PTA is more likely to include more strict 
commitments, which are complied. Moreover, out of all the commitments made in the 
PTA, be they strict or broad, a higher share of them is complied with if at least one of 
these countries is a PTA member. However, if these countries are part of a PTA, which 
includes non-binding references to agreements, the (legally non-required) compliance 
with these commitments is significantly lower for PTAs with these four countries. If one 
signs a PTA with countries with a high increase of patent protection, the odds of compli-
ance are thus fairly high for strict commitments and negative for broad ones. 
PTAs with the new IP producers and developers show only significantly negative ef-
fects on compliance, however, not for all measures. The effect is significantly negative 
for the sum of strict compliance (-0.657) and the average of broad compliance (-0.044). 
This implies that PTAs with Israel, South Korea, Singapore and or Taiwan are much less 
likely to include a higher number of strict commitments that are complied. Moreover, 
they are also less likely to comply with many of the referenced to IPR multilateral agree-
ments in their PTAs. 
The average GDP (log), GDP per capita (log) and geographic distance (log) all show 
a positive effect on compliance, yet on a highly marginal level (estimates < 0.00000). 
Compared to the other measures, they can only explain a small share of the strict as well 
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as broad compliance of countries. In order to see if a specific level of bindingness drives 
the results, Table 56 shows the effects for the sum of strict compliance according to the 
level of bindingness whereas Table 57 shows the average of strict compliance. 
Table 56 shows that all of the levels of IPR multilateral coherence bindingness have 
a significant effect on the sum of strict compliance. However, the legally non-binding 
measures (categories ‘1’, ‘2’ and ‘3’) have a negative effect on the sum of strict compli-
ance and the strict measures (categories ‘4’ and ‘5’) show a positive one. Hereby, the 
effect is marginally stronger for the highest category of bindingness (0.063). The results 
indicate that strict compliance is negatively affected by an increased number of non-bind-
ing references to IPR multilateral agreements in the PTA as well as positively influenced 
by a higher number of strict IPR multilateral commitments. 
 













    
   Level of Bindingness 1 2 3 4 5 
IPR multilateral agreements -0.321***     
(0.054) 
-0.165***     
(0.013) 
-0.09***     
(0.021) 
0.043***     
(0.004) 




    
WIPO 2.938***     
(0.126) 
1.949***     
(0.074) 
2.868***     
(0.125) 
1.815***     
(0.074) 
1.47***     
(0.073) 
Control Variables      
Classic IP leaders -0.041             
(0.08) 
0.033     
(0.044) 
-0.009     
(0.08) 
-0.223***     
(0.045) 
0.15***     
(0.04) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.423**             
(0.152) 
0.262**     
(0.085) 
0.495**     
(0.151) 
0.218**     
(0.084) 
0.073     
(0.076) 
New IP producers and developers -0.351***             
(0.094) 
0.009     
(0.057) 
-0.348***     
(0.094) 
-0.181***     
(0.055) 
-0.137**     
(0.05) 
ln GDP (mean) 0***                                       
(0) 
0***                                  
(0) 
0***                                   
(0) 
0***                                    
(0) 
0***                            
(0) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0***                              
(0) 
0***                                   
(0) 
0***                          
(0) 
0***                              
(0) 
0***                                   
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0***                              
(0) 
0***                               
(0) 
0***                                     
(0) 
0***                                       
(0) 
0***                               
(0) 
Intercept – 0.012     
(0.076) 
– 0.129.     
(0.075) 
0.014     
(0.072) 
Model m2ss.1_op m2ss.2_nb m2ss.3_op m2ss.4_nb m2ss.5_nb 
Observations 1203 1203 1203 1203 1203 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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   Level of Bindingness 1 2 3 4 5 
IPR multilateral agreements -0.058***     
(0.009) 
0                    
(0.004) 
-0.006.     
(0.004) 
-0.003*     
(0.001) 




    
WIPO -0.015     
(0.015) 
-0.034*     
(0.015) 
-0.028.     
(0.015) 
-0.029.     
(0.015) 
-0.047**     
(0.017) 
Control Variables      
Classic IP leaders 0.021             
(0.014) 
0.027.     
(0.014) 
0.026.     
(0.014) 
0.034*     
(0.014) 
0.033*     
(0.014) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.047.             
(0.026) 
0.066*     
(0.026) 
0.063*     
(0.026) 
0.065*     
(0.026) 
0.063*     
(0.026) 
New IP producers and developers -0.011             
(0.016) 
-0.019     
(0.016) 
-0.015     
(0.016) 
-0.019     
(0.016) 
-0.016     
(0.016) 
ln GDP (mean) 0***                                       
(0) 
0***                 
(0) 
0***                       
(0) 
0***                       
(0) 
0***              
(0) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0*                              
(0) 
0**                            
(0) 
0**             
(0) 
0**                          
(0) 
0*                          
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0                              
(0) 
0                       
(0) 
0                            
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
Intercept 0.889***     
(0.015) 
0.881***     
(0.015) 
0.88***     
(0.015) 
0.88***     
(0.015) 
0.877***     
(0.015) 
Model m2sm.1_ols m2sm.2_ols m2sm.3_ols m2sm.4_ols m2sm.5_ols 
Observations 1203 1203 1203 1203 1203 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
Table 57 highlights that the effects on the average compliance to strict commitments 
are much less pronounced than the effects for absolute compliance. For the categories ‘1’ 
and ‘3’, the effect remains significantly negative, whereas category ‘2’ shows no signifi-
cant effects on average compliance. Furthermore, the effect is also significantly negative 
for the binding category ‘4’, and the only significant positive effect is found for the high-
est bindingness category ‘5’. Thus, unlike for the absolute compliance the average strict 
compliance is impacted negatively by IPR multilateral commitments requesting an acces-
sion and positively to reaffirmations. This could imply that most compliance can be found 
for countries, which repeat, i.e. reaffirm their pre-existing commitments to IPR multilat-
eral agreements in PTAs instead of requesting at least one PTA member to accede to one 
of these agreements post PTA signature. 
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   Level of Bindingness 1 2 3 4 5 
IPR multilateral agreements 0.046*     
(0.019) 
-0.012                    
(0.01) 
0.033***     
(0.005) 
0.027***     
(0.003) 




    
WIPO 2.013***     
(0.064) 
2.031***     
(0.064) 
1.989***     
(0.064) 
1.987***     
(0.063) 
1.633***     
(0.062) 
Control Variables      
Classic IP leaders 0.08.             
(0.041) 
0.079.     
(0.042) 
0.056     
(0.04) 
-0.011     
(0.041) 
0.255***     
(0.036) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.15.             
(0.078) 
-0.17*     
(0.077) 
-0.15*     
(0.076) 
-0.149*     
(0.075) 
-0.223**     
(0.069) 
New IP producers and developers -0.04             
(0.051) 
-0.016     
(0.054) 
-0.04     
(0.051) 
-0.018     
(0.05) 
0.032     
(0.045) 
ln GDP (mean) 0***                                       
(0) 
0***                                  
(0) 
0***                                   
(0) 
0***                                    
(0) 
0***                            
(0) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0***                              
(0) 
0***                                   
(0) 
0***                          
(0) 
0***                              
(0) 
0***                                   
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0***                              
(0) 
0***                               
(0) 
0***                                     
(0) 
0***                                       
(0) 
0***                                   
(0) 
Intercept 0.125*     
(0.063) 
0.137*     
(0.063) 
0.145*     
(0.062) 
0.151*     
(0.062) 
0.077     
(0.06) 
Model m2bs.1_nb m2bs.2_nb m2bs.3_nb m2bs.4_nb m2bs.5_nb 
Observations 1474 1474 1474 1474 1474 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
For broad commitments, the regression analysis shows a different picture. Whereas 
for the absolute strict compliance (Table 56), the effects are all significant and negative 
for the legally non-binding and positive for the binding commitments, the absolute broad 
compliance shows only significantly positive effects (Table 58) except for category ‘2’ 
without significant effects. 
The effects are far less pronounced than for the absolute strict compliance, implying 
that the compliance to non-binding commitments is affected on a lower level by the pre-
cision of the commitments. Moreover, all of the categories show a similar effect on the 
sum of broad compliance, which indicates that this effect is not driven by a particular 
form of commitment. The commitments reaffirming specific parts of IPR multilateral 
agreements (category ‘2’) has no significant effect on compliance, which could imply that 
such commitments are redundant. 
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   Level of Bindingness 1 2 3 4 5 
IPR multilateral agreements -0.026***     
(0.007) 
-0.014***                    
(0.004) 
0               
(0.002) 
0.001     
(0.001) 




    
WIPO -0.073***     
(0.014) 
-0.078***     
(0.014) 
-0.082***     
(0.014) 
-0.084***     
(0.014) 
-0.124***     
(0.016) 
Control Variables      
Classic IP leaders -0.018             
(0.014) 
0                
(0.014) 
-0.009     
(0.014) 
-0.012     
(0.014) 
0.008     
(0.014) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.062**             
(0.023) 
0.078***     
(0.023) 
0.074**     
(0.023) 
0.076**     
(0.023) 
0.075**     
(0.023) 
New IP producers and developers -0.048**             
(0.015) 
-0.033*     
(0.016) 
-0.048**     
(0.016) 
-0.048**     
(0.015) 
-0.042**     
(0.015) 
ln GDP (mean) 0***                                       
(0) 
0***                                  
(0) 
0***                                   
(0) 
0***                                    
(0) 
0***                            
(0) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0***                              
(0) 
0***                                   
(0) 
0***                          
(0) 
0***                              
(0) 
0***                                   
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0***                              
(0) 
0***                               
(0) 
0***                                     
(0) 
0***                                       
(0) 
0***                                   
(0) 
Intercept 0.96***     
(0.013) 
0.944***     
(0.013) 
0.949***     
(0.013) 
0.949***     
(0.013) 
0.942***     
(0.013) 
Model m1.1_ols m1.2_ols m1.3_ols m1.4_ols m1.5_ols 
Observations 3602 3602 3602 3602 3602 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
Comparing the average compliance of strict (Table 57) and broad commitments (Ta-
ble 59) shows that the effects are highly similar for categories ‘1’ and ‘5’. In both cases, 
the effect is significantly positive for the strict bindingness and significantly negative for 
the least binding commitment. The categories in-between alternate in their significance. 
For average broad compliance, the effect is only significantly negative for category ‘2’, 
whereas the effects of average strict compliance are significantly negative for ‘3’ and ‘4’.  
The average compliance of broad and strict commitments are thus affected the same 
for the lowest and highest level of precision, whereas the effects in-between are mostly 
significantly negative for the average compliance with strict commitments than with 
broad commitments. This suggests that the more non-binding references a PTA includes, 
the less likely the countries will comply with their commitments, regardless if their strict 
or broad. In like manner, an increase of reaffirmation commitments, countries are more 
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likely to comply with their IPR multilateral coherence commitments. This could indicate 
that shallower IPR commitments lead to less overall compliance than stringent ones. 
In the following chapter, I connect the compliance to those instances where the IPR 
multilateral coherence commitments led to a change in the domestic ratification of the 
IPR multilateral agreements. 
5.1.3.3 Effectiveness Legal-institutional Effects Analysis 
The analysis of the effectiveness shows that both precision, as well as delegation, have 
a significantly positive impact on the effectiveness of IPR multilateral commitments 
made in PTAs. Moreover, the changes in the status quo are more likely if amongst the 
PTA members are classic IP leaders. 
First off, Table 60 displays the strict and broad effectiveness regression results for the 
best fitting models.  
 
Table 60: Legal-Institutional Effects Regression – Effectiveness I 
 Effectiveness Sum Effectiveness Mean 












IPR multilateral agreements 0.017***     
(0.002) 
0.01***     
(0.002) 
0                  
(0) 
0               
(0) 
Delegation       
WIPO 3.635***     
(1.011) 
2.716***     
(0.47) 
0.046***     
(0.011) 
0.051***     
(0.009) 
Control Variables       
Classic IP leaders 1.301***     
(0.185) 
0.955***     
(0.165) 
0.045***     
(0.009) 
0.027***     
(0.007) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.019     
(0.465) 
-0.721.     
(0.406) 
0                
(0.016) 
-0.016     
(0.012) 
New IP producers and developers 0.148     
(0.209) 
-0.083     
(0.207) 
0.024*     
(0.01) 
0.012     
(0.008) 
ln GDP (mean) 0*                                    
(0) 
0                                    
(0) 
0                                    
(0) 
0                                    
(0) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0***                                        
(0) 
0*                               
(0) 
0***                                        
(0) 
0***                                        
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0***                                      
(0) 
0***                                      
(0) 
0***                                      
(0) 
0***                                      
(0) 
Intercept -5.421***     
(1.01) 
-4.003***     
(0.46) 
0.011     
(0.009) 
0.021**     
(0.007) 
Model m3ss_nb m3bs_nb m3sm_ols m3bm_ols 
Observations 1203 1474 1203 1474 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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The precision variables have a significantly positive effect on the sum of effective-
ness, yet not on average effectiveness. This means that with an increase of the precision 
the effectiveness of both the strict and broad commitments increase as well. However, the 
precision has no significant effect on the average effectiveness. The delegation variable 
also has a significantly positive effect on all measures of effectiveness, indicating that 
with an increase of WIPO-administrated agreements in the PTA both the absolute as well 
as the relative number of legally binding as well as non-binding commitments increases. 
Moreover, the control variables also have a significant effect on the effectiveness 
measures. The most pronounced one can be observed for the classic IP leaders, which 
have a strong significantly positive effect on the sum of both strict and broad effectiveness 
as well as on a lower level for the average effectiveness. Thus, if the US, EU, EFTA and 
or Japan are PTA members, it is more likely that the IPR multilateral coherence commit-
ments in a PTAs are complied with and lead to a change in the status quo of at least one 
PTA member. This suggests that if PTAs with these countries either ask for more changes 
if the status quo and or are able to follow through on them respectively make their PTA 
partners compliant. Classic IP leaders thus impact the multilateral IPR regulation by in-
cluding and following up on their IPR multilateral coherence commitments in their PTAs. 
Countries with a high increase of patent protection only have a significantly negative 
effect on the sum of effectiveness for broad commitments (-0.721). This means that if one 
of these countries is part of the PTA, the PTA members are less likely to either comply 
with the IPR multilateral commitments and or they do not require a change of the status 
quo. As Table 55 already shows a significantly negative effect for broad compliance, it is 
likely that PTAs with Brazil, China, India and or Mexico are less likely leading to com-
pliance as well as more likely to repeat the status quo in PTAs than requesting a change 
by PTA members. Thus, PTAs with the countries with a high increase of patent protection 
are less likely to change the multilateral IPR regulation as they both negatively affect 
compliance as well as effectiveness. 
New IP producers and developers also have only one significant effect, namely a pos-
itive one on the average effectiveness of strict commitments (0.024). This indicates that 
PTAs with Israel, South Korea, Singapore and or Taiwan as members are more likely to 
comply with a higher share of all their commitments made even if these commitments 
require a change of the status quo. As the effect is only visible for the strict effectiveness, 
it can be assumed that they tend to include fewer commitments in their PTAs, yet are 
compliant even if the commitments mean they or their PTA partners have to adjust their 
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status quo. Because Table 55 shows no significant effect of these countries for the strict 
compliance, it can be assumed that they are not simply repeating their pre-existing IPR 
multilateral commitments, but use PTAs to enforce IPR multilateral regulations by re-
questing other to change their status quo or doing it themselves. 
The remaining control variables average GDP (log), GDP per capita (log) and geo-
graphic distance (log) all have a significantly positive effect on effectiveness, yet on a 
marginal level (estimates < 0.000). This means that their impact on effectiveness happens 
on a negligible level. 
In order to analyse the effects of precision on effectiveness in more detail, I look first 
at the sum of effectiveness for strict commitments in Table 61 and then on their average 
effectiveness in Table 62. 
 













    
   Level of Bindingness 1 2 3 4 5 
IPR multilateral agreements -0.26***     
(0.076) 
-0.921***     
(0.133) 
-0.021     
(0.039) 
0.125***     
(0.009) 




    
WIPO 2.008***     
(0.367) 
4.55***     
(1.005) 
4.341***     
(1.006) 
3.98***     
(1.008) 
4.407***     
(1.007) 
Control Variables      
Classic IP leaders 0.94***             
(0.131) 
1.579***     
(0.179) 
1.313***     
(0.191) 
0.854***     
(0.19) 
1.259***     
(0.194) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.02             
(0.299) 
-0.048     
(0.442) 
-0.026     
(0.474) 
0.165     
(0.453) 
0.005     
(0.472) 
New IP producers and developers 0.155             
(0.148) 
0.511*     
(0.214) 
0.021     
(0.216) 
0.138     
(0.21) 
-0.023     
(0.216) 
ln GDP (mean) 0                                       
(0) 
0**                                  
(0) 
0.                     
(0) 
0*                       
(0) 
0.             
(0) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0*                              
(0) 
0                                   
(0) 
0                          
(0) 
0**                              
(0) 
0                                   
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0***                              
(0) 
0***                               
(0) 
0***                                     
(0) 
0***                                       
(0) 
0***                                   
(0) 
Intercept – -5.801***     
(1.012) 
-5.414***     
(1.011) 
-5.193***     
(1.009) 
-5.379***     
(1.011) 
Model m3ss.1_op m3ss.2_nb m3ss.3_nb m3ss.4_nb m3ss.5_nb 
Observations 1203 1203 1203 1203 1203 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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The effects of the non-binding levels of precision are significantly negative for cate-
gories ‘1’ (-0.26) and ‘2’ (-0.921) and significantly positive for category ‘4’ (0.125), 
whilst the other categories are not significantly affected. This means that the more refer-
ences or partial reaffirmations of IPR multilateral agreements are in a PTA, the less will 
the PTA lead to a change of the status quo of domestic reaffirmation of these IPR multi-
lateral agreements. And as to be expected, the only positive effect comes out of those 
legally binding PTA provisions requiring PTA members to accede to one of the IPR mul-
tilateral agreements.  
The lack of a significant effect for category ‘3’ (“shall make an effort to accede”) 
shows that these non-binding commitments in PTAs will not lead to a change of the status 
quo. Likewise, the reaffirmation category ‘5’ seems to serve a mere consolidation purpose 
of pre-existing regulation and does not lead to a change of the status quo of PTA mem-
bers. 
 













    
   Level of Bindingness 1 2 3 4 5 
IPR multilateral agreements -0.014*     
(0.006) 
-0.015***     
(0.002) 
0.003     
(0.002) 
0.007***     
(0.001) 




    
WIPO 0.052***     
(0.009) 
0.055***     
(0.009) 
0.046***     
(0.009) 
0.037***     
(0.009) 
0.068***     
(0.01) 
Control Variables      
Classic IP leaders 0.044***             
(0.009) 
0.057***     
(0.009) 
0.045***     
(0.009) 
0.029***     
(0.008) 
0.035***     
(0.009) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.004             
(0.016) 
0.006     
(0.015) 
0.002     
(0.016) 
0.003     
(0.015) 
0.005     
(0.016) 
New IP producers and developers 0.026**             
(0.01) 
0.042***     
(0.01) 
0.022*     
(0.01) 
0.025**     
(0.009) 
0.02*     
(0.009) 
ln GDP (mean) 0                                       
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
0                       
(0) 
0                       
(0) 
0              
(0) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0***                              
(0) 
0***                           
(0) 
0***             
(0) 
0***                          
(0) 
0***                           
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0***                              
(0) 
0***                       
(0) 
0***                            
(0) 
0**                       
(0) 
0***                   
(0) 
Intercept 0.013     
(0.009) 
0.002     
(0.009) 
0.011     
(0.009) 
0.013     
(0.009) 
0.016.     
(0.009) 
Model m3sm.1_ols m3sm.2_ols m3sm.3_ols m3sm.4_ols m3sm.5_ols 
Observations 1203 1203 1203 1203 1203 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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The results for the average effectiveness of strict commitments paint a similar picture. 
As Table 62 on the previous page shows, the level of precision has a significant effect on 
all categories except category ‘3’. The previous assumptions about the negative effect of 
non-binding commitments on the effectiveness of strict commitments are thus reaffirmed, 
as well as the positive effect of legally binding commitments calling for the accession of 
an IPR multilateral agreement (category ‘4’). This means that more precise commitments 
have only a positive effect on strict effectiveness if the precision requires PTA members 
to accede to an IPR multilateral agreement. 
Additionally to the effects previously seen for the sum of effectiveness, category ‘5’ 
shows a significantly negative effect on the average effectiveness of strict commitments. 
This strengthens the presumptions that the mere reaffirmation of IPR multilateral agree-
ments in PTAs serves another purpose than changing the status quo. 
Table 63 displays the results for the sum of effectiveness to broad commitments. 
 













    
   Level of Bindingness 1 2 3 4 5 
IPR multilateral agreements -0.011     
(0.072) 
-0.857***     
(0.111) 
0.034*     
(0.017) 
0.127***     
(0.009) 




    
WIPO 3.143***     
(0.461) 
3.263***     
(0.456) 
3.1***     
(0.461) 
2.846***     
(0.462) 
3.366***     
(0.463) 
Control Variables      
Classic IP leaders 1.005***             
(0.17) 
1.306***     
(0.158) 
0.992***     
(0.166) 
0.549***     
(0.165) 
0.919***     
(0.168) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.842*             
(0.404) 
-0.772*     
(0.388) 
-0.802*     
(0.402) 
-0.519     
(0.388) 
-0.83*     
(0.393) 
New IP producers and developers -0.173             
(0.21) 
0.307     
(0.21) 
-0.167     
(0.208) 
-0.054     
(0.202) 
-0.258     
(0.209) 
ln GDP (mean) 0                                       
(0) 
0                                  
(0) 
0                                   
(0) 
0                                    
(0) 
0                            
(0) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0                              
(0) 
0                                   
(0) 
0                          
(0) 
0*                              
(0) 
0                                   
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0***                              
(0) 
0**                               
(0) 
0***                                
(0) 
0***                                       
(0) 
0***                                   
(0) 
Intercept -4.006***     
(0.461) 
-4.316***     
(0.463) 
-4.003***     
(0.461) 
-3.86***     
(0.457) 
-3.951***     
(0.46) 
Model m3bs.1_nb m3bs.2_nb m3bs.3_nb m3bs.4_nb m3bs.5_nb 
Observations 1474 1474 1474 1474 1474 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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For the sum of effectiveness to broad commitments, Table 63 shows that the effects 
are different from the ones for strict commitments (Table 61). For category ‘1’, there is 
no significant effect. Instead, the effects for categories ‘3’ and ‘5’ become significant. 
The effects are significantly negative for categories ‘2’ (-0.857) and ‘5’ (-0.047), and 
interestingly significantly positive for both categories ‘3’ (0.034) and ‘4’ (0.127). This 
means that for those PTAs reaffirming certain parts or the entire IPR multilateral agree-
ment, there is less effectiveness of broad commitments. Further, PTAs including more 
non-binding and binding accession requirements have a positive effect on the sum of ef-
fectiveness of broad commitments. This means that the more PTA provisions require ac-
cession to an IPR multilateral agreement or at least a reasonable effort to do so are more 
likely to lead to a change of the status quo of at least one PTA member. The non-binding 
accession commitments seem to have a positive effect after all and increase the overall 
effectiveness of PTAs. 
 













    
   Level of Bindingness 1 2 3 4 5 
IPR multilateral agreements -0.004     
(0.004) 
-0.016***     
(0.002) 
0.001     
(0.001) 
0.007***     
(0.001) 




    
WIPO 0.045***     
(0.007) 
0.048***     
(0.007) 
0.042***     
(0.007) 
0.034***     
(0.007) 
0.069***     
(0.008) 
Control Variables      
Classic IP leaders 0.026***             
(0.007) 
0.038***     
(0.007) 
0.027***     
(0.007) 
0.013.     
(0.007) 
0.017*     
(0.007) 
Countries with a high increase of pa-
tent protection 
-0.016             
(0.012) 
-0.011     
(0.012) 
-0.014     
(0.012) 
-0.008     
(0.011) 
-0.015     
(0.012) 
New IP producers and developers 0.013             
(0.008) 
0.029***     
(0.008) 
0.012     
(0.008) 
0.015*     
(0.008) 
0.009     
(0.008) 
ln GDP (mean) 0                                       
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                             
(0) 
0                             
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0***                              
(0) 
0***                           
(0) 
0***                       
(0) 
0***                          
(0) 
0*                         
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0***                              
(0) 
0***                       
(0) 
0***                                  
(0) 
0***                                 
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
Intercept 0.022**     
(0.007) 
0.015*     
(0.007) 
0.02**     
(0.007) 
0.021**     
(0.006) 
0.024***     
(0.007) 
Model m3bm.1_ols m3bm.2_ols m3bm.3_ols m3bm.4_ols m3bm.5_ols 
Observations 1474 1474 1474 1474 1474 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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Finally, Table 64 shows the effects on the average effectiveness of broad commit-
ments and the effects are almost identical to the ones on strict commitments (Table 62). 
The only difference is that the precision category ‘1’ loses its significance. This means 
that the level of precision has the same effect on the average effectiveness for both strict 
as well as broad commitments. Thus, the only positive effect on the average effectiveness 
can be observed for those commitments requesting the accession to an IPR commitment. 
This means that the average change in the status quo is higher for those provisions spe-
cifically demanding the accession to an IPR multilateral agreement, whilst the other com-
mitments either are not complied with and or have no effect on the status quo. 
Overall, the effectiveness analysis shows that both precision and delegation play a 
significant role in the absolute and relative effectiveness of IPR multilateral commit-
ments. However, the role of the included PTA members, namely the classic IP leaders, 
plays a crucial role as well. 
5.1.3.4 Summary of Legal-Institutional Effects Analysis  
As seen in the analysis, the legal-institutional effects are indeed affected by the dif-
ferent forms of legalisation. Both precision, as well as delegation, affect the implementa-
tion, compliance and effectiveness of the IPR multilateral coherence commitments made 
in PTAs. Moreover, the analysis provides evidence that most of the postulated hypotheses 
are reaffirmed (see 5.1.1 Legal-institutional Effects: Theory). Before summarising the 
most important results, Table 65 lists the hypotheses, their relation based on the theory 
(‘T’) as well as the relation shown in the regression analysis (‘RA’). 
 
Table 65: Overview of the Analysis for Legal-Institutional Effects 
Hypotheses and Conclusions Relation 
H1 The bindingness of IPR multilateral coherence commitments in the PTA has no 
significant effect on their implementation. 
T:    no effect 
RA: negative/ 
no effect 
H2 The bindingness of IPR multilateral coherence commitments in the PTA increases 
their compliance. 
T:    positive 
RA: positive 
H3 The bindingness of IPR multilateral coherence commitments in the PTA increases 
their effectiveness. 
T:    positive 
RA: positive 
H4 The effect of WIPO-administered IPR multilateral agreements is stronger than the 
effect of other IPR multilateral agreements. 
T:    positive 
RA: positive 
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Hypothesis 1 is tested with the implementation analysis (5.1.3.1). The overall score 
shows a significantly negative effect, which is contrary to the postulated hypothesis sug-
gesting no effect. However, the effect is highly marginal (-0.001) and only significantly 
negative for the two lowest scoring non-binding commitments (‘1’ and ‘2’), and even 
significantly positive for the third non-binding commitment (‘3’). Further, the two bind-
ing precision categories (‘4’ and ‘5’) show no significant effect on implementation. H1 
can thus only partially be accepted, namely for strict commitments. The non-binding 
commitments show a significantly positive as well as negative effect on implementation 
and H1 should thus be rejected. 
Hypothesis 2 is checked by the compliance analysis (5.1.3.2). And indeed, precision 
has a significantly positive effect on compliance and H2 can be reaffirmed. The same is 
true for hypothesis 3, which is covered by the effectiveness analysis (5.1.3.3). Here, the 
level of bindingness also shows a significant positive effect on the effectiveness of IPR 
multilateral agreements in PTAs. Thus, H3 can be reaffirmed as well. However, the anal-
ysis shows that the control variables, especially the country blocks also have a consider-
able effect on the effectiveness. The most distinct effect is thereby observed for the classic 
IP leaders, which have a significantly positive impact on effectiveness. 
Hypothesis 4 is tested in all three analysis by the inclusion of the delegation variable 
for WIPO-administrated treaties. The analyses show that the delegation to WIPO indeed 
has a significantly positive effect on implementation, compliance and effectiveness. The 
only significantly negative effect can be observed for the average compliance score, 
which suggests that more WIPO-administrated treaties do increase the overall compli-
ance, yet might decrease the compliance with non-WIPO administrated agreements. 
Overall, the results for delegation reaffirm H4. 
Concluding, both precision as well as delegation affect the legal-institutional effects. 
However, the analysis shows that many of the binding commitments in PTAs are repeti-
tions of the status quo and that only commitments with a binding accession requirement 
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5.1.4 Legal-institutional Effects: Conclusion 
The analysis shows that the legal commitments made to IPR multilateral agreements 
do matter and that compliance with the PTA commitments is very high (see Figure 16: 
Descriptive Statistics for the Legal-institutional Effects). Furthermore, in a clear majority 
of cases, the countries are not required to change their pre-existing commitments to IPR 
multilateral agreements, which indicates, on the one hand, that countries often reaffirm 
their status quo in the PTAs, and on the other hand, that only a minority of PTA members 
has to adjust their status quo. For future research, it would be interesting to analyse what 
role the power argument plays and which countries are more likely to repeat respectively 
adjust their status quo. For a more detailed analysis, future research should analyse coun-
tries behaviour in more depth, for instance, by making country-specific case studies. 
These could account for the domestic intentions to join an IPR multilateral agreement 
aside from the PTA provisions. Further, the analysis of legal-institutional effects can be 
adapted for the analysis of other multilateral agreements mentioned in PTAs besides IPR 
multilateral agreements. 
Future research can also build on my analysis of legal-institutional effects to measure 
the legal effects of IPRs in PTAs. My data already builds the starting point with the var-
iables on IPR. These variables could be matched by a domestic IPR coding of the same 
variables. Currently, there already exists domestic data on a substantial part of the TRIPS-
plus data for several countries by Gold et al. (2019) that could be analysed for the legal 
effects of the TRIPS-plus variables. Ideally, the data would expand to the other IPR var-
iables as well and expand the country coverage of Gold et al. (2019). Only by comparing 
the full coverage of IPRs in PTAs, their domestic legal effects become measurable. Due 
to the lack of such a domestic coding, I refrain from a partial analysis of the TRIPS-plus 
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5.2 Economic Effects 
At the centre of the analysis of the economic effects are the postulated effects of IPR 
protection (see Figure 4: Rationale of IPRs). Thus, the aim of this chapter is to test if the 
design of IPRs in PTAs shows any indications of a positive effect on the factors antici-
pated by the rationale of IPRs. For instance, countries are willing to regulate the market 
of intellectual property because they expect a positive effect of IPR protection on FDI 
and innovation. The analysis of the economic effects should show if there is any statistical 
evidence that the design of IPRs in PTAs matters economically. 
The rationale of IPR protection is widely accepted, yet there is comparatively little 
empirical evidence for the postulated economic effects of IPRs. This has to do with the 
nature of the affected factors such as FDI, which are affected by various other elements 
besides IPRs, and the structural difference between IPRs and their alleged impacted fac-
tors: 
 
“The idea that patents are necessary to support invention is so ingrained that we would expect 
there to be massive empirical evidence in its favour. In fact, systematic evidence of any causal 
relationship has always been elusive, in part because of the difficulty of finding data that could 
firmly attribute investments on inventions to changes in national patent laws and regulations. 
The former are microeconomic decisions while the latter are macroeconomic conditions that 
are challenging to quantify.” Maskus (2012, 44) 
 
This argument by Maskus can be expanded to IPRs in general. Thus, one of the issues 
of IPR analysis is the gap between the two levels of analysis. The microeconomic factors 
such as FDI can supposedly be explained (partially) by macroeconomic elements such as 
IPR regulation. However, there is a lack of comparative data on domestic IPR legislation, 
i.e. data that covers the development over time for multiple countries in a comparative 
manner. And additionally, most existing explanatory data strongly generalises IPR by 
using patent protection as the only indicator for IPR regulation. Thus, the economic ef-
fects of stronger IPR protection are empirically challenging to identify (Fink and 
Reichenmiller 2005, 7). This makes causal statements such as “IPRs increase FDI” diffi-
cult to analyse and support with statistical evidence, as the effects cannot be solely allo-
cated to changes in IPR regulation and often the definition of IPRs actually refers exclu-
sively to patents. 
Nevertheless, there have been studies analysing the economic effects of IPRs that 
found a significant relationship between postulated factors and domestic IPR regulation. 
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Until now, there existed no comprehensive and detailed datasets covering the commit-
ments on IPRs in PTAs, and consequentially, studies on the effects of IPRs in PTAs are 
rare. The previous research on the topic predominately used a binary coding of PTAs, 
which either include IPR commitments versus PTAs without an IPR provisions to test the 
economic effects. Such a simplification of design measures was a common approach for 
the effect analysis of PTAs, and Dür et al. (2014, 354) stated that “many studies concep-
tualize PTAs as a dichotomous variable, namely whether countries sign an agreement or 
not, and hence treat PTAs as if they were all equal in purpose and effect.” By moving 
beyond the binary coding of PTAs design features, the analysis of effects becomes more 
meaningful. Due to the knowledge on the design variations of IPRs in PTAs, I can analyse 
if the economic effects are based on more stringent IPR protection or if it is enough for a 
PTA to include general IPR statements. The rationale of IPR claims many positive effects 
for itself and the analysis of PTAs with stringent IPRs in PTAs should reflect at least 
some of these tendencies. Otherwise, the design of IPRs– at least in PTAs – might not 
matter in the way that the rationale of IPR in PTAs suggests. 
In the following subchapters, I provide an overview of the theory for the economic 
effects and analysed factors, followed by a description of the data and the regression anal-
ysis, which tests the postulated hypotheses. 
5.2.1 Economic Effects: Theory 
The theory of economic effects is based on the rationale of IPRs (see 2.2.1.2 Rationale 
of IPRs). Summarising the rationale, IPR is intermediately expected to compensate for 
seed capital, lead to investment in R&D, create reliability for consumers, improve the 
quality of the IPR protected goods, help consumers to overcome information asymme-
tries, create an obligation to disclose information, lag competition, increase FDI and li-
censing (outcome). From a long-term perspective, IPRs are expected to increase innova-
tion, technology transfer, growth and welfare (impact).  
Previous research was predominately conducted for the economic effects of domestic 
IPR regulation and not IPRs in PTAs. Most of these studies focused on the effect of more 
stringent patent regulation and used the Ginarte-Park patent right index as IPR measure 
(Ginarte and Park 1997). The Ginarte-Park index is so far the most reliable domestic IPR 
index as it uses scientific measures to capture domestic patent regulation and encom-
passes many countries for its long-term study. Of course, there have been other previous 
IPR indexes such as the patent protection scale developed by Rapp and Rozek (1990) or 
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the IPR components developed by Sherwood (1997). However, all of these other IPR 
indexes are somewhat less equipped to capture IPR for comparative studies than the Gi-
narte-Park index, be it due to the measure of IPR, the coverage of countries or the limited 
reflection of the development over time. There are also more recent IPR indexes such as 
the International Property Rights Index (IPRI; Property Rights Alliance 2018) and the 
domestic TRIPS-plus index by Gold et al. (2019). The latter index by Gold et al. (2019) 
is useful for the analysis of the domestic effects of TRIPS-plus measures, yet it does not 
measure IPR per se, covers only developing countries with more than 1 million inhabit-
ants (124, from 1995-2011) and compares their TRIPS-plus protection to the one of the 
US. It is thus a conditional measure of TRIPS-plus protection in developing countries 
compared to the US regulation rather than a domestic IPR measure. The former index 
IPRI is highly comprehensive and covers 125 countries from 2007-2018. But it has to be 
used carefully, as it might not reflect an entirely objective measure of domestic IPRs. The 
IPRI is a project by the Property Rights Alliance and ranks countries based on their IPR 
score measured based on domestic IPR as well as national expert opinions and the “Spe-
cial 301 Report” by the Office of the United States Trade Representative, which might 
suggest some bias on the IPR measures. Thus, most researchers still draw on the Ginarte-
Park index to capture domestic IPRs. 
Primarily, previous research focuses on the factors FDI, innovation, technology trans-
fer and growth. Most studies found a positive effect of domestic IPR regulation repre-
sented by patent law on innovation (for an overview of previous research on innovation 
see Maskus 2012, 50 Table 2.4), technology transfer (Maskus 2012, 75 Table 2.7) and 
growth (Falvey, Foster, and Greenaway 2006). Moreover, the previous research on FDI 
shows ambiguous results – none, positive as well as negative effects – of more stringent 
IPR regulation (Maskus 2012, 73 et seqq.). Further, the previous research has shown that 
the effects vary depending on the countries status of economic development. The effects 
are either not or less significantly positive for least-developed and developing countries, 
whereas the effects are mostly positive for more developed countries. For all factors, there 
are some studies, which show opposing or at least not significant effects and some papers 
postulate that the effects of IPR are non-linear, i.e. that a steady increase of stringent IPR 
provisions becomes too stringent and eventually turns initially positive effects into nega-
tive ones. 
To my knowledge, there is currently only one study on the economic effects of IPRs 
in PTAs using a more detailed IPR design measure. This study by Maskus and Ridley 
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(2016) focuses on 24 PTAs by the US, EU and EFTA and identifies IPR design measures 
for patents, copyrights, trademarks and enforcement. Their analysis finds significant ef-
fects of more stringent IPR provisions on aggregate trade, which is most pronounced for 
middle-income countries. Due to my IPRs in PTAs dataset, I can enrich the previous 
research by a more comprehensive PTA coverage on both content and scope. For the 
analysis of the economic effects, I focus on those measures of the rationale, which have 
been previously researched for IPRs resp. which are measurable by currently existing 
data. These factors are namely investment in R&D, FDI and licensing, innovation, tech-
nology transfer and growth. I shed some light on a selection of these measures and assume 
that the design of IPR matters to their development. Before going into detail on the theory 
behind these factors, it is important to disclose that the analysis of IPRs in PTAs differs 
from domestic IPR analysis in two main points: compliance and effectiveness. 
Firstly, the PTA provisions give no indications about the compliance of PTA mem-
bers. This means that unlike with domestic measures of IPR, the coding of the design of 
IPR in PTAs does not necessarily implicate that these measures were domestically im-
plemented. As Deere (2009) suggests for the implementation of TRIPS, there is actually 
a variation on the degree of implementation and thus compliance. This matters for the 
effect analysis because there should only be an observable effect if the PTA provisions 
were implemented and, for example, copyright protection is increased. With the imple-
mentation of the IPR provisions in PTAs, the right holders enjoy increased protection and 
their behaviour should be altered changing the anticipated factors such as licensing. But 
as the legal-institutional analysis has shown, compliance is not perfect, and there might 
be some countries not complying with the IPR provisions in PTAs and thus skewing the 
results of the economic effect analysis. However, as there is no data matching the PTA 
design to control for compliance, and there are indications that before a PTA enters into 
force the PTA members have to comply with the IPR provisions in the PTA, I will assume 
for the further analysis that countries comply with their commitments. 
Secondly, the PTA provisions might not represent effectiveness, i.e. countries might 
not comply with them, or the provisions might change only the status quo of some and 
not all PTA members. For example, Morocco and the US already had a prohibition on 
parallel imports of pharmaceutical products in place before agreeing on such TRIPS-plus 
exhaustion provisions in their PTA (Fink and Reichenmiller 2005, 8). Hereby, both Mo-
rocco and the US comply with the IPR provisions, because the PTA design repeats the 
status quo. But it is not an effective commitment, as it does not change the domestic IPR 
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regulation. Therefore, there should not be any observable effects due to the lack of effec-
tiveness (no change, no effect). Consequently, only for those PTA members changing 
their status quo, there should be an observable economic effect. Looking at the results of 
the legal-institutional analysis, I assume that most commitments are complied with, but 
only around every fourth commitment is effective, i.e. complied with and required a 
change of the status quo. This means that most likely a majority of countries repeats their 
domestic IPR regulation in PTAs and requires from PTA members to adapt their regula-
tions. Again, the lack of data on the domestic IPR regulation means that there is no ideal 
way of controlling for effectiveness and compare the situation before the PTA to the one 
after. 
In the case that countries predominately repeat their status quo in PTAs, it might thus 
be that the economic effect analysis shows the effects of IPRs already implemented do-
mestically rather than the effect of IPRs in PTAs. I control for this factor in two manners. 
Firstly, by accounting for the IPR commitments, on the one hand, as an overall measure, 
which might represent more of the domestic IPR effects than the IPRs in PTAs effects. 
And on the other hand, I calculate a measure of the IPR provisions representing only the 
first commitment, which was made in a PTA that entered into force (see 5.2.2.2 Economic 
Effects: Explanatory Variables). Secondly, by adding the dimension of the development 
status of countries to the analysis (see 5.2.2.3 Economic Effects: Control Variables). 
Hereby, the assumption is that countries with a lower development status are less likely 
to have stringent domestic IPR regulation due to the high cost of IPR protection and pos-
sibly fewer IPR-intensive industries. These countries are therefore more likely to agree 
to IPR provisions requiring them to change their status quo (effective commitments) 
whereas countries with a high development status are more likely to repeat their already 
stringent domestic IPR provisions. The effects of IPRs in PTAs should be more pro-
nounced for those changing their status quo and increasing their IPR regulation due to the 
PTA commitments, thus theoretically for less developed countries. 
In the next subchapters, I describe the theory behind the five factors investment in 
R&D (5.2.1.1), FDI and licensing (5.2.1.2), innovation (5.2.1.3), technology transfer 
(5.2.1.4) and growth (5.2.1.5), and derive hypotheses on the impact of IPRs in PTAs on 
these factors. The underlying assumption for all factors is that more stringent IPRs in 
PTAs lead to an increase in the respective factor. In the following subchapters, I test the 
hypotheses in statistical analysis and check if the effects are indeed varying depending 
on the development level of countries. 
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5.2.1.1 Investment in R&D 
The rationale of IPRs postulates that through the protection of intellectual property, 
the IPR holders can generate additional revenue, which they will reinvest in research and 
development, either to improve their product or to develop new inventions. 
The majority of empirical studies testing this assumption find a positive effect of more 
stringent IPRs – predominately operationalised by looking at patents – on investment in 
R&D. For example, Kanwar and Evenson (2003) found that there is a significantly posi-
tive and pronounced effect of stronger IPR protection on the investment in R&D. Maskus 
(2012, figs. 2.2c, 2.2d) plotted the investment in R&D as a percentage of the GDP to the 
five-year lagged Ginarte-Park patent index for the years 1995 and 2000. For both years, 
he found a clear positive correlation, with an increased correlation for 2000. A more re-
cent study by Banerjee and Nayak (2014) also showed that more stringent IPR protection 
increased the investment in R&D, at least regarding the Indian pharmaceutical industry. 
One of the studies testing multiple forms of IPRs was the one by Park (2005). He found 
that many forms of IPRs have a significant effect on the investment in R&D, but that the 
main driver are IPR enforcement measures. 
I base my hypotheses on the positive relationship found between the investment in 
R&D and IPR respectively patent regulation. As previous studies mostly used an IPR 
measure based on patents, it might be, that the effect is only positive for patent provisions 
in PTAs. However, Park (2005) has found positive effects for other IPR forms, and there 
is no empirical evidence proposing an opposite effect of the other IPR forms. Therefore, 
I test the impact of different forms of IPR on the investment in R&D and expect to find a 
positive relation. 
 
Hypothesis 1.1: Stringent IPR provisions in PTAs increase investment in R&D. 
 
Further, I also test the results of IPR enforcement found by Park (2005) and expect to 
find an especially pronounced effect on the investment in R&D for the IPR enforcement 
provisions in PTAs. As other studies have found a positive effect of patents regardless of 
the enforcement provisions, I refrain from assuming that they are the main drivers behind 
the positive effect on investment in R&D. 
 
Hypothesis 1.2: Stringent IPR enforcement provisions in PTAs drive the increase 
of investment in R&D. 
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5.2.1.2 FDI/ Licensing 
The basic assumption for FDI and licensing is that investors respectively rights hold-
ers have to be ensured that their investment resp. rights are protected abroad. In connec-
tion to IPR, this can be, for instance, an investment in a factory producing high-technol-
ogy goods such as computing machinery and ensuring the protection of trade secrets, 
industrial designs or patents, or a factory producing low-technology goods such as textiles 
being ensured their design and trademark are not imitated. For licensing, this can be, for 
instance, the protection of literary and artistic work abroad. Thus, investors and right 
holders are more willing to invest and license in a foreign country, if domestic law abroad 
ensures that their IPRs are protected. 
Among the IPR factors, FDI is one of the most broadly researched ones. One of the 
earlier studies by Mansfield (1994) finds that lower IPR protection has a negative effect 
on US FDI, especially regarding the chemical and pharmaceutical sector. In a later study, 
Mansfield (1995) expands his analysis to Japanese and German FDI, also showing a sig-
nificantly positive relationship between stronger IPR protection and FDI. In later studies, 
Javorcik (2004) found a strong positive effect of IPRs on FDI in Eastern European coun-
tries, whereas Du et al. (2008) found a significantly positive effect of patents on US FDI 
in China. In their study, Park and Lippoldt (2008) compare the effects of FDI across mul-
tiple developing countries in-between 1990 to 2005 and also found a positive effect of 
more stringent IPR protection on FDI. Adams (2010) reaffirms their results and shows 
that there is a significantly positive effect of more stringent patent protection for 75 de-
veloping countries from 1985 to 2003. Further, Adams (2010) shows that this positive 
effect intensified after TRIPS was signed. 
However, there are also studies suggesting that the effect between more stringent IPR 
protection and FDI is weak or not significant (for instance Fink and Primo Braga 1999), 
or show even negative results (for example Mayer and Pfister 2001). Even though the 
previous results of the impact of IPR on FDI have been ambiguous, I base my hypotheses 
on the majority of studies, which find a positive relationship between IPRs and FDI. Con-
cretely, I assume that more stringent IPRs lead to an increase in FDI. Again, it might be 
that the effects will only be visible for patents as the majority of studies use a patent index 
as explanatory IPR variable. But as there are no studies indicating negative effects of 
other forms of IPRs, I assume that more stringent IPR protection increases FDI due to the 
Chapter 5: Effects of Intellectual Property Rights in PTAs  318 
increased predictability and security of intellectual property, regardless of the protected 
form of IPR. 
 
Hypothesis 2.1: Stringent IPR provisions in PTAs increase FDI. 
 
For the effect of IPR on licensing, there are fewer studies. One of the first studies by 
Yang and Maskus (2001) analysed the effect of patent protection represented by the Gi-
narte-Park index on licensing and found an u-shaped relationship, whereas other studies 
such as Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley (2006), Branstetter et al. (2011) and Koff et al. 
(2011) also looked at patent reforms and found a significantly positive effect on licensing. 
Thus, even though there have been only a few studies on licensing and on most, if not all 
of them, focus on the effect of patents, I assume that the mechanism for licensing is sim-
ilar to the one of FDI, and that not only patent but more stringent IPR protection per se 
has a positive effect on licensing. Therefore, I expect to find an increase in licensing for 
more stringent IPR provisions. 
 
Hypothesis 2.2: Stringent IPR provisions in PTAs increase licensing. 
 
5.2.1.3 Innovation 
IPRs supposedly have a positive effect on innovation, because without the protection 
of inventions through IPRs, it becomes unattractive to produce and invest in new inven-
tions if they can be easily counterfeit without negative repercussions. For example, ac-
cording to the rationale of IPRs the investment in a trademark on improving the quality 
of a good and image of a brand becomes obsolete if everyone can label their product the 
same way making it impossible for consumers to distinct between the original and the 
counterfeit. Neither would it make sense for a company to invest millions in research and 
development of a new drug if once the product is on the market, it can be instantly copied 
by a rival. The protection of intellectual property thus gives an incentive and encourages 
innovation according to the rationale of IPRs. 
And indeed, the results of economic studies of IPRs on innovation find predominately 
positive effects. For instance, P. H. Schneider (2005) analysed 47 countries and found 
that stronger IPRs have a positive effect on innovation and that the effect is more pro-
nounced for countries with a higher level of development. Another study by Chen and 
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Puttitanun (2005) also found positive effects of more stringent patent protection, whereby 
the effect is only significant for middle-income countries. Allred and Park (2007) found 
the same effect, yet significantly positive for developed countries, not only middle-in-
come countries.  
The previous studies thus show, that the effect of IPRs on innovation might be con-
nected to the development level of countries, yet so far research shows ambiguous results. 
Therefore, it would be premature to include the level of development in the postulated 
hypothesis as the relationship could go either way. Thus, I keep my hypothesis in line 
with most previous studies and assume that with more stringent IPRs in PTAs comes an 
increase in innovation. If and how this positive effect might be related to the development 
level of countries remains to be shown in the analysis. 
 
Hypothesis 3.1: Stringent IPR provisions in PTAs increase innovation. 
 
However, some researchers argue that there is a tipping point to the economic benefits 
of intellectual property rights. The argument is that after a certain level of protection, 
IPRs can turn into market barriers and monopolies, which hinder technology transfer and 
competition benefitting only the rights holder without positive spill-over effects for inno-
vation and society. Dourado and Tabarrok (2015) describe this phenomenon by using the 
curve displayed in Figure 18, which shows the relation between innovation and patent 
strength. Figure 18 is a slightly adapted version of the illustration displayed in Dourado 
and Tabarrok (2015 fig. 3). 
 
Figure 18: Curve of Innovation to Patent Strength 
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The curve is based on the Laffer curve, which explains the relation between taxes and 
government revenue (see Buchanan and Lee 1982). Adapted for the relation between in-
novation and patent strength, the curve shows that stronger patent rights reduce innova-
tion after a certain degree because “as patents become stronger, the incentives for new 
innovation decline while the disincentives for using and building on old innovations in-
creases, so the curve must bend eventually” (Dourado and Tabarrok 2015, 140). Dourado 
and Tabarrok (2015, 140 et seqq.) provide no indication about when the tipping point 
occurs, but suggest that the curve is also applicable to other forms of IPR, with slightly 
varying slopes and occurrences of turning points. 
There have been studies, which found a negative or even an inverted u-shaped effect 
as represented by the curve of innovation to patent strength in Figure 18. For example, 
Lerner (2009) found in his study a negative effect of more stringent IPRs on innovation, 
whereas Hudson and Minea (2013) found both a negative as well as an inverted u-shaped 
effect depending on the development level of countries. These results imply that there 
might be a tipping point of the optimal level of IPRs as proposed by Dourado and Tabar-
rok (2015). Therefore, I assume that unlike for the other factors affected by IPR measures, 
there is a tipping point to the positive effects of IPRs for innovation. Based on the previ-
ous discussion on the TRIPS Agreement being a minimum or maximum standard of IPR 
protection (see Figure 7: Diverging Ideals of IPR Standards), I postulate that stringent 
IPR provisions still have a positive effect on innovation as long as they do not go beyond 
the commitments of TRIPS. If a PTA includes TRIPS-plus provisions, I expect to find a 
negative effect on innovation. 
 
Hypothesis 3.2: TRIPS-plus provisions in PTAs decrease innovation. 
 
5.2.1.4 Technology Transfer 
One of the reasons to protect IPRs is the postulated effect of technology transfers. 
Maskus (2004, 9) defines technology transfer as “any process by which one party gains 
access to a second party's information and successfully learns and absorbs it into his 
production function. Clearly, much technology transfer occurs between willing partners 
in voluntary transactions. Thus, there are demanders and suppliers of technology and 
information is traded in technology markets.” According to the rationale of IPRs, coun-
tries can thus encourage technology transfer by ensuring the IPRs of right holders. 
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Most studies analysing the effect of IPRs on technology transfer find a strong and 
significant positive relationship. The operationalisation of technology transfer, however, 
varies immensely. Whilst some studies use R&D, FDI or licensing data as a measure for 
technology transfer, other papers look at exports and imports (see Maskus 2012 Table 
2.7). I consider technology transfer to be either related to actual disclosure of information 
related to patent protection and the exchange of IPR-related goods and not the mere trans-
fer of financial flows such as FDI and licensing. For example, I expect technology transfer 
to be mainly connected to patents, whereby the idea is to receive protection for a limited 
amount of time and in turn disclose the protected invention afterwards ensuring the trans-
fer of technology. Alternatively, technology is transferred through the import of IPR-
related goods, from which the importing countries can advance their technology (see 
Maskus 2004, 10). 
Studies using data on traded goods for technology transfer found mainly apparent 
positive effects of IPRs. For example, Co (2004) looked at the US in R&D-intensive ex-
ports to 71 countries between 1970 to 1992 and found that exports increased significantly 
with more patent protection in these countries. Ivus (2010) looked at exports of developed 
countries to developing countries between 1962 to 2000 and also showed that with an 
increase of patent protection in developing countries comes an increase of patent-sensi-
tive exports to them by developed countries. And Maskus and Yang (2013) analysed the 
effect of patent reforms before and after TRIPS was signed for 82 countries between 1985 
and 2005 and found significant positive effects on technology transfers. The effects are 
more pronounced after TRIPS was signed, with growing impacts for developing countries 
around the time of their domestic due date for the TRIPS entry into force. This implies 
that the positive effects of more stringent IPR provisions in PTAs might be especially 
pronounced for TRIPS-plus commitments. As the results are not directly linked to the 
domestic implementation of TRIPS but are based on the interpretation of the authors, I 
bear their argument in mind, without formulating a separate hypothesis for TRIPS-plus 
commitments. 
The most comprehensive study so far is probably the one by Chen (2017). He analysed 
119 countries between 1976 to 2010 and found strong positive effects of more stringent 
IPR protection on the imports of R&D-intensive products. And as commonly observed 
for the effect analysis of IPRs, there were also studies finding no significant effect of 
more stringent IPR protection on imports nor exports (for example Koff et al. 2011). 
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Due to the predominance of studies finding positive effects using similar measures 
for technology transfer, I argue that more stringent IPRs have a positive effect on tech-
nology transfers. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Stringent IPR provisions in PTAs increase technology transfer. 
 
5.2.1.5 Growth 
The rationale of IPR is based on the assumption that, ultimately, IPRs have a positive 
effect on economic growth. Growth is closely related to competitiveness and innovation, 
and it is assumed that a short-term restriction of competition through IPRs is legitimised 
due to the long-term positive effects on innovation, which is one of the driving forces of 
economic growth. Moreover, all other assumed positive effects of IPRs, such as increased 
FDI, are supposed to stimulate growth further. 
Previous research on the effects of IPRs on growth often focuses on the development 
of GDP. For example, Gould and Gruben (1996) analysed the relationship between the 
average yearly per capita growth from 1960 to 1988 to the level of domestic patent pro-
tection and found a significantly positive effect of more stringent IPR on economic 
growth. Falvey et al. (2006) also found a significantly positive effect of IPR on growth 
measured as the average growth rate of GDP per capita. However, they only found visible 
effects for low-income and high-income countries, whereas middle-income countries are 
not significantly affected by more stringent IPR protection.  
Similar to the previous research on the other factors, there are also studies suggesting 
an opposite or no effect of IPRs on growth. For instance, Ostergard (2014, 26) found that 
IPRs have no significant effect on growth, even differentiated according to the develop-
ment level of countries. Another recent study by Gold et al. (2019) looked at the effects 
of domestic TRIPS-plus provisions on the economic growth captured by GDP per capita 
and found that the effect of IPRs on growth is mostly indirect, through positive effects on 
technology transfers such as imports. Further, their analysis shows that the effect of 
growth on more stringent IPRs is much more pronounced than the effect of IPRs on 
growth. However, their results might not be generalisable to general IPR analysis. As 
described previously, their IPR measure is based on TRIPS-plus regulations and is con-
ditional to the US IPR regulations. Their results might thus be applied to TRIPS-plus 
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regulation, but not IPR regulation per se and might be biased towards the US IPR regu-
lation standards. However, their results indicate that there might also be a tipping point 
of the positive effects of IPRs on growth, similar to the one described for innovation. 
Their IPR measurement through TRIPS-plus factors could represent this tipping point 
and explain the inverted effects of IPRs on growth. As there have been too few studies 
on this topic so far, I remain with the previously tested base assumption that stronger IPRs 
increase growth, which should also be visible for stringent IPR provisions in PTAs. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Stringent IPR provisions in PTAs increase growth. 
 
5.2.1.6 Summary of Economic Effect Hypotheses 
Table 66 summarises the eight hypotheses on the economic effects of IPRs in PTA. 
Based on the previous research, I predominately postulate a positive effect of the IPR 
design on the five factors investment in R&D, FDI and licensing, innovation, technology 
transfer and growth. Only for the second hypothesis on innovation, I assume a possible 
negative impact of TRIPS-plus commitments in PTAs. 
 
Table 66: Economic Effects Hypotheses Overview 
Factor Hypotheses Relation 





Stringent IPR provisions in PTAs increase investment 
in R&D. 
Stringent IPR enforcement provisions in PTAs drive the 








Stringent IPR provisions in PTAs increase FDI. 





Stringent IPR provisions in PTAs increase innovation. 





H4 Stringent IPR provisions in PTAs increase technology 
transfer. 
Positive 
Growth H5 Stringent IPR provisions in PTAs increase growth. Positive 
 
I expect there to be variation according to the different IPR forms and the level of IPR 
protection, be it general IPR provisions, specific IPR commitments or TRIPS-plus con-
ditions. I test all of these measures, yet as the analysis of the economic effects has so far 
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not been related extensively to the effects of IPRs in PTAs, I refrain from formulating a 
more refined hypothesis on IPR design matter than the direction of the relationship be-
tween stringent IPRs and respective factors. Only for the first hypothesis on the effects 
of investment in R&D, I include an additional hypothesis on enforcement as there has 
been a previous study showing significant results. 
In the following sections, I describe how these factors are operationalised, which ex-
planatory and control variables I use in the analysis, highlight some descriptive statistics, 
and describe the models I apply for the analysis of the economic effects. 
5.2.2 Economic Effects: Data 
The data is based on the IPRs in PTAs dataset, which is used for the country and year 
selection as well as the explanatory variables. Included are only cases of PTAs, which 
have entered into force, as otherwise, the PTAs should not enfold any lasting economic 
effects. For the dependent variables, which I describe in the next subchapters, I added 
data from the World Bank resp. the WIPO database. 
The PTA effect analysis usually concentrates on the effects of PTAs on the trade flows 
in-between PTA members and, therefore, uses a dyadic-format for the data. This is due 
to the preferential nature of common PTA commitments such as tariffs that are granted 
(only) to PTA members. By using a dyadic-dataset, the analysis shows the changes 
amongst the trade flows between PTA members. Unlike conventional effect analyses of 
PTAs, IPRs in PTAs are granted on an MFN basis and are thus not preferential. The MFN 
and NT principles granted in TRIPS are strictly speaking only applicable to WTO mem-
bers, as TRIPS is one of the three pillars of the WTO (besides GATT and GATS). Cur-
rently, there are still 34 countries not part of the WTO such as Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bel-
arus, Iran, Iraq and Serbia. Yet some of them are on the accession track and most likely 
already complying with the MFN commitment. Further, it can be assumed that for IPRs 
countries make no distinction between WTO members or not, due to their domestic na-
ture. The effects should have a broader range than only in-between PTA partners as the 
IPR provisions are implemented into domestic law and applicable to all countries, regard-
less if they are part of the PTA or not. Therefore, I refrain from using a dyadic-format, 
converted my IPRs in PTAs dataset from a PTA-level to a country-level format and added 
the data for the dependent variables for all countries included in my dataset. Thus, the 
effects data is in so far limited as it only includes countries which have signed a PTA, 
which entered into force. However, as my data also contains PTAs without any IPR, the 
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dataset should at least show if the economic effects are solely due to PTAs or can also be 
linked to the design of IPRs in PTAs. If the former was true, then there should be no 
visible variation based on the IPR design, i.e. cases of PTAs with no IPR and cases of 
PTAs with stringent IPR should show the same effects. 
For the description of the dependent variables, I already apply some descriptive sta-
tistics for those dependent variables based on the data from the World Bank. The World 
Bank data has a predefined category of low-, middle- and high-income countries, which 
I use in the next section to display some of the dependent variables according to the de-
velopment level over time. This should give some insights on how the development level 
shapes the discussion on economic effects. However, the classification also shows that 
there is some missing data for the selected years, mostly for the low-income countries. 
Therefore, I use for the analysis a further refined classification differentiating between 
low-middle and upper-middle-income countries. 
5.2.2.1 Economic Effects: Dependent Variables 
I employ 23 dependent variables for the five factors analysed for the economic effects 
of IPRs. The measure for the effects is captured by using the delta between the time of 
PTA signature to five different time lags for each variable. Firstly, I use the delta to the 
time of the entry into force of the PTA (df). Secondly, I use a delta to a three-year-lag 
(df3) and a five-year-lag (df5) after the time of entry into force for the short-term and 
intermediate impact, as well as a delta to a ten-year-lag (df10) for the long-term impact. 
The first time frame represents when the IPR provisions should be in force and could 
already deploy their effects. However, as the rationale of IPRs argue that the effects of 
IPRs take some time to unfold, I use three additional lags representing a short-term, in-
termediate and long-term lag. Thirdly, as some PTAs include an additional transition pe-
riod for IPR provisions, I include the same delta calculation for each variable reflecting 
the transition period (dft). This means that, for example, the investment in R&D is meas-
ured as the change of the variable at the time of entry into force of the PTA to the time of 
PTA signature: 𝑑𝑓 =
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑅&𝐷 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑇𝐴 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑅&𝐷 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑇𝐴 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒
− 1. I apply this calculation 
to every dependent variable described below for these five time dimensions (df, df3, df5, 
df10, dft). 
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5.2.2.1.1 Investment in R&D 
For the investment in R&D, I use the data from the World Bank database (World Bank 
2018a) on expenditure on R&D ranging from 1960 until 2017. I do not differentiate be-
tween public and private investment in R&D as more stringent IPRs should encourage 
both private as well as public investments. 
As previous research has shown, the effects of the identified factors supposedly vary 
depending on the development status of countries. Graph 29 displays the development of 
the investment in R&D over time for the World Bank categories of low-, middle- and 
high-income countries. For those groups on the zero line of the graph, the World Bank 
data includes no information. For Graph 29 this applies to the data for low-income coun-
tries and all country groups in the year 1995.  
 
Graph 29: World Development Indicators – Investment in R&D 
 
 
Graph 29 shows, on the one hand, that middle-income have had a steeper growth in 
R&D expenditure from 2005 until 2015 than high-income countries. The middle-income 
countries were thus able to drastically reduce the gap between their share of investment 
in R&D of the GDP compared to one of the high-income countries. On the other hand, 
the graph shows that the pre-set development categories by the World Bank might be 
misleading due to their lack of data for the categories. Nevertheless, the data also show 
that there seems to be a difference for countries resulting from their development status. 
Thus, I include a slightly adapted development measure in the control variables to capture 
these effects in the analysis. 
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According to the rationale of IPRs, high-income countries would have the highest 
protection of IPR already before 2005, and middle-income countries would have substan-
tially increased their IPR protection after 2005, leading them to increase their investment 
in R&D substantially. As there is no data for the top category of low-income countries 
for the selected years, there can no assumptions be made about their IPR protection stand-
ard. The analysis will try to show if it indeed was the increase in IPR protection through 
PTAs that has positively impacted the increase in investment in R&D. 
5.2.2.1.2 FDI/ Licensing 
The data for both FDI and licensing are taken from the World Bank database (World 
Bank 2018a) ranging from 1960 until 2017. For the FDI measure, I use the FDI inflows 
(BoP, current US$), and for the licensing measure, I use the received charges for the use 
of IP (BoP, current US$). Graph 30 illustrates the development of FDI and Graph 31 the 
development of licensing according to the development level of countries. 
As Graph 30 on the next page shows, the development of FDI differs from the devel-
opment of the investment in R&D. The high-income countries seem to have increased 
their FDI inflows more than the middle-income countries, which are further away from 
catching up with the high-income countries in 2015 than they were in 2005. The low-
income countries are operating on a level that is compared to the other income groups 
very low. However, looking at the data of only the low-income countries shows that the 
FDI inflows have quintupled from 1995 to 2005, and again risen by 250% from 2005 to 
2015. All of the development categories thus follow an upward trend. 

















F D I  i n f low s ( BoP, cur r ent  U S$) 
1995 2005 2015
Chapter 5: Effects of Intellectual Property Rights in PTAs  328 
Based on the rationale of IPR, this could indicate that since 1995, when TRIPS entered 
into force, all countries at least showed some form of IPR protection, which increased 
their FDI inflows. Moreover, the high-income countries supposedly have substantially 
increased their IPRs by 2005 and even further in 2015, whereas middle-income countries 
have started to increase their IPR in 2015. The low-income countries potentially have a 
low-level of IPR protection, keeping their FDI inflows comparatively low.  
For licensing, Graph 31 shows a slightly different development over time.  
 
Graph 31: World Development Indicators – Licensing 
 
 
It seems as if there is no data for low- and middle-income countries, when in fact there 
is, just on a much lower level than for high-income countries. It is apparent that the high-
income countries show the steepest increase of payments received for licensing over time 
and that the distance towards low-and middle-income countries widens continuously. By 
2015, the low- and middle-income countries are farthest away from catching-up on li-
censing fees. Looking at their development in more detail, it shows that the low-income 
countries have made substantial increases from 1995 to 2005 (2614%) and then almost 
stagnated from 2005 to 2015 (11%). The received payments for IP charges of middle-
income countries had quadrupled from 1995 to 2015 and then almost doubled again from 
2005 to 2015 (146%). 
According to the rationale of IPRs, this indicates that high-income countries show the 
most stringent IPR protection and keep on increasing it over time. Both the middle- and 
low-income countries have increased their IPR protection after 1995, whereby the low-
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income countries have adapted their IPR regulation more extensively, leading to a sub-
stantial increase in the received licencing fees until 2005. After then, the rationale sug-
gests that the low-income countries have not further increased their IPR protection or 
only on a marginal level, whereas the middle-income countries further increase their IPR 
protection. Again, these are only assumptions on the effects of IPRs, which are tested in 
the analysis. 
5.2.2.1.3 Innovation 
There are different studies on innovation, which often differ in the way they opera-
tionalise innovation. For a long time, the investment in R&D was used as a proxy for 
innovation, often in relation to GDP. However, more recent studies argue that there are 
other factors more ideally suited to capture innovation, such as patent applications by 
residents (see Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley 2006; P. H. Schneider 2005). Based on these 
studies, I focus on four factors to measure innovation: researchers in R&D, and resident 
applications for trademarks, industrial designs and patents. 
The measure for researchers in R&D (per million people) is taken from the World 
Bank database (World Bank 2018a) ranging from 1960 until 2017. Graph 32 shows the 
development of the number of researchers according to the development level of coun-
tries. However, there is no data for all country groups in the year 1995 and also no data 
for the low-income countries for the other selected years. Nevertheless, the data shows 
that the high-income countries operate on a substantially higher level than the middle-
income countries. Further, they show a steeper increase from 2005 to 2015 and widen the 
distance to middle-income countries. 
Graph 32: World Development Indicators – Innovation 
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According to the IPR rationale, the impact of stringent IPR regulation would unfold 
with a certain lag. Graph 32 would indicate once more that high-income countries already 
had a more stringent IPR protection before 2005 and further increased it over time, 
whereas middle-income countries operate on a substantially lower level of IPR protection 
and marginally increased it over time. 
For the resident applications of trademarks, industrial designs and patents, I use the 
data of the WIPO Intellectual Property Statistics Data Center (World Intellectual Property 
Organization 2018a). To capture the growth over time, I use a cumulative measure of 
residential IPR applications. 
5.2.2.1.4 Technology Transfer 
Previous research on the effects of IPRs has operationalised technology transfer in 
various ways. Most studies use data on either FDI and licensing or exports respectively 
imports (Maskus 2012, 75 Table 2.7). I use FDI and licensing as standalone factors and 
consider them to be only indirect measures of technology transfer because they are not 
necessarily linked to technology transfer. For example, by using copyright-protected mu-
sic and paying charges for it, there is hardly any transfer of technology involved. As ar-
gued previously, I consider the applications for those IPRs including an obligation to 
disclose to be a far more representative and observable measures of technology transfer. 
I thus look at imports of IPR-intensive goods, which has already been used in previous 
research, and IPR applications as a measure for technology transfer. 
For the IPR applications, I use the total applications for industrial designs and patents 
as well as the applications for industrial designs and patents by PTA members. The ap-
plication data is provided by the WIPO Intellectual Property Statistics Data Center 
(World Intellectual Property Organization 2018a) for all of these four variables. The delta 
is calculated based on the cumulative measure of applications. 
For the IPR imports, I also look at the total as well as the imports by PTA members. 
The design analysis has already shown that it is important for IPR research to differentiate 
according to the technology-intensiveness of goods. For instance, Manger (2009) states 
that it is more likely for developing countries to export low-technology goods and for 
developed countries high-technology goods: 
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“Capital-intensive production takes place in developed countries that offer access to high 
technology and research and design facilities and personnel. Labor-intensive stages of pro-
duction are outsourced to the developing world. This vertical fragmentation of production 
leads to an increase in intra-industry trade, or trade in the same industry in differentiated 
goods. Unlike intraindustry trade between developed countries, however, the traded goods are 
differentiated by “quality”: developing countries are more likely to export low-cost goods, 
while developed countries export highcost, high-quality goods. For example, while many car 
manufacturers produce their upscale vehicles in their home country, entry-level cars are pro-
duced in less developed countries.” Manger (2009, 16) 
 
It is thus more likely that stronger IPR protection will have a positive effect on already 
stronger sectors. For instance, a positive effect on low-technology imports from develop-
ing countries and high-technology imports from developed countries. To reflect the vari-
ous IPR-related sectors, I differentiate between products with a high, medium-high, me-
dium-low and low technology-intensiveness (htp, mhtp, mltp, ltp) for both total imports 
and imports by PTA members (see Table 25: Nomenclature for Technology Intensiveness 
of Goods). The data is derived from the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solutions 
(WITS) database (World Bank 2018b). 
5.2.2.1.5 Growth 
Previous studies on the effects of IPR on growth such as Gould and Gruben (1996), 
Park (1999), and Falvey et al. (2004) operationalise growth as the average annual GDP 
per capita. For my analysis, I operationalise growth in four manners: by looking at the 
delta of GDP, GDPpc, GDP growth rate and GDPpc growth rate. The GDP and GDP 
growth rate show the economic growth of a country, whereas the GDPpc and GDPpc 
growth rate show the country’s level of development. The data is downloaded from the 
World Bank database (World Bank 2018a) ranging from 1960 until 2017. 
5.2.2.2 Economic Effects: Explanatory Variables 
The explanatory variables are solely based on the design of IPRs in PTAs. Similar to 
Kim (2015), who compares those PTAs with stringent IPR provisions to those without 
stringent IPR provisions, I analyse if the design of IPRs in PTAs affects the dependent 
variables. Based on the rationale of IPRs in PTAs (see 2.2.1.3 Rationale of IPRs in PTAs), 
I expect there to be a difference between those PTAs, which include no IPRs, general 
IPR, specific IPRs and TRIPS-plus provisions.  
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I use the same variables, which I used as dependent variables for the design analysis. 
For general IPR, I use the Index IPR general, Index IPR scope mentioned, binary varia-
bles for IPR scope mentioned, Index IPR general enforcement and the Index IPR multi-
lateral coherence dummy. For stringent IPR, I use the index IPR specific, Index IPR scope 
tangible, binary variables for IPR scope tangible, Index IPR specific enforcement, Index 
IPR multilateral coherence, Index TRIPS-plus, and additive variables for TRIPS-plus cat-
egories. Additionally to the stringent variables, I test the Index IPR DSM and for enforce-
ment the Index IPR general enforcement, Index IPR specific enforcement and Index IPR 
enforcement. 
As shown in the legal-institutional analysis, one of the core problems of the effect 
analysis is the lack of knowledge about the effectiveness of commitments on IPRs in 
PTAs. Without a domestic IPR dataset matching the PTA provisions, there is no 
knowledge on which IPR provisions actually require a change in domestic regulation and 
which commitments simply repeat the status quo. In theory, also these latter non-com-
mitments and repetitions could have an economic effect by reinsuring the stability of the 
IPR system and its values. However, as long as there is no domestic data on IPRs, there 
is no ideal control for this effectiveness issue. I deal with this effectiveness issue in two 
manners. Firstly, I use the design features and assume that there is an effect regardless if 
the commitments require a change in that status quo or not (overall). Secondly, I create 
an additional measure based on the design features, which only accounts for the design 
features in the first PTA per country (first-comer). For example, if a country has two 
PTAs including TRIPS-plus provisions on patents, I account for them in the PTA entering 
into force first. For the second PTA, it would be a non-commitment, as the provisions 
should have been already implemented at the time the first PTA entered into force. The 
first-comer IPR measurement is thus a more conservative approach than the overall IPR 
measure. Conclusively, I run separate models for the overall and first-comer IPR 
measures and per model include either general, specific or TRIPS-plus provisions. 
5.2.2.3 Economic Effects: Control Variables 
I use the same seven control measures as for the analysis of the design (4.2.3 Control 
Variables). Namely, I include for each country the annual score for democratisation (Pol-
ity 2); a variable accounting for IPR-interested PTA members for the three IPR country 
blocks classic IP leaders, countries with a high increase of patent protection and new IP 
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producers and developers; the annual GDP and GDPpc (log); as well as the average ge-
ographic distance between PTA members. The variables are measured at the time of entry 
into force of the PTA. For the data of the country blocks and the average geographical 
distance, I use the measures of the PTA-level dataset. 
The descriptive graphs shown before already indicate that the dependent variables 
developed differently according to a countries’ development level. As the previous re-
search has suggested, the effect of IPRs might differ based on the development level of 
countries. For example, in the case of patent protection, it might be that low-income coun-
tries have a lower risk of reverse-engineering. Thus, IPR protection might not play a sub-
stantial role because the means for IPR infringement are not given. Yet the effect of 
stronger patent protection should be visible for middle- and high-income countries with 
actual capabilities of infringing on patents (see Fink and Maskus 2005, 7). Therefore, I 
will test the models additionally for four different development level:. low-income, 
lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income and high-income countries. The classifica-
tion is based on the World Bank Analytical Classifications (World Bank 2018a). As de-
scribed before, the World Bank data already comes with a classification of low-, middle- 
and high-income countries, which I used for the previous descriptive graphs of some of 
the dependent variables. However, this classification generates more missing data than 
the more fine-grained classification, which is thus preferable. The development level is 
already represented by the GDP variables, thus the levels are not included in the normal 
regression model. Rather, I run separate models for subgroups of the data according to 
the development level of countries. 
5.2.2.4 Economic Effects: Descriptive Statistics 
In total, the data includes 3’833 data entries for 201 countries covering 632 PTAs, 
which entered into force between 1949 to 2018. The data entries include mostly data 
entries for high-income countries (1844; 48%), whereas the other development groups 
for upper-middle-income countries (642; 17%), lower-middle-income countries (627; 
16%), and low-income countries (501; 13%) are more equally distributed in the dataset. 
219 data entries of countries are unclassified due to NAs in the World Bank classification 
(6%). 
The descriptive statistics for the dependent variables are co-dependent on the time 
dimension, i.e. for the smaller time lags (df) there are generally more observations than 
for the greater time lags (df10). Table 67 displays thus the values for the df time dimension 
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to give some insights on the descriptive statistics of the dependent, explanatory (IPR 
overall) and control variables. It shows that most of the dependent variables only have 
limited data availability. When looking at time dimensions further in the future, this issue 
grows even more pronounced, especially for PTAs that have entered into force only re-
cently. However, there is still a substantial amount of data entries, which allow for a re-
liable statistical analysis.  
For the dependent variables on researchers in R&D and IPR-intensive imports, the 
number of data entries drops to as low as 584 (15% of all data entries). The effects of 
IPRs in PTAs on these dependent variables might thus be less generalisable than antici-
pated. For the other variables, the number of observations is substantially higher, and the 
results cover the majority of data entries. 
 
Table 67: Descriptive Statistics for the Economic Effects Data 
Variables N Min Max Median Mean Std.Dev. 
Dependent Variables       
Investment in R&D       
Investment in R&D 1124 -0.82 10.88 0.01 0.05 0.37 
FDI/ Licensing       
FDI 3182 -1157.88 4999.09 0.00 5.39 140.08 
Licensing 1835 -0.99 13685.85 0.07 8.28 319.52 
Innovation       
Researchers in R&D 945 -0.77 2.96 0.04 0.07 0.18 
Resident applications for trademarks  
(cumulative) 
2853 0.00 914.60 0.14 1.28 21.38 
Resident applications for industrial designs 
(cumulative) 
2474 0.00 288.99 0.10 1.15 10.61 
Resident applications for patents  
(cumulative) 
2735 0.00 217.50 0.11 0.45 4.48 
Technology Transfer       
Total applications for industrial designs  
(cumulative) 
2268 0.00 330.66 0.08 0.50 7.31 
Total applications for patents (cumulative) 2691 0.00 280.64 0.05 0.26 5.45 
PTA member applications for industrial  
designs (cumulative) 
1007 -1.00 167.00 0.00 1.38 10.42 
PTA member applications for patents  
(cumulative) 
1153 -1.00 2999.00 0.05 10.97 156.81 
Total htp imports 796 -1.00 54.16 0.09 0.40 3.37 
Total mhtp imports 796 -1.00 46421.49 0.07 58.61 1645.36 
Total mltp imports 796 -0.91 9.00 0.09 0.21 0.60 
Total ltp imports 796 -0.77 7.24 0.08 0.20 0.54 
PTA member htp imports 754 -1.00 2540945.43 0.06 4504.42 94272.17 
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Variables N Min Max Median Mean Std.Dev. 
PTA member mhtp imports 741 -1.00 97137.20 0.09 369.09 5024.37 
PTA member mltp imports 757 -1.00 244216.74 0.05 1782.86 17969.90 
PTA member ltp imports 584 -1.00 244216.74 0.09 2236.55 20394.11 
Growth       
GDP growth 3583 -0.75 5.71 0.06 0.12 0.28 
GDPpc growth 3583 -0.76 5.31 0.04 0.10 0.26 
GDP growth rate 3430 -202.86 283.03 0.00 0.12 11.46 
GDPpc growth rate 3434 -1603.58 2106.90 -0.03 0.34 49.47 
Independent Variables (Overall)       
IPR Indexes       
Index IPR general (sum) 3833 0.00 24.00 3.00 6.28 6.94 
Index IPR specific (sum) 3833 0.00 15.00 0.00 1.87 3.81 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) 3833 0.00 39.00 0.00 4.09 9.68 
Binary & Additive Variables of Indexes       
Index IPR general (sum) 
see Appendix 60: Descriptive Statistics for the Economic Effects 
Data – Binary & Additive Variables of Indexes 
Index IPR specific (sum) 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) 
Control Variables       
Democratisation (Polity 2) 3318 -10.00 10.00 9.00 5.42 6.47 
Classic IP leaders 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.49 0.50 
Countries with a high increase of patent  
protection 
3833 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.14 0.49 
New IP producers and developers 3833 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.12 0.39 
ln GDP 3613 16.05 30.45 24.64 24.43 2.53 
ln GDPpc 3613 3.72 12.10 8.75 8.61 1.69 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 3511 4.11 9.89 7.42 7.55 0.89 
 
The descriptive statistics of the independent variables and control variables has 
changed slightly compared to the design analysis (see 4.2.4 Design: Descriptive Statis-
tics) due to the conversion from PTA-level to the country-level format of the data. The 
details of the IPR general and specific binary variables, as well as the IPR TRIPS-plus 
additive variables, are listed in the appendix due to their extensiveness. In the following 
paragraphs, I show descriptive graphs for some of the dependent variables in relation to 
the income level of countries, because previous research has shown that the effects of 
IPRs vary according to the income level of countries. Therefore, I illustrate those varia-
bles, which I have not displayed in the previous subchapters and differentiate between 
low-income, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income and higher-income countries.  
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Firstly, I look at innovation using IPR applications by residents (Graph 33). Secondly, 
I display the technology transfer using IPR applications (Graph 34) as well as IPR-inten-
sive imports (Graph 35, Graph 36). Thirdly, I highlight the development of growth over 
time using GDP (Graph 37) and GDP per capita (Graph 38). 
Graph 33 shows the df delta (see formula) of the average cumulative resident appli-
cations for trademarks, industrial designs and patents according to the development level 
of countries. 
 
Graph 33: Resident IPR Applications by Development Level 
 
 
The graph shows that the most pronounced increase in resident applications is visible 
for trademarks. Particularly, low- and lower-middle-income countries’ residents increase 
their trademark applications immensely from the time of PTA signature compared to the 
time of the entry into force of the PTA. The analysis will shows if this increase is con-
nected to the design of IPRs in PTAs or might be coincidental. Lower-middle-income 
countries show overall the highest increase in IPR-applications by residents. This sug-
gests an increased innovative domestic activity for goods protected by trademarks, indus-
trial designs and patents at the time of entry into force of a PTA. The residential applica-
tions by upper-middle- and higher-income countries are far less pronounced. For patents, 
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their applications for trademarks, and high-income countries’ residents increase their ap-
plications for industrial designs. The innovation in connection with PTAs seems thus 
more likely to be connected to trademarks and industrial design for developed countries, 
whereas innovation of patents is also relevant in lower-middle-income countries. 
Graph 34 displays four measures of technology transfer: the df delta of the total cu-
mulative applications as well as applications by PTA members for each industrial designs 
and patents. 
The graph illustrates that the total applications of both industrial designs as well as 
patents are only marginally impacted for all development levels of countries. However, 
looking at patent applications by PTA members, the graph shows that there is an immense 
increase in high-income countries at the time of entry into force of the PTA compared to 
the time of PTA signature. This is in so far astonishing, as the high-income countries most 
likely already ensured a similar IPR protection domestically and the PTA most likely did 
alter the IPR regulation only marginally. Thus, the increase might not be only connected 
to the design of IPRs in PTAs and rather to other PTA factors. The other income-level 
countries also show an increase of patent applications by PTA members, yet on a much 
lower level than high-income countries. A similarly pronounced increase can be observed 
for industrial design applications by PTA members in lower-middle-income countries, 
and on a lower level also in low-income countries. This could suggest that after more 
stringent IPR protection is granted in the PTA, PTA members are more likely to protect 
industrial designs in lower-middle-income and to a lesser extent in low-income countries.  
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Graph 34: Total and PTA Member IPR Applications by Development Level 
 
 
Graph 35 shows the delta (df) of the average total IPR-intensive imports differentiated 
by colour (see legend). The rings represent the development level of countries, whereby 
the inner circle represents the values of low-income countries, followed by lower-middle-
income countries, upper-middle-income countries and the outmost ring the high-income 
countries. 
The graph shows that total mhtp imports play an important part across all countries’ 
development levels. For upper-middle-income countries, they show by far the most rele-
vant increase (df) across all imports, almost diminishing the other coloured bars. For high- 
and low-income countries, the positive effect on imports is almost equally distributed 
across the IPR-intensiveness forms. For lower-middle-income countries, htp imports in-
crease the most, followed by mhtp imports, whereas mltp and ltp imports are less in-
creased. If these results are connected to the IPR design, then it could, for example, mean 
that more stringent IPR protection immensely increase mhtp imports in upper-middle in-
come countries. 
Similar to the total imports illustrated in Graph 35, Graph 36 shows the delta (df) of 
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Graph 35: Total IPR-intensive Imports by Development Level 
 
 
The picture for IPR-intensive imports by PTA members differs from the one for total 
imports. Here, the increase of mhtp imports is only sizeable for lower-middle-income 
countries. For low-income countries, it is mostly htp imports by PTA members, which 
increase immensely between the time of PTA signature and the entry into force of the 
PTA (df). For all other development levels, the most increase can be seen for ltp imports 
and mltp imports by PTA members. For high- and upper-middle-income countries, htp 
imports by PTA members also increase substantially, yet they are only marginally im-
portant in lower-middle-income countries. Again, if these developments in the dependent 
variable are affected by the IPR design, it could be that, for instance, the PTA provisions 
and the following implementation of more stringent IPRs in low-income countries have 
a strong positive effect on htp imports from PTA members. The analysis will test if the 
observable changes in the imports are statistically related to stringent IPRs in PTAs, or if 
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Graph 36: IPR-intensive Imports from PTA Members by Development Level 
 
 
Finally, Graph 37 and Graph 38 display the average development of growth for the 
five delta time dimensions over time. They show that the development of growth is not 
only yet predominantly positive. 
The years in the graph represent the year of PTA signature, which is the constant year 
across deltas. The GDP and GDPpc data is only available for the years between 1960 and 
2017, which means that PTAs signed before 1960 are not represented and, for example, 
PTAs signed after 2007 have no data for the ten-year lag. The beginning and end of the 
graphs are thus flat due to a lack of data availability. However, the score after 2007 of the 
df and other time-lags is mostly available, yet is indeed operating on a comparatively 
lower level.  
Overall, the graphs show that the development of growth for GDP and GDP per capita 
are highly similar, whilst growth by GDPpc is operating at a slightly lower level than 
GDP. For both measures, the highest increase in growth can be observed for the delta 
with the ten-year lag after the entry into force of the PTA (df10). Similar developments 
are shown by the five-year lag delta (df5) and the three-year lag delta (df3) but on a lower 
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compared to the time of the transition period (dft) is less pronounced than anticipated, yet 
at certain points in time the delta for the transition period tends to score slightly higher 
(approximately 10%). 
 
Graph 37: Development of Average GDP by the Five Time Deltas (df, df3, df5, df10, dft) 
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Graph 37 shows that there are certain peaks of PTAs signed in particular years. Look-
ing at the ten-year lag (df10), it starts with PTAs signed in 1962 and peaks in 1964 and 
with some turbulence reaches a similar level again until 1969. These years of PTA signa-
ture show long term the most positive growth delta Then growth drops significantly for 
PTAs signed afterwards, only rising again in 1982 and 1985 before deflating again. With 
the agreements around the time of the TRIPS signature in 1994, the long-term growth 
increases to a highly consistent level until PTAs signed in 2003. The following drop might 
be overrepresented due to the missing data for the ten-year lag after 2007. The shorter 
time-lags show that mid-term growth is also highest for those PTAs signed in 1970, 1986, 
and 2002-2003. However, the highly positive delta seen in the early 60ies and 90ies are 
only visible for the long-term perspective and are less relevant for the short- and mid-
term growth.  
These development graphs alone give no indication on the impact of the design of 
IPRs in PTAs. The postulated effect of more stringent IPR provisions increasing growth 
is not apparent by looking at these graphs, as it is mostly PTAs after 2000, which include 
stringent IPRs (see Graph 1: Development of IPRs in PTAs (cumulative)). I elaborate in 
the following paragraphs on the models used for the analysis, before looking for expla-
nations for the descriptive statistics shown above and testing the postulated hypotheses. 
5.2.2.5 Economic Effects: Models 
In total, I run 1’380 models for the economic effects: 12 models according to the 
overall and first-comer IPR explanatory variable selection for each of the 23 dependent 
variables for each of the five time dimensions. Kepaptsoglou et al. (2010 Table 1) show 
that most of the previous studies for the effects of PTAs, which used a gravity model to 
explain the effect on trade flows, applied an OLS model respectively an OLS model with 
fixed effects. Therefore, I will also run my models using OLS regression. Figure 19 on 
the next page displays the model specifications. 
There is some loss of coded PTAs due to missing values in the dependent variables, 
especially for the greater time lags (five years and ten years). The regression tables will 
include the number of observations, which vary not only across variables but also time 
dimensions. Additionally, to the models shown in Figure 19, I also run the models in-
cluding only the subsets of the four country development levels (low-, lower-middle-, 
upper-middle- and high-income) to see if the effects are driven by a certain development 
level of countries. 
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Table 68 presents a model overview for the economic effect analysis, lists the 23 de-
pendent variables run for five time dimension (1x5), the six independent variable combi-
nations run once for overall (O) and once for first-comer (FC) measurements of the design 
variables (6x2). The model fits of the dependent variables affected significantly by at 
least one IPR explanatory variables are included in the Appendix 61: Model Fit of Eco-
nomic Effect Analysis (AIC & BIC). 
 









Dependent Variables (DVs) 115  1’380  
Investment in R&D     
Investment in R&D 1x5 6x2 60 m1 
FDI/ Licensing     
FDI 1x5 6x2 60 m2.1 
Licensing 1x5 6x2 60 m2.2 
Innovation     
Researchers in R&D 1x5 6x2 60 m3.1 
Resident applications for trademarks  
(cumulative) 
1x5 6x2 60 m3.2 
Resident applications for industrial designs (cumula-
tive) 













































































































































































































Lag: df3l, df5l, df10l
Transition Period: dft
Overall  |   First-comer
Index IPR General
Binary Variables IPR General
Index IPR Specific
Binary Variables IPR Specific
Index IPR TRIPS-plus
Additive TRIPS-plus Categories









Resident applications for patents  
(cumulative) 
1x5 6x2 60 m3.4 
Technology Transfer     
Total applications for industrial designs  
(cumulative) 
1x5 6x2 60 m4.1 
Total applications for patents (cumulative) 1x5 6x2 60 m4.2 
PTA member applications for industrial  
designs (cumulative) 
1x5 6x2 60 m4.3 
PTA member applications for patents  
(cumulative) 
1x5 6x2 60 m4.4 
Total htp imports 1x5 6x2 60 m4.5 
Total mhtp imports 1x5 6x2 60 m4.6 
Total mltp imports 1x5 6x2 60 m4.7 
Total ltp imports 1x5 6x2 60 m4.8 
PTA member htp imports 1x5 6x2 60 m4.9 
PTA member mhtp imports 1x5 6x2 60 m4.10 
PTA member mltp imports 1x5 6x2 60 m4.11 
PTA member ltp imports 1x5 6x2 60 m4.12 
Growth     
GDP growth 1x5 6x2 60 m5.1 
GDPpc growth 1x5 6x2 60 m5.2 
GDP growth rate 1x5 6x2 60 m5.3 
GDPpc growth rate 1x5 6x2 60 m5.4 
 
5.2.3 Economic Effects: Analysis 
The order for the economic effect analysis follows the five factors investment in R&D 
(5.2.3.1), FDI and licensing (5.2.3.2), innovation (5.2.3.3), technology transfer (5.2.3.4), 
and growth (5.2.3.5). I display those regression tables, which show a significant result for 
the IPR indexes and include the significant regression tables for the binary and additive 
variables in Appendix 62: Economic Effect Regression Tables of the Binary Variables for 
IPR General, Appendix 63: Economic Effect Regression Tables of the Binary Variables 
for IPR Specific, resp. Appendix 64: Economic Effect Regression Tables of the Additive 
Variables for the TRIPS-plus Categories. Further, I display the significant effects of the 
IPR indexes according to the development of countries in Appendix 65: Significant Mod-
els of High-income Countries (HIC), Appendix 66: Significant Models of Upper-middle-
income Countries (UMIC), Appendix 67: Significant Models of Lower-middle-income 
Countries (LMIC), resp. Appendix 68: Significant Models of Low-income Countries 
(LIC). 
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The regression analysis shows that not all of the factors are generally affected by IPRs 
in PTAs. For example, there are no significant results of IPR provisions on FDI, resident 
applications for trademarks nor the total applications for trademarks and patents. How-
ever, IPR has an effect on these factors, if one separates the dataset according to the level 
of development of countries. 
For those factors generally impacted by IPRs, the design of IPRs in PTAs shapes the 
direction of the effect, whereby all of the IPR indexes – general, specific and TRIPS-plus 
– show significant effects on multiple factors. However, some of the significant results 
observed for IPRs are surpassed by the effect of the control variables included in the 
model or are highly marginal. For instance, the impact of the IPR indexes on technology 
transfer measured by the total htp and mltp imports has significant estimates scoring be-
low 1.02E-09. Furthermore, the results vary according to the development level of coun-
tries, with high-income countries being affected most often across all factors and lower-
middle-income countries the fewest. Again, these results according to the development 
level have to be used with precaution as the number of observations is in some cases 
insufficient for general statements. Overall, those factors affected the most by IPR 
measures are licensing and technology transfer, namely PTA member applications for 
industrial designs and patents, total mhtp and ltp imports, and PTA member htp, mhtp and 
mltp imports. 
5.2.3.1 Investment in R&D Economic Effect Analysis 
The analysis of the effects of IPR on investment in R&D shows highly mixed results 
across the different deltas and IPR measures. Only two of the overall IPR measures have 
a significant effect, whereas the first-comer IPR measure has multiple significant results. 
In summary, the significant effects of IPR on investment in R&D are predominately neg-
ative. Table 69 displays the significant effects for the overall IPR measure on the left-
hand side and on the right-hand side, the ones for the comparable time lag for the first-
comer IPR measure. 
For the overall IPR measure, there are only these two displayed significant results, 
whereby the index IPR general has a positive effect (estimate = 0.025) after a ten-year 
lag, and the index IPR specific has a negative effect after the transition period has passed 
(-0.003). This means that an increase of general IPR provisions in PTAs has a positive 
effect on the investment in R&D after ten years of the PTA entering into force whilst an 
increase of specific provisions decreases the investment in R&D after the IPR transition 
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period has ended. However, the number of observations of df10l (N = 433) is compara-
tively low and might not reflect a generalisable positive effect, especially considering the 
significant results of the first-comer IPR models. As the effects on the right-hand side 
show, the results for the transition period of the first-comer IPR measure are similar. The 
ten-year lag for the FC models shows no significant (positive nor negative) effect, yet the 
transition period models display significantly negative results for both the index IPR gen-
eral (-0.008) as well as index IPR specific (-0.01). 
 
Table 69: Economic Effects Regression – Investment in R&D, IPR Indexes I 
 Overall IPR First-comer IPR 









Index IPR general (sum) 0.025*              
(0.012) 
─ -0.008*                  
(0.003) 
─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ -0.003.                     
(0.002) 
─ -0.01.                  
(0.006) 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ ─ ─ 
Control Variables     
Democratisation (Polity 2) -0.029.              
(0.017) 
0.002                     
(0.002) 
0.001                  
(0.002) 
0.002                  
(0.002) 
Classic IP leaders 0.15                   
(0.227) 
0.073***                     
(0.02) 
0.069***                  
(0.019) 
0.075***                  
(0.02) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.178                 
(0.178) 
-0.024                     
(0.018) 
-0.024                  
(0.018) 
-0.021                  
(0.018) 
New IP producers and developers 0.045                              
(0.265) 
0.037*                     
(0.018) 
0.032.                  
(0.018) 
0.038*                  
(0.018) 
ln GDP -0.059                     
(0.047) 
-0.001                     
(0.005) 
-0.001                  
(0.005) 
-0.002                  
(0.005) 
ln GDPpc -0.046                       
(0.101) 
-0.022**                     
(0.008) 
-0.024**                  
(0.008) 
-0.024**                  
(0.008) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.183*                     
(0.092) 
0.028**                     
(0.009) 
0.025**                  
(0.008) 
0.024**                  
(0.008) 
Intercept 3.598**                      
(1.186) 
0.017                     
(0.106) 
0.076                  
(0.104) 








Observations 433 817 817 817 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
Table 69 also shows that some of the control variables have a more pronounced effect 
on the investment in R&D than the IPR indexes. The classic IPR leaders, for example, 
score for all dft models significant and substantially higher than the IPR indexes, meaning 
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that if the US, EU, EFTA or Japan are members of a negotiated PTAs than there is a 
positive effect on the investment in R&D after the transition period has ended. A similar 
effect on a lower level can be observed for the new IP producers and developers Israel, 
South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. A consistently negative effect is shown for the GDP 
per capita (log) measure, indicating that with an increase in the GDP per capita, there is 
a decrease in the investment in R&D. 
Besides the overall IPR measure, the first-comer results show uniformly significant 
negative results of IPR on investment in R&D, indicating that the positive result for the 
ten-year lag might indeed be unreliable due to the reduced number of observations. The 
remaining significant results for the IPR indexes are illustrated in Table 70 on the next 
page. The table shows that the TRIPS-plus provisions in PTAs have no significant effect 
on the investment in R&D and that the general provisions have a reoccurring negative 
effect over time. However, the most distinct negative effect has the index IPR specific 
after the time of entry into force of the PTAs (-0.026), which means that the investment 
in R&D is decreased by including more general and especially more specific IPR provi-
sions in PTAs. Similar to the models covering the overall IPR measure, the control vari-
ables in the FC models have a more pronounced significant effect on the investment in 
R&D. The most consistent positive effect can be observed for the classic IP leader, re-
spectively the negative one for the GDP per capita (log). The significant effects cover all 
time deltas except the ten-year lag. 
These results would suggest that the effect of IPR on investment in R&D is most likely 
observable if the PTA is the first one to include the IPR commitments (FC models) and 
contrary to the anticipated positive effect, these more novel IPR provisions lead to a de-
crease of investment in R&D over time. 
The general binary variables also show some significantly positive and negative ef-
fects. For example, for the overall IPR measurement ipr_mfn and ipr_m_new_plant_va-
rieties have a significantly positive effect on investment in R&D, whilst others have a 
significantly negative effect such as ipr_border_measures and ipr_m_copyrights_re-
lated_rights. This suggests that if certain general IPR variables are included in PTAs, 
whether novel or repetitively, then these variables increase resp. decrease investment in 
R&D. However, the results are, for the most part, only visible for a single time dimension 
and do not constitute generalisable patterns for particular variables. This predicament also 
extends to the FC models as well as the specific binary variables. 
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Table 70: Economic Effects Regression – Investment in R&D, IPR Indexes II 
 First-comer IPR 









Index IPR general (sum) -0.014*                      
(0.007) 
─ -0.024.                  
(0.013) 
-0.015*                  
(0.007) 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ -0.026*                  
(0.01) 
─ ─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ ─ ─ 
Control Variables     
Democratisation (Polity 2) -0.006.                        
(0.003) 
-0.006.                  
(0.003) 
-0.02**                  
(0.006) 
0.006.                  
(0.003) 
Classic IP leaders 0.15***                       
(0.04) 
0.173***                  
(0.041) 
0.09                  
(0.078) 
0.197***                  
(0.044) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.008                         
(0.039) 
-0.002                  
(0.039) 
-0.042                  
(0.068) 
0.017                  
(0.035) 
New IP producers and developers 0.038                       
(0.038) 
0.052                  
(0.038) 
0.131.                  
(0.069) 
0.172***                  
(0.042) 
ln GDP -0.01                   
(0.009) 
-0.012                  
(0.009) 
0.008                  
(0.017) 
0.005                  
(0.009) 
ln GDPpc -0.039*                       
(0.017) 
-0.041*                  
(0.017) 
-0.026                  
(0.034) 
-0.081***                  
(0.018) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.015                   
(0.017) 
0.017                  
(0.017) 
0.005                  
(0.033) 
0.026                  
(0.018) 
Intercept 0.538*     
(0.215) 
0.563**                  
(0.215) 
0.225                  
(0.415) 










Observations 923 923 764 684 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
The TRIPS-plus additive variables show more consistently significant effects. For in-
stance, ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications have a significantly positive and ipr_tripsplus_new 
_plant_varieties a significantly negative effect on the investment in R&D, for both overall 
and FC IPR measures. This means that countries including IPR commitments on GIs go-
ing beyond TRIPS have an increased investment in R&D, whilst the effect is negative for 
TRIPS-plus provisions on new plant varieties. 
Finally, looking at the results for the separate development levels of countries, the 
regression analysis shows that the FC models include significantly negative results across 
development levels except for low-income countries (LIC). For the LIC models, the index 
IPR specific has a significantly positive effect on the investment in R&D after a ten-year 
lag (2.112). However, the number of observations is again substantially lower than for 
Chapter 5: Effects of Intellectual Property Rights in PTAs  349 
the other models, meaning that these results could change with broader data coverage for 
the dependent variable. The overall IPR measure shows mostly significantly positive re-
sults for high-income countries (HIC), lower-middle-income countries (LMIC) and LIC 
across various time deltas. These results suggest that for those PTAs repeating IPR pro-
visions already included in a countries’ previous PTA, there is a significantly positive 
effect on investment in R&D and a negative effect if the IPR provisions are novel (FC). 
For upper-middle-income countries (UMIC), there are only significantly negative effects 
for the FC models. 
5.2.3.2 FDI/ Licensing Economic Effect Analysis 
For FDI, there are no significant results of the IPR indexes across all models and time 
dimensions. This is the case for both the overall as well as the FC IPR measurement. 
Furthermore, neither the general and specific binary variables nor the TRIPS-plus addi-
tive variables show significant results of any of the IPR variables on FDI across all tested 
models. For illustrative purposes, the following Table 71 displays the results for the IPR 
indexes at df. The regression table shows that the level of democratisation has a consist-
ently significant negative effect on FDI. This means that with an increased level of de-
mocratisation, there is a decrease of investment in R&D for the time between PTA sig-
nature and the entry into force of the PTA. This effect remains valid for the majority of 
the tested models and thus also for other time dimensions. 
There is only one observable significant effect of IPRs on FDI, which is found in one 
of the HIC models. Hereby, the regression analysis shows that the index IPR general of 
the overall IPR measure has a positive effect on FDI (1.325) for the time after the transi-
tion period has ended (dft). This means that an increase in general IPR variables has a 
positive effect on FDI in high-income countries, even if the general IPR provisions repeat 
previous commitments. This effect is not driven by any IPR variable in particular as the 
general binary variables of the HIC models show no distinct positive effects, rather sig-
nificantly negative effects (ipr_m_new_plant_varieties: -32.076; ipr_m_encrypted_pro-
gram_carrying_satellite_signals: -39.52). HIC countries are thus more likely to receive 
an increase in FDI after the transition period for IPRs has ended if the increase general 
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Table 71: Economic Effects Regression – FDI 







Index IPR general (sum) 0.032              
(0.504) 
─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ 0.064                     
(0.876) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ 0.025                     
(0.329) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) -1.678**              
(0.621) 
-1.675**                     
(0.62) 
-1.675**                     
(0.62) 
Classic IP leaders 6.156                   
(7.915) 
6.117                     
(7.977) 
6.096                     
(8.026) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
7.403                 
(7.03) 
7.374                     
(6.972) 
7.357                     
(6.958) 
New IP producers and developers -12.256                              
(8.476) 
-12.259                  
(8.476) 
-12.244                     
(8.47) 
ln GDP -1.324                     
(2.03) 
-1.323                     
(2.03) 
-1.315                     
(2.033) 
ln GDPpc 0.5                       
(3.359) 
0.504                     
(3.331) 
0.501                     
(3.337) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -1.043                     
(3.852) 
-1.065                     
(3.896) 
-1.048                     
(3.843) 
Intercept 50.829                      
(49.067) 
51.038                     
(49.392) 
50.766                     
(48.691) 
Model m2.1_df_gi m2.1_df_sgi m2.1_df_ti 
Observations 2594 2594 2594 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
For licensing, the situation is different than for FDI, and the regression analysis shows 
significant results. Table 72 summarises the significant effects of the IPR indexes on li-
censing and illustrates that the observable effects are only seen for the index IPR general. 
For the overall IPR measure, the effect is significantly negative for the three-year lag 
(-0.57) and significantly positive after the transition period has ended, yet on a much 
lower level (0.057). For novel IPR commitments shown in the FC model, the effect is 
most pronounced and significantly positive after the five-year lag (1.978). 
The general binary variables for the FC models show ambiguous results. Whilst some 
general variables have a significantly positive effect in some models, their effect is sig-
nificantly negative for the model in other time dimensions. The only general FC IPR 
variable with a consistently positive effect on licensing is ipr_investment_nt resp. with a 
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consistently negative effect are ipr_as_investment and ipr_assistance_coop_coordina-
tion. For example, this implies that where IPR is defined as investment there is a negative 
effect on licensing, which is counterbalanced if the investment provisions also grant na-
tional treatment. The FC measure shows no further significant results for both the binary 
specific variables and the TRIPS-plus additive variables. 
 
Table 72: Economic Effects Regression – Licensing 
 Overall IPR FC IPR 







Index IPR general (sum) -0.57*              
(0.281) 
0.057.                     
(0.032) 
1.978.                      
(1.025) 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ ─ ─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ ─ 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) 1.017*              
(0.494) 
-0.104.                     
(0.055) 
0.431                        
(0.701) 
Classic IP leaders -6.204                   
(4.567) 
-0.455                     
(0.528) 
-12.732.                       
(6.641) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
18.892***                 
(4.409) 
-0.086                     
(0.513) 
21.885***                         
(6.069) 
New IP producers and developers -0.497                              
(4.462) 
-0.225                     
(0.518) 
-4.287                       
(6.272) 
ln GDP -4.929***                     
(1.206) 
-0.316*                     
(0.14) 
-5.426**                   
(1.725) 
ln GDPpc 6.433**                       
(2.107) 
0.076                     
(0.246) 
8.938**                       
(2.937) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 3.651                     
(2.269) 
-0.219                     
(0.26) 
1.163                   
(3.226) 
Intercept 44.453                      
(28.986) 
11.114***                     
(3.3) 






Observations 1326 1356 1224 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
The overall IPR measure shows for the general binary variables consistently signifi-
cant positive results of ipr_mentioned and negative ones for ipr_1_article and ipr_m_lay-
out_design_integ_circuits. This implies that if countries repeatedly mention IPRs, licens-
ing increases, whilst including only one IPR article resp. generally mentioning the layout-
design of integrated circuits decreases licensing. Out of the specific binary variables of 
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the overall measure, ipr_t_industrial_designs has a significantly reoccurring positive ef-
fect on licensing, whilst ipr_t_new_plant_varieties shows a negative one. Thus, countries 
repeating tangible industrial design measures in their PTAs have an increase in licensing 
whilst those including tangible provisions on new plant varieties experience a decrease. 
For the TRIPS-plus additive variables, there is one reoccurring significant negative effect, 
namely for ipr_tripsplus_enforcement. This means that TRIPS-plus provisions have no 
positive effect on licensing and by including TRIPS-plus provisions on enforcement, a 
countries’ licensing decreases. 
Looking at the countries according to their development level, the HIC models show 
multiple significant results, whereby all results show a negative effect of the IPR indexes 
on licensing. This means that the effect of IPRs on licensing in HIC are contrary to the 
anticipated positive effect. For the UMIC models, there is only one significant result, 
namely for the five-year lag of the FC measure of the index IPR general (9.691). Thus, 
unlike for the HIC models, here, more general IPR increases licensing along the line of 
the argument of the hypothesis. For the LMIC models, there IPR indexes show no signif-
icant results on licensing. Lastly, for the LIC models, there are two significant results for 
the index IPR specific for the three-year lag for both the overall (5.687) and FC measure 
(5.687). This means that specific IPR provisions have a positive effect on licensing in 
low-income countries. 
In summary, the IPR indexes have no generalisable effects on FDI but significantly 
positive as well as negative effects on licensing. The analysis according to the develop-
ment level of countries shows significant diverging results. 
5.2.3.3 Innovation Economic Effect Analysis 
The results for the innovation factors differ substantially. Whereas researchers in 
R&D are significantly affected by the IPR indexes, the residential applications for trade-
marks, industrial designs and patents are only selectively impacted. 
Firstly, all IPR indexes have a significant effect on researchers in R&D. Table 73 
displays the significant results of the overall IPR measure for df, and Table 74 for df3l. 
Table 75 illustrates the significant effects of the FC IPR measure. All three tables show 
that the index IPR general, specific and TRIPS-plus have a significantly negative effect 
on the development of the number of researchers in R&D. However, across all displayed 
Chapter 5: Effects of Intellectual Property Rights in PTAs  353 
models, the control variables show a more pronounced significant effect, namely a con-
sistently positive effect of the classic IP leader and geographical distance as well as a 
negative effect of GDPpc (log). 
 
Table 73: Economic Effects Regression – Innovation: Researchers in R&D I 







Index IPR general (sum) -0.006***              
(0.001) 
─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ -0.011***                     
(0.002) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ -0.003***                     
(0.001) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) 0.003              
(0.002) 
0.002                     
(0.002) 
0.002                     
(0.002) 
Classic IP leaders 0.049*                   
(0.022) 
0.075***                     
(0.022) 
0.063**                     
(0.022) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.035                 
(0.021) 
-0.024                     
(0.021) 
-0.017                     
(0.021) 
New IP producers and developers 0.04*                              
(0.02) 
0.051*                     
(0.02) 
0.042*                     
(0.02) 
ln GDP -0.001                     
(0.005) 
-0.002                     
(0.005) 
-0.003                     
(0.005) 
ln GDPpc -0.021*                       
(0.01) 
-0.023*                     
(0.01) 
-0.021*                     
(0.01) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.028**                     
(0.009) 
0.042***                     
(0.01) 
0.032**                     
(0.01) 
Intercept 0.103                      
(0.116) 
-0.006                     
(0.116) 
0.065                     
(0.117) 
Model m3.1_df_gi m3.1_df_si m3.1_df_ti 
Observations 786 786 786 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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Table 74: Economic Effects Regression – Innovation: Researchers in R&D II 







Index IPR general (sum) -0.007**                     
(0.002) 
─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ -0.016***                     
(0.004) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ -0.006***                     
(0.002) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) 0.001                     
(0.004) 
0.001                     
(0.004) 
0.001                     
(0.004) 
Classic IP leaders 0.113**                     
(0.043) 
0.135**                     
(0.044) 
0.131**                     
(0.044) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.02                     
(0.04) 
-0.011                     
(0.039) 
-0.006                     
(0.039) 
New IP producers and developers 0.064                     
(0.039) 
0.093*                     
(0.04) 
0.091*                     
(0.04) 
ln GDP -0.004                     
(0.009) 
-0.004                     
(0.009) 
-0.004                     
(0.009) 
ln GDPpc -0.086***                     
(0.02) 
-0.089***                     
(0.02) 
-0.089***                     
(0.02) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.054**                     
(0.018) 
0.073***                     
(0.02) 
0.067***                     
(0.019) 
Intercept 0.757**                     
(0.237) 
0.559*                     
(0.24) 








Observations 640 640 640 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
Table 75 illustrates that the effect of the IPR indexes is more pronounced after the 
three-year lag. However, the number of observations has also substantially dropped 
(N=640), which means that the results are less generalisable. Table 75 summarises the 
significant results for the FC IPR measure, which display almost identical effects for the 
IPR indexes as seen in the overall IPR analysis. The results imply that an increase in 
general, specific and TRIPS-plus provisions in PTAs has a significantly negative effect 
on the number of researchers in a country after the PTA has entered into force and even 
more so three years after the entry into force. This intermediate negative effect is not 
counterbalanced by a later positive effect, which means that there is no positive effect of 
IPR on this measure of innovation. 
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Table 75: Economic Effects Regression – Innovation: Researchers in R&D III 
 First-comer IPR 











Index IPR general (sum) ─ ─ -0.018.                  
(0.009) 
─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) -0.018**                      
(0.006) 
─ ─ -0.035**                  
(0.011) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ -0.008***                  
(0.002) 
─ ─ -0.011***                  
(0.003) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) 0.001                        
(0.002) 
0.001                  
(0.002) 
-0.002                  
(0.004) 
-0.001                  
(0.004) 
-0.001                  
(0.004) 
Classic IP leaders 0.056*                       
(0.023) 
0.066**                  
(0.022) 
0.108*                  
(0.043) 
0.135**                  
(0.045) 
0.129**                  
(0.044) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.011                         
(0.021) 
-0.014                  
(0.021) 
0                 
(0.039) 
0.001                  
(0.039) 
0                  
(0.039) 
New IP producers and developers 0.043*                       
(0.02) 
0.038.                
(0.02) 
0.053                  
(0.039) 
0.076.                  
(0.039) 
0.059                  
(0.038) 
ln GDP -0.002                   
(0.005) 
-0.005                  
(0.005) 
-0.006                  
(0.009) 
-0.009                  
(0.009) 
-0.009                  
(0.009) 
ln GDPpc -0.027**                       
(0.01) 
-0.025*               
(0.01) 
-0.089***                  
(0.02) 
-0.091***                  
(0.02) 
-0.085***                  
(0.02) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.023*                   
(0.009) 
0.032***                  
(0.01) 
0.055**                  
(0.019) 
0.06**                  
(0.019) 
0.065***                  
(0.019) 
Intercept 0.178     
(0.12) 
0.158                  
(0.117) 
0.778**                  
(0.239) 
0.809***                  
(0.238) 












Observations 786 786 640 640 640 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
The general binary variables show a less consistent picture. For the overall IPR meas-
ure, only the variable ipr_implementation shows a reoccurring positive effect on the num-
ber of researchers in R&D. Unlike the FC IPR measure, which shows repeating signifi-
cant negative results for ipr_implementation, as well as ipr_mentioned and ipr_m_indus-
trial_designs. Moreover, the FC models also include reoccurring significant positive ef-
fects for ipr_1_article, ipr_m_geo_indications, ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits, and 
ipr_m_domain_names. For instance, this means that if countries include a general provi-
sions on IPR implementation for the first time in a PTA, there is a negative effect on the 
number of researchers. This effect is inverted if countries repeat the implementation pro-
visions (overall IPR measure). The specific binary variables show for the overall IPR 
measures a negative impact of ipr_civil_administrative_procedures_remedies and ipr_t 
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_geo_indications, whereas the FC measure shows a positive effect of ipr_t_patents and a 
negative one for ipr_t_industrial_designs. For example, this means that countries includ-
ing specific commitments on patents for the first time in a PTA, there is a positive effect 
on the number of researchers in R&D, whereas the effect is inverted for industrial design. 
Further, for the repetitive use of specific provisions on GIs, there is also a negative effect 
observable. 
The TRIPS-plus additive variables of the overall IPR measurement show a reoccur-
ring positive effect of ipr_tripsplus_trademarks and a negative one for ipr_tripsplus 
_new_plant_varieties as well as ipr_tripsplus_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources. The 
FC IPR measure also indicates a positive effect of ipr_tripsplus_trademarks and a nega-
tive effect of ipr_tripsplus_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources, as well as ipr_tripsplus 
_enforcement and ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion. This indicates that, for example, PTAs men-
tioning or repeating TRIPS-plus provisions on trademarks positively affect the number 
of researchers in R&D, whereas firstly mentioned TRIPS-plus provisions on enforcement 
or exhaustion have a negative effect. 
Further, the analysis for the subgroups of the development levels shows multiple sig-
nificant results for the IPR indexes. The HIC data shows multiple significant results for 
all indexes with predominately negative results, and only two positive results for the gen-
eral index in the df10l and dft model (0.008 resp. 0.004). The df10l model has a limited 
number of observations, and the results are not representative for the HIC data. The UMIC 
subgroup displays multiple significant results for all indexes also with predominately 
negative results as well as three positive results for the TRIPS-plus index in the overall 
df5l and df10l and FC df10l model (0.017, 0.046 resp. 0.14). Here, the two latter results 
also are found in the models with the fewest observations due to the ten-year lag, and the 
results are not generalisable for the UMIC data. For the LMIC data, there is only one 
significant result for the general index (-0.015), which is significantly negative. There are 
no significant results for the LIC data. Thus, the majority of results for the HIC, UMIC 
and LMIC data primarily reflects the negative effects also found in the general analysis. 
Secondly, I analyse the resident applications for trademarks as a measure for inno-
vation. However, the regression tables for the resident applications show no significant 
results for the IPR indexes on the number of researchers in R&D. This concerns the over-
all and FC IPR measures as well as the general and specific binary variables and the 
additive categories. Table 76 illustrates the regression for df and shows that the indexes 
all have a negative effect on the number of researchers, yet to no significant extent. The 
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only significant effect is shown by the level of democratisation, which has a significantly 
negative effect on the number of researchers in R&D. 
 
Table 76: Economic Effects Regression – Innovation: Resident Applications for Trade-
marks 







Index IPR general (sum) -0.089              
(0.08) 
─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ -0.042                     
(0.131) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ -0.01                     
(0.049) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) -0.284**              
(0.104) 
-0.294**                     
(0.104) 
-0.294**                     
(0.104) 
Classic IP leaders -0.176                   
(1.308) 
-0.4                     
(1.309) 
-0.427                     
(1.317) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-1.672                 
(1.106) 
-1.474                     
(1.091) 
-1.455                     
(1.089) 
New IP producers and developers 0.517                              
(1.318) 
0.451                     
(1.317) 
0.437                     
(1.316) 
ln GDP 0.164                     
(0.316) 
0.154                     
(0.316) 
0.15                     
(0.316) 
ln GDPpc -0.246                       
(0.525) 
-0.285                     
(0.524) 
-0.289                     
(0.525) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.316                     
(0.612) 
-0.377                     
(0.622) 
-0.403                     
(0.614) 
Intercept 4.475                      
(7.518) 
5.114                     
(7.614) 
5.414                     
(7.52) 
Model m3.2_df_gi m3.2_df_si m3.2_df_ti 
Observations 2278 2278 2278 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
The separation of the data according to the development level of countries shows mul-
tiple significant results across all IPR indexes for HIC. Most effects are negative, with 
the only two positive effects observable for the overall general IPR dft and FC specific 
index dft. For UMIC, the analysis shows only one significantly positive result for the 
general index dft (0.016), and for LMIC and LIC, there are no significant results. This 
means that LMIC and LIC are in line with the general analysis, which observes no effect. 
For UMIC, there is a slight positive effect on the number of resident applications for 
trademarks for countries including general provisions, whereas HIC are negatively af-
fected. 
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Thirdly, I look at the resident applications for industrial designs and find multiple 
significant effects for the overall IPR measure and none for the FC measure. Table 77 and 
Table 78 display all significant effects found for the IPR indexes. 
 
Table 77: Economic Effects Regression – Innovation: Resident Applications for Industrial 
Designs I 
 Overall IPR 







Index IPR general (sum) -0.16***              
(0.044) 
─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ -0.172*                     
(0.07) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ -0.062*                     
(0.026) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) -0.035              
(0.063) 
-0.051                     
(0.063) 
-0.051                     
(0.063) 
Classic IP leaders 0.823                   
(0.741) 
0.722                     
(0.749) 
0.748                     
(0.753) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-1.052.                 
(0.635) 
-0.735                     
(0.626) 
-0.676                     
(0.624) 
New IP producers and developers 0.717                              
(0.734) 
0.669                     
(0.735) 
0.621                     
(0.735) 
ln GDP 0.098                     
(0.179) 
0.092                     
(0.18) 
0.075                     
(0.18) 
ln GDPpc 0.148                       
(0.308) 
0.085                     
(0.308) 
0.088                     
(0.308) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.399                     
(0.353) 
-0.408                     
(0.36) 
-0.474                     
(0.354) 
Intercept 1.632                      
(4.294) 
1.65                     
(4.347) 
2.479                     
(4.296) 
Model m3.3_df_gi m3.3_df_si m3.3_df_ti 
Observations 1998 1998 1998 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
Table 77 shows that the general and specific IPR indexes have a more pronounced 
impact on the resident applications for industrial designs than the TRIPS-plus index. The 
results indicate that with an increase of general and specific provisions, the number of 
residential applications for industrial design decreases significantly. At least for the time 
between the date of signature of the PTA and its entry into force (df). However, the IPR 
indexes are not the only variables with significant results. Unlike for the previously ana-
lysed factors, here, the countries with a high increase of patent protection have the most 
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pronounced significant result, at least in the model including the general IPR index. If a 
country signs a PTA with Brazil, China, India or Mexico, then this negatively affects the 
resident applications for industrial design. However, if the PTA includes IPR specific or 
TRIPS-plus provisions then the effect loses its significance. 
Table 78 shows that for the three-year lag (df3l), the negative effect of the three IPR 
indexes intensifies. Moreover, the countries with a high increase of patent protection have 
no more significant effect, whilst democratisation shows a reoccurring negative and clas-
sic IPR leaders a consistently positive effect. This means that a higher score on the de-
mocratisation index intermediately decreases the residential applications for industrial 
design, whereas PTAs with the classic IP leaders substantial increase them. 
 
Table 78: Economic Effects Regression – Innovation: Resident Applications for Industrial 
Designs II 
 Overall IPR 







Index IPR general (sum) -0.304**                     
(0.092) 
─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ -0.421**                     
(0.154) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ -0.159**                     
(0.061) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) -0.297*                     
(0.126) 
-0.33**                     
(0.125) 
-0.334**                     
(0.125) 
Classic IP leaders 3.146*                     
(1.514) 
3.032*                     
(1.521) 
2.993*                     
(1.521) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.848                     
(1.251) 
-0.377                     
(1.234) 
-0.275                     
(1.231) 
New IP producers and developers 1.679                     
(1.451) 
1.664                     
(1.453) 
1.583                     
(1.452) 
ln GDP -0.155                     
(0.366) 
-0.153                     
(0.366) 
-0.181                     
(0.366) 
ln GDPpc 0.765                     
(0.621) 
0.686                     
(0.62) 
0.689                     
(0.62) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -1.021                     
(0.708) 
-0.863                     
(0.728) 
-0.963                     
(0.721) 
Intercept 11.351                     
(8.758) 
9.582                     
(8.894) 








Observations 1797 1797 1797 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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Looking at the effect of the IPR design in more detail highlights that the specific bi-
nary IPR variables have no significant effect on the resident applications for industrial 
designs, both for the overall and FC IPR measurement. Out of the overall binary general 
variables, only the variable ipr_1_article has a negative effect and ipr_assistance_coop 
_coordination a positive one. The FC binary general variables only have a significant 
negative effect for the variable ipr_nt (-0.577) for dft. The overall TRIPS-plus additive 
variables also show only significant effects for dft, whereby ipr_tripsplus_geo_indica-
tions has a significantly negative effect (-0.767), and ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion has a sig-
nificantly positive effect (6.975). The effect of exhaustion remains significant for the FC 
IPR measure (6.495). For instance, this means that countries agreeing to TRIPS-plus ex-
haustion measures in PTAs experience a rise in residential applications for industrial de-
signs after the transition period for IPRs has ended. However, the majority of the IPR 
variables are negatively related to the dependent variable and are mirroring the effects 
observable for the IPR indexes. 
The analysis for the subgroups of countries’ development levels shows multiple sig-
nificant results for HIC. All of them are negative except for the positive effect of the FC 
index IPR specific for dft, which additionally represents the most pronounced estimate 
(0.815). The results for the UMIC data is similar to the HIC data with multiple significant 
negative results for the general IPR index of both overall and FC IPR measure. The LMIC 
data differs as it shows two significant positive results for the FC general IPR index of 
df3l and df5l. The LIC analysis displays no significant results for the IPR indexes. The 
results suggest that the design of IPRs in PTAs has no effect on resident applications for 
industrial designs in LIC, whereas an increase in general IPR commitments has a positive 
effect of residential applications in LMIC. The negative relation between IPR design and 
resident applications is mirrored by the HIC and UMIC data. 
Fourthly, I analyse the resident applications for patents as a measure for innovation. 
Table 79 on the next page displays the only two significant results of the IPR indexes 
found for the five-year and ten-year lag of the overall IPR measure. Both results show a 
significant negative effect for the index IPR general, whereby in both models, democra-
tisation shows an even more pronounced negative effect on the resident applications for 
patents. Moreover, the df10l model includes a significantly negative effect of countries 
with a high increase of patent protection and GDP (log) as well as a significantly positive 
one for GDPpc (log). As the number of observations is comparably high for df10l, this 
indicates that after ten years of the entry into force of the PTA, the resident applications 
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are negatively affected not only by the general IPR provisions in a PTA but also, for 
example, by the level of democratisation. 
 
Table 79: Economic Effects Regression – Innovation: Resident Applications for Patents 
 Overall IPR 





Index IPR general (sum) -0.056.              
(0.031) 
-0.152*                     
(0.07) 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ ─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ 
Control Variables   
Democratisation (Polity 2) -0.188***              
(0.038) 
-0.753***                     
(0.084) 
Classic IP leaders 0.111                   
(0.484) 
-0.474                     
(1.075) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.511                 
(0.389) 
-1.757.                     
(0.898) 
New IP producers and developers -0.163                              
(0.466) 
1.361             
(1.285) 
ln GDP -0.129                     
(0.119) 
-0.718**                     
(0.261) 
ln GDPpc 0.165                       
(0.196) 
1.89***                     
(0.436) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.297                     
(0.227) 
-0.425                     
(0.502) 
Intercept 7.509**                      
(2.814) 






Observations 1901 1558 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
The detailed IPR variables analysis finds no significant results for all FC regressions 
as well as none for the overall binary specific and additive TRIPS-plus variables. Only 
one of the overall binary general models shows significant effects. Again, these results 
are found in the df10l model, which shows a significant negative effect for ipr_as_invest-
ment (-14.297) and a positive one for ipr_assistance_coop_coordination (3.501). This 
suggests that those countries with PTAs defining IPR as investment have a substantially 
lower number of residential applications for patents, whereas a general commitment to 
IPR assistance, cooperation and coordination positively affects them. 
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The analysis of the development subgroups mostly reflects the negative results found 
for the analysis of the general data. The HIC have multiple significant results across in-
dexes predominately negative expect from significantly positive results for the overall 
general index for dft and all three FC IPR indexes for dft. The UMIC only has three sig-
nificant results, whereby one is significantly positive for the overall general IPR index 
for dft, and the other two are significantly negative for the specific and TRIPS-plus in-
dexes for df. For LMIC, there are two significant negative results for the overall general 
IPR index for df5l and df10l. The LIC have one significant result for the FC general IPR 
index (0.052) and are otherwise not visibly impacted by the design of IPRs in PTAs. 
Except for the LIC, the majority of effects for the development level of countries is neg-
ative and as suggested by the comprehensive analysis shows a decrease of residential 
applications for patents with an increase of IPRs in PTAs. Unlike in the original dataset, 
the analysis by development level also shows significant negative effects for the specific 
and TRIPS-plus indexes. 
In summary, the analysis of the four measures for innovation shows consistent nega-
tive effects of the general, specific and TRIPS-plus indexes. 
5.2.3.4 Technology Transfer Economic Effect Analysis 
The regression analysis for technology covers twelve factors, namely, the total appli-
cations for industrial designs, total applications for patents, PTA member applications for 
industrial designs, PTA member applications for patents, total htp imports, total mhtp 
imports, total mltp imports, total ltp imports, PTA member htp imports, PTA member 
mhtp imports, PTA member mltp imports and PTA member ltp imports. Where the results 
show a positive relationship between the design of IPRs in PTAs and technology transfer, 
the effects are predominantly positive or at least positive as well as negative. 
Firstly, the total applications for industrial designs are not significantly affected by 
the design of IPRs, neither for the overall nor the FC IPR measurement. Table 80 on the 
following page displays the regression results of the general, specific and TRIPS-plus 
index for the overall IPR measure for df. The table shows that the only significant effect 
is observable for the control variable measuring the geographical distance, which shows 
for the models including the specific resp. TRIPS-plus index a significantly negative ef-
fect on the number of total applications for industrial designs. This means that with an 
increased distance between PTA members, there are fewer total applications for industrial 
designs. 
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Table 80: Economic Effects Regression – Technology Transfer: Total Applications for In-
dustrial Designs (cumulative) 







Index IPR general (sum) -0.03              
(0.032) 
─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ 0.001                     
(0.052) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ 0.002                     
(0.019) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) 0.01              
(0.045) 
0.008                     
(0.045) 
0.008                     
(0.045) 
Classic IP leaders -0.28                   
(0.523) 
-0.384                     
(0.527) 
-0.393                     
(0.531) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.512                 
(0.446) 
-0.425                     
(0.438) 
-0.424                     
(0.437) 
New IP producers and developers 0.352                              
(0.522) 
0.32                     
(0.522) 
0.32                     
(0.522) 
ln GDP 0.101                     
(0.133) 
0.1                     
(0.133) 
0.101                     
(0.133) 
ln GDPpc -0.326                       
(0.235) 
-0.355                     
(0.235) 
-0.357                     
(0.235) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.385                     
(0.247) 
-0.426.                     
(0.251) 
-0.428.                     
(0.247) 
Intercept 4.142                      
(3.044) 
4.538                     
(3.077) 
4.551                     
(3.036) 
Model m4.1_df_gi m4.1_df_si m4.1_df_ti 
Observations 1807 1807 1807 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
The in-depth analysis of the general and specific binary IPR variables as well as the 
TRIPS-plus additive categories also finds no significant effect for IPR on the total appli-
cations for industrial designs, neither for the overall nor the FC IPR measure. 
The development level subgroups show some significant links, yet only for the HIC 
and UMIC data. For both of these subgroups, the analysis reveals multiple significant 
positive and negative results for the overall and FC IPR measure across all indexes. The 
LMIC and LIC data displays no significant effects. This suggests that HIC and UMIC 
countries total applications for industrial deigsn can be both positively as well as nega-
tively affected by the design of IPRs in PTAs, whereas the those countries with a lower 
income level are not affected by it. 
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Secondly, I look at the total applications for patents, which also display no signifi-
cant results for the IPR design for both the overall as well as the FC IPR measures. There-
fore, Table 81 illustrates the regression analysis for the general, specific and TRIPS-plus 
index for the overall IPR measure for df. Similar to the analysis of the total applications 
for industrial designs, the table only shows significant effects for the geographical dis-
tance. Hereby, the effect is significantly negative across all IPR indexes. There are also 
no observable effects when looking at the general and specific binary variables nor the 
TRIPS-plus additive variable, neither for the overall nor FC IPR measure. 
 
Table 81: Economic Effects Regression – Technology Transfer: Total Applications for Pa-
tents (cumulative) 







Index IPR general (sum) -0.019              
(0.022) 
─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ 0.005                     
(0.036) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ 0.002                     
(0.013) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) 0.006              
(0.031) 
0.004                     
(0.031) 
0.004                     
(0.031) 
Classic IP leaders -0.378                   
(0.362) 
-0.45                     
(0.363) 
-0.455                     
(0.365) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.184                 
(0.303) 
-0.131                     
(0.299) 
-0.131                     
(0.298) 
New IP producers and developers 0.003                              
(0.371) 
-0.02             
(0.371) 
-0.019                     
(0.37) 
ln GDP 0.098                     
(0.087) 
0.095                     
(0.087) 
0.096                     
(0.087) 
ln GDPpc -0.138                       
(0.152) 
-0.152                     
(0.152) 
-0.153                     
(0.152) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.287.                     
(0.167) 
-0.315.                     
(0.171) 
-0.315.                     
(0.168) 
Intercept 1.528                      
(2.062) 
1.83                     
(2.087) 
1.825                     
(2.061) 
Model m4.2_df_gi m4.2_df_si m4.2_df_ti 
Observations 2194 2194 2194 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
However, all of the subgroups of income levels show significant results. The HIC data 
has multiple significant positive and negative results across all indexes for both the over-
all and FC IPR measure. The UMIC data also includes multiple significant effects, which 
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are predominately positive except for a negative effect for FC index IPR general for df10l 
(-0.053). The LMIC data has one significant effect for the overall general index for df10l 
(-0.435), and the LIC data three significant effects for the overall general index for df, 
df3l and df5l. The effects of IPR design on the total applications for patents are thus mixed 
for the HIC, mostly positive for UMIC and negative for both the LMIC and LIC. Hence, 
the development level of countries clearly affects the direction of the effect of IPRs in 
PTAs for this measure. 
Thirdly, I look at the PTA member applications for industrial designs, and unlike 
for the total applications, the regression analysis finds significant effects. Table 82 dis-
plays the significant overall IPR effects and Table 83 the significant FC IPR effects.  
 
Table 82: Economic Effects Regression – Technology Transfer: PTA Member Applications 
for Industrial Designs (cumulative) I 
 Overall IPR 









Index IPR general (sum) ─ ─ ─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) 0.206.                     
(0.114) 
─ 0.476**                     
(0.178) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ 0.086.                     
(0.05) 
─ 0.301**                     
(0.097) 
Control Variables     
Democratisation (Polity 2) 0.023                     
(0.13) 
0.02                     
(0.13) 
-0.14                     
(0.175) 
-0.138                     
(0.175) 
Classic IP leaders -0.58                     
(1.351) 
-0.545                     
(1.35) 
-6.274***                     
(1.883) 
-6.237***                     
(1.871) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-1.667                     
(1.272) 
-1.739                     
(1.268) 
-1.837                     
(1.516) 
-1.788                     
(1.509) 
New IP producers and developers 0.199                     
(1.182) 
0.136                     
(1.2) 
-1.416                     
(1.803) 
-1.303                     
(1.798) 
ln GDP 0.701*                     
(0.281) 
0.702*                     
(0.281) 
0.738*                     
(0.371) 
0.68.                     
(0.371) 
ln GDPpc -1.018.                     
(0.544) 
-1.002.                     
(0.545) 
0.312                     
(0.722) 
0.409                     
(0.722) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 2.144**                     
(0.704) 
2.209**                     
(0.696) 
4.288***                     
(0.942) 
4.125***                     
(0.944) 
Intercept -23.447**                     
(8.052) 
-23.985**                     
(8.004) 
-47.341***                     
(11.438) 










Observations 506 506 361 361 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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Table 82 shows that the overall specific IPR and TRIPS-plus indexes have a signifi-
cantly positive effect on the applications for industrial designs by PTA members. How-
ever, the effects of the FC IPR measure in Table 83 show significantly negative results 
for the general IPR and TRIPS-plus index. This suggests that novel general IPR and 
TRIPS-plus commitments significantly decrease the PTA member applications for indus-
trial designs, whilst repetitive specific IPR and TRIPS-plus provisions increase them. 
However, the regression analysis also shows that the other included factors also have a 
significant and mostly more pronounced effect than the IPR design features. Moreover, 
the results for the overall IPR and FC general IPR index are hardly generalisable due to 
the particularly low number of observations (less than 14% of the total observations). 
 
Table 83: Economic Effects Regression – Technology Transfer: PTA Member Applications 
for Industrial Designs (cumulative) II 
 First-comer IPR 







Index IPR general (sum) ─ -0.485.                  
(0.247) 
-12.984**                  
(4.866) 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ ─ ─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) -0.066.                      
(0.036) 
─ ─ 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) 0.025                        
(0.058) 
-0.233                 
(0.178) 
-5.834***                  
(1.11) 
Classic IP leaders 0.749                       
(0.587) 
-4.59*                  
(1.951) 
7.03                  
(11.191) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.907                         
(0.618) 
-2.64.               
(1.515) 
13.934                  
(11.138) 
New IP producers and developers 0.044                       
(0.548) 
-1.051                  
(1.823) 
-18.192*                  
(7.943) 
ln GDP 0.336**                   
(0.126) 
0.942*                  
(0.369) 
7.524***                  
(2) 
ln GDPpc -0.811***                       
(0.245) 
-0.565                  
(0.788) 
-16.179***                  
(4.873) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 1.355***                   
(0.29) 
5.382***                  
(0.946) 
9.743*                  
(4.499) 
Intercept -11.049***     
(3.315) 
-52.008***                  
(11.293) 








Observations 755 361 430 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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The detailed IPR variables analysis finds significant effects for all time dimensions 
for both the overall and FC IPR measure. The general binary variables have plenty of 
reoccurring effects, whereby the overall IPR shows mostly effects with a consistent di-
rection. Namely, the analysis finds positive effects for ipr_nt, ipr_border_measures, 
ipr_m_trademarks, ipr_m_encrypted_program_carrying_satellite_signals and negative 
results for ipr_mfn, ipr_investment_mfn, ipr_assistance_coop_coordination, and ipr_m 
_geo_indications. The FC IPR measure identifies different variables with reoccurring ef-
fects, namely positive effects for ipr_investment_dispute_settlement_mechanism, ipr_m 
_undisclosed_information, and ipr_m_domain_names, as well as negative ones for ipr 
_investment_expropriation_exception, ipr_m_patents, ipr_m_layout_design_integ_cir-
cuits, and ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources. The IPR measures thus show that 
there are many general IPR variables that have an effect on PTA members for industrial 
designs, and that their effects vary according to their novelty in a countries’ PTA. 
The specific binary variables show a similar picture with multiple reoccurring signif-
icant IPR variables, whereby the positive and negative effects vary according to the IPR 
measurement. For example, the overall IPR measure displays significantly positive ef-
fects for ipr_special_requirements_related_border_measures and ipr_t_trademarks, 
whereas the FC IPR measure suggests a positive effect of ipr_t_patents and ipr_t_do-
main_names. However, the FC IPR measure also shows a significantly negative effect of 
specific provisions on industrial designs, meaning that if PTAs include specific industrial 
design provisions for the first time, it has a significantly negative effect on the PTA mem-
ber applications for industrial designs. Thus, where the IPR provisions most likely require 
a change of the status quo of the domestic legislation, PTA members are less likely to 
apply for the protection of industrial design. 
The TRIPS-plus additive variables have fewer, yet also a couple of significant reoc-
curring results. For the overall IPR measure, ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information and 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design have a positive resp. ipr_tripsplus_patents, ipr_tripsplus 
_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources, and ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion a negative effect on 
PTA members applications for industrial designs. The FC IPR measure shows only one 
reoccurring effect for the TRIPS-plus variables, namely for PTAs including ipr_trip-
splus_encrypted_program_carrying_satellite_signals. Certain TRIPS-plus variables thus 
have a significantly positive or negative effect on the number of applications for industrial 
designs by PTA members. Albeit the results should be considered and generalised care-
fully, as the number of observations is low across most models.  
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Looking at the development level of countries, the regression analysis also shows 
multiple significant results. For the HIC data, there are multiple significant negative ef-
fects across indexes and both IPR measures. Unlike the UMIC data, which shows a sig-
nificant positive result for the specific IPR index for both overall and FC measure for 
df10l. However, the number of observations might make these results unreliable. The 
LMIC data has two significant negative effects, one for the overall TRIPS-plus index for 
df (-0.121) and one for the FC general index for df10l (-0.353). The LIC data finds one 
significant result for the overall index IPR general df (0.509). The effects thus seem to 
vary across the level of development, yet are even more prone to bias due to the additional 
separation resp. reduction of the number of observations. 
Fourthly, I also examine the PTA member applications for patents and find multi-
ple significant results for the design of IPRs in PTAs again. Table 84 and Table 85 on the 
following pages illustrate all significant results for the overall IPR indexes, and Table 86 
displays all significant effects found for the FC IPR measure. 
The overall IPR regressions show a clear positive effect of the general, specific and 
TRIPS-plus IPR indexes for df, df3l, df5l or df10l. Only for dft, there is a significantly 
negative effect of the index IPR TRIPS-plus. This indicates that after a certain amount of 
time has passed between PTA signature and the PTA entering into force, the IPR com-
mitments increase the applications for patents by PTA members. TRIPS-plus commit-
ments have an initial negative effect after the transition period has ended, yet the positive 
effects for the other deltas suggest that this effect turns positive over time. Besides the 
effect of the TRIPS-plus index for df10l, the effects of the general and specific index are 
far more distinct than the ones for the TRIPS-plus index. In light of the low number of 
observations and the lower reliability of the df10l results, it is likely that the general and 
specific IPR commitments in PTAs have a more distinct effect on the PTA member ap-
plications for patents than commitments going beyond TRIPS, especially considering the 
significant negative results for dft.  
Besides the significant effect of the IPR design, the tables also show that there are 
other factors in the model with a more pronounced effect. GDP (log) shows a consistently 
positive effect, surpassed only by the positive results for the geographic distance. This 
suggests that a higher GDP is in a country and the greater the distance to its PTA partner, 
the more applications for patents will it receive by its PTA partners.  
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Table 84: Economic Effects Regression – Technology Transfer: PTA Member Applications 
for Patents (cumulative) I 
 Overall IPR 











Index IPR general (sum) ─ ─ ─ 2.69***                     
(0.475) 
─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ ─ 3.733***                     
(1.111) 
─ 2.285***                     
(0.432) 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) 0.876*              
(0.42) 
0.425*                     
(0.201) 
─ ─ ─ 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) 0.582              
(1.984) 
0.095                     
(0.847) 
-0.121                     
(1.281) 
-0.412                     
(1.264) 
0.243                     
(0.414) 
Classic IP leaders 13.35                   
(19.686) 
4.084                     
(7.97) 
-3.531                     
(12.801) 
-8.807                     
(12.599) 
-1.707                     
(4.158) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-24.655                 
(18.62) 
-13.245.                     
(7.52) 
-19.207.                     
(11.403) 
-16.829                     
(11.227) 
-7.015*                     
(3.561) 
New IP producers and developers -14.481                              
(16.899) 
-4.589                     
(6.745) 
-18.141.                     
(10.672) 
-25.267*                     
(10.601) 
-6.356                     
(4.14) 
ln GDP 16.708***                     
(3.812) 
7.587***                     
(1.584) 
10.094***                     
(2.566) 
9.481***                     
(2.532) 
1.882*                     
(0.802) 
ln GDPpc -2.485                       
(7.37) 
-0.645                     
(3.048) 
0.466                     
(4.824) 
1.303                     
(4.76) 
-0.265                     
(1.598) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 34.835***                     
(8.73) 
14.715***                     
(3.734) 
18.634**                     
(6.031) 
14.728*                     
(5.869) 
7.39***                     
(1.992) 
Intercept -
687.258***                      
(108.213) 
-
303.791***                     
(47.373) 
-
399.344***                     
(74.162) 
-
356.653***                     
(72.73) 










Observations 980 796 721 721 521 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
Table 84 shows for some models also a significant negative effect of countries with a 
high increase of patent protection. This suggests that if Brazil, China, India or Mexico are 
part of the PTA then countries are less likely to receive more applications by them or 
other PTA members after the PTA has entered into force than at the time of PTA signa-
ture. The other country blocks show no significant effect on the overall IPR measures, 
same as the other control variables democratisation and GDPpc. 
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Table 85: Economic Effects Regression – Technology Transfer: PTA Member Applications 
for Patents (cumulative) II 
 Overall IPR 





Index IPR general (sum) ─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ ─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) 2.292***                     
(0.21) 
-1.521.              
(0.848) 
Control Variables   
Democratisation (Polity 2) 0.24                     
(0.383) 
2.667              
(3.959) 
Classic IP leaders -1.368                     
(3.842) 
36.8                  
(35.811) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-3.932                     
(3.303) 
-18.879                 
(31.382) 
New IP producers and developers -4.202                     
(3.836) 
46.278.                              
(26.395) 
ln GDP 0.835                     
(0.75) 
21.998***                     
(6.005) 
ln GDPpc -0.083                     
(1.479) 
0.844                       
(13.326) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 3.295.                     
(1.866) 
36.025*                     
(15.253) 
Intercept -45.156.                     
(24.139) 
-





Observations 521 622 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
For the FC effects displayed in Table 86 on the next page, the results are different 
compared to the overall IPR measure in both direction and emphasis. The IPR design 
only shows significant effects for the TRIPS-plus index for df, df3l and df5l, which are 
all distinctly negative. This suggests that amongst those IPR commitments mentioned for 
the first time in a countries’ PTA, the general and specific ones have no significant effect 
on PTA member applications for patents, whereas TRIPS-plus provisions have a clear 
negative effect on them. Thus, when countries first include provisions more stringent than 
TRIPS, PTA members decrease their applications for patents.  
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The regression table also shows the same effects as found for the overall IPR measure, 
namely a significant negative one for countries with a high increase of patent protection 
and a significant positive one for GDP (log) and the geographic distance. 
 
Table 86: Economic Effects Regression – Technology Transfer: PTA Member Applications 
for Patents (cumulative) III 
 First-comer IPR 







Index IPR general (sum) ─ ─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ ─ ─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) -2.494*              
(1.205) 
-1.179*                     
(0.491) 
-1.858*                     
(0.863) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) 0.454              
(1.986) 
0.058                     
(0.846) 
0.147                     
(1.284) 
Classic IP leaders 30.943                   
(19.733) 
11.196                     
(7.975) 
10.426                     
(12.804) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-29.348                 
(18.558) 
-16.599*                     
(7.47) 
-25.218*                     
(11.387) 
New IP producers and developers -11.492                              
(16.903) 
-3.035                     
(6.72) 
-8.806                     
(10.486) 
ln GDP 15.939***                     
(3.829) 
7.341***                     
(1.588) 
10.402***                     
(2.576) 
ln GDPpc -3.502                       
(7.395) 
-1.031                     
(3.051) 
-0.383                     
(4.849) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 45.245***                     
(8.872) 
20.21***                     
(3.649) 
30.133***                     
(5.878) 
Intercept -
736.319***                      
(107.003) 
-335.27***                     
(45.955)
-








Observations 980 796 721 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
The general binary variables show multiple reoccurring significant positive and neg-
ative effects for the overall IPR measure. For instance, there are positive effects for 
ipr_m_trademarks and ipr_m_patents, and negative ones for ipr_m_industrial_designs 
and ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits. This indicates that by mentioning for examples 
patents in a general manner in PTAs, the number of patent applications by PTA members 
increases. 
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The FC IPR measure only shows one significant reoccurring measure, which is nega-
tive for ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources. This suggests that if a country in-
cludes general provisions on TK & GR for the first time in a PTA, then it has a negative 
effect on the applications for patents by PTA members. 
The specific binary variables also show multiple reoccurring effects for the overall 
IPR measure, which are, for example, positive for ipr_transparency and ipr_t_patents, as 
well as negative for ipr_committee and ipr_t_industrial_designs. Thus, not only general 
but also specific patent provisions in PTAs have a positive effect on the number of patent 
applications by PTA members. However, other factors such as specific provisions on in-
dustrial designs decrease the PTA member applications for patents. Looking at the FC 
measure, there is again only one significant result, namely for ipr_t_trad_knowledge_ge-
netic_resources for both df3l and df5l. Specific TK &GR commitments decrease the num-
ber of patent applications by PTA members, which repeats the observable effect for gen-
eral statements on TK & GR. 
The TRIPS-plus additive variables show a multiple reoccurring significant effects for 
the IPR overall measure again, yet no significant impact for the FC IPR measure. For 
example, the additive variables for ipr_tripsplus_trademarks and ipr_tripsplus_patents 
have a significantly positive effect on PTA members applications for patents, whereas 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications and ipr_tripsplus_enforcement have a significantly nega-
tive effect. This suggests that countries, which are repeating TRIPS-plus provisions on 
patents, can expect an increase in patent applications by PTA members, whereas repeti-
tive TRIPS-plus enforcement provisions have the opposite effect. 
The development level analysis shows that multiple significant positive and negative 
results for both the overall and FC measure across all indexes for the HIC as well as the 
LIC data. For the UMIC data, there is one significant negative effect for the overall gen-
eral IPR index for df10l (-0.619). These results suggest that the countries with the highest 
resp. lowest income level are affected the most, both positively as well as negatively when 
it comes to PTA member applications for patents. The UMIC can be affected negatively 
by general IPR provisions, yet the results need some further testing due to the low data 
availability of the df10l measures. 
Fifthly, I look at the total htp imports as a measure for technology transfer. The re-
gression analysis shows multiple significant effects of the IPR indexes for both the overall 
and FC IPR measure. However, these effects take place on a very low level, i.e. show 
neglectable low estimates. The highest impact of an IPR index shows an estimate of 
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0.000000001017. Thus, the IPR design in PTAs for the total htp imports is significant, 
yet not highly important. Table 87 illustrates some of the found significant effects for 
both the overall and the FC IPR measure and shows that the effect of some of the other 
control variables is also significant, yet on a similarly low level as for the IPR indexes. 
 
Table 87: Economic Effects Regression – Technology Transfer: Total htp Imports 
 Overall IPR First-comer IPR 











Index IPR general (sum) ─ 0.                     
(0) 
0*                      
(0) 
─ 0.                  
(0) 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ ─ ─ 0*                  
(0) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) 0.                         
(0) 
─ ─ ─ ─ 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) 0                        
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
Classic IP leaders 0***                   
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0***                       
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0                 
(0) 
0.                     
(0) 
0                         
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
New IP producers and developers 0                              
(0) 
0*                     
(0) 
0                       
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
ln GDP 0***                     
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
0***                   
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
ln GDPpc 0**                       
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0***                       
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0**                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0**                   
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
Intercept -1***                      
(0) 
-1***                     
(0) 
-1***     (0) -1***                  
(0) 












Observations 311 182 305 305 305 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
The regression table also shows that the number of observations is fairly low, making 
the results of this analysis less generalisable and reliable. 
The general and specific binary variables as well as the additive TRIPS-plus variables 
repeat this pattern and show multiple significant results for both the overall and FC IPR 
measure. Similar to the IPR indexes, the estimates are very low and only for df there are 
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estimates with an effect higher than 0.00000000. This suggests that the effect of IPR de-
sign on the total htp imports is highest after the entry into force of a PTA, remains signif-
icant but loses its importance afterwards. 
The analysis separated according to the development level of countries shows that the 
HIC, LMIC and LIC mirror the results of the previous analysis and show multiple signif-
icant positive results for both the overall and FC IPR measure across indexes, yet on a 
very low level. The UMIC data has only two significant positive results for the overall 
TRIPS-plus index for df10l and the FC specific index for df3l, yet both on a very low 
level. The effects are thus similar across the development levels, whereby UMIC are a 
little less affected than the other income-level countries. However, for this dependent 
variable, the number of observations is particularly low, making the results possible un-
reliable. 
Sixthly, I examine the total mhtp imports and find no significant results for any of 
the IPR indexes, neither for the overall nor the FC IPR measure. Table 88 thus illustrates 
the effects for the three IPR indexes of the overall IPR measure for df. 
There are also no significant results for the FC binary regressions nor for the overall 
binary specific and TRIPS-plus variables. The only significant results found in the more 
detailed analysis of the IPR variables is the one for the overall general binary variables 
for df, df3l and df5l. Thereby, there are reoccurring positive effects for the variable 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties, with the most pronounced effect for df (682.929). This sug-
gests that general provisions on the protection of new plant varieties in PTAs increases 
the total number of mhtp imports after the entry into force of a PTA, three years later as 
well as five years later. 
Unlike the general analysis, the subgroups of the development levels show multiple 
significant effects. The HIC data finds one significant positive result for the overall 
TRIPS-plus index for df10l, yet on a very low level. But the UMIC and LMIC data have 
multiple significant positive results for the overall indexes, although also on a very low 
level. The LIC data shows predominantly significantly negative effects on a very low 
level. Thus, even though the income level of countries seems to matter for the effect of 
IPR design on total mhtp imports, the estimates are so low that the importance of IPR is 
neglectable. 
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Table 88: Economic Effects Regression – Technology Transfer: Total mhtp Imports 







Index IPR general (sum) 7.786              
(12.179) 
─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ -10.149                     
(24.042) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ -3.343                     
(10.359) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) 9.063              
(14.756) 
10.451                     
(14.664) 
10.445                     
(14.673) 
Classic IP leaders -158.152                   
(217.533) 
-64.67                     
(237.627) 
-73.485                     
(242.189) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-33.771                 
(171.165) 
-79.594                     
(162.783) 
-74.521                     
(161.834) 
New IP producers and developers -52.291                              
(161.354) 
-59.937                     
(161.364) 
-60.885                     
(161.671) 
ln GDP -1.161                     
(49.921) 
2.756                     
(50.108) 
1.388                     
(49.912) 
ln GDPpc 21.012                       
(84.194) 
29.709                     
(84.15) 
28.868                     
(84.137) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -54.622                     
(87.538) 
-47.819                     
(88.253) 
-50.596                     
(87.743) 
Intercept 294.862                      
(1002.824) 
142.542                     
(1031.284) 
198.244                     
(1012.406) 
Model m4.6_df_gi m4.6_df_si m4.6_df_ti 
Observations 623 623 623 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
Seventhly, I use the total mltp imports as a measure for technology transfer and find 
a multitude of significant results for both the overall as well as the FC IPR measure. The 
effects are displayed in Table 89 on the following page and shows similar to the total htp 
imports that the effect of IPR design on the total mltp imports is significant, but on a very 
low level. The highest observable effect for an IPR index has an estimate of 
0.0000000001809, which indicates that the effect of IPR in PTAs is benign. The effects 
of the other variable in the model are comparably insignificant. Additionally, the number 
of observations is precariously low, making the results unreliable. 
The general binary variables show a significant effect for the overall IPR measure of 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination (-0.14), and for the FC IPR measure multiple signifi-
cant effects, yet on a very low level. 
 
Chapter 5: Effects of Intellectual Property Rights in PTAs  376 
Table 89: Economic Effects Regression – Technology Transfer: Total mltp Imports 
 Overall IPR First-comer IPR 











Index IPR general (sum) 0*                     
(0) 
─ ─ ─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ 0*                            
(0) 
─ 0***                  
(0) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ 0*                            
(0) 
─ 0***                  
(0) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) 0                       
(0) 
0                            
(0) 
0                              
(0) 
0                           
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
Classic IP leaders 0**                  
(0) 
0**                  
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
0**                  
(0) 
0                       
(0) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0                         
(0) 
0                             
(0) 
0                          
(0) 
0                            
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
New IP producers and developers 0                         
(0) 
0                          
(0) 
0                          
(0) 
0                         
(0) 
0                      
(0) 
ln GDP 0***                  
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ln GDPpc 0                         
(0) 
0                           
(0) 
0                             
(0) 
0*                     
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0                       
(0) 
0.                              
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0.                
(0) 
0.                     
(0) 
Intercept -1***                  
(0) 
-1***                  
(0) 
-1***                  
(0) 
-1***                  
(0) 










Observations 279 279 279 279 279 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
The specific binary variables also show multiple significant effects for the overall IPR 
measure on a very low level, whereas for the FC IPR measure, there are only two signif-
icant positive effects for ipr_t_geo_indications (0.23) and ipr_t_trad_knowledge_ge-
netic_resources (0.258). This suggests concretely that specific provisions on GI and TK 
& GR increase mltp imports. 
The TRIPS-plus additive variables show no significant effects for the overall IPR 
measure and for the FC IPR measure there is only one significant effect for ipr_trip-
splus_trademarks for the df model (0.121). This indicates that if countries firstly include 
TRIPS-plus provisions on trademarks, there is an increase in mltp imports. 
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The number of observations is so low that the analysis of the level of development 
cannot be considered as being representative for the subgroups. For the sake of complete-
ness, I briefly summarise the findings. 
The HIC data shows for the overall and FC TRIPS-plus index a significant positive 
effect for df3l, yet on a very low level. The UMIC data has all positive effects for the 
overall and FC IPR measures across indexes but also on a very low level. For the LMIC 
data, the analysis finds no significant effects. Finally, the LIC data shows significant neg-
ative effects for the overall and FC IPR measures for the specific and TRIPS-plus index 
for df. Again, these results are based on an insufficient number of observations due to the 
missing data for the dependent variable. 
Eighthly, I analyse the total ltp imports and find no significant effects of any of the 
IPR indexes.  
 
Table 90: Economic Effects Regression – Technology Transfer: Total ltp Imports 







Index IPR general (sum) 299.94              
(193.32) 
─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ -251.31                     
(373.5) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ -181.69                     
(156.69) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) 27.41              
(223.8) 
99.38                     
(221.74) 
97.21                     
(220.93) 
Classic IP leaders -417.41                   
(3384.72) 
3185                     
(3723.17) 
4195.73                     
(3717.5) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
129.66                 
(2321.11) 
-1119.77                     
(2210.36) 
-1077.06                     
(2203.51) 
New IP producers and developers 10.31                              
(2286.44) 
-261.33               
(2291.57) 
-451.43                     
(2298.11) 
ln GDP 1311.29.                     
(714.86) 
1368.01.                     
(717.21) 
1369.5.                     
(715.83) 
ln GDPpc 572.19                       
(1193.16) 
889.03                     
(1191.23) 
929.77                     
(1188.88) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -2998.62*                     
(1253.85) 
-2967.89*                     
(1260.18) 
-3008.24*                     
(1255.3) 
Intercept -14083.16                      
(14371.77) 
-16355.08                     
(14607.07) 
-16381.6                     
(14456.47) 
Model m4.8_df_gi m4.8_df_si m4.8_df_ti 
Observations 462 462 462 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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Table 90 thus illustrates the regression results for the general, specific and TRIPS-
plus index for the overall IPR measure for df. It shows that two of the control variables 
have significant reoccurring effects on the total ltp imports. Namely, GDP (log) has a 
significantly positive and geographical distance a significantly negative effect. This 
means that the further apart PTA members are, the lower is the total of ltp imports and 
the higher a countries’ GDP, the more low-technology products it imports. However, the 
number of observations is comparatively low, and the results might not be generalisable. 
The general binary variables show pronounced significant effects for both the overall 
as well as the FC IPR measure. These effects are sometimes the opposite depending on 
the IPR measure. For example, the variable ipr_as_investment has for the overall IPR 
measure a positive effect (31’388.2) and for the FC a negative one (-26’473.2). This sug-
gests that if a country defines IPR as investment for the first time in a PTA, there is a 
significant decrease in ltp imports, yet if a country repeatedly includes it in its PTAs, then 
the ltp imports increase substantially compared to the time of PTA signature. 
The specific binary variables show significant effects only for the overall IPR meas-
ure, namely for the following variables: ipr_special_requirements_related_border 
_measures (21’744.8), ipr_provisional_measure (-20’386.4), ipr_t_industrial_designs 
(20’262.7), and ipr_t_new_plant_varieties (-24’180.4). This indicates that special border 
measures and specific provisions on industrial designs increase the total ltp imports, 
whilst provisional measures and tangible provisions on new plant varieties decrease them. 
The TRIPS-plus additive variables find only one significant effect for the overall 
measure of ipr_tripsplus_enforcement (1’674.7). This means that repetitively used IPR 
enforcement provisions in PTAs, which go beyond the TRIPS regulation, have a positive 
effect on the total imports of low-technology products. 
For the development level, the HIC data shows only significantly negative results for 
the specific and TRIPS-plus indexes, predominately for the overall measure. The UMIC 
data has one significantly positive result for the overall general index for df, whereas the 
LMIC data finds no significant results for the IPR indexes. The LIC data has one signifi-
cant negative result for the overall general index for df5l and one significantly positive 
result for the FC TRIPS-plus measure for dfl10. The development level thus alters the 
effects, but yet again, the number of observations is too low to make generalisable state-
ments. 
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Ninthly, besides looking at the total imports, I analyse the effect that the design of 
IPRs in PTAs has on the PTA member htp imports. The analysis shows no significant 
results for any of the indexes. Table 91 on the next page thus displays the insignificant 
results for the overall general, specific and TRIPS-plus indexes for df to illustrate the 
regression results. It has to be noted, that due to the missing values in the dependent var-
iable, the number of observations is barely above 15%, making the results hardly gener-
alisable. 
Unlike the indexes, the control GDP (log) and GDPpc (log) have a significant effect 
on the htp imports from PTA members. For the displayed df model, GDP has a positive 
effect and GDPpc a negative one. This means that countries with a higher GDP are more 
likely to have more htp imports by PTA members after the PTA has entered into force, 
whilst a higher GDPpc decreases the htp imports. 
 
Table 91: Economic Effects Regression – Technology Transfer: PTA Member htp Imports 







Index IPR general (sum) -506.6              
(712.8) 
─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ -642.7                     
(1396) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ -248.2                     
(601.1) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) 943.9              
(892.8) 
896.3                     
(889.6) 
901.1                     
(890.1) 
Classic IP leaders -1840.3                   
(12651.8) 
-1390.2                     
(13898) 
-1449.9                     
(14233.5) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-592.5                 
(9992.8) 
1273.1                     
(9478.5) 
1566.9                     
(9425.5) 
New IP producers and developers -4704.5                              
(9395.9) 
-4531.2                     
(9394) 
-4617.3                     
(9411.1) 
ln GDP 7321.8*                     
(2914.8) 
7319.1*                     
(2921.9) 
7244.5*                     
(2912.6) 
ln GDPpc -11252.3*                       
(4883.2) 
-11390.4*                     
(4882.1) 
-11420.3*                     
(4880.7) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 940.8                     
(5138.3) 
1068.1                     
(5181) 
901.2                     
(5146.8) 
Intercept -90886                      
(59056.7) 
-93728.9                     
(60527.8) 
-90738.2                     
(59466.2) 
Model m4.9_df_gi m4.9_df_si m4.9_df_ti 
Observations 584 584 584 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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The general binary variables show multiple significant results for the overall IPR var-
iables. There are reoccurring positive effects for the variables ipr_assistance_coop_co-
ordination, ipr_general_enforcement, ipr_investment_dispute_settlement_mechanism, 
ipr_border_measures, and ipr_m_geo_indications as well as one negative one for 
ipr_more_than_1_article. For instance, this suggests that if countries repeatedly include 
more than one provision on IPRs, there is a decrease of htp imports by PTA members. 
The specific binary variables also show only significant effects for the overall IPR 
measure and none for the FC IPR measure. The analysis shows reoccurring positive ef-
fects for ipr_special_requirements_related_border_measures, ipr_transparency, and ipr 
_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources and a negative effect for ipr_t_copyrights_related 
_rights. This indicates, for example, that certain specific enforcement provisions such as 
special border measures and transparency increase the htp imports by PTA members, 
whilst specific copyright commitments decrease these imports. 
The TRIPS-plus additive variables show only reoccurring effects for two overall var-
iables, concretely a positive effect for ipr_tripsplus_new_plant_varieties and a negative 
one for ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design. For the FC IPR measure, there is also one sig-
nificant positive effect of ipr_tripsplus_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources for df. This 
means that, for example, if a country includes TRIPS-plus provisions on TK & GR for 
the first time in a PTA, it increases the htp imports by PTA members. 
The analysis according to the development level shows that the IPR design in PTAs 
matter to some income levels whilst others are not significantly affected by it. The HIC 
data shows multiple significant negative effects for the TRIPS-plus index of the overall 
IPR measure. The LMIC data has only one significant effect for general IPR index for df 
(1.256). There are no significant effects for the UMIC and LIC data. Thus, HIC have 
fewer htp imports by PTA members if they include TRIPS-plus provisions in their PTAs, 
whereas LMIC have more htp imports by PTA members at the time of entry into force of 
the PTA if they include general IPR provisions in their PTAs. 
Tenthly, I examine the PTA member mhtp imports and, like the results found for 
the htp imports by PTA members, I find no significant results for the IPR indexes. There-
fore, Table 92 simply illustrates the effects for the overall IPR measure of the IPR indexes 
for df. One again, the number of observations is undesirably low due to the missing data 
for the dependent variable. This might make the results of the regression analysis less 
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reliable than anticipated. Whereas some of the previous variables were significantly af-
fected by the control variables, the mhtp imports show no significant effects for any of 
the tested variables. 
Furthermore, there are no significant results for the FC binary and TRIPS-plus addi-
tive variables. The overall IPR measure also finds no significant results for the specific 
binary and TRIPS-plus additive variables, but for the general binary variables. There, the 
analysis shows three significant results, which are positive for ipr_assistance_coop_co-
ordination and ipr_general_enforcement as well as negative for ipr_more_than_1_arti-
cle. This suggests that countries repeatedly including more than one article on IPR have 
fewer mhtp imports by PTA members, whilst those repeating IPR assistance, cooperation 
and coordination resp. general IPR enforcement commitments have more mhtp imports. 
 
Table 92: Economic Effects Regression – Technology Transfer: PTA Member mhtp Imports 







Index IPR general (sum) -15.27              
(28.95) 
─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ -36.093                     
(56.351) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ -16.513                     
(24.192) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) 12.25              
(36.55) 
11.134                     
(36.427) 
11.657                     
(36.447) 
Classic IP leaders -338.09                   
(512.11) 
-239.886                     
(563.13) 
-211.493                     
(575.611) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-502.3                 
(404.9) 
-461.329                     
(383.63) 
-447.154                     
(381.215) 
New IP producers and developers -277.29                              
(379.58) 
-277.474                     
(379.288) 
-285.218                     
(379.953) 
ln GDP 158.59                     
(118.39) 
162.52                     
(118.715) 
159.029                     
(118.356) 
ln GDPpc -3.75                       
(198.53) 
-3.824                     
(198.118) 
-3.572                     
(198.046) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 219.25                     
(210.19) 
231.041                     
(211.888) 
223.032                     
(210.312) 
Intercept -5076.4*                      
(2391.72) 
-5335.937*                     
(2449.248) 





Observations 575 575 575 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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The analysis according the the income-level of countries shows that unlike the general 
analysis, most categories find some significant effects. The HIC data has significantly 
positive effects for the FC IPR measure of the general and specific IPR index, whereas 
the UMIC data finds multiple significant positive effects for all IPR indexes of the overall 
IPR measure. The LMIC are the only ones, where the mhtp imports by PTA members are 
not significantly affected by the IPR indexes. The LIC data is the only one showing sig-
nificant negative effects for the general IPR index for both overall and FC measure. This 
suggests that the mhtp imports by PTA members in LIC are negatively affected by general 
IPR in PTAs, whereas the mhtp imports in both UMIC and HIC are positively affected. 
Again, the number of observations is even lower for the subgroups than for the general 
analysis, making these results possibly unreliable. 
Eleventhly, I analyse the PTA member mltp imports and also find no significant 
effects for the IPR indexes. Table 93 displays the overall regression analysis for the gen-
eral, specific and TRIPS-plus indexes for df. 
Out of the control variables, GDP (log) has a significant positive effect and geographic 
distance a significant negative one. This implies one the one hand that in countries signing 
a PTA with PTA members further away, there is a decrease of mltp imports from these 
PTA members. On the other hand, countries with a higher GDP are more likely to import 
medium-low-technology products by their PTA members. 
The general binary variables find some significant results, all for the df models. The 
overall IPR measure finds only negative effects, namely for ipr_investment_expropria-
tion_exception and ipr_implementation. The FC IPR measure additionally finds positive 
results for ipr_investment_dispute_settlement_mechanism, ipr_m_patents and ipr_m 
_new_plant_varieties, as well as negative results for ipr_as_investment and ipr_m_indus-
trial_designs. This suggests, for instance, that if countries define for the first time in their 
PTAs IPR as investment, or if the repetitively include general IPR implementation pro-
visions, they experience a decrease of the mltp imports by PTA members. 
The specific binary variables as well as the TRIPS-plus additive variables have no 
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Table 93: Economic Effects Regression – Technology Transfer: PTA Member mltp Imports 







Index IPR general (sum) 170.4              
(135.2) 
─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ -222.6                     
(265.5) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ -138.1                     
(114) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) 103.4              
(169.3) 
125.6                     
(168.8) 
130.8                     
(168.8) 
Classic IP leaders -230.7                   
(2406.4) 
1814.9                     
(2653.2) 
2447.2                     
(2709.3) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
107                 
(1893.2) 
-894.2                     
(1797) 
-847.4                     
(1785.2) 
New IP producers and developers -134                              
(1777.4) 
-343                     
(1778) 
-437.5                     
(1780.1) 
ln GDP 938.7.                     
(552.2) 
1013.6.                     
(554.1) 
998.9.                     
(552) 
ln GDPpc 240.4                       
(929.1) 
441.8                     
(927.8) 
468.1                     
(926.8) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -2506.9*                     
(973.5) 
-2313.1*                     
(983.3) 
-2335.5*                     
(975.4) 
Intercept -5858.6                      
(11184.3) 
-9288.3                     
(11469.4) 





Observations 590 590 590 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
The analysis of the data according to countries’ development levels shows only a cou-
ple of significant effects of the IPR indexes on the mltp imports by PTA members. The 
HIC data finds significantly negative results for the specific and TRIPS-plus indexes, 
mostly for the overall models as well as the FC IPR measure for df10l. The UMIC and 
LMIC subgroups have no significant results, whereas the LIC data shows one significant 
effect of the overall general IPR index for df5l. The results suggest that the development 
level of countries matters for the analysis of the mltp imports by PTA members and that 
HIC mostly experience a decrease of imports, UMIC and LMIC are not affected, and LIC 
show a tendency for more mltp imports with general IPRs in PTAs. However, due to the 
low number of observations of the subgroups, these results have to be considered and 
generalised carefully. 
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Twelfthly, I look at the PTA member ltp imports. This is the only one out of the four 
technology-intensive measures of imports by PTA members, which shows significant re-
sults. However, almost all of the significant results register at a very low level. On the 
following pages I display in Table 94 all significant effects found for the overall IPR 
measure, and in Table 95 all significant effects except the dft models for the FC measure. 
The overall IPR measure only has significant results for those deltas with the lowest num-
bers of observation, namely df10l and dft. These models represent less than 8% of all 
observations for the IPR design data, and the results are thus most likely unreliable. 
 
Table 94: Economic Effects Regression – Technology Transfer: PTA Member ltp Imports I 
 Overall IPR 







Index IPR general (sum) 0.                  
(0) 
─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ 0.                     
(0) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ 0.                     
(0) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) 0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Classic IP leaders 0                   
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0                 
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
New IP producers and developers 0                              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ln GDP 0**                     
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
ln GDPpc 0                       
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0                     
(0) 
0*                     
(0) 
0*                     
(0) 
Intercept -1***                      
(0) 
-1***                     
(0) 








Observations 299 289 289 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
Besides the effects of the design of IPRs in PTAs, the other variables included in the 
model also show only marginal impacts, some of them also significant ones. Generally, 
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there are the classic IP leaders, GDP (log) and geographic distance with a significant 
effect on the ltp imports by PTA members. 
The results of the overall IPR measure for dft in Table 94 are almost identical to the 
ones for the FC IPR measure. As they bare no additional insights due to the low level of 
their estimates, I refrain from displaying them in an additional regression table. The far 
more interesting effects are displayed in Table 95 for df. 
 
Table 95: Economic Effects Regression – Technology Transfer: PTA Member ltp Imports 
II 
 First-comer IPR 









Index IPR general (sum) 0.012.                      
(0.007) 
─ ─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ 0.                  
(0) 
0**                  
(0) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ ─ 0*                  
(0) 
Control Variables     
Democratisation (Polity 2) 0.013**                        
(0.004) 
0           
(0) 
0.                  
(0) 
0.                  
(0) 
Classic IP leaders -0.061                       
(0.064) 
0**                  
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.013                         
(0.049) 
0**              
(0) 
0*                  
(0) 
0*                  
(0) 
New IP producers and developers 0.043                       
(0.049) 
0              
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
ln GDP 0.016                   
(0.015) 
0***                  
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
ln GDPpc -0.06*                       
(0.026) 
0                  
(0) 
0*                  
(0) 
0*                  
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.004                   
(0.027) 
0.                  
(0) 
0*                  
(0) 
0*                  
(0) 
Intercept 0.193     
(0.305) 
-1***                  
(0) 
-1***                  
(0) 










Observations 623 532 493 493 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
The effects take place on a higher level than for all other deltas and show a positive 
effect of the index IPR general on the ltp imports by PTA members. This means that if a 
country includes in their PTA for the first time (more) general IPR provisions, there is an 
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increase of PTA member ltp imports. Furthermore, the table also shows a significantly 
positive effect of democratisation and a negative one for GDPpc (log), yet only for the df 
model. This would mean that with an increase of democratisation and a decrease of a 
countries GDPpc, there is an increase of ltp imports by PTA members. 
The general binary variables mirror the high number of significant effects, yet most 
of these effects are also restricted to a very low set of estimates. There are no significant 
results for the specific binary variables nor the TRIPS-plus additive variables for any of 
the tested models. 
The development levels show significant results for all four subgroups. The HIC data 
finds significant positive results for the specific and TRIPS-plus index for both overall 
and FC IPR measure. The UMIC data also has multiple significant results for all indexes, 
whereby the most significant ones are significantly negative. The LMIC data shows two 
significant positive results for the general IPR index yet with fairly low estimates. And 
the LIC data has multiple significant results, which are all negative except the IPR general 
for df10l (which has the lowest number of observations). The number of observations is 
especially low, and the results might not be generalisable. So far, the analysis suggests 
that HIC mostly see an increase of ltp imports by PTA members with more specific and 
TRIPS-plus commitments in their PTAs, whereas UMIC and LIC predominately are 
faced with a decrease of ltp imports by PTA members if they increase the IPR content of 
their PTAs. 
In summary, the IPR indexes have a significant effect on technology transfer. The 
trend is predominately positive for the overall IPR measure, i.e. the reoccurring IPR pro-
visions, whereas the FC IPR measure, reflecting provisions firstly mentioned in a coun-
tries PTA, shows mostly negative effects. However, a majority of the dependent measures 
for technology transfer have only a limited number of observations impeding general 
statements about the relationship between the design of IPRs in PTAs and technology 
transfer. 
5.2.3.5 Growth Economic Effect Analysis 
The following section describes the analysis for the four growth measures GDP, GDP 
per capita, GDP growth rate and GDP per capita growth rate. Only the latter finds no 
significant effects for the IPR indexes. 
Firstly, the results for the GDP development shows multiple significant effects of the 
IPR indexes for both the overall as well as the FC IPR measure. Table 96 and Table 97 
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display the significant results for the overall IPR measure, whereas Table 98 and Table 
99 illustrate the FC IPR measure effects. 
Table 96 shows negative effects for the overall specific and TRIPS-plus indexes for 
both df as well as df3l, whereby the effects become more distinct over time. The general 
provisions seem to have no significant effect on GDP for these deltas.  
The control variables only show a significant effect for the df3l models, whereby de-
mocratisation and geographic distance have a significantly negative effect on GDP. The 
effect of the former is on a lower level than the effect of the IPR measure, yet the effect 
of geographic distance is more pronounced. This suggests that when the distance between 
PTA members increases and the level of democratisation increases, there might be a de-
crease of GDP between PTA signature and three years after the PTA has entered into 
force. In these models, the other control variables have no significant effects on GDP. 
 
Table 96: Economic Effects Regression – Growth: GDP I 
 Overall IPR 









Index IPR general (sum) ─ ─ ─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) -0.01***                         
(0.002) 
─ -0.03***                     
(0.004) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ -0.005***                     
(0.001) 
─ -0.011***                     
(0.002) 
Control Variables     
Democratisation (Polity 2) 0                        
(0.001) 
-0.001                     
(0.001) 
-0.007**                     
(0.002) 
-0.007***                     
(0.002) 
Classic IP leaders 0.013                        
(0.014) 
0.018                     
(0.014) 
0.03                     
(0.03) 
0.026                     
(0.03) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.003                        
(0.013) 
0.004                     
(0.013) 
0.013                     
(0.028) 
0.018                     
(0.028) 
New IP producers and developers -0.005                        
(0.016) 
-0.008                     
(0.016) 
0.051                     
(0.035) 
0.045                     
(0.035) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.002                        
(0.007) 
0.001                     
(0.007) 
-0.03.                     
(0.016) 
-0.036*                     
(0.016) 
Intercept 0.128*                      
(0.055) 
0.136*                     
(0.055) 
0.743***                     
(0.124) 
0.783***                     
(0.123) 




Observations 2970 2970 2764 2764 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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Same as Table 96, Table 97 on the next page displays the significant overall IPR ef-
fect, yet for the df5l and dft models. It also shows significant negative effects for the 
specific and TRIPS-plus indexes, which become more distinct over time (estimates df5l 
> estimates df3l > estimates df). The effect of the control variables also develops accord-
ingly. 
Additionally, the dft model shows a significant positive effect for the index IPR gen-
eral. This makes it the only GDP model with a positive effect of an overall IPR index. 
Moreover, after the dft GDP is also significantly affected by some of the control variables, 
namely positively by countries with a high increase of patent protection and negatively 
by new IP producers and developers. However, this effect is only visible for the model 
including the index IPR general and thus not generalisable. 
 
Table 97: Economic Effects Regression – Growth: GDP II 
 Overall IPR 









Index IPR general (sum) ─ ─ 0.01***                     
(0.001) 
─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) -0.041***                     
(0.009) 
 
─ -0.004.                     
(0.002) 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ -0.015***                     
(0.004) 
─ ─ 
Control Variables     
Democratisation (Polity 2) -0.016***                     
(0.004) 
-0.017***                     
(0.004) 
-0.001                     
(0.001) 
0.001                     
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders 0.029                     
(0.057) 
0.017                     
(0.057) 
-0.018                     
(0.016) 
0.015                     
(0.016) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.042                     
(0.053) 
0.048                     
(0.053) 
0.035*                     
(0.015) 
0.011                     
(0.015) 
New IP producers and developers 0.004                     
(0.066) 
-0.003                     
(0.066) 
-0.043*                     
(0.018) 
-0.023                     
(0.019) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.068*                     
(0.03) 
-0.075*                     
(0.03) 
-0.042***                     
(0.008) 
-0.023**                     
(0.009) 
Intercept 1.382***                     
(0.233) 
1.434***                     
(0.232) 
0.451***                     
(0.064) 







Observations 2653 2653 2786 2786 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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The results suggest that repetitively including general provisions on IPRs in PTAs has 
a positive effect on GDP after the transition period has ended, whereas repeating specific 
and TRIPS-plus commitments has a significantly negative effect, especially after for the 
intermediate time lags (df3l and df5l). 
The FC IPR measure shown in the following Table 98 and Table 99 indicates another 
relationship between GDP and IPR design. Firstly, the general IPR index scores posi-
tively across all FC models and shows an increased impact over time. Thus, unlike for 
the overall IPR measure, those countries including general IPR commitments in their 
PTAs for the first time, are significantly more likely to experience an increased GDP 
across all time deltas. Secondly, the significant results of the specific and TRIPS-plus 
indexes are less frequent than for the overall IPR measure. 
The control variables mostly show similar results as for the overall IPR measure, 
which means a significantly negative effect of democratisation and geographic distance. 
 
Table 98: Economic Effects Regression – Growth: GDP III 
 First-comer IPR 











Index IPR general (sum) 0.014***                      
(0.002) 
0.047***                  
(0.005) 
─ 0.069***                  
(0.009) 
─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ ─ ─ ─ -0.028.                  
(0.016) 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ -0.011**                  
(0.003) 
─ ─ 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) 0                        
(0.001) 
-0.006**                  
(0.002) 
-0.008***                  
(0.002) 
-0.015***                  
(0.004) 
-0.018***                  
(0.004) 
Classic IP leaders -0.021                        
(0.013) 
-0.063*                  
(0.03) 
-0.005                  
(0.03) 
-0.083                  
(0.056) 
-0.01                  
(0.056) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.014                        
(0.013) 
0.046                  
(0.028) 
0.031                  
(0.028) 
0.086.                  
(0.052) 
0.064                  
(0.053) 
New IP producers and developers -0.01                        
(0.016) 
0.04               
(0.035) 
0.032                  
(0.035) 
-0.015                  
(0.065) 
-0.026                  
(0.066) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.017*                        
(0.007) 
-0.087***                  
(0.016) 
-0.052**                  
(0.016) 
-0.14***                  
(0.03) 
-0.092**                  
(0.03) 
Intercept 0.259***     
(0.054) 
1.133***                  
(0.12) 
0.907***                  
(0.122) 
1.865***                  
(0.228) 












Observations 2970 2764 2764 2653 2653 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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Table 99 displays significantly positive results of all three IPR indexes for dft. This 
means that after the transition period has ended, countries including general, specific and 
TRIPS-plus commitments for the first time in one of their PTAs have an increased GDP 
compared to the time of PTA signature. The effect of the specific and TRIPS-plus indexes 
on GDP is thus ambiguous across different time measures. 
Table 98 and Table 99 show also that the effects for the specific IPR and TRIPS-plus 
indexes generally operate on a lower significance level than the results for the general 
IPR index. Moreover, the general IPR index shows higher estimates for the identical time 
deltas. It can, therefore, be assumed that the index IPR general has the most significant 
effect on GDP amongst the IPR indexes indeed. The number of observations is compara-
ble across time deltas, making the results reliable. 
 
Table 99: Economic Effects Regression – Growth: GDP IV 
 First-comer IPR 











Index IPR general (sum) ─ 0.08**                      
(0.028) 
0.021***                  
(0.002) 
─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ ─ ─ 0.012*                  
(0.005) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) -0.016*                  
(0.007) 
─ ─ ─ 0.006**                  
(0.002) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) -0.018***                  
(0.004) 
-0.052***                        
(0.013) 
0.002                 
(0.001) 
0.001                  
(0.001) 
0.001                  
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders 0                  
(0.057) 
-0.303.                        
(0.176) 
-0.007               
(0.016) 
0.004                  
(0.016) 
0.002                  
(0.016) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.062                  
(0.053) 
-0.009                        
(0.181) 
0.019               
(0.015) 
0.014                  
(0.015) 
0.014                  
(0.015) 
New IP producers and developers -0.026                  
(0.066) 
-0.084                        
(0.261) 
-0.022                  
(0.018) 
-0.028                  
(0.019) 
-0.028                  
(0.019) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.086**                  
(0.03) 
-0.38***                        
(0.096) 
-0.038***                  
(0.008) 
-0.029***                  
(0.008) 
-0.03***                  
(0.008) 
Intercept 1.518***                  
(0.231) 
4.812***     
(0.735) 
0.437***                  
(0.063) 
0.378***                  
(0.064) 












Observations 2653 2301 2786 2786 2786 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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The general binary variables show multiple significant results for both the overall as 
well as the FC IPR measure. For instance, there are reoccurring positive results for the 
overall and FC variables of ipr_general_enforcement and ipr_m_undisclosed_infor-
mation resp. negative ones for ipr_as_investment, ipr_border_measures and ipr_m_lay-
out_design_integ_circuits. This suggests that, on the one hand, general measures on en-
forcement and undisclosed information have a positive effect on GDP. Hereby, the effect 
occurs for countries including these measures for the first time as well as those repeti-
tively including them in their PTAs. On the other hand, countries defining IPR as invest-
ment, only including general border measures on IPR and mentioning layout-designs of 
integrated circuits in a general manner in their PTAs experience a negative effect on GDP. 
The specific binary variables show fewer yet also a couple of significant reoccurring 
effects, which are exclusively negative. For the overall IPR measure, these negative ef-
fects are seen for ipr_committee and ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights, and for FC there is 
only one effect for ipr_service_provider_liability. This indicates that repetitive specific 
measures on IPR committees and coprights as well as firstly including commitments on 
service provider liability lead to a decrease in GDP. 
The TRIPS-plus additive variables find only negative effects for the overall IPR meas-
ure, namely for ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights and ipr_tripsplus_geo_indica-
tions, whereas the FC IPR measure finds a positive effect of ipr_tripsplus_trademarks 
and a negative one for ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion. This means that TRIPS-plus measures 
on copyrights, geographical indications, trademarks and exhaustion have a negative effect 
on GDP. 
The analysis of the four development-level subgroup shows similar results as the pre-
vious regression analysis. The HIC data finds multiple significant results for both the 
overall and FC IPR measures across all IPR indexes, whereby all results are negative 
except for the IPR general for dft. These results largely mirror the effects found for the 
regression on the total dataset. The UMIC data also shows multiple significant results 
with both positive and negative effects across all indexes and overall and FC IPR 
measures. For the LMIC data, there are mainly significant positive effects for the overall 
and FC IPR measures, but only for the index IPR general. The LIC data also finds multi-
ple significant effects across all IPR indexes with both positive and negative effects. The 
level of development thus seems to reflect mostly the results already found in the general 
analysis and the income-level of countries seems, therefore, less influential for the effect 
of IPR design on GDP. 
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Secondly, for the development of GDP per capita, the analysis finds multiple signif-
icant results. Table 100 and Table 101 show the significant effects for the overall IPR 
measure, and Table 102 contains the ones for the FC IPR measure. 
Table 100 shows the effects for df and df3l, which are positive for the general IPR 
index of df resp. negative for the specific and TRIPS-plus indexes for both df and df3l. 
The specific and TRIPS-plus indexes have a more pronounced explanatory power than 
the effect of the general IPR index and operate on a higher significance level. This means 
that countries, which repeatedly include specific or TRIPS-plus provisions in their PTAs, 
are more likely to be faced with a decrease of GDPpc. 
Most of the control variables show no significant effects on the GDPpc. Only the 
geographical distance shows a reoccurring significant negative effect, which means that 
with an increase in the distance between PTA partners, there is a decrease in the GDPpc. 
 
Table 100: Economic Effects Regression – Growth: GDPpc I 
 Overall IPR 











Index IPR general (sum) 0.002.                         
(0.001) 
─ ─ ─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ -0.009***                     
(0.002) 
─ -0.027***                     
(0.004) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ -0.004***                     
(0.001) 
─ -0.01***                     
(0.001) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) 0.001                        
(0.001) 
0.002.                   
(0.001) 
0.002.                     
(0.001) 
0.001                     
(0.002) 
0                  
(0.002) 
Classic IP leaders -0.012                        
(0.013) 
0.014                  
(0.013) 
0.02                     
(0.013) 
0.028                     
(0.026) 
0.024                     
(0.026) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.019                        
(0.012) 
0.009                     
(0.012) 
0.01                     
(0.012) 
0.021                     
(0.025) 
0.025                     
(0.025) 
New IP producers and developers -0.009                        
(0.015) 
0               
(0.015) 
-0.002                     
(0.015) 
0.056.                     
(0.031) 
0.05                    
(0.031) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.019**                        
(0.007) 
-0.006                     
(0.007) 
-0.007                     
(0.007) 
-0.05***                     
(0.014) 
-0.055***                     
(0.014) 
Intercept 0.24***                      
(0.051) 
0.152**                     
(0.051) 
0.156**                     
(0.051) 
0.77***                     
(0.108) 
0.804***                     
(0.107) 




Observations 2970 2970 2970 2764 2764 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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Table 101 continues the significant results for the overall IPR measure and shows that 
the effects remain positive for the index IPR general resp. negative for the indexes IPR 
specific and TRIPS-plus. For the dft model, only the general index has a significant effect 
on GDPpc, whereas for the df5l model all three indexes score significantly. Similar to the 
effects for GDP, the estimates of the specific and TRIPS-plus indexes for the GDPpc 
regression analysis increase over time and become more pronounced. 
As already shown for the previous time deltas, the control variables have no constant 
reoccurring effects. The most constant one can be found again for the geographic distance 
between PTA members, which shows a negative effect between an increase in distance 
and GDPpc. 
 
Table 101: Economic Effects Regression – Growth: GDPpc II 
 Overall IPR 









Index IPR general (sum) 0.005.                         
(0.003) 
─ ─ 0.009***                         
(0.001) 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ -0.037***                     
(0.007) 
─ ─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ -0.014***                     
(0.003) 
─ 
Control Variables     
Democratisation (Polity 2) -0.004                        
(0.003) 
-0.002                     
(0.003) 
-0.002                     
(0.003) 
0.001                        
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders -0.051                        
(0.045) 
0.013                   
(0.044) 
0.002                     
(0.044) 
-0.022                        
(0.015) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.08.                        
(0.042) 
0.05                   
(0.041) 
0.055                     
(0.041) 
0.039**                        
(0.014) 
New IP producers and developers -0.016                        
(0.052) 
0.02                  
(0.052) 
0.014                     
(0.052) 
-0.035*                        
(0.017) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.129***                        
(0.023) 
-0.098***                     
(0.024) 
-0.104***                     
(0.024) 
-0.05***                        
(0.008) 
Intercept 1.611***                      
(0.18) 
1.392***                     
(0.182) 
1.436***                     
(0.182) 









Observations 2653 2653 2653 2786 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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Table 102: Economic Effects Regression – Growth: GDPpc III 
 First-comer IPR 











Index IPR general (sum) 0.012***                      
(0.002) 
0.039***                  
(0.004) 
─ 0.054***                  
(0.007) 
─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ ─ ─ ─ -0.025*                  
(0.013) 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ -0.01***                  
(0.003) 
─ ─ 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) 0.002.                        
(0.001) 
0.001               
(0.002) 
-0.001                  
(0.002) 
-0.001                  
(0.003) 
-0.003                  
(0.003) 
Classic IP leaders -0.016                        
(0.012) 
-0.053*                  
(0.026) 
-0.003                  
(0.026) 
-0.081.                  
(0.044) 
-0.022                  
(0.044) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.019                        
(0.012) 
0.049*                  
(0.024) 
0.037                  
(0.025) 
0.087*                  
(0.041) 
0.069.                  
(0.041) 
New IP producers and developers -0.004                        
(0.015) 
0.045               
(0.03) 
0.038                  
(0.031) 
0.001                  
(0.051) 
-0.007                  
(0.052) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.023***                        
(0.007) 
-0.099***                  
(0.014) 
-0.07***                  
(0.014) 
-0.157***                  
(0.023) 
-0.119***                  
(0.023) 
Intercept 0.266***     
(0.05) 
1.108***                  
(0.105) 
0.915***                  
(0.106) 
1.794***                  
(0.179) 












Observations 2970 2764 2764 2653 2653 
 
 df5l df10l dft dft dft 
Index IPR general (sum) ─ 0.055**                      
(0.017) 
0.018***                  
(0.002) 
─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ ─ ─ 0.01*                  
(0.004) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) -0.014**                  
(0.005) 
─ ─ ─ 0.005*                  
(0.002) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) -0.003                  
(0.003) 
-0.008                        
(0.008) 
0.004***                  
(0.001) 
0.003**                  
(0.001) 
0.003**                  
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders -0.013                  
(0.044) 
-0.314**                        
(0.104) 
-0.01                  
(0.015) 
0.001                  
(0.015) 
-0.001                  
(0.015) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.068                  
(0.041) 
0.013                        
(0.107) 
0.023.                
(0.014) 
0.019                  
(0.014) 
0.019                  
(0.014) 
New IP producers and developers -0.008                  
(0.052) 
-0.018                        
(0.154) 
-0.015                  
(0.017) 
-0.02                  
(0.017) 
-0.02                  
(0.017) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.114***                  
(0.023) 
-0.395***                        
(0.057) 
-0.046***                  
(0.008) 
-0.037***                  
(0.008) 
-0.039***                  
(0.008) 
Intercept 1.512***                  
(0.181) 
4.352***     
(0.435) 
0.457***                  
(0.06) 
0.406***                  
(0.06) 












Observations 2653 2300 2786 2786 2786 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
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Table 102 displays that the index IPR general has a significantly positive effect on 
GDPpc for all FC IPR models. This is the same relationship already discovered for the 
GDP regression analysis. The table also shows that the effects of the specific and TRIPS-
plus indexes are less consistently significant across the time dimensions and that their 
direction is ambiguous. Whereas they show negative effect for dfl3 and dfl5, the effects 
are positive for dft. 
Furthermore, the regression also shows that the control variable geographic distance 
has a far more pronounced effect than any of the IPR indexes. The effect is significantly 
negative across all FC models, which means that an increase in the distance amongst PTA 
members decreases a countries’ GDPpc. It is, therefore, more beneficial for the GDPpc 
to sign PTAs with neighbouring countries than countries further away. The other control 
variables sporadically show a significant effect, yet not consistently enough to make gen-
eral statements on the effect on GDPpc. 
The general binary variables show multiple significant effects for both the overall and 
the FC IPR measure. For both IPR measures, there are positive effects for ipr_gen-
eral_enforcement, ipr_m_undisclosed_information, ipr_m_new_plant_varieties and ipr 
_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources, resp. negative effect for ipr_as_investment and 
ipr_border_measures. This means, for instance, that general enforcement measures in 
PTAs increase GDPpc whereas defining IPR as investment has the opposite effect. 
The specific binary variables have exclusively negative effects, be it for the overall 
IPR measure and the variable ipr_committee and ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights, or the 
FC IPR measure for ipr_service_provider_liability and ipr_committee. This means that 
IPR committees in PTAS per se have a negative effect on GDPpc, regardless if they are 
novel or repetitive commitments. 
The TRIPS-plus additive variables find negative effects for the overall IPR measure 
of ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights and ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications as well as 
one positive effect for the FC measure for ipr_tripsplus_trademarks and a negative one 
for ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion. For example, this indicates that repetitive TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on copyrights and geographical indications increase a countries GDPpc, whereas 
novel TRIPS-plus provisions on trademarks in a PTA have the opposite impact. 
The development level analysis mirrors largely the effects found for the comprehen-
sive regression analysis. The HIC data finds multiple significant effects for both the over-
all and FC IPR measure, which are all negative except for the general IPR index for dft. 
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The UMIC data finds for the overall and FC IPR measures significantly positive and neg-
ative effects across all models. For the LMIC data, there is only one negative effect for 
the index IPR specific. Otherwise there are only positive effects for the general IPR index 
for both the overall and FC IPR measure. The LIC data finds multiple significant effects 
across all indexes, whereby the index IPR general has only positive results, and the other 
two indexes have both negative as well as positive results. 
Thirdly, the GDP growth rate finds one significant result for the overall general in-
dex, but none for the FC IPR measure. Table 103 displays this result found in the df5l 
model. The clear positive effect suggests that with an increase of general IPR provisions 
repeatedly mentioned in PTAs, a country increases its GDP growth rate. However, as 
none of the other models shows any effects of the IPR indexes, the effect has to be con-
sidered carefully before making general statements on the effect of the design of IPRs in 
PTAs. It is only significant for the intermediate analysis (df5l), and not per se generally. 
 
Table 103: Economic Effects Regression – Growth: GDP Growth Rate 




Index IPR general (sum) 0.147*              
(0.072) 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ 
Control Variables  
Democratisation (Polity 2) 0.003              
(0.075) 
Classic IP leaders 0.448              
(0.998) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-2.807**              
(0.945) 
New IP producers and developers 2.976*              
(1.164) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.525              
(0.528) 






Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
Chapter 5: Effects of Intellectual Property Rights in PTAs  397 
However, there are also two control variables, which show an immensely more dis-
tinct effect than the general IPR index. Countries with a high increase of patent protection 
– Brazil, China, India and Mexico – have a significantly negative effect on the GDP 
growth rate, whereas new IP producers and developers – Israel, South Korea, Singapore 
and Taiwan – have a significantly positive one. This means if one of the former countries 
is amongst the PTA members, a country is more likely to experience a decrease in the 
GDP growth rate resp. if one of the former countries is included, an increase in the GDP 
growth rate. The other control variables show no significant effects. 
The general binary variables show three reoccurring negative effects for the overall 
IPR measure of ipr_more_than_1_article and ipr_m_new_plant_varieties as well as for 
FC IPR measure of ipr_investment_mfn. For instance, this indicates that countries repeat-
edly including more than one article on IPRs are more likely to face a decrease in the 
GDP growth rate. 
The specific binary variables only find a significant effect for the FC IPR measure-
ment, namely reoccurring positive effect for ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies and neg-
ative ones for ipr_service_provider_liability. This suggests that including commitments 
on criminal procedures and remedies for the first time in a PTA increases a countries’ 
GDP growth rate, whilst the effect is inverted for provisions on service provider liability. 
The TRIPS-plus additive variables have no significant effects for the overall IPR 
measure and only one effect for the FC measure of ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_infor-
mation for dft (-5.095). This suggests that most of the TRIPS-plus variables in PTAs have 
no significant effect on the GDP growth rate. Only TRIPS-plus provisions on undisclosed 
affect the GDP growth rate, yet negatively. 
The analysis according to the development level of countries highlights that the effects 
differ based on the income level of countries. The HIC data shows significant positive 
results for both the overall (df5l, df10l) and FC measure (df3l, dft) of the index IPR gen-
eral. The UMIC data finds significantly positive results for the overall general and TRIPS-
plus index, whereas the LMIC data has one significant positive effect for TRIPS-plus 
index of the overall IPR measure. The LIC data finds multiple significant positive effects 
for all IPR indexes of both the overall and FC IPR measure. This suggests that the GDP 
growth rate of LIC generally profits significantly from including general, specific and 
TRIPS-plus provisions in PTAs, whereas for the HIC only the general commitments in 
PTAs have a significant impact. 
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Fourthly, the GDPpc growth rate also shows no significant results for the IPR in-
dexes. Table 104 thus displays the effects for the overall IPR measure for df to illustrate 
the results.  
The regression shows that unlike the IPR indexes, the control variables have a signif-
icant effect on the GDPpc growth rate. Both the classic IP leaders as well as countries 
with a high increase of patent protection have a significant positive result, meaning that 
if the US, EU, EFTA and Japan or even more so if Brazil, China, India and Mexico are 
part of a countries’ PTA, there is a significant increase of the countries’ GDPpc growth 
rate. 
 
Table 104: Economic Effects Regression – Growth: GDPpc Growth Rate 







Index IPR general (sum) 0.089              
(0.167) 
─ ─ 
Index IPR specific (sum) ─ -0.085                     
(0.304) 
─ 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum) ─ ─ -0.054                     
(0.115) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) -0.204              
(0.192) 
-0.18                     
(0.189) 
-0.179                     
(0.189) 
Classic IP leaders 4.184.              
(2.508) 
4.694.                     
(2.526) 
4.841.                     
(2.536) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
7.992**              
(2.428) 
7.726**                     
(2.408) 
7.715**                     
(2.403) 
New IP producers and developers -4.018              
(2.957) 
-3.831                     
(2.954) 
-3.833                     
(2.949) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -1.914              
(1.324) 
-1.671                     
(1.337) 
-1.642                     
(1.32) 
Intercept 12.856                      
(10.163) 
11.304                     
(10.331) 
11.077                     
(10.22) 
Model m5.4_df_gi m5.4_df_si m5.4_df_ti 
Observations 2868 2868 2868 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
The general binary variables show only one significant effect for the overall IPR 
measure for df3l, namely for ipr_border_measures (3.176), and multiple significant ef-
fects for the FC IPR measure, also for df3l. Concretely, there is a significantly positive 
effect for ipr_implementation (8.267), ipr_m_industrial_designs (9.983) and ipr_m_new 
_plant_varieties (6.186), resp. a negative one for ipr_1_article (-8.038), ipr_nt (-4.908), 
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ipr_as_investment (-20.804), and ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits (-6.245). This sug-
gests, for example, that repeating general statements on IPR border measures increased 
the GDPpc growth rate, whereas countries’ first time defining IPR as investment in a PTA 
has a substantially negative effect on the GDPpc growth rate. 
The specific binary variables show only two significant effects for the overall IPR 
measure for ipr_t_industrial_designs (-10.14) and ipr_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources (-5.109), and one significant effect for the FC IPR measure for ipr_committee 
(7.903). This means that countries, which repeatedly include specific provisions on in-
dustrial design and TK & GR are more likely faced with a decrease of the GDPpc growth 
rate. 
The TRIPS-plus additive variables also find three significant effects, whereby there 
are two overall effects for ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design (-7.315) and ipr_tripsplus 
_new_plant_varieties (7.543), and one for the FC measure for ipr_tripsplus_new 
_plant_varieties (9.416). This indicates that same as for the specific provisions, including 
TRIPS-plus commitment on industrial design in a PTAs, leads to a decrease of the GDPpc 
growth rate, whereas TRIPS-plus provisions on new plant varieties have a positive effect. 
The development level shows different results for the subgroups of countries. The 
HIC data finds significant results for the overall specific and TRIPS-plus indexes for df 
and the general index for df10l, whereby all of the effects are significantly negative. For 
the UMIC and LMIC data, there are no significant results. The LIC data shows two sig-
nificantly positive effects for the overall general IPR for df5l and for df10l. The design of 
IPRs in PTAs thus clearly has diverging effects on the GDPpc growth rate depending on 
the income level of countries. Whereby HIC experience a decrease of the GDPpc growth 
rate if they include general, specific and TRIPS-plus provisions repetitively in their PTAs, 
LIC countries benefit from repeating general IPR commitments in their PTAs. 
In summary, the IPR indexes show a significant result on growth, predominately for 
the GDP and GPDpc development and not the resp. growth rate. The effects are mostly 
negative for the overall IPR measure and barely more often positive than negative for the 
FC IPR measure. A majority across all measures suggest that growth is negatively af-
fected by the design of IPRs in PTAs. 
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5.2.4 Summary of Economic Effects Analysis 
The economic effect analysis has shown that the design of IPRs in PTAs has a signif-
icant effect on many of the factors postulated in the rationale of IPRs in PTAs. However, 
the direction of these effects is often the opposite of the assumed theoretical relationship. 
Table 105 summarises the factors, the postulated hypotheses and the direction of the sig-
nificant regression results for the IPR indexes found in the analysis of the economic ef-
fects. 
 
Table 105: Conclusion Overview for the Economic Effects Hypotheses 
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H4 Stringent IPR provisions in PTAs increase 
technology transfer. 
Positive General IPR:  








Growth H5 Stringent IPR provisions in PTAs increase 
growth. 
Positive General IPR:  









Table 105 illustrates that all except one hypothesis anticipate a positive effect of the 
stringent IPR features of PTAs, i.e. the specific and or TRIPS-plus indexes. However, the 
results predominately show either ambiguous or negative effects. Only for the factors of 
investment in R&D and technology transfer, the postulated hypotheses match the results 
found in the regression analysis unambigously. In the following paragraphs, I make a 
brief summary of each factor and its hypotheses. 
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For investment in R&D, the general analysis finds significantly negative effects of the 
specific IPR provisions and only a negative effect for the general IPR variables. This 
means that H1.1 is overthrown as stringent IPRs have no positive effect on the investment 
in R&D. However, H1.2 is reaffirmed by analysis, as for the subgroup of IPR enforce-
ment variables, there is a significantly positive effect for the TRIPS-plus variables as well 
as an ambiguous one for the specific index. This means that stringent IPR enforcement 
provisions in PTAs indeed increase the investment in R&D. 
For FDI, none of the regressions shows any significant effects. Therefore, H2.1 has 
to be rejected as there are no significant results reaffirming a positive effect of stringent 
IPR on FDI. This is astonishing in so far as FDI is one of the most prominent factors used 
to promote the positive effects of IPRs. 
For licensing, the regression analysis finds significant positive effects, yet only for the 
general IPR variables. As the hypothesis assumes that only stringent IPR provisions have 
a significant effect, H2.2 also has to be rejected. However, there is a significantly positive 
between IPRs in PTAs and licensing, whereby it is sufficient to include general IPR com-
mitments to achieve an increase in licensing. 
For innovation, the four tested measures find significant results suggesting a clear 
negative effect of the general, specific and TRIPS-plus IPR design features on innovation. 
The idea behind the hypotheses for innovation was that there is a positive effect of IPR 
on innovation but that there might be a tipping point, where the positive effects become 
negative. However, the results show that the effect of IPRs in PTAs is per se negative on 
innovation. This means that H3.1 has to be rejected, and H3.2 is accepted, with a caution-
ary note. The underlying theoretical assumption of H3.2 has to be revisited as there is no 
previous positive effect of IPRs in PTAs on innovation. 
For technology transfer, I tested twelve measures on applications for IPRs and imports 
of IPR-intensive goods. Across the measures, the regression analysis shows a positive 
effect of specific IPR provisions on technology transfer and H4 can, therefore, be ac-
cepted. However, the analysis also shows mixed results for the TRIPS-plus measures, 
meaning that not all stringent IPR factors have the same effect. Moreover, certain 
measures for technology transfer are not affected in a significant manner, whereas other 
positive effects operate on a very low level. Further, the results for technology transfer 
have to be treated prudently as the number of observations for the dependent variables is 
fairly low, making the results less generalisable than desired. The results for the analysis 
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of technology transfer have to be repeated with a more comprehensive dataset on the 
dependent variables. 
For growth, the effects show predominately significant negative effects of the strin-
gent IPR indexes and mostly positive effects of the general IPR index. However, the FC 
IPR measure accounting for PTAs firstly including any given IPR provision shows next 
to some significant negative effects also some significant positive effects of the stringent 
IPR indexes. Thus, H5 can only be tentatively and partially accepted for the FC IPR 
measures. For the comprehensive analysis of stringent IPRs in PTAs, H5 has to be re-
jected as a majority of the effects are negative. Nevertheless, the analysis shows that a 
plurality of the general IPR commitments has a significantly positive effect on growth. 
Unlike anticipated in the hypothesis, growth is decreased by stringent IPRs in PTAs but 
increased by general IPR provisions. 
Conclusively, almost all hypothesis on the economic effects have to be rejected, either 
because the analysis finds no significant effects and even more often because the effect 
of the design of IPRs in PTAs is negative and not as postulated by the rationale of IPRs 
in PTAs positive. 
Besides the analysis of the IPR indexes representing the additive content of general, 
specific and TRIPS-plus commitments in PTAs, I also looked at the possible effect indi-
vidual binary IPR variables can have on five factors. The results show that mostly the 
general binary variables affect the factors, but there are also tendencies for specific and 
TRIPS-plus variables. However, these results are not generalisable as they reflect tenden-
cies for specific factors rather than concrete evidence of a relation. 
Further, I also took into account the development level of countries because previous 
research has suggested that the development level of countries significantly alters the 
effects of IPRs in PTAs. So, for every factor, I ran the regression models additionally for 
the four income-level subgroups HIC, UMIC , LMIC and LIC. The results suggest that 
there is indeed a difference in how countries are affected by the design of IPRs. Unlike 
generally assumed, there is not a clear divide between how the high-income countries are 
affected versus the effects on low-income countries. Only for very few cases, the effects 
of these income-levels are entirely inverted. For instance, for PTA member applications 
for industrial designs HIC are negatively affected by IPR design features and LIC posi-
tively, whereas for PTA member mhtp imports the effects are reversed. Furthermore, 
there are plenty of measures where the subgroups show no significant effects. Generally, 
the HIC are affected most often positively as well as negatively by the design of IPRs in 
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PTAs. Table 106 summarises the significant effects of the IPR indexes on the five factors 
for each income-level subgroup. 
 
Table 106: Overview for the Significant Economic Effects by Countries’ Development Level 
Factor  HIC UMIC LMIC LIC 
Investment in R&D     
Investment in R&D + / – – + / – + 
FDI/ Licensing     
FDI +    
Licensing + / – +  + 
Innovation     
Researchers in R&D + / – + / – –  
Resident applications for trademarks (cumulative) + / – +   
Resident applications for industrial designs (cumulative) + / – – +  
Resident applications for patents (cumulative) + / – + / – – + 
Technology Transfer     
Total applications for industrial designs (cumulative) + / – +   
Total applications for patents (cumulative) + / – + / – – – 
PTA member applications for industrial designs (cumulative) – + – + 
PTA member applications for patents (cumulative) + / – –  + 
Total htp imports + + + + / – 
Total mhtp imports + + + + / – 
Total mltp imports + +  – 
Total ltp imports – +  + / – 
PTA member htp imports –  +  
PTA member mhtp imports + +  – 
PTA member mltp imports –   – 
PTA member ltp imports + + / – + + / – 
Growth     
GDP growth + / – + / – + + / – 
GDPpc growth + / – + / – + / – + / – 
GDP growth rate + + + + 
GDPpc growth rate –   + / – 
 
Sometimes the results according to the development levels mirror the results found 
for the entire dataset, but Table 106 shows that there is sufficient evidence to support 
previous research calling for a differentiated analysis. Future research on the effect of 
IPRs should consider the development level of countries to be an additional level towards 
understanding the mechanisms behind IPRs. 
Concluding, the design of IPRs in PTAs has a significant economic effect, yet this 
effect is predominately negative for stringent IPR provisions or at least ambiguous. 
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5.2.5 Economic Effects: Conclusion 
The analysis of the economic effects tested the postulated positive impact of IPRs on 
economic factors based on the rationale of IPRs and the rationale of IPRs in PTAs. Be-
sides the positive effects accredited to IPRs, some argue that the level of IPR protection 
has its limits, whereby after a certain point, the positive effects become negative. Thereby, 
TRIPS functions either as a maximum standard and any additional stringent IPR regula-
tion is counterproductive, or TRIPS is considered to be a minimum standard, and IPRs 
need TRIPS-plus protection to unfold their positive effects. 
However, the regression analysis finds that most of the IPR design features in PTAs 
have a negative effect on the economic factors and not a positive one. Thereby, it is not 
only those provisions going beyond TRIPS commitments but also specific IPR provi-
sions, which drive the negative direction of the effects. At least, some factors are posi-
tively affected by general IPR commitments in PTAs. 
These results make it necessary to critically reflect on the rationale of IPRs in PTAs 
and reconsider it. It might even be necessary the revise the rational of IPRs, yet before-
hand, one should run similar regression analyses for the economic effects of domestic 
IPR regulations. Moreover, countries should reconsider the option of including TRIPS-
plus commitments in PTAs. If the economic effects of TRIPS-plus provisions in PTAs 
are predominately negative, then PTAs might not be the ideal forum for these commit-
ments. The TRIPS-plus provisions in PTAs set an alternative and more stringent standard 
than the most common denominator (TRIPS) and alter the international IPR regulation 
due to the MFN character of IPRs in PTAs. Without clear positive effects, the trade-offs 
gained in PTA negotiations need to be substantial or it should be refrained from including 
TRIPS-plus in PTAs. Of course, the effects might change if there was a uniform TRIPS-
plus standard and not multiple diverging, interest-driven forms of TRIPS-plus regula-
tions. 
My analysis has also shown that the level of development of countries should always 
be considered for the analysis of the effects of IPRs in PTAs. As stated in a report by the 
United Nations, “it is unlikely that an increase in the levels of IPR protection will en-
courage foreign firms to expand their R&D activities in developing countries, unless 
other conditions (availability of highly qualified personnel, good and inexpensive re-
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search infrastructure, etc.) are met.” (United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment (UNCTAD) 2010, 18). It is necessary to also take into account the domestic 
frameworks, which could be commenced by country- or region-specific case studies. 
Further research on the effect of IPRs in PTAs should also control for the economic 
rationale of PTAs (see 2.2.1.1 Rationale of PTAs). For example in the form of a case 
study, one could focus on a single country and test if IPRs in PTAs lead to an observable 
trade creation or trade diversion effect. My study already shows some positive effects for 
both trade creation looking at the significant positive effects of the total IPR imports as 
well as indications for a preference of PTA members through the positive effects for PTA 
members imports. An in-depth study could analyse these effects appropriately. 
Moreover, it might be interesting to focus more on a particular form of IPRs in PTAs 
and select more tailor-made factors for the effect analysis. For example, one could focus 
on patents and analyse the effects on the pharmaceutical industry. 
There should also be an effort by researchers to gather more reliable data on the de-
pendent variables, i.e. those factors supposedly affected by IPR. For example, the number 
of observations for the data on technology transfer is notoriously low. With technology 
transfer being one of the key factors for countries to optimise their production process 
and development level, it is necessary to gather more information on how technology 
transfer is affected by IPRs as well as IPRs in PTAs (see United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2010, 19). 
Concluding, there is a need for further analysis of IPRs in PTAs, ideally in connection 
with more domestic data on both IPRs, the IPR environment and economic factors. 
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Chapter 6:  Overarching Summary and Conclusion 
To conclude my thesis, the following subchapters first summarises and discusses the 
findings for the three research questions on what is the state of play (dataset), what can 
explain the status quo (design) and if it matters (effects). Afterwards, I describe the im-
plications of my research and highlight pathways for future studies. 
6.1 Summary and Discussion 
There has been a vast amount of research on trade agreements as well as intellectual 
property rights. This monography adds to this previous research by reflecting the existing 
theories and creating a comprehensive and extensive dataset on IPRs in PTAs to test 
said theories. The dataset allows shedding light on the development and current state of 
the design of IPRs in PTAs. For instance, it shows that IPRs in PTAs have become far 
more common than generally assumed and that 80% of PTAs signed after 2010 include 
specific IPR provisions resp. 68% contain TRIPS-plus provisions. Furthermore, there are 
not only PTAs with the US, EU, EFTA and Japan, which cover stringent IPR provisions, 
but also other countries agree on such commitments amongst each other. The analysis of 
the development of IPRs in PTAs and their effects has thus growing global importance. 
The dataset also illustrates that there is immense variation in the design, for instance, in 
regard to the IPR forms covered. Moreover, the descriptive statistics show that these dif-
ferences also diverge amongst like-minded groups such as the classic IP leaders, suggest-
ing that countries specific preferences impact the design of IPRs in PTAs. 
Therefore, I firstly analyse how the design of IPRs in PTAs can be explained. This 
design analysis shows that out of the theoretically derived impact factors, the design of 
IPRs in PTAs can be mostly explained by economic power asymmetries and domestic 
interests. The other factors, namely political pressure, veto players, endogeneity, regime 
preference and path dependency, also affect the design but less distinctively. These results 
suggest that countries decide on the design of IPR provisions in their PTAs either accord-
ing to economic pressure and or follow their domestic interests. There is no statistical 
evidence that countries act according to the rationale of IPRs if it does not align with their 
domestic interest or if they are subjected to or assert economic power. 
Further, I test in the effect analysis if the design of IPRs in PTAs matters, i.e. if the 
effects vary depending on the IPR content of PTAs. For this purpose, I apply two forms 
of analysis: the legal-institutional and economic effect analysis.  
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For the legal-institutional analysis, I focus on the commitments toward IPR multilat-
eral agreement in PTAs. Ideally, I would also test the legal effect, but as there is no com-
prehensive data on domestic IPR regulation, there is no way of testing if PTAs alter do-
mestic IPR regulation or are merely reaffirming the status quo. However, there is infor-
mation on the ratification of IPR multilateral agreements, which are often included as 
accession or reaffirmation commitments in PTAs. The legal-institutional analysis tests 
these commitments and compares the status pre and post PTAs. It shows, that most coun-
tries comply with the commitments made on IPR multilateral agreement made in PTAs 
but that most of these commitments are factually repeating the status quo, i.e. are com-
mitments to already ratified multilateral agreements and do not require a change in the 
status quo. Moreover, the analysis shows that the more precise and legally binding pro-
vision have a stronger effect. They lead to a higher rate of compliance and effectiveness. 
The analysis of the legal-institutional effects thus shows, that that the design of the IPR 
commitments matters and impacts the intended factors. 
The economic effect analysis tests if the design of IPRs finds statistical evidence for 
the effects ascribed to IPRs by the rationale of IPRs. More precisely, I look at the effect 
of general, specific and TRIPS-plus provisions on investment in R&D, FDI and licensing, 
innovation, technology transfer and growth. The regression analysis finds that some, yet 
not all of these factors are significantly affected by the design of IPRs in PTAs. Moreover, 
the analysis shows that especially the stringent IPR commitments in PTAs have a negative 
effect on these factors and not a positive one, as suggested by the rationale of IPR. The 
results indicate that the rationale for IPRs as well as the rationale of IPRs in PTAs calling 
for an increased IPR protection beyond TRIPS have to be critically revisited. Further-
more, the economic effect analysis illustrates that both the effect of the design of IPRs in 
PTAS varies according to a countries’ development level. Future research should bear in 
mind that some effects might only be visible for particular income levels. 
6.2 Implications and Pathways for Future Research 
The importance of my analysis lies not only in the academic development of theoret-
ically founded arguments, but should also serve for policymakers as grounds for negoti-
ations. Recent developments indicate that PTAs will continue to include more stringent 
IPR provisions. For example, recently signed agreements between Switzerland and Indo-
nesia (2018) as well as the two EU PTAs with Vietnam resp. Mercosur (2019) include 
stringent IPR provisions and even TRIPS-plus provisions. Countries should be aware of 
Chapter 6: Overarching Summary and Conclusion  409 
the non-preferential character of IPRs included in PTAs, and that there is an in-balance 
between received preferential trade-offs and MFN IPR commitments. Especially regard-
ing those IPR provisions going beyond TRIPS, which are not reflecting a harmonised 
international standard and mostly further very particular interests. After all, my analysis 
shows that most stringent IPR provisions come with negative economic effects. 
In the future, my dataset on IPRs in PTAs should be updated periodically with the 
latest agreements, which might even include new developments on the IPR front. The 
already existing data can be used in a multitude of ways. On the one hand, policymakers 
can use it to gain information about their home country or the PTA commitments of other 
countries. The data and analysis can thus assist policymakers in making informed deci-
sions with trading partners. On the other hand, my dataset and analysis provide academia 
with an alternative approach on how to capture and measure PTA design, as well as a 
novel approach to evaluate PTA design and its effects. Other researchers and institutions 
can use my data to make in-depth analyses of the IPR design or IPR effects focusing on 
countries or regions. 
Moreover, my dataset could be extended by a more precise legal coding of the IPR 
provisions, for example, for the specific IPR provisions. Hereby, one could differentiate 
the specific IPR provisions according to their legal bindingness or analyse the novelty of 
the commitments. For the latter, one could perform a text-as-data analysis and check how 
much of the IPR design is copied from already existing IPR multilateral agreements. 
Additional, my analysis could be extended by using additional data on the non-PTA 
variables. For example, the data on technology transfer is scarce, and with an improved 
dataset, the economic effect analysis might yield more reliable results for technology 
transfer. The design, as well as the effect analysis, could also be tested using firm-level 
data, which could represent the domestic interest, power asymmetries as well as the eco-
nomic effects. 
Besides adding to my data and analysis, it would be useful to create a mirroring dataset 
for the state of domestic IPR regulation that goes beyond patents, trademarks and copy-
rights. Such a comprehensive dataset could be used to test the rationale of IPRs and the 
legal effects of IPRs in PTAs. Such data will be relevant to see on the one hand to what 
degree countries agree to new commitments in PTAs or if the reinforce mostly their do-
mestic legislation. On the other hand, such data could give answers to the compliance of 
countries with their PTA commitments on IPRs. 
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Further, it would be interesting to have an IPR dataset containing information on the 
other fora of IPR regulation such as BITs or state agreements on IPRs. Even though they 
tend to be either less common or include fewer IPR provisions, their information would 
be useful for a comprehensive, informed picture on IPR regulation. For example, the state 
agreement on geographical indications between the Czech Republic and Switzerland 
signed in 1976 still prevents beer to be labelled as “Pils” in Switzerland if it does not 
originate from the Czech Republic (see Die Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft 1976). 
More information on such agreements could help understand countries’ interest and show 
the development more comprehensively. 
From a legal perspective, it would be interesting to analyse the lawsuits based on the 
infringement of IPRs in PTAs, for example, regarding the issuance of compulsory li-
censes, exhaustion measures or IPRs defined as investment. Further, legal scholars can 
use the T+PTA dataset I created in collaboration with Morin (2019) either for qualitative 
analysis by helping them identify countries with TRIPS-plus provisions in their PTAs or 
for quantitative analysis by comparing it to the domestic TRIPS-plus regulation data by 
Gold et al. (2019).  
Finally, future research should also consider the effects of IPRs in PTAs on society. 
This can be the general costs of IPRs such as higher prices due to patent protection, or 
more specific factors such as the expenses paid by society for investor-state dispute set-
tlements based on IPR commitments made in PTAs, or the effects of parallel importation 
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Appendix 1: List of PTAs per Country 
Country ISO 
Code 
Number of PTAs 
724 698 
AFGHANISTAN 4 3 2 
ALBANIA 8 12 12 
ALGERIA 12 12 12 
ANDORRA 20 1 1 
ANGOLA 24 8 8 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 28 17 17 
ARGENTINA 32 37 36 
ARMENIA 51 14 14 
AUSTRALIA 36 21 20 
AUSTRIA 40 69 60 
AZERBAIJAN 31 7 6 
BAHAMAS 44 14 14 
BAHRAIN 48 9 9 
BANGLADESH 50 7 6 
BARBADOS 52 17 17 
BELARUS 112 8 8 
BELGIUM 56 114 105 
BELIZE 84 14 14 
BENIN 204 13 13 
BHUTAN 64 4 4 
BOLIVIA 68 12 12 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 70 12 12 
BOTSWANA 72 15 15 
BRAZIL 76 30 30 
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM 96 14 14 
BULGARIA 100 47 39 
BURKINA FASO 854 15 15 
BURUNDI 108 12 12 
CAMBODIA 116 8 8 
CAMEROON 120 16 15 
CANADA 124 22 22 
CAPE VERDE 132 8 8 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 140 15 15 
CHAD 148 15 15 
CHILE 152 42 41 
CHINA 156 18 17 
COLOMBIA 170 36 35 
COMOROS 174 9 8 
CONGO, Democratic Republic of (was Zaire) 180 13 13 
CONGO, Republic of (Brazzaville) 178 15 15 
COOK ISLANDS 184 4 4 
COSTA RICA 188 24 24 
COTE D'IVOIRE 384 15 15 
CROATIA 191 26 24 
CUBA 192 19 19 
CYPRUS 196 33 24 
CZECH REPUBLIC 203 46 37 
DENMARK 208 101 92 
DJIBOUTI 262 10 10 
DOMINICA 212 17 17 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 214 8 8 
ECUADOR 218 18 18 
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Country ISO 
Code 
Number of PTAs 
724 698 
EL SALVADOR 222 23 23 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 226 10 10 
ERITREA 232 2 2 
ESTONIA 233 50 41 
ETHIOPIA 231 9 9 
FAROE ISLANDS 234 9 9 
FIJI 242 9 8 
FINLAND 246 76 67 
FRANCE 250 115 106 
GABON 266 15 15 
GAMBIA 270 10 10 
GEORGIA 268 12 12 
GERMANY 276 114 105 
GHANA 288 13 13 
GREECE 300 78 69 
GRENADA 308 18 18 
GUATEMALA 320 26 26 
GUINEA 324 11 11 
GUINEA-BISSAU 624 9 9 
GUYANA 328 20 20 
HAITI 332 4 4 
HONDURAS 340 22 22 
HONG KONG 344 5 5 
HUNGARY 348 45 36 
ICELAND 352 44 43 
INDIA 356 22 21 
INDONESIA 360 15 14 
IRAN 364 9 7 
IRAQ 368 8 7 
IRELAND 372 100 91 
ISRAEL 376 20 20 
ITALY 380 113 104 
JAMAICA 388 16 16 
JAPAN 392 17 17 
JORDAN 400 37 37 
KAZAKHSTAN 398 14 13 
KENYA 404 13 13 
KIRIBATI 296 7 7 
KOREA, Democratic People's Republic of (North Korea) 408 1 1 
KOREA, Republic of (South Korea) 410 21 21 
KOSOVO 900 3 3 
KUWAIT 414 10 10 
KYRGYZSTAN 417 12 11 
LAO 418 12 12 
LATVIA 428 49 40 
LEBANON 422 9 9 
LESOTHO 426 16 16 
LIBERIA 430 11 11 
LIBYA 434 8 8 
LIECHTENSTEIN 438 40 39 
LITHUANIA 440 49 40 
LUXEMBOURG 442 114 105 
MACAO 446 2 2 
MADAGASCAR 450 12 11 
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Country ISO 
Code 
Number of PTAs 
724 698 
MALAYSIA 458 22 22 
MALDIVES 462 2 2 
MALI 466 15 15 
MALTA 470 32 23 
MARSHALL ISLANDS 584 4 2 
MAURITANIA 478 17 17 
MAURITIUS 480 13 12 
MEXICO 484 42 40 
MICRONESIA 583 4 2 
MOLDOVA 498 17 17 
MONACO 492 1 1 
MONGOLIA 496 1 1 
MONTENEGRO 499 5 5 
MONTSERRAT 500 11 11 
MOROCCO 504 25 25 
MOZAMBIQUE 508 12 12 
MYANMAR 104 8 8 
NAMIBIA 516 10 10 
NAURU 520 3 3 
NEPAL 524 4 4 
NETHERLANDS 528 114 105 
NEW ZEALAND 554 17 17 
NICARAGUA 558 21 21 
NIGER 562 14 14 
NIGERIA 566 11 11 
NIUE 570 4 4 
NORTH MACEDONIA 807 13 13 
NORWAY 578 47 46 
OMAN 512 8 8 
PAKISTAN 586 16 13 
PALAU 585 3 2 
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY (West Bank and Gaza) 275 9 6 
PANAMA 591 25 25 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 598 9 8 
PARAGUAY 600 21 21 
PERU 604 35 34 
PHILIPPINES 608 16 16 
POLAND 616 44 35 
PORTUGAL 620 79 69 
QATAR 634 9 9 
ROMANIA 642 44 36 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 643 14 14 
RWANDA 646 13 13 
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS 659 16 16 
SAINT LUCIA 662 17 17 
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES 670 16 16 
SAMOA 882 8 8 
SAN MARINO 674 1 1 
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE 678 7 7 
SAUDI ARABIA 682 10 10 
SENEGAL 686 15 15 
SERBIA 688 16 16 
SEYCHELLES 690 9 8 
SIERRA LEONE 694 10 10 
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Country ISO 
Code 
Number of PTAs 
724 698 
SLOVAKIA 703 47 38 
SLOVENIA 705 50 41 
SOLOMON ISLANDS 90 7 7 
SOMALIA 706 14 14 
SOUTH AFRICA 710 12 11 
SOUTH SUDAN 728 1 1 
SPAIN 724 76 67 
SRI LANKA 144 8 8 
SUDAN 736 15 15 
SURINAME 740 12 12 
SWAZILAND (ESWATINI) 748 17 17 
SWEDEN 752 72 63 
SWITZERLAND 756 49 48 
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 760 11 11 
TAIWAN 158 7 6 
TAJIKISTAN 762 7 6 
TANZANIA 834 16 16 
THAILAND 764 17 17 
TOGO 768 13 13 
TONGA 776 8 8 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 780 20 20 
TUNISIA 788 18 18 
TURKEY 792 41 38 
TURKMENISTAN 795 5 4 
TUVALU 798 7 7 
UGANDA 800 13 13 
UKRAINE 804 22 22 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 784 12 12 
UNITED KINGDOM 826 102 93 
UNITED STATES 840 28 23 
URUGUAY 858 32 32 
UZBEKISTAN 860 6 5 
VANUATU 548 6 6 
VENEZUELA 862 27 27 
VIETNAM 704 17 17 
WESTERN SAHARA 732 2 2 
YEMEN 887 3 3 
ZAMBIA 894 14 10 
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Appendix 2: Codebook of IPRs in PTAs Dataset 
ID Category Variable Description Note Range Occurrence Mode 
724 698 
A PTA information JS_ID Identification number listing all 
coded PTAs. Numbers assigned from 
1-724, sorted by date of signature, 
year of signature and alphabetical or-
der. 
Basis for PTA selection are the PTAs from 
DESTA (designoftradeagreements.org). 
[1, 724] 724 698 basis 
 
A PTA information DESTA_ID DESTA identification number, in-
cluding indication for acces-
sions/withdrawals (+) 
Based on DESTA version June2016. Those 
PTAs which were dropped from DESTA but 
already coded on their IPR content are coded 
as 'X' for this variable (#26 PTAs). 
– 698 698 basis 
A PTA information DESTA_ 
Base_Treaty 
DESTA identification number Based on DESTA version June2016. Those 
PTAs which were dropped from DESTA but 
already coded on their IPR content are coded 
as 'X' for this variable (#26 PTAs). 
– 698 698 basis 
A PTA information PTA Name (Members) of PTA Based on DESTA version June2016, eventu-
ally adjusted for clarification. Countries are 
listed in alphabetical order. 
– – – basis 
A PTA information Members Abbreviation of member countries 
(ISO 2-letter code) 
Based on DESTA version June2016, eventu-
ally corrected 
– – – basis 




– – basis 




724 698 basis 
A PTA information date_en-
try_into_force 




– – basis 
A PTA information year_en-
try_into_force 




655 632 basis 
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ID Category Variable Description Note Range Occurrence Mode 
724 698 
1 Index IPR general ipr_gen-
eral_sum 
Sum of general IPR provisions Sum of all general IPR provisions:  
- sum of general IPR variables (ipr_men-
tioned, ipr_1_article, ipr_more_than_1_arti-
cle, ipr_mfn, ipr_nt, ipr_as_investment, 
ipr_investment_mfn, ipr_investment_nt, 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination) 
- sum of general enforcement variables 
(ipr_general_enforcement_sum) 
- sume of mentioned scope variables 
(ipr_scope_mentioned) 
Multilateral coherence variables are excluded. 
[0, 24] 390 378 calculated 
2 Index IPR general ipr_gen-
eral_ipr_dumm
y 
Based on sum: binary calculation of 
general IPR provisions 
0: ipr_general_ipr_dummy = 0 
1: ipr_general_ipr_dummy > 0 
[0, 1] 390 378 calculated 




Sum of specific IPR provisions Sum of all specific provisions 
- sum of specific enforcement variables 
(ipr_specific_enforcement_sum) 
- sum of tangible scope variables 
(ipr_scope_tangible) 
Multilateral coherence variables are excluded. 
[0, 15] 165 159 calculated 





Based on sum: binary calculation of 
specific IPR provisions 
0: ipr_specific_ipr_dummy = 0 
1: ipr_specific_ipr_dummy > 0 
[0, 1] 165 159 calculated 
5 IPR general ipr_mentioned Does the treaty mention IPRs? Not coded if only as exception (e.g. as 
standalone article excluding IPRs or exception 
regarding compulsory licenses within the in-
vestment chapter) 
[0, 1] 390 377 coded 
6 IPR general ipr_men-
tioned_excep-
tion 
Are IPRs mentioned as general ex-
ceptions in the agreement? 
Codes if generally applicable (exceptions/res-
ervation for intellectual property rights). Not 
coded if in a specific subchapter such as gov-
ernment procurement. 
[0, 1] 234 228 coded 
7 IPR general ipr_1_article Is there an article specifically on 
IPRs? 
  [0, 1] 355 346 coded 
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ID Category Variable Description Note Range Occurrence Mode 
724 698 
8 IPR general ipr_more_than_
1_article 
Are there more than one article spe-
cifically on IPRs? 
  [0, 1] 307 299 coded 
9 IPR general ipr_word_count What is the word count on IPR arti-
cles, chapters and annexes? 
This does only concern IPR specific parts of 
the treaty, as the IPR chapter, the IPR annex 
and the IPR joint declaration (including titles 
and footnotes). This does not concern the gen-
eral exceptions, the preamble, the objectives, 
the investment, cooperation or dispute settle-
ment standalone chapters or additional legal 
texts reaffirmed in the treaty (e.g. EC PTAs). 
[0, 56242] 324 326 coded 
10 IPR general ipr_mfn Is most-favoured-nation treatment 
granted in relation to IPRs (without 
considering investment chapters)? 
This should be found directly in the IPR chap-
ter/article/paragraph 
[0, 1] 104 103 coded 
11 IPR general ipr_nt Is national treatment (NT) granted in 
relation to IPRs (without considering 
investment chapters)? 
This should be found directly in the IPR chap-
ter/article/paragraph 
[0, 1] 101 100 coded 




Are national and/or most-favoured-
nation treatment granted in relation to 
IPRs without considering investment 
chapters? 
Sum of ipr_mfn and ipr_nt: 
0: ipr_mfn = '0' AND ipr_nt = '0' 
1: ipr_mfn = '1' AND/OR ipr_nt = '1' 
[0, 1] 143 142 calculated 
13 IPR general ipr_as_invest-
ment 
Are IPRs defined as investment? This should be found in the investment chap-
ter 
[0, 1] 96 94 coded 
14 IPR general ipr_invest-
ment_mfn 
If IPR defined as investment: Is most-
favoured-nation treatment granted in 
relation to IPRs in investment chap-
ters? 
If IPR is defined as investment and the invest-
ment chapter/article/paragraph grants MFN 
treatment 
[0, 1] 86 84 coded 
15 IPR general ipr_invest-
ment_nt 
If IPR defined as investment: Is na-
tional treatment granted in relation to 
IPRs in investment chapters? 
If IPR is defined as investment and the invest-
ment chapter/article/paragraph grants national 
treatment 
[0, 1] 92 91 coded 
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ID Category Variable Description Note Range Occurrence Mode 
724 698 





Are national and/or most-favoured-
nation treatment granted in relation to 
IPRs? 
Considering MFN and NT provisions of IPR 
and investment chapter: 
0: ipr_mfn = '0' AND ipr_nt = '0' AND ipr_in-
vestment_mfn = '0' AND ipr_investment_nt = 
'0' 
1: ipr_mfn = '1' AND/OR ipr_nt = '1' 
AND/OR ipr_investment_mfn = '0' AND/OR 
ipr_investment_nt = '0' 
[0, 1] 193 190 calculated 




dination agreed upon in relation to 
IPR? 
This can be in a specific IPR provision, but 
also in a specific article on cooperation 
[0, 1] 281 273 coded 
18 IPR general ipr_transi-
tion_period  
Is there a transition period agreed 
upon for accession to IPR provision 
(such as IPR agreements/conven-
tions)? 
Transition period is coded in years (calculated 
from signatory date) 
[0, 13] 95 93 coded 





Sum of all general IPR enforcement 
variables 





ation_exception ipr_implementation  
ipr_border_measures 
[0, 6] 301 294 calculated 






Based on sum: binary calculation of 
general IPR enforcement provisions 
0: ipr_general_enforcement = 0 
1: ipr_general_enforcement > 0 
[0, 1] 301 294 calculated 




Is there a general statement on IPRs 
enforcement? 
Often these are very general statements on the 
enforcement of IPRs. 
[0, 1] 257 253 coded 
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ID Category Variable Description Note Range Occurrence Mode 
724 698 





Is there an explicit dispute settlement 
mechanism directly related to IPRs 
(without considering investment 
chapters)? 
In the IPR chapter or if IPR is specifically 
mentioned in the dipsute settlement chapter.  
Note: of course, there can also be general 
PTA dispute settlement mechanism, that cover 
IPR (if general and IPR is not excluded). Yet 
this variable only codes dispute settlement 
that explicitly refer to IPR. The variable 
ipr_excluded_from_dsm shows which PTAs 
explicitly exclude IPR from dispute settlement 
mechanisms. 
[0, 1] 29 29 coded 







If IPR defined as investment: Is there 
an explicit dispute settlement mecha-
nism? 
If IPR is defined as investment and the invest-
ment chapter contains a dispute settlement 
mechanism 
[0, 1] 88 86 coded 








Is there a dispute settlement mecha-
nism directly related to IPRs? 
Considering both IPR and investment chapter: 
0: ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism = '0' 
AND ipr_investment_dispute_settle-
ment_mechanism = '0'  
1: ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism = '1' 
AND/OR ipr_investment_dispute_settle-
ment_mechanism = '1'  
[0, 1] 99 97 calculated 





Is IPR explicitly excluded from the 
dispute settlement mechanism? 
This can be found either within the IPR chap-
ter or the general dispute settlement chapter of 
the PTA. 
[0, 1] 5 5 coded 





If IPR defined as investment: is there 
an exception for expropriation for 
compulsory licenses/intellectual 
property rights? 
Some PTAs only include an expropriation ex-
ception in the investment chapter, but IPR is 
not defined as investment. This indicates that 
these provisions are most likely not included 
intentionally and are not coded. 
[0, 1] 70 69 coded 
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ID Category Variable Description Note Range Occurrence Mode 
724 698 







Conditional variable: If IPR defined 
as investment and compulsory li-
censes/IPRs are not namely exempted 
from expropriation. Meaning: IPR 
rights holder could challenge a issu-
ance of compulsory license even in 
case of a national emergency as an 
act of investment expropriation 
0: all other scenarios than '1' 
1: if ipr_investment_nt = '1' and ipr_invest-
ment_expropriation_exception = '0' 
[0, 1] 28 27 calculated 




Is there a general statement on IPRs 
implementation? 
Often this are very general statements on the 
implementation of IPRs. 
[0, 1] 105 101 coded 




Is there a general statement on border 
measures related to IPRs? 
Often this provisions can be found within the 
IPR chapter or articles on cross-border trade. 
[0, 1] 125 124 coded 





Sum of specific statement on IPRs 
enforcement 










[0, 7] 139 137 calculated 






Based on sum: binary calculation of 
specific IPR enforcement provisions 
0: ipr_specific_enforcement_sum = 0 
1: ipr_specific_enforcement_sum > 0 
[0, 1] 139 137 calculated 
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ID Category Variable Description Note Range Occurrence Mode 
724 698 






Are there special requirements related 
to border measures for the enforce-
ment of IPRs? 
- suspension of release of suspected counter-
feit or confusingly similar trademark goods, 
or pirated copyright goods 
- prima facie an infringement of the right 
holder's intellectual property right 
- requirement of information 
- authorities have authority to require security 
from right holder 
- authority inform the right holder in case of 
infringement about consignor, importer, con-
signee and quantity 
- authority can initiate border measures ex of-
ficio without formal complaint 
- suspended, counterfeit goods are destroyed, 
never exported/imported 
- reasonable fee for border measures 
e.g. EFTA treaties "Suspension of Release by 
Competent Authorities" / "Right of Inspec-
tion"  
- technical advise and cooperation on border 
measures 
[0, 1] 107 107 coded 
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ID Category Variable Description Note Range Occurrence Mode 
724 698 






Are there any civil and administrative 
procedures and remedies defined for 
the enforcement of IPRs? 
in civil judicial proceedings: judicial authori-
ties have authority  
   - to order the 
         infringer to pay the right holder (pre-es-
tablished or additional (repayment of profits) 
damages, court costs) 
         seizure of counterfeits/ documentary ev-
idence of infringement 
         destruction of infringed goods at right 
holders request 
         destruction of all goods related to the 
production of the counterfeit 
         infringer to provide information on ac-
complices 
   - to fine and imprison infringers, impose 
sanctions, award provisional measures and 
damages 
   - to enjoin a party to a civil judicial proceed-
ing from the exportation of goods that are al-
leged to infringe IPR 
[0, 1] 96 96 coded 




Are there any provisional measures 
defined for the enforcement of IPRs? 
- authorities shall act on requests for relief in-
audita altera parte expeditiously 
- judicial authorities have authority to require 
applicant to provide evidence to make sure 
applicant’s right is being infringed and to or-
der applicant to provide reasonable security 
- for grant of provisional measures each Party 
shall provide for a rebuttable presumption of 
valid patent 
[0, 1] 88 88 coded 
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ID Category Variable Description Note Range Occurrence Mode 
724 698 





Are there any criminal procedures 
and remedies defined for the enforce-
ment of IPRs? 
- criminal procedures and penalties for willful 
counterfeiting/piracy on a commercial scale 
(penalties include imprisonment, monetary 
fines)  
-  judicial authorities shall have authority to 
order seizure of suspected counterfeit or pi-
rated goods 
-  judicial authorities shall have authority to 
order the forfeiture of assets traceable to the 
infringing activity and shall order the forfei-
ture and destruction of all goods found to be 
counterfeit or pirated 
- authorities have the authority to initiate 
criminal legal action ex officio without the 
need for a formal complaint by a private party 
or right holder. 
- criminal procedures and penalties for the 
knowing transport, transfer, in the course of 
trade or the making or obtaining control of, 
with intent to so transport, transfer, or other-
wise dispose of, to another for anything of 
value, either false or counterfeit labels affixed 
or designed to be affixed to phonograms, copy 
of a computer program or documentation, 
packaging for a computer program, copy of a 
motion picture or other audiovisual work, 
counterfeit documentation or packaging for a 
computer program where the documentation 
or packaging has been made or obtained with-
out the authorisation of the right holder 
[0, 1] 91 91 coded 
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ID Category Variable Description Note Range Occurrence Mode 
724 698 




Is there a service provider liability 
defined for the enforcement of IPRs? 
Expeditious remedies to prevent infringe-
ments and criminal and civil remedies 
- legal incentives for service providers to co-
operate with copyright owners in deterring the 
unauthorised storage and transmission of cop-
yrighted material 
- limitations preclude monetary relief and 
should provide restrictions on court-ordered 
relief to compel or restrain e.g. transmitting 
and routing 
[0, 1] 29 29 coded 
37 IPR specific  
enforcement 
ipr_committee Is there an IPR Committee monitor-
ing implementation/enforcement/ad-
ministration of IPRs? 
If the Committee had only a consulting func-
tion it was coded as 0. 
[0, 1] 55 54 coded 




Is there a statement on transparency 
defined to ensure the enforcement of 
IPR protection? 
E.g. decisions on IPR (infringements) are pub-
licly available in at least the national language 
or in the English language. 
[0, 1] 56 55 coded 




Level of general and specific enforce-
ment 




[0, 11] 305 298 calculated 




Degree of general and specific en-
forcement 
0: no IPR in PTA 
1: general enforcement 
2: specific enforcement (can also include gen-
eral enforcement) 
[0, 2] 305 298 calculated 





Does the IPR definition/chapter men-
tion copyrights and/or related rights? 
This doesn't code provisions where copyright 
is only mentioned in a subparagraph as an ex-
ception (often introduced by "nothing in this 
chapter..."). 
[0, 1] 264 261 coded 




Does the IPR definition/chapter men-
tion trademarks? 
  [0, 1] 259 255 coded 




Does the IPR definition/chapter men-
tion geographical indications? 
  [0, 1] 255 251 coded 
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Does the IPR definition/chapter men-
tion industrial design? 
  [0, 1] 219 215 coded 
45 IPR scope  
mentioned 
ipr_m_patents Does the IPR definition/chapter men-
tion patents? 
  [0, 1] 248 241 coded 





Does the IPR definition/chapter men-
tion undisclosed information (includ-
ing knowhow)? 
Also called confidential information. [0, 1] 212 209 coded 





Does the IPR definition/chapter men-
tion layout-designs (topographies) of 
integrated circuits? 
Design of semiconductor product also referred 
to as topographies. 
integrated circuit: electronic circuit with ele-
ments integrated into a medium/semiconduc-
tor (such as silicon) 
Example: silicon chips for electronic equip-
ment (e.g. SIM cards) 
[0, 1] 205 199 coded 




Does the IPR definition/chapter men-
tion new plant varieties? 
Also called plant breeders' rights. [0, 1] 112 110 coded 





Does the IPR definition/chapter men-
tion traditional knowledge and/or ge-
netic resources? 
This can also in a different chapter (e.g. envi-
ronment), yet usually is regulated directly in 
the IPR chapter. 
[0, 1] 43 43 coded 







Does the IPR definition/chapter men-
tion encrypted program-carrying sat-
ellite signals? 
This is not the same as broadcasting via satel-
lites (which is often mentioned in connection 
to copyrights). 
[0, 1] 34 34 coded 




Does the IPR definition/chapter men-
tion domain names? 
  [0, 1] 19 19 coded 





Does the IPR definition/chapter in-
clude tangible commitments on copy-
rights and/or related rights? 
 
 
  [0, 1] 84 84 coded 
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Does the IPR definition/chapter in-
clude tangible commitments on trade-
marks? 
  [0, 1] 92 91 coded 




Does the IPR definition/chapter in-
clude tangible commitments on geo-
graphical indications? 
  [0, 1] 106 105 coded 




Does the IPR definition/chapter in-
clude tangible commitments on in-
dustrial design? 
  [0, 1] 63 62 coded 
56 IPR scope  
tangible 
ipr_t_patents Does the IPR definition/chapter in-
clude tangible commitments on pa-
tents? 
  [0, 1] 84 80 coded 





Does the IPR definition/chapter in-
clude tangible commitments on un-
disclosed information (including 
knowhow)? 
  [0, 1] 48 48 coded 





Does the IPR definition/chapter in-
clude tangible commitments on lay-
out-designs (topographies) of inte-
grated circuits? 
  [0, 1] 11 8 coded 




Does the IPR definition/chapter in-
clude tangible commitments on new 
plant varieties? 
  [0, 1] 16 15 coded 





Does the IPR definition/chapter in-
clude tangible commitments on tradi-
tional knowledge and/or genetic re-
sources? 
  [0, 1] 27 27 coded 







Does the IPR definition/chapter in-
clude tangible commitments on en-
crypted program-carrying satellite 
signals? 
  [0, 1] 28 28 coded 
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Does the IPR definition/chapter in-
clude tangible commitments on do-
main names? 
  [0, 1] 17 17 coded 




Sum of all mentioned IPRs Sum(ipr_m_copyrights_re-
lated_rights:ipr_m_domain_names) 
[0, 11] 297 291 calculated 




Recoded variable ipr_scope_ 
mentioned into binary variable 
0: ipr_scope_mentioned = 0 
1: ipr_scope_mentioned > 0 
[0, 1] 297 291 calculated 




Does it mention the same IPRs as 
TRIPS? 
TRIPS mentiones ipr_m_copyrights_related_ 
rights-ipr_m_new_plant_varieties, so if all of 
those IPR areas are at least included in defini-
tion than coded as 1 
[0, 1] 295 289 calculated 





Are there any additional IPRs men-
tioned?  
0: sum(ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_ 
resources-ipr_m_domain_names) = 0 
1: sum(ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_ 
resources-ipr_m_domain_names) > 0 
[0, 1] 76 76 calculated 




Sum of all tangible IPRs Sum(ipr_t_copyrights_re-
lated_rights:ipr_t_domain_names) 
[0, 11] 150 146 calculated 






sum into binary variable 
0: ipr_scope_tangible = 0 
1: ipr_scope_tangible > 0 
[0, 1] 150 146 calculated 




Same scope of tangible IPRs as 
TRIPS (coded as 1) 
TRIPS includes tangible IPRs on ipr_t_ 
copyrights_related_rights-ipr_t_layout_ 
design_integ_circuits. TRIPS includes noth-
ing tangible on plant varieties. 
[0, 1] 150 146 calculated 





Are there any additional tangible IPR 





[0, 1] 63 62 calculated 
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Degree of tangible IPR coverage 0: no tangible IPRs 
1: only tangible IPR provisions on areas 
which are also covered by TRIPS 
2: also tangible IPR provisions on areas not 
regulated by TRIPS 
[0, 2] 150 146 calculated 
72 Multilateral  
coherence 
ipr_trips_1994 How does the treaty include the 
TRIPS agreement? 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights. The TRIPS Agreement is Annex 1C 
of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization (1994) 
The level of regulation is coded categori-
cally for all variables of the multilateral co-
herence category: 
0: not included 
1: reference 
2: reaffirmation of certain parts (Articles, 
Paragraphs) 
3: recommendation, e.g. make every possi-
ble effort (non-binding, non-commitment, 
intention) "will favourably consider acced-
ing to", "express their attachment to ob-
serving the obligations flowing from the 
following multilateral conventions", "shall 
apply to accede" 
4: accession, e.g. shall accede/ratify, e.g. 
"shall undertake to obtain their adher-
ence" 
5: reaffirmation & compliance, are already 
part of IPR treaty (e.g. 260_Croatia Mol-
dova_2004: "The Contracting Parties con-
firm the importance they attach to the obli-
gations arising from the following multilat-
eral conventions") 
NA: PTA was signed before IPR treaty. 
[0, 5] 224 220 coded 
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73 Multilateral  
coherence 
ipr_doha_2001 How does the treaty include the Dec-
laration on the TRIPS agreement and 
public health? 
Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and pub-
lic health (Adopted on 14 November 2001) 
[0, 5] 55 55 coded 
74 Multilateral  
coherence 
ipr_wipo_1967 How does the treaty include the 
WIPO Convention? 
Convention Establishing the World Intellec-
tual Property Organisation (WIPO Conven-
tion, 1967,as amended 1979) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 160 160 coded 
75 Multilateral  
coherence 
ipr_rome_1961 How does the treaty include the 
Rome Convention? 
International Convention for the Protection of 
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organizations (1961) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 152 151 coded 
76 Multilateral  
coherence 
ipr_paris_1883 How does the treaty include the Paris 
Convention? 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Indus-
trial Property (as amended on September 28, 
1979) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 206 204 coded 
77 Multilateral  
coherence 
ipr_bern_1886 How does the treaty include the Bern 
Convention? 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Liter-
ary and Artistic Works (as amended on Sep-
tember 28, 1979) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 203 202 coded 




How does the treaty include the 
WCT? 
WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) (1996) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 104 103 coded 




How does the treaty include the 
WPPT? 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
(WPPT) (1996) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 103 102 coded 
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How does the treaty include the Con-
vention for the Protection of Produc-
ers of Phonograms Against Unauthor-
ized Duplication of Their Phono-
grams? 
Convention for the Protection of Producers of 
Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplica-
tion of Their Phonograms (1971), Geneva 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 69 69 coded 






How does the treaty include the Bei-
jing Treaty? 
Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances 
(2012) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 10 10 coded 





How does the treaty include the Sin-
gapore Treaty? 
Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks 
(2006) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 18 17 coded 





How does the treaty include the TLT? Trademark Law Treaty (TLT) (1994) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 45 44 coded 





How does the treaty include the PLT? Patent Law Treaty (2000) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 34 33 coded 






How does the treaty include the Brus-
sels Convention? 
Brussels Convention Relating to the Distribu-
tion of Programme-Carrying Signals Trans-
mitted by Satellite (1974) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 33 33 coded 






How does the treaty include the Nai-
robi Treaty? 
Nairobi Treaty on the Protection of the Olym-
pic Symbol (1981) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 5 5 coded 




How does the treaty include the Bu-
dapest Treaty? 
Budapest Treaty on the International Recogni-
tion of the Deposit of Micro-organisms for the 
Purposes of Patent Procedure (as amended on 
September 26, 1980) 
[0, 5] 114 113 coded 
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Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 






How does the treaty include the 
Hague Agreement? 
Hague Agreement Concerning the Interna-
tional Registration of Industrial Designs 
(1925) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 56 55 coded 





How does the treaty include the Lis-
bon Agreement? 
Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Ap-
pellations of Origin and their International 
Registration (as amended on September 28, 
1979) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 5 5 coded 




How does the treaty include the Ma-
drid Agreement? 
Madrid Agreement Concerning the Interna-
tional Registration of Marks (as amended on 
September 28, 1979) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 47 47 coded 





How does the treaty include the Pro-
tocol of the Madrid Agreement? 
Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement 
Concerning the International Registration of 
Marks (as amended on November 12, 2007) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 109 108 coded 






How does the treaty include the PCT? Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) (1970) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 148 147 coded 




How does the treaty include the Nice 
Agreement? 
Nice Agreement Concerning the International 
Classification of Goods and Services for the 
Purposes of the Registration of Marks (as 
amended on September 28, 1979) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 121 121 coded 
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How does the treaty include the 
Strasbourg Agreement? 
Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the Inter-
national Patent Classification (as amended on 
September 28, 1979) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 29 29 coded 






How does the treaty include the Vi-
enna Agreement? 
Vienna Agreement Establishing an Interna-
tional Classification of the Figurative Ele-
ments of Marks (as amended on October 1, 
1985) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 8 8 coded 







How does the treaty include the Lo-
carno Agreement? 
Locarno Agreement Establishing an Interna-
tional Classification for Industrial Designs (as 
amended on September 28, 1979) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 18 18 coded 






How does the treaty include the EPC? European Patent Convention (1973) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 33 33 coded 





How does the treaty include the 
UPOV? 
International Convention for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) (1961) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 127 126 coded 
99 Multilateral  
coherence 
ipr_upov_1968 Does this treaty refer to the 1968 ver-
sion of UPOV? 
This is a more detailed coding of ipr_new_ 
varieties_plants_upov_1961. In some cases 
there is a specific version of UPOV men-
tioned. This can have ramifications on the 
protection of plant varieties. 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 5 5 coded 
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100 Multilateral  
coherence 
ipr_upov_1972 Does this treaty refer to the 1972 ver-
sion of UPOV? 
This is a more detailed coding of ipr_new_ 
varieties_plants_upov_1961. In some cases 
there is a specific version of UPOV men-
tioned. This can have ramifications on the 
protection of plant varieties. 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 8 8 coded 
101 Multilateral  
coherence 
ipr_upov_1978 Does this treaty refer to the 1978 ver-
sion of UPOV? 
This is a more detailed coding of ipr_new_ 
varieties_plants_upov_1961. In some cases 
there is a specific version of UPOV men-
tioned. This can have ramifications on the 
protection of plant varieties. 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 32 32 coded 
102 Multilateral  
coherence 
ipr_upov_1991 Does this treaty refer to the 1991 ver-
sion of UPOV? 
This is a more detailed coding of ipr_new_ 
varieties_plants_upov_1961. In some cases 
there is a specific version of UPOV men-
tioned. This can have ramifications on the 
protection of plant varieties. 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 62 62 coded 






How does the treaty include the 
IPPC? 
International Plant Protection Convention 
(1951).  
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 102 102 coded 




How does the treaty include the 
CBD? 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
(1992) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 80 80 coded 
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How does the treaty include the UCC 
(Geneva, 1952)? 
Universal Copyright Convention of 6 Septem-
ber 1952, with Appendix Declaration relating 
to Article XVII and Resolution concerning 
Article XI, Geneva 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 43 43 coded 






How does the treaty include the UCC 
(Paris, 1971)? 
Universal Copyright Convention as revised on 
24 July 1971, with Appendix Declaration re-
lating to Article XVII and Resolution con-
cerning Article XI, Paris 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 24 24 coded 






How does the treaty include the 
UDRP? 
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Policy (1999) 
Note: if PTA signed before IPR treaty then set 
to NA. 
[0, 5] 17 17 coded 




Is there a deadline to accede/imple-
ment to those treaties? 
Indicates transitional flexibility, weaker com-
mitment 
Code the number of years. 
[0, 13] 97 96 coded 
109 Multilateral  
coherence 
ipr_both_parties Does the treaty mention (generally) 
binding multilateral agreements to 
which both are party? 
i.e. "The Parties reaffirm their existing rights 
and obligations with respect to multilateral in-
tellectual property agreements to which both 
are party." 
[0, 1] 86 86 coded 




Does the treaty include the TRIPS 
agreement? 
0: ipr_trips_1994 = 0 
1: ipr_trips_1994 > 0 
[0, 1] 224 220 calculated 




Does the treaty include the Declara-
tion on the TRIPS agreement and 
public health? 
0: ipr_doha_2001 = 0 
1: ipr_doha_2001 > 0 
[0, 1] 55 55 calculated 




Does the treaty include the WIPO 
Convention? 
0: ipr_wipo_1967 = 0 
1: ipr_wipo_1967 > 0 
[0, 1] 160 160 calculated 




Does the treaty include the Rome 
Convention? 
0: ipr_rome_1961 = 0 
1: ipr_rome_1961 > 0 
[0, 1] 152 151 calculated 
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Does the treaty include the Paris Con-
vention? 
0: ipr_paris_1883 = 0 
1: ipr_paris_1883 > 0 
[0, 1] 206 204 calculated 




Does the treaty include the Bern Con-
vention? 
0: ipr_bern_1886 = 0 
1: ipr_bern_1886 > 0 
[0, 1] 203 202 calculated 





Does the treaty include the WCT? 0: ipr_wipo_copyright_1996 = 0 
1: ipr_wipo_copyright_1996 > 0 
[0, 1] 104 103 calculated 




Does the treaty include the WPPT? 0: ipr_wipo_phono_1996 = 0 
1: ipr_wipo_phono_1996 > 0 
[0, 1] 103 102 calculated 






Does the treaty include the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Producers of 
Phonograms Against Unauthorized 
Duplication of Their Phonograms? 
0: ipr_phonograms_geneva_1971 = 0 
1: ipr_phonograms_geneva_1971 > 0 
[0, 1] 69 69 calculated 







Does the treaty include the Beijing 
Treaty? 
0: ipr_audiovisual_performances_beijing_ 
2012 = 0 
1: ipr_audiovisual_performances_beijing_ 
2012 > 0 
[0, 1] 10 10 calculated 






Does the treaty include the Singapore 
Treaty? 
0: ipr_trademarks_singapore_2006 = 0 
1: ipr_trademarks_singapore_2006 > 0 
[0, 1] 18 17 calculated 







Does the treaty include the TLT? 0: ipr_trademark_law_treaty_geneva_1994 = 
0 
1: ipr_trademark_law_treaty_geneva_1994 > 
0 
[0, 1] 45 44 calculated 






Does the treaty include the PLT? 0: ipr_patent_law_treaty_2000 = 0 
1: ipr_patent_law_treaty_2000 > 0 
[0, 1] 34 33 calculated 
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Does the treaty include the Brussels 
Convention? 
0: ipr_prog_carr_signals_trans_satellite_ 
brussels_1974 = 0 
1: ipr_prog_carr_signals_trans_satellite_ 
brussels_1974 > 0 
[0, 1] 33 33 calculated 







Does the treaty include the Nairobi 
Treaty? 
0: ipr_olympic_symbol_nairobi_1981 = 0 
1: ipr_olympic_symbol_nairobi_1981 > 0 
[0, 1] 5 5 calculated 






Does the treaty include the Budapest 
Treaty? 
0: ipr_patents_budapest_1977 = 0 
1: ipr_patents_budapest_1977 > 0 
[0, 1] 114 113 calculated 






Does the treaty include the Hague 
Agreement? 
0: ipr_industrial_design_hague_1925 = 0 
1: ipr_industrial_design_hague_1925 > 0 
[0, 1] 56 55 calculated 






Does the treaty include the Lisbon 
Agreement? 
0: ipr_appellation_origin_lisbon_1958 = 0 
1: ipr_appellation_origin_lisbon_1958 > 0 
[0, 1] 5 5 calculated 





Does the treaty include the Madrid 
Agreement? 
0: ipr_marks_madrid_1891 = 0 
1: ipr_marks_madrid_1891 > 0 
[0, 1] 47 47 calculated 






Does the treaty include the Protocol 
of the Madrid Agreement? 
0: ipr_protocol_marks_madrid_1989 = 0 
1: ipr_protocol_marks_madrid_1989 > 0 
[0, 1] 109 108 calculated 






Does the treaty include the PCT? 0: ipr_patent_cooperation_treaty_1970 = 0 
1: ipr_patent_cooperation_treaty_1970 > 0 
[0, 1] 148 147 calculated 
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Does the treaty include the Nice 
Agreement? 
0: ipr_marks_nice_1957 = 0 
1: ipr_marks_nice_1957 > 0 
[0, 1] 121 121 calculated 












[0, 1] 29 29 calculated 







Does the treaty include the Vienna 
Agreement? 
0: ipr_figurative_elements_marks_vienna_ 
1973 = 0 
1: ipr_figurative_elements_marks_vienna_ 
1973 > 0 
[0, 1] 8 8 calculated 








Does the treaty include the Locarno 
Agreement? 
0: ipr_classifiaction_industrial_designs_ 
locarno_1968 = 0 
1: ipr_classifiaction_industrial_designs_ 
locarno_1968 > 0 
[0, 1] 18 18 calculated 







Does the treaty include the EPC? 0: ipr_european_patent_connvention_1973 = 
0 
1: ipr_european_patent_connvention_1973 > 
0 
[0, 1] 33 33 calculated 





Does the treaty include the UPOV? 0: ipr_new_varieties_plants_upov_1961 = 0 
1: ipr_new_varieties_plants_upov_1961 > 0 
[0, 1] 127 126 calculated 




Does this treaty refer to the 1968 ver-
sion of UPOV? 
0: ipr_upov_1968 = 0 
1: ipr_upov_1968 > 0 
[0, 1] 5 5 calculated 




Does this treaty refer to the 1972 ver-
sion of UPOV? 
0: ipr_upov_1972 = 0 
1: ipr_upov_1972 > 0 
[0, 1] 8 8 calculated 




Does this treaty refer to the 1978 ver-
sion of UPOV? 
0: ipr_upov_1978 = 0 
1: ipr_upov_1978 > 0 
[0, 1] 32 32 calculated 
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Does this treaty refer to the 1991 ver-
sion of UPOV? 
0: ipr_upov_1991 = 0 
1: ipr_upov_1991 > 0 
[0, 1] 62 62 calculated 







Does the treaty include the IPPC? 0: ipr_international_plant_protection_ 
convention_1951 = 0 
1: ipr_international_plant_protection_ 
convention_1951 > 0 
[0, 1] 102 102 calculated 





Does the treaty include the CBD? 0: ipr_cbd_biodiversity_1992 = 0 
1: ipr_cbd_biodiversity_1992 > 0 
[0, 1] 80 80 calculated 








Does the treaty include the UCC (Ge-
neva, 1952)? 
0: ipr_universal_copyright_convention_ 
geneva_1952 = 0 
1: ipr_universal_copyright_convention_ 
geneva_1952 > 0 
[0, 1] 43 43 calculated 







Does the treaty include the UCC 
(Paris, 1971)? 
0: ipr_universal_copyright_convention_paris_ 
1971 = 0 
1: ipr_universal_copyright_convention_paris_ 
1971 > 0 
[0, 1] 24 24 calculated 











[0, 1] 17 17 calculated 





Is there any reference to WIPO trea-
ties regulating IPR?  
TRIPS and WIPO establishing agreement are 
excluded: coded as '1' if any of the WIPO 
governed treaties are coded: 
0: sum(ipr_rome_1961 : ipr_classifiaction_in-
dustrial_designs_locarno_1968) = 0 
1: sum(ipr_rome_1961 : ipr_classifiaction_in-
dustrial_designs_locarno_1968) > 0 
[0, 1] 215 213 calculated 
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Level of WIPO and WTO embed-
dedness 
NT/MFN treatment, TRIPS, WIPO reaffirma-




[0, 4] 287 282 calculated 





Number of NAs within level of 
WIPO and WTO embeddedness  
This concerns TRIPS and WIPO reaffirmation 
which can be 'NA' if the PTA entered into 
force before TRIPS/WIPO/WIPO treaties 
[0, 2] 251 244 calculated 





Level of WIPO and WTO embed-
dedness, corrected by NAs 
NT/MFN treatment, TRIPS, WIPO reaffirma-
tion, 1 or more WIPO treaties reaffirmed: 
ipr_mfn_nt_dummy+ipr_trips_1994_dummy+
ipr_wipo_1967_dummy+ipr_wipo_treaty_ref-
erence_dummy with 'NA' removed from co-
herence measure 
[0, 4] 287 282 calculated 





Level of treaty embeddedness Number of IPR related treaties reaffirmed, ex-
cluding TRIPS, Doha, WIPO Organization 








[0, 22] 238 236 calculated 





Level of treaty embeddedness, cate-
gorized 
0: no multilateral coherence 
1:   1-8 
2: more than 8 
[0, 2] 238 236 calculated 






Sum of all coded IPR multilateral 
provisions 
Excluded are the four sub-variables for the 
referenced year of UPOV. 
[0, 112] 311 306 calculated 
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Based on sum: binary calculation of 
general IPR provisions 
0: ipr_general_ipr_dummy = 0 
1: ipr_general_ipr_dummy > 0 
[0, 1] 311 306 calculated 






Sum of all coded IPR multilateral 
provisions, count variable. 
Accounts to the reference of any of the coded 
agreements regardless of their bindingness. 
Excluded are the four sub-variables for the 
referenced year of UPOV. 
[0, 24] 311 306 calculated 






Based on sum: binary calculation of 
general IPR provisions 
0: ipr_general_ipr_dummy = 0 
1: ipr_general_ipr_dummy > 0 
[0, 1] 311 306 calculated 
N Notes ipr_pta_com-
ment 
Is there anything special about this 
PTA/ a certain IPR variable within 
this PTA? 
        notes 
N Notes ipr_arti-
cle_m_annex 
If the annex is missing in the treaty: 
Which article of the treaty mentions 
the missing annex? 
        notes 
N Notes ipr_an-
nex_name 
If the annex is missing in the treaty: 
What is the name of this missing an-
nex? 
        notes 
N Notes ipr_directives Does the PTA refer to directives al-
tering the coding? 
These was foremost the case for EU treaties. 
Coded, where they specifically referred to an 
IPR context. 
      notes 
T+PTA Index TRIPS-plus ipr_trip-
splus_per_pta 
Sum of TRIPS+ IPR provisions per 
PTA 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 42] 137 136 calculated 




Sum of TRIPS+ IPR provisions on 
copyright 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 3] 59 59 calculated 
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T+PTA Index TRIPS-plus ipr_trip-
splus_trade-
marks 
Sum of TRIPS+ IPR provisions on 
trademarks 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 5] 71 70 calculated 
T+PTA Index TRIPS-plus ipr_trip-
splus_geo_indi-
cations 
Sum of TRIPS+ IPR provisions on 
geographical indications 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 7] 91 90 calculated 
T+PTA Index TRIPS-plus ipr_trip-
splus_indus-
trial_design 
Sum of TRIPS+ IPR provisions on 
industrial design 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 1] 52 51 calculated 
T+PTA Index TRIPS-plus ipr_trip-
splus_patents 
Sum of TRIPS+ IPR provisions on 
patents 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 6] 53 52 calculated 




Sum of TRIPS+ IPR provisions on 
undisclosed information 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 6] 46 46 calculated 
T+PTA Index TRIPS-plus ipr_trip-
splus_lay-
out_design 
Sum of TRIPS+ IPR provisions on 
layout designs 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 1] 3 3 calculated 
T+PTA Index TRIPS-plus ipr_trip-
splus_new_plan
t_varieties 
Sum of TRIPS+ IPR provisions on 
new plant varieties 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 2] 91 90 calculated 




Sum of TRIPS+ IPR provisions on 
traditional knowledge and genetic re-
sources 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
 
[0, 7] 24 24 calculated 






Sum of TRIPS+ IPR provisions on 
encrypted program-carrying satellite 
signals 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 1] 29 29 calculated 
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T+PTA Index TRIPS-plus ipr_trip-
splus_do-
main_names 
Sum of TRIPS+ IPR provisions on 
domain names 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 1] 17 17 calculated 
T+PTA Index TRIPS-plus ipr_trip-
splus_enforce-
ment 
Sum of TRIPS+ IPR provisions on 
enforcement 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 21] 92 92 calculated 
T+PTA Index TRIPS-plus ipr_trip-
splus_exhaus-
tion 
Sum of TRIPS+ IPR provisions on 
exhaustion 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 6] 6 6 calculated 
T+PTA Index TRIPS-plus ipr_trip-
splus_per_pta_d
ummy 
Based on sum: binary calculation of 
TRIPS+ IPR provisions per PTA 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 1] 137 136 calculated 





Based on sum: binary calculation of 
TRIPS+ IPR provisions on copyright 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 1] 59 59 calculated 
T+PTA Index TRIPS-plus ipr_trip-
splus_trade-
marks_dummy 
Based on sum: binary calculation of 
TRIPS+ IPR provisions on trade-
marks 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 1] 71 70 calculated 
T+PTA Index TRIPS-plus ipr_trip-
splus_geo_indi-
cations_dummy 
Based on sum: binary calculation of 
TRIPS+ IPR provisions on geograph-
ical indications 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 1] 91 90 calculated 




Based on sum: binary calculation of 
TRIPS+ IPR provisions on industrial 
design 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 1] 52 51 calculated 
T+PTA Index TRIPS-plus ipr_trip-
splus_pa-
tents_dummy 
Based on sum: binary calculation of 
TRIPS+ IPR provisions on patents 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 1] 53 52 calculated 
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Based on sum: binary calculation of 
TRIPS+ IPR provisions on undis-
closed information 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 1] 46 46 calculated 




Based on sum: binary calculation of 
TRIPS+ IPR provisions on layout de-
signs 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 1] 3 3 calculated 




Based on sum: binary calculation of 
TRIPS+ IPR provisions on new plant 
varieties 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 1] 91 90 calculated 





Based on sum: binary calculation of 
TRIPS+ IPR provisions on traditional 
knowledge and genetic resources 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 1] 24 24 calculated 







Based on sum: binary calculation of 
TRIPS+ IPR provisions on encrypted 
program-carrying satellite signals 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 1] 29 29 calculated 




Based on sum: binary calculation of 
TRIPS+ IPR provisions on domain 
names 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 1] 17 17 calculated 
T+PTA Index TRIPS-plus ipr_trip-
splus_enforce-
ment_dummy 
Based on sum: binary calculation of 
TRIPS+ IPR provisions on enforce-
ment 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 1] 92 92 calculated 
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T+PTA Index TRIPS-plus ipr_trip-
splus_exhaus-
tion_dummy 
Based on sum: binary calculation of 
TRIPS+ IPR provisions on exhaus-
tion 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 1] 6 6 calculated 
T+PTA Index TRIPS-plus ipr_trip-
splus_subin-
dex_patent 
Subindex for all TRIPS-plus varia-
bles on patents, double weighed by 
number of variables and importance 
to index overall 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 1] 53 52 calculated 
T+PTA Index TRIPS-plus ipr_trip-
splus_subin-
dex_copyright 
Subindex for all TRIPS-plus varia-
bles on copyrights, double weighed 
by number of variables and im-
portance to index overall 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 1] 60 60 calculated 
T+PTA Index TRIPS-plus ipr_trip-
splus_subin-
dex_trademark 
Subindex for all TRIPS-plus varia-
bles on trademarks, double weighed 
by number of variables and im-
portance to index overall 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 1] 71 70 calculated 




Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus provi-
sions on patent, including enforce-
ment and exhaustion provisions for 
patents 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 10] 75 74 calculated 





Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus provi-
sions on copyright, including enforce-
ment and exhaustion provisions for 
copyrights 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 11] 88 88 calculated 





Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus provi-
sions on trademarks, including en-
forcement and exhaustion provisions 
for trademarks 
This variable is based on the T+PTA dataset 
developed in collaboration with Jean-Frédéric 
Morin (available on DESTA homepage) 
[0, 12] 96 95 calculated 
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1 Copyright copyright_ 
term_protec-
tion_70 
Duration 70 years: This variable 
codes the duration of protection 
of literary work in years of copy-
right beyond the death of the au-
thor(s). 
Code if number of years of protection “after 
life” is 70 
Note: code the "general rule": which ever ap-
plies to most categories of copyright. 
[0, 1] 32 32 Coded Gold (domestic 
TRIPS+): cd70 
2 Copyright copyright_ 
term_protec-
tion_90 
Duration 90 years: This variable 
codes the duration of protection 
of literary work in years of copy-
right beyond the death of the au-
thor(s). 
Code if number of years of protection “after 
life” is 90 
Note: code the "general rule": which ever ap-
plies to most categories of copyright. 
[0, 1] 0 0 Coded Gold (domestic 
TRIPS+): cd90 
3 Copyright copyright_ 
scope_vide-
ograms 
Scope includes videograms: This 
variable codes if the scope for 
copyright protection includes 
videograms. 
Code if videograms are covered in the copyright 
section of the PTA. 
Note: TRIPS only refers to cinematographic 
works. 
[0, 1] 7 7 Coded Surbeck 




Private use exceptions: This var-
iable codes the extent of to which 
a private use exception exists in 
copyright. 
Code if exceptions include at least a specified 
set of scenarios for users. 
Note: If the private use exception is only related 
to anti-circumventive measures then it is not 
coded. 
[0, 1] 4 4 Coded Gold (domestic 
TRIPS+): cpue 
5 Copyright copyright_ 
scope_berne
_6bis 
Article 6bis of the Berne Con-
vention is included in the copy-
right section. 
Code if the text of the Berne Convention Article 
6bis is copied or highly similarly included in the 
copyright IPR section of the PTA. 
Note: TRIPS notes that Article 6bis is excluded. 
[0, 1] 13 13 Coded Surbeck 








ogy protection measures: This 
variable codes whether actions to 
circumvent TPMs (region lock, 
DRM, etc.) can be considered as 
copyright infringement. 
Code if it covers at least circumvention for 
commercial use. 
Note: in Spanish PTAs search for "elusión (de 
medidas tecnológiacs de protección)" or "me-
didas de protección de tecnología 
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7 Trademark trademark_ 
scope_3d_m
arks 
Scope of protection: 3-D marks 
This variable codes the type of 
marks that may be registered un-
der trademark legislation. 
Code if 3-D marks (including fashion) are cov-
ered 
Note: in Spanish PTAs search for "tridimen-
sional" 
[0, 1] 2 2 Coded Gold (domestic 
TRIPS+): tmsp1 
8 Trademark trademark_ 
scope_sound
s 
Scope of protection: Sounds 
This variable codes the type of 
marks that may be registered un-
der trademark legislation. 
Code if sounds are covered.  [0, 1] 37 37 Coded Gold (domestic 
TRIPS+): tmsp2 
9 Trademark trademark_ 
scope_holo-
grams 
Scope of protection: Holograms 
This variable codes the type of 
marks that may be registered un-
der trademark legislation. 
Code if holograms are covered [0, 1] 0 0 Coded Gold (domestic 
TRIPS+): tmsp3 
10 Trademark trademark_ 
scope_scents
_smells 
Scope of protection: 
Scents/smells 
This variable codes the type of 
marks that may be registered un-
der trademark legislation. 
Code if scents/smells are covered.  [0, 1] 21 21 Coded Gold (domestic 
TRIPS+): tmsp4 
11 Trademark trademark_ 
scope_move
ments 
Scope of protection: Movements 
This variable codes the type of 
marks that may be registered un-
der trademark legislation. 
Code if movements are covered.  [0, 1] 0 0 Coded Gold (domestic 
TRIPS+): tmsp5 
12 Trademark trademark_ 
scope_spe-
cific_colour 
Scope of protection: Colours 
This variable codes the type of 
marks that may be registered un-
der trademark legislation. 
Code if (specific) colours are covered 
Note: For the colour indicator, arrangements of 
colour does not count, we are looking for the 
ability to trademark a specific colour. 
[0, 1] 12 12 Coded Gold (domestic 
TRIPS+): tmsp6 
13 Trademark trademark_ 
term 
Term of initial trademark pro-
tection 
Code if term of initial registration and each re-
newal of registration is more than 7 years (not 
non-use). 
Note: Clarification of TRIPS Art. 18 
[0, 1] 34 33 Coded Surbeck 
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Duration of protection without 
use: more than 3 years 
This variable codes for the num-
ber of years a trademark holder 
can refrain from using the mark 
without that mark being subject to 
expungement (losing protection 
for trademark). 
Code if the duration of protection without use 
for trademarks is more than 3 years. (TRIPS Ar-
ticle 19.1 grants 3 years). 










Electronic registration system 
for trademarks 
Countries shall provide for an electronic regis-
tration system for trademarks 









Scope of protection: Agricultural 
products 
This variable codes the extent of 
protection available to products 
other than wine/spirits in the 
form of geographical indications. 
Code if agricultural products are covered. 
Code if geographical indications are granted for 
"any good"/"all products". 
Note 1: A GI indicator is not satisfied by 
laws/administrative bodies meant for Trade-
marks -> excludes GI norms contained in 
Trademarks' sections. 
Note 2: Wine and Spirits are already protected 
under TRIPS. 
[0, 1] 66 65 Coded Gold (domestic 
TRIPS+): gisp1 
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Scope of protection: Non-agri-
cultural products 
This variable codes the extent of 
protection available to products 
other than wine/spirits in the 
form of geographical indications. 
Code if non-agricultural products (foodstuff) 
are covered. 
Code if geographical indications are granted for 
"any good"/"all products". 
Note 1: A GI indicator is not satisfied by 
laws/administrative bodies meant for Trade-
marks -> excludes GI norms contained in 
Trademarks' sections. 
Wine and Spirits are already protected under 
TRIPS. 
Note 2: Foodstuff is not agricultural (processed 
goods) 










Protection against genericity: This 
variable codes whether a regis-
tered geographical indication 
can become a generic term for a 
product/service that others can 
use. 
Code if registered names cannot become ge-
neric. 
Note: A GI indicator is not satisfied by laws/ad-
ministrative bodies meant for Trademarks -> 
excludes GI norms contained in Trademarks' 
sections. 
[0, 1] 13 12 Coded Gold (domestic 
TRIPS+): gipag 
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Extent of protection: Delocalizers 
This variable codes whether it is 
possible to circumvent GI protec-
tion by the use of delocalizers 
(product accompanied by expres-
sions such as “imitation of”, 
“style”, “type”, “kind”, etc.) or by 
translation. 
This variable codes the extent of 
protection available to products 
other than wine/spirits in the form 
of geographical indications. 
Note: make sure that the PTA 
does not only cover wine and 
spirit related GIs and that the 
deloclizers are not only prohibited 
for wine and spirits (if so it is not 
TRIPS+ and should not be 
coded). 
Code if delocalizers are prohibited without GI 
holder consent. 
Note: A GI indicator is not satisfied by laws/ad-
ministrative bodies meant for Trademarks -> 
excludes GI norms contained in Trademarks' 
sections. 
[0, 1] 18 17 Coded Gold (domestic 
TRIPS+): giep1 
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Extent of protection: Transla-
tions 
This variable codes whether it is 
possible to circumvent GI protec-
tion by the use of delocalizers 
(product accompanied by expres-
sions such as “imitation of”, 
“style”, “type”, “kind”, etc.) or by 
translation. 
This variable codes the extent of 
protection available to products 
other than wine/spirits in the form 
of geographical indications. 
Note: make sure that the PTA 
does not only cover wine and 
spirit related GIs and that the de-
localizers are not only prohibited 
for wine and spirits (if so it is not 
TRIPS+ and should not be 
coded). 
Code if translation are prohibited without GI 
holder consent. 
Note: A GI indicator is not satisfied by laws/ad-
ministrative bodies meant for Trade-marks -> 
excludes GI norms contained in Trademarks' 
sections. 










Extent of protection: Homony-
mous geographical indications 
This variable codes whether it is 
possible to circumvent GI protec-
tion by the use of homonymous 
goods 
This variable codes the extent of 
protection available to products 
other than wine/spirits in the form 
of geographical indications. 
 
Homonymous means an ambiguous GI with 
multiple meaning which are defined by context. 
I.e. same name (spelled/pronounced) can stand 
for products from different places/countries 
Note 1: excludes GI norms contained in Trade-
marks' sections. 
Note 2: TRIPS grants protection to homony-
mous GIs, yet only for wines. 
[0, 1] 24 23 Coded Cottier et al. 
2016 
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Commercial use of country 
names is protected 
Note: excludes GI norms contained in Trade-
marks' sections. 








Codes specific GI lists Note: this can range from a couple of protected 
names such as Pisco to page-long listings of 
protected GIs. 






Term of industrial design protec-
tion 
Code if term of protection is more than 10 
years. Can be accumulated number of years. 
Note: This is a clarification of TRIPS Art. 26.3. 




Scope of coverage: Plants 
This variable codes the nature of 
the inventions that can be patenta-
ble. 
Code if plants are patentable. 
Sui generis system is not the same (other form 
of protection than patents). 
Note 1: only code if namely mentioned as pa-
tentable ("any invention", "any application", 
"any fields of technology" does not suffice). 
Note 2: excludes implicit patentability, e.g. if 
Parties are given the possibility to exclude 
plants from patentability. 
Note 3: Term "plant protection products" does 
not cover plants for patent protection as it refers 
to pesticides. 





Scope of coverage: Animals 
This variable codes the nature of 
the inventions that can be patenta-
ble. 
Code if animals are patentable. 
Note 1: only code if namely mentioned as pa-
tentable ("any invention", "any application", 
"any fields of technology" does not suffice). 
Note 2: excludes implicit patentability, e.g. if 
Parties are given the possibility to exclude 
plants from patentability. 
[0, 1] 7 7 Coded Gold (domestic 
TRIPS+): psc5 
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Transitional extension for de-
veloping countries. 
TRIPS Article 65.2 grants a tran-
sitional period for DCs. 
Code if there are transitional extensions for de-
veloping countries. 
Note 1: includes references to transitional ex-
tension for intellectual property rights in general 
as it includes patents.  
Note 2: already coded for all countries in 
DESTA dataset. 








lection/second Use): Second-use 
patents 
This variable codes for the availa-
bility of selection patents (i.e. a 
patent claiming a subclass of a 
previously patent genus for a par-
ticular feature not included in the 
initial patent) or second-use pa-
tents (i.e. a patent claiming a new 
use from a previously existing pa-
tent). 
Code if second-use/new use of patents are al-
lowed. 
Note: Patents of Addition do not qualify for ei-
ther Selection or Second Use. 





Patent term extensions: This 
variable codes whether an exten-
sion is given to patent term when 
regulation requirements have un-
duly delayed market entry. 
Code if there is compensation/ patent term ex-
tension (further period) for unreasonable delay 
due to patent examination and/or marketing ap-
proval process. 
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Compulsory licenses are re-
stricted/limited to specific sce-
narios/ grounds 
Limited to national emergencies, as antitrust 
remedy, and for public non-commercial use 
(limits competition for generic products such as 
medicines). 
Note 1: Compulsory licenses can be circum-
scribed as "Neither Party shall permit the use of 
the subject matter of a patent without the au-
thorization of the right holder except in the fol-
lowing circumstances". 
Note 2: TRIPS grants right for each country to 
determine the grounds upon which licenses are 
granted. TRIPS makes examples, but does not 
provide a fixed list. 
Note 3: in Spanish PTAs search for "licencias 
obligatorias" 





Novelty/disclosure grace period: 
This variable codes the length of 
the grace period in which a pa-
tentee may disclose the invention 
without that disclosure being con-
sidered as prior art to invalidate 
the patent based on novelty. 
Code if 12 months 
Note: in Spanish PTAs search for "periodo de 
gracia" or "novedad/novela" 





Burden of proof: This variable 
codes whether, when examining 
an invention, the burden of proof 
lies on the patent office or on the 
applicant to demonstrate non-pa-
tentability/patentability. 
Code if burden of proof lies on the patent office, 
i.e. if the patent office has to prove that an in-
vention is or is not patentable. Code as '0' if 
country has a formal review only. 
Note: make sure not to confuse it with the 
TRIPS burden of proof (Article 34). 





Restriction of revocation rights 
for patents 
Restriction of revocation rights for patents to 
cases of fraud and misrepresentation (limits 
flexibility granted under TRIPS). 
[0, 1] 21 21 Coded El-Said 2005 
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Scope of trade secret protec-
tion: This variable codes whether 
or not a country exceeds TRIPs’ 
expectations on the definition of 
trade secret. 
Code if the definition of trade secret is broader 
than the TRIPS definition ; 0 if the definition is 
no broader (or less broad) than that in TRIPs ar-
ticle 39(2) 
1) check if there is something specific on trade 
secrets in PTA 
2) if yes: compare to TRIPS Article 39 
3) Examples of TRIPS+: No limitation of dura-
tion; detailed definition of trade secret (docu-
ments, microfilms) 
Note: in Spanish PTAs search for "secreto 
comercial/industrial/de negocio" 










Scope of liability: Disclosure 
type of action that can trigger lia-
bility for misappropriation of a 
trade secret 
Code if disclosure of trade secrets can be liti-
gated as misappropriation (criminal procedures 
and penalties). 










Scope of liability: Receipt 
type of action that can trigger lia-
bility for misappropriation of a 
trade secret 
Code if receipt of trade secrets can be litigated 
as misappropriation including inducing disclo-
sure (criminal procedures and penalties).  









Scope of liability: Use 
type of action that can trigger lia-
bility for misappropriation of a 
trade secret 
Code if use of trade secrets can be litigated as 
misappropriation (criminal procedures and pen-
alties). 
[0, 1] 3 3 Coded Gold (domestic 
TRIPS+): cisl3 
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Test data exclusivity for a spe-
cific timeframe 
Code if there is a specific period or additionaly 
exclusivity for test data (e.g. due to new clinical 
information). Often around 3-5 years. 
Note: in Spanish PTAs search for "aprobación 
de comercialización" 









Test data exclusivity for new 
uses of registered products 
Code if marketing approval for unapproved use 
of approved drugs (new use of patented prod-
uct) requires new clinical data. This test data is 
exclusive (limited timeframe). 












Foreign test data exclusivity for 
accepted/approved and/ or sub-
mitted applications 
Test data exclusivity is allowed, also for mar-
keting approval submissions of foreign regula-
tors for same products in home market. 








Prohibition of compulsory li-
censes for layout designs 
Compulsory license not permitted for layout de-
signs 
[0, 1] 3 3 Coded Surbeck 







Accession/Reaffirmation of the 
International Convention for 
the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants (UPOV) (1961) 
Code if the PTA reaffirms the UPOV Conven-
tion 
Note 1: Convention references are already 
coded in DESTA.  
Note 2: Code as '1' if level of regulation in 
DESTA is 5 (reaffirmation) or 4 (accession). 
Note 3: Accession/Reaffirmation of the UPOV 
Convention is TRIPS + 
[0, 1] 83 83 Coded Surbeck 
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Specific regulation on new plant 
varieties, which go beyond the 
UPOV Convention.  
Not coded if there is only a reference to UPOV 
or if the Article in the PTA is copying UPOV 
regulations. 











Duty to consult/prior informed 
consent: Genetic resources 
(binding obligations) 
This variable codes whether a 
proposed user of TK or GR must 
first obtain prior informed con-
sent from the use of genetic re-
sources or traditional knowledge 
from the country/indigenous peo-
ple/local community. 
Code if there is a duty to obtain consent before 
use of genetic resources 
Includes shall, should, must, have to, etc.  
Hard version: binding commitments 
("acknowledge", "reaffirm", "shall", "should", 
"must", "have"). 
Note 1: TK/GR provisions can occur in other 
sections of PTA than IPR chapter. 
Note 2: in Spanish PTAs search for "consenti-
miento" 













Duty to consult/prior informed 
consent: Genetic resources 
(non-binding obligations) 
This variable codes whether a 
proposed user of TK or GR must 
first obtain prior informed con-
sent from the use of genetic re-
sources or traditional knowledge 
from the country/indigenous peo-
ple/local community. 
Code if there is a duty to obtain consent before 
use of genetic resources 
Includes may, best efforts, resolve, wish, etc.  
Soft version: non-binding commitments 
(""may"", ""best efforts"", ""resolve"", 
""wish""). 
Note 1: TK/GR provisions can occur in other 
sections of PTA than IPR chapter. 
Note 2: in Spanish PTAs search for "consenti-
miento" 














Duty to consult/prior informed 
consent: traditional knowledge 
(binding obligations) 
This variable codes whether a 
proposed user of TK or GR must 
first obtain prior informed con-
sent from the use of genetic re-
sources or traditional knowledge 
Code if there is a duty to obtain consent before 
use of traditional knowledge 
Includes shall, should, must, have to, etc.  
Hard version: binding commitments 
("acknowledge", "reaffirm", "shall", "should", 
"must", "have"). 
Note 1: TK/GR provisions can occur in other 
sections of PTA than IPR chapter. 
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724 698 
from the country/indigenous peo-
ple/local community. 













Duty to consult/prior informed 
consent: traditional knowledge 
(non-binding obligations) 
This variable codes whether a 
proposed user of TK or GR must 
first obtain prior informed con-
sent from the use of genetic re-
sources or traditional knowledge 
from the country/indigenous peo-
ple/local community. 
Code if there is a duty to obtain consent before 
use of traditional knowledge 
Includes may, best efforts, resolve, wish, etc.  
Soft version: non-binding commitments 
(""may"", ""best efforts"", ""resolve"", 
""wish""). 
Note 1: TK/GR provisions can occur in other 
sections of PTA than IPR chapter. 
Note 2: in Spanish PTAs search for "consenti-
miento" 















of the source - patent: Genetic 
resources (binding obligations) 
This variable codes whether or 
not there is a requirement for the 
patent holder to indicate the 
origin of genetic resources/tradi-
tional knowledge used in a patent 
application.  
Code if patent application must disclose origin 
of genetic resources used 
The requirements for this indicator is met even 
if an applicant is relieved of the obligation to 
disclose it when origin is unknown. 
Includes shall, should, must, have to, etc.  
Hard version: binding commitments 
("acknowledge", "reaffirm", "shall", "should", 
"must", "have"). 
Note 1: TK/GR provisions can occur in other 
sections of PTA than IPR chapter. 
Note 2: in Spanish PTAs search for "divul-
gación del origen" 
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of the source - patent: Genetic 
resources (non-binding obliga-
tions) 
This variable codes whether or 
not there is a requirement for the 
patent holder to indicate the 
origin of genetic resources/tradi-
tional knowledge used in a patent 
application.  
Code if patent application must disclose origin 
of genetic resources used 
The requirements for this indicator is met even 
if an applicant is relieved of the obligation to 
disclose it when origin is unknown. 
Includes may, best efforts, resolve, wish, etc.  
Soft version: non-binding commitments 
(""may"", ""best efforts"", ""resolve"", 
""wish""). 
Note 1: TK/GR provisions can occur in other 
sections of PTA than IPR chapter. 
Note 2: in Spanish PTAs search for "divul-
gación del origen" 















of the source - patent: tradi-
tional knowledge (binding obli-
gations) 
This variable codes whether or 
not there is a requirement for the 
patent holder to indicate the 
origin of genetic resources/tradi-
tional knowledge used in a patent 
application.  
Code if patent application must disclose origin 
of traditional knowledge used 
The requirements for this indicator is met even 
if an applicant is relieved of the obligation to 
disclose it when origin is unknown. 
Includes shall, should, must, have to, etc. 
Hard version: binding commitments 
("acknowledge", "reaffirm", "shall", "should", 
"must", "have"). 
Note 1: TK/GR provisions can occur in other 
sections of PTA than IPR chapter. 
Note 2: in Spanish PTAs search for "divul-
gación del origen" 
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of the source - patent: tradi-
tional knowledge (non-binding 
obligations) 
This variable codes whether or 
not there is a requirement for the 
patent holder to indicate the 
origin of genetic resources/tradi-
tional knowledge used in a patent 
application.  
Code if patent application must disclose origin 
of traditional knowledge used 
The requirements for this indicator is met even 
if an applicant is relieved of the obligation to 
disclose it when origin is unknown. 
Includes may, best efforts, resolve, wish, etc.  
Soft version: non-binding commitments 
(""may"", ""best efforts"", ""resolve"", 
""wish""). 
Note 1: TK/GR provisions can occur in other 
sections of PTA than IPR chapter. 
Note 2: in Spanish PTAs search for "divul-
gación del origen" 












ing of benefits: Genetic re-
sources (binding obligations) 
This variable codes the existence 
of a mandated equitable benefits 
sharing mechanism enforced by 
government. 
Code if some form of mandatory, fair and equi-
table benefits sharing for genetic resources is 
mandated 
Includes shall, should, must, have to, etc.  
Hard version: binding commitments 
("acknowledge", "reaffirm", "shall", "should", 
"must", "have"). 
Note 1: TK/GR provisions can occur in other 
sections of PTA than IPR chapter. 
Note 2: in Spanish PTAs search for "partici-
pación justa y equitativa en los beneficios" 
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ing of benefits: Genetic re-
sources (non-binding obliga-
tions) 
This variable codes the existence 
of a mandated equitable benefits 
sharing mechanism enforced by 
government. 
Code if some form of mandatory, fair and equi-
table benefits sharing for genetic resources is 
mandated 
Includes may, best efforts, resolve, wish, etc.  
Soft version: non-binding commitments 
(""may"", ""best efforts"", ""resolve"", 
""wish""). 
Note 1: TK/GR provisions can occur in other 
sections of PTA than IPR chapter. 
Note 2: in Spanish PTAs search for "partici-
pación justa y equitativa en los beneficios" 













ing of benefits: traditional 
knowledge (binding obligations) 
This variable codes the existence 
of a mandated equitable benefits 
sharing mechanism enforced by 
government. 
Code if some form of mandatory, fair and equi-
table benefits sharing for traditional knowledge 
is mandated 
Includes shall, should, must, have to, etc.  
Hard version: binding commitments 
("acknowledge", "reaffirm", "shall", "should", 
"must", "have"). 
Note 1: TK/GR provisions can occur in other 
sections of PTA than IPR chapter. 
Note 2: in Spanish PTAs search for "partici-
pación justa y equitativa en los beneficios" 













ing of benefits: traditional 
knowledge (non-binding obliga-
tions) 
This variable codes the existence 
of a mandated equitable benefits 
sharing mechanism enforced by 
government. 
Code if some form of mandatory, fair and equi-
table benefits sharing for traditional knowledge 
is mandated 
Includes may, best efforts, resolve, wish, etc.  
Soft version: non-binding commitments 
(""may"", ""best efforts"", ""resolve"", 
""wish""). 
Note 1: TK/GR provisions can occur in other 
sections of PTA than IPR chapter. 
Note 2: in Spanish PTAs search for "partici-
pación justa y equitativa en los beneficios" 
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Protection of encrypted pro-
gram-carrying satellite signals 
Code if encrypted program-carrying satellite 
signals are protected. 





Protection of domain names on 
the internet 
Code if domain names on the internet are pro-
tected. 






Preliminary injunctions: Patent 
This variable codes for whether 
preliminary injunctions are avail-
able for patent, copyright, and 
trademark infringement actions. 
Code if available for patent. 
Note 1: Preliminary/ interlocutory injunctions is 
an instrument to protect the right owner before 
actual judicial decision on case of infringement 
is made.  
Note 2: also code if available for IP in general. 
Note 3: in Spanish PTAs search for "medidas 
cauteleras/preliminares", "resolución interlocu-
toria" or "orden/madamiento preliminar" 










This variable codes for whether 
preliminary injunctions are avail-
able for patent, copyright, and 
trademark infringement actions. 
Code if available for copyright. 
Note 1: Preliminary/ interlocutory injunctions is 
an instrument to protect the right owner before 
actual judicial decision on case of infringement 
is made.  
Note 2: also code if available for IP in general. 
Note 3: in Spanish PTAs search for "medidas 
cauteleras/preliminares", "resolución interlocu-
toria" or "orden/madamiento preliminar" 
[0, 1] 11 11 Coded Gold (domestic 
TRIPS+): epi2 
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This variable codes for whether 
preliminary injunctions are avail-
able for patent, copyright, and 
trademark infringement actions. 
Code if available for trademark.  
Note 1: Preliminary/ interlocutory injunctions is 
an instrument to protect the right owner before 
actual judicial decision on case of infringement 
is made.  
Note 2: also code if available for IP in general. 
Note 3: in Spanish PTAs search for "medidas 
cauteleras/preliminares", "resolución interlocu-
toria" or "orden/madamiento preliminar" 







Ex parte search and seizure: 
Patent 
This variable codes whether it is 
possible for a party to ask for 
search and seizure of goods with-
out notifying the other party of 
this procedure (i.e. Anton Piller 
order). 
Code if available for patent.  
Note 1: also code if either only search (of 
goods/premises) or only seizure (of goods/evi-
dence) without prior warning as precautionary 
measure for alleged infringed goods is men-
tioned. 
Note 2: also code if available for IP in general. 
Note 3: in Spanish PTAs search for "embargo" 
or "retirados de los circuitos comerciales" 









Ex parte search and seizure: 
Copyright 
This variable codes whether it is 
possible for a party to ask for 
search and seizure of goods with-
out notifying the other party of 
this procedure (i.e. Anton Piller 
order). 
Code if available for copyright. 
Note 1: also code if either only search (of 
goods/premises) or only seizure (of goods/evi-
dence) without prior warning as precautionary 
measure for alleged infringed goods is men-
tioned. 
Note 2: also code if available for IP in general. 
Note 3: in Spanish PTAs search for "embargo" 
or "retirados de los circuitos comerciales" 
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Ex parte search and seizure: 
Trademarks 
This variable codes whether it is 
possible for a party to ask for 
search and seizure of goods with-
out notifying the other party of 
this procedure (i.e. Anton Piller 
order). 
Code if available for trademark.  
Note 1: also code if either only search (of 
goods/premises) or only seizure (of goods/evi-
dence) without prior warning as precautionary 
measure for alleged infringed goods is men-
tioned. 
Note 2: also code if available for IP in general. 
Note 3: in Spanish PTAs search for "embargo" 
or "retirados de los circuitos comerciales" 







Measure of damages: Statutory 
damages, patent 
This variable codes for the types 
of damages that are available for 
patent, copyright, and trademarks 
infringement. 
Code if statutory damages are available for pa-
tent.  
Note 1: Statutory damages are predefined/pre-
established damages awarded for cases of in-
fringement. Level of damage award is thus 
based on the act of infringement and not on the 
specific harm caused in specific case. It is used 
in IP infringement cases because it is often dif-
ficult to establish the value loss suffered by IP 
owners. 
Note 2: also code if available for IP in general. 
Note 3: in Spanish PTAs search for "daños pre-
viamente determinados" 
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Measure of damages: Statutory 
damages, copyright 
This variable codes for the types 
of damages that are available for 
patent, copyright, and trademarks 
infringement. 
Code if statutory damages are available for cop-
yright.  
Note 1: Statutory damages are predefined/pre-
established damages awarded for cases of in-
fringement. Level of damage award is thus 
based on the act of infringement and not on the 
specific harm caused in specific case. It is used 
in IP infringement cases because it is often dif-
ficult to establish the value loss suffered by IP 
owners. 
Note 2: also code if available for IP in general. 
Note 3: in Spanish PTAs search for "daños pre-
viamente determinados" 








Measure of damages: Statutory 
damages, trademarks 
This variable codes for the types 
of damages that are available for 
patent, copyright, and trademarks 
infringement. 
Code if statutory damages are available for 
trademarks.  
Note 1: Statutory damages are predefined/pre-
established damages awarded for cases of in-
fringement. Level of damage award is thus 
based on the act of infringement and not on the 
specific harm caused in specific case. It is used 
in IP infringement cases because it is often dif-
ficult to establish the value loss suffered by IP 
owners. 
Note 2: also code if available for IP in general. 
Note 3: in Spanish PTAs search for "daños pre-
viamente determinados" 
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Measure of damages: Compensa-
tory damages, patent 
This variable codes for the types 
of damages that are available for 
patent, copyright, and trademarks 
infringement. 
Code if compensatory damages are available for 
patent.  
Note 1: Compensatory damages are damages 
that compensate/counterbalance/reimburse the 
owner of IPRs in cases of infringement. 
Note 2: also code if available for IP in general. 
Note 3: in Spanish PTAs search for "indemniza-
ción/resarcimiento/comensación" or "daño" 









Measure of damages: Compensa-
tory damages, copyright 
This variable codes for the types 
of damages that are available for 
patent, copyright, and trademarks 
infringement. 
Code if compensatory damages are available for 
copyright.  
Note 1: Compensatory damages are damages 
that compensate/counterbalance/reimburse the 
owner of IPRs in cases of infringement. 
Note 2: also code if available for IP in general. 
Note 3: in Spanish PTAs search for "indemniza-
ción/resarcimiento/comensación" or "daño" 









Measure of damages: Compensa-
tory damages, trademarks 
This variable codes for the types 
of damages that are available for 
patent, copyright, and trademarks 
infringement. 
Code if compensatory damages are available for 
trademarks.  
Note 1: Compensatory damages are damages 
that compensate/counterbalance/reimburse the 
owner of IPRs in cases of infringement. 
Note 2: also code if available for IP in general. 
Note 3: in Spanish PTAs search for "indemniza-
ción/resarcimiento/comensación" or "daño" 









Measure of damages: Accounting 
of profits, patent 
This variable codes for the types 
of damages that are available for 
patent, copyright, and trademarks 
infringement. 
Code if accounting of profits is available for pa-
tent.  
Note 1: Accounting of profits is when the dam-
ages include (recovery of) profits gained by IPR 
infringement. 
Note 2: also code if available for IP in general. 
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Measure of damages: Accounting 
of profits, copyright 
This variable codes for the types 
of damages that are available for 
patent, copyright, and trademarks 
infringement. 
Code if accounting of profits is available for 
copyright.  
Note 1: Accounting of profits is when the dam-
ages include (recovery of) profits gained by IPR 
infringement. 
Note 2: also code if available for IP in general. 










Measure of damages: Accounting 
of profits, trademarks 
This variable codes for the types 
of damages that are available for 
patent, copyright, and trademarks 
infringement. 
Code if accounting of profits is available for 
trademarks.  
Note 1: Accounting of profits is when the dam-
ages include (recovery of) profits gained by IPR 
infringement. 
Note 2: also code if available for IP in general. 







Measure of damages: Punitive 
damages, patent 
This variable codes for the types 
of damages that are available for 
patent, copyright, and trademarks 
infringement. 
Code if punitive damages are available for pa-
tent. 
Note 1: Punitive/exemplary damages are dam-
ages imposed to deter alleged infringer/others 
from (further) committing IPR infringement by 
setting the damage higher than what the evi-
dence-based loss could be (e.g. exceeding statu-
tory damages). Often additional damages to al-
ready imposed damages based on the severity of 
the infringement. 
Note 2: Includes references providing for the 
possibility to impose sanctions on parties to a 
litigation, their counsel, experts, or other per-
sons subject to the court’s jurisdiction, for vio-
lation of judicial orders regarding the protection 
of undisclosed information produced or ex-
changed in a proceeding. 
Note 3: Excludes criminal penalties (e.g. pecu-
niary fines). 
Note 4: Also code if available for IP in general. 
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Measure of damages: Punitive 
damages, copyright 
This variable codes for the types 
of damages that are available for 
patent, copyright, and trademarks 
infringement. 
Code if punitive damages are available for pa-
tent. 
Note 1: Punitive/exemplary damages are dam-
ages imposed to deter alleged infringer/others 
from (further) committing IPR infringement by 
setting the damage higher than what the evi-
dence-based loss could be (e.g. exceeding statu-
tory damages). Often additional damages to al-
ready imposed damages based on the severity of 
the infringement. 
Note 2: Includes references providing for the 
possibility to impose sanctions on parties to a 
litigation, their counsel, experts, or other per-
sons subject to the court’s jurisdiction, for vio-
lation of judicial orders regarding the protection 
of undisclosed information produced or ex-
changed in a proceeding. 
Note 3: Excludes criminal penalties (e.g. pecu-
niary fines). 
Note 4: Also code if available for IP in general. 
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Measure of damages: Punitive 
damages, trademarks 
This variable codes for the types 
of damages that are available for 
patent, copyright, and trademarks 
infringement. 
Code if punitive damages are available for pa-
tent. 
Note 1: Punitive/exemplary damages are dam-
ages imposed to deter alleged infringer/others 
from (further) committing IPR infringement by 
setting the damage higher than what the evi-
dence-based loss could be (e.g. exceeding statu-
tory damages). Often additional damages to al-
ready imposed damages based on the severity of 
the infringement. 
Note 2: Includes references providing for the 
possibility to impose sanctions on parties to a 
litigation, their counsel, experts, or other per-
sons subject to the court’s jurisdiction, for vio-
lation of judicial orders regarding the protection 
of undisclosed information produced or ex-
changed in a proceeding. 
Note 3: Excludes criminal penalties (e.g. pecu-
niary fines). 
Note 4: Also code if available for IP in general. 







Criminal sanctions for IP In-
fringement: Patent 
This variable codes for the availa-
bility of criminal sanctions for IP 
infringement 
Code if criminal sanctions are available for pa-
tent.  
Note 1: Criminal sanctions include imprison-
ment, fines, capital punishment, restitution. 
Note 2: TRIPS already grants criminal sanctions 
for copyrights and trademarks thus not coded. 
Note 3: also code if available for IP in general. 
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Presumption of validity: Patent 
This variable codes for the exist-
ence of a presumption of validity 
in favour of the holder of the IP 
right in any litigation. 
Code if presumption of validity for patent ex-
ists, i.e. patent is considered to be valid.  
Note 1: Procedural consideration (preliminary 
injunctions, order of issues, etc.) that may lead 
to a form of presumption of validity in favour of 
the IP holder do not count toward this indicator. 
Note 2: This differs from the presumption ap-
plies by the IP office in reviewing applications 
for IP. 
Note 3: also code if available for IP in general. 








Presumption of validity: Copy-
right 
This variable codes for the exist-
ence of a presumption of validity 
in favour of the holder of the IP 
right in any litigation. 
Code if presumption of validity for copyright 
exists (presumption of authorship or owner-
ship), i.e. copyright is considered to be valid.  
Note 1: Procedural consideration (preliminary 
injunctions, order of issues, etc.) that may lead 
to a form of presumption of validity in favour of 
the IP holder do not count toward this indicator. 
Note 2: This differs from the presumption ap-
plies by the IP office in reviewing applications 
for IP. 
Note 3: also code if available for IP in general. 








Presumption of validity: Trade-
mark 
This variable codes for the exist-
ence of a presumption of validity 
in favour of the holder of the IP 
right in any litigation. 
Note: Also code for trademark li-
censes 
Code if presumption of validity for trademarks 
exists, i.e. trademark is considered to be valid.  
Note 1: Procedural consideration (preliminary 
injunctions, order of issues, etc.) that may lead 
to a form of presumption of validity in favour of 
the IP holder do not count toward this indicator. 
Note 2: This differs from the presumption ap-
plies by the IP office in reviewing applications 
for IP. 
Note 3: also code if available for IP in general. 
[0, 1] 16 16 Coded Gold (domestic 
TRIPS+): epv3 
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Restriction of institutional flexi-
bility in IPR enforcement 
Code if the flexibility regarding IPR enforce-
ment is restricted, e.g. resource constraints shall 
not prevent IPR enforcement. 
Note: in Spanish PTAs search for "distribución 
de los recursos"  








Border measures: Code if border 
measures apply to imported and 
exported or/and transiting 
goods 
Note: TRIPS applies border measures only to 
imported goods, except for suspension of ex-
ported goods. 









Criminal Procedures and Reme-
dies: no formal complaint 
needed for copyright infringe-
ment 
Copyright infringement (piracy): authorities 
may initiate criminal actions and border 
measures without the need for formal com-
plaint. 
Note: in Spanish PTAs search for "solicitud for-
mal"  









Criminal Procedures and Reme-
dies: no formal complaint 
needed for trademark infringe-
ment 
Trademark infringement (counterfeiting): au-
thorities may initiate criminal actions and bor-
der measures without the need for formal com-
plaint. 
Note: in Spanish PTAs search for "solicitud for-
mal"  
[0, 1] 48 48 Coded El-Said 2005 
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Is there a service provider liability 
defined for the enforcement of 
IPRs? 
Expeditious remedies to prevent infringements 
and criminal and civil remedies 
- legal incentives for service providers to coop-
erate with copyright owners in deterring the un-
authorised storage and transmission of copy-
righted materia 
- limitations preclude monetary relief and 
should provide restrictions on court-ordered re-
lief to compel or restrain e.g. transmitting and 
routing 





National exhaustion for patents 
is stated 
Code if anti-parallel importation provisions ex-
ist for importation beyond the country (national 
exhaustion) for patents 
Note 1: also code if available for IP in general. 
Note 2: in Spanish PTAs search for "agota-
miento" or "importación paralela" 






Regional exhaustion for patents 
is stated 
Code if anti-parallel importation provisions ex-
ist for importation beyond the region (regional 
exhaustion) for patents 
Note 1: also code if available for IP in general. 
Note 2: in Spanish PTAs search for "agota-
miento" or "importación paralela" 






National exhaustion for copy-
rights is stated 
Code if anti-parallel importation provisions ex-
ist for importation beyond the country (national 
exhaustion) for copyrights 
Note 1: also code if available for IP in general. 
Note 2: in Spanish PTAs search for "agota-
miento" or "importación paralela" 
[0, 1] 4 4 Coded Gold (domestic 
TRIPS+) 
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Regional exhaustion for copy-
rights is stated 
Code if anti-parallel importation provisions ex-
ist for importation beyond the region (regional 
exhaustion) for copyrights 
Note 1: also code if available for IP in general. 
Note 2: in Spanish PTAs search for "agota-
miento" or "importación paralela" 






National exhaustion for trade-
marks is stated 
Code if anti-parallel importation provisions ex-
ist for importation beyond the country (national 
exhaustion) for trademarks 
Note 1: also code if available for IP in general. 
Note 2: in Spanish PTAs search for "agota-
miento" or "importación paralela" 






Regional exhaustion for trade-
marks is stated 
Code if anti-parallel importation provisions ex-
ist for importation beyond the region (regional 
exhaustion) for trademarks 
Note 1: also code if available for IP in general. 
Note 2: in Spanish PTAs search for "agota-
miento" or "importación paralela" 
[0, 1] 4 4 Coded Gold (domestic 
TRIPS+) 
C Comment comment Comment regarding coding deci-
sion or specific PTAs 




Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus 
provisions 
Sum of TRIPS-plus provisions across IPR areas 








Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions, weighed 
Sum of TRIPS-plus provisions across IPR areas 




[0, 1]     Calculated T+PTA 
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Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions, excluding enforcement 
and exhaustion provisions 
Sum of TRIPS-plus provisions across IPR areas 
(I_05:I_15), not taking into account the varia-












Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions, excluding enforcement 
and exhaustion provisions, 
weighed 
Sum of TRIPS-plus provisions across IPR areas 
(I_16:I_26), , not taking into account the varia-








Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-









Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-









Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-










Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-






I_09 Index patent_9 Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-









Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-









Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
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Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-












Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on traditional knowledge 












Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on encrypted program-









Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-









Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on copyright, weighed by 
reachable maximum in category 
Formula:  
I_05/5 




Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on trademark, weighed 









Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on geographical indica-
tions, weighed by reachable max-
imum in category 
Formula:  
I_07/7 
[0, 1]     Calculated T+PTA 
 
Appendixes  - 85 - 






Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on industrial design, 








Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on patent, weighed by 
reachable maximum in category 
Formula:  
I_09/9 






Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on undisclosed infor-
mation, weighed by reachable 
maximum in category 
Formula:  
I_10/7 




Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on semiconductors, 









Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on new plant varieties, 











Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on traditional knowledge 
& genetic resources, weighed by 
reachable maximum in category 
Formula:  
I_13/6 





Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on encrypted program-
carrying satellite signals, 




[0, 1]     Calculated T+PTA 
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Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on domain names, 




[0, 1]     Calculated T+PTA 
I_27 Index enforce-
ment_27 
Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on enforcement 









Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on enforcement, weighed 
Sum of TRIPS-plus provisions on enforcement, 










Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-







ing_transiting_goods) are not re-
stricted to a specific IPR right and 
thus not included in this index. 
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Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on enforcement for pa-
tents, weighed 
Sum of TRIPS-plus provisions on enforcement 
for patents, weighed by number of enforcement 









Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-







ing_transiting_goods) are not re-
stricted to a specific IPR right and 
thus not included in this index. 











Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on enforcement for cop-
yrights, weighed 
Sum of TRIPS-plus provisions on enforcement 
for copyrights, weighed by number of enforce-









Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-







ing_transiting_goods) are not re-
stricted to a specific IPR right and 
thus not included in this index. 
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Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on enforcement for 
trademarks, weighed 
Sum of TRIPS-plus provisions on enforcement 
for trademark, weighed by number of enforce-








Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on exhaustion 
Note: This excludes coded varia-
bles for 'free to decide' as this 
equals the TRIPS-plus standard 
and is not TRIPS-plus, and it ex-
cludes coded variables for 'inter-
national exhaustion' as this would 
be TRIPS-minus. 
Sum of TRIPS-plus provisions on exhaustion 
Formula: 
sum(variable85,86,87,88,89,90) 
[0, 6]     Calculated T+PTA 
I_36 Index exhaustion_ 
weighed 
Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on exhaustion, weighed 
by reachable maximum in cate-
gory and stringency of exhaustion 
regime 
Sum of TRIPS-plus provisions on exhaustion, 
weighed by number of all exhaustion variables 
and stringency of exhaustion regime: 
   National Exhaustion: 2/3 (strongest exhaus-
tion mean) 




[0, 1]     Calculated T+PTA 
I_37 Index exhaustion_ 
patents_2 
Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on exhaustion for pa-
tents 
Note: This excludes coded varia-
bles for 'free to decide' as this 
equals the TRIPS-plus standard 
and is not TRIPS-plus, and it ex-
cludes coded variables for 'inter-
national exhaustion' as this would 
be TRIPS-minus. 




[0, 2]     Calculated T+PTA 
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ID Category Variable Description Note Range Occurrence Mode Origin 
724 698 
I_38 Index exhaustion_ 
patents_ 
weighed 
Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on exhaustion for pa-
tents, weighed 
Sum of TRIPS-plus provisions on exhaustion 
for patents, weighed by number of exhaustion 
variables for patents and stringency of exhaus-
tion regime: 
   National Exhaustion: 2/3 (strongest exhaus-
tion mean) 
   Regional Exhaustion: 1/3 
Formula: 
variable85*2/3 + variable86*1/3 
[0, 1]     Calculated T+PTA 
I_39 Index exhaustion_ 
copyright_2 
Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on exhaustion for copy-
rights 
Note: This excludes coded varia-
bles for 'free to decide' as this 
equals the TRIPS-plus standard 
and is not TRIPS-plus, and it ex-
cludes coded variables for 'inter-
national exhaustion' as this would 
be TRIPS-minus. 




[0, 2]     Calculated T+PTA 
I_40 Index exhaustion_ 
copyright_ 
weighed 
Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on exhaustion for copy-
rights, weighed 
Sum of TRIPS-plus provisions on exhaustion 
for copyrights, weighed by number of exhaus-
tion variables for copyrights and stringency of 
exhaustion regime: 
   National Exhaustion: 2/3 (strongest exhaus-
tion mean) 
   Regional Exhaustion: 1/3 
Formula: 
variable87*2/3 + variable88*1/3 
[0, 1]     Calculated T+PTA 
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ID Category Variable Description Note Range Occurrence Mode Origin 
724 698 
I_41 Index exhaustion_ 
trademark_2 
Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on exhaustion for trade-
marks 
Note: This excludes coded varia-
bles for 'free to decide' as this 
equals the TRIPS-plus standard 
and is not TRIPS-plus, and it ex-
cludes coded variables for 'inter-
national exhaustion' as this would 
be TRIPS-minus. 




[0, 2]     Calculated T+PTA 
I_42 Index exhaustion_ 
trademark_ 
weighed 
Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on exhaustion for trade-
marks, weighed 
Sum of TRIPS-plus provisions on exhaustion 
for trademark, weighed by number of exhaus-
tion variables for trademark and stringency of 
exhaustion regime: 
   National Exhaustion: 2/3 (strongest exhaus-
tion mean) 
   Regional Exhaustion: 1/3 
Formula: 
variable89*2/3 + variable90*1/3 
[0, 1]     Calculated T+PTA 
I_43 Index patent_ 
weighed_sub 
Subindex for all TRIPS-plus vari-
ables on patents, double 
weighed by number of variables 
and importance to index overall 
Patent variables on scope (25,26,28,31), dura-
tion (29), rights conferred (27,30,32,33) and ex-
haustion for patents (I_38) weighed by number 
of variables coded and subjective weight ac-
cording to overall importance 
   Scope: 1/4 
   Duration: 1/4 
   Rights Conferred: 1/4 
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ID Category Variable Description Note Range Occurrence Mode Origin 
724 698 
I_44 Index copyright_ 
weighed_sub 
Subindex for all TRIPS-plus vari-
ables on copyrights, double 
weighed by number of variables 
and importance to index overall 
Copyright variables on scope (3), duration (1,2: 
mutually exclusive), rights conferred (4,5,6) and 
exhaustion for copyrights (I_40) weighed by 
number of variables coded and subjective 
weight according to overall importance 
   Scope: 1/4 
   Duration: 1/4 
   Rights Conferred: 1/4 








I_45 Index trademark_ 
weighed_sub 
Subindex for all TRIPS-plus vari-
ables on trademarks, double 
weighed by number of variables 
and importance to index overall 
Trademark variables on scope (7:12), duration 
(13), rights conferred (14,15) and exhaustion for 
trademarks (I_42) weighed by number of varia-
bles coded and subjective weight according to 
overall importance 
   Scope: 1/4 
   Duration: 1/4 
   Rights Conferred: 1/4 








I_46 Index patent_ 
index_sum 
Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on patent, including en-
forcement and exhaustion provi-
sions for patents 
Sum of indexes of patent variables: patent vari-
ables (I_09), patent enforcement (I_29) and pa-
tent exhaustion (I_37) 
[0, 19]     Calculated T+PTA 
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ID Category Variable Description Note Range Occurrence Mode Origin 
724 698 
I_47 Index patent_ 
index_ 
weighed 
Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on patent, including en-
forcement and exhaustion provi-
sions for patents, weighed 
Sum of weighed indexes of patent variables: pa-
tent variables (I_20), patent enforcement (I_30) 
and patent exhaustion (I_38) 
[0, 1]     Calculated T+PTA 
I_48 Index copyright_ 
index_sum 
Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on copyright, including 
enforcement and exhaustion pro-
visions for copyrights 
Sum of indexes of copyright variables: copy-
right variables (I_05), copyright enforcement 
(I_31) and copyright exhaustion (I_39) 
[0, 16]     Calculated T+PTA 
I_49 Index copyright_ 
index_ 
weighed 
Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on copyright, including 
enforcement and exhaustion pro-
visions for copyrights, weighed 
Sum of weighed indexes of copyright variables: 
copyright variables (I_16), copyright enforce-
ment (I_32) and copyright exhaustion (I_40) 
[0, 1]     Calculated T+PTA 
I_50 Index trademark_ 
index_sum 
Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on trademarks, including 
enforcement and exhaustion pro-
visions for trademarks 
Sum of indexes of trademark variables: trade-
mark variables (I_06), trademark enforcement 
(I_33) and trademark exhaustion (I_41) 
[0, 19]     Calculated T+PTA 
I_51 Index trademark_ 
index_ 
weighed 
Sum of all coded TRIPS-plus pro-
visions on trademarks, including 
enforcement and exhaustion pro-
visions for trademarks, weighed 
Sum of weighed indexes of trademark variables: 
trademark variables (I_17), trademark enforce-
ment (I_34) and trademark exhaustion (I_42) 
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Appendix 4: Cohen’s Kappa for 2 Coders (Weights: unweighted) – IRR 
 
 IPRs in PTAs dataset T+PTA dataset 
Subjects 62264  12192 
z 355 97.3 
p-value 0 0 
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Canada US Automotive Products Trade Agreement (APTA) 1965 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Israel US 1985 9 0 1 0 3 0 8 0 0 0 
Canada US 1988 8 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 1992 16 12 2 4 9 8 4 22 10 0 
US Vietnam 2000 19 11 3 4 8 7 7 24 14 0 
Jordan US 2000 11 7 3 3 4 4 10 17 11 0 
Singapore US 2003 18 11 5 5 6 6 14 27 15 0 
Chile US 2003 20 12 6 6 6 6 17 31 16 0 
Laos US 2003 15 12 3 5 8 7 7 25 14 0 
Australia US 2004 21 14 5 6 8 8 14 37 17 2 
Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 2004 19 13 4 7 7 6 18 33 17 0 
Morocco US 2004 19 12 6 6 6 6 18 39 20 0 
Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) Dominican Republic 2004 19 13 4 7 7 6 17 34 17 0 







































































































































































Oman US 2006 18 12 5 6 6 6 17 35 18 0 
Peru US 2006 19 12 5 6 6 6 19 36 19 0 
Colombia US 2006 19 12 5 6 6 6 18 34 17 0 
Panama US 2007 21 12 6 6 7 6 19 35 18 0 
Korea US 2007 20 12 6 6 6 6 19 33 16 0 
Korea US environmental side agreement 2012 10 2 1 0 5 2 1 0 0 0 
Panama US environmental side agreement 2012 4 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Colombia US environmental side agreement 2013 4 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 2016 24 15 5 6 11 9 17 42 21 0 
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EC 1957 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Greece Association Agreement 1961 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Turkey Association Agreement (Ankara Agreement) 1963 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Tunisia Association Agreement 1969 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Morocco Association Agreement 1969 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Israel 1970 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Spain 1970 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Turkey Additional Protocol 1970 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Malta 1970 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC (9) Enlargement 1972 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Austria EC 1972 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Iceland 1972 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Switzerland Liechtenstein 1972 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 







































































































































































EC Lebanon 1972 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cyprus EC 1972 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Sweden 1972 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Portugal 1972 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Norway 1973 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Turkey Supplementary Protocol 1973 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Finland 1973 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Greece Additional Protocol 1975 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Israel 1975 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Tunisia 1976 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Algeria EC 1976 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Morocco 1976 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Portugal Additional Protocol 1976 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Egypt 1977 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 







































































































































































EC Syria 1977 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Lebanon 1977 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC (10) Enlargement 1979 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Yugoslavia 1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC (12) Enlargement 1985 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Single European Act 1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Andorra EC 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Faroe Islands 1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC San Marino 1991 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Hungary 1991 11 0 0 0 7 0 9 0 0 0 
EC Poland 1991 4 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 
European Economic Area (EEA) 1992 12 10 2 4 6 6 9 10 0 3 
EC Maastricht 1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Romania 1993 13 0 1 0 7 0 9 0 0 0 







































































































































































EC Slovakia 1993 12 0 1 0 7 0 9 0 0 0 
EC Slovenia 1993 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Czech Republic EC 1993 10 0 0 0 7 0 9 0 0 0 
EC Latvia 1994 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Maastricht (15) Enlargement 1994 5 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 
EC Estonia 1994 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Lithuania 1994 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Estonia Europe Agreement 1995 7 0 2 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 
EC Latvia Europe Agreement 1995 13 0 2 0 7 0 9 0 0 0 
EC Lithuania Europe Agreement 1995 14 0 2 0 7 0 9 0 0 0 
EC Tunisia Euro-Med Association Agreement 1995 13 0 2 0 7 0 7 0 0 0 
EC Israel Euro-Med Association Agreement 1995 4 0 1 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 
EC Turkey 1995 16 9 3 4 9 5 9 7 2 0 
EC Morocco Euro-Med Association Agreement 1996 6 0 2 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 







































































































































































EC Faroe Islands 1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Amsterdam 1997 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Jordan Euro-Med Association Agreement 1997 6 0 2 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 
EC Switzerland Bilaterals I 1999 8 2 2 0 2 2 3 3 0 0 
EC South Africa 1999 12 0 1 0 7 0 10 0 0 0 
EC Mexico 2000 12 0 1 0 7 0 1 0 0 0 
Cotonou Agreement 2000 13 0 1 0 8 0 4 0 0 0 
EC Nice 2001 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC North Macedonia SAA 2001 14 0 2 0 7 0 10 0 0 0 
EC Egypt Euro-Med Association Agreement 2001 13 0 2 0 7 0 10 0 0 0 
Croatia EC 2001 14 0 2 0 7 0 10 0 0 0 
Algeria EC Euro-Med Association Agreement 2002 13 0 2 0 7 0 13 0 0 0 
EC Lebanon Euro-Med Association Agreement 2002 13 0 2 0 7 0 11 0 0 0 
Chile EC 2002 13 2 2 0 7 2 17 0 0 0 







































































































































































EC Nice (27) Enlargement 2005 10 5 1 0 6 5 0 6 0 0 
Albania EC SAA 2006 15 3 2 1 8 2 15 2 0 0 
EC Montenegro SAA 2007 16 4 3 2 8 2 22 9 1 0 
EC Lisbon 2007 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Serbia SAA 2008 15 5 2 3 8 2 22 21 13 0 
Bosnia and Herzegovina EC SAA 2008 14 3 1 2 8 1 22 25 16 0 
CARIFORUM EC EPA 2008 16 10 3 3 9 7 16 23 18 0 
Cote d'Ivoire EC EPA 2008 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
EC Korea 2010 16 12 3 6 9 6 14 30 17 0 
Colombia Peru EC 2012 18 14 3 7 9 7 18 37 17 0 
Central America EC 2012 19 11 4 6 9 5 15 30 18 0 
EC Georgia 2014 14 11 3 6 7 5 15 38 17 6 
EC Moldova 2014 14 11 3 6 7 5 18 38 17 6 
EC Ukraine 2014 16 13 3 7 9 6 11 33 14 0 







































































































































































EC Kosovo SAA 2015 9 2 2 0 2 2 22 9 1 0 
EC Vietnam 2016 21 13 5 7 8 6 18 34 20 0 
EC South African Development Community (SADC) EPA 2016 9 2 1 1 4 1 2 6 0 0 
Canada EC (CETA) 2016 20 9 5 4 8 5 12 27 15 0 
Armenia EC 2017 16 12 4 6 8 6 19 39 16 6 
EC Singapore 2018 17 9 5 4 8 5 15 28 15 0 
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EFTA 1960 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EFTA Finland 1961 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EFTA Spain 1979 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EFTA Turkey 1991 17 7 3 5 8 2 9 4 0 0 
Czech and Slovak Republic EFTA 1992 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EFTA Israel 1992 14 3 2 2 7 1 3 6 3 0 
EFTA Poland 1992 13 0 1 0 7 0 5 0 0 0 
EFTA Romania 1992 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) 1992 12 0 1 0 7 0 5 0 0 0 
Bulgaria EFTA 1993 13 4 1 2 7 2 5 6 3 0 
EFTA Hungary 1993 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EFTA Estonia 1995 14 6 2 4 7 2 7 3 0 0 
EFTA Latvia 1995 14 6 2 4 7 2 6 3 0 0 







































































































































































EFTA Slovenia 1995 16 5 2 4 8 1 8 4 0 0 
EFTA Morocco 1997 16 5 2 4 8 1 10 4 0 0 
EFTA North Macedonia 2000 16 6 2 4 8 2 8 4 0 0 
EFTA Mexico 2000 16 6 2 5 8 1 10 4 0 0 
Croatia EFTA 2001 16 6 2 4 8 2 8 4 0 0 
EFTA Jordan 2001 16 5 2 4 8 1 10 4 0 0 
EFTA services 2001 15 6 2 4 8 2 9 4 0 0 
EFTA Singapore 2002 20 8 3 5 8 3 7 4 0 0 
Chile EFTA 2003 15 9 2 5 8 4 14 4 0 0 
EFTA Lebanon 2004 16 7 2 4 8 3 15 5 0 0 
EFTA Tunisia 2004 16 7 2 4 8 3 16 3 0 0 
EFTA Korea 2005 16 10 2 5 8 5 8 6 0 0 
EFTA Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 2006 15 0 1 0 8 0 2 0 0 0 
Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) 2006 13 0 2 0 7 0 24 0 0 0 







































































































































































Canada EFTA 2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Colombia EFTA 2008 16 11 3 4 7 7 15 12 0 0 
EFTA GCC 2009 14 1 1 1 8 0 1 0 0 0 
Albania EFTA 2009 16 8 2 3 8 5 10 8 1 0 
EFTA Serbia 2009 16 10 2 5 8 5 10 9 1 0 
EFTA Ukraine 2010 19 10 2 5 8 5 13 9 1 0 
EFTA Peru 2010 15 10 2 4 7 6 16 11 1 0 
EFTA Hong Kong 2011 16 9 2 2 8 7 12 8 1 0 
EFTA Montenegro 2011 16 10 2 4 8 6 13 18 7 0 
Bosnia and Herzegovina EFTA 2013 16 10 2 4 8 6 14 18 7 0 
Central America EFTA 2013 17 9 2 4 9 5 16 12 4 0 
EFTA Philippines 2016 16 13 2 5 8 8 15 18 7 0 
EFTA Georgia 2016 17 11 1 5 10 6 16 16 8 0 
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Japan Singapore 2002 15 1 2 1 7 0 1 0 0 0 
Japan Mexico 2004 5 1 0 0 1 1 16 2 0 0 
Japan Malaysia 2005 20 11 3 5 8 6 7 7 6 0 
Japan Philippines 2006 18 6 3 4 8 2 11 8 7 0 
Chile Japan 2007 20 7 5 5 8 2 13 8 6 0 
Japan Thailand 2007 21 12 4 5 8 7 7 14 10 0 
Brunei Japan 2007 13 0 3 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 
Indonesia Japan 2007 20 10 3 5 8 5 14 8 7 0 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Japan 2008 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Japan Vietnam 2008 16 10 3 5 7 5 10 7 6 0 
Japan Switzerland 2009 21 12 4 6 8 6 23 25 11 0 







































































































































































Japan Peru 2011 16 12 3 7 7 5 17 8 7 0 
Australia Japan 2014 19 11 3 6 8 5 18 16 12 0 
Japan Mongolia 2015 18 10 3 5 7 5 13 5 5 0 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 2016 24 15 5 6 11 9 17 42 21 0 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) 2018 24 15 5 6 11 9 17 35 21 0 
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Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) 1960 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Protocol on Trade Negotiations (PTN) 1971 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Latin American Integration Association (ALADI LAIA) 1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Brazil Uruguay 1982 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Argentina Brazil 1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Brazil Uruguay 1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) 1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Argentina Brazil 1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Brazil Cuba 1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Argentina Brazil 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MERCOSUR 1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Brazil Peru 1993 2 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 
Chile MERCOSUR 1996 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 







































































































































































MERCOSUR services 1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Andean Community Brazil 1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Brazil Cuba 1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Brazil Guyana 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Brazil Mexico 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MERCOSUR Mexico Auto Agreement 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India MERCOSUR 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Andean Countries MERCOSUR 2004 3 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 
MERCOSUR Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Brazil Suriname 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MERCOSUR Peru 2005 3 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 
Cuba MERCOSUR 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Israel MERCOSUR 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MERCOSUR Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 







































































































































































Egypt MERCOSUR 2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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China Hong Kong 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
China Macao 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations China 2004 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (Bangkok Agreement amended) 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile China 2005 12 2 2 1 3 1 9 6 3 0 
China Pakistan 2006 9 1 2 1 3 0 1 3 3 0 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations China Services 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
China New Zealand 2008 18 0 3 0 8 0 9 0 0 0 
China Singapore 2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
China Pakistan Services 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
China Peru 2009 15 4 3 2 5 2 12 6 3 0 
China Costa Rica 2010 8 4 2 2 2 2 14 7 3 0 
China Iceland 2013 12 1 0 1 8 0 7 0 0 0 







































































































































































China Korea 2015 22 12 5 6 9 6 21 23 14 0 
Australia China 2015 21 8 4 5 9 3 18 5 2 0 
China Georgia 2017 15 7 2 2 9 5 14 2 0 0 
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Tripartite Agreement 1967 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Protocol on Trade Negotiations (PTN) 1971 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bhutan India 1972 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bangkok Agreement 1975 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) 1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India Nepal 1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) 1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India Sri Lanka 1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Afghanistan India 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India MERCOSUR 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India Singapore 2005 9 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (Bangkok Agreement amended) 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 







































































































































































Bhutan India 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India Korea 2009 10 4 4 4 0 0 3 0 0 0 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations India 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India Nepal 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India Japan 2011 17 2 3 0 7 2 3 0 0 0 
India Malaysia 2011 8 1 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) 1960 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Protocol on Trade Negotiations (PTN) 1971 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Latin American Integration Association (ALADI LAIA) 1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Costa Rica Mexico 1982 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Honduras Mexico 1985 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Guatemala Mexico 1985 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cuba Mexico 1985 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
El Salvador Mexico 1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Argentina Mexico 1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mexico Peru 1987 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) 1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile Mexico 1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 1992 16 12 2 4 9 8 4 22 10 0 







































































































































































Costa Rica Mexico 1994 20 9 4 4 7 5 5 16 9 0 
Group of Three 1994 13 8 2 3 6 5 6 16 9 0 
Association of Caribbean States 1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bolivia Mexico 1994 17 11 2 4 9 7 7 19 10 0 
Chile Mexico 1998 13 7 4 4 3 3 5 14 12 0 
Guatemala Mexico 1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Mexico 2000 12 0 1 0 7 0 1 0 0 0 
Israel Mexico 2000 5 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Cuba Mexico 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EFTA Mexico 2000 16 6 2 5 8 1 10 4 0 0 
Brazil Mexico 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MERCOSUR Mexico Auto Agreement 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mexico Uruguay 2003 21 11 4 4 8 7 9 17 11 0 
Japan Mexico 2004 5 1 0 0 1 1 16 2 0 0 







































































































































































Pacific Alliance 2012 7 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mexico Panama 2014 17 7 4 4 4 3 19 10 1 0 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 2016 24 15 5 6 11 9 17 42 21 0 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) 2018 24 15 5 6 11 9 17 35 21 0 
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EC Israel 1970 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Protocol on Trade Negotiations (PTN) 1971 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC Israel 1975 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Israel US 1985 9 0 1 0 3 0 8 0 0 0 
EFTA Israel 1992 14 3 2 2 7 1 3 6 3 0 
Israel PLO 1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Israel Jordan 1995 3 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
EC Israel Euro-Med Association Agreement 1995 4 0 1 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 
Israel Turkey 1996 5 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Czech Republic Israel 1996 13 0 1 0 8 0 1 0 0 0 
Canada Israel 1996 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Israel Slovakia 1996 13 0 1 0 8 0 1 0 0 0 
Israel Poland 1997 13 0 1 0 8 0 1 0 0 0 







































































































































































Israel Slovenia 1998 13 0 1 0 8 0 1 0 0 0 
Israel Mexico 2000 5 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Israel Romania 2001 12 0 1 0 7 0 2 0 0 0 
Bulgaria Israel 2001 13 0 2 0 7 0 2 0 0 0 
Israel MERCOSUR 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Colombia Israel 2013 14 0 2 0 8 0 1 0 0 0 
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Appendix 14: Descriptive Statistics – Detailed Coding Profile South Korea 


































































































































































Protocol on Trade Negotiations (PTN) 1971 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bangkok Agreement 1975 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) 1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile Korea 2003 13 6 5 4 2 2 4 3 0 0 
Korea Singapore 2005 17 1 4 1 7 0 3 0 0 0 
Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (Bangkok Agreement amended) 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EFTA Korea 2005 16 10 2 5 8 5 8 6 0 0 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Korea 2006 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Korea US 2007 20 12 6 6 6 6 19 33 16 0 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Korea services 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India Korea 2009 10 4 4 4 0 0 3 0 0 0 
EC Korea 2010 16 12 3 6 9 6 14 30 17 0 
Korea Peru 2011 15 7 4 4 3 3 17 7 3 0 
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Korea Turkey 2012 15 8 3 5 8 3 18 8 1 0 
Colombia Korea 2013 16 8 4 4 4 4 18 11 4 0 
Australia Korea 2014 19 11 6 7 5 4 24 25 14 0 
Canada Korea 2014 21 10 5 5 8 5 14 26 14 0 
Korea New Zealand 2015 21 3 4 1 9 2 12 7 1 0 
Korea Vietnam 2015 21 9 5 5 8 4 13 13 9 0 
China Korea 2015 22 12 5 6 9 6 21 23 14 0 
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Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA) 1977 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) 1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) FTA 1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Services 1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Zealand Singapore 2000 6 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Japan Singapore 2002 15 1 2 1 7 0 1 0 0 0 
EFTA Singapore 2002 20 8 3 5 8 3 7 4 0 0 
Australia Singapore 2003 19 1 4 0 9 1 5 1 1 0 
Singapore US 2003 18 11 5 5 6 6 14 27 15 0 
Jordan Singapore 2004 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations China 2004 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India Singapore 2005 9 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Trans-Pacific Strategic EPA (TPSEP) 2005 13 1 1 0 8 1 6 2 0 0 







































































































































































Panama Singapore 2006 7 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Korea 2006 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations China Services 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Korea services 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Japan 2008 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Peru Singapore 2008 9 1 2 0 1 1 1 3 0 0 
China Singapore 2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Singapore 2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Goods 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Australia New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA) 2009 21 7 5 3 9 4 12 5 0 0 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations India 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Costa Rica Singapore 2010 13 3 3 1 3 2 12 3 0 0 
Singapore Taiwan 2013 15 0 2 0 7 0 1 0 0 0 
Singapore Turkey 2015 20 9 5 4 8 5 19 5 0 0 







































































































































































Australia Singapore 2016 22 6 4 4 11 2 16 9 5 0 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) 2018 24 15 5 6 11 9 17 35 21 0 
Singapore Sri Lanka 2018 24 9 5 4 12 5 10 2 0 0 
EC Singapore 2018 17 9 5 4 8 5 15 28 15 0 
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Panama Taiwan 2003 15 6 4 2 4 4 9 7 0 1 
Guatemala Taiwan 2005 19 4 4 2 8 2 2 2 0 0 
Nicaragua Taiwan 2006 22 11 5 4 10 7 10 8 1 0 
El Salvador Honduras Taiwan 2007 6 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
New Zealand Taiwan 2013 19 3 4 1 8 2 1 1 0 0 
Singapore Taiwan 2013 15 0 2 0 7 0 1 0 0 0 
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Appendix 17: List of Net Bilateral Aid from DAC Donors 
 

























25 South Korea 
26 Sweden 
27 Switzerland 
28 United Kingdom 
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Appendix 18: Descriptive Statistics of the Indexes Based on Binary and Additive Variables 
(Design Data) 
Variables NAs Min Max Median Mean Std.Dev. 
Independent Variables       
Path Dependency       
Indexes based on binary IPR scope mentioned pl       
Copyrights and Related Rights 0 0 44 2.00 3.66 6.53 
Trademarks 0 0 44 2.00 3.69 6.69 
Geographical Indication 0 0 44 2.00 3.56 6.55 
Industrial Designs 0 0 44 2.00 3.59 6.71 
Patents 0 0 44 2.00 3.63 6.70 
Undisclosed Information 0 0 44 2.00 3.54 6.55 
Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits 0 0 44 1.00 3.41 6.57 
New Plant Varieties 0 0 44 1.00 2.88 6.25 
Traditional Knowledge & Genetic Resources 0 0 31 0 1.14 4.38 
Encrypted Program-carrying Satellite Signals 0 0 33 0 2.45 5.72 
Domain Names 0 0 11 0 0.28 0.83 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible pl       
Copyrights and Related Rights 0 0 33 0 2.54 5.49 
Trademarks 0 0 33 1.00 2.65 5.87 
Geographical Indication 0 0 33 0 1.75 5.17 
Industrial Designs 0 0 32 1.00 2.74 5.89 
Patents 0 0 33 1.00 2.73 5.90 
Undisclosed Information 0 0 33 0 1.67 4.69 
Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits 0 0 29 0 1.88 4.86 
New Plant Varieties 0 0 29 0 2.15 5.73 
Traditional Knowledge & Genetic Resources 0 0 31 0 0.91 4.24 
Encrypted Program-carrying Satellite Signals 0 0 11 0 0.46 1.03 
Domain Names 0 0 11 0 0.28 0.83 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible pdw s       
Copyrights and Related Rights 0 0 1.00 0 0.14 0.35 
Trademarks 0 0 1.00 0 0.15 0.36 
Geographical Indication 0 0 1.00 0 0.17 0.38 
Industrial Designs 0 0 1.00 0 0.10 0.30 
Patents 0 0 1.00 0 0.13 0.34 
Undisclosed Information 0 0 1.00 0 0.08 0.27 
Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits 0 0 1.00 0 0.01 0.11 
New Plant Varieties 0 0 1.00 0 0.02 0.16 
Traditional Knowledge & Genetic Resources 0 0 1.00 0 0.04 0.21 
Encrypted Program-carrying Satellite Signals 0 0 1.00 0 0.05 0.21 
Domain Names 0 0 1.00 0 0.03 0.17 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible pdw f       
Copyrights and Related Rights 54 0 1.00 0 0.14 0.35 
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Variables NAs Min Max Median Mean Std.Dev. 
Geographical Indication 54 0 1.00 0 0.18 0.38 
Industrial Designs 54 0 1.00 0 0.11 0.31 
Patents 54 0 1.00 0 0.14 0.35 
Undisclosed Information 54 0 1.00 0 0.08 0.28 
Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits 54 0 1.00 0 0.01 0.12 
New Plant Varieties 54 0 1.00 0 0.03 0.16 
Traditional Knowledge & Genetic Resources 54 0 1.00 0 0.04 0.20 
Encrypted Program-carrying Satellite Signals 54 0 1.00 0 0.05 0.22 
Domain Names 54 0 1.00 0 0.03 0.17 
Indexes based on additive TRIPS-plus categories pd       
Copyrights and Related Rights 0 0 33 0 2.34 5.33 
Trademarks 0 0 33 0 2.57 5.87 
Geographical Indication 0 0 33 1.00 2.42 5.44 
Industrial Designs 0 0 32 1.00 2.65 5.87 
Patents 0 0 33 0 2.33 5.57 
Undisclosed Information 0 0 33 0 1.17 4.10 
Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits 0 0 4.00 0 0.13 0.41 
New Plant Varieties 0 0 33 1.00 2.73 5.89 
Traditional Knowledge & Genetic Resources 0 0 31 0 0.84 4.24 
Encrypted Program-carrying Satellite Signals 0 0 11 0 0.47 1.04 
Domain Names 0 0 11 0 0.28 0.83 
Enforcement 0 0 33 1.00 2.40 5.47 
Exhaustion 0 0 28 0 1.80 5.03 
Indexes based on additive TRIPS-plus categories pdw 
s 
      
Copyrights and Related Rights 0 0 1.00 0 0.06 0.23 
Trademarks 0 0 1.00 0 0.06 0.23 
Geographical Indication 0 0 1.00 0 0.02 0.15 
Industrial Designs 0 0 1.00 0 0.22 0.42 
Patents 0 0 1.00 0 0.10 0.30 
Undisclosed Information 0 0 1.00 0 0.12 0.32 
Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits 0 0 1.00 0 0.15 0.36 
New Plant Varieties 0 0 1.00 0 0.08 0.28 
Traditional Knowledge & Genetic Resources 0 0 1.00 0 0.09 0.28 
Encrypted Program-carrying Satellite Signals 0 0 1.00 0 0.08 0.27 
Domain Names 0 0 1.00 0 0 0.07 
Enforcement 0 0 1.00 0 0.15 0.36 
Exhaustion 0 0 1.00 0 0.04 0.20 
Indexes based on additive TRIPS-plus categories pdw 
f 
      
Copyrights and Related Rights 54 0 1.00 0 0.06 0.24 
Trademarks 54 0 1.00 0 0.06 0.24 
Geographical Indication 54 0 1.00 0 0.02 0.15 
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Variables NAs Min Max Median Mean Std.Dev. 
Patents 54 0 1.00 0 0.10 0.30 
Undisclosed Information 54 0 1.00 0 0.12 0.32 
Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits 54 0 1.00 0 0.15 0.36 
New Plant Varieties 54 0 1.00 0 0.09 0.28 
Traditional Knowledge & Genetic Resources 54 0 1.00 0 0.09 0.28 
Encrypted Program-carrying Satellite Signals 54 0 1.00 0 0.08 0.27 
Domain Names 54 0 1.00 0 0.01 0.07 
Enforcement 54 0 1.00 0 0.16 0.36 






- 130 - 
Appendix 19: Model Fit of Design Analysis (AIC & BIC) 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m1ols_f 3249.26 36 3405.89 36 
m1op_f 2297.79 59 2554.49 59 
m1p_f 3716.51 35 3868.79 35 
m1nb_f 2961.15 36 3117.78 36 
m1hp_f 2417.90 70 2722.46 70 
m1hnb_f 2383.21 71 2692.12 71 
m1zip_f 2418.28 70 2722.85 70 
m1zinb_f 2364.92 71 2673.83 71 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2ols_f 2643.39 32 2782.61 32 
m2op_f 1481.51 41 1659.90 41 
m2p_f 2492.97 31 2627.85 31 
m2nb_f 2133.31 32 2272.54 32 
m2hp_f 1627.71 62 1897.47 62 
m2hnb_f 1629.78 63 1903.89 63 
m2zip_f 1623.62 62 1893.38 62 
m2zinb_f 1625.62 63 1899.73 63 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3aols_f 437.56 23 537.63 23 
m3aop_f 435.08 20 522.09 20 
m3ap_f 769.12 22 864.84 22 
m3anb_f 771.13 23 871.20 23 
m3ahp_f 477.59 44 669.03 44 
m3ahnb_f 480.36 45 676.15 45 
m3azinb_f 719.91 45 915.70 45 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3bols_f 432.78 22 528.50 22 
m3bop_f 434.78 21 526.15 21 
m3bp_f 752.52 21 843.89 21 
m3bnb_f 754.54 22 850.26 22 
m3bhp_f 476.24 42 658.97 42 
m3bhnb_f 478.33 43 665.41 43 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3cols_f 358.65 26 471.77 26 
m3cop_f 354.57 25 463.34 25 
m3cp_f 731.20 25 839.97 25 
m3cnb_f 733.21 26 846.34 26 
m3chp_f 403.95 50 621.49 50 
m3chnb_f 406.13 51 628.02 51 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3dols_f 500.66 28 622.48 28 
m3dop_f 488.59 27 606.06 27 
m3dp_f 695.63 27 813.10 27 
m3dnb_f 697.64 28 819.47 28 
m3dhp_f 542.55 54 777.50 54 
m3dhnb_f 544.58 55 783.88 55 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3eols_f 482.13 26 595.25 26 
m3eop_f 476.18 25 584.95 25 
m3ep_f 735.13 25 843.90 25 
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m3ehp_f 525.27 50 742.81 50 
m3ehnb_f 528.18 51 750.07 51 
m3ezinb_f 702.57 51 924.47 51 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3fols_f 464.88 27 582.35 27 
m3fop_f 452.66 26 565.78 26 
m3fp_f 657.68 26 770.80 26 
m3fnb_f 659.71 27 777.18 27 
m3fhp_f 504.66 52 730.90 52 
m3fhnb_f 506.66 53 737.25 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3gols_f 419.54 28 541.36 28 
m3gop_f 414.93 27 532.40 27 
m3gp_f 627.80 27 745.28 27 
m3gnb_f 629.83 28 751.65 28 
m3ghp_f 468.93 54 703.88 54 
m3gzinb_f 578.95 55 818.25 55 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3hols_f 314.40 23 414.47 23 
m3hop_f 382.71 22 478.43 22 
m3hp_f 445.00 22 540.72 22 
m3hnb_f 447.02 23 547.09 23 
m3hhp_f 425.92 44 617.36 44 
m3hhnb_f 428.71 45 624.50 45 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3iols_f -97.93 23 2.14 23 
m3iop_f 190.16 22 285.88 22 
m3ip_f 219.06 22 314.78 22 
m3inb_f 221.07 23 321.14 23 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3jols_f -189.35 27 -71.88 27 
m3jop_f 136.19 26 249.31 26 
m3jp_f 181.75 26 294.88 26 
m3jnb_f 183.76 27 301.23 27 
m3jhnb_f 189.42 53 420.02 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3kols_f -531.64 21 -440.28 21 
m3kop_f 78.86 20 165.88 20 
m3kp_f 100.83 20 187.85 20 
m3knb_f 102.84 21 194.21 21 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4ols_f 1515.78 29 1641.95 29 
m4op_f 1096.54 33 1240.12 33 
m4p_f 1193.10 28 1314.92 28 
m4nb_f 1195.10 29 1321.28 29 
m4hp_f 1059.20 56 1302.85 56 
m4hnb_f 1061.20 57 1309.20 57 
m4zip_f 1034.74 56 1278.39 56 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5ols_f 3385.68 33 3529.26 33 
m5op_f 2042.93 55 2282.23 55 
m5p_f 3437.45 32 3576.68 32 
m5nb_f 2273.59 33 2417.17 33 
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m6epa1_ols 1659.95 23 1751.29 23 
m6epa1_op 555.21 36 698.18 36 
m6epa1_p 830.38 22 917.75 22 
m6epa1_nb 678.57 23 769.91 23 
m6epa1_hp 612.87 44 787.61 44 
m6epa1_hnb 611.61 45 790.32 45 
m6epa1_zip 605.86 44 780.59 44 
m6epa1_zinb 594.05 45 772.76 45 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m6epa2_ols 1698.57 23 1789.91 23 
m6epa2_op 578.63 36 721.60 36 
m6epa2_p 840.13 22 927.50 22 
m6epa2_nb 694.62 23 785.96 23 
m6epa2_hp 631.68 44 806.42 44 
m6epa2_hnb 629.26 45 807.97 45 
m6epa2_zip 616.59 44 791.33 44 
m6epa2_zinb 584.09 45 762.79 45 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m6di1_ols 2237.63 36 2391.39 36 
m6di1_op 759.06 49 968.34 49 
m6di1_p 1191.38 35 1340.87 35 
m6di1_nb 982.09 36 1135.85 36 
m6di1_hp 831.23 70 1130.20 70 
m6di1_hnb 833.23 71 1136.47 71 
m6di1_zip 830.80 70 1129.77 70 
m6di1_zinb 832.80 71 1136.04 71 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m6pdg1_ols 2237.67 27 2352.98 27 
m6pdg1_op 775.52 40 946.36 40 
m6pdg1_p 1276.11 26 1387.15 26 
m6pdg1_nb 1005.13 27 1120.44 27 
m6pdg1_hp 813.77 52 1035.86 52 
m6pdg1_hnb 815.32 53 1041.68 53 
m6pdg1_zip 814.15 52 1036.24 52 
m6pdg1_zinb 815.71 53 1042.07 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m6pds1_ols 2212.58 26 2323.62 26 
m6pds1_op 766.00 39 932.57 39 
m6pds1_p 1258.28 25 1365.06 25 
m6pds1_nb 974.90 26 1085.94 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m6pds1.2_ols 2237.34 20 2322.76 20 
m6pds1.2_op 774.22 33 915.16 33 
m6pds1.2_p 1315.50 19 1396.65 19 
m6pds1.2_nb 996.77 20 1082.19 20 
m6pds1.2_hp 852.77 38 1015.06 38 
m6pds1.2_hnb 849.62 39 1016.19 39 
m6pds1.2_zip 848.60 38 1010.90 38 
m6pds1.2_zinb 850.30 39 1016.87 39 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m6pdtp1_ols 2232.60 26 2343.65 26 
m6pdtp1_op 783.87 39 950.44 39 
m6pdtp1_p 1274.62 25 1381.40 25 
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m6pdtp1_hp 837.68 50 1051.23 50 
m6pdtp1_hnb 839.05 51 1056.87 51 
m6pdtp1_zip 829.91 50 1043.46 50 
m6pdtp1_zinb 831.22 51 1049.05 51 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m6pdwss1_ols -31420.19 26 -31309.14 26 
m6pdwss1_op 78.00 39 244.57 39 
m6pdwss1_p 820.11 25 926.88 25 
m6pdwss1_nb 791.30 26 902.35 26 
m6pdwss1_hp 513.92 50 727.47 50 
m6pdwss1_hnb 515.92 51 733.75 51 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m6pdwstp1_ols 1461.96 25 1568.74 25 
m6pdwstp1_op 567.76 38 730.05 38 
m6pdwstp1_p 680.51 24 783.01 24 
m6pdwstp1_nb 682.56 25 789.33 25 
m6pdwstp1_hp 650.03 48 855.04 48 
m6pdwstp1_hnb 652.03 49 861.31 49 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m6pdwfs1_ols -29598.11 26 -29489.37 26 
m6pdwfs1_op 76.00 38 234.92 38 
m6pdwfs1_p 783.65 25 888.20 25 
m6pdwfs1_nb 758.48 26 867.21 26 
m6pdwfs1_hp 497.11 50 706.21 50 
m6pdwfs1_hnb 499.11 51 712.39 51 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m6pdwftp1_ols 1382.68 24 1483.05 24 
m6pdwftp1_op 547.09 36 697.64 36 
m6pdwftp1_p 658.15 23 754.33 23 
m6pdwftp1_nb 660.19 24 760.56 24 
m6pdwftp1_hp 628.09 46 820.46 46 
m6pdwftp1_hnb 630.09 47 826.64 47 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m7epa3_ols 880.91 24 976.22 24 
m7epa3_op 371.37 31 494.48 31 
m7epa3_p 473.50 23 564.83 23 
m7epa3_nb 466.47 24 561.78 24 
m7epa3_hp 385.38 46 568.06 46 
m7epa3_hnb 387.38 47 574.03 47 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m7di3_ols 1240.18 37 1398.21 37 
m7di3_op 518.60 44 706.52 44 
m7di3_p 667.11 36 820.87 36 
m7di3_nb 660.10 37 818.12 37 
m7di3_hp 561.32 72 868.83 72 
m7di3_hnb 563.32 73 875.10 73 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m7di4_ols 1257.97 37 1416.00 37 
m7di4_op 532.28 44 720.20 44 
m7di4_p 675.53 36 829.28 36 
m7di4_nb 668.82 37 826.84 37 
m7di4_hp 560.45 72 867.96 72 
m7di4_hnb 562.45 73 874.24 73 
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m7pdg3_ols 1239.05 28 1358.64 28 
m7pdg3_op 527.99 35 677.48 35 
m7pdg3_p 686.78 27 802.10 27 
m7pdg3_nb 670.45 28 790.04 28 
m7pdg3_hp 541.78 54 772.42 54 
m7pdg3_hnb 543.78 55 778.69 55 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m7pds3_ols 1229.72 27 1345.03 27 
m7pds3_op 522.05 34 667.26 34 
m7pds3_p 679.73 26 790.78 26 
m7pds3_nb 661.79 27 777.10 27 
m7pds3_hp 547.01 52 769.10 52 
m7pds3_hnb 549.01 53 775.38 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m7pds3.2_ols 1228.38 23 1326.61 23 
m7pds3.2_op 519.27 30 647.40 30 
m7pds3.2_p 687.48 22 781.44 22 
m7pds3.2_nb 666.96 23 765.20 23 
m7pds3.2_hp 536.63 44 724.56 44 
m7pds3.2_hnb 538.63 45 730.83 45 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m7pdtp3_ols 1216.51 27 1331.83 27 
m7pdtp3_op 524.58 34 669.79 34 
m7pdtp3_p 677.10 26 788.14 26 
m7pdtp3_nb 665.26 27 780.57 27 
m7pdtp3_hp 540.51 52 762.60 52 
m7pdtp3_hnb 542.51 53 768.87 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m7pdwss1_ols -32765.36 27 -32650.05 27 
m7pdwss1_op 68.00 34 213.21 34 
m7pdwss1_p 546.88 26 657.93 26 
m7pdwss1_nb 548.89 27 664.21 27 
m7pdwss1_hp 399.10 52 621.19 52 
m7pdwss1_hnb 401.10 53 627.47 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m7pdwstp3_ols 804.42 26 915.47 26 
m7pdwstp3_op 380.37 33 521.31 33 
m7pdwstp3_p 466.58 25 573.35 25 
m7pdwstp3_nb 468.65 26 579.69 26 
m7pdwstp3_hp 455.30 50 668.85 50 
m7pdwstp3_hnb 457.30 51 675.12 51 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m7pdwfs1_ols -28980.37 27 -28867.45 27 
m7pdwfs1_op 66.00 33 204.01 33 
m7pdwfs1_p 522.52 26 631.26 26 
m7pdwfs1_nb 524.53 27 637.45 27 
m7pdwfs1_hp 384.69 52 602.16 52 
m7pdwfs1_hnb 386.69 53 608.34 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m7pdwftp3_ols 732.61 25 837.17 25 
m7pdwftp3_op 355.06 31 484.71 31 
m7pdwftp3_p 447.32 24 547.69 24 
m7pdwftp3_nb 449.39 25 553.94 25 
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m7pdwftp3_hnb 440.78 49 645.70 49 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8aepa1_ols -244.54 24 -149.23 24 
m8aepa1_op 95.15 23 186.48 23 
m8aepa1_p 180.69 23 272.03 23 
m8aepa1_nb 182.70 24 278.01 24 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8adi1_ols -281.32 37 -123.29 37 
m8adi1_op 124.39 36 278.15 36 
m8adi1_p 260.41 36 414.16 36 
m8adi1_nb 262.41 37 420.44 37 
m8adi1_hp 196.39 72 503.90 72 
m8adi1_hnb 198.39 73 510.17 73 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8apdg2_ols -289.62 27 -174.31 27 
m8apdg2_op 135.51 26 246.55 26 
m8apdg2_p 252.92 26 363.96 26 
m8apdg2_nb 254.92 27 370.24 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8apds2_ols -302.57 27 -187.25 27 
m8apds2_op 110.34 26 221.38 26 
m8apds2_p 248.93 26 359.98 26 
m8apds2_nb 250.94 27 366.25 27 
m8apds2_hp 161.73 52 383.82 52 
m8apds2_hnb 164.30 53 390.66 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8apdtp1_ols -318.43 27 -203.11 27 
m8apdtp1_op 105.64 26 216.69 26 
m8apdtp1_p 239.81 26 350.85 26 
m8apdtp1_nb 241.81 27 357.13 27 
m8apdtp1_hp 157.64 52 379.74 52 
m8apdtp1_hnb 159.64 53 386.01 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8apdwss2_ols -34944.15 27 -34828.83 27 
m8apdwss2_op 52.00 26 163.05 26 
m8apdwss2_p 178.00 26 289.05 26 
m8apdwss2_nb 180.00 27 295.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8apdwss2_ols -34944.15 27 -34828.83 27 
m8apdwss2_op 52.00 26 163.05 26 
m8apdwss2_p 178.00 26 289.05 26 
m8apdwss2_nb 180.00 27 295.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8apdwstp1_ols -662.01 26 -550.96 26 
m8apdwstp1_op 50.00 25 156.77 25 
m8apdwstp1_p 204.65 25 311.42 25 
m8apdwstp1_nb 206.65 26 317.69 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8apdwfs2_ols -30582.73 27 -30469.81 27 
m8apdwfs2_op 52.00 26 160.73 26 
m8apdwfs2_p 170.00 26 278.73 26 
m8apdwfs2_nb 172.00 27 284.92 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
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m8apdwftp1_op 63.95 24 164.32 24 
m8apdwftp1_p 194.53 24 294.90 24 
m8apdwftp1_nb 196.53 25 301.09 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8bepa3_ols -246.53 24 -151.22 24 
m8bepa3_op 87.32 23 178.66 23 
m8bepa3_p 193.75 23 285.09 23 
m8bepa3_nb 195.76 24 291.07 24 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8bdi2_ols -348.16 37 -190.13 37 
m8bdi2_op 72.00 36 225.76 36 
m8bdi2_p 265.99 36 419.74 36 
m8bdi2_nb 267.99 37 426.02 37 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8bpdg2_ols -330.84 28 -211.25 28 
m8bpdg2_op 114.38 27 229.70 27 
m8bpdg2_p 262.60 27 377.91 27 
m8bpdg2_nb 264.60 28 384.19 28 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8bpds2_ols -353.12 27 -237.81 27 
m8bpds2_op 109.79 26 220.83 26 
m8bpds2_p 255.95 26 366.99 26 
m8bpds2_nb 257.95 27 373.27 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8bpdtp2_ols -354.41 27 -239.09 27 
m8bpdtp2_op 96.31 26 207.36 26 
m8bpdtp2_p 258.68 26 369.73 26 
m8bpdtp2_nb 260.69 27 376.00 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8bpdwss2_ols -33634.99 27 -33519.67 27 
m8bpdwss2_op 52.00 26 163.05 26 
m8bpdwss2_p 190.00 26 301.05 26 
m8bpdwss2_nb 192.00 27 307.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8bpdwstp2_ols -568.77 26 -457.72 26 
m8bpdwstp2_op 50.00 25 156.77 25 
m8bpdwstp2_p 231.85 25 338.63 25 
m8bpdwstp2_nb 233.88 26 344.92 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8bpdwfs2_ols -31332.05 27 -31219.13 27 
m8bpdwfs2_op 52.00 26 160.73 26 
m8bpdwfs2_p 182.00 26 290.73 26 
m8bpdwfs2_nb 184.00 27 296.92 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8bpdwftp3_ols -499.90 25 -395.35 25 
m8bpdwftp3_op 48.00 24 148.37 24 
m8bpdwftp3_p 220.11 24 320.48 24 
m8bpdwftp3_nb 222.14 25 326.69 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8cepa3_ols -2.43 24 92.88 24 
m8cepa3_op 154.40 23 245.74 23 
m8cepa3_p 243.50 23 334.84 23 
m8cepa3_nb 245.50 24 340.81 24 
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m8cdi3_ols -21.91 37 136.12 37 
m8cdi3_op 183.44 36 337.20 36 
m8cdi3_p 312.16 36 465.92 36 
m8cdi3_nb 314.17 37 472.19 37 
m8cdi3_hp 255.44 72 562.95 72 
m8cdi3_hnb 257.44 73 569.22 73 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8cpdg3_ols -22.89 28 96.70 28 
m8cpdg3_op 185.47 27 300.79 27 
m8cpdg3_p 307.62 27 422.94 27 
m8cpdg3_nb 309.63 28 429.22 28 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8cpds3_ols -43.80 27 71.52 27 
m8cpds3_op 180.27 26 291.31 26 
m8cpds3_p 304.50 26 415.55 26 
m8cpds3_nb 306.51 27 421.82 27 
m8cpds3_hp 230.54 52 452.63 52 
m8cpds3_hnb 234.22 53 460.58 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8cpdtp3_ols -36.92 27 78.39 27 
m8cpdtp3_op 185.93 26 296.98 26 
m8cpdtp3_p 304.11 26 415.15 26 
m8cpdtp3_nb 306.11 27 421.43 27 
m8cpdtp3_hp 237.85 52 459.94 52 
m8cpdtp3_hnb 239.93 53 466.29 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8cpdwss2_ols -34354.72 27 -34239.40 27 
m8cpdwss2_op 52.00 26 163.05 26 
m8cpdwss2_p 208.00 26 319.05 26 
m8cpdwss2_nb 210.00 27 325.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8cpdwstp1_ols -432.55 26 -321.51 26 
m8cpdwstp1_op 105.52 25 212.30 25 
m8cpdwstp1_p 266.83 25 373.61 25 
m8cpdwstp1_nb 268.85 26 379.90 26 
m8cpdwstp1_hp 155.47 50 369.02 50 
m8cpdwstp1_hnb 157.52 51 375.34 51 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8cpdwfs2_ols -35652.82 27 -35539.91 27 
m8cpdwfs2_op 52.00 26 160.73 26 
m8cpdwfs2_p 202.00 26 310.73 26 
m8cpdwfs2_nb 204.00 27 316.92 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8cpdwftp1_ols -274.25 25 -169.70 25 
m8cpdwftp1_op 126.66 24 227.03 24 
m8cpdwftp1_p 260.56 24 360.93 24 
m8cpdwftp1_nb 262.58 25 367.13 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8depa4_ols -293.51 24 -198.20 24 
m8depa4_op 46.00 23 137.34 23 
m8depa4_p 106.98 23 198.32 23 
m8depa4_nb 108.98 24 204.29 24 
Models AIC df BIC df 




- 138 - 
m8ddi4_op 118.40 36 272.15 36 
m8ddi4_p 194.85 36 348.60 36 
m8ddi4_nb 196.85 37 354.88 37 
m8ddi4_hp 189.91 72 497.43 72 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8dpdg4_ols -309.34 28 -189.75 28 
m8dpdg4_op 93.58 27 208.89 27 
m8dpdg4_p 171.95 27 287.26 27 
m8dpdg4_nb 173.95 28 293.54 28 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8dpds4_ols -328.07 27 -212.75 27 
m8dpds4_op 89.37 26 200.41 26 
m8dpds4_p 172.79 26 283.84 26 
m8dpds4_nb 174.79 27 290.11 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8dpdtp4_ols -354.80 27 -239.49 27 
m8dpdtp4_op 79.04 26 190.08 26 
m8dpdtp4_p 171.49 26 282.54 26 
m8dpdtp4_nb 173.49 27 288.81 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8dpdwss1_ols -33835.06 27 -33719.74 27 
m8dpdwss1_op 52.00 26 163.05 26 
m8dpdwss1_p 128.00 26 239.05 26 
m8dpdwss1_nb 130.00 27 245.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8dpdwstp4_ols -856.98 26 -745.93 26 
m8dpdwstp4_op 50.00 25 156.77 25 
m8dpdwstp4_p 148.74 25 255.51 25 
m8dpdwstp4_nb 150.74 26 261.79 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8dpdwfs1_ols -31099.32 27 -30986.40 27 
m8dpdwfs1_op 50.00 25 154.55 25 
m8dpdwfs1_p 124.00 26 232.73 26 
m8dpdwfs1_nb 126.00 27 238.92 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8dpdwftp4_ols -792.67 25 -688.12 25 
m8dpdwftp4_op 48.00 24 148.37 24 
m8dpdwftp4_p 140.88 24 241.25 24 
m8dpdwftp4_nb 142.88 25 247.43 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8eepa4_ols -346.14 24 -250.83 24 
m8eepa4_op 80.51 23 171.84 23 
m8eepa4_p 140.27 23 231.61 23 
m8eepa4_nb 142.28 24 237.59 24 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8edi3_ols -375.67 37 -217.64 37 
m8edi3_op 129.28 36 283.03 36 
m8edi3_p 234.01 36 387.77 36 
m8edi3_nb 236.02 37 394.05 37 
m8edi3_hp 201.28 72 508.79 72 
m8edi3_hnb 203.28 73 515.06 73 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8epdg3_ols -404.56 28 -284.97 28 
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m8epdg3_p 217.42 27 332.73 27 
m8epdg3_nb 219.42 28 339.01 28 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8epds3_ols -402.18 27 -286.86 27 
m8epds3_op 120.92 26 231.96 26 
m8epds3_p 217.98 26 329.02 26 
m8epds3_nb 219.99 27 335.30 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8epdtp3_ols -403.47 27 -288.16 27 
m8epdtp3_op 122.02 26 233.06 26 
m8epdtp3_p 217.96 26 329.00 26 
m8epdtp3_nb 219.97 27 335.28 27 
m8epdtp3_hp 173.59 52 395.69 52 
m8epdtp3_hnb 176.01 53 402.37 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8epdwss1_ols -35656.10 27 -35540.79 27 
m8epdwss1_op 52.00 26 163.05 26 
m8epdwss1_p 164.00 26 275.05 26 
m8epdwss1_nb 166.00 27 281.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8epdwstp3_ols -556.80 26 -445.76 26 
m8epdwstp3_op 77.77 25 184.54 25 
m8epdwstp3_p 201.09 25 307.86 25 
m8epdwstp3_nb 203.11 26 314.15 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8epdwfs1_ols -36047.45 27 -35934.53 27 
m8epdwfs1_op 50.00 25 154.55 25 
m8epdwfs1_p 160.00 26 268.73 26 
m8epdwfs1_nb 162.00 27 274.92 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8epdwftp3_ols -448.90 25 -344.34 25 
m8epdwftp3_op 77.73 24 178.10 24 
m8epdwftp3_p 194.95 24 295.32 24 
m8epdwftp3_nb 196.98 25 301.53 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8fepa3_ols -222.61 24 -127.30 24 
m8fepa3_op 96.60 23 187.94 23 
m8fepa3_p 116.27 23 207.61 23 
m8fepa3_nb 118.27 24 213.58 24 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8fdi3_ols -254.03 37 -96.00 37 
m8fdi3_op 123.41 36 277.17 36 
m8fdi3_p 173.40 36 327.16 36 
m8fdi3_nb 175.40 37 333.43 37 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8fpdg3_ols -270.14 28 -150.55 28 
m8fpdg3_op 123.44 27 238.76 27 
m8fpdg3_p 158.08 27 273.39 27 
m8fpdg3_nb 160.08 28 279.67 28 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8fpds3_ols -279.81 27 -164.49 27 
m8fpds3_op 126.01 26 237.06 26 
m8fpds3_p 162.25 26 273.30 26 
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m8fpds3_hp 178.00 52 400.09 52 
m8fpds3_hnb 180.01 53 406.37 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8fpdtp3_ols -261.40 27 -146.08 27 
m8fpdtp3_op 130.29 26 241.34 26 
m8fpdtp3_p 158.08 26 269.13 26 
m8fpdtp3_nb 160.09 27 275.40 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8fpdwss1_ols -34797.29 27 -34681.98 27 
m8fpdwss1_op 52.00 26 163.05 26 
m8fpdwss1_p 110.00 26 221.05 26 
m8fpdwss1_nb 112.00 27 227.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8fpdwstp3_ols -345.73 26 -234.69 26 
m8fpdwstp3_op 126.13 25 232.90 25 
m8fpdwstp3_p 154.96 25 261.74 25 
m8fpdwstp3_nb 156.97 26 268.01 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8fpdwfs1_ols -32535.93 27 -32423.01 27 
m8fpdwfs1_op 50.00 25 154.55 25 
m8fpdwfs1_p 106.00 26 214.73 26 
m8fpdwfs1_nb 108.00 27 220.92 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8fpdwftp3_ols -284.74 25 -180.18 25 
m8fpdwftp3_op 122.17 24 222.54 24 
m8fpdwftp3_p 147.44 24 247.81 24 
m8fpdwftp3_nb 149.44 25 253.99 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8gepa4_ols -690.74 24 -595.43 24 
m8gepa4_op 46.00 23 137.34 23 
m8gepa4_p 54.00 23 145.34 23 
m8gepa4_nb 56.00 24 151.31 24 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8gdi4_ols -967.11 37 -809.09 37 
m8gdi4_op 72.00 36 225.76 36 
m8gdi4_p 82.00 36 235.76 36 
m8gdi4_nb 84.00 37 242.03 37 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8gpdg4_ols -1022.65 28 -903.06 28 
m8gpdg4_op 54.00 27 169.32 27 
m8gpdg4_p 64.00 27 179.32 27 
m8gpdg4_nb 66.00 28 185.59 28 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8gpds3_ols -1037.00 27 -921.68 27 
m8gpds3_op 52.00 26 163.05 26 
m8gpds3_p 62.00 26 173.05 26 
m8gpds3_nb 64.00 27 179.32 27 
m8gpds3_hp 178.00 52 400.09 52 
m8gpds3_hnb 180.01 53 406.37 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8gpdtp3_ols -1019.73 27 -904.42 27 
m8gpdtp3_op 52.00 26 163.05 26 
m8gpdtp3_p 62.00 26 173.05 26 
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Models AIC df BIC df 
m8gpdwss1_ols -36318.11 27 -36202.80 27 
m8gpdwss1_op 52.00 26 163.05 26 
m8gpdwss1_p 62.00 26 173.05 26 
m8gpdwss1_nb 64.00 27 179.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8gpdwstp4_ols -1475.05 26 -1364.00 26 
m8gpdwstp4_op 50.00 25 156.77 25 
m8gpdwstp4_p 60.00 25 166.77 25 
m8gpdwstp4_nb 62.00 26 173.05 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8gpdwfs1_ols -32754.27 27 -32641.35 27 
m8gpdwfs1_op 50.00 25 154.55 25 
m8gpdwfs1_p 62.00 26 170.73 26 
m8gpdwfs1_nb 64.00 27 176.92 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8gpdwftp4_ols -1296.80 25 -1192.24 25 
m8gpdwftp4_op 48.00 24 148.37 24 
m8gpdwftp4_p 58.00 24 158.37 24 
m8gpdwftp4_nb 60.00 25 164.55 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8hepa4_ols -702.61 24 -607.30 24 
m8hepa4_op 46.00 23 137.34 23 
m8hepa4_p 54.00 23 145.34 23 
m8hepa4_nb 56.00 24 151.31 24 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8hdi4_ols -548.65 37 -390.62 37 
m8hdi4_op 72.00 36 225.76 36 
m8hdi4_p 96.00 36 249.76 36 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8hpdg3_ols -563.21 28 -443.62 28 
m8hpdg3_op 95.37 27 210.68 27 
m8hpdg3_p 104.63 27 219.95 27 
m8hpdg3_nb 106.63 28 226.22 28 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8hpds4_ols -584.09 27 -468.78 27 
m8hpds4_op 83.30 26 194.35 26 
m8hpds4_p 97.49 26 208.53 26 
m8hpds4_nb 99.49 27 214.81 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8hpdtp3_ols -619.23 27 -503.91 27 
m8hpdtp3_op 52.00 26 163.05 26 
m8hpdtp3_p 86.73 26 197.77 26 
m8hpdtp3_nb 88.73 27 204.04 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8hpdwss1_ols -35195.46 27 -35080.14 27 
m8hpdwss1_op 52.00 26 163.05 26 
m8hpdwss1_p 76.00 26 187.05 26 
m8hpdwss1_nb 78.00 27 193.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8hpdwstp3_ols -753.40 26 -642.35 26 
m8hpdwstp3_op 50.00 25 156.77 25 
m8hpdwstp3_p 74.00 25 180.77 25 
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Models AIC df BIC df 
m8hpdwfs1_ols -31779.96 27 -31667.04 27 
m8hpdwfs1_op 50.00 25 154.55 25 
m8hpdwfs1_p 76.00 26 184.73 26 
m8hpdwfs1_nb 78.00 27 190.92 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8hpdwftp3_ols -639.75 25 -535.20 25 
m8hpdwftp3_op 48.00 24 148.37 24 
m8hpdwftp3_p 72.00 24 172.37 24 
m8hpdwftp3_nb 74.00 25 178.55 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8iepa1_ols -290.89 24 -195.58 24 
m8iepa1_op 46.00 23 137.34 23 
m8iepa1_p 79.25 23 170.59 23 
m8iepa1_nb 81.25 24 176.56 24 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8idi1_ols -354.91 37 -196.89 37 
m8idi1_op 72.00 36 225.76 36 
m8idi1_p 114.00 36 267.76 36 
m8idi1_nb 116.00 37 274.03 37 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8ipdg1_ols -383.77 28 -264.18 28 
m8ipdg1_op 54.00 27 169.32 27 
m8ipdg1_p 113.89 27 229.21 27 
m8ipdg1_nb 115.89 28 235.48 28 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8ipds1_ols -409.88 27 -294.57 27 
m8ipds1_op 52.00 26 163.05 26 
m8ipds1_p 104.26 26 215.30 26 
m8ipds1_nb 106.26 27 221.57 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8ipdtp1_ols -435.03 27 -319.71 27 
m8ipdtp1_op 52.00 26 163.05 26 
m8ipdtp1_p 106.07 26 217.11 26 
m8ipdtp1_nb 108.07 27 223.38 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8ipdwss2_ols -36493.40 27 -36378.08 27 
m8ipdwss2_op 52.00 26 163.05 26 
m8ipdwss2_p 94.00 26 205.05 26 
m8ipdwss2_nb 96.00 27 211.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8ipdwstp4_ols -844.78 26 -733.74 26 
m8ipdwstp4_op 50.00 25 156.77 25 
m8ipdwstp4_p 107.85 25 214.62 25 
m8ipdwstp4_nb 109.85 26 220.90 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8ipdwfs2_ols -32949.71 27 -32836.79 27 
m8ipdwfs2_op 52.00 26 160.73 26 
m8ipdwfs2_p 88.00 26 196.73 26 
m8ipdwfs2_nb 90.00 27 202.92 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8ipdwftp4_ols -860.25 25 -755.70 25 
m8ipdwftp4_op 48.00 24 148.37 24 
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m8ipdwftp4_nb 99.50 25 204.05 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8jepa2_ols -286.29 24 -190.98 24 
m8jepa2_op 73.30 23 164.64 23 
m8jepa2_p 103.66 23 195.00 23 
m8jepa2_nb 105.67 24 200.98 24 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8jdi1_ols -415.18 37 -257.16 37 
m8jdi1_op 72.00 36 225.76 36 
m8jdi1_p 136.53 36 290.28 36 
m8jdi1_nb 138.53 37 296.56 37 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8jpdg1_ols -407.77 27 -292.45 27 
m8jpdg1_op 80.92 26 191.96 26 
m8jpdg1_p 125.94 26 236.99 26 
m8jpdg1_nb 127.94 27 243.26 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8jpds2_ols -454.09 27 -338.78 27 
m8jpds2_op 70.55 26 181.59 26 
m8jpds2_p 117.77 26 228.81 26 
m8jpds2_nb 119.77 27 235.09 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8jpdtp1_ols -516.45 27 -401.14 27 
m8jpdtp1_op 80.84 26 191.89 26 
m8jpdtp1_p 125.55 26 236.59 26 
m8jpdtp1_nb 127.55 27 242.86 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8jpdwss1_ols -34960.14 27 -34844.82 27 
m8jpdwss1_op 52.00 26 163.05 26 
m8jpdwss1_p 100.00 26 211.05 26 
m8jpdwss1_nb 102.00 27 217.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8jpdwstp1_ols -731.67 26 -620.63 26 
m8jpdwstp1_op 50.00 25 156.77 25 
m8jpdwstp1_p 104.73 25 211.51 25 
m8jpdwstp1_nb 106.73 26 217.78 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8jpdwfs1_ols -31674.66 27 -31561.74 27 
m8jpdwfs1_op 50.00 25 154.55 25 
m8jpdwfs1_p 98.00 26 206.73 26 
m8jpdwfs1_nb 100.00 27 212.92 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8jpdwftp1_ols -641.98 25 -537.43 25 
m8jpdwftp1_op 48.00 24 148.37 24 
m8jpdwftp1_p 100.65 24 201.02 24 
m8jpdwftp1_nb 102.65 25 207.20 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8kepa2_ols -467.71 24 -372.40 24 
m8kepa2_op 46.00 23 137.34 23 
m8kepa2_p 68.00 23 159.34 23 
m8kepa2_nb 70.00 24 165.31 24 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8kdi1_ols -602.71 37 -444.69 37 
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m8kdi1_p 104.00 36 257.76 36 
m8kdi1_nb 106.00 37 264.03 37 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8kpdg1_ols -632.58 28 -512.99 28 
m8kpdg1_op 54.00 27 169.32 27 
m8kpdg1_p 86.00 27 201.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8kpds1_ols -654.07 27 -538.75 27 
m8kpds1_op 52.00 26 163.05 26 
m8kpds1_p 84.00 26 195.05 26 
m8kpds1_nb 86.00 27 201.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8kpdtp1_ols -686.22 27 -570.91 27 
m8kpdtp1_op 52.00 26 163.05 26 
m8kpdtp1_p 84.00 26 195.05 26 
m8kpdtp1_nb 86.00 27 201.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8kpdwss1_ols -35701.70 27 -35586.38 27 
m8kpdwss1_op 52.00 26 163.05 26 
m8kpdwss1_p 84.00 26 195.05 26 
m8kpdwss1_nb 86.00 27 201.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8kpdwstp1_ols -905.10 26 -794.06 26 
m8kpdwstp1_op 50.00 25 156.77 25 
m8kpdwstp1_p 82.10 25 188.88 25 
m8kpdwstp1_nb 84.10 26 195.15 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8kpdwfs1_ols -31364.84 27 -31251.93 27 
m8kpdwfs1_op 50.00 25 154.55 25 
m8kpdwfs1_p 82.00 26 190.73 26 
m8kpdwfs1_nb 84.00 27 196.92 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m8kpdwftp1_ols -769.07 25 -664.52 25 
m8kpdwftp1_op 48.00 24 148.37 24 
m8kpdwftp1_p 78.16 24 178.53 24 
m8kpdwftp1_nb 80.16 25 184.71 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m9epa1_ols 1133.33 23 1224.67 23 
m9epa1_op 401.46 28 512.65 28 
m9epa1_p 520.71 22 608.08 22 
m9epa1_nb 506.25 23 597.59 23 
m9epa1_hp 459.23 44 633.97 44 
m9epa1_hnb 461.23 45 639.94 45 
m9epa1_zip 438.49 44 613.22 44 
m9epa1_zinb 440.49 45 619.20 45 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m9di1_ols 1514.28 36 1668.03 36 
m9di1_op 550.11 41 725.22 41 
m9di1_p 754.63 35 904.12 35 
m9di1_nb 741.50 36 895.25 36 
m9di1_hp 642.88 70 941.85 70 
m9di1_hnb 644.89 71 948.13 71 
m9di1_zip 602.61 70 901.58 70 
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m9pdg1_ols 1508.02 27 1623.34 27 
m9pdg1_op 545.11 32 681.78 32 
m9pdg1_p 784.56 26 895.60 26 
m9pdg1_nb 744.09 27 859.40 27 
m9pdg1_hp 624.46 52 846.55 52 
m9pdg1_hnb 626.46 53 852.82 53 
m9pdg1_zip 619.78 52 841.87 52 
m9pdg1_zinb 621.78 53 848.15 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m9pds1_ols 1480.07 26 1591.11 26 
m9pds1_op 534.21 31 666.61 31 
m9pds1_p 783.33 25 890.10 25 
m9pds1_nb 735.27 26 846.32 26 
m9pds1_hp 625.41 50 838.96 50 
m9pds1_hnb 627.41 51 845.23 51 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m9pds1.2_ols 1481.23 22 1575.19 22 
m9pds1.2_op 532.65 27 647.96 27 
m9pds1.2_p 796.79 21 886.48 21 
m9pds1.2_nb 742.33 22 836.29 22 
m9pds1.2_hp 619.50 42 798.89 42 
m9pds1.2_hnb 621.50 43 805.16 43 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m9pdtp1_ols 1507.00 26 1618.05 26 
m9pdtp1_op 560.27 31 692.67 31 
m9pdtp1_p 795.55 25 902.32 25 
m9pdtp1_nb 746.40 26 857.44 26 
m9pdtp1_hp 638.16 50 851.71 50 
m9pdtp1_hnb 640.16 51 857.98 51 
m9pdtp1_zip 632.24 50 845.79 50 
m9pdtp1_zinb 634.24 51 852.06 51 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m9pdwss1_ols -33038.18 26 -32927.13 26 
m9pdwss1_op 62.00 31 194.40 31 
m9pdwss1_p 560.16 25 666.93 25 
m9pdwss1_nb 562.16 26 673.21 26 
m9pdwss1_hp 397.97 50 611.52 50 
m9pdwss1_hnb 399.97 51 617.79 51 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m9pdwstp1_ols 988.96 25 1095.73 25 
m9pdwstp1_op 440.19 30 568.32 30 
m9pdwstp1_p 543.40 24 645.91 24 
m9pdwstp1_nb 545.45 25 652.22 25 
m9pdwstp1_hp 528.25 48 733.26 48 
m9pdwstp1_hnb 530.25 49 739.53 49 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m9pdwfs1_ols -30779.09 26 -30670.35 26 
m9pdwfs1_op 62.00 31 191.64 31 
m9pdwfs1_p 537.53 25 642.09 25 
m9pdwfs1_nb 539.54 26 648.27 26 
m9pdwfs1_hp 386.73 50 595.83 50 
m9pdwfs1_hnb 388.73 51 602.01 51 
Models AIC df BIC df 




- 146 - 
m9pdwftp1_op 427.71 29 548.99 29 
m9pdwftp1_p 525.22 23 621.40 23 
m9pdwftp1_nb 527.26 24 627.63 24 
m9pdwftp1_hp 512.23 46 704.60 46 
m9pdwftp1_hnb 514.23 47 710.79 47 
m9pdwftp1_zip 517.57 46 709.95 46 
m9pdwftp1_zinb 519.57 47 716.13 47 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m10epa1_ols 3323.58 23 3414.92 23 
m10epa1_op 1691.72 84 2025.30 84 
m10epa1_p 6667.51 22 6754.88 22 
m10epa1_nb 2090.04 23 2181.38 23 
m10epa1_hp 4157.54 44 4332.28 44 
m10epa1_hnb 1881.29 45 2060.00 45 
m10epa1_zip 4157.36 44 4332.10 44 
m10epa1_zinb 1867.45 45 2046.16 45 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m10di1_ols 4467.94 36 4621.69 36 
m10di1_op 2326.09 105 2774.54 105 
m10di1_p 8035.25 35 8184.73 35 
m10di1_nb 2876.42 36 3030.18 36 
m10di1_hp 4960.01 70 5258.98 70 
m10di1_hnb 2559.80 71 2863.04 71 
m10di1_zip 4959.94 70 5258.91 70 
m10di1_zinb 2542.53 71 2845.77 71 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m10pdg1_ols 4469.28 27 4584.60 27 
m10pdg1_op 2373.64 96 2783.65 96 
m10pdg1_p 9376.16 26 9487.20 26 
m10pdg1_nb 2877.22 27 2992.54 27 
m10pdg1_hp 5457.55 52 5679.64 52 
m10pdg1_hnb 2586.19 53 2812.55 53 
m10pdg1_zip 5457.54 52 5679.64 52 
m10pdg1_zinb 2574.57 53 2800.93 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m10pds1_ols 4448.10 26 4559.15 26 
m10pds1_op 2362.44 95 2768.18 95 
m10pds1_p 9065.73 25 9172.50 25 
m10pds1_nb 2890.37 26 3001.41 26 
m10pds1_hp 5375.93 50 5589.48 50 
m10pds1_hnb 2582.64 51 2800.46 51 
m10pds1_zip 5375.98 50 5589.53 50 
m10pds1_zinb 2575.81 51 2793.63 51 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m10pdtp1_ols 4494.66 26 4605.71 26 
m10pdtp1_op 2387.32 95 2793.06 95 
m10pdtp1_p 9690.26 25 9797.03 25 
m10pdtp1_nb 2892.01 26 3003.05 26 
m10pdtp1_hp 5717.76 50 5931.31 50 
m10pdtp1_hnb 2590.88 51 2808.70 51 
m10pdtp1_zip 5717.76 50 5931.31 50 
m10pdtp1_zinb 2579.41 51 2797.23 51 
Models AIC df BIC df 
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m10pdwss1_op 1471.59 95 1877.34 95 
m10pdwss1_p 4499.88 25 4606.65 25 
m10pdwss1_nb 4501.77 26 4612.81 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m10pdwstp1_ols 4438.85 25 4545.62 25 
m10pdwstp1_op 2394.73 94 2796.20 94 
m10pdwstp1_p 9753.01 24 9855.51 24 
m10pdwstp1_nb 2909.44 25 3016.21 25 
m10pdwstp1_hp 5504.62 48 5709.63 48 
m10pdwstp1_hnb 2598.73 49 2808.01 49 
m10pdwstp1_zip 5504.62 48 5709.63 48 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m10pdwfs1_ols 2619.04 26 2727.77 26 
m10pdwfs1_op 1432.68 95 1829.98 95 
m10pdwfs1_p 4185.61 25 4290.16 25 
m10pdwfs1_nb 4187.55 26 4296.29 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m10pdwftp2_ols 4106.92 24 4207.29 24 
m10pdwftp2_op 2329.56 93 2718.50 93 
m10pdwftp2_p 8955.10 23 9051.29 23 
m10pdwftp2_nb 2771.98 24 2872.35 24 
m10pdwftp2_hp 5355.16 46 5547.53 46 
m10pdwftp2_hnb 2513.01 47 2709.57 47 
m10pdwftp2_zip 5355.91 46 5548.29 46 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m11epa3_ols 2146.17 24 2241.48 24 
m11epa3_op 577.59 56 799.98 56 
m11epa3_p 972.44 23 1063.78 23 
m11epa3_nb 693.90 24 789.21 24 
m11epa3_hp 619.92 46 802.59 46 
m11epa3_hnb 576.46 47 763.11 47 
m11epa3_zip 621.66 46 804.34 46 
m11epa3_zinb 576.23 47 762.88 47 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m11di3_ols 2859.93 37 3017.96 37 
m11di3_op 732.19 70 1031.15 70 
m11di3_p 1159.83 36 1313.59 36 
m11di3_nb 926.51 37 1084.54 37 
m11di3_hp 741.62 72 1049.13 72 
m11di3_hnb 743.62 73 1055.40 73 
m11di3_zip 741.29 72 1048.81 72 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m11pdg3_ols 2858.82 28 2978.41 28 
m11pdg3_op 783.76 61 1044.29 61 
m11pdg3_p 1365.60 27 1480.91 27 
m11pdg3_hp 854.51 54 1085.15 54 
m11pdg3_hnb 791.20 55 1026.11 55 
m11pdg3_zip 853.67 54 1084.30 54 
m11pdg3_zinb 777.40 55 1012.30 55 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m11pds1_ols 2844.55 27 2959.87 27 
m11pds1_op 769.42 60 1025.68 60 
m11pds1_p 1248.20 26 1359.25 26 
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m11pds1_hp 828.54 52 1050.63 52 
m11pds1_hnb 791.23 53 1017.59 53 
m11pds1_zip 829.20 52 1051.29 52 
m11pds1_zinb 792.16 53 1018.53 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m11pdtp3_ols 2770.71 27 2886.03 27 
m11pdtp3_op 770.92 60 1027.17 60 
m11pdtp3_p 1276.70 26 1387.75 26 
m11pdtp3_nb 959.38 27 1074.70 27 
m11pdtp3_hp 785.06 52 1007.15 52 
m11pdtp3_hnb 770.20 53 996.56 53 
m11pdtp3_zip 774.56 52 996.66 52 
m11pdtp3_zinb 755.21 53 981.57 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m11pdwss1_ols 2359.13 27 2474.44 27 
m11pdwss1_op 612.91 60 869.17 60 
m11pdwss1_p 996.37 26 1107.41 26 
m11pdwss1_nb 868.98 27 984.29 27 
m11pdwss1_hp 613.40 52 835.49 52 
m11pdwss1_hnb 615.40 53 841.76 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m11pdwstp2_ols 2355.77 26 2466.81 26 
m11pdwstp2_op 566.48 59 818.46 59 
m11pdwstp2_p 568.58 25 675.36 25 
m11pdwstp2_nb 570.59 26 681.63 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m11pdwfs1_ols 2181.76 27 2294.68 27 
m11pdwfs1_op 592.90 59 839.65 59 
m11pdwfs1_p 941.56 26 1050.30 26 
m11pdwfs1_nb 828.55 27 941.47 27 
m11pdwfs1_hp 591.42 52 808.89 52 
m11pdwfs1_hnb 593.42 53 815.07 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m11pdwfs2_ols 2181.45 27 2294.37 27 
m11pdwfs2_op 593.37 59 840.12 59 
m11pdwfs2_p 941.00 26 1049.74 26 
m11pdwfs2_nb 825.08 27 938.00 27 
m11pdwfs2_hp 597.43 52 814.90 52 
m11pdwfs2_hnb 599.43 53 821.08 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m11pdwftp2_ols 2158.58 25 2263.14 25 
m11pdwftp2_op 534.72 57 773.10 57 
m11pdwftp2_p 532.89 24 633.26 24 
m11pdwftp2_nb 534.90 25 639.45 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12aepa1_ols 185.28 24 280.60 24 
m12aepa1_p 164.20 23 255.54 23 
m12aepa1_nb 166.20 24 261.51 24 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12adi1_ols 272.01 37 430.04 37 
m12adi1_op 165.44 38 327.74 38 
m12adi1_p 233.81 36 387.57 36 
m12adi1_nb 235.82 37 393.84 37 
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m12adi1_hnb 240.32 73 552.10 73 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12apdg1_ols 233.15 28 352.74 28 
m12apdg1_op 183.18 29 307.04 29 
m12apdg1_p 231.52 27 346.84 27 
m12apdg1_nb 233.53 28 353.11 28 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12apds4_ols 186.71 27 302.02 27 
m12apds4_p 224.96 26 336.01 26 
m12apds4_nb 226.96 27 342.28 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12apdtp4_ols 181.60 27 296.92 27 
m12apdtp4_p 222.38 26 333.43 26 
m12apdtp4_nb 224.39 27 339.70 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12apdwss1_ols -82.54 27 32.78 27 
m12apdwss1_op 133.82 28 253.40 28 
m12apdwss1_p 193.79 26 304.83 26 
m12apdwss1_nb 195.80 27 311.11 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12apdwstp2_ols -581.60 26 -470.55 26 
m12apdwstp2_op 54.00 27 169.32 27 
m12apdwstp2_p 164.48 25 271.25 25 
m12apdwstp2_nb 166.48 26 277.53 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12apdwfs1_ols -59.14 27 53.78 27 
m12apdwfs1_op 122.80 27 235.72 27 
m12apdwfs1_p 183.54 26 292.28 26 
m12apdwfs1_nb 185.55 27 298.47 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12apdwftp2_ols -488.03 25 -383.48 25 
m12apdwftp2_op 52.00 26 160.73 26 
m12apdwftp2_p 155.82 24 256.19 24 
m12apdwftp2_nb 157.82 25 262.37 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12bepa1_ols 668.69 24 764.00 24 
m12bepa1_op 171.72 26 274.97 26 
m12bepa1_p 194.23 23 285.57 23 
m12bepa1_nb 196.23 24 291.54 24 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12bdi4_ols 921.23 37 1079.25 37 
m12bdi4_op 201.06 40 371.90 40 
m12bdi4_p 261.27 36 415.03 36 
m12bdi4_nb 263.28 37 421.30 37 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12bpdg1_ols 890.94 28 1010.53 28 
m12bpdg1_op 240.67 31 373.07 31 
m12bpdg1_p 274.90 27 390.22 27 
m12bpdg1_nb 276.91 28 396.50 28 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12bpds1_ols 863.82 27 979.13 27 
m12bpds1_op 241.00 30 369.13 30 
m12bpds1_p 280.20 26 391.25 26 
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Models AIC df BIC df 
m12bpdtp3_ols 825.43 27 940.75 27 
m12bpdtp3_op 213.88 30 342.00 30 
m12bpdtp3_p 260.09 26 371.13 26 
m12bpdtp3_nb 262.09 27 377.41 27 
m12bpdtp3_hp 249.27 52 471.36 52 
m12bpdtp3_hnb 251.27 53 477.63 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12bpdwss1_ols 259.64 27 374.96 27 
m12bpdwss1_op 154.38 30 282.51 30 
m12bpdwss1_p 206.89 26 317.94 26 
m12bpdwss1_nb 208.90 27 324.21 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12bpdwstp3_ols 456.09 26 567.13 26 
m12bpdwstp3_p 187.39 25 294.16 25 
m12bpdwstp3_nb 189.39 26 300.44 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12bpdwfs1_ols 272.44 27 385.36 27 
m12bpdwfs1_p 198.08 26 306.82 26 
m12bpdwfs1_nb 200.08 27 313.00 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12bpdwftp3_ols 458.78 25 563.34 25 
m12bpdwftp3_p 177.80 24 278.17 24 
m12bpdwftp3_nb 179.81 25 284.36 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12cepa3_ols 978.96 24 1074.27 24 
m12cepa3_op 312.31 29 427.48 29 
m12cepa3_p 363.58 23 454.92 23 
m12cepa3_nb 353.99 24 449.30 24 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12cdi4_ols 1310.40 37 1468.42 37 
m12cdi4_op 420.66 42 600.04 42 
m12cdi4_p 484.23 36 637.99 36 
m12cdi4_nb 478.62 37 636.65 37 
m12cdi4_hp 470.01 72 777.52 72 
m12cdi4_hnb 472.21 73 783.99 73 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12cpdg3_ols 1269.15 28 1388.74 28 
m12cpdg3_p 542.15 27 657.47 27 
m12cpdg3_nb 501.45 28 621.04 28 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12cpds3_ols 1250.25 27 1365.56 27 
m12cpds3_op 435.07 32 571.74 32 
m12cpds3_p 536.57 26 647.62 26 
m12cpds3_nb 502.24 27 617.56 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12cpdtp3_ols 1213.12 27 1328.43 27 
m12cpdtp3_op 421.18 32 557.85 32 
m12cpdtp3_p 527.07 26 638.12 26 
m12cpdtp3_nb 493.13 27 608.45 27 
m12cpdtp3_hp 449.73 52 671.82 52 
m12cpdtp3_hnb 451.73 53 678.09 53 
Models AIC df BIC df 
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m12cpdwss1_op 317.82 32 454.49 32 
m12cpdwss1_p 389.60 26 500.64 26 
m12cpdwss1_nb 390.75 27 506.06 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12cpdwstp4_ols 740.16 26 851.21 26 
m12cpdwstp4_p 249.00 25 355.77 25 
m12cpdwstp4_nb 251.00 26 362.05 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12cpdwfs1_ols 994.28 27 1107.19 27 
m12cpdwfs1_op 299.34 32 433.16 32 
m12cpdwfs1_p 369.09 26 477.83 26 
m12cpdwfs1_nb 370.90 27 483.82 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12cpdwftp3_ols 1036.18 25 1140.74 25 
m12cpdwftp3_p 315.29 24 415.66 24 
m12cpdwftp3_nb 317.29 25 421.84 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12depa4_ols -357.34 24 -262.03 24 
m12depa4_p 86.59 23 177.93 23 
m12depa4_nb 88.59 24 183.90 24 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12ddi4_ols -306.62 37 -148.59 37 
m12ddi4_p 164.19 36 317.94 36 
m12ddi4_nb 166.19 37 324.22 37 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12dpdg3_ols -344.17 28 -224.59 28 
m12dpdg3_p 147.87 27 263.19 27 
m12dpdg3_nb 149.87 28 269.46 28 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12dpds4_ols -365.97 27 -250.65 27 
m12dpds4_op 77.12 26 188.17 26 
m12dpds4_p 155.14 26 266.18 26 
m12dpds4_nb 157.14 27 272.46 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12dpdtp4_ols -390.72 27 187.21 26 
m12dpdtp4_op 76.17 26 262.24 26 
m12dpdtp4_p 151.19 26 268.51 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12dpdwss1_ols -988.04 27 -872.72 27 
m12dpdwss1_p 115.89 26 226.94 26 
m12dpdwss1_nb 117.89 27 233.21 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12dpdwstp2_ols -35387.66 26 -35276.61 26 
m12dpdwstp2_p 110.00 25 216.77 25 
m12dpdwstp2_nb 112.00 26 223.05 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12dpdwfs1_ols -892.18 27 -779.27 27 
m12dpdwfs1_p 113.83 26 222.56 26 
m12dpdwfs1_nb 115.83 27 228.74 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12dpdwftp3_ols -32681.10 25 -32576.54 25 
m12dpdwftp3_p 106.00 24 206.37 24 
m12dpdwftp3_nb 108.00 25 212.55 25 
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m12eepa2_ols 802.64 24 897.95 24 
m12eepa2_p 162.76 23 254.10 23 
m12eepa2_nb 164.78 24 260.09 24 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12edi4_ols 1033.33 37 1191.35 37 
m12edi4_op 189.79 41 364.90 41 
m12edi4_p 226.93 36 380.68 36 
m12edi4_nb 228.93 37 386.96 37 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12epdg4_ols 1044.76 28 1164.35 28 
m12epdg4_op 217.34 32 354.01 32 
m12epdg4_p 228.19 27 343.51 27 
m12epdg4_nb 230.20 28 349.79 28 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12epds4_ols 1006.84 27 1122.15 27 
m12epds4_op 206.81 31 339.21 31 
m12epds4_p 219.84 26 330.88 26 
m12epds4_nb 221.85 27 337.16 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12epdtp4_ols 946.62 27 1061.94 27 
m12epdtp4_op 199.71 31 332.11 31 
m12epdtp4_p 219.31 26 330.36 26 
m12epdtp4_nb 221.32 27 336.64 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12epdwss2_ols 374.90 27 490.22 27 
m12epdwss2_op 162.63 31 295.03 31 
m12epdwss2_p 195.01 26 306.06 26 
m12epdwss2_nb 197.02 27 312.33 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12epdwstp1_ols 454.77 26 565.82 26 
m12epdwstp1_p 152.16 25 258.94 25 
m12epdwstp1_nb 154.16 26 265.21 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12epdwfs2_ols 384.08 27 497.00 27 
m12epdwfs2_op 155.01 31 284.65 31 
m12epdwfs2_p 185.98 26 294.72 26 
m12epdwfs2_nb 187.99 27 300.90 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12epdwftp1_ols 492.32 25 596.87 25 
m12epdwftp1_op 78.82 29 200.10 29 
m12epdwftp1_p 144.89 24 245.26 24 
m12epdwftp1_nb 146.89 25 251.45 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12fepa3_ols 405.51 24 500.82 24 
m12fepa3_p 149.76 23 241.10 23 
m12fepa3_nb 151.77 24 247.08 24 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12fdi4_ols 510.80 37 668.83 37 
m12fdi4_p 184.32 36 338.08 36 
m12fdi4_nb 186.32 37 344.35 37 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12fpdg2_ols 541.02 28 660.61 28 
m12fpdg2_p 209.23 27 324.55 27 
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Models AIC df BIC df 
m12fpds4_ols 483.79 27 599.10 27 
m12fpds4_p 196.61 26 307.65 26 
m12fpds4_nb 198.61 27 313.93 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12fpdtp4_ols 406.15 27 521.46 27 
m12fpdtp4_p 180.20 26 291.25 26 
m12fpdtp4_nb 182.20 27 297.52 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12fpdwss1_ols 88.47 27 203.79 27 
m12fpdwss1_op 100.83 29 224.69 29 
m12fpdwss1_p 152.35 26 263.39 26 
m12fpdwss1_nb 154.35 27 269.66 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12fpdwstp2_ols -67.54 26 43.51 26 
m12fpdwstp2_op 56.00 28 175.59 28 
m12fpdwstp2_p 131.73 25 238.51 25 
m12fpdwstp2_nb 133.73 26 244.78 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12fpdwfs2_ols 3.16 27 116.08 27 
m12fpdwfs2_op 93.96 28 211.06 28 
m12fpdwfs2_p 144.64 26 253.37 26 
m12fpdwfs2_nb 146.64 27 259.56 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12fpdwftp1_ols -389.20 25 -284.65 25 
m12fpdwftp1_op 52.00 26 160.73 26 
m12fpdwftp1_p 123.83 24 224.20 24 
m12fpdwftp1_nb 125.83 25 230.38 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12gepa3_ols -949.50 24 -854.19 24 
m12gepa3_p 50.00 23 141.34 23 
m12gepa3_nb 52.00 24 147.31 24 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12gdi4_ols -1419.17 37 -1261.14 37 
m12gdi4_p 76.00 36 229.76 36 
m12gdi4_nb 78.00 37 236.03 37 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12gpdg3_ols -1456.84 28 -1337.25 28 
m12gpdg3_p 58.00 27 173.32 27 
m12gpdg3_nb 60.00 28 179.59 28 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12gpds3_ols -1430.02 27 -1314.71 27 
m12gpds3_p 56.00 26 167.05 26 
m12gpds3_nb 58.00 27 173.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12gpdtp3_ols -1429.61 27 -1314.29 27 
m12gpdtp3_p 56.00 26 167.05 26 
m12gpdtp3_nb 58.00 27 173.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12gpdwss2_ols -1834.60 27 -1719.29 27 
m12gpdwss2_p 56.00 26 167.05 26 
m12gpdwss2_nb 58.00 27 173.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
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m12gpdwstp2_p 54.00 25 160.77 25 
m12gpdwstp2_nb 56.00 26 167.05 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12gpdwfs2_ols -1647.43 27 -1534.51 27 
m12gpdwfs2_p 56.00 26 164.73 26 
m12gpdwfs2_nb 58.00 27 170.92 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12gpdwftp2_ols -33957.54 25 -33852.99 25 
m12gpdwftp2_p 52.00 24 152.37 24 
m12gpdwftp2_nb 54.00 25 158.55 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12hepa3_ols -146.62 24 -51.31 24 
m12hepa3_op 119.34 24 214.65 24 
m12hepa3_p 187.20 23 278.54 23 
m12hepa3_nb 189.20 24 284.51 24 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12hdi3_ols -102.94 37 55.09 37 
m12hdi3_op 188.24 37 346.27 37 
m12hdi3_p 273.88 36 427.63 36 
m12hdi3_nb 275.88 37 433.91 37 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12hpdg3_ols -115.59 28 4.00 28 
m12hpdg3_op 180.32 28 299.90 28 
m12hpdg3_p 263.47 27 378.78 27 
m12hpdg3_nb 265.47 28 385.06 28 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12hpds3_ols -124.86 27 -9.54 27 
m12hpds3_op 183.28 27 298.59 27 
m12hpds3_p 263.55 26 374.59 26 
m12hpds3_nb 265.55 27 380.87 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12hpdtp3_ols -118.26 27 298.62 27 
m12hpdtp3_op 183.31 27 373.43 26 
m12hpdtp3_p 262.38 26 379.70 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12hpdwss1_ols -265.36 27 -150.05 27 
m12hpdwss1_op 137.56 27 252.88 27 
m12hpdwss1_p 250.49 26 361.53 26 
m12hpdwss1_nb 252.49 27 367.81 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12hpdwstp3_ols -1176.88 26 -1065.83 26 
m12hpdwstp3_p 182.01 25 288.78 25 
m12hpdwstp3_nb 184.01 26 295.05 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12hpdwfs1_ols -202.45 27 -89.53 27 
m12hpdwfs1_op 139.63 26 248.36 26 
m12hpdwfs1_p 242.05 26 350.79 26 
m12hpdwfs1_nb 244.06 27 356.97 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12hpdwftp3_ols -1033.65 25 -929.10 25 
m12hpdwftp3_p 175.98 24 276.35 24 
m12hpdwftp3_nb 177.98 25 282.54 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
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m12iepa3_p 104.47 23 195.81 23 
m12iepa3_nb 106.47 24 201.78 24 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12idi1_ols 1119.52 37 1277.54 37 
m12idi1_p 128.84 36 282.60 36 
m12idi1_nb 130.84 37 288.87 37 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12ipdg3_ols 1081.91 28 1201.50 28 
m12ipdg3_op 136.35 32 273.02 32 
m12ipdg3_p 166.41 27 281.73 27 
m12ipdg3_nb 168.42 28 288.00 28 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12ipds1_ols 1065.69 27 1181.01 27 
m12ipds1_p 151.02 26 262.07 26 
m12ipds1_nb 153.02 27 268.34 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12ipdtp1_ols 1068.81 27 1184.13 27 
m12ipdtp1_op 126.84 31 259.24 31 
m12ipdtp1_p 137.42 26 248.47 26 
m12ipdtp1_nb 139.43 27 254.75 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12ipdwss1_ols 662.57 27 777.89 27 
m12ipdwss1_p 120.46 26 231.51 26 
m12ipdwss1_nb 122.46 27 237.78 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12ipdwstp1_ols 399.10 26 510.15 26 
m12ipdwstp1_p 106.84 25 213.61 25 
m12ipdwstp1_nb 108.84 26 219.89 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12ipdwfs1_ols 562.60 27 675.52 27 
m12ipdwfs1_p 99.09 26 207.82 26 
m12ipdwfs1_nb 101.09 27 214.01 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12ipdwftp1_ols 362.20 25 466.75 25 
m12ipdwftp1_p 95.09 24 195.46 24 
m12ipdwftp1_nb 97.09 25 201.64 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12jepa2_ols -282.61 24 -187.30 24 
m12jepa2_p 106.03 23 197.37 23 
m12jepa2_nb 108.03 24 203.35 24 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12jdi1_ols -405.28 37 -247.26 37 
m12jdi1_p 139.08 36 292.83 36 
m12jdi1_nb 141.08 37 299.10 37 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12jpdg1_ols -402.82 28 -283.23 28 
m12jpdg1_op 80.56 27 195.88 27 
m12jpdg1_p 130.29 27 245.61 27 
m12jpdg1_nb 132.29 28 251.88 28 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12jpds3_ols -446.60 27 -331.28 27 
m12jpds3_p 116.62 26 227.66 26 
m12jpds3_nb 118.62 27 233.93 27 
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m12jpdtp2_ols -518.75 27 -403.43 27 
m12jpdtp2_op 78.70 26 189.75 26 
m12jpdtp2_p 126.65 26 237.70 26 
m12jpdtp2_nb 128.65 27 243.97 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12jpdwss1_ols -1829.16 27 -1713.84 27 
m12jpdwss1_p 105.33 26 216.38 26 
m12jpdwss1_nb 107.34 27 222.65 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12jpdwstp1_ols -742.08 26 -631.03 26 
m12jpdwstp1_p 105.15 25 211.93 25 
m12jpdwstp1_nb 107.16 26 218.20 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12jpdwfs1_ols -1628.79 27 -1515.87 27 
m12jpdwfs1_p 101.72 26 210.46 26 
m12jpdwfs1_nb 103.72 27 216.64 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12jpdwftp3_ols -647.25 25 -542.70 25 
m12jpdwftp3_p 101.32 24 201.69 24 
m12jpdwftp3_nb 103.32 25 207.88 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12kepa2_ols -467.71 24 -372.40 24 
m12kepa2_p 68.00 23 159.34 23 
m12kepa2_nb 70.00 24 165.31 24 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12kdi1_ols -602.71 37 -444.69 37 
m12kdi1_p 104.00 36 257.76 36 
m12kdi1_nb 106.00 37 264.03 37 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12kpdg1_ols -632.58 28 -512.99 28 
m12kpdg1_op 54.00 27 169.32 27 
m12kpdg1_p 86.00 27 201.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12kpds1_ols -654.07 27 -538.75 27 
m12kpds1_p 84.00 26 195.05 26 
m12kpds1_nb 86.00 27 201.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12kpdtp1_ols -686.22 27 -570.91 27 
m12kpdtp1_p 84.00 26 195.05 26 
m12kpdtp1_nb 86.00 27 201.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12kpdwss1_ols -35701.70 27 -35586.38 27 
m12kpdwss1_p 84.00 26 195.05 26 
m12kpdwss1_nb 86.00 27 201.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12kpdwstp1_ols -905.10 26 -794.06 26 
m12kpdwstp1_p 82.10 25 188.88 25 
m12kpdwstp1_nb 84.10 26 195.15 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12kpdwfs1_ols -31364.84 27 -31251.93 27 
m12kpdwfs1_p 82.00 26 190.73 26 
m12kpdwfs1_nb 84.00 27 196.92 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
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m12kpdwftp1_p 78.16 24 178.53 24 
m12kpdwftp1_nb 80.16 25 184.71 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12lepa2_ols 1715.52 24 1810.83 24 
m12lepa2_p 474.15 23 565.49 23 
m12lepa2_nb 438.85 24 534.16 24 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12ldi1_ols 2297.83 37 2455.85 37 
m12ldi1_op 433.04 55 667.94 55 
m12ldi1_p 669.25 36 823.01 36 
m12ldi1_nb 607.13 37 765.16 37 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12lpdg1_ols 2309.35 28 2428.94 28 
m12lpdg1_op 467.66 46 664.12 46 
m12lpdg1_p 744.05 27 859.37 27 
m12lpdg1_nb 622.75 28 742.34 28 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12lpds1_ols 2256.29 27 2371.60 27 
m12lpds1_op 450.90 45 643.10 45 
m12lpds1_p 707.84 26 818.88 26 
m12lpds1_nb 602.00 27 717.32 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12lpdtp1_ols 2201.57 27 2316.88 27 
m12lpdtp1_op 439.85 45 632.04 45 
m12lpdtp1_p 715.28 26 826.33 26 
m12lpdtp1_nb 611.91 27 727.23 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12lpdwss1_ols 1973.70 27 2089.02 27 
m12lpdwss1_op 404.04 45 596.23 45 
m12lpdwss1_p 613.79 26 724.83 26 
m12lpdwss1_nb 577.14 27 692.45 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12lpdwstp1_ols 2054.55 26 2165.60 26 
m12lpdwstp1_p 517.39 25 624.17 25 
m12lpdwstp1_nb 505.00 26 616.05 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12lpdwfs1_ols 1823.49 27 1936.41 27 
m12lpdwfs1_op 385.79 43 565.62 43 
m12lpdwfs1_p 586.48 26 695.21 26 
m12lpdwfs1_nb 550.36 27 663.28 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12lpdwftp2_ols 1913.72 25 2018.27 25 
m12lpdwftp2_p 483.83 24 584.20 24 
m12lpdwftp2_nb 473.45 25 578.00 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12mepa1_ols 423.79 24 519.10 24 
m12mepa1_op 46.00 23 137.34 23 
m12mepa1_p 53.31 23 144.65 23 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12mdi1_ols 511.22 37 669.25 37 
m12mdi1_p 86.92 36 240.68 36 
m12mdi1_nb 88.92 37 246.95 37 
Models AIC df BIC df 
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m12mpdg3_p 68.92 27 184.24 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12mpds1_ols 359.31 27 474.63 27 
m12mpds1_p 66.92 26 177.97 26 
m12mpds1_nb 68.92 27 184.24 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12mpdtp1_ols 407.04 27 522.35 27 
m12mpdtp1_p 66.92 26 177.97 26 
m12mpdtp1_nb 68.92 27 184.24 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12mpdwss1_ols 436.70 27 552.02 27 
m12mpdwss1_p 66.92 26 177.97 26 
m12mpdwss1_nb 68.92 27 184.24 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12mpdwstp1_ols 389.62 26 500.67 26 
m12mpdwstp1_p 64.92 25 171.70 25 
m12mpdwstp1_nb 66.92 26 177.97 26 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12mpdwfs1_ols 439.87 27 552.78 27 
m12mpdwfs1_p 66.92 26 175.65 26 
m12mpdwfs1_nb 68.92 27 181.84 27 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m12mpdwftp1_ols 399.62 25 504.17 25 
m12mpdwftp1_p 62.92 24 163.29 24 
m12mpdwftp1_nb 64.92 25 169.47 25 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m13ols 320.22 10 363.73 10 
m13op 366.42 9 405.57 9 
m13p 422.38 9 461.54 9 
m13nb 424.40 10 467.91 10 
m13hp 384.37 18 462.69 18 
m13hnb 386.42 19 469.08 19 
m13zip 411.88 18 490.19 18 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m14aols 1846.61 10 1890.12 10 
m14aop 1376.73 14 1437.64 14 
m14ap 1442.24 9 1481.40 9 
m14anb 1422.30 10 1465.81 10 
m14ahp 1336.24 18 1414.55 18 
m14ahnb 1338.24 19 1420.90 19 
m14azip 1330.31 18 1408.62 18 
m14azinb 1332.31 19 1414.97 19 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m14bols 2042.79 10 2086.30 10 
m14bop 804.80 15 870.06 15 
m14bp 1158.14 9 1197.29 9 
m14bnb 957.60 10 1001.11 10 
m14bhp 845.26 18 923.58 18 
m14bhnb 847.26 19 929.93 19 
m14bzip 844.72 18 923.03 18 
m14bzinb 846.72 19 929.38 19 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m14cols 2650.76 10 2694.27 10 
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m14cp 2100.33 9 2139.49 9 
m14cnb 1749.12 10 1792.62 10 
m14chp 1759.26 18 1837.58 18 
m14chnb 1687.43 19 1770.09 19 
m14czip 1770.90 18 1849.22 18 
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Appendix 20: Design Regression Tables of the Binary Variables for IPR Scope Mentioned 
 
Dependent Variables ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights 









    
ln Charges for the use of IP, receipts (sum) 0.057***     
(0.016) 
0.012***     
(0.003) 
-0.337     
(15.841) 
0.057***     
(0.016) 
ln Resident applications for patents (sum) -0.231*     
(0.096) 
-0.034.     
(0.019) 
1.478     
(135.411) 
-0.231*     
(0.096) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(sum) 
0.312*     
(0.144) 
0.029.     
(0.017) 
1.41     
(90.816) 
0.312*     
(0.144) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
0.308***     
(0.093) 
0.062**     
(0.019) 
-2.677     
(157.533) 
0.308***     
(0.093) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(cumulative, sum) 
-0.422**     
(0.135) 
-0.06***     
(0.017) 
4.05     
(135.275) 
-0.422**     
(0.135) 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) 0.061**     
(0.023) 
0.015**     
(0.005) 
0.132     
(12.569) 
0.061**     
(0.023) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members /                                
total mhtp imports 
-1.744     
(1.956) 
-0.918*     
(0.433) 
-3.258     
(1172.098) 
-1.743     
(1.956) 
Veto Players 
    
Veto players (sum) -0.218***     
(0.059) 
-0.035***     
(0.009) 
-1.054     
(69.774) 
-0.218***     
(0.059) 
Regime Preference 
    
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.044***     
(0.004) 
0.01***     
(0.001) 
0.033     
(1.993) 
0.044***     
(0.004) 
Path Dependency 
    
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – industrial designs 
-0.585.     
(0.352) 
-0.152.     
(0.079) 
0.088     
(142.701) 
-0.585.     
(0.352) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – patents 
0.685.     
(0.35) 
0.173*     
(0.079) 
0.38     
(124.377) 
0.685.     
(0.35) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – new plant varieties 
-0.078*     
(0.04) 
-0.022*     
(0.009) 
-0.455     
(30.147) 
-0.078*     
(0.04) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
-0.235.     
(0.131) 
-0.039     
(0.026) 
-1.285     
(86.089) 
-0.235.     
(0.131) 
Index IPR general enforcement pd (sum) 0.022.     
(0.011) 
0.004.     
(0.002) 
0.037     
(10.201) 
0.022.     
(0.011) 
Control Variables 
    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.024     
(0.019) 
0.006     
(0.004) 
0.36     
(17.667) 
0.024     
(0.019) 
Classic IP leaders 0.245     
(0.317) 
0.051     
(0.06) 
1.312     
(210.821) 
0.245     
(0.317) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.274     
(0.261) 
-0.015     
(0.046) 
0.319     
(109.398) 
-0.274     
(0.261) 
New IP producers and developers 0.089     
(0.225) 
0.038     
(0.049) 
-1.401     
(135.34) 
0.089     
(0.225) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.184.     
(0.095) 
-0.053**     
(0.018) 
-2.69     
(107.051) 
-0.184.     
(0.095) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.271**     
(0.102) 
0.072***     
(0.02) 
1.585     
(65.561) 
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Dependent Variables ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.153.     
(0.084) 
-0.043*     
(0.018) 
-0.413     
(45.057) 
-0.153.     
(0.084) 
Intercept – 1.131***     
(0.342) 
-2.19     
(2143.258) 
2.172     
(1.763) 
Model m3aop_f m3aols_f m3ahp_f m3ahp_f 





Observations 573 573 573 573 
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Dependent Variables ipr_m_trademarks 









    
ln Charges for the use of IP, receipts (sum) 0.056***     
(0.016) 
0.011***     
(0.003) 
-0.31     
(8.132) 
0.056***     
(0.016) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(sum) 
0.157     
(0.126) 
0.017     
(0.016) 
1.999     
(48.446) 
0.157     
(0.126) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
0.094.     
(0.05) 
0.027**     
(0.01) 
-1.587     
(25.773) 
0.094.     
(0.05) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(cumulative, sum) 
-0.231*     
(0.117) 
-0.04*     
(0.017) 
3.463     
(68.111) 
-0.231*     
(0.117) 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) 0.037     
(0.024) 
0.015**     
(0.005) 
0.525     
(8.593) 
0.037     
(0.024) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members /                                
total mhtp imports 
-6.046*     
(2.391) 
-1.479**     
(0.456) 
-3.473     
(419.347) 
-6.046*     
(2.39) 
Veto Players 
    
Veto players (sum) -0.157**     
(0.057) 
-0.026**     
(0.009) 
0.315     
(9.929) 
-0.157**     
(0.057) 
Regime Preference 
    
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.036***     
(0.004) 
0.009***     
(0.001) 
0.035     
(0.708) 
0.036***     
(0.004) 
Path Dependency 
    
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – patents 
0.142**     
(0.046) 
0.038***     
(0.009) 
-0.204     
(8.412) 
0.142**     
(0.046) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – new plant varieties 
-0.185***     
(0.047) 
-0.039***     
(0.009) 
-0.546     
(10.645) 
-0.185***     
(0.047) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – encrypted program-carrying sat-
ellite signals 
-0.263***     
(0.061) 
-0.05***     
(0.01) 
-0.572     
(9.673) 
-0.263***     
(0.061) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
-0.308*     
(0.136) 
-0.04     
(0.025) 
-0.732     
(19.294) 
-0.308*     
(0.136) 
Index IPR general enforcement pd (sum) 0.096***     
(0.022) 
0.014***     
(0.003) 
0.16     
(2.316) 
0.096***     
(0.022) 
Control Variables 
    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.031.     
(0.018) 
0.008*     
(0.004) 
0.282     
(5.914) 
0.031.     
(0.018) 
Classic IP leaders 0.242     
(0.318) 
0.056     
(0.06) 
0.651     
(63.135) 
0.242     
(0.318) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.448.     
(0.27) 
-0.032     
(0.045) 
0.409     
(47.577) 
-0.448.     
(0.27) 
New IP producers and developers -0.107     
(0.226) 
0.005     
(0.049) 
-0.922     
(43.527) 
-0.107     
(0.226) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.122     
(0.092) 
-0.039*     
(0.018) 
-2.732     
(50.456) 
-0.122     
(0.092) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.185.     
(0.1) 
0.053**     
(0.02) 
1.505     
(31.199) 
0.185.     
(0.1) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.164.     
(0.085) 
-0.047*     
(0.018) 
-0.162     
(20.552) 
-0.164.     
(0.085) 
Intercept – 0.922**     
(0.327) 
-1.942     
(635.402) 
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Dependent Variables ipr_m_trademarks 
Model m3bop_f m3bols_f m3bhp_f m3bhp_f 





Observations 573 573 573 573 
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Dependent Variables ipr_m_geo_indications 









    
ln Charges for the use of IP, receipts (sum) 0.069**     
(0.021) 
0.01***     
(0.003) 
-0.051     
(195.3) 
0.069**     
(0.021) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
0.204**     
(0.063) 
0.038***     
(0.009) 
-0.586     
(564.4) 
0.204**     
(0.063) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(cumulative, sum) 
-0.239**     
(0.079) 
-0.039***     
(0.011) 
4.23     
(1340) 
-0.239**     
(0.079) 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) 0.036     
(0.029) 
0.017***     
(0.005) 
0.459     
(253.9) 
0.036     
(0.029) 
Imports of htp by PTA members (sum) -0.184**     
(0.068) 
-0.017.     
(0.01) 
0.352     
(126.2) 
-0.184**     
(0.068) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members (sum) 0.214***     
(0.065) 
0.021*     
(0.01) 
-0.553     
(185.4) 
0.214***     
(0.065) 
Imports of htp by PTA members /                                   
total htp imports 
12.546*     
(5.701) 
2.418*     
(1.026) 
5.153     
(43180) 
12.546*     
(5.7) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members /                                
total mhtp imports 
-17.801**     
(6.859) 
-1.845*     
(0.83) 
-3.652     
(33020) 
-17.801**     
(6.859) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members /                                    
total ltp imports 
-6.807     
(15.163) 
-2.405     
(2.242) 
-7.556     
(116300) 
-6.807     
(15.163) 
Veto Players 
    
Veto players (sum) -0.253***     
(0.063) 
-0.031***     
(0.008) 
0.177     
(433.7) 
-0.253***     
(0.063) 
Regime Preference 
    
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.05***     
(0.005) 
0.009***     
(0.001) 
0.008     
(17.07) 
0.05***     
(0.005) 
Path Dependency 
    
Index IPR general pd (sum) 0.063***     
(0.018) 
0.005*     
(0.002) 
0.005     
(67.99) 
0.063***     
(0.018) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – copyrights 
-0.45.     
(0.247) 
-0.085*     
(0.037) 
-0.623     
(1151) 
-0.45.     
(0.247) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – geographical indications 
0.253     
(0.244) 
0.079*     
(0.037) 
0.724     
(1081) 
0.253     
(0.244) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – new plant varieties 
-0.154**     
(0.048) 
-0.032***     
(0.009) 
-0.039     
(230.3) 
-0.154**     
(0.048) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
-0.556***     
(0.165) 
-0.056*     
(0.024) 
0.459     
(590.2) 
-0.556***     
(0.165) 
Index IPR general enforcement pd (sum) 0.048*     
(0.021) 
0.005     
(0.003) 
-0.19     
(112.9) 
0.048*     
(0.021) 
Control Variables 
    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.11***     
(0.026) 
0.016***     
(0.003) 
0.569     
(237.2) 
0.11***     
(0.026) 
Classic IP leaders -0.541     
(0.365) 
-0.085     
(0.056) 
-0.486     
(1339) 
-0.541     
(0.365) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.034     
(0.297) 
0.013     
(0.042) 
0.95     
(1256) 
-0.034     
(0.297) 
New IP producers and developers -0.281     
(0.259) 
-0.007     
(0.047) 
-0.548     
(1132) 
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Dependent Variables ipr_m_geo_indications 
ln GDP (mean) -0.369***     
(0.109) 
-0.075***     
(0.017) 
-3.542     
(1122) 
-0.369***     
(0.109) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.402***     
(0.12) 
0.09***     
(0.019) 
1.172     
(622.9) 
0.402***     
(0.12) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.025     
(0.098) 
-0.004     
(0.017) 
1.57     
(523.8) 
0.025     
(0.098) 
Intercept – 1.212***     
(0.308) 
-0.654     
(13290) 
3.514.     
(1.943) 
Model m3cop_f m3cols_f m3chp_f m3chp_f 





Observations 573 573 573 573 
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Dependent Variables ipr_m_industrial_designs 









    
ln Charges for the use of IP, receipts (sum) 0.035*     
(0.017) 
0.007*     
(0.003) 
-0.095     
(9.261) 
0.035*     
(0.017) 
ln Resident applications for patents (sum) -0.198*     
(0.099) 
-0.025     
(0.02) 
0.568     
(46.82) 
-0.198*     
(0.099) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(sum) 
0.288*     
(0.139) 
0.027     
(0.018) 
-0.265     
(88.14) 
0.288*     
(0.139) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
0.292**     
(0.097) 
0.061**     
(0.02) 
-0.069     
(33.06) 
0.292**     
(0.097) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(cumulative, sum) 
-0.363**     
(0.131) 
-0.055**     
(0.019) 
-0.377     
(81.94) 
-0.363**     
(0.131) 
Applications for patents by PTA members /                    
total applications for patents 
0.43
(0.353) 
0.05     
(0.074) 
0.712     
(374.9) 
0.43     
(0.353) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs 
-0.263     
(0.225) 
-0.058     
(0.049) 
-0.567     
(240.8) 
-0.263     
(0.225) 
Applications for patents by PTA members /                   
total applications for patents (cumulative) 
-426.6**     
(152.1) 
-46.502**     
(15.639) 
-289.1     
(108300) 
-426.6**     
(152.1) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs (cumulative) 
 
6.544.     
(3.664) 
0.927     
(0.711) 
1.589     
(1683) 
6.544.     
(3.664) 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) 0.054*     
(0.023) 
0.016**     
(0.005) 
0.178     
(10.09) 
0.054*     
(0.023) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members (sum) 0.037*     
(0.018) 
0.007.     
(0.004) 
0.143     
(6.224) 
0.037*     
(0.018) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members /                                
total mhtp imports 
-8.258**     
(2.695) 
-1.831***     
(0.529) 
-5.26     
(2087) 
-8.258**     
(2.695) 
Veto Players 
    
Veto players (sum) -0.056     
(0.054) 
-0.01     
(0.01) 
0.4     
(18.67) 
-0.056     
(0.054) 
Regime Preference 
    
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.021***     
(0.003) 
0.006***     
(0.001) 
0.026     
(1.091) 
0.021***     
(0.003) 
Path Dependency 
    
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – patents 
0.143**     
(0.044) 
0.034***     
(0.01) 
-0.135     
(20.12) 
0.143**     
(0.044) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – new plant varieties 
-0.142***     
(0.041) 
-0.034***     
(0.01) 
0.367     
(23.16) 
-0.142***     
(0.041) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – encrypted program-carrying sat-
ellite signals 
-0.181**     
(0.062) 
-0.039**     
(0.013) 
0.299     
(32.89) 
-0.181**     
(0.062) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
-0.247*     
(0.12) 
-0.076**     
(0.028) 
0.27     
(73.53) 
-0.247*     
(0.12) 
Index IPR general enforcement pd (sum) 0.052***     
(0.016) 
0.011***     
(0.003) 
-0.255     
(13) 
0.052***     
(0.016) 
Control Variables 
    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.005     
(0.018) 
0.004     
(0.004) 
0.335     
(16.56) 
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Dependent Variables ipr_m_industrial_designs 
Classic IP leaders 0.204     
(0.276) 
0.032     
(0.065) 
-1.156     
(99.37) 
0.204     
(0.276) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.122     
(0.245) 
0.044     
(0.048) 
0.455     
(192.1) 
0.122     
(0.245) 
New IP producers and developers 0.114     
(0.217) 
0.037     
(0.052) 
-0.314     
(81.35) 
0.114     
(0.217) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.313***     
(0.091) 
-0.084***     
(0.019) 
-0.687     
(47.84) 
-0.313***     
(0.091) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.492***     
(0.102) 
0.112***     
(0.022) 
0.97     
(45.38) 
0.492***     
(0.102) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.206*     
(0.085) 
-0.057**     
(0.02) 
-0.261     
(33.01) 
-0.206*     
(0.085) 
Intercept – 1.577***     
(0.367) 
0.023     
(864.7) 
3.327*     
(1.686) 
Model m3dop_f m3dols_f m3dhp_f m3dhp_f 





Observations 573 573 573 573 
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Dependent Variables ipr_m_patents 









    
ln Charges for the use of IP, receipts (sum) 0.051**     
(0.016) 
0.01***     
(0.003) 
0.041     
(6.405) 
0.051**     
(0.016) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(sum) 
0.288*     
(0.134) 
0.028.     
(0.017) 
1.008     
(46.79) 
0.288*     
(0.134) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
0.124*     
(0.051) 
0.038***     
(0.011) 
-0.565     
(18.23) 
0.124*     
(0.051) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(cumulative, sum) 
-0.364**     
(0.123) 
-0.055**     
(0.018) 
0.65     
(43.91) 
-0.364**     
(0.123) 
Applications for patents by PTA members /                   
total applications for patents (cumulative) 
-336**     
(126.9) 
-42.25**     
(14.78) 
-167.8     
(34850) 
-336**     
(126.9) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs (cumulative) 
2.334     
(2.589) 
-0.044     
(0.476) 
0.356     
(465.7) 
2.334     
(2.589) 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) 0.042.     
(0.023) 
0.015**     
(0.005) 
0.213     
(6.688) 
0.042.     
(0.023) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members (sum) 0.042*     
(0.018) 
0.008*     
(0.004) 
-0.046     
(4.416) 
0.042*     
(0.018) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members /                                
total mhtp imports 
-7.086**     
(2.697) 
-1.627**     
(0.535) 
-4.173     
(842.6) 
-7.087**     
(2.696) 
Veto Players 
    
Veto players (sum) -0.147*     
(0.057) 
-0.023*     
(0.01) 
0.299     
(12.49) 
-0.147*     
(0.057) 
Regime Preference 
    
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.023***     
(0.003) 
0.006***     
(0.001) 
0.001     
(0.523) 
0.023***     
(0.003) 
Path Dependency 
    
Index IPR general pd (sum) -0.017     
(0.015) 
-0.005.     
(0.003) 
-0.222     
(4.864) 
-0.017     
(0.015) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – patents 
0.239***     
(0.065) 
0.058***     
(0.013) 
0.864     
(20.33) 
0.239***     
(0.065) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – new plant varieties 
-0.154***     
(0.042) 
-0.041***     
(0.01) 
-0.13     
(10.56) 
-0.154***     
(0.042) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – encrypted program-carrying sat-
ellite signals 
-0.174**     
(0.06) 
-0.045***     
(0.013) 
-0.058     
(12.91) 
-0.174**     
(0.06) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
-0.129     
(0.119) 
-0.034     
(0.027) 
0.843     
(24.96) 
-0.129     
(0.119) 
Index IPR general enforcement pd (sum) 0.065**     
(0.022) 
0.016***     
(0.005) 
0.019     
(6.582) 
0.065**     
(0.022) 
Control Variables 
    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.003     
(0.017) 
0.002     
(0.004) 
0.003     
(3.789) 
0.003     
(0.017) 
Classic IP leaders 0.698*     
(0.304) 
0.157*     
(0.063) 
0.251     
(45.02) 
0.698*     
(0.304) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.274     
(0.262) 
-0.024     
(0.047) 
-0.072     
(67.72) 
-0.274     
(0.262) 
New IP producers and developers -0.009     
(0.221) 
0.017     
(0.051) 
-0.172     
(37.38) 
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Dependent Variables ipr_m_patents 
ln GDP (mean) -0.24**     
(0.09) 
-0.066***     
(0.019) 
-1.305     
(21.7) 
-0.24**     
(0.09) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.353***     
(0.098) 
0.086***     
(0.021) 
0.786     
(20.66) 
0.353***     
(0.098) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.158.     
(0.083) 
-0.046*     
(0.019) 
0.528     
(19.35) 
-0.158.     
(0.083) 
Intercept – 1.283***     
(0.346) 
-0.583     
(339.3) 
2.579     
(1.601) 
Model m3eop_f m3eols_f m3ehp_f m3ehp_f 





Observations 573 573 573 573 
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Dependent Variables ipr_m_undisclosed_information 









    
ln Charges for the use of IP, receipts (sum) 0.065**     
(0.02) 
0.01**     
(0.003) 
-0.089     
(100.3) 
0.065**     
(0.02) 
ln Resident applications for patents (sum) -0.275**     
(0.103) 
-0.047*     
(0.02) 
-0.23     
(677.4) 
-0.275**     
(0.103) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(sum) 
0.447**     
(0.173) 
0.03.     
(0.017) 
0.322     
(1553) 
0.447**     
(0.173) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
0.441***     
(0.102) 
0.092***     
(0.02) 
0.21     
(630.8) 
0.441***     
(0.102) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(cumulative, sum) 
-0.594***     
(0.159) 
-0.072***     
(0.018) 
-0.647     
(1459) 
-0.594***     
(0.159) 
Applications for patents by PTA members /                   
total applications for patents (cumulative) 
-202.7*     
(91.11) 
-32.31**     
(12.5) 
-121.6     
(2492000) 
-202.7*     
(91.11) 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) 0.056*     
(0.024) 
0.014**     
(0.005) 
0.004     
(132.5) 
0.056*     
(0.024) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members (sum) 0.084**     
(0.027) 
0.018**     
(0.006) 
0.029     
(217) 
0.084**     
(0.027) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members (sum) -0.062*     
(0.025) 
-0.014*     
(0.006) 
-0.057     
(217.2) 
-0.062*     
(0.025) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members /                                
total mltp imports 
-6.432     
(8.423) 
-1.823     
(1.907) 
-5.21     
(164500) 
-6.432     
(8.423) 
Veto Players 
    
Veto players (sum) -0.136**     
(0.052) 
-0.019*     
(0.009) 
-0.133     
(920.9) 
-0.136**     
(0.052) 
Regime Preference 
    
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.021***     
(0.003) 
0.006***     
(0.001) 
0.007     
(17.32) 
0.021***     
(0.003) 
Path Dependency 
    
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – copyrights 
-0.337.     
(0.185) 
-0.105**     
(0.04) 
-0.309     
(1755) 
-0.337.     
(0.185) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – geographical indications 
0.264     
(0.185) 
0.084*     
(0.04) 
0.204     
(2058) 
0.264     
(0.185) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – patents 
0.175*     
(0.075) 
0.037*     
(0.017) 
0.153     
(1863) 
0.175*     
(0.075) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – new plant varieties 
-0.029     
(0.034) 
-0.01     
(0.008) 
-0.042     
(551.1) 
-0.029     
(0.034) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
-0.024     
(0.026) 
-0.005     
(0.006) 
-0.006     
(1261) 
-0.024     
(0.026) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
-0.043     
(0.119) 
-0.008     
(0.027) 
0.047     
(2065) 
-0.043     
(0.119) 
Control Variables 
    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.077**     
(0.024) 
0.011**     
(0.004) 
-0.016     
(182) 
0.077**     
(0.024) 
Classic IP leaders 0.369     
(0.293) 
0.096     
(0.063) 
-0.061     
(2656) 
0.369     
(0.293) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.276     
(0.248) 
0.041     
(0.047) 
0.087     
(5342) 
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Dependent Variables ipr_m_undisclosed_information 
New IP producers and developers 0.105     
(0.218) 
0.02     
(0.05) 
-0.025     
(2215) 
0.105     
(0.218) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.275**     
(0.094) 
-0.074***     
(0.019) 
-0.432     
(678) 
-0.275**     
(0.094) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.252*     
(0.113) 
0.072***     
(0.021) 
0.193     
(732.5) 
0.252*     
(0.113) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.286**     
(0.089) 
-0.069***     
(0.019) 
-0.37     
(549.9) 
-0.286**     
(0.089) 
Intercept – 1.709***     
(0.353) 
0.849     
(12810) 
4.41*     
(1.777) 
Model m3fop_f m3fols_f m3fhp_f m3fhp_f 





Observations 573 573 573 573 
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Dependent Variables ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits 









    
ln Charges for the use of IP, receipts (sum) 0.061**     
(0.02) 
0.009**     
(0.003) 
-0.106     
(139.5) 
0.061**     
(0.02) 
ln Resident applications for patents (sum) -0.269*     
(0.106) 
-0.037.     
(0.019) 
-0.188     
(847.3) 
-0.269*     
(0.106) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(sum) 
0.435*     
(0.179) 
0.025     
(0.016) 
0.25     
(2067) 
0.435*     
(0.179) 
ln Resident applications for patents  
(cumulative, sum) 
0.476***     
(0.106) 
0.088***     
(0.019) 
0.236     
(828.5) 
0.476***     
(0.106) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(cumulative, sum) 
-0.646***     
(0.166) 
-0.074***     
(0.018) 
-0.656     
(2105) 
-0.646***     
(0.166) 
Applications for patents by PTA members /                    
total applications for patents 
0.696.   
(0.363) 
0.063     
(0.069) 
0.323     
(12590) 
0.696.     
(0.363) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs 
-0.409.     
(0.244) 
-0.086.     
(0.047) 
-0.043     
(7113) 
-0.409.     
(0.244) 
Applications for patents by PTA members /                    
total applications for patents (cumulative) 
-459.4**     
(161.1) 
-42.3**     
(14.56) 
-264.6     
(3238000) 
-459.3**     
(161.1) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs (cumulative) 
4.951     
(3.627) 
0.867     
(0.642) 
1.173     
(32750) 
4.951     
(3.627) 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) 0.051*     
(0.025) 
0.012*     
(0.005) 
-0.003     
(171.4) 
0.051*     
(0.025) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members (sum) 0.104***     
(0.029) 
0.018**     
(0.006) 
0.034     
(235.1) 
0.104***     
(0.029) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members (sum) -0.087**     
(0.027) 
-0.017**     
(0.005) 
-0.062     
(238.1) 
-0.087**     
(0.027) 
Veto Players 
    
Veto players (sum) -0.109.     
(0.062) 
-0.012     
(0.009) 
-0.124     
(1196) 
-0.109.     
(0.062) 
Regime Preference 
    
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.027***     
(0.004) 
0.007***     
(0.001) 
0.023     
(22.42) 
0.027***     
(0.004) 
Path Dependency   
  
  
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – copyrights 
-0.102     
(0.106) 
-0.022     
(0.018) 
-0.045     
(1750) 
-0.102     
(0.106) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – patents 
0.21*     
(0.1) 
0.044**     
(0.016) 
0.123     
(1698) 
0.21*     
(0.1) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – new plant varieties 
-0.038     
(0.036) 
-0.012     
(0.008) 
-0.067     
(649) 
-0.038     
(0.036) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – encrypted program-carrying sat-
ellite signals 
0.013     
(0.047) 
0.003     
(0.01) 
0.009     
(1084) 
0.013     
(0.047) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
-0.548***     
(0.163) 
-0.11***     
(0.026) 
-0.234     
(3172) 
-0.548***     
(0.163) 
Control Variables   
  
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.077**     
(0.024) 
0.012***     
(0.004) 
-0.021     
(191.5) 
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Dependent Variables ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits 
Classic IP leaders -0.195     
(0.285) 
-0.069     
(0.061) 
-0.485     
(3893) 
-0.195     
(0.285) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.289     
(0.259) 
0.046     
(0.044) 
0.169     
(9139) 
0.289     
(0.259) 
New IP producers and developers 0.261     
(0.227) 
0.047     
(0.049) 
-0.006     
(2997) 
0.261     
(0.227) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.385***     
(0.098) 
-0.094***     
(0.018) 
-0.606     
(917.4) 
-0.385***     
(0.098) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.451***     
(0.117) 
0.106***     
(0.02) 
0.403     
(981.5) 
0.451***     
(0.117) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.108     
(0.092) 
-0.038*     
(0.018) 
-0.231     
(689.6) 
-0.108     
(0.092) 
Intercept – 1.724***     
(0.344) 
1.952     
(17000) 
4.434*     
(1.811) 
Model m3gop_f m3gols_f m3ghp_f m3ghp_f 





Observations 573 573 573 573 
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Dependent Variables ipr_m_new_plant_varieties 









    
ln Resident applications for patents (sum) -0.151     
(0.109) 
-0.008     
(0.017) 
-0.015     
(105.9) 
-0.151     
(0.109) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
0.214*     
(0.105) 
0.015     
(0.015) 
-0.312     
(114.8) 
0.214*     
(0.105) 
Applications for patents by PTA members /                    
total applications for patents 
0.467    
(0.341) 
0.045     
(0.051) 
0.707     
(394.7) 
0.467     
(0.342) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members (sum) 0.022     
(0.017) 
0.001     
(0.003) 
0.197     
(11.47) 
0.022     
(0.017) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members /                                
total mhtp imports 
-11.911*     
(4.92) 
-2.356**     
(0.813) 
-11.1     
(8281) 
-11.911*     
(4.92) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members /                                
total mltp imports 
28.183.     
(16.442) 
6.202*     
(2.932) 
26.2     
(12630) 
28.183.     
(16.438) 
Veto Players 
    
Veto players (sum) -0.152.     
(0.086) 
-0.013     
(0.008) 
-0.031     
(122.3) 
-0.152.     
(0.086) 
Regime Preference 
    
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.016***     
(0.003) 
0.004***     
(0.001) 
0.031     
(1.772) 
0.016***     
(0.003) 
Path Dependency 
    
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – geographical indications 
-0.541*     
(0.244) 
-0.12**     
(0.043) 
-1.248     
(183.3) 
-0.541*     
(0.244) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – industrial designs 
-0.633.     
(0.38) 
-0.14.     
(0.072) 
-0.875     
(151.4) 
-0.633.     
(0.38) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – patents 
0.833*     
(0.384) 
0.174*     
(0.072) 
1.085     
(196.8) 
0.833*     
(0.384) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – undisclosed information 
0.283     
(0.236) 
0.063     
(0.042) 
-0.579     
(161.8) 
0.283     
(0.236) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
-0.276*     
(0.132) 
-0.056*     
(0.024) 
1.058     
(51.03) 
-0.276*     
(0.131) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pl 
(dummy sum) 
0.008***     
(0.002) 
0.002***     
(0) 
0.056     
(7.975) 
0.008***     
(0.002) 
Control Variables 
    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.007     
(0.022) 
0        
(0.003) 
-0.284     
(10.87) 
0.007     
(0.022) 
Classic IP leaders -0.296     
(0.277) 
-0.025     
(0.053) 
-0.705     
(197.7) 
-0.296     
(0.277) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.277     
(0.23) 
0.039     
(0.039) 
0.68     
(122.3) 
0.277     
(0.23) 
New IP producers and developers 0.299     
(0.231) 
0.075.     
(0.045) 
0.483     
(70.74) 
0.299     
(0.231) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.127     
(0.109) 
-0.018     
(0.016) 
-0.699     
(90.97) 
-0.127     
(0.109) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.426***     
(0.115) 
0.067***     
(0.018) 
1.016     
(68.37) 
0.426***     
(0.115) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.102     
(0.096) 
0.03.     
(0.016) 
0.879     
(51.68) 
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Dependent Variables ipr_m_new_plant_varieties 
Intercept – -0.346     
(0.302) 
-5.896     
(1754) 
-3.822.     
(2) 
Model m3hop_f m3hols_f m3hzip_f m3hzip_f 





Observations 573 573 573 573 
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Dependent Variables ipr_m_trad_knowledge
_genetic_resources 






ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(sum) 
-0.207.     
(0.118) 
-0.013     
(0.01) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
-0.16     
(0.119) 
-0.008     
(0.006) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(cumulative, sum) 
0.518*     
(0.261) 
0.013     
(0.01) 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) 0.124*     
(0.053) 
0.001     
(0.003) 
R&D expenditure (sum) -0.255     
(0.158) 
-0.022     
(0.013) 
Imports of htp by PTA members /                                   
total htp imports 
-1.298     
(4.556) 




Veto players (sum) -0.014     
(0.103) 




Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.026***     
(0.005) 




Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – undisclosed information 
-0.345     
(0.313) 
-0.022     
(0.019) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0.011     
(0.251) 
0.03     
(0.019) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – new plant varieties 
0.474     
(0.306) 
0.01.     
(0.006) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
0.09*     
(0.045) 
0.017***     
(0.004) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
0.266     
(0.176) 
0.065***     
(0.016) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pl 
(dummy sum) 
-0.006     
(0.004) 




Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.015     
(0.035) 
0.001     
(0.002) 
Classic IP leaders -0.473     
(0.476) 
-0.109**     
(0.038) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.37     
(0.321) 
0.037     
(0.028) 
New IP producers and developers 0.144     
(0.339) 
0.031     
(0.031) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.33     
(0.23) 
0.002     
(0.011) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.141     
(0.191) 
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Dependent Variables ipr_m_trad_knowledge
_genetic_resources 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.599**     
(0.19) 
0.034**     
(0.012) 
Intercept – -0.254     
(0.205) 
log(theta) – 0                
(0) 
Model m3iop_f m3iols_f 
Observations 573 573 
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Dependent Variables ipr_m_encrypted_program_carrying_satel-
lite_signals 









    
ln Resident applications for patents (sum) -0.932***     
(0.268) 
-0.009     
(0.012) 
0.079     
(42820) 
-0.932***     
(0.269) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(sum) 
0.714*     
(0.36) 
0.008     
(0.007) 
0.329     
(11290) 
0.714*     
(0.36) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (sum) 
-0.542.     
(0.285) 
-0.005     
(0.01) 
-0.069     
(53070) 
-0.542.     
(0.285) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
0.685.     
(0.357) 
0.014     
(0.013) 
1.318     
(52270) 
0.685.     
(0.357) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (cumulative, sum) 
-0.318     
(0.374) 
-0.02.     
(0.011) 
-0.096     
(60200) 
-0.318     
(0.374) 
Applications for patents by PTA members /                    
total applications for patents 
2.443.   
(1.403) 
0.09*     
(0.039) 
1.754     
(18510) 
2.443.     
(1.344) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs (cumulative) 
-27.342.     
(16.457) 
-0.773**     
(0.291) 
-14.06     
(129700) 
-27.342.     
(16.139) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members (sum) -0.52**     
(0.158) 
-0.017**     
(0.006) 
0.274     
(3188) 
-0.52***     
(0.157) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members (sum) 0.559**     
(0.18) 
0.012     
(0.008) 
0.435     
(4475) 
0.559**     
(0.179) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members (sum) 0.049     
(0.056) 
0.008*     
(0.003) 
0.418     
(2041) 
0.049     
(0.056) 
Veto Players 
    
Veto players (sum) 0.319*     
(0.159) 
0          
(0.005) 
0.498     
(7907) 
0.319*     
(0.158) 
Regime Preference 
    
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.037***     
(0.009) 
0.002***     
(0) 
0.048     
(287.9) 
0.037***     
(0.009) 
Path Dependency 
    
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – geographical indications 
0.304.     
(0.173) 
0.014     
(0.009) 
0.125     
(1951) 
0.304.     
(0.17) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – industrial designs 
0.124     
(0.183) 
-0.004     
(0.008) 
0.262     
(5703) 
0.124     
(0.182) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – encrypted program-carrying sat-
ellite signals 
-0.139     
(0.13) 
-0.018**     
(0.007) 
-0.036     
(2410) 
-0.139     
(0.128) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
0.245     
(0.256) 
0.057***     
(0.015) 
0.173     
(1048) 
0.245     
(0.253) 
Index IPR general enforcement pd (sum) 0.094     
(0.059) 
0.004*     
(0.002) 
-0.053     
(732) 
0.094     
(0.058) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pl 
(dummy sum) 
-0.052**     
(0.02) 
-0.001*     
(0) 
-0.024     
(4.589) 
-0.052**     
(0.019) 
Control Variables 
    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.03     
(0.058) 
-0.002     
(0.002) 
-0.442     
(695.7) 
0.03     
(0.058) 
Classic IP leaders -1.389.     
(0.759) 
0.099**     
(0.036) 
-1.625     
(21120) 
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Dependent Variables ipr_m_encrypted_program_carrying_satel-
lite_signals 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.186     
(0.465) 
-0.022     
(0.026) 
0.016     
(14860) 
-0.186     
(0.464) 
New IP producers and developers 1.327*     
(0.565) 
0.011     
(0.029) 
0.709     
(5517) 
1.327*     
(0.565) 
ln GDP (mean) 2.197***     
(0.502) 
0.054***     
(0.011) 
0.596     
(9364) 
2.197***     
(0.502) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.432     
(0.346) 
-0.024*     
(0.012) 
-0.423     
(11320) 
-0.432     
(0.346) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.13     
(0.289) 
0.005     
(0.011) 
-0.028     
(12590) 
0.13     
(0.289) 
Intercept – -1.134***     
(0.214) 
-60.52     
(37570) 
-59.622***     
(12.17) 
Model m3jop_f m3jols_f m3jhnb_f m3jhnb_f 





Observations 573 573 573 573 
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Dependent Variables ipr_m_domain_names 






Applications for patents by PTA members /                    
total applications for patents 
9.014    
(6.291) 
0.054     
(0.036) 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks 
-7.027.     
(3.981) 
-0.03     
(0.018) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs 
-2.243     
(8.979) 
0.048*     
(0.02) 
Applications for patents by PTA members /                    
total applications for patents (cumulative) 
207.231     
(403.615) 
5.263     
(6.34) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs (cumulative) 
-26.018     
(83.204) 
-0.765**     
(0.291) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members (sum) 0.221**     
(0.079) 




Veto players (sum) 0.426     
(0.279) 




Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.032*     
(0.013) 




Index IPR general pd (sum) -0.364*     
(0.167) 
-0.001     
(0.001) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – encrypted program-carrying sat-
ellite signals 
-0.02     
(0.636) 
-0.005     
(0.005) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
0.424     
(0.484) 
0.056***     
(0.011) 
Index IPR general enforcement pd (sum) 0.527*     
(0.266) 




Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.119     
(0.088) 
-0.001     
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders 1.238     
(1.131) 
0.151***     
(0.025) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-7.635     
(954.704) 
-0.045*     
(0.019) 
New IP producers and developers 1.147     
(0.707) 
0.022     
(0.02) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.193     
(0.397) 
0.011.     
(0.006) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.337     
(0.529) 
-0.017*     
(0.008) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.765.     
(0.416) 
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Dependent Variables ipr_m_domain_names 
Model m3kop_f m3kols_f 
Observations 573 573 
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Appendix 21: Design Regression Tables of the Binary Variables for IPR Scope Tangible 
 













































Economic Power Asymmetry 
         
GDP asymmetry (max/sum) 0.015     
(0.714) 
0.825     
(0.708) 
-0.442     
(0.966) 
-0.467     
(0.666) 
-0.467     
(0.623) 
-0.966     
(0.73) 
0.127     
(0.402) 
-0.045     
(0.396) 
-0.842     
(0.673) 
GDPpc asymmetry (max/sum) 0.304     
(0.888) 
-0.819     
(0.881) 
0.83     
(1.202) 
0.327     
(0.833) 
0.529     
(0.778) 
0.904     
(0.908) 
-0.169     
(0.502) 
0.446     
(0.494) 
0.654     
(0.837) 
GDP asymmetry * substantial tariff cuts 0.033     
(0.094) 
-0.013     
(0.094) 
-0.067     
(0.129) 
-0.077     
(0.108) 
-0.049     
(0.101) 
0.031     
(0.097) 
0.004     
(0.065) 
-0.04     
(0.064) 
0       
(0.089) 
GDPpc asymmetry * substantial tariff cuts -0.168     
(0.115) 
-0.082     
(0.115) 
0.065     
(0.157) 
-0.302**     
(0.109) 
0.014     
(0.102) 
-0.075     
(0.118) 
-0.126.     
(0.066) 
-0.02     
(0.065) 
-0.129     
(0.109) 
GDP asymmetry * ln FDI 0.015     
(0.012) 
0.006     
(0.012) 
0       
(0.016) 
-0.011     
(0.011) 
-0.014     
(0.01) 
-0.009     
(0.012) 
-0.001     
(0.007) 
-0.004     
(0.006) 
0.019.     
(0.011) 
GDPpc asymmetry * ln FDI -0.018     
(0.013) 
-0.011     
(0.013) 
-0.006     
(0.018) 
0.011     
(0.012) 
0.018     
(0.011) 
0.009     
(0.013) 
0.001     
(0.007) 
0.004     
(0.007) 
-0.027*     
(0.012) 
GDP asymmetry * lnofficial development 
assistance and official aid received 
-0.013     
(0.036) 
-0.042     
(0.036) 
0.025     
(0.049) 
0.04     
(0.034) 
0.038     
(0.032) 
0.059     
(0.037) 
-0.004     
(0.02) 
0.007     
(0.02) 
0.028     
(0.034) 
GDPpc asymmetry * lnofficial develop-
ment assistance and official aid received 
0.005     
(0.046) 
0.056     
(0.045) 
-0.038     
(0.062) 
-0.022     
(0.043) 
-0.041     
(0.04) 
-0.05     
(0.047) 
0.012     
(0.026) 
-0.023     
(0.025) 
-0.01     
(0.043) 
GDP asymmetry * (DAC aid received by 
PTA members/ DAC aid received) 
-0.05     
(0.433) 
-0.366     
(0.433) 
0.226     
(0.592) 
-0.148     
(0.408) 
-0.209     
(0.382) 
0.08     
(0.447) 
-0.22     
(0.246) 
-0.16     
(0.242) 
































GDPpc asymmetry * (DAC aid received by 
PTA members/ DAC aid received) 
-0.038     
(0.56) 
0.279     
(0.56) 
-0.74     
(0.765) 
0.18     
(0.528) 
0.348     
(0.493) 
-0.277     
(0.578) 
0.208     
(0.318) 
-0.037     
(0.313) 
-0.325     
(0.527) 
Political Pressure 
         
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.001     
(0.004) 
0.009*     
(0.004) 
-0.002     
(0.006) 
-0.018***     
(0.004) 
-0.003     
(0.004) 
0.002     
(0.004) 
0.002     
(0.002) 
0.004     
(0.002) 
0.001     
(0.004) 
Veto Players   
        
Veto players (sum) 0.003     
(0.004) 
0.005     
(0.004) 
0.01.     
(0.005) 
0.008*     
(0.004) 
-0.005     
(0.003) 
-0.008*     
(0.004) 
0.002     
(0.002) 
0.008***     
(0.002) 
-0.004     
(0.004) 
Endogeneity   
        
PTA depth 0.021*     
(0.009) 
0.04***     
(0.009) 
0.048***     
(0.012) 
– – 0.017.     
(0.009) 
– – 0.035***     
(0.009) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – – – 0.241***     
(0.063) 
0.033     
(0.058) 
– 0.063.     
(0.038) 
0.053     
(0.037) 
– 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.099***     
(0.006) 
– – – – – – – 0.008     
(0.006) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – 0.143***     
(0.009) 
0.093***     
(0.012) 
0.077***     
(0.008) 
0.125***     
(0.008) 
0.069***     
(0.009) 
0.017***     
(0.005) 
0.014**     
(0.005) 
– 
Regime Preference   
        
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0         
(0.001) 
0.002**     
(0.001) 
0.004***     
(0.001) 
-0.002***     
(0) 
-0.002***     
(0) 
-0.001*     
(0.001) 
-0.001**     
(0) 
0                
(0) 
0.003***     
(0.001) 
Control Variables 
         
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.004.     
(0.002) 
-0.001     
(0.002) 
-0.001     
(0.003) 
0.001     
(0.002) 
-0.001     
(0.002) 
0.001     
(0.002) 
0          
(0.001) 
0          
(0.001) 
-0.002     
(0.002) 
Classic IP leaders -0.109**     
(0.041) 
-0.055     
(0.042) 
-0.173**     
(0.057) 
0.174***     
(0.039) 
0.261***     
(0.037) 
0.161***     
(0.043) 
0.022     
(0.024) 
-0.003     
(0.023) 
































Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.015     
(0.024) 
0.005     
(0.024) 
0.003     
(0.033) 
0.076***     
(0.023) 
0.023     
(0.021) 
0.076**     
(0.025) 
0.004     
(0.014) 
-0.001     
(0.014) 
-0.008     
(0.023) 
New IP producers and developers 0.02     
(0.028) 
-0.037     
(0.028) 
-0.035     
(0.039) 
-0.06*     
(0.027) 
-0.061*     
(0.025) 
-0.045     
(0.029) 
-0.016     
(0.016) 
-0.007     
(0.016) 
0.054*     
(0.027) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.014     
(0.012) 
0.006     
(0.011) 
0.007     
(0.016) 
-0.037***     
(0.011) 
-0.012     
(0.01) 
-0.027*     
(0.012) 
0.001     
(0.006) 
-0.001     
(0.006) 
-0.009     
(0.011) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.036*     
(0.015) 
-0.022     
(0.015) 
-0.007     
(0.02) 
0.066***     
(0.014) 
0.015     
(0.013) 
0.02     
(0.015) 
0.007     
(0.008) 
-0.005     
(0.008) 
0.001     
(0.014) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.001     
(0.013) 
-0.004     
(0.013) 
0.07***     
(0.017) 
-0.006     
(0.012) 
0.002     
(0.011) 
-0.007     
(0.013) 
-0.006     
(0.007) 
0.001     
(0.007) 
0.022.     
(0.012) 
Intercept -0.112     
(0.226) 
-0.122     
(0.225) 
-0.711*     
(0.307) 
0.292     
(0.215) 
0.117     
(0.201) 
0.465*     
(0.232) 
-0.089     
(0.129) 
-0.026     
(0.127) 




















Observations 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 
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Appendix 21 Design Regression Table 2: Economic Power Asymmetry II 
Dependent Variables ipr_t_epcss ipr_t_do-
main_name
s 




Economic Power Asymmetry 
  
GDP asymmetry (max/sum) -0.534     
(0.676) 
-0.82     
(0.536) 
GDPpc asymmetry (max/sum) 1.04     
(0.844) 
1.238.     
(0.669) 
GDP asymmetry * substantial tariff cuts 0.191.     
(0.109) 
0.051     
(0.087) 
GDPpc asymmetry * substantial tariff cuts -0.072     
(0.11) 
0.094     
(0.087) 
GDP asymmetry * ln FDI 0.016     
(0.011) 
0.016.     
(0.009) 
GDPpc asymmetry * ln FDI -0.015     
(0.012) 
-0.013     
(0.01) 
GDP asymmetry * lnofficial development 
assistance and official aid received 
0.008     
(0.034) 
0.024     
(0.027) 
GDPpc asymmetry * lnofficial develop-
ment assistance and official aid received 
-0.035     
(0.043) 
-0.05     
(0.034) 
GDP asymmetry * (DAC aid received by 
PTA members/ DAC aid received) 
0.249     
(0.41) 
0.253     
(0.325) 
GDPpc asymmetry * (DAC aid received by 
PTA members/ DAC aid received) 
-0.128     
(0.53) 
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Political Pressure 
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.008.     
(0.004) 




Veto players (sum) -0.012***     
(0.004) 




PTA depth – – 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) -0.115.     
(0.063) 
-0.11*     
(0.05) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.06***     
(0.005) 
0.032***     
(0.004) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – – 
Regime Preference 
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) -0.001*     
(0.001) 




Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.002     
(0.002) 
-0.002     
(0.002) 
Classic IP leaders 0.053     
(0.038) 
0.132***     
(0.03) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.037     
(0.023) 
-0.027     
(0.018) 
New IP producers and developers 0.017     
(0.027) 
0.031     
(0.021) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.003     
(0.011) 
0.005     
(0.009) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.035*     
(0.014) 
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Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
  
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.016     
(0.012) 
0.009     
(0.01) 
Intercept 0.262     
(0.218) 
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Appendix 21 Design Regression Table 3: Domestic Interests I 
Dependent Variables ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights ipr_t_trade
marks 
ipr_t_geo_indications 















       
ln Charges for the use of IP, receipts (sum) 0         
(0.002) 
-0.103        
(967.3) 
-0.062        
(0.071) 
0.001        
(0.002) 
0.001         
(0.002) 
0.036         
(1243) 
0.061         
(0.09) 
ln Resident applications for patents (sum) -0.012         
(0.011) 
0.127        
(11390) 
-1.146*        
(0.517) 
-0.01        
(0.01) 
-0.006         
(0.014) 
0.217         
(9531) 
-0.253         
(0.332) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(sum) 
-0.001         
(0.009) 
0.163        
(3439) 
1.708*        
(0.741) 
-0.011        
(0.008) 
0         
(0.012) 
0.027         
(10210) 
0.185         
(0.4) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (sum) 
-0.011         
(0.009) 
-0.128        
(11340) 
-0.538        
(0.513) 
-0.018*        
(0.008) 
-0.016         
(0.011) 
0.183         
(9152) 
-0.054         
(0.323) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
0.01         
(0.012) 
0.115        
(10920) 
-0.216        
(0.707) 
0.015        
(0.012) 
-0.01         
(0.016) 
-0.206         
(9590) 
-0.635         
(0.399) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(cumulative, sum) 
0.01         
(0.01) 
-0.194        
(7295) 
-0.268        
(0.682) 
0.005        
(0.01) 
0.016         
(0.013) 
0.699         
(11760) 
0.781         
(0.486) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (cumulative, sum) 
-0.014         
(0.011) 
0.01        
(9034) 
-0.065        
(0.618) 
-0.003        
(0.011) 
-0.005         
(0.015) 
-0.18         
(7999) 
-0.112         
(0.367) 
Applications for patents by PTA members / 
total applications for patents 
0.008         
(0.045) 
-0.055        
(4991) 
-0.377        
(1.687) 
0.007        
(0.042) 
0.032         
(0.057) 
-0.665         
(17270) 
-1.041         
(1.49) 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks 
-0.047         
(0.031) 
0.488        
(8777) 
-1.575        
(1.493) 
0.035        
(0.029) 
0.042         
(0.04) 
1.439         
(13200) 
1.096         
(0.926) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs 
0.015         
(0.027) 
-0.516        
(5426) 
0.447        
(1.125) 
-0.023        
(0.026) 
0.041         
(0.035) 
0.199         
(7494) 
0.092         
(0.66) 
Applications for patents by PTA members / 
total applications for patents (cumulative) 
4.55         
(8.538) 
-322.4        
(2191000) 
-131.674        
(444.068) 
9.189        
(8.023) 
41.047***         
(10.911) 
148.6         
(2185000) 
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Dependent Variables ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights ipr_t_trade
marks 
ipr_t_geo_indications 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks (cu-
mulative) 
-0.285         
(0.327) 
-8.097        
(131900) 
-7.024        
(17.568) 
-0.738*        
(0.307) 
-1.168**         
(0.418) 
-20.99         
(468600) 
-32.76*         
(15.09) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs (cumulative) 
-0.128         
(0.42) 
14.09        
(190700) 
17.067        
(21.397) 
-0.6        
(0.395) 
-1.397**         
(0.537) 
-2.749         
(206000) 
1.214         
(11.22) 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) -0.006.         
(0.003) 
-0.299        
(1334) 
-0.162        
(0.151) 
-0.003        
(0.003) 
0         
(0.004) 
-0.165         
(1535) 
-0.018         
(0.089) 
R&D expenditure (sum) 0.01         
(0.012) 
0.1        
(3061) 
0.653        
(0.554) 
0.017        
(0.011) 
0         
(0.015) 
0.106         
(3505) 
0.301         
(0.315) 
Imports of htp by PTA members (sum) 0.01         
(0.006) 
-0.072        
(843) 
-0.028        
(0.232) 
0.004        
(0.006) 
-0.015.         
(0.008) 
-0.264         
(1776) 
-0.123         
(0.118) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members (sum) -0.012.         
(0.007) 
-0.084        
(1332) 
-0.259        
(0.249) 
-0.005        
(0.007) 
0.016         
(0.01) 
0.257         
(1646) 
0.203         
(0.144) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members (sum) 0.008         
(0.008) 
-0.148        
(1557) 
0.475        
(0.292) 
0.014*        
(0.007) 
-0.012         
(0.01) 
-0.029         
(1814) 
-0.092         
(0.141) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members (sum) -0.006         
(0.004) 
0.309        
(595.8) 
-0.037        
(0.116) 
-0.014***        
(0.004) 
0.008         
(0.005) 
-0.079         
(669.9) 
0.064         
(0.054) 
Imports of htp by PTA members /                                   
total htp imports 
-1.784*         
(0.894) 
-16.17        
(129200) 
-24.604        
(37.013) 
-1.971*        
(0.839) 
1.626         
(1.141) 
-0.832         
(216300) 
11.2         
(16.85) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members /                                
total mhtp imports 
0.895       
(0.563) 
8.917        
(189900) 
42.74.        
(24.186) 
0.51        
(0.523) 
-1.074         
(0.718) 
-17.75         
(418200) 
-30.98.         
(17.44) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members /                                
total mltp imports 
1.408        
(3.218) 
30.91        
(802800) 
-148.116        
(162.381) 
2.654        
(3.015) 
3.148         
(4.108) 
87.11         
(2237000) 
171.1         
(107.5) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members /                                    
total ltp imports 
0.753       
(2.361) 
-23.2        
(734600) 
93.257        
(112.443) 
-0.324        
(2.216) 
-3.567         
(3.018) 
-62.05         
(1921000) 
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PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.007         
(0.005) 
-0.18        
(1922) 
-0.131        
(0.264) 
0.013**        
(0.004) 
0.006         
(0.006) 
0.176         
(1818) 





      
Veto players (sum) 0.015**         
(0.005) 
0.108        
(2389) 
0.559        
(0.355) 
0.005        
(0.005) 
-0.003         
(0.007) 
-0.384         
(2992) 
0.016         
(0.248) 
Endogeneity   
      
PTA depth 0.009         
(0.007) 
0.254        
(2194) 
0.384        
(0.26) 
– 0.052***         
(0.009) 
0.316         
(1832) 
0.399**         
(0.131) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.084***         
(0.005) 
1.096        
(1072) 
0.753***        
(0.214) 
0.09***        
(0.005) 
– – – 
Regime Preference   
      
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.001*         
(0.001) 
0.046        
(107.4) 
0.037*        
(0.018) 
0.001*        
(0) 
0.002***         
(0.001) 
-0.037         
(139.5) 
0.018*         
(0.008) 
Control Variables 
       
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.003         
(0.002) 
-0.198        
(300.6) 
-0.05        
(0.111) 
-0.002        
(0.002) 
0.004         
(0.003) 
0.082         
(876.4) 
0.028         
(0.055) 
Classic IP leaders -0.066.         
(0.037) 
0.083        
(9352) 
0.062        
(1.123) 
-0.051        
(0.035) 
-0.044         
(0.049) 
0.588         
(10840) 
1.429*         
(0.722) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.044.         
(0.025) 
-0.05        
(7373) 
-2.036.        
(1.082) 
-0.001        
(0.024) 
0         
(0.032) 
0.138         
(10510) 
-0.206         
(0.424) 
New IP producers and developers -0.009         
(0.029) 
0.032        
(4105) 
1.863.        
(0.991) 
-0.057*        
(0.027) 
0.005         
(0.036) 
0.011         
(5712) 
0.328         
(0.499) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.049***         
(0.01) 
-0.244        
(7183) 
2.218**        
(0.774) 
0.035***        
(0.01) 
0.021         
(0.013) 
-0.815         
(5037) 





- 191 - 
Dependent Variables ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights ipr_t_trade
marks 
ipr_t_geo_indications 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.041***         
(0.011) 
-0.274        
(3492) 
-0.207        
(0.547) 
-0.026*        
(0.011) 
-0.018         
(0.015) 
-0.283         
(5027) 
-0.179         
(0.307) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.006         
(0.01) 
-0.25        
(3326) 
-0.428        
(0.393) 
-0.001        
(0.01) 
0.054***         
(0.013) 
0.404         
(4269) 





-0.811***     
(0.202) 
-13.23     
(125200) 
-57.922**     
(21.39) 
-0.586**     
(0.192) 
-0.766**     
(0.257) 
-6.915     
(113900) 
-16.9*     
(7.256) 











Observations 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 
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Appendix 21 Design Regression Table 4: Domestic Interests II 






























         
ln Charges for the use of IP, receipts (sum) -0.003.         
(0.002) 
1.086         
(780) 
-0.815.        
(0.473) 
-0.001         
(0.002) 
-0.385         
(3170) 
-0.116         
(0.072) 
0.001         
(0.002) 
0         
(0.001) 
-0.002         
(0.001) 
ln Resident applications for patents (sum) -0.005         
(0.011) 
-0.053         
(13490) 
-4.03        
(4.35) 
-0.006         
(0.01) 
0.887         
(40700) 
-0.363         
(0.563) 
-0.008         
(0.011) 
-0.004         
(0.006) 
-0.003         
(0.009) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(sum) 
0.003         
(0.009) 
-0.241         
(3492) 
1.854        
(1.889) 
0.002         
(0.008) 
-0.134         
(27690) 
0.044         
(0.6) 
-0.005         
(0.009) 
0.003         
(0.005) 
-0.002         
(0.007) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (sum) 
0.003         
(0.009) 
-0.063         
(7642) 
2.15        
(5.049) 
-0.004         
(0.008) 
-0.422         
(35320) 
-0.348         
(0.434) 
-0.003         
(0.009) 
0.002         
(0.005) 
0         
(0.007) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
-0.003         
(0.012) 
0.089         
(8807) 
-2.355        
(5.761) 
0.011         
(0.011) 
0.66         
(44220) 
-0.27         
(0.737) 
0.011         
(0.012) 
0.008         
(0.006) 
0.002         
(0.01) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(cumulative, sum) 
0.003         
(0.01) 
-0.23         
(4810) 
-2.385        
(2.457) 
0.001         
(0.009) 
-0.051         
(35480) 
0.408         
(0.737) 
-0.002         
(0.01) 
-0.008         
(0.005) 
-0.004         
(0.008) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (cumulative, sum) 
0.016         
(0.011) 
0.99         
(3385) 
6.336        
(6.949) 
-0.001         
(0.01) 
0.317         
(37190) 
0.217         
(0.533) 
0.007         
(0.012) 
-0.003         
(0.006) 
0.005         
(0.009) 
Applications for patents by PTA members / 
total applications for patents 
-0.01         
(0.045) 
0.32         
(2399) 
-6.027        
(5.418) 
-0.098*         
(0.041) 
-0.805         
(21250) 
-1.544         
(1.185) 
-0.057         
(0.046) 
-0.048*         
(0.024) 
0.033         
(0.035) 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks 
-0.005         
(0.031) 
0.453         
(6882) 
7.136        
(4.823) 
-0.004         
(0.029) 
0.275         
(36800) 
-0.712         
(1.027) 
-0.043         
(0.032) 
0.035*         
(0.016) 
0.016         
(0.024) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs 
-0.033         
(0.028) 
-0.476         
(1757) 
-1.166        
(3.556) 
0.035         
(0.025) 
-0.131         
(23100) 
0.996         
(1.402) 
0.114***         
(0.028) 
-0.022         
(0.014) 
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Applications for patents by PTA members / 
total applications for patents (cumulative) 
-9.569         
(8.602) 
-491.2         
(823100) 
601.8        
(689.1) 
3.861         
(7.81) 
-137         
(7740000) 
-120.664         
(194.911) 
0.07         
(8.761) 
-0.216         
(4.47) 
-8.25         
(6.639) 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks (cu-
mulative) 
0.207         
(0.33) 
7.455         
(69740) 
80.44        
(49.77) 
0.145         
(0.299) 
10.3         
(443500) 
24.491*         
(10.874) 
-0.105         
(0.336) 
-0.153         
(0.171) 
0.144         
(0.254) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs (cumulative) 
0.484         
(0.423) 
-3.551         
(49240) 
-92.41        
(86.31) 
-0.165         
(0.384) 
-0.223         
(782000) 
-5.157         
(19.704) 
-0.398         
(0.431) 
0.214         
(0.22) 
-0.052         
(0.327) 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) -0.001         
(0.003) 
-0.163         
(1692) 
0.082        
(0.365) 
-0.001         
(0.003) 
-0.13         
(5358) 
-0.115         
(0.116) 
-0.003         
(0.003) 
-0.001         
(0.002) 
0         
(0.002) 
R&D expenditure (sum) 0.01         
(0.012) 
-0.209         
(2679) 
0.792        
(1.607) 
0.002         
(0.011) 
-0.075         
(16900) 
0.299         
(0.427) 
-0.001         
(0.012) 
-0.004         
(0.006) 
-0.001         
(0.009) 
Imports of htp by PTA members (sum) 0.003         
(0.006) 
-0.146         
(203.6) 
0.372        
(0.38) 
0.001         
(0.006) 
-0.315         
(1447) 
0.146         
(0.153) 
0.008         
(0.006) 
-0.001         
(0.003) 
-0.004         
(0.005) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members (sum) -0.002         
(0.008) 
0.186         
(364.4) 
0.401        
(0.671) 
0.001         
(0.007) 
0.22         
(3195) 
0.104         
(0.231) 
-0.001         
(0.008) 
0         
(0.004) 
0.008         
(0.006) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members (sum) 0.005         
(0.008) 
-0.108         
(484.1) 
-0.432        
(0.695) 
-0.001         
(0.007) 
-0.039         
(3472) 
-0.302         
(0.26) 
0.003         
(0.008) 
0.007.         
(0.004) 
0.008         
(0.006) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members (sum) -0.002         
(0.004) 
0.129         
(177.6) 
0.08        
(0.314) 
0.002         
(0.004) 
0.02         
(1032) 
0.146.         
(0.088) 
-0.007         
(0.004) 
-0.003         
(0.002) 
-0.011***         
(0.003) 
Imports of htp by PTA members /                                   
total htp imports 
-0.152         
(0.899) 
1.654         
(17690) 
241.6        
(152.1) 
-1.638*         
(0.817) 
-9.41         
(307800) 
-27.097         
(24.42) 
-0.512         
(0.916) 
-0.511         
(0.467) 
0.437         
(0.694) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members /                                
total mhtp imports 
0.745       
(0.558) 
-5.992         
(29900) 
-132.6        
(89.68) 
0.701         
(0.514) 
2.596         
(431000) 
-4.384         
(26.497) 
0.914         
(0.577) 
0.098         
(0.29) 
-0.037         
(0.43) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members /                                
total mltp imports 
-1.905         
(3.227) 
28         
(108200) 
-227.1        
(348.6) 
-0.101         
(2.941) 
27.65         
(1796000) 
113.283         
(151.974) 
-3.826         
(3.299) 
0.555         
(1.677) 
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Imports of ltp by PTA members /                                    
total ltp imports 
-1.326         
(2.376) 
-24.96         
(151500) 
-72.57        
(294.7) 
1.639         
(2.16) 
-4.613         
(1492000) 
-22.394         
(97.761) 
0.633         
(2.424) 
-0.748         
(1.235) 
-0.792         
(1.834) 
Political Pressure 
         
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.014**         
(0.005) 
0.028         
(177.5) 
-0.801        
(0.701) 
-0.006         
(0.004) 
-0.578         
(3742) 
-0.183         
(0.17) 
0.003         
(0.005) 
0.004         
(0.002) 
0.007.         
(0.004) 
Veto Players 
         
Veto players (sum) 0.009.         
(0.006) 
-0.251         
(1768) 
-1.1        
(0.949) 
0.004         
(0.005) 
0.055         
(6017) 
0.272         
(0.268) 
-0.006         
(0.006) 
0.001         
(0.003) 
-0.001         
(0.004) 
Endogeneity 
         
PTA depth – – – -0.009         
(0.006) 
1.619         
(5328) 
-0.057         
(0.201) 
0.01         
(0.007) 
– – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) – – – – – – – – – 
Regime Preference 
         
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) -0.001**         
(0) 
-0.041         
(93.34) 
-0.163*        
(0.078) 
-0.001*         
(0) 
-0.118         
(389.7) 
-0.023         
(0.016) 
-0.001         
(0.001) 
-0.001**         
(0) 
0                
(0) 
Control Variables 
         
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.003         
(0.002) 
0.314         
(363.6) 
0.005        
(0.191) 
-0.003.         
(0.002) 
0.072         
(1017) 
-0.051         
(0.072) 
-0.002         
(0.002) 
0         
(0.001) 
0         
(0.002) 
Classic IP leaders 0.167***         
(0.038) 
1.724         
(7706) 
20.41*        
(9.767) 
0.126***         
(0.035) 
0.57         
(24720) 
0.464         
(0.894) 
0.102**         
(0.039) 
-0.003         
(0.02) 
0         
(0.029) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.087***         
(0.025) 
1.198         
(5327) 
15.08*        
(6.627) 
-0.016         
(0.023) 
0.391         
(18270) 
-0.24         
(0.765) 
0.051.         
(0.026) 
0.005         
(0.013) 
0.02         
(0.02) 
New IP producers and developers -0.073**         
(0.028) 
0.053         
(2176) 
-7.553.        
(3.988) 
-0.046.         
(0.026) 
0.261         
(12880) 
0.012         
(0.84) 
-0.086**         
(0.029) 
-0.015         
(0.015) 
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ln GDP (mean) -0.056***         
(0.01) 
-1.312         
(1757) 
-2.237        
(1.637) 
-0.002         
(0.009) 
-0.319         
(18340) 
1.431*         
(0.636) 
-0.01         
(0.01) 
0         
(0.005) 
-0.011         
(0.008) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.046***         
(0.012) 
-0.203         
(4563) 
1.996        
(1.416) 
0.012         
(0.01) 
-0.538         
(14990) 
0.671         
(0.43) 
0.003         
(0.012) 
-0.002         
(0.006) 
0.002         
(0.009) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.026*         
(0.01) 
-0.494         
(729) 
-6.127*        
(2.862) 
-0.008         
(0.009) 
-0.09         
(5450) 
0.268         
(0.328) 
-0.005         
(0.01) 
-0.006         
(0.005) 
0.008         
(0.008) 
Intercept -0.003         
(0.002) 
0.314         
(363.6) 
0.005        
(0.191) 
-0.003.         
(0.002) 
0.072         
(1017) 
-0.051         
(0.072) 
-0.002         
(0.002) 
0         
(0.001) 
0         
(0.002) 











   
Observations 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 
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Appendix 21 Design Regression Table 5: Domestic Interests III 
Dependent Variables ipr_t_tkgr ipr_t_epcss ipr_t_do-
main_name
s 







   
ln Charges for the use of IP, receipts (sum) -0.003.        
(0.002) 
0.003.         
(0.001) 
0.001         
(0.001) 
ln Resident applications for patents (sum) 0.001        
(0.01) 
-0.009         
(0.01) 
-0.006         
(0.008) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(sum) 
-0.005        
(0.008) 
0.011         
(0.008) 
0.007         
(0.007) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (sum) 
0.001        
(0.008) 
-0.003         
(0.008) 
-0.004         
(0.006) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
-0.022.        
(0.011) 
0.017         
(0.011) 
0.009         
(0.009) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(cumulative, sum) 
0.016.        
(0.009) 
-0.01         
(0.009) 
0         
(0.007) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (cumulative, sum) 
0.002        
(0.011) 
-0.018.         
(0.01) 
-0.014.         
(0.008) 
Applications for patents by PTA members / 
total applications for patents 
0.084*        
(0.042) 
0.054         
(0.04) 
0.089**         
(0.033) 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks 
-0.032        
(0.029) 
-0.03         
(0.027) 
-0.062**         
(0.023) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs 
-0.029        
(0.026) 
0.007         
(0.024) 
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Dependent Variables ipr_t_tkgr ipr_t_epcss ipr_t_do-
main_name
s 
Applications for patents by PTA members / 
total applications for patents (cumulative) 
-3.741        
(7.964) 
8.777         
(7.523) 
11.13.         
(6.301) 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks (cu-
mulative) 
-0.028        
(0.305) 
-0.049         
(0.288) 
0.045         
(0.241) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs (cumulative) 
0.204        
(0.392) 
-0.196         
(0.37) 
-0.359         
(0.31) 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) -0.001        
(0.003) 
-0.002         
(0.003) 
0         
(0.002) 
R&D expenditure (sum) -0.013        
(0.011) 
0.002         
(0.01) 
0.007         
(0.009) 
Imports of htp by PTA members (sum) 0.013*        
(0.006) 
-0.002         
(0.006) 
-0.006         
(0.005) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members (sum) -0.004        
(0.007) 
-0.017*         
(0.007) 
-0.006         
(0.006) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members (sum) -0.009        
(0.007) 
0.003         
(0.007) 
0         
(0.006) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members (sum) -0.001        
(0.004) 
0.012**         
(0.004) 
0.008**         
(0.003) 
Imports of htp by PTA members /                                   
total htp imports 
-1.742*        
(0.834) 
-0.45         
(0.788) 
-0.003         
(0.66) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members /                                
total mhtp imports 
0.453      
(0.525) 
-0.416         
(0.496) 
-0.573         
(0.415) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members /                                
total mltp imports 
4.868        
(3.001) 
6.069*         
(2.835) 
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Dependent Variables ipr_t_tkgr ipr_t_epcss ipr_t_do-
main_name
s 
Imports of ltp by PTA members /                                    
total ltp imports 
-2.627        
(2.202) 
-1.793         
(2.08) 
-0.145         
(1.742) 
Political Pressure 
   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.005        
(0.004) 
0.008.         
(0.004) 
0.007.         
(0.003) 
Veto Players 
   
Veto players (sum) 0.01.        
(0.005) 
-0.011*         
(0.005) 
-0.006         
(0.004) 
Endogeneity 
   
PTA depth 0.02**        
(0.007) 
-0.001         
(0.006) 
-0.008         
(0.005) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.006        
(0.005) 
0.048***         
(0.005) 
0.033***         
(0.004) 
Regime Preference 
   
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.003***        
(0) 
0               
(0) 
0               
(0) 
Control Variables 
   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0        
(0.002) 
-0.001         
(0.002) 
-0.001         
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders -0.073*        
(0.035) 
0.025         
(0.033) 
0.087**         
(0.027) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.011        
(0.024) 
0.012         
(0.022) 
-0.048*         
(0.019) 
New IP producers and developers 0.093***        
(0.027) 
-0.017         
(0.025) 
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Dependent Variables ipr_t_tkgr ipr_t_epcss ipr_t_do-
main_name
s 
ln GDP (mean) 0.005        
(0.009) 
0.034***         
(0.009) 
0.026***         
(0.007) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.014        
(0.011) 
-0.018.         
(0.01) 
-0.022**         
(0.008) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.013        
(0.009) 
0.013         
(0.009) 
0.012         
(0.007) 
Intercept -0.087     
(0.189) 
-0.708***     
(0.178) 
-0.513***     
(0.149) 
Model m8idi1_ols m8jdi1_ols m8kdi1_ols 
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PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.003        
(0.005) 
0.009.         
(0.005) 
-0.001         
(0.006) 
-0.001         
(0.005) 
-0.005         
(0.004) 
0.008.         
(0.005) 
0.006*         
(0.002) 
0.003         
(0.004) 
0         
(0.004) 
Veto Players   
        
Veto players (sum) 0.007        
(0.006) 
0.008         
(0.005) 
-0.008         
(0.007) 
-0.013*         
(0.006) 
-0.001         
(0.005) 
-0.016**         
(0.006) 
0.002         
(0.003) 
0.005         
(0.004) 
0.006         
(0.005) 
Endogeneity   
        
PTA depth – – 0.046***         
(0.009) 
– -0.008         
(0.006) 
0.019**         
(0.007) 
– -0.001         
(0.005) 
0.01         
(0.007) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) -0.037.        
(0.021) 
-0.048*         
(0.021) 
– -0.012         
(0.021) 
– – -0.01         
(0.011) 
– – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.088***        
(0.005) 
0.094***         
(0.005) 
– – – – – – 0.005         
(0.005) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – – 0.083***         
(0.01) 
0.094***         
(0.008) 
0.146***         
(0.007) 
0.069***         
(0.008) 
0.021***         
(0.004) 
0.033***         
(0.006) 
– 
Regime Preference   
        
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.001.            
(0) 
0.001         
(0) 
0.001*         
(0.001) 
-0.001*         
(0) 
-0.001.         
(0) 
0              
(0) 
-0.001**         
(0) 
0               
(0) 
0.002***         
(0) 
Path Dependency   
        
Index IPR general pd (sum) 0.003.        
(0.002) 
0.001         
(0.002) 
0.004.         
(0.002) 
0.004*         
(0.002) 
0         
(0.002) 
0.006**         
(0.002) 
-0.001.         
(0.001) 
0         
(0.001) 
































Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – copyrights 
0.016        
(0.025) 
0.015         
(0.024) 
0.008         
(0.032) 
-0.025         
(0.024) 
-0.009         
(0.023) 
-0.049.         
(0.026) 
0.013         
(0.012) 
-0.016         
(0.019) 
0.002         
(0.023) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – trademarks 
-0.01        
(0.035) 
0.037         
(0.034) 
0.003         
(0.046) 
0.004         
(0.035) 
0.013         
(0.032) 
-0.039         
(0.036) 
-0.009         
(0.018) 
-0.011         
(0.027) 
0.057.         
(0.032) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – geographical indications 
-0.053*        
(0.025) 
-0.051*         
(0.024) 
0.029         
(0.032) 
0.034         
(0.024) 
-0.02         
(0.022) 
-0.031         
(0.025) 
-0.035**         
(0.012) 
0.02         
(0.019) 
0.019         
(0.023) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – industrial designs 
0.043        
(0.044) 
0.022         
(0.043) 
0.132*         
(0.057) 
0             
(0.044) 
-0.08*         
(0.04) 
-0.018         
(0.045) 
-0.006         
(0.022) 
-0.035         
(0.034) 
0.058         
(0.041) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – patents 
-0.055        
(0.05) 
-0.073         
(0.048) 
-0.155*         
(0.065) 
-0.007         
(0.049) 
0.061         
(0.045) 
0.036         
(0.051) 
0.019         
(0.025) 
0.04         
(0.039) 
-0.117*         
(0.046) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – undisclosed information 
0.014        
(0.032) 
-0.004         
(0.031) 
-0.057         
(0.042) 
-0.027         
(0.031) 
0.036         
(0.029) 
0.036         
(0.033) 
0.048**         
(0.016) 
0.024         
(0.025) 
-0.078**         
(0.03) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0.038.        
(0.02) 
0.052**         
(0.02) 
0.01         
(0.026) 
0.021         
(0.02) 
0.01         
(0.018) 
0.03         
(0.021) 
-0.013         
(0.01) 
-0.003         
(0.016) 
0.066***         
(0.019) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – new plant varieties 
0.006        
(0.006) 
-0.001         
(0.005) 
0.004         
(0.007) 
0.012*         
(0.006) 
-0.011*         
(0.005) 
0.004         
(0.006) 
-0.01***         
(0.003) 
-0.008.         
(0.004) 
0.006         
(0.005) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
0.015***        
(0.004) 
-0.004         
(0.004) 
-0.015**         
(0.005) 
0.011*         
(0.004) 
0.004         
(0.004) 
0.001         
(0.004) 
-0.001         
(0.002) 
-0.003         
(0.003) 
0.013***         
(0.004) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – encrypted program-carrying sat-
ellite signals 
0.006        
(0.007) 
-0.021**         
(0.007) 
0.001         
(0.01) 
0              
(0.007) 
-0.021**         
(0.007) 
0.002         
(0.008) 
-0.017***         
(0.004) 
-0.019**         
(0.006) 
0.007         
(0.007) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
0.035*        
(0.016) 
0.031.         
(0.016) 
0.043*         
(0.021) 
-0.028.         
(0.016) 
-0.05***         
(0.015) 
-0.07***         
(0.017) 
-0.015.         
(0.008) 
-0.004         
(0.013) 
































Index IPR general enforcement pd (sum) -0.005.        
(0.003) 
0         
(0.003) 
0.001         
(0.004) 
-0.011***         
(0.003) 
0.006*         
(0.003) 
0         
(0.003) 
0.001         
(0.002) 
0.001         
(0.002) 
-0.001         
(0.003) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pl 
(dummy sum) 
-0.001             
(0) 
0.001.         
(0) 
0.001.         
(0.001) 
0.001.              
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0.001**         
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
-0.001*         
(0) 
Control Variables   
        
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.003        
(0.002) 
-0.003.         
(0.002) 
0.003         
(0.002) 
-0.001         
(0.002) 
-0.002         
(0.002) 
-0.002         
(0.002) 
-0.001         
(0.001) 
-0.002         
(0.001) 
-0.001         
(0.002) 
Classic IP leaders -0.067*        
(0.034) 
-0.066*         
(0.033) 
-0.078.         
(0.046) 
0.191***         
(0.035) 
0.117***         
(0.032) 
0.09*         
(0.036) 
-0.004         
(0.018) 
-0.032         
(0.027) 
-0.072*         
(0.031) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.041.        
(0.023) 
-0.013         
(0.022) 
-0.024         
(0.03) 
0.092***         
(0.023) 
-0.011         
(0.021) 
0.046.         
(0.023) 
0.003         
(0.011) 
0.001         
(0.018) 
0.023         
(0.021) 
New IP producers and developers -0.037        
(0.027) 
-0.086***         
(0.026) 
-0.043         
(0.034) 
-0.028         
(0.026) 
-0.039         
(0.024) 
-0.084**         
(0.027) 
-0.013         
(0.013) 
0.017         
(0.021) 
0.046.         
(0.025) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.024**        
(0.008) 
0.022**         
(0.008) 
-0.001         
(0.011) 
-0.037***         
(0.008) 
0.006         
(0.007) 
-0.009         
(0.008) 
0.003         
(0.004) 
-0.003         
(0.006) 
-0.012.         
(0.008) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.04***        
(0.011) 
-0.026*         
(0.011) 
-0.027.         
(0.014) 
0.042***         
(0.011) 
0.011         
(0.01) 
0.003         
(0.011) 
0.001         
(0.005) 
-0.001         
(0.008) 
-0.015         
(0.01) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.006        
(0.01) 
-0.002         
(0.01) 
0.057***         
(0.013) 
-0.017.         
(0.01) 
0         
(0.009) 
-0.001         
(0.01) 
0              
(0.005) 
0.011         
(0.008) 
0.01         
(0.009) 
Intercept -0.229     
(0.162) 
-0.322*     
(0.156) 
-0.232     
(0.212) 
0.705***     
(0.158) 
-0.203     
(0.148) 
0.19     
(0.168) 
-0.074     
(0.08) 
-0.004     
(0.127) 




















Observations 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 
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Appendix 21 Design Regression Table 7: Path Dependency (general) II 
Dependent Variables ipr_t_epcss ipr_t_do-
main_name
s 






PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.004         
(0.004) 




Veto players (sum) 0.007         
(0.005) 




PTA depth -0.005         
(0.007) 
-0.017**         
(0.005) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.05***         
(0.005) 
0.034***         
(0.004) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – – 
Regime Preference 
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) -0.001**         
(0) 




Index IPR general pd (sum) -0.002         
(0.002) 
-0.003**         
(0.001) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – copyrights 
0.051*         
(0.022) 
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Dependent Variables ipr_t_epcss ipr_t_do-
main_name
s 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – trademarks 
0.002         
(0.032) 
0.037         
(0.026) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – geographical indications 
-0.046*         
(0.022) 
-0.001         
(0.018) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – industrial designs 
0.045         
(0.04) 
-0.023         
(0.032) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – patents 
-0.044         
(0.045) 
-0.007         
(0.036) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – undisclosed information 
0.019         
(0.029) 
0.005         
(0.023) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
-0.017         
(0.018) 
-0.015         
(0.015) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – new plant varieties 
0.001         
(0.005) 
-0.003         
(0.004) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
-0.007*         
(0.004) 
-0.005         
(0.003) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – encrypted program-carrying sat-
ellite signals 
0             
(0.007) 
-0.008         
(0.005) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
0.052***         
(0.015) 
0.071***         
(0.012) 
Index IPR general enforcement pd (sum) 0.002         
(0.003) 
0.005*         
(0.002) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pl 
(dummy sum) 
-0.001               
(0) 
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Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.001         
(0.002) 
-0.001         
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders 0.034         
(0.031) 
0.088***         
(0.025) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.012         
(0.02) 
-0.038*         
(0.017) 
New IP producers and developers -0.048*         
(0.024) 
0         
(0.019) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.018*         
(0.007) 
0.016**         
(0.006) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.026**         
(0.01) 
-0.025**         
(0.008) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.002         
(0.009) 
0.005         
(0.007) 
Intercept -0.265.     
(0.146) 






Observations 529 529 
 







- 206 - 
Appendix 21 Design Regression Table 8: Path Dependency (specific) I 



























         
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.009.         
(0.005) 
0.332        
(2562) 
0.144         
(0.193) 
0.014**         
(0.005) 
0.004         
(0.006) 
-0.391         
(2950) 
0.082         
(0.106) 
0.001         
(0.005) 
0.003         
(0.004) 
Veto Players   
        
Veto players (sum) 0.006         
(0.005) 
-1.087        
(2582) 
0.19         
(0.222) 
0.002         
(0.005) 
-0.005         
(0.006) 
-3.518         
(5132) 
-0.236         
(0.23) 
-0.008.         
(0.005) 
-0.004         
(0.004) 
Endogeneity   
        
PTA depth – 0.47        
(4079) 
0.722**         
(0.275) 
– 0.039***         
(0.009) 
-0.631         
(1637) 
0.373***         
(0.109) 
– -0.007         
(0.006) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) -0.034         
(0.021) 
– – -0.034.         
(0.02) 
– – – -0.008         
(0.02) 
– 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.085***         
(0.005) 
1.36        
(1782) 
0.804***         
(0.195) 
0.092***         
(0.005) 
– – – – – 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – – – – 0.077***         
(0.011) 
-0.074         
(1390) 
0.271**         
(0.099) 
0.092***         
(0.008) 
0.149***         
(0.008) 
Regime Preference   
        
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.001.         
(0) 
0.055        
(114.7) 
0.021.         
(0.013) 
0.001         
(0) 
0.002***         
(0.001) 
0.179         
(61.14) 
0.014*         
(0.006) 
-0.001*         
(0) 
-0.001*         
(0) 
Path Dependency   
        
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – copyrights 
-0.015         
(0.023) 
-0.089        
(3634) 
-1.127.         
(0.659) 
-0.048*         
(0.022) 
0.027         
(0.029) 
0.174         
(4876) 
0.168         
(0.316) 
0.031         
(0.022) 
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Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – trademarks 
-0.086**         
(0.029) 
-1.328        
(4500) 
-3.044*         
(1.195) 
-0.007         
(0.027) 
-0.001         
(0.037) 
0.732         
(5957) 
-0.044         
(0.329) 
-0.088**         
(0.028) 
-0.05.         
(0.026) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – geographical indications 
0.009         
(0.011) 
-0.335        
(2920) 
0.964*         
(0.405) 
0.009         
(0.01) 
0.057***         
(0.014) 
1.398         
(5249) 
0.488**         
(0.162) 
0.001         
(0.011) 
0.009         
(0.01) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – industrial designs 
0.001         
(0.026) 
0.375        
(7813) 
0.473         
(0.611) 
0.017         
(0.025) 
-0.011         
(0.033) 
1.082         
(2332) 
-0.039         
(0.357) 
-0.081**         
(0.025) 
-0.021         
(0.023) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – patents 
0.024         
(0.03) 
0.787        
(6879) 
0.726         
(0.77) 
-0.01         
(0.028) 
-0.02         
(0.038) 
0.306         
(6387) 
-0.359         
(0.495) 
0.105***         
(0.029) 
0.031         
(0.027) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – undisclosed information 
-0.008.         
(0.005) 
0.001        
(585.2) 
-0.109         
(0.198) 
0.007         
(0.005) 
0.007         
(0.006) 
-0.142         
(544.6) 
0.034         
(0.124) 
-0.007         
(0.005) 
-0.007.         
(0.004) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – layout-designs of integrated circuits 
0.01         
(0.01) 
-0.246        
(675.8) 
2.125**         
(0.699) 
0.001         
(0.009) 
0.029*         
(0.012) 
0.492         
(860.4) 
0.643*         
(0.28) 
-0.034***         
(0.009) 
0.023**         
(0.009) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – new plant varieties 
0.047*         
(0.019) 
0.345        
(3335) 
0.062         
(0.605) 
0.048**         
(0.018) 
-0.016         
(0.024) 
-0.472         
(3245) 
-0.36         
(0.291) 
0.033.         
(0.019) 
-0.019         
(0.017) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – traditional knowledge & genetic re-
sources 
0.016         
(0.01) 
-0.483        
(2114) 
0.677         
(0.498) 
0.022*         
(0.01) 
-0.024.         
(0.013) 
-0.134         
(1316) 
-0.131         
(0.148) 
-0.008         
(0.01) 
-0.008         
(0.009) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – encrypted program-carrying satellite 
signals 
0.115***         
(0.026) 
0.629        
(7467) 
1.786.         
(0.944) 
0.083***         
(0.025) 
-0.041         
(0.033) 
-0.912         
(5067) 
-0.203         
(0.348) 
0.039         
(0.026) 
0.003         
(0.024) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – domain names 
-0.052*         
(0.026) 
-0.972        
(8301) 
-1.296         
(1) 
-0.02         
(0.024) 
0.066*         
(0.033) 
1.143         
(5790) 
0.263         
(0.379) 
-0.115***         
(0.025) 
-0.043.         
(0.023) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pd (sum) 0.004         
(0.002) 
0.194        
(1556) 
0.243*         
(0.112) 
-0.002         
(0.002) 
-0.001         
(0.003) 
0.128         
(754) 
0.004         
(0.063) 
0.006*         
(0.002) 
0.001         
(0.002) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pd (sum) -0.001         
(0.001) 
0.009        
(2.179) 
-0.041.         
(0.024) 
-0.001         
(0.001) 
-0.001         
(0.001) 
-0.06         
(12.83) 
0.004         
(0.014) 
0.001         
(0.001) 
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Control Variables   
        
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.004*         
(0.002) 
0.233        
(1144) 
-0.072         
(0.099) 
-0.004*         
(0.002) 
0.003         
(0.002) 
-0.444         
(483.9) 
0.059         
(0.044) 
-0.002         
(0.002) 
-0.002         
(0.002) 
Classic IP leaders -0.039         
(0.034) 
1.46        
(5902) 
-0.672         
(1.049) 
-0.007         
(0.033) 
-0.054         
(0.045) 
1.342         
(4372) 
0.368         
(0.516) 
0.168***         
(0.035) 
0.12***         
(0.032) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.055*         
(0.023) 
-0.001        
(9888) 
-2.428**         
(0.843) 
-0.02         
(0.022) 
-0.023         
(0.029) 
-1.899         
(9794) 
-0.161         
(0.357) 
0.087***         
(0.023) 
-0.012         
(0.021) 
New IP producers and developers -0.022         
(0.027) 
0.001        
(5291) 
-0.327         
(0.93) 
-0.066**         
(0.025) 
-0.03         
(0.034) 
-1.349         
(3519) 
-0.36         
(0.376) 
-0.017         
(0.026) 
-0.015         
(0.024) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.023**         
(0.008) 
-1.221        
(2516) 
0.644.         
(0.339) 
0.014.         
(0.008) 
-0.004         
(0.01) 
-1.727         
(2902) 
-0.128         
(0.151) 
-0.033***         
(0.008) 
0.003         
(0.007) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.036***         
(0.011) 
0.298        
(4847) 
-1.552**         
(0.573) 
-0.018.         
(0.01) 
-0.019         
(0.014) 
2.662         
(2692) 
-0.457*         
(0.213) 
0.043***         
(0.01) 
0.01         
(0.01) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.004         
(0.01) 
-0.459        
(3980) 
-0.723.         
(0.38) 
-0.007         
(0.01) 
0.051***         
(0.013) 
0.836         
(2424) 
0.91***         
(0.225) 
-0.012         
(0.01) 
-0.001         
(0.009) 
Intercept -0.259     
(0.158) 
-4.385     
(91040) 
-5.273     
(5.8) 
-0.147     
(0.151) 
-0.17     
(0.204) 
-8.067     
(87510) 
-3.711     
(2.824) 
0.564***     
(0.153) 





























Observations 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 
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Appendix 21 Design Regression Table 9: Path Dependency (specific) II 
























         
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.008        
(0.005) 
0.602         
(5100) 
0.475*         
(0.187) 
0.008**         
(0.002) 
0.602         
(5100) 
0.475*         
(0.187) 
0.014***             
(0.004) 
0.008.         
(0.004) 
-0.006         
(0.004) 
Veto Players 
         
Veto players (sum) -0.012*        
(0.005) 
-0.679         
(11570) 
-0.617*         
(0.265) 
0.001         
(0.002) 
-0.679         
(11570) 
-0.617*         
(0.265) 
0             
(0.004) 
0.001         
(0.004) 
0.005         
(0.004) 
Endogeneity 
         
PTA depth 0.013.        
(0.007) 
0.222         
(2181) 
0.211         
(0.152) 
0.003         
(0.003) 
0.222         
(2181) 
0.211         
(0.152) 
– 0.007         
(0.006) 
– 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – – – – – – 0.006             
(0.016) 
– -0.016         
(0.018) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) – – – – – – – 0.008.         
(0.005) 
0.05***         
(0.004) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0.062***        
(0.008) 
0.776         
(2767) 
0.616***         
(0.156) 
0.021***         
(0.004) 
0.776         
(2767) 
0.616***         
(0.156) 




         
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0                 
(0) 
0.087         
(237.4) 
0.001         
(0.012) 
-0.001***         
(0) 
0.087         
(237.4) 
0.001         
(0.012) 
0                   
(0) 
0.002***         
(0) 
-0.001**         
(0) 
Path Dependency 
         
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – copyrights 
0.007        
(0.023) 
0.125         
(18510) 
-0.161         
(0.405) 
-0.027*         
(0.011) 
0.125         
(18510) 
-0.161         
(0.405) 
0.005             
(0.017) 
0.033         
(0.021) 
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Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – trademarks 
-0.053.        
(0.029) 
-1.024         
(29000) 
-0.779         
(0.494) 
0.006         
(0.014) 
-1.024         
(29000) 
-0.779         
(0.494) 
-0.058**             
(0.022) 
-0.071**         
(0.026) 
0.055*         
(0.025) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – geographical indications 
0.037***        
(0.011) 
0.294         
(10450) 
0.483.         
(0.249) 
-0.017**         
(0.006) 
0.294         
(10450) 
0.483.         
(0.249) 
0.003             
(0.008) 
0.01         
(0.01) 
-0.013         
(0.009) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – industrial designs 
-0.008        
(0.026) 
-0.066         
(10740) 
-0.466         
(0.72) 
-0.017         
(0.013) 
-0.066         
(10740) 
-0.466         
(0.72) 
-0.045*             
(0.02) 
-0.094***         
(0.023) 
0.1***         
(0.022) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – patents 
-0.009        
(0.031) 
-0.113         
(17490) 
0.196         
(0.756) 
0.056***         
(0.015) 
-0.113         
(17490) 
0.196         
(0.756) 
0.042.             
(0.023) 
0.064*         
(0.027) 
-0.077**         
(0.026) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – undisclosed information 
-0.004        
(0.005) 
0.356         
(6843) 
-0.198         
(0.215) 
-0.003         
(0.002) 
0.356         
(6843) 
-0.198         
(0.215) 
-0.008*             
(0.004) 
-0.014**         
(0.004) 
0.003         
(0.004) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – layout-designs of integrated circuits 
0.052***        
(0.01) 
-0.114         
(6995) 
0.373*         
(0.158) 
-0.013**         
(0.005) 
-0.114         
(6995) 
0.373*         
(0.158) 
-0.016*             
(0.007) 
-0.009         
(0.009) 
0.026**         
(0.008) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – new plant varieties 
0.007        
(0.019) 
0.614         
(13270) 
0.683         
(0.443) 
-0.022*         
(0.01) 
0.614         
(13270) 
0.683         
(0.443) 
0.035*             
(0.015) 
0.071***         
(0.017) 
-0.046**         
(0.017) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – traditional knowledge & genetic re-
sources 
-0.001        
(0.01) 
0.023         
(13860) 
0.354         
(0.275) 
0.012*         
(0.005) 
0.023         
(13860) 
0.354         
(0.275) 
-0.015.             
(0.008) 
-0.006         
(0.009) 
0.011         
(0.009) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – encrypted program-carrying satellite 
signals 
0.031        
(0.027) 
0.954         
(15200) 
0.896.         
(0.473) 
0.006         
(0.013) 
0.954         
(15200) 
0.896.         
(0.473) 
0.006             
(0.02) 
0.056*         
(0.024) 
0.031         
(0.023) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – domain names 
-0.057*        
(0.026) 
-0.504         
(19720) 
-1.199.         
(0.613) 
-0.047***         
(0.013) 
-0.504         
(19720) 
-1.199.         
(0.613) 
-0.006             
(0.02) 
0.034         
(0.023) 
0.035         
(0.022) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pd (sum) 0.002        
(0.002) 
-0.214         
(3165) 
0.114         
(0.08) 
0.001         
(0.001) 
-0.214         
(3165) 
0.114         
(0.08) 
0.005**             
(0.002) 
0         
(0.002) 
-0.007***         
(0.002) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pd (sum) -0.001        
(0.001) 
0.075         
(57.18) 
-0.031         
(0.028) 
0                 
(0) 
0.075         
(57.18) 
-0.031         
(0.028) 
0                      
(0) 
0.001         
(0.001) 
0         
(0.001) 
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Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.001        
(0.002) 
-0.265         
(1039) 
-0.015         
(0.055) 
-0.001         
(0.001) 
-0.265         
(1039) 
-0.015         
(0.055) 
-0.001             
(0.001) 
-0.002         
(0.002) 
-0.002         
(0.002) 
Classic IP leaders 0.109**        
(0.036) 
2.544         
(19850) 
1.821*         
(0.737) 
0.006         
(0.018) 
2.544         
(19850) 
1.821*         
(0.737) 
-0.014             
(0.027) 
-0.068*         
(0.031) 
0.048         
(0.03) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.045.        
(0.024) 
0.946         
(16030) 
0.91.         
(0.494) 
-0.005         
(0.012) 
0.946         
(16030) 
0.91.         
(0.494) 
0.011             
(0.018) 
0.028         
(0.021) 
-0.006         
(0.02) 
New IP producers and developers -0.052.        
(0.027) 
-1.033         
(42240) 
-1.095.         
(0.655) 
-0.005         
(0.013) 
-1.033         
(42240) 
-1.095.         
(0.655) 
0.038.             
(0.02) 
0.074**         
(0.024) 
-0.076**         
(0.023) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.008        
(0.008) 
-0.9         
(9697) 
-0.317         
(0.197) 
0.004         
(0.004) 
-0.9         
(9697) 
-0.317         
(0.197) 
-0.007             
(0.006) 
-0.017*         
(0.007) 
0.014*         
(0.007) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.003        
(0.011) 
0.203         
(8714) 
0.112         
(0.293) 
-0.004         
(0.005) 
0.203         
(8714) 
0.112         
(0.293) 
0             
(0.008) 
-0.004         
(0.01) 
-0.025**         
(0.009) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.004        
(0.01) 
-0.201         
(7027) 
-0.152         
(0.307) 
0.002         
(0.005) 
-0.201         
(7027) 
-0.152         
(0.307) 
0.01             
(0.008) 
0.01         
(0.009) 
0.002         
(0.009) 
Intercept 0.213     
(0.164) 
-0.383     
(268100) 
4.239     
(4.499) 
-0.089     
(0.08) 
-0.383     
(268100) 
4.239     
(4.499) 
0.098     
(0.12) 
0.339*     
(0.145) 
























   
Observations 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 
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PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 








PTA depth -0.016**         
(0.005) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.035***         
(0.004) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – 
Regime Preference 
 




Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – copyrights 
0.023         
(0.016) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – trademarks 










Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – geographical indications 
0.008         
(0.008) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – industrial designs 
0.073***         
(0.019) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – patents 
-0.087***         
(0.021) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – undisclosed information 
-0.002         
(0.003) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – layout-designs of integrated circuits 
0.021**         
(0.007) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – new plant varieties 
-0.041**         
(0.014) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – traditional knowledge & genetic re-
sources 
-0.015*         
(0.007) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – encrypted program-carrying satellite 
signals 
-0.026         
(0.019) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – domain names 
0.096***         
(0.019) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pd (sum) -0.004**         
(0.002) 














Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.001         
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders 0.08**         
(0.025) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.044**         
(0.017) 
New IP producers and developers -0.024         
(0.019) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.013*         
(0.006) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.026***         
(0.008) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.004         
(0.007) 
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Appendix 21 Design Regression Table 11: Path Dependency (TRIPS-plus) I 























        
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.006            
(0.005) 
0.053            
(1074) 
0.175           
(0.18) 
0.015**           
(0.005) 
0.003           
(0.006) 
0.957          
(748.7) 
0.093           
(0.119) 
-0.003          
(0.005) 
Veto Players   
       
Veto players (sum) 0.011*            
(0.005) 
0.196            
(1742) 
0.138           
(0.161) 
0.004           
(0.005) 
-0.007           
(0.006) 
-0.543          
(1094) 
-0.248           
(0.226) 
-0.005          
(0.005) 
Endogeneity   
       
PTA depth – -0.015            
(1734) 
0.584*           
(0.238) 
– 0.043***           
(0.009) 
0.352          
(610.6) 
0.392***           
(0.111) 
– 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) -0.043*            
(0.021) 
– – -0.042*           
(0.02) 
– – – -0.015          
(0.02) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.086***            
(0.005) 
1.271            
(996.5) 
0.834***           
(0.204) 
0.091***           
(0.005) 
– – – – 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – – – – 0.079***           
(0.01) 
0.359          
(276.3) 
0.288**           
(0.098) 
0.095***          
(0.008) 
Regime Preference   
       
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.001**            
(0) 
-0.014            
(76.13) 
0.019           
(0.012) 
0.001*           
(0) 
0.002**           
(0.001) 
0.05          
(26.64) 
0.01.           
(0.006) 
-0.001*          
(0) 
Path Dependency   
       
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – copyrights 
-0.034*            
(0.013) 
-0.254            
(1856) 
-0.489           
(0.459) 
-0.052***           
(0.013) 
-0.047**           
(0.017) 
-0.102          
(1367) 
-0.107           
(0.248) 
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Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – trademarks 
-0.011            
(0.016) 
-0.633            
(2984) 
-0.721           
(0.622) 
0.059***           
(0.015) 
0.093***           
(0.021) 
-0.036          
(1151) 
0.293           
(0.274) 
-0.06***          
(0.015) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – geographical indications 
-0.014*            
(0.006) 
-0.421            
(1800) 
-0.182           
(0.182) 
0.007           
(0.006) 
0.015.           
(0.008) 
-0.69          
(1290) 
0.375           
(0.255) 
0.004          
(0.006) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd –  industrial designs 
0.006            
(0.015) 
0.614            
(2743) 
0.524           
(0.456) 
-0.021           
(0.015) 
-0.034.           
(0.02) 
0.981          
(778.8) 
-0.064           
(0.242) 
-0.011          
(0.014) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – patents 
0.042***            
(0.012) 
0.347            
(3208) 
0.821           
(0.588) 
0.009           
(0.011) 
0.002           
(0.015) 
-0.217          
(990) 
-0.05           
(0.176) 
0.051***          
(0.011) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – undisclosed information  
0.009            
(0.007) 
0.299            
(1398) 
0.143           
(0.238) 
0.016*           
(0.007) 
0.02*           
(0.009) 
0.441          
(734.3) 
0.194           
(0.198) 
0.011          
(0.007) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0.091**            
(0.03) 
0.311            
(2921) 
5.044**           
(1.928) 
0.097***           
(0.029) 
0.111**           
(0.039) 
0.826          
(1317) 
0.612           
(0.429) 
-0.103***          
(0.029) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – new plant varieties 
-0.004            
(0.016) 
0.027            
(2233) 
-0.561           
(0.507) 
-0.006           
(0.016) 
-0.024           
(0.021) 
-0.202          
(1398) 
-0.17           
(0.277) 
0.053***          
(0.016) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
0.005            
(0.006) 
0.206            
(1248) 
0.152           
(0.141) 
0.002           
(0.006) 
-0.011           
(0.008) 
0.436          
(455.9) 
-0.008           
(0.093) 
-0.01          
(0.006) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
0.01            
(0.024) 
0.047            
(3009) 
-3.004*           
(1.522) 
-0.037           
(0.023) 
-0.049           
(0.031) 
-0.451          
(1521) 
-0.164           
(0.377) 
0.008          
(0.023) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – domain names 
-0.007            
(0.023) 
-0.703            
(2527) 
2.45.           
(1.38) 
0.026           
(0.023) 
0.06.           
(0.031) 
-0.289          
(1295) 
0.083           
(0.353) 
-0.102***          
(0.023) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – enforcement 
0.001            
(0.006) 
-0.131            
(1962) 
0.147           
(0.096) 
-0.014*           
(0.006) 
-0.007           
(0.008) 
-0.445          
(1551) 
0.008           
(0.159) 
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Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – exhaustion 
-0.004            
(0.009) 
-0.421            
(512.7) 
0.321           
(0.513) 
0           
(0.009) 
0.007           
(0.012) 
-0.079          
(287.9) 
-0.153           
(0.2) 
-0.048***          
(0.009) 
Control Variables   
       
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.003            
(0.002) 
0.116            
(326) 
-0.089           
(0.086) 
-0.004*           
(0.002) 
0.002           
(0.002) 
0.265          
(226.5) 
0.026           
(0.043) 
0.001          
(0.002) 
Classic IP leaders -0.09**            
(0.034) 
0.716            
(4519) 
-1.517.           
(0.861) 
-0.042           
(0.033) 
-0.057           
(0.046) 
0.873          
(1894) 
0.492           
(0.476) 
0.154***          
(0.034) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.053*            
(0.023) 
0.012            
(2454) 
-1.581*           
(0.76) 
-0.024           
(0.022) 
-0.038           
(0.03) 
-0.246          
(1737) 
-0.225           
(0.354) 
0.1***          
(0.022) 
New IP producers and developers -0.05.            
(0.026) 
-0.816            
(2920) 
-0.36           
(0.678) 
-0.073**           
(0.025) 
-0.034           
(0.034) 
-0.906          
(1418) 
-0.473           
(0.364) 
-0.025          
(0.025) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.021**            
(0.008) 
-0.579            
(2576) 
0.19           
(0.253) 
0.014.           
(0.008) 
-0.004           
(0.01) 
-0.738          
(708.9) 
-0.176           
(0.146) 
-0.034***          
(0.008) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.031**            
(0.01) 
-0.089            
(3677) 
-0.847*           
(0.419) 
-0.017.           
(0.01) 
-0.019           
(0.014) 
0.738          
(1054) 
-0.404.           
(0.231) 
0.04***          
(0.01) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.007            
(0.01) 
-0.982            
(2103) 
-0.442           
(0.394) 
-0.007           
(0.01) 
0.056***           
(0.013) 
-0.221          
(667.5) 
0.969***           
(0.223) 
-0.017.          
(0.01) 
Intercept -0.217        
(0.156) 
-1.979     
(53560) 
-0.533     
(4.823) 
-0.165     
(0.151) 
-0.193     
(0.206) 
-7.229     
(17240) 
-3.322     
(2.679) 





























Observations 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 
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Appendix 21 Design Regression Table 12: Path Dependency (TRIPS-plus) II 

































         
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.002          
(0.004) 
-0.034          
(645) 
0.006          
(0.093) 
0.005           
(0.005) 
0.007**           
(0.002) 
0.007*           
(0.004) 
0.003           
(0.004) 
0.001          
(0.004) 
0           
(0.003) 
Veto Players 
         
Veto players (sum) -0.003          
(0.004) 
-0.111          
(1208) 
0.035          
(0.108) 
-0.009.           
(0.005) 
0.002           
(0.002) 
0.004           
(0.004) 
0.003           
(0.004) 
0.003          
(0.004) 
0.002           
(0.003) 
Endogeneity 
         
PTA depth -0.007          
(0.006) 
3.013          
(1224) 
-0.112          
(0.158) 
0.016*           
(0.007) 
0.002           
(0.003) 
0.001           
(0.005) 
0.007           
(0.006) 
-0.005          
(0.006) 
-0.015**           
(0.005) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – – – – – – – – – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) – – – – – – 0.009*           
(0.005) 
0.047***          
(0.004) 
0.033***           
(0.004) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0.148***          
(0.007) 
2.573          
(1646) 
0.868***          
(0.169) 
0.063***           
(0.008) 
0.019***           
(0.004) 
0.04***           
(0.006) 
– – – 
Regime Preference 
         
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) -0.001.          
(0) 
-0.079          
(39.79) 
-0.015          
(0.012) 
0               
(0) 
-0.001**           
(0) 
0                
(0) 
0.002***           
(0) 
-0.001*          
(0) 
0                
(0) 
Path Dependency 
         
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – copyrights 
-0.041***          
(0.012) 
-0.982          
(1265) 
-0.35          
(0.262) 
-0.002           
(0.014) 
-0.015*           
(0.007) 
-0.011           
(0.01) 
-0.019           
(0.012) 
-0.017          
(0.011) 
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Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – trademarks 
-0.006          
(0.015) 
0.041          
(1482) 
-0.08          
(0.302) 
0.012           
(0.017) 
-0.027***           
(0.008) 
-0.037**           
(0.012) 
-0.004           
(0.014) 
0.041**          
(0.013) 
0.031**           
(0.011) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – geographical indications 
0.004          
(0.006) 
-0.444          
(905.2) 
0.246          
(0.213) 
-0.007           
(0.007) 
0           
(0.003) 
0.005           
(0.005) 
0.006           
(0.006) 
-0.005          
(0.005) 
0.001           
(0.005) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd –  industrial designs 
-0.011          
(0.014) 
0.156          
(1911) 
-0.25          
(0.359) 
-0.032*           
(0.016) 
0.013.           
(0.008) 
-0.012           
(0.011) 
-0.073***           
(0.013) 
0.049***          
(0.012) 
0.027*           
(0.011) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – patents 
0.039***          
(0.011) 
0.744          
(1454) 
0.396          
(0.257) 
0.012           
(0.012) 
-0.007           
(0.006) 
0.04***           
(0.009) 
0.05***           
(0.011) 
0              
(0.01) 
-0.009           
(0.008) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – undisclosed information  
0.016*          
(0.007) 
-0.104          
(570.4) 
0.134          
(0.125) 
0.015*           
(0.008) 
0.008*           
(0.004) 
0.012*           
(0.005) 
-0.011.           
(0.006) 
-0.004          
(0.006) 
-0.004           
(0.005) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0.022          
(0.028) 
1.378          
(1110) 
0.95          
(1.052) 
0.065*           
(0.032) 
-0.021           
(0.015) 
-0.106***           
(0.023) 
-0.071**           
(0.027) 
0.189***          
(0.025) 
0.113***           
(0.021) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – new plant varieties 
0.004          
(0.015) 
-0.018          
(840.3) 
0.091          
(0.373) 
0.018           
(0.017) 
0.024**           
(0.008) 
0.049***           
(0.012) 
0.059***           
(0.015) 
-0.087***          
(0.014) 
-0.061***           
(0.012) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
-0.011.          
(0.006) 
0.691          
(865.4) 
-0.096          
(0.098) 
-0.006           
(0.007) 
0.002           
(0.003) 
-0.018***           
(0.005) 
0.004           
(0.006) 
-0.004          
(0.005) 
-0.002           
(0.004) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
-0.009          
(0.022) 
0.749          
(1260) 
-0.944          
(1.05) 
-0.044.           
(0.025) 
0.017           
(0.012) 
-0.005           
(0.018) 
0.007           
(0.021) 
-0.007          
(0.02) 
-0.001           
(0.017) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – domain names 
-0.03          
(0.022) 
0.053          
(1396) 
0.609          
(0.996) 
-0.059*           
(0.025) 
-0.013           
(0.012) 
-0.022           
(0.018) 
0.032           
(0.021) 
0.059**          
(0.02) 
0.09***           
(0.017) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – enforcement 
-0.002          
(0.005) 
-0.9          
(1152) 
-0.219          
(0.188) 
0.009           
(0.006) 
-0.007*           
(0.003) 
-0.009*           
(0.004) 
-0.004           
(0.005) 
-0.001          
(0.005) 
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Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – exhaustion 
0.01          
(0.009) 
0.739          
(915.2) 
0.151          
(0.254) 
-0.014           
(0.01) 
0.012*           
(0.005) 
-0.029***           
(0.007) 
-0.014           
(0.008) 
0.01          
(0.008) 
0.022**           
(0.007) 
Control Variables 
         
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.001          
(0.002) 
-0.329          
(212.3) 
-0.024          
(0.052) 
0           
(0.002) 
0           
(0.001) 
0           
(0.001) 
0.001           
(0.002) 
-0.003*          
(0.002) 
-0.003*           
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders 0.109***          
(0.033) 
0.726          
(2578) 
0.339          
(0.561) 
0.089*           
(0.037) 
0.005           
(0.018) 
-0.032           
(0.027) 
-0.084**           
(0.031) 
0.026          
(0.028) 
0.083***           
(0.024) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.009          
(0.021) 
-0.016          
(1941) 
0.103          
(0.451) 
0.049*           
(0.024) 
0.006           
(0.012) 
0.018           
(0.017) 
0.038.           
(0.02) 
-0.024          
(0.019) 
-0.061***           
(0.016) 
New IP producers and developers -0.029          
(0.024) 
-0.207          
(1589) 
0.011          
(0.523) 
-0.056*           
(0.027) 
-0.013           
(0.013) 
0.036.           
(0.02) 
0.064**           
(0.023) 
-0.089***          
(0.022) 
-0.025           
(0.018) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.001          
(0.007) 
-0.283          
(1332) 
0.164          
(0.188) 
-0.009           
(0.008) 
0.001           
(0.004) 
-0.006           
(0.006) 
-0.015*           
(0.007) 
0.014*          
(0.007) 
0.012*           
(0.006) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.012          
(0.01) 
-1.732          
(1877) 
0.253          
(0.263) 
0.005           
(0.011) 
-0.003           
(0.005) 
-0.005           
(0.008) 
-0.007           
(0.009) 
-0.018*          
(0.009) 
-0.021**           
(0.007) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.006          
(0.009) 
-0.048          
(618.8) 
0.009          
(0.225) 
-0.004           
(0.01) 
-0.001           
(0.005) 
0.007           
(0.007) 
0.006           
(0.009) 
0.006          
(0.008) 
0.007           
(0.007) 
Intercept -0.054     
(0.145) 
-10.88     
(26490) 
-9.112.     
(5.054) 
0.195     
(0.166) 
0.002     
(0.081) 
0.108     
(0.119) 
0.356*     
(0.141) 
-0.226.     
(0.131) 

























      
Observations 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 
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PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0                      
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
Veto Players   
        
Veto players (sum) 0                      
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
Endogeneity   
        
PTA depth – – – 0                     
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                
(0) 
– 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) 0.                      
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
– – – – – 0                 
(0) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0                      
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0.                     
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0.                     
(0) 
0.                
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – – – – – – – – – 
Regime Preference   
        
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0                      
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
0.                     
(0) 
0                
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
Path Dependency   
        
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – copyrights 
1***                      
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0**              
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
0.                     
(0) 
0***                
(0) 
































Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – trademarks 
0                      
(0) 
1***                  
(0) 
0***              
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
0***              
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                
(0) 
0.                 
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – geographical indications 
0                      
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
1***              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
0                
(0) 
0***                 
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – industrial designs 
0                      
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
1***                     
(0) 
0***              
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
0*                     
(0) 
0***                
(0) 
0***                 
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – patents  
0                      
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
1***              
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                
(0) 
0***                 
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s  – undisclosed information  
0                      
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0              
(0) 
1***                  
(0) 
0.                     
(0) 
0                
(0) 
0**                 
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0                      
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
1***                     
(0) 
0*                
(0) 
0**                 
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s  – new plant varieties 
0                      
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
1***                
(0) 
0***                 
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
0                      
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                
(0) 
1***                 
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – encrypted program-carrying satel-
lite signals 
0                      
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – domain names 
0                      
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pdw s 
(sum) 
0                      
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0.                     
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                
(0) 
































Index IPR multilateral coherence pdw s 
(sum) 
0                      
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
Control Variables   
        
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0                      
(0) 
0*                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
Classic IP leaders 0                      
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0*                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0                      
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
New IP producers and developers 0                      
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
ln GDP (mean) 0                      
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0                      
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0*                      
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
Intercept 0                     
(0) 
0                             
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
0*                 
(0) 
0*                 
(0) 




















Observations 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 
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Appendix 21 Design Regression Table 14: Path Dependency (world, signature, specific) II 
Dependent Variables ipr_t_epcss ipr_t_do-
main_name
s 






PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0                    
(0) 




Veto players (sum) 0                    
(0) 




PTA depth 0                    
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.                    
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – – 
Regime Preference 
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0***                    
(0) 




Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – copyrights 
0***                    
(0) 
0*                 
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – trademarks 
0                    
(0) 





- 228 - 
Dependent Variables ipr_t_epcss ipr_t_do-
main_name
s 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – geographical indications 
0**                    
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – industrial designs 
0***                    
(0) 
0***                 
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – patents  
0***                    
(0) 
0***                 
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s  – undisclosed information  
0*                    
(0) 
0***                 
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0                    
(0) 
0***                 
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s  – new plant varieties 
0***                    
(0) 
0.                 
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
0***                    
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – encrypted program-carrying satel-
lite signals 
1***                    
(0) 
0***                 
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – domain names 
0.                    
(0) 
1***                 
(0) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pdw s 
(sum) 
0                    
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pdw s 
(sum) 
0***                    
(0) 
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Dependent Variables ipr_t_epcss ipr_t_do-
main_name
s 
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0                    
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
Classic IP leaders 0                    
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0                    
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
New IP producers and developers 0                    
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
ln GDP (mean) 0                    
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0                    
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0                    
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
Intercept 0                      
(0) 






Observations 529 529 
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PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0            
(0.002) 
0.002           
(0.003) 
0.002          
(0.003) 
0.055           
(528.1) 
0.1           
(0.083) 
0                  
(0.002) 
-0.001          
(0.003) 
0.001          
(0.003) 
0.006***           
(0.001) 
Veto Players   
        
Veto players (sum) 0.001            
(0.003) 
0           
(0.003) 
0.003          
(0.003) 
-0.071           
(406.9) 
-0.013           
(0.068) 
-0.005*           
(0.002) 
-0.005.          
(0.003) 
0.001          
(0.003) 
-0.007***           
(0.001) 
Endogeneity   
        
PTA depth 0.008            
(0.005) 
– 0.02**          
(0.006) 
-0.172           
(888.4) 
0.602**           
(0.225) 
– -0.008          
(0.005) 
0.004          
(0.007) 
– 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – -0.024           
(0.016) 
– – – -0.008           
(0.012) 
– – 0.004           
(0.007) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.013*            
(0.005) 
0.042***           
(0.006) 
-0.011          
(0.006) 
0.019           
(388.7) 
-0.011           
(0.141) 
– – – – 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – – – – – 0.059***           
(0.008) 
0.075***          
(0.01) 
0.059***          
(0.013) 
-0.006           
(0.004) 
Regime Preference   
        
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) -0.001            
(0) 
0                
(0) 
0                
(0) 
-0.085           
(153.1) 
-0.004           
(0.012) 
0                      
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
-0.001***           
(0) 
Path Dependency   
        
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – copyrights 
0.005            
(0.024) 
0.014           
(0.027) 
0.006          
(0.03) 
0.067           
(25810) 
-2.418           
(8.383) 
0.009           
(0.02) 
-0.012          
(0.027) 
0.005          
(0.033) 


























Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – geographical indications 
-0.004            
(0.055) 
0.244***           
(0.06) 
-0.011          
(0.068) 
0.052           
(10110) 
1.313           
(1.386) 
-0.008           
(0.045) 
-0.152*          
(0.06) 
-0.267***          
(0.074) 
0.343***           
(0.025) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – industrial designs 
0.319***            
(0.041) 
0.126**           
(0.044) 
0.325***          
(0.051) 
2.424           
(8085) 
-0.031           
(1.124) 
-0.038           
(0.033) 
0.178***          
(0.045) 
-0.002          
(0.054) 
0.033.           
(0.019) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – patents 
0.405***            
(0.043) 
-0.008           
(0.047) 
-0.057          
(0.053) 
0.016           
(7343) 
0.369           
(1.357) 
-0.058           
(0.036) 
-0.124**          
(0.048) 
-0.006          
(0.058) 
0.051*           
(0.02) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – undisclosed information 
0.264***            
(0.045) 
0.527***           
(0.049) 
0.017          
(0.056) 
-0.1           
(7688) 
0.382           
(1.4) 
-0.106**           
(0.038) 
0.106*          
(0.05) 
-0.035          
(0.061) 
0.08***           
(0.021) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – layout-designs of integrated 
circuits 
-0.159***            
(0.031) 
0.035           
(0.034) 
0.429***          
(0.039) 
0.344           
(5278) 
3.756***           
(1.089) 
0.043           
(0.026) 
-0.174***          
(0.034) 
0.078.          
(0.042) 
-0.052***           
(0.014) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – new plant varieties 
-0.084*            
(0.035) 
-0.248***           
(0.038) 
-0.472***          
(0.043) 
-0.573           
(5757) 
-1.72           
(1.268) 
0.772***           
(0.03) 
0.328***          
(0.041) 
0.007          
(0.05) 
0.046**           
(0.017) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
-0.025            
(0.044) 
-0.116*           
(0.048) 
0.216***          
(0.054) 
0.649           
(8445) 
0.367           
(0.99) 
-0.037           
(0.037) 
0.349***          
(0.049) 
-0.318***          
(0.059) 
-0.026           
(0.02) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
0.036            
(0.042) 
0.042           
(0.046) 
0.395***          
(0.052) 
1.002           
(7660) 
5.021**           
(1.779) 
0.032           
(0.035) 
0.043          
(0.047) 
0.417***          
(0.057) 
-0.074***           
(0.02) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – domain names 
0.531***            
(0.104) 
0.315**           
(0.114) 
-0.021          
(0.129) 
-0.028           
(13060) 
-2.387           
(21.878) 
0.061           
(0.087) 
-0.248*          
(0.116) 
0.784***          
(0.142) 
0.937***           
(0.049) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – enforcement 
-0.026            
(0.035) 
0.054           
(0.038) 
0.063          
(0.043) 
0.478           
(5737) 
0.679           
(1.011) 
0                 
(0.029) 
-0.027          
(0.039) 
0.068          
(0.047) 
0.022           
(0.016) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – exhaustion 
0.207***            
(0.036) 
0.077*           
(0.039) 
0.208***          
(0.045) 
-0.998           
(7982) 
2.213           
(1.632) 
0.089**           
(0.03) 
-0.011          
(0.04) 
-0.038          
(0.049) 
-0.004           
(0.017) 
   


























Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.001            
(0.001) 
-0.002           
(0.001) 
0.001          
(0.002) 
0.629           
(1102) 
-0.039           
(0.07) 
0                   
(0.001) 
-0.001          
(0.001) 
-0.001          
(0.002) 
0.001           
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders 0.015            
(0.026) 
0.028           
(0.028) 
-0.074*          
(0.032) 
0.626           
(5897) 
0.597           
(0.836) 
0.102***           
(0.022) 
0.092**          
(0.029) 
0.019          
(0.036) 
0.027*           
(0.012) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.006            
(0.017) 
-0.011           
(0.018) 
-0.04.          
(0.021) 
-0.459           
(5272) 
-0.504           
(0.663) 
0.012           
(0.014) 
-0.006          
(0.018) 
0.018          
(0.022) 
0.006           
(0.008) 
New IP producers and developers -0.008            
(0.018) 
-0.041*           
(0.02) 
0.013          
(0.022) 
-0.346           
(2875) 
-0.161           
(0.523) 
-0.015           
(0.015) 
-0.024          
(0.02) 
-0.046.          
(0.024) 
-0.011           
(0.008) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.003            
(0.006) 
0.01           
(0.006) 
0.006          
(0.007) 
-0.494           
(2993) 
-0.072           
(0.271) 
-0.003           
(0.005) 
0.002          
(0.006) 
-0.002          
(0.008) 
-0.005*           
(0.003) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.017*            
(0.008) 
-0.01           
(0.008) 
-0.016          
(0.01) 
0.191           
(1956) 
-0.504           
(0.41) 
0.002           
(0.006) 
0.009          
(0.009) 
0.002          
(0.011) 
0.003           
(0.004) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.005            
(0.007) 
-0.006           
(0.008) 
0.033***          
(0.009) 
-0.157           
(2855) 
1.554**           
(0.474) 
-0.005           
(0.006) 
-0.001          
(0.008) 
-0.007          
(0.009) 
0.001           
(0.003) 
Intercept 0.076     
(0.114) 
-0.127     
(0.122) 
-0.29*     
(0.142) 
-9.087     
(47830) 
-10.753*     
(5.3) 
0.107     
(0.093) 
-0.1     
(0.126) 
0.08     
(0.154) 

























    
Observations 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 
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PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.006**           
(0.002) 
0.001           
(0.002) 
0.003           
(0.002) 
0.001           
(0.002) 
Veto Players 
    
Veto players (sum) -0.005*           
(0.002) 
-0.004.           
(0.002) 
-0.006*           
(0.002) 
-0.005**           
(0.002) 
Endogeneity 
    
PTA depth 0.008.           
(0.005) 
– -0.001           
(0.005) 
-0.007.           
(0.004) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – -0.004           
(0.013) 
– – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) – – 0.015**           
(0.005) 
0.02***           
(0.004) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0.018*           
(0.009) 




    
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) -0.001***           
(0) 
0.001**           
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                       
(0) 
Path Dependency 
    
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – copyrights 
0.041.           
(0.022) 
-0.023           
(0.02) 
0.034           
(0.023) 












Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – geographical indications 
0.121*           
(0.05) 
-0.055           
(0.046) 
-0.179***           
(0.051) 
-0.146***           
(0.043) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – industrial designs 
0.005           
(0.037) 
0.113***           
(0.034) 
0.048           
(0.038) 
0.087**           
(0.032) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – patents 
0.111**           
(0.04) 
0.068.           
(0.036) 
-0.15***           
(0.04) 
-0.106**           
(0.034) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – undisclosed information 
0.078.           
(0.042) 
0.108**           
(0.038) 
0.342***           
(0.042) 
0.093**           
(0.036) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – layout-designs of integrated 
circuits 
-0.107***           
(0.029) 
-0.008           
(0.026) 
-0.001           
(0.029) 
-0.145***           
(0.025) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – new plant varieties 
0.152***           
(0.034) 
-0.046           
(0.031) 
-0.234***           
(0.033) 
-0.25***           
(0.028) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
-0.147***           
(0.04) 
-0.134***           
(0.037) 
0.226***           
(0.041) 
0.349***           
(0.035) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
-0.302***           
(0.039) 
-0.018           
(0.035) 
0.162***           
(0.04) 
0.086*           
(0.034) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – domain names 
-0.168.           
(0.096) 
0.05           
(0.088) 
0.417***           
(0.098) 
-0.399***           
(0.083) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – enforcement 
0.209***           
(0.032) 
-0.02           
(0.029) 
0.013           
(0.033) 
-0.007           
(0.028) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – exhaustion 
0.192***           
(0.033) 
0.752***           
(0.03) 
-0.222***           
(0.034) 
















Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0           
(0.001) 
0           
(0.001) 
0                 
(0.001) 
0           
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders 0.046.           
(0.024) 
0.036           
(0.022) 
0.029           
(0.024) 
0.082***           
(0.021) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.008           
(0.015) 
0.008           
(0.014) 
0.023           
(0.016) 
0.004           
(0.013) 
New IP producers and developers -0.002           
(0.016) 
0.064***           
(0.015) 
-0.011           
(0.017) 
0.01           
(0.014) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.007           
(0.005) 
-0.004           
(0.005) 
-0.002           
(0.005) 
-0.006           
(0.005) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.008           
(0.007) 
-0.005           
(0.007) 
-0.006           
(0.007) 
-0.002           
(0.006) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.008           
(0.006) 
0.006           
(0.006) 
0.006           
(0.007) 
0.008           
(0.006) 
Intercept 0.162     
(0.105) 
0.081     
(0.094) 
0.04           
(0.107) 










Observations 529 529 529 529 
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PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0***                        
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Veto Players   
        
Veto players (sum) 0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0**                  
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Endogeneity   
        
PTA depth – – – 0                   
(0) 
0.                  
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
– 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) 0.                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
– – – – – 0                     
(0) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0.                   
(0) 
0*                  
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0.                       
(0) 
0.                   
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – – – – – – – – – 
Regime Preference   
        
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0***                        
(0) 
0.                    
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Path Dependency   
        
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – copyrights 
1***                     
(0) 
0***                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
0**                        
(0) 
0*                        
(0) 
0***                   
(0) 
































Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – trademarks 
0                     
(0) 
1***                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0**                   
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0.                     
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – geographical indications 
0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
1***                     
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0.                  
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0*                        
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – industrial designs 
0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
1***                   
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
0***                        
(0) 
0*                        
(0) 
0***                   
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – patents 
0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
1***                  
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f  – undisclosed information  
0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0*                  
(0) 
1***                        
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0**                  
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
1***                        
(0) 
0*                   
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f  – new plant varieties 
0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0**                  
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
1***                   
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
1***                     
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – encrypted program-carrying satel-
lite signals 
0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – domain names 
0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pdw f 
(sum) 
0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0*                  
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
































Index IPR multilateral coherence pdw f 
(sum) 
0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0***                        
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Control Variables   
        
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0                     
(0) 
0*                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Classic IP leaders 0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0.                        
(0) 
0                      
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0*                  
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
New IP producers and developers 0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ln GDP (mean) 0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0.                  
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0.                  
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                        
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Intercept 0                           
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
0                      
(0) 
0                   
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
0*                   
(0) 
0*                 
(0) 




















Observations 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 
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Appendix 21 Design Regression Table 18: Path Dependency (world, force, specific) II 
Dependent Variables ipr_t_epcss ipr_t_do-
main_name
s 






PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0                     
(0) 




Veto players (sum) 0                     
(0) 




PTA depth 0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – – 
Regime Preference 
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0***                     
(0) 




Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – copyrights 
0***                     
(0) 
0**                    
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – trademarks 
0                     
(0) 
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Dependent Variables ipr_t_epcss ipr_t_do-
main_name
s 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – geographical indications 
0**                     
(0) 
0.                    
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – industrial designs 
0***                     
(0) 
0***                    
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – patents 
0***                     
(0) 
0***                    
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f  – undisclosed information  
0*                     
(0) 
0***                    
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0                     
(0) 
0***                    
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f  – new plant varieties 
0***                     
(0) 
0*                    
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
0***                     
(0) 
0.                   
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – encrypted program-carrying satel-
lite signals 
1***                     
(0) 
0***                    
(0) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – domain names 
0.                     
(0) 
1***                    
(0) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pdw f 
(sum) 
0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pdw f 
(sum) 
0***                     
(0) 
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Dependent Variables ipr_t_epcss ipr_t_do-
main_name
s 
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
Classic IP leaders 0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
New IP producers and developers 0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
ln GDP (mean) 0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0                     
(0) 
0                    
(0) 
Intercept 0                      
(0) 






Observations 484 484 
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PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.001           
(0.003) 
0.002          
(0.003) 
-0.001          
(0.004) 
0               
(0.002) 
0          
(0.003) 
0.002          
(0.003) 
0.007***          
(0.001) 
0.006**           
(0.002) 
0          
(0.002) 
Veto Players   
        
Veto players (sum) 0                 
(0.003) 
0.001          
(0.003) 
0.008*          
(0.004) 
-0.004.               
(0.002) 
-0.007*          
(0.003) 
0          
(0.004) 
-0.008***          
(0.001) 
-0.006*           
(0.003) 
0.001          
(0.002) 
Endogeneity   
        
PTA depth 0.007                 
(0.006) 
0.011.          
(0.006) 
0.025***          
(0.007) 
– -0.011.          
(0.006) 
0.004          
(0.007) 
– 0.008.           
(0.005) 
– 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – – – -0.01               
(0.013) 
– – 0.003          
(0.008) 
– -0.005          
(0.012) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.019***                 
(0.006) 
– -0.025***          
(0.007) 
– – – – – – 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – 0.076***          
(0.01) 
– 0.058***               
(0.008) 
0.086***          
(0.011) 
0.052***          
(0.013) 
-0.004          
(0.005) 
0.023*           
(0.009) 
-0.016*          
(0.007) 
Regime Preference   
        
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) -0.001*                 
(0) 
0                
(0) 
0.001*          
(0.001) 
0                      
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
-0.001***          
(0) 
-0.001***           
(0) 
0.001***          
(0) 
Path Dependency   
        
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – copyrights 
0.011           
(0.026) 
0.026          
(0.027) 
-0.01          
(0.034) 
0.004          
(0.02) 
-0.005          
(0.029) 
0.003          
(0.034) 
0.004          
(0.012) 
0.044.           
(0.023) 
































Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – geographical indications 
-0.026           
(0.061) 
0.224***          
(0.063) 
0.008          
(0.08) 
-0.006          
(0.047) 
-0.173**          
(0.067) 
-0.204*          
(0.079) 
0.356***          
(0.028) 
0.085           
(0.055) 
-0.134**          
(0.044) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – industrial designs 
0.17***           
(0.033) 
0.133***          
(0.034) 
0.709***          
(0.043) 
0.002          
(0.025) 
0.031          
(0.036) 
0.078.          
(0.043) 
-0.01          
(0.015) 
-0.082**           
(0.03) 
0.091***          
(0.023) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – patents 
0.39***           
(0.049) 
-0.079          
(0.052) 
-0.076          
(0.065) 
-0.053          
(0.038) 
-0.19***          
(0.055) 
-0.004          
(0.065) 
0.037          
(0.023) 
0.102*           
(0.045) 
0.074*          
(0.036) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – undisclosed information 
0.31***           
(0.05) 
0.568***          
(0.053) 
-0.054          
(0.066) 
-0.133***          
(0.039) 
0.209***          
(0.055) 
-0.055          
(0.066) 
0.108***          
(0.023) 
0.112*           
(0.045) 
0.076*          
(0.036) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – new plant varieties 
-0.112**           
(0.037) 
-0.302***          
(0.041) 
-0.381***          
(0.049) 
0.804***          
(0.03) 
0.267***          
(0.043) 
0.031          
(0.051) 
0.027          
(0.018) 
0.121***           
(0.035) 
-0.007          
(0.028) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
-0.032           
(0.047) 
-0.129**          
(0.049) 
0.237***          
(0.062) 
-0.047          
(0.036) 
0.354***          
(0.052) 
-0.333***          
(0.062) 
-0.03          
(0.022) 
-0.14**           
(0.043) 
-0.136***          
(0.034) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
0.02           
(0.045) 
0.048          
(0.047) 
0.441***          
(0.059) 
0.029          
(0.035) 
0.014          
(0.05) 
0.414***          
(0.059) 
-0.084***          
(0.021) 
-0.317***           
(0.041) 
-0.02          
(0.032) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – domain names 
0.514***           
(0.112) 
0.302*          
(0.118) 
-0.047          
(0.148) 
0.087          
(0.087) 
-0.294*          
(0.125) 
0.806***          
(0.148) 
0.93***          
(0.052) 
-0.171.           
(0.102) 
0.075          
(0.082) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – enforcement 
0.016           
(0.037) 
0.052          
(0.039) 
-0.035          
(0.049) 
-0.009          
(0.029) 
-0.014          
(0.042) 
0.055          
(0.049) 
0.031.          
(0.017) 
0.212***           
(0.034) 
-0.017          
(0.027) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – exhaustion 
0.187***           
(0.041) 
0.056          
(0.043) 
0.251***          
(0.054) 
0.102**          
(0.032) 
0.025          
(0.046) 
-0.054          
(0.054) 
-0.008          
(0.019) 
0.233***           
(0.037) 
0.791***          
(0.029) 
Control Variables   
        
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0                 
(0.002) 
-0.001          
(0.002) 
0.004.          
(0.002) 
0               
(0.001) 
-0.002          
(0.002) 
-0.001          
(0.002) 
0.001          
(0.001) 
-0.001           
(0.001) 
































Classic IP leaders 0.034           
(0.028) 
0.011          
(0.03) 
-0.125***          
(0.037) 
0.06**          
(0.022) 
0.111***          
(0.032) 
-0.004          
(0.038) 
0.036**          
(0.013) 
0.057*           
(0.026) 
-0.025          
(0.021) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.017           
(0.019) 
-0.01          
(0.019) 
-0.02          
(0.025) 
-0.001          
(0.014) 
-0.02          
(0.02) 
0.015          
(0.024) 
0.003          
(0.009) 
0           
(0.017) 
-0.015          
(0.013) 
New IP producers and developers 0.001           
(0.02) 
-0.032          
(0.02) 
0.002          
(0.026) 
-0.03*          
(0.015) 
-0.023          
(0.021) 
-0.057*          
(0.025) 
-0.01          
(0.009) 
-0.001           
(0.018) 
0.049***          
(0.014) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.007           
(0.006) 
0.009          
(0.007) 
0          
(0.008) 
0                 
(0.005) 
0.007          
(0.007) 
-0.002          
(0.008) 
-0.004          
(0.003) 
-0.004           
(0.006) 
0.003          
(0.005) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.024**           
(0.009) 
-0.012          
(0.009) 
-0.006          
(0.012) 
0.004          
(0.007) 
0.006          
(0.01) 
0.005          
(0.011) 
0.002          
(0.004) 
-0.012           
(0.008) 
-0.006          
(0.006) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.005           
(0.008) 
-0.006          
(0.008) 
0.033**          
(0.01) 
-0.007          
(0.006) 
-0.004          
(0.009) 
-0.007          
(0.01) 
0.001          
(0.004) 
0.006           
(0.007) 
0.003          
(0.006) 
Intercept 0.041     
(0.127) 
-0.114     
(0.133) 
-0.235     
(0.168) 
0.029     
(0.096) 
-0.169     
(0.14) 
0.05     
(0.166) 
0.098.     
(0.057) 
0.138     
(0.115) 




















Observations 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 
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Appendix 21 Design Regression Table 20: Path Dependency (world, force, TRIPS-plus) II 
Dependent Variables ipr_t_epcss ipr_t_do-
main_name
s 






PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.002          
(0.002) 




Veto players (sum) -0.004.          
(0.003) 




PTA depth -0.002          
(0.005) 
-0.01*          
(0.004) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.017***          
(0.005) 
0.025***          
(0.004) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – – 
Regime Preference 
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0                   
(0) 




Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – copyrights 
0.033          
(0.023) 
0.021          
(0.021) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – geographical indications 
-0.194***          
(0.055) 
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Dependent Variables ipr_t_epcss ipr_t_do-
main_name
s 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – industrial designs 
0.041          
(0.03) 
-0.043          
(0.026) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – patents 
-0.198***          
(0.044) 
-0.152***          
(0.039) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – undisclosed information 
0.384***          
(0.045) 
0.164***          
(0.04) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – new plant varieties 
-0.229***          
(0.033) 
-0.278***          
(0.029) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
0.231***          
(0.042) 
0.349***          
(0.037) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
0.156***          
(0.041) 
0.062.          
(0.036) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – domain names 
0.372***          
(0.101) 
-0.431***          
(0.089) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – enforcement 
0.014          
(0.034) 
0.014          
(0.03) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – exhaustion 
-0.213***          
(0.037) 




Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0                       
(0.001) 
-0.001          
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders 0.018          
(0.026) 
0.084***          
(0.022) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.019          
(0.017) 
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Dependent Variables ipr_t_epcss ipr_t_do-
main_name
s 
New IP producers and developers -0.015          
(0.018) 
0.008          
(0.016) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.001          
(0.006) 
0          
(0.005) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.006          
(0.008) 
-0.006          
(0.007) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.005          
(0.007) 
0.007          
(0.006) 
Intercept -0.014     
(0.115) 






Observations 484 484 
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Appendix 22: Design Regression Tables of the Additive Variables for the TRIPS-plus Categories 
 













































Economic Power Asymmetry 
         
GDP asymmetry (max/sum) -71.82           
(27920) 
-23.934          
(19.674) 
-5.954          
(11.02) 
0.845          
(0.614) 
67.9           
(59260) 
-58.06           
(20090) 
0.093           
(0.289) 
0.176          
(0.804) 
-47.24          
(20530) 
GDPpc asymmetry (max/sum) 17.54           
(32600) 
24.09          
(21.764) 
3.674          
(13.077) 
-1.254          
(0.767) 
91.56           
(39470) 
-18.85           
(24350) 
-0.225           
(0.359) 
-0.255          
(1) 
1.888          
(19280) 
GDP asymmetry * substantial tariff cuts 69.54           
(27920) 
0.719          
(6.657) 
1.323          
(2.153) 
-0.047          
(0.1) 
-105.5           
(59260) 
54.79           
(20090) 
0.044           
(0.038) 
0.101          
(0.107) 
47.82          
(20530) 
GDPpc asymmetry * substantial tariff cuts -15.13           
(32600) 
-2.578          
(6.673) 
-0.352          
(3.086) 
-0.371***          
(0.101) 
-76.25           
(39470) 
19.2           
(24350) 
-0.099*           
(0.047) 
-0.076          
(0.131) 
-25.91          
(19280) 
GDP asymmetry * ln FDI 0.109           
(0.393) 
0.423          
(0.512) 
0.037          
(0.195) 
-0.007          
(0.01) 
1.798*           
(0.897) 
-0.073           
(0.461) 
0           
(0.005) 
-0.003          
(0.013) 
-1.716          
(2.361) 
GDPpc asymmetry * ln FDI -0.294           
(0.433) 
-0.316          
(0.336) 
-0.095          
(0.205) 
0.005          
(0.011) 
-1.061           
(1.092) 
0.02           
(0.567) 
-0.001           
(0.005) 
0.004          
(0.015) 
1.436          
(2.926) 
GDP asymmetry * lnofficial development 
assistance and official aid received 
0.087           
(0.718) 
0.638          
(0.768) 
0.167          
(0.52) 
-0.03          
(0.031) 
-0.099           
(0.702) 
0.168           
(0.86) 
-0.005           
(0.015) 
-0.009          
(0.041) 
2.127          
(5.953) 
GDPpc asymmetry * lnofficial develop-
ment assistance and official aid received 
0.033           
(0.985) 
-0.787          
(0.99) 
-0.131          
(0.645) 
0.063          
(0.039) 
0.387           
(0.927) 
-0.129           
(1.105) 
0.015           
(0.018) 
0.009          
(0.051) 
-0.547          
(6.165) 
GDP asymmetry * (DAC aid received by 
PTA members/ DAC aid received) 
7.356           
(8.696) 
13.066          
(8.287) 
0.489          
(6.527) 
-0.297          
(0.376) 
11.71           
(11.85) 
73.33*           
(35.93) 
-0.056           
(0.177) 
-0.127          
(0.492) 
































GDPpc asymmetry * (DAC aid received by 
PTA members/ DAC aid received) 
-6.614           
(11.31) 
-12.96          
(11.602) 
-2.69          
(8.145) 
0.376          
(0.486) 
-10.55           
(14.56) 
-122.8*           
(59.44) 
0.08           
(0.229) 
-0.38          
(0.637) 
30.92          
(32.68) 
Political Pressure 
         
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.078           
(0.081) 
0.107          
(0.084) 
-0.102*          
(0.044) 
-0.019***          
(0.004) 
-0.263           
(0.199) 
-0.403           
(0.269) 
-0.001           
(0.002) 
-0.01*          
(0.005) 
0.444.          
(0.259) 
Veto Players   
        
Veto players (sum) -0.073           
(0.079) 
-0.163*          
(0.078) 
0.085.          
(0.044) 
0.016***          
(0.003) 
0.07           
(0.104) 
-0.152           
(0.117) 
-0.002           
(0.002) 
0.007          
(0.004) 
0.105          
(0.131) 
Endogeneity   
        
PTA depth -0.006           
(0.198) 
0.172          
(0.167) 
0.195*          
(0.09) 
– – 0.298           
(0.25) 
0.009*           
(0.004) 
-0.025*          
(0.01) 
4.731**          
(1.691) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – – – 0.265***          
(0.058) 
178.2           
(39300) 
– – – – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.606***           
(0.12) 
0.803***          
(0.14) 
– – 0.393***           
(0.112) 
– – – – 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – – 0.144.          
(0.078) 
0.062***          
(0.008) 
– 1.053***           
(0.251) 
0.001           
(0.004) 
0.105***          
(0.01) 
0.293          
(0.27) 
Regime Preference   
        
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.008           
(0.013) 
0.003          
(0.015) 
0.021***          
(0.005) 
-0.002***          
(0) 
-0.019           
(0.013) 
-0.01           
(0.017) 
0.                
(0) 
0.003***          
(0.001) 
0.096**          
(0.037) 
Control Variables 
         
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.012           
(0.076) 
-0.141.          
(0.082) 
0.088.          
(0.047) 
0          
(0.002) 
0.113           
(0.069) 
-0.023           
(0.089) 
-0.001           
(0.001) 
-0.003          
(0.002) 
-0.992**          
(0.352) 
Classic IP leaders -1.615*           
(0.707) 
-1.811*          
(0.781) 
-1.368**          
(0.44) 
0.023          
(0.036) 
-1.112           
(0.883) 
0.106           
(0.927) 
0.051**           
(0.017) 
0.168***          
(0.048) 
































Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.701           
(0.841) 
0.399          
(0.845) 
0.701*          
(0.333) 
0.059**          
(0.021) 
0.859           
(1.048) 
0.776           
(0.838) 
0.008           
(0.01) 
0.005          
(0.028) 
4.584          
(3.345) 
New IP producers and developers 0.011           
(0.636) 
-0.627          
(0.624) 
-0.752*          
(0.38) 
-0.075**          
(0.024) 
-0.871           
(0.688) 
-0.709           
(0.759) 
-0.013           
(0.012) 
-0.034          
(0.032) 
-4.562*          
(1.989) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.522           
(0.408) 
0.081          
(0.382) 
-0.089          
(0.187) 
-0.027**          
(0.01) 
0.184           
(0.471) 
0.239           
(0.415) 
0           
(0.005) 
-0.004          
(0.013) 
-1.992*          
(0.962) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.234           
(0.57) 
0.173          
(0.497) 
0.584*          
(0.233) 
0.068***          
(0.013) 
0.832           
(0.657) 
-0.143           
(0.529) 
0.004           
(0.006) 
0.031.          
(0.017) 
1.816          
(1.401) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.385           
(0.386) 
-0.464          
(0.394) 
0.176          
(0.212) 
-0.011          
(0.011) 
-0.136           
(0.39) 
-0.323           
(0.455) 
-0.002           
(0.005) 
0.03*          
(0.014) 
1.018.          
(0.612) 
Intercept -17.48     
(10.91) 
– – 0.07     
(0.198) 
-195.3     
(39300) 
-5.374     
(9.67) 
-0.023     
(0.092) 
-0.32     
(0.256) 

















Observations 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 
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Appendix 22 Design Regression Table 2: Economic Power Asymmetry II 

















Economic Power Asymmetry 
    
GDP asymmetry (max/sum) -0.639          
(0.679) 
-0.82            
(0.536) 
138.4           
(6596000) 
1861          
(2733000) 
GDPpc asymmetry (max/sum) 1.181          
(0.848) 
1.238.            
(0.669) 
229.3           
(4783000) 
-1378          
(1885000) 
GDP asymmetry * substantial tariff cuts 0.2.          
(0.11) 
0.051            
(0.087) 
-130.8           
(6596000) 
-58.82          
(473800) 
GDPpc asymmetry * substantial tariff cuts -0.06          
(0.111) 
0.094            
(0.087) 
-228.5           
(4783000) 
-336.5          
(484800) 
GDP asymmetry * ln FDI 0.017          
(0.011) 
0.016.            
(0.009) 
0.09           
(0.284) 
-7.921          
(61510) 
GDPpc asymmetry * ln FDI -0.016          
(0.012) 
-0.013            
(0.01) 
-0.11           
(0.336) 
5.632          
(87590) 
GDP asymmetry * lnofficial development 
assistance and official aid received 
0.012          
(0.035) 
0.024            
(0.027) 
-0.363           
(0.472) 
-84.6          
(74740) 
GDPpc asymmetry * lnofficial develop-
ment assistance and official aid received 
-0.04          
(0.043) 
-0.05            
(0.034) 
0.128           
(0.626) 
83.43          
(54680) 
GDP asymmetry * (DAC aid received by 
PTA members/ DAC aid received) 
0.333          
(0.412) 
0.253            
(0.325) 
9.576           
(6.14) 
3862          
(4321000) 
GDPpc asymmetry * (DAC aid received by 
PTA members/ DAC aid received) 
-0.242          
(0.533) 
-0.512            
(0.421) 
-9.525           
(7.859) 
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PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.008*          
(0.004) 
0.004            
(0.003) 
-0.042           
(0.058) 
-42.98          
(21990) 
Veto Players 
    
Veto players (sum) -0.012**          
(0.004) 
-0.009**            
(0.003) 
0.157**           
(0.05) 
14.52          
(19330) 
Endogeneity 
    
PTA depth – – – – 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) -0.129*          
(0.063) 
-0.11*            
(0.05) 
354.4           
(3822000) 
336.5          
(233600) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.066***          
(0.005) 
0.032***            
(0.004) 
0.419***           
(0.05) 
-8.528          
(7414) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – – – – 
Regime Preference 
    
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) -0.001*          
(0.001) 
0                  
(0) 
0.025***           
(0.006) 
0.006          
(367.2) 
Control Variables 
    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.002          
(0.002) 
-0.002            
(0.002) 
-0.025           
(0.045) 
3.055          
(11740) 
Classic IP leaders 0.032          
(0.038) 
0.132***            
(0.03) 
-0.198           
(0.4) 
-55.27          
(54750) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.031          
(0.023) 
-0.027            
(0.018) 
1.463***           
(0.407) 
32.8          
(78030) 
New IP producers and developers 0.017          
(0.027) 
0.031            
(0.021) 
-0.57           
(0.428) 
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ln GDP (mean) -0.001          
(0.011) 
0.005            
(0.009) 
0.38           
(0.233) 
11.53          
(57880) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.04**          
(0.014) 
-0.038***            
(0.011) 
-0.474.           
(0.284) 
18.77          
(27040) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.012          
(0.012) 
0.009            
(0.01) 
-0.265           
(0.233) 
1.455          
(50760) 
Intercept 0.279     
(0.219) 
0.154     
(0.173) 
-364.3     
(3822000) 










Observations 392 392 392 392 
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Appendix 22 Design Regression Table 3: Domestic Interests I 



























         
ln Charges for the use of IP, receipts (sum) 0.306           
(0.291) 
-4.521           
(29.502) 
0.794            
(0.779) 
0.254.           
(0.138) 
-0.032          
(0.032) 
-0.028           
(0.057) 
-0.074           
(0.068) 
-0.079           
(0.114) 
0.743*          
(0.347) 
ln Resident applications for patents (sum) -0.474           
(0.535) 
11.303           
(44.095) 
-0.355            
(1.621) 
-0.428           
(0.544) 
0.322          
(0.318) 
1.419           
(1.105) 
0.545           
(0.638) 
-0.48           
(0.782) 
-0.404          
(0.695) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(sum) 
0.954*           
(0.43) 
7.308           
(34.093) 
-0.263            
(0.955) 
1.571**           
(0.564) 
-0.014          
(0.239) 
-0.839.           
(0.483) 
0.244           
(0.544) 
0.568           
(0.855) 
2.211*          
(0.983) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (sum) 
-0.57           
(0.48) 
-8.581           
(29.931) 
-0.478            
(1.719) 
-0.529           
(0.482) 
-0.144          
(0.197) 
-0.403           
(0.588) 
-0.148           
(0.421) 
-0.068           
(0.553) 
-0.492          
(0.451) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
-1.352.           
(0.82) 
-5.519           
(85.072) 
-3.306            
(2.993) 
-1.155           
(0.714) 
-0.765*          
(0.326) 
-1.538           
(1) 
-1.438*           
(0.688) 
-0.524           
(0.988) 
-0.17          
(1.074) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(cumulative, sum) 
0.326           
(0.661) 
2.038           
(58.717) 
2.177            
(1.83) 
-0.27           
(0.595) 
0.838**          
(0.293) 
1.226.           
(0.651) 
1.275*           
(0.62) 
-0.141           
(1.126) 
-0.289          
(1.17) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (cumulative, sum) 
1.241.           
(0.741) 
2.018           
(53.64) 
2.055            
(2.165) 
0.046           
(0.591) 
0.397          
(0.264) 
0.494           
(0.578) 
0.788           
(0.584) 
1.022           
(0.865) 
-1.173.          
(0.704) 
Applications for patents by PTA members / 
total applications for patents 
0.273           
(0.822) 
-3.39           
(26.517) 
2.541            
(3.494) 
-2.16**           
(0.824) 
-0.076          
(0.493) 
0.156           
(0.558) 
0.215           
(1.272) 
-0.004           
(1.016) 
-0.755          
(0.823) 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks 
-1.486.           
(0.865) 
-0.559           
(51.585) 
-4.713            
(3.72) 
0.502           
(0.749) 
1.562***          
(0.424) 
0.109           
(0.422) 
2.616*           
(1.02) 
1.48           
(1.078) 
-0.514          
(0.886) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs 
-2.478***           
(0.738) 
-2.086           
(58.165) 
-1.389            
(2.179) 
0.329           
(0.593) 
-0.382          
(0.317) 
-0.292           
(0.322) 
-0.46           
(0.833) 
-0.559           
(0.699) 
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Applications for patents by PTA members / 
total applications for patents (cumulative) 
-28.12           
(296) 
-161.956           
(9282.251) 
308.868            
(626.747) 
79.32           
(250.3) 
147.6          
(97.75) 
49.81           
(111) 
319.341           
(228.679) 
-1564           
(979.9) 
253.484          
(221.208) 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks (cu-
mulative) 
-5.47           
(12.81) 
-0.48           
(815.066) 
3.954            
(36.508) 
6.426           
(13.63) 
-21.73**          
(7.767) 
5.724           
(10.93) 
-40.148*           
(17.021) 
12.73           
(12.5) 
17.339          
(13.891) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs (cumulative) 
32.93*           
(13.79) 
12.771           
(942.404) 
33.655            
(41.662) 
9.046           
(15.36) 
9.559          
(6.35) 
4.174           
(8.01) 
12.502           
(15.354) 
7.567           
(22.09) 
-26.531.          
(15.065) 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) -0.407**           
(0.141) 
0.078           
(16.222) 
-0.657            
(0.408) 
-0.192.           
(0.112) 
-0.102.          
(0.055) 
-0.035           
(0.108) 
-0.204.           
(0.111) 
-0.19           
(0.184) 
-0.137          
(0.145) 
R&D expenditure (sum) 0.856*           
(0.374) 
-0.039           
(19.074) 
3.058            
(2.057) 
0.944**           
(0.343) 
-0.104          
(0.18) 
-0.024           
(0.402) 
-0.215           
(0.367) 
-0.36           
(0.683) 
0.779          
(0.478) 
Imports of htp by PTA members (sum) 0.27           
(0.174) 
0.245           
(4.054) 
-0.047            
(0.352) 
0.306.           
(0.169) 
-0.029          
(0.073) 
0.184           
(0.128) 
-0.02           
(0.153) 
0.264           
(0.182) 
0.116          
(0.181) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members (sum) -0.288           
(0.228) 
-1.27           
(3.263) 
-0.762            
(0.482) 
-0.381.           
(0.205) 
0.041          
(0.095) 
-0.109           
(0.119) 
0.131           
(0.198) 
-0.353           
(0.337) 
-0.545.          
(0.284) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members (sum) 0.113           
(0.198) 
1.004           
(5.963) 
0.772            
(0.552) 
0.318.           
(0.176) 
0.055          
(0.091) 
-0.075           
(0.132) 
-0.043           
(0.198) 
0.078           
(0.323) 
0.481*          
(0.237) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members (sum) 0.006           
(0.058) 
-0.009           
(1.137) 
0.058            
(0.118) 
-0.072           
(0.061) 
-0.052          
(0.036) 
-0.068.           
(0.037) 
-0.007           
(0.086) 
0.164           
(0.103) 
0.041          
(0.076) 
Imports of htp by PTA members /                                   
total htp imports 
8.491         
(19.89) 
11.327           
(433.283) 
24.22            
(55.891) 
-73.96**           
(23.18) 
19.57.          
(11.4) 
12.76           
(18.83) 
43.201.           
(23.308) 
-8.088           
(25.97) 
13.663          
(20.601) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members /                                
total mhtp imports 
13.08         
(17.94) 
25.634           
(413.25) 
-9.601            
(35.989) 
6.1           
(19.46) 
-13          
(9.053) 
4.41           
(12.28) 
-34.782.           
(19.86) 
-16.27           
(20.99) 
4.737          
(16.408) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members /                                
total mltp imports 
-104.7           
(92.63) 
-27.761           
(2013.494) 
-240.47            
(322.238) 
234.3*           
(108.9) 
-51.94          
(48.73) 
-82.5           
(87.28) 
-51.809           
(86.821) 
164.8           
(145.6) 
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Imports of ltp by PTA members /                                    
total ltp imports 
79.93         
(75.08) 
30.573           
(1638.613) 
270.606            
(244.451) 
-140.4           
(91.34) 
36.44          
(35.67) 
67.47           
(67.91) 
36.597           
(68.671) 
-129.5           
(121.5) 
-20.47          
(93.294) 
Political Pressure   
        
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.122           
(0.129) 
0.291           
(5.103) 
0.127            
(0.428) 
0.025           
(0.144) 
-0.174**          
(0.058) 
-0.111           
(0.068) 
-0.156           
(0.123) 
-0.36           
(0.222) 
-0.038          
(0.167) 
Veto Players   
        
Veto players (sum) 0.553**           
(0.185) 
0.506           
(8.216) 
0.817            
(0.664) 
0.017           
(0.151) 
-0.186.          
(0.096) 
0.012           
(0.103) 
-0.532*           
(0.228) 
-0.102           
(0.201) 
-0.146          
(0.187) 
Endogeneity   
        
PTA depth 0.127           
(0.189) 
-0.983           
(5.81) 
-0.146            
(0.373) 
– – – – – – 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – – – 2.14.           
(1.214) 
1.706**          
(0.603) 
11.55           
(312.3) 
3.022*           
(1.181) 
-1.431           
(1.734) 
-0.671          
(1.072) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.692***           
(0.128) 
0.757           
(1.42) 
1.293*            
(0.642) 
– – – – – – 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – – – 1.301***           
(0.206) 
0.195**          
(0.074) 
0.083           
(0.112) 
0.494**           
(0.158) 
1.248           
(0.35) 
0.883***          
(0.207) 
Regime Preference   
        
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.017           
(0.012) 
0.034           
(0.218) 
0.032            
(0.028) 
0.022*           
(0.011) 
0.017***          
(0.005) 
-0.001           
(0.007) 
0.025*           
(0.012) 
-0.004           
(0.018) 
0.003          
(0.012) 
Control Variables 
         
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.035           
(0.08) 
-0.125           
(0.819) 
-0.092            
(0.222) 
0.008           
(0.06) 
0.136**          
(0.046) 
0.076           
(0.07) 
0.29**           
(0.102) 
-0.108           
(0.094) 
0.079          
(0.073) 
Classic IP leaders -0.985           
(1.066) 
5.194           
(25.901) 
-3.85            
(4.469) 
-0.886           
(0.778) 
0.074          
(0.451) 
-0.632           
(0.714) 
0.767           
(1.036) 
0.681           
(1.271) 
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Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-2.197**           
(0.818) 
-2.78           
(79.97) 
-4.336            
(2.727) 
-1.809**           
(0.683) 
0.613.          
(0.339) 
0.079           
(0.715) 
2.041**           
(0.712) 
0.435           
(0.865) 
-0.552          
(0.694) 
New IP producers and developers -0.367           
(0.65) 
2.11           
(10.889) 
0.071            
(2.593) 
0.692           
(0.577) 
-0.037          
(0.333) 
-0.144           
(0.527) 
-0.185           
(0.688) 
1.32           
(1.077) 
1.159.          
(0.643) 
ln GDP (mean) 1.447**           
(0.509) 
-1.886           
(9.048) 
3.078.            
(1.682) 
1.533***           
(0.375) 
-0.676***          
(0.204) 
-0.162           
(0.424) 
-1.673***           
(0.457) 
0.027           
(0.548) 
1.121.          
(0.636) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.108           
(0.519) 
4.717           
(13.662) 
-0.677            
(1.646) 
-0.437           
(0.485) 
0.551**          
(0.188) 
0.09           
(0.29) 
1.571***           
(0.471) 
0.823           
(0.581) 
0.584          
(0.557) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.76*           
(0.386) 
1.306           
(10.154) 
-2.12            
(1.326) 
0.889**           
(0.337) 
0          
(0.14) 
0.07           
(0.221) 
0.072           
(0.31) 
-0.815           
(0.458) 
0.2          
(0.39) 
Intercept – -23.579     
(460.361) 
-83.292.     
(43.919) 
– – -12.19     
(312.4) 
7.928     
(8.458) 
-9.843     
(12.78) 
– 
Model m12adi1_op m12adi1_hp m12adi1_hp m12bdi4_o
p 












Observations 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 
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ln Charges for the use of IP, receipts (sum) 0.535           
(0.377) 
0          
(0.001) 
-0.001           
(0.002) 
1.936           
(4319) 
0.003.            
(0.001) 
0.001           
(0.001) 
-0.002           
(0.044) 
-1.58           
(5729) 
ln Resident applications for patents (sum) -0.877*           
(0.355) 
-0.002          
(0.004) 
0.012           
(0.013) 
-22.34           
(48640) 
-0.01            
(0.01) 
-0.006           
(0.008) 
-0.711**           
(0.227) 
6.93           
(84800) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(sum) 
1.623.           
(0.935) 
0.002          
(0.003) 
-0.001           
(0.011) 
-2.955           
(16700) 
0.012            
(0.008) 
0.007           
(0.007) 
0.984***           
(0.291) 
-3.781           
(18660) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (sum) 
-1.091*           
(0.545) 
0.001          
(0.003) 
0.004           
(0.01) 
36.17           
(43860) 
-0.003            
(0.008) 
-0.004           
(0.006) 
-0.663**           
(0.206) 
2.862           
(78230) 
ln Resident applications for patents (cumu-
lative, sum) 
-0.827           
(0.827) 
0.005          
(0.004) 
-0.008           
(0.014) 
-29.34           
(33550) 
0.017            
(0.011) 
0.009           
(0.009) 
0.419           
(0.326) 
-5.542           
(84920) 
ln Resident applications for trademarks 
(cumulative, sum) 
-0.284           
(1.04) 
-0.003          
(0.003) 
0.006           
(0.012) 
14.04           
(30130) 
-0.011            
(0.009) 
0           
(0.007) 
-0.726*           
(0.34) 
8.889           
(25190) 
ln Resident applications for industrial de-
sign (cumulative, sum) 
1.082           
(0.74) 
-0.003          
(0.004) 
-0.006           
(0.013) 
1.974           
(30800) 
-0.019.            
(0.01) 
-0.014.           
(0.008) 
0.422           
(0.324) 
-8.912           
(65970) 
Applications for patents by PTA members / 
total applications for patents 
0.078           
(1.317) 
-0.009          
(0.015) 
-0.007           
(0.053) 
-41.77           
(40660) 
0.049            
(0.04) 
0.089**           
(0.033) 
1.938***           
(0.582) 
-85.47           
(183900) 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks 
-1.654           
(1.735) 
0.011          
(0.011) 
0.044           
(0.037) 
-14.09           
(41810) 
-0.025            
(0.028) 
-0.062**           
(0.023) 
-0.199           
(0.438) 
21.89           
(92100) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs 
0.419           
(0.871) 
0.004          
(0.009) 
0.014           
(0.032) 
11.12           
(26690) 
0.004            
(0.024) 
0.009           
(0.02) 
-0.54           
(0.429) 


























Applications for patents by PTA members / 
total applications for patents (cumulative) 
79.26           
(281.2) 
-1.148          
(2.916) 
11.55           
(10.106) 
-7006           
(12110000) 
8.164            
(7.594) 
11.13.           
(6.301) 
136.9           
(101) 
-533.6           
(21660000) 
Applications for trademarks by PTA mem-
bers / total applications for trademarks (cu-
mulative) 
-8.957           
(36.91) 
-0.09          
(0.112) 
-0.381           
(0.387) 
185.3           
(332500) 
-0.043            
(0.291) 
0.045           
(0.241) 
-1.259           
(7.953) 
-192.8           
(1753000) 
Applications for industrial designs by PTA 
members / total applications for industrial 
designs (cumulative) 
19.52           
(22.23) 
0          
(0.144) 
-0.664           
(0.497) 
-420.9           
(695500) 
-0.112            
(0.374) 
-0.359           
(0.31) 
-5.223           
(10.38) 
141           
(1930000) 
Number of researchers in R&D (sum) -0.181           
(0.162) 
0          
(0.001) 
-0.001           
(0.004) 
8.355           
(5206) 
-0.001            
(0.003) 
0           
(0.002) 
-0.051           
(0.073) 
1.269           
(13530) 
R&D expenditure (sum) 0.887.           
(0.518) 
-0.001          
(0.004) 
0.004           
(0.014) 
-7.791           
(14190) 
-0.002            
(0.01) 
0.007           
(0.009) 
-0.32           
(0.251) 
0.306           
(34570) 
Imports of htp by PTA members (sum) 0.427*           
(0.217) 
-0.002          
(0.002) 
-0.005           
(0.007) 
4.409           
(15140) 
0            
(0.006) 
-0.006           
(0.005) 
0.017           
(0.087) 
1.855           
(9297) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members (sum) -0.462           
(0.318) 
0          
(0.003) 
0.005           
(0.009) 
-3.452           
(17770) 
-0.018**            
(0.007) 
-0.006           
(0.006) 
-0.117           
(0.129) 
1.375           
(11130) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members (sum) -0.05           
(0.25) 
0.002          
(0.003) 
0.01           
(0.009) 
2.567           
(11450) 
0.002            
(0.007) 
0           
(0.006) 
0.129           
(0.123) 
-4.021           
(10730) 
Imports of ltp by PTA members (sum) 0.144           
(0.125) 
0.001          
(0.001) 
-0.005           
(0.005) 
-2.216           
(2797) 
0.012**            
(0.004) 
0.008**           
(0.003) 
0.069.           
(0.042) 
1.752           
(7838) 
Imports of htp by PTA members /                                   
total htp imports 
12.34         
(32.08) 
-0.419          
(0.305) 
-0.089           
(1.057) 
-439.7           
(3045000) 
-0.534            
(0.795) 
-0.003           
(0.66) 
8.343           
(14.05) 
-438.2           
(2437000) 
Imports of mhtp by PTA members /                                
total mhtp imports 
-20.77           
(29.29) 
-0.298          
(0.189) 
-0.287           
(0.665) 
-131.1           
(2778000) 
-0.245            
(0.501) 
-0.573           
(0.415) 
15.33           
(10.15) 
45.93           
(1793000) 
Imports of mltp by PTA members /                                
total mltp imports 
48.03          
(186.4) 
1.961.          
(1.094) 
-2.906           
(3.805) 
2361           
(20270000) 
5.747*            
(2.862) 
4.274.           
(2.375) 
-106.9*           
(50.62) 


























Imports of ltp by PTA members /                                    
total ltp imports 
-58.04           
(177.6) 
-0.382          
(0.806) 
2.533           
(2.796) 
-4034           
(14680000) 
-1.758            
(2.1) 
-0.145           
(1.742) 
94.45*           
(39.32) 
553.5           
(10310000) 
Political Pressure 
        
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.164           
(0.295) 
-0.001          
(0.002) 
-0.008           
(0.006) 
5.211           
(6305) 
0.007.            
(0.004) 
0.007.           
(0.003) 
-0.358**           
(0.112) 
-2.979           
(12240) 
Veto Players 
        
Veto players (sum) 0.198           
(0.334) 
-0.003          
(0.002) 
-0.002           
(0.006) 
8.008           
(3593) 
-0.01*            
(0.005) 
-0.006           
(0.004) 
0.264**           
(0.097) 
5.263           
(8093) 
Endogeneity 
        
PTA depth – – -0.02*           
(0.008) 
15.21           
(10740) 
0.001            
(0.007) 
-0.008           
(0.005) 
0.195           
(0.125) 
3.744           
(17170) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) 20.26           
(2326) 
-0.01          
(0.008) 
– – – – – – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) – – – -1.174           
(3256) 
0.052***            
(0.005) 
0.033***           
(0.004) 
0.562***           
(0.074) 
0.717           
(9505) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0.737**           
(0.24) 
0.003          
(0.003) 
0.113***           
(0.01) 
– – – – – 
Regime Preference 
        
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.008           
(0.016) 
0                 
(0) 
0.003***           
(0.001) 
1.188           
(1030) 
-0.001            
(0) 
0               
(0) 
0.023***           
(0.007) 
-0.154           
(903.5) 
Control Variables 
        
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.09           
(0.065) 
-0.001          
(0.001) 
-0.004.           
(0.002) 
-1.441           
(1623) 
-0.001            
(0.002) 
-0.001           
(0.001) 
-0.143**           
(0.045) 
2.142           
(5231) 
Classic IP leaders 1.019           
(1.409) 
0.027*          
(0.013) 
0.11*           
(0.045) 
106.7           
(62520) 
0.012            
(0.033) 
0.087**           
(0.027) 
0.184           
(0.545) 


























Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.679           
(0.807) 
0.005          
(0.009) 
0.002           
(0.03) 
3.268           
(34890) 
0.007            
(0.023) 
-0.048*           
(0.019) 
-0.195           
(0.445) 
-14.07           
(106100) 
New IP producers and developers 0.534           
(0.671) 
-0.001          
(0.01) 
-0.008           
(0.034) 
12.97           
(39130) 
-0.019            
(0.025) 
0.024           
(0.021) 
0.232           
(0.409) 
-18.55           
(87670) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.859           
(0.627) 
0.003          
(0.003) 
-0.009           
(0.012) 
-13.9           
(29170) 
0.037***            
(0.009) 
0.026***           
(0.007) 
1.452***           
(0.26) 
3.241           
(27570) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.293           
(0.568) 
-0.001          
(0.004) 
0.012           
(0.013) 
-13.82           
(22090) 
-0.023*            
(0.01) 
-0.022**           
(0.008) 
-0.478*           
(0.241) 
0.223           
(32980) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.626           
(0.479) 
0          
(0.004) 
0.022.           
(0.012) 
39.06           
(8314) 
0.01            
(0.009) 
0.012           
(0.007) 
-0.404*           
(0.184) 
5.897           
(27900) 
Intercept -49.88     
(2326) 
-0.05     
(0.069) 
-0.047     
(0.238) 
-84.36     
(735300) 
-0.747***     
(0.18) 
-0.513***     
(0.149) 









Observations 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 
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PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.024           
(0.105) 
-0.064          
(0.137) 
-0.023           
(0.078) 
-0.004           
(0.004) 
-0.118            
(0.202) 
-0.18           
(0.184) 
-0.281          
(0.228) 
0.001           
(0.002) 
-0.011*          
(0.006) 
Veto Players   
        
Veto players (sum) 0.046           
(0.25) 
0.141          
(0.112) 
-0.182           
(0.188) 
-0.006           
(0.005) 
0.114            
(0.165) 
0.098           
(0.165) 
-0.084          
(0.251) 
-0.001           
(0.002) 
0          
(0.007) 
Endogeneity   
        
PTA depth -0.011           
(0.153) 
0.092          
(0.139) 
0.357**           
(0.12) 
-0.006           
(0.007) 
– – – 0.005*           
(0.002) 
-0.018*          
(0.008) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – – – – -1.879.            
(0.978) 
-2.01**           
(0.706) 
17.13          
(1865) 
– – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.591***           
(0.108) 
0.651***          
(0.101) 
– – – – 0.448***          
(0.101) 
– – 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – – 0.354**           
(0.111) 
0.079***           
(0.008) 
0.896***            
(0.221) 
0.803***           
(0.164) 
– 0.003           
(0.003) 
0.117***          
(0.01) 
Regime Preference   
        
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.008           
(0.008) 
0.003          
(0.007) 
0.013*           
(0.007) 
-0.001           
(0) 
-0.025**            
(0.009) 
-0.024**           
(0.009) 
-0.001          
(0.01) 
0              
(0) 
0.003***          
(0.001) 
Path Dependency   
        
Index IPR general pd (sum) -0.019           
(0.031) 
0.019          
(0.03) 
0.019           
(0.027) 
0.003.           
(0.002) 
0.051            
(0.033) 
0.04           
(0.034) 
0.089          
(0.057) 
-0.001           
(0.001) 





























Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – copyrights 
0.124           
(0.637) 
0.724          
(0.628) 
-0.411           
(0.518) 
-0.005           
(0.024) 
2.192*            
(0.859) 
1.274.           
(0.676) 
0.087          
(0.561) 
0.004           
(0.008) 
-0.008          
(0.03) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – trademarks 
0.85           
(1.094) 
0.144          
(1.157) 
0.114           
(0.789) 
-0.021           
(0.034) 
-0.838            
(1.27) 
-0.106           
(0.821) 
-0.382          
(1.059) 
-0.016           
(0.012) 
-0.02          
(0.042) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – geographical indications 
0.23           
(0.34) 
-0.526.          
(0.298) 
0.666.           
(0.385) 
0.036           
(0.024) 
0.242            
(0.395) 
-0.467           
(0.496) 
-0.263          
(0.444) 
-0.034***           
(0.008) 
0.027          
(0.029) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – industrial designs 
0.562           
(1.474) 
-0.957          
(0.821) 
36.2           
(11650000) 
-0.009           
(0.042) 
1.683            
(1.578) 
1.321           
(1.116) 
-0.239          
(1.286) 
0.005           
(0.015) 
0.028          
(0.053) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – patents 
-1.216           
(1.49) 
0.534          
(0.955) 
-36.23           
(11650000) 
0.026           
(0.048) 
-2.262            
(1.585) 
-1.911           
(1.162) 
0.594          
(1.509) 
0.016           
(0.017) 
-0.019          
(0.059) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – undisclosed information 
-0.57           
(0.643) 
-0.265          
(0.698) 
-0.88           
(0.573) 
-0.023           
(0.031) 
-0.885            
(0.718) 
-0.146           
(0.614) 
-0.114          
(0.58) 
0.047***           
(0.011) 
0.003          
(0.038) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0.432           
(0.379) 
0.462          
(0.306) 
0.308           
(0.421) 
-0.002           
(0.019) 
-0.323            
(0.419) 
-0.033           
(0.362) 
0.066          
(0.427) 
-0.021**           
(0.007) 
-0.007          
(0.024) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – new plant varieties 
-0.283.           
(0.155) 
0.003          
(0.126) 
0.16           
(0.125) 
0.011.           
(0.005) 
-0.09            
(0.223) 
-0.168           
(0.221) 
-0.005          
(0.319) 
0           
(0.002) 
-0.013.          
(0.007) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
0.067           
(0.106) 
0.054          
(0.083) 
-0.076           
(0.046) 
0.012**           
(0.004) 
-0.185**            
(0.058) 
-0.15*           
(0.061) 
0.055          
(0.196) 
-0.001           
(0.001) 
-0.008          
(0.005) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – encrypted program-carrying sat-
ellite signals 
-0.21.           
(0.109) 
0.074          
(0.128) 
0.258*           
(0.13) 
0.007           
(0.007) 
-0.031            
(0.15) 
-0.037           
(0.158) 
0.367          
(0.276) 
-0.002           
(0.002) 
-0.007          
(0.009) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
0.302           
(0.193) 
0.243          
(0.167) 
0.102           
(0.192) 
-0.048**           
(0.016) 
0.37.            
(0.22) 
0.272           
(0.171) 
-0.095          
(0.223) 
-0.01.           
(0.005) 





























Index IPR general enforcement pd (sum) 0.02           
(0.05) 
-0.021          
(0.051) 
-0.014           
(0.045) 
-0.011***           
(0.003) 
-0.053            
(0.053) 
-0.036           
(0.052) 
-0.126          
(0.086) 
0           
(0.001) 
0.002          
(0.004) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pl 
(dummy sum) 
0.002           
(0.011) 
-0.015.          
(0.009) 
0           
(0.007) 
0                
(0) 
0.013            
(0.009) 
0.011           
(0.011) 
-0.003          
(0.018) 
0                 
(0) 
0          
(0.001) 
Control Variables   
        
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.049           
(0.059) 
-0.059          
(0.049) 
0.105*           
(0.048) 
-0.001           
(0.002) 
0.023            
(0.064) 
0.023           
(0.045) 
-0.019          
(0.051) 
-0.001           
(0.001) 
-0.005*          
(0.002) 
Classic IP leaders -0.599           
(0.459) 
-0.702          
(0.428) 
-1.157*           
(0.459) 
0.069*           
(0.034) 
0.027            
(0.521) 
-0.029           
(0.442) 
1.679**          
(0.6) 
0.027*           
(0.012) 
0.07.          
(0.042) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.288           
(0.452) 
-0.197          
(0.386) 
0.971*           
(0.4) 
0.087***           
(0.022) 
-0.58            
(0.622) 
-0.352           
(0.524) 
1.411**          
(0.454) 
0.008           
(0.008) 
0.01          
(0.027) 
New IP producers and developers -0.402           
(0.412) 
-0.453          
(0.382) 
-0.959*           
(0.405) 
-0.005           
(0.025) 
0.31            
(0.44) 
0.445           
(0.311) 
-0.224          
(0.485) 
-0.009           
(0.009) 
-0.008          
(0.031) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.235           
(0.174) 
0.094          
(0.151) 
-0.512***           
(0.142) 
-0.035***           
(0.008) 
0.745***            
(0.202) 
0.823***           
(0.187) 
0.106          
(0.207) 
0.001           
(0.003) 
0.004          
(0.01) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.153           
(0.256) 
-0.247          
(0.243) 
0.905***           
(0.217) 
0.046***           
(0.01) 
0.438            
(0.383) 
0.539           
(0.397) 
-0.414          
(0.351) 
-0.001           
(0.004) 
0.011          
(0.013) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.516*           
(0.251) 
-0.199          
(0.233) 
0.298           
(0.19) 
-0.017.           
(0.009) 
-0.17            
(0.375) 
-0.174           
(0.349) 
0.013          
(0.348) 
0.002           
(0.003) 
0.03*          
(0.012) 
Intercept – – -1.47     
(3.173) 
0.611***     
(0.156) 
– – -21.66     
(1865) 
-0.05     
(0.055) 
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Appendix 22 Design Regression Table 6: Path Dependency (general) II 




















     
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
1.027*           
(0.408) 
-0.004          
(0.004) 
-0.005          
(0.003) 
-0.218**          
(0.085) 
0.014           
(0.009) 
Veto Players 
     
Veto players (sum) -3.546***           
(1.063) 
0.007          
(0.005) 
0.007.          
(0.004) 
0.078          
(0.152) 
0           
(0.011) 
Endogeneity 
     
PTA depth 3.557***           
(0.887) 
-0.003          
(0.007) 
-0.017**          
(0.005) 
0.145          
(0.107) 
0.017           
(0.014) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – – – – – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) – 0.053***          
(0.005) 
0.034***          
(0.004) 
0.5***          
(0.069) 
– 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0.615*           
(0.275) 
– – – 0.035*           
(0.016) 
Regime Preference 
     
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.071**           
(0.023) 
-0.001**          
(0) 
-0.001          
(0) 
0.004          
(0.006) 
0           
(0.001) 
Path Dependency 
     
Index IPR general pd (sum) -0.186*           
(0.073) 
-0.002          
(0.002) 
-0.003**          
(0.001) 
-0.029          
(0.026) 
0.005           
(0.004) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – copyrights 
2.278           
(1.393) 
0.051*          
(0.023) 
0.02          
(0.018) 
0.857          
(0.531) 
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Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – trademarks 
-9.779*           
(4.447) 
-0.001          
(0.032) 
0.037          
(0.026) 
-0.923          
(0.936) 
0.01           
(0.072) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – geographical indications 
2.865*           
(1.158) 
-0.049*          
(0.022) 
-0.001          
(0.018) 
0.316          
(0.273) 
-0.001           
(0.05) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – industrial designs 
2.671           
(2.376) 
0.046          
(0.04) 
-0.023          
(0.032) 
0.551          
(0.809) 
-0.045           
(0.09) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – patents 
4.296           
(3.413) 
-0.042          
(0.045) 
-0.007          
(0.036) 
-0.555          
(0.943) 
0.027           
(0.101) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – undisclosed information 
-0.742           
(1.073) 
0.019          
(0.029) 
0.005          
(0.023) 
-0.214          
(0.49) 
0.003           
(0.065) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0.435           
(1.11) 
-0.014          
(0.018) 
-0.015          
(0.015) 
0.189          
(0.266) 
0.016           
(0.041) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – new plant varieties 
-0.571           
(0.518) 
0.002          
(0.005) 
-0.003          
(0.004) 
0.022          
(0.102) 
-0.004           
(0.012) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
0.054           
(0.089) 
-0.008*          
(0.004) 
-0.005          
(0.003) 
-0.01          
(0.037) 
0.024**           
(0.009) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – encrypted program-carrying sat-
ellite signals 
0.082           
(0.61) 
0.002          
(0.007) 
-0.008          
(0.005) 
0.015          
(0.106) 
-0.022           
(0.015) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
-1.18.           
(0.637) 
0.048**          
(0.015) 
0.071***          
(0.012) 
0.357*          
(0.153) 
-0.07*           
(0.033) 
Index IPR general enforcement pd (sum) 0.217           
(0.152) 
0.002          
(0.003) 
0.005*          
(0.002) 
0.04          
(0.043) 
-0.021**           
(0.006) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pl 
(dummy sum) 
0.045.           
(0.026) 
-0.001.          
(0) 
-0.001.          
(0) 
-0.007          
(0.006) 
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Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.245*           
(0.111) 
-0.001          
(0.002) 
-0.001          
(0.001) 
-0.073.          
(0.039) 
0           
(0.004) 
Classic IP leaders 1.203           
(1.12) 
0.017          
(0.031) 
0.088***          
(0.025) 
0.572          
(0.368) 
0.001           
(0.072) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.766           
(1.28) 
0.008          
(0.021) 
-0.038*          
(0.017) 
-0.06          
(0.324) 
-0.006           
(0.046) 
New IP producers and developers -0.2           
(0.718) 
-0.053*          
(0.024) 
0          
(0.019) 
-0.459          
(0.344) 
0.015           
(0.054) 
ln GDP (mean) -1.237**           
(0.479) 
0.02**          
(0.007) 
0.016**          
(0.006) 
0.571***          
(0.126) 
-0.006           
(0.016) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -2.023**           
(0.707) 
-0.03**          
(0.01) 
-0.025**          
(0.008) 
-0.771***          
(0.179) 
-0.006           
(0.022) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.292           
(0.406) 
0          
(0.009) 
0.005          
(0.007) 
-0.353*          
(0.167) 
0.003           
(0.02) 
Intercept – -0.268.     
(0.148) 
-0.22.     
(0.119) 












      
Observations 529 529 529 529 529 
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PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.012            
(0.008) 
0.045          
(0.103) 
-0.111.          
(0.062) 
-0.002           
(0.005) 
-0.381.           
(0.215) 
-0.084            
(0.164) 
-0.389             
(0.337) 
0           
(0.002) 
-0.002            
(0.006) 
Veto Players   
        
Veto players (sum) 0.022**            
(0.008) 
0.073          
(0.142) 
-0.173          
(0.133) 
-0.001           
(0.005) 
0.002           
(0.221) 
0.046            
(0.198) 
-0.211             
(0.345) 
-0.002           
(0.002) 
0            
(0.006) 
Endogeneity   
        
PTA depth – 0.116          
(0.138) 
0.163*          
(0.078) 
– – 0                  
(0) 
– 0.004.           
(0.002) 
-0.02*            
(0.008) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) -0.055.            
(0.033) 
– – -0.006           
(0.02) 
-2.287*           
(0.913) 
-2.095**            
(0.696) 
16.92             
(1826) 
– – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) – 0.604***          
(0.099) 
– – – 0                 
(0) 
– – – 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0.185***            
(0.013) 
– 0.143*          
(0.07) 
0.076***           
(0.008) 
0.886***           
(0.21) 
0.737***            
(0.166) 
0.804***             
(0.187) 
0.004           
(0.003) 
0.118***            
(0.01) 
Regime Preference   
        
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.002*            
(0.001) 
0.002          
(0.007) 
0.015***          
(0.005) 
-0.001*           
(0) 
-0.025*           
(0.01) 
-0.02*            
(0.009) 
-0.011             
(0.01) 
0*                
(0) 
0.003***            
(0.001) 
Path Dependency   
        
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – copyrights 
0.018            
(0.036) 
0.121          
(0.246) 
-0.286          
(0.189) 
0.01           
(0.021) 
0.572           
(0.349) 
0.154            
(0.264) 
-0.025             
(0.364) 
-0.014.           
(0.008) 





























Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – trademarks 
-0.045            
(0.046) 
-0.108          
(0.31) 
0.372          
(0.254) 
-0.064*           
(0.027) 
-1.278**           
(0.427) 
-0.855**            
(0.31) 
-0.915*             
(0.438) 
0.009           
(0.01) 
-0.061.            
(0.034) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – geographical indications 
-0.018            
(0.017) 
0.046          
(0.149) 
0.028          
(0.097) 
-0.005           
(0.01) 
0.741*           
(0.289) 
0.806**            
(0.302) 
0.812**             
(0.254) 
-0.006           
(0.004) 
0.032*            
(0.013) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – industrial designs 
0.146***            
(0.041) 
0.562          
(0.355) 
-0.389          
(0.25) 
-0.075**           
(0.024) 
1.549*           
(0.675) 
0.913*            
(0.377) 
0.539             
(0.543) 
-0.002           
(0.009) 
-0.016            
(0.031) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – patents 
-0.055            
(0.047) 
-0.515          
(0.445) 
0.542.          
(0.318) 
0.114***           
(0.028) 
-1.221           
(0.787) 
-0.634            
(0.425) 
0.171             
(0.608) 
0.005           
(0.01) 
0.012            
(0.035) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – undisclosed information 
-0.006            
(0.008) 
-0.073          
(0.09) 
-0.023          
(0.055) 
-0.008.           
(0.005) 
0.019           
(0.105) 
0.072            
(0.108) 
0.028             
(0.155) 
0.001           
(0.002) 
-0.011*            
(0.006) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – layout-designs of integrated circuits 
-0.017            
(0.015) 
0.047          
(0.065) 
-0.032          
(0.065) 
-0.032***           
(0.009) 
0.068           
(0.067) 
0.042            
(0.049) 
0.071             
(0.069) 
0           
(0.003) 
0.025*            
(0.011) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – new plant varieties 
-0.067*            
(0.03) 
-0.149          
(0.232) 
0.05          
(0.176) 
0.018           
(0.018) 
-0.546           
(0.352) 
-0.362            
(0.288) 
-0.211             
(0.402) 
0.002           
(0.007) 
-0.004            
(0.023) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – traditional knowledge & genetic re-
sources 
0.026            
(0.016) 
-0.073          
(0.11) 
0.093          
(0.084) 
0.001           
(0.01) 
-0.387*           
(0.179) 
-0.134            
(0.137) 
0.038             
(0.217) 
0.006.           
(0.003) 
-0.023.            
(0.012) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – encrypted program-carrying satellite 
signals 
0.01            
(0.041) 
-0.04          
(0.367) 
0.082          
(0.249) 
0.028           
(0.025) 
-0.102           
(0.427) 
-0.171            
(0.351) 
-0.019             
(0.471) 
0.012           
(0.009) 
-0.01            
(0.031) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – domain names 
0.053            
(0.04) 
0.245          
(0.354) 
-0.335          
(0.266) 
-0.122***           
(0.024) 
0.58           
(0.397) 
0.423            
(0.301) 
0.044             
(0.44) 
-0.014           
(0.009) 
0.004            
(0.03) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pd (sum) -0.002            
(0.004) 
-0.014          
(0.025) 
0.03          
(0.019) 
0.007**           
(0.002) 
-0.045           
(0.029) 
-0.029            
(0.028) 
-0.041             
(0.036) 
0           
(0.001) 
0.002            
(0.003) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pd (sum) 0.001            
(0.001) 
0.006          
(0.01) 
-0.013.          
(0.007) 
0           
(0.001) 
0.032.           
(0.018) 
0.008            
(0.013) 
-0.001             
(0.021) 
0                
(0) 





























Control Variables   
        
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.006.            
(0.003) 
-0.061          
(0.049) 
0.073*          
(0.033) 
-0.002           
(0.002) 
0.078           
(0.06) 
0.037            
(0.042) 
0.005             
(0.052) 
-0.001           
(0.001) 
-0.004.            
(0.002) 
Classic IP leaders -0.148**            
(0.056) 
-0.682          
(0.441) 
-0.475          
(0.334) 
0.048           
(0.033) 
-0.22           
(0.584) 
-0.397            
(0.501) 
1.491*             
(0.718) 
0.035**           
(0.012) 
0.079.            
(0.042) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.13***            
(0.037) 
-0.081          
(0.404) 
0.807**          
(0.289) 
0.085***           
(0.022) 
-0.17           
(0.532) 
-0.504            
(0.628) 
1.683**             
(0.581) 
0.005           
(0.008) 
0.008            
(0.027) 
New IP producers and developers -0.068            
(0.042) 
-0.546          
(0.388) 
-0.31          
(0.294) 
-0.007           
(0.025) 
-0.472           
(0.498) 
-0.147            
(0.373) 
-0.694             
(0.545) 
-0.005           
(0.009) 
0.001            
(0.031) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.06***            
(0.013) 
0.002          
(0.154) 
-0.31**          
(0.1) 
-0.031***           
(0.007) 
0.791***           
(0.238) 
0.856***            
(0.201) 
0.154             
(0.2) 
0.001           
(0.003) 
0.002            
(0.009) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.053**            
(0.017) 
-0.14          
(0.225) 
0.443**          
(0.143) 
0.046***           
(0.01) 
0.203           
(0.332) 
0.633.            
(0.33) 
-0.343             
(0.333) 
-0.002           
(0.004) 
0.01            
(0.013) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.022            
(0.016) 
-0.06          
(0.219) 
0.207.          
(0.121) 
-0.012           
(0.01) 
-0.354           
(0.315) 
-0.384            
(0.271) 
-0.081             
(0.322) 
0.001           
(0.003) 
0.026*            
(0.012) 
Intercept -0.892***     
(0.249) 
– – 0.485**     
(0.148) 
– -28.571***     
(6.035) 
-22.36     
(1826) 
-0.027     
(0.055) 


















Observations 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 
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Appendix 22 Design Regression Table 8: Path Dependency (specific) II 




















     
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.722*           
(0.315) 
-0.007               
(0.004) 
-0.003              
(0.004) 
-0.274**           
(0.098) 
-6.314           
(19150) 
Veto Players 
     
Veto players (sum) -1.264*           
(0.635) 
0.005               
(0.004) 
0.004              
(0.004) 
0.124           
(0.091) 
1.799           
(6422) 
Endogeneity 
     
PTA depth 2.293***           
(0.545) 
0.012*               
(0.006) 
-0.016**              
(0.005) 
0.147           
(0.109) 
13.51           
(20250) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – – – – – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.152           
(0.166) 
– 0.035***              
(0.004) 
0.516***           
(0.067) 
-0.039           
(10910) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – 0.085***               
(0.007) 
– – – 
Regime Preference 
     
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.039*           
(0.019) 
-0.001**               
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0.007           
(0.005) 
0.107           
(1008) 
Path Dependency 
     
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – copyrights 
0.371           
(0.601) 
-0.044*               
(0.02) 
0.023              
(0.016) 
-0.19           
(0.244) 
27.4           
(44680) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – trademarks 
-1.421           
(0.93) 
0.068**               
(0.025) 
0.017              
(0.021) 
0.116           
(0.323) 
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Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – geographical indications 
0.802           
(0.837) 
-0.019*               
(0.01) 
0.008              
(0.008) 
-0.079           
(0.152) 
6.574           
(33600) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – industrial designs 
0.134           
(0.242) 
0.096***               
(0.023) 
0.073***              
(0.019) 
0.105           
(0.291) 
31.2           
(37610) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – patents 
-0.337           
(0.958) 
-0.069**               
(0.026) 
-0.087***              
(0.021) 
-0.227           
(0.374) 
-19.57           
(36150) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – undisclosed information 
-0.094           
(0.081) 
0.005               
(0.004) 
-0.002              
(0.003) 
-0.272**           
(0.092) 
-4.879           
(26290) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – layout-designs of integrated circuits 
0.185*           
(0.09) 
0.034***               
(0.008) 
0.021**              
(0.007) 
0.108           
(0.067) 
1.283           
(5540) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – new plant varieties 
0.154           
(0.392) 
-0.052**               
(0.017) 
-0.041**              
(0.014) 
-0.017           
(0.211) 
-4.364           
(41840) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – traditional knowledge & genetic re-
sources 
-0.176           
(0.232) 
0.014               
(0.009) 
-0.015*              
(0.007) 
0.024           
(0.111) 
-9.464           
(45050) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – encrypted program-carrying satellite 
signals 
-1.604           
(1.026) 
0.033               
(0.023) 
-0.026              
(0.019) 
0.967**           
(0.322) 
-43.65           
(84040) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – domain names 
1.583           
(0.99) 
0.039.               
(0.022) 
0.096***              
(0.019) 
-0.533.           
(0.303) 
8.173           
(59240) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pd (sum) -0.039           
(0.031) 
-0.008***               
(0.002) 
-0.004**              
(0.002) 
0.025           
(0.023) 
0.178           
(6038) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pd (sum) 0.061.           
(0.035) 
0               
(0.001) 
0.001*              
(0) 
0.011           
(0.009) 
0.2           
(1736) 
Control Variables 
     
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.092           
(0.095) 
0               
(0.002) 
-0.001              
(0.001) 
-0.072.           
(0.037) 
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Classic IP leaders -0.233           
(1.54) 
-0.003               
(0.031) 
0.08**              
(0.025) 
0.336           
(0.391) 
0.661           
(180700) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
3.308*           
(1.511) 
-0.022               
(0.02) 
-0.044**              
(0.017) 
-0.344           
(0.341) 
-2.669           
(101500) 
New IP producers and developers 0.469           
(0.73) 
-0.063**               
(0.023) 
-0.024              
(0.019) 
-0.677.           
(0.365) 
-10.96           
(53230) 
ln GDP (mean) -1.06**           
(0.371) 
0.018**               
(0.007) 
0.013*              
(0.006) 
0.623***           
(0.14) 
0.854           
(26500) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.391           
(0.472) 
-0.034***               
(0.009) 
-0.026***              
(0.008) 
-0.775***           
(0.19) 
-16.85           
(36340) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.301           
(0.42) 
0               
(0.009) 
0.004              
(0.007) 
-0.329*           
(0.167) 
14.97           
(34650) 
Intercept 16.956*     
(7.666) 
-0.199     
(0.14) 
-0.137     
(0.115) 










Observations 529 529 529 529 529 
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PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.015*            
(0.008) 
0.204.           
(0.109) 
-0.107           
(0.34) 
0.278          
(0.183) 
-0.084          
(0.052) 
-0.041          
(0.043) 
-0.012         
(0.061) 
-0.004          
(0.004) 
Veto Players   
       
Veto players (sum) 0.022**            
(0.008) 
0.066           
(0.094) 
0.208           
(0.529) 
0.097          
(0.176) 
-0.195.          
(0.109) 
-0.141          
(0.211) 
-0.314*         
(0.125) 
0          
(0.004) 
Endogeneity   
       
PTA depth – 0.395**           
(0.15) 
0.627.           
(0.36) 
0.241          
(0.192) 
0.25**          
(0.079) 
-0.001          
(0.104) 
0.328***         
(0.094) 
– 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) -0.044            
(0.033) 
– – – – – – -0.013          
(0.019) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) – – – – – – – – 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0.18***            
(0.013) 
0.967***           
(0.145) 
0.264           
(0.349) 
1.085***          
(0.231) 
0.176**          
(0.068) 
-0.067          
(0.077) 
0.304***         
(0.082) 
0.08***          
(0.007) 
Regime Preference   
       
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.002**            
(0.001) 
0.018*           
(0.008) 
-0.003           
(0.016) 
0.034*          
(0.013) 
0.013**          
(0.004) 
0.01*          
(0.005) 
0.006         
(0.005) 
-0.001*          
(0) 
Path Dependency   
       
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – copyrights 
0.005            
(0.021) 
-0.507.           
(0.259) 
-0.411           
(0.626) 
-0.972*          
(0.444) 
0.096          
(0.147) 
-0.098          
(0.233) 
0.271         
(0.193) 














Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – trademarks 
-0.062*            
(0.025) 
0.381           
(0.286) 
1.103           
(0.936) 
-0.067          
(0.41) 
-0.09          
(0.179) 
-0.223          
(0.319) 
-0.169         
(0.195) 
-0.07***          
(0.015) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – geographical indications 
0.002            
(0.01) 
-0.308           
(0.189) 
-0.733           
(0.705) 
0.233          
(0.395) 
-0.086          
(0.075) 
-0.188          
(0.2) 
-0.082         
(0.082) 
0.002          
(0.006) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd –  industrial designs 
0.071**            
(0.024) 
0.097           
(0.243) 
-0.181           
(0.591) 
-0.056          
(0.377) 
0.071          
(0.163) 
0.115          
(0.194) 
0.154         
(0.199) 
0.003          
(0.014) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – patents 
-0.027            
(0.019) 
0.122           
(0.164) 
-0.882.           
(0.522) 
0.675          
(0.476) 
-0.399**          
(0.131) 
-0.214          
(0.247) 
-0.31.         
(0.161) 
0.049***          
(0.011) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – undisclosed information  
-0.006            
(0.011) 
0.192           
(0.12) 
0.516           
(0.579) 
0.232          
(0.199) 
-0.015          
(0.07) 
0.058          
(0.104) 
-0.041         
(0.096) 
0.011          
(0.007) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0.196***            
(0.048) 
3.228***           
(0.647) 
1.096           
(0.7) 
2.397.          
(1.372) 
-0.639*          
(0.287) 
-0.095          
(0.432) 
-0.89**         
(0.338) 
-0.107***          
(0.028) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – new plant varieties 
-0.028            
(0.026) 
-0.121           
(0.297) 
0.74           
(0.604) 
-0.393          
(0.42) 
0.465*          
(0.185) 
0.62          
(0.386) 
0.467*         
(0.207) 
0.052***          
(0.015) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
0.041***            
(0.01) 
-0.02           
(0.057) 
-0.118           
(0.297) 
0.101          
(0.143) 
0.081          
(0.063) 
0.097          
(0.108) 
0.114         
(0.078) 
-0.007          
(0.006) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
0.02            
(0.038) 
-2.088***           
(0.584) 
-0.771           
(0.802) 
-0.545          
(1.326) 
0.403.          
(0.239) 
0.195          
(0.426) 
0.363         
(0.289) 
0.018          
(0.022) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – domain names 
0.109**            
(0.038) 
2.012***           
(0.541) 
0.609           
(0.586) 
0.68          
(1.277) 
-0.385          
(0.237) 
-0.229          
(0.402) 
-0.397         
(0.271) 
-0.107***          
(0.022) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – enforcement 
-0.018.            
(0.009) 
0.036           
(0.148) 
-0.092           
(0.289) 
-0.288          
(0.362) 
0.077          
(0.066) 
-0.019          
(0.05) 
0.085         
(0.08) 














Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – exhaustion 
0.03*            
(0.015) 
-0.011           
(0.078) 
-0.087           
(0.141) 
0.709          
(0.507) 
0.063          
(0.069) 
0.019          
(0.037) 
-0.2         
(0.168) 
-0.038***          
(0.009) 
Control Variables   
       
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.005.            
(0.003) 
-0.052           
(0.05) 
-0.036           
(0.059) 
-0.041          
(0.102) 
0.09*          
(0.037) 
0.042          
(0.053) 
0.096*         
(0.041) 
0          
(0.002) 
Classic IP leaders -0.17**            
(0.057) 
-1.158*           
(0.468) 
-0.535           
(1.085) 
-2.403**          
(0.889) 
-0.422          
(0.353) 
-0.465          
(0.544) 
-0.072         
(0.417) 
0.038          
(0.033) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.131***            
(0.036) 
-0.642           
(0.418) 
-1.52*           
(0.707) 
0.359          
(0.656) 
1.016***          
(0.298) 
-0.139          
(0.502) 
1.459***         
(0.347) 
0.099***          
(0.021) 
New IP producers and developers -0.075.            
(0.041) 
-0.346           
(0.391) 
0.909           
(0.693) 
-0.82          
(0.704) 
-0.314          
(0.308) 
0.201          
(0.379) 
-0.752*         
(0.373) 
-0.019          
(0.024) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.048***            
(0.013) 
-0.291           
(0.182) 
0.336           
(0.543) 
-0.16          
(0.261) 
-0.334**          
(0.103) 
-0.006          
(0.161) 
-0.555***         
(0.124) 
-0.032***          
(0.007) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.039*            
(0.017) 
-0.204           
(0.231) 
-0.759           
(0.676) 
-0.081          
(0.378) 
0.419**          
(0.151) 
0.041          
(0.215) 
0.617***         
(0.181) 
0.043***          
(0.01) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.022            
(0.016) 
0.047           
(0.24) 
0.551           
(0.443) 
-0.315          
(0.362) 
0.19          
(0.127) 
-0.014          
(0.134) 
0.265.         
(0.146) 
-0.017.          
(0.009) 
Intercept -0.717**     
(0.248) 
– -10.776     
(12.366) 
1.716     
(5.151) 
– 0.082     
(4.08) 
2.939     
(2.361) 





























Observations 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 
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Appendix 22 Design Regression Table 10: Path Dependency (TRIPS-plus) II 

































         
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.216          
(0.245) 
-0.211           
(0.177) 
0.014           
(0.281) 
0.001          
(0.002) 
-0.007            
(0.006) 
1.882**           
(0.58) 
1.263**           
(0.46) 
0           
(0.004) 
0           
(0.003) 
Veto Players 
         
Veto players (sum) 0.17          
(0.181) 
0.171           
(0.155) 
-0.095           
(0.291) 
-0.002          
(0.002) 
0.001            
(0.006) 
-3.869*           
(1.527) 
-3.541**           
(1.211) 
0.004           
(0.004) 
0.002           
(0.003) 
Endogeneity 
         
PTA depth – – – 0.003          
(0.002) 
-0.016*            
(0.008) 
1.859**           
(0.575) 
1.715***           
(0.488) 
– -0.015**           
(0.005) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) -1.593          
(0.988) 
-1.232.           
(0.655) 
17.09           
(1774) 
– – – – -0.013           
(0.017) 
– 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) – – – – – 0.485*           
(0.245) 
0.287           
(0.209) 
0.05***           
(0.004) 
0.033***           
(0.004) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0.853***          
(0.191) 
0.674***           
(0.156) 
0.733***           
(0.183) 
0.003          
(0.003) 
0.12***            
(0.01) 
– – – – 
Regime Preference 
         
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) -0.012          
(0.01) 
-0.01           
(0.011) 
0.009           
(0.013) 
0                 
(0) 
0.003***            
(0.001) 
0.118**           
(0.039) 
0.13**           
(0.044) 
-0.001**           
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
Path Dependency 
         
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – copyrights 
-1.218**          
(0.422) 
-0.799*           
(0.351) 
-0.916*           
(0.419) 
-0.006          
(0.005) 
-0.027.            
(0.016) 
-2.984***           
(0.868) 
-2.274**           
(0.738) 
-0.014           
(0.011) 
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Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – trademarks 
0.157          
(0.491) 
0.079           
(0.352) 
-0.366           
(0.601) 
0.007          
(0.006) 
0.007            
(0.019) 
1.038           
(0.956) 
0.077           
(0.95) 
0.039**           
(0.013) 
0.031**           
(0.011) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – geographical indications 
0.648.          
(0.36) 
0.76*           
(0.341) 
0.59.           
(0.314) 
-0.001          
(0.002) 
-0.001            
(0.008) 
-0.079           
(0.761) 
0.166           
(1.084) 
-0.005           
(0.005) 
0.001           
(0.005) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd –  industrial designs 
0.233          
(0.334) 
0.129           
(0.267) 
-0.47           
(0.456) 
0.004          
(0.005) 
0.011            
(0.018) 
0.223           
(0.683) 
0.788.           
(0.441) 
0.052***           
(0.012) 
0.027*           
(0.011) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – patents 
-0.115          
(0.18) 
-0.085           
(0.234) 
1.21*           
(0.56) 
0.001          
(0.004) 
0.012            
(0.014) 
3.527**           
(1.141) 
2.567*           
(1.25) 
0.002           
(0.01) 
-0.009           
(0.008) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – undisclosed information  
0.488**          
(0.179) 
0.328*           
(0.157) 
0.338.           
(0.182) 
0.002          
(0.002) 
0.016.            
(0.009) 
1.128**           
(0.343) 
0.794**           
(0.277) 
-0.006           
(0.006) 
-0.004           
(0.005) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
1.869**          
(0.622) 
0.761.           
(0.409) 
2.136***           
(0.595) 
-0.001          
(0.01) 
-0.006            
(0.036) 
3.1           
(2.342) 
2.623           
(2.828) 
0.203***           
(0.025) 
0.113***           
(0.021) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – new plant varieties 
-0.567          
(0.493) 
-0.576           
(0.363) 
-0.701           
(0.462) 
-0.007          
(0.006) 
0.011            
(0.02) 
0.228           
(0.964) 
0.756           
(1.148) 
-0.088***           
(0.014) 
-0.061***           
(0.012) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
-0.032          
(0.087) 
-0.006           
(0.095) 
0.018           
(0.122) 
0          
(0.002) 
-0.012            
(0.008) 
-0.075           
(0.166) 
-0.161           
(0.139) 
-0.005           
(0.005) 
-0.002           
(0.004) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
-0.825          
(0.602) 
-0.089           
(0.392) 
-1.064.           
(0.644) 
0.001          
(0.008) 
-0.006            
(0.028) 
-4.918.           
(2.626) 
-3.656           
(2.945) 
-0.007           
(0.02) 
-0.001           
(0.017) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – domain names 
1.376*          
(0.539) 
0.427           
(0.314) 
0.472           
(0.494) 
-0.006          
(0.008) 
-0.007            
(0.029) 
2.74           
(2.381) 
2.009           
(2.81) 
0.051**           
(0.02) 
0.09***           
(0.017) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – enforcement 
0.267          
(0.509) 
0.086           
(0.234) 
0.365           
(0.434) 
0.001          
(0.002) 
-0.009            
(0.007) 
-0.208           
(0.715) 
-0.107           
(0.93) 
-0.001           
(0.005) 
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Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – exhaustion 
0.031          
(0.084) 
-0.006           
(0.066) 
-0.027           
(0.083) 
0          
(0.003) 
-0.006            
(0.011) 
-0.001           
(0.145) 
0.064           
(0.121) 
0.008           
(0.008) 
0.022**           
(0.007) 
Control Variables 
         
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.072          
(0.064) 
0.009           
(0.039) 
-0.035           
(0.045) 
-0.001          
(0.001) 
-0.004.            
(0.002) 
-0.253.           
(0.149) 
-0.084           
(0.138) 
-0.003*           
(0.002) 
-0.003*           
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders 0.044          
(0.623) 
-0.192           
(0.644) 
1.456           
(0.901) 
0.036**          
(0.012) 
0.08.            
(0.043) 
-2.286           
(2.222) 
-2.475           
(2.248) 
0.007           
(0.028) 
0.083***           
(0.024) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.126          
(0.549) 
-0.345           
(0.581) 
1.51**           
(0.585) 
0.006          
(0.008) 
0.01            
(0.027) 
0.292           
(2.278) 
2.164           
(2.175) 
-0.032.           
(0.019) 
-0.061***           
(0.016) 
New IP producers and developers -0.886          
(0.572) 
-0.365           
(0.434) 
-0.862           
(0.635) 
-0.007          
(0.009) 
-0.007            
(0.031) 
-0.098           
(0.938) 
0.264           
(0.958) 
-0.095***           
(0.021) 
-0.025           
(0.018) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.493*          
(0.248) 
0.612**           
(0.237) 
-0.07           
(0.242) 
0.002          
(0.003) 
0.001            
(0.009) 
-1.327**           
(0.494) 
-1.462**           
(0.523) 
0.016*           
(0.006) 
0.012*           
(0.006) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.284          
(0.389) 
0.633.           
(0.339) 
-0.394           
(0.398) 
-0.002          
(0.004) 
0.01            
(0.013) 
-2.251*           
(0.984) 
-1.661*           
(0.645) 
-0.022*           
(0.009) 
-0.021**           
(0.007) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.061          
(0.37) 
-0.31           
(0.264) 
-0.074           
(0.346) 
0.001          
(0.003) 
0.028*            
(0.012) 
0.718           
(0.697) 
0.868           
(0.604) 
0.002           
(0.008) 
0.007           
(0.007) 
Intercept – -23.424***     
(6.835) 
-16.9     
(1774) 
-0.029     
(0.055) 
-0.299     
(0.19) 
– 26.558**     
(8.744) 
-0.212     
(0.13) 




















Observations 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 
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PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.223*           
(0.105) 




Veto players (sum) 0.132.           
(0.077) 




PTA depth 0.113           
(0.106) 
17.09           
(18510) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.496***           
(0.066) 
0.424           
(8881) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – – 
Regime Preference 
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.015**           
(0.005) 




Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – copyrights 
0.077           
(0.18) 
4.018           
(23590) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – trademarks 
0.085           
(0.263) 












Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – geographical indications 
-0.005           
(0.1) 
-11.35           
(48130) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd –  industrial designs 
0.167           
(0.204) 
34.04           
(22550) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – patents 
0.267**           
(0.1) 
-11.1           
(49910) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – undisclosed information  
-0.068           
(0.087) 
-2.32           
(9690) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
1.928***           
(0.498) 
1.371           
(41110) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – new plant varieties 
-0.388.           
(0.231) 
-17.81           
(39350) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
-0.08.           
(0.049) 
11.52           
(35350) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
-0.922.           
(0.491) 
-34.52           
(46400) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – domain names 
0.92*           
(0.427) 
14.63           
(36580) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – enforcement 
0.084           
(0.083) 
2.756           
(11670) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – exhaustion 
-0.128.           
(0.074) 














Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.069.           
(0.037) 
2.016           
(6452) 
Classic IP leaders 0.015           
(0.389) 
-5.578           
(73370) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.397           
(0.339) 
-5.417           
(61160) 
New IP producers and developers -0.759*           
(0.378) 
-14.4           
(42360) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.564***           
(0.141) 
7.21           
(21670) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.75***           
(0.183) 
-24.66           
(28980) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.273           
(0.167) 
26.05           
(25090) 






Observations 529 529 
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PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.002           
(0.004) 
0.033           
(0.066) 
-0.039           
(0.044) 
-0.001           
(0.002) 
-0.109            
(0.106) 
-0.011*             
(0.005) 
-0.002*            
(0.001) 
-0.013***            
(0.004) 
-0.684*           
(0.335) 
Veto Players   
        
Veto players (sum) 0.012***           
(0.004) 
-0.022           
(0.038) 
0.119***           
(0.032) 
0.006***           
(0.002) 
0.032            
(0.048) 
0.008.             
(0.004) 
-0.001            
(0.001) 
0.006.            
(0.003) 
0.191.           
(0.112) 
Endogeneity   
        
PTA depth – – -0.259*           
(0.119) 
-0.001           
(0.004) 
– -0.001             
(0.011) 
– -0.02**            
(0.008) 
1.095.           
(0.664) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) 0.002           
(0.026) 
0.89           
(1.331) 
– – -3.22*            
(1.346) 
– -0.007            
(0.005) 
– – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) -0.059***           
(0.014) 
0.069           
(0.153) 
0.566***           
(0.145) 
-0.003           
(0.006) 
-0.592.            
(0.326) 
-0.014             
(0.018) 
0.003            
(0.003) 
-0.025*            
(0.013) 
0.785           
(0.489) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – – – – – – – – – 
Regime Preference   
        
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) -0.005.           
(0.003) 
-0.02           
(0.021) 
0.067**           
(0.024) 
-0.004**           
(0.001) 
-0.094**            
(0.035) 
-0.011**             
(0.003) 
0            
(0.001) 
0.004            
(0.002) 
-0.101           
(0.126) 
Path Dependency   
        
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – copyrights 
0.763***           
(0.072) 
0.951           
(0.811) 
1.33**           
(0.46) 
0.023           
(0.031) 
2.212*            
(1.03) 
0.132             
(0.085) 
-0.026.            
(0.014) 
-0.004            
(0.061) 
































Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – trademarks 
-0.016           
(0.072) 
20.211           
(3086.09) 
-1.689***           
(0.485) 
-0.16***           
(0.03) 
-0.671            
(1.078) 
-0.004             
(0.084) 
0.001            
(0.014) 
-0.079            
(0.06) 
0.437           
(1.969) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – geographical indications 
0.057           
(0.045) 
0.209           
(0.376) 
4.11***           
(0.523) 
0.049*           
(0.019) 
1.715*            
(0.709) 
0.254***             
(0.054) 
0.003            
(0.009) 
0.192***            
(0.038) 
-1.047           
(1.188) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – industrial designs 
-0.141.           
(0.076) 
-0.084           
(0.476) 
1.846***           
(0.544) 
0.753***           
(0.033) 
0.648            
(0.624) 
0.472***             
(0.09) 
0.048**            
(0.015) 
-0.079            
(0.065) 
6.561.           
(3.874) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – patents  
-0.001           
(0.074) 
-0.22           
(0.454) 
-0.621           
(0.465) 
0.079*           
(0.032) 
1.026            
(0.873) 
-0.269**             
(0.087) 
-0.028*            
(0.014) 
0.05            
(0.063) 
-5.748.           
(2.938) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s  – undisclosed information  
-0.223***           
(0.062) 
0.369           
(0.427) 
-0.677.           
(0.404) 
-0.209***           
(0.026) 
0.114            
(0.564) 
0.699***             
(0.073) 
0.063***            
(0.012) 
0.085            
(0.052) 
5.045*           
(2.553) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0.838***           
(0.115) 
1.334*           
(0.664) 
-0.026           
(1.018) 
0.167***           
(0.049) 
1.831*            
(0.879) 
0.171             
(0.135) 
0.416***            
(0.022) 
0.444***            
(0.096) 
10.225*           
(4.607) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s  – new plant varieties 
-0.239**           
(0.077) 
-0.245           
(0.494) 
-1.835***           
(0.506) 
-0.007           
(0.033) 
-0.098            
(0.698) 
-0.592***             
(0.091) 
-0.052***            
(0.015) 
0.589***            
(0.065) 
1.868           
(1.51) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
-0.064           
(0.066) 
0.837.           
(0.453) 
-1.144**           
(0.44) 
-0.026           
(0.028) 
-1.652.            
(0.89) 
0.212**             
(0.077) 
0.027*            
(0.013) 
0.043            
(0.055) 
6.397**           
(2.05) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – encrypted program-carrying satel-
lite signals 
-0.395***           
(0.08) 
0.855.           
(0.448) 
-0.888           
(0.608) 
0.114***           
(0.034) 
1.351.            
(0.8) 
0.597***             
(0.094) 
0.108***            
(0.015) 
0.113.            
(0.067) 
-24.16           
(4485.467) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – domain names 
0.988***           
(0.109) 
0.622           
(0.555) 
-1.645*           
(0.826) 
-0.314***           
(0.046) 
3.423**            
(1.06) 
1.611***             
(0.128) 
-0.03            
(0.021) 
0.033            
(0.092) 
1.709           
(4.504) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pdw s 
(sum) 
0.178***           
(0.025) 
0.318.           
(0.188) 
-0.601**           
(0.226) 
0.03**           
(0.011) 
0.783*            
(0.395) 
-0.034             
(0.03) 
-0.017***            
(0.005) 
0.104***            
(0.022) 
































Index IPR multilateral coherence pdw s 
(sum) 
0.03*           
(0.014) 
0.093           
(0.12) 
-0.241*           
(0.12) 
0.019***           
(0.006) 
0.507**            
(0.181) 
0.044**             
(0.016) 
0.002            
(0.003) 
0            
(0.012) 
0.63           
(0.649) 
Control Variables   
        
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.002           
(0.002) 
-0.016           
(0.044) 
0.028           
(0.046) 
-0.001           
(0.001) 
0.078            
(0.077) 
-0.005.             
(0.003) 
0                
(0) 
-0.003.            
(0.002) 
0.014           
(0.225) 
Classic IP leaders -0.168***           
(0.044) 
-0.934*           
(0.438) 
-0.589           
(0.434) 
-0.068***           
(0.019) 
0.649            
(0.698) 
0.146**             
(0.052) 
0.016.            
(0.008) 
0.083*            
(0.037) 
0.297           
(2.892) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.001           
(0.028) 
-0.347           
(0.424) 
1.095**           
(0.42) 
0.017           
(0.012) 
-0.355            
(0.807) 
0.073*             
(0.033) 
-0.006            
(0.005) 
0.006            
(0.024) 
-0.536           
(2.382) 
New IP producers and developers -0.022           
(0.031) 
0.116           
(0.299) 
-0.639.           
(0.367) 
-0.009           
(0.013) 
0.696            
(0.572) 
0.023             
(0.037) 
0.006            
(0.006) 
-0.003            
(0.026) 
1.117           
(1.642) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.018.           
(0.01) 
-0.057           
(0.204) 
-0.294*           
(0.139) 
-0.003           
(0.004) 
0.336            
(0.275) 
0.001             
(0.012) 
0.003            
(0.002) 
0.005            
(0.008) 
0.276           
(0.569) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.01           
(0.013) 
0.144           
(0.25) 
1.004***           
(0.226) 
0.009           
(0.006) 
0.347            
(0.37) 
-0.008             
(0.016) 
-0.001            
(0.003) 
0.02.            
(0.011) 
-1.531           
(0.977) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.028*           
(0.013) 
-0.072           
(0.279) 
-0.188           
(0.153) 
-0.007           
(0.005) 
-0.307            
(0.395) 
-0.027.             
(0.014) 
0.002            
(0.002) 
0.007            
(0.01) 
-0.364           
(0.825) 
Intercept -0.321     
(0.196) 
-23.338     
(3086.095) 
– 0.062     
(0.084) 
– 0.22     
(0.232) 
-0.07.     
(0.037) 
-0.32.     
(0.166) 




















Observations 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 
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Appendix 22 Design Regression Table 13: Path Dependency (world, signature, specific) II 


















    
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0           
(0.001) 
0               
(0) 
-0.182***           
(0.055) 
1.823             
(16510) 
Veto Players 
    
Veto players (sum) 0           
(0.001) 
0               
(0) 
0.252***           
(0.035) 
-0.786             
(3856) 
Endogeneity 
    
PTA depth 0           
(0.002) 
0                
(0) 
-0.139           
(0.136) 
9.774             
(23240) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – – – – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.003           
(0.003) 
0               
(0) 
0.669***           
(0.164) 
-21.26             
(119700) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – – – – 
Regime Preference 
    
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0           
(0.001) 
0               
(0) 
0.051*           
(0.023) 
0.75             
(914.6) 
Path Dependency 
    
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – copyrights 
0.021           
(0.014) 
0*              
(0) 
1.942***           
(0.462) 
88.68             
(268900) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – trademarks 
0.01           
(0.014) 
0               
(0) 
-1.013*           
(0.508) 
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Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – geographical indications 
0.01           
(0.009) 
0               
(0) 
1.102***           
(0.334) 
4.587             
(72160) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – industrial designs 
-0.011           
(0.015) 
0***           
(0) 
1.061*           
(0.455) 
67.2             
(71380) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – patents  
-0.041**           
(0.014) 
0***           
(0) 
0.374           
(0.452) 
7.747             
(85960) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s  – undisclosed information  
0.045***           
(0.012) 
0***           
(0) 
-0.201           
(0.364) 
-24.13             
(54470) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0.007           
(0.022) 
0***           
(0) 
-1.433*           
(0.644) 
-15.14             
(34480) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s  – new plant varieties 
-0.023           
(0.015) 
0.              
(0) 
0.259           
(0.427) 
-6.242             
(76420) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
-0.02           
(0.013) 
0                
(0) 
0.123           
(0.431) 
-34.52             
(76450) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – encrypted program-carrying satel-
lite signals 
0.95***           
(0.015) 
0***           
(0) 
2.12***           
(0.48) 
6.285             
(117400) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – domain names 
0.031           
(0.021) 
1***           
(0) 
1.132.           
(0.672) 
53.92             
(278200) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pdw s 
(sum) 
0.002           
(0.005) 
0                
(0) 
-0.482*           
(0.216) 
19.84             
(140000) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pdw s 
(sum) 
-0.003           
(0.003) 
0               
(0) 
-0.169           
(0.114) 
-1.622             
(2227) 
Control Variables 
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Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0                
(0) 
0                
(0) 
-0.095*           
(0.043) 
1.329             
(23850) 
Classic IP leaders -0.006           
(0.008) 
0                
(0) 
0.694           
(0.462) 
16.47             
(47540) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.003           
(0.005) 
0                
(0) 
-0.085           
(0.415) 
-33.58             
(121000) 
New IP producers and developers -0.002           
(0.006) 
0               
(0) 
-0.361           
(0.393) 
21.21             
(86310) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.001           
(0.002) 
0                
(0) 
0.763***           
(0.153) 
-8.402             
(33250) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.002           
(0.003) 
0               
(0) 
-0.793***           
(0.214) 
-7.402             
(71170) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.003           
(0.002) 
0               
(0) 
-0.597***           
(0.181) 
11.51             
(59140) 
Intercept 0.019     
(0.038) 
0              
(0) 










Observations 529 529 529 529 
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PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.007**           
(0.003) 
0.089            
(0.083) 
-0.047           
(0.031) 
0                
(0) 
-0.228          
(0.198) 
0.001             
(0.004) 
0              
(0) 
0.005**           
(0.002) 
0.309            
(4621) 
Veto Players   
        
Veto players (sum) -0.014***           
(0.003) 
-0.03            
(0.039) 
0.067**           
(0.025) 
0                
(0) 
-0.002          
(0.048) 
-0.017***             
(0.004) 
0              
(0) 
-0.005***           
(0.002) 
-0.197            
(2136) 
Endogeneity   
        
PTA depth – 0.257            
(0.18) 
– – 0.176          
(0.238) 
– – -0.002           
(0.003) 
0.27            
(7574) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) -0.008           
(0.016) 
– 0.698           
(1.055) 
0                
(0) 
– -0.005             
(0.026) 
0              
(0) 
– – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.006           
(0.005) 
– – 0                
(0) 
0.097          
(0.145) 
0.012             
(0.009) 
0              
(0) 
– -0.093            
(3893) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – 0.161            
(0.156) 
-0.102           
(0.071) 
– – – – 0.005           
(0.006) 
– 
Regime Preference   
        
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0               
(0) 
-0.004            
(0.009) 
0.007.           
(0.004) 
0                
(0) 
-0.005          
(0.009) 
0             
(0.001) 
0              
(0) 
0                
(0) 
0.013            
(255.1) 
Path Dependency   
        
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – copyrights 
0.006           
(0.026) 
-1.795.            
(1.068) 
-0.031           
(0.643) 
0                
(0) 
-0.278          
(0.552) 
0.056             
(0.043) 
0              
(0) 
0.007           
(0.015) 
































Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – geographical indications 
0.627***           
(0.059) 
0.008            
(0.636) 
-0.069           
(0.341) 
0***                
(0) 
0.836          
(0.841) 
-0.176.             
(0.096) 
0.              
(0) 
0.128***           
(0.034) 
0.027            
(8876) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – industrial designs 
-0.028           
(0.044) 
-0.856            
(16170) 
-0.258           
(11580) 
0                
(0) 
-0.512          
(38340) 
-0.111             
(0.071) 
0              
(0) 
-0.048.           
(0.025) 
-2.18            
(61020) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – patents 
1.138***           
(0.046) 
-0.176            
(0.598) 
0.215           
(0.352) 
0***                
(0) 
-0.005          
(0.77) 
-0.046             
(0.075) 
0***              
(0) 
0.057*           
(0.027) 
0.28            
(19680) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – undisclosed information 
0.178***           
(0.049) 
24.57            
(15260) 
0.114           
(0.432) 
0***                
(0) 
0.17          
(0.818) 
0.183*             
(0.079) 
0***              
(0) 
0.07*           
(0.028) 
0.212            
(5376) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – layout-designs of integrated 
circuits 
-0.12***           
(0.034) 
0.121            
(0.385) 
24.05           
(11090) 
0***                
(0) 
-0.333          
(0.71) 
0.134*             
(0.055) 
0              
(0) 
0.007           
(0.019) 
-0.6            
(22800) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – new plant varieties 
0.023           
(0.037) 
-0.48            
(0.458) 
0.352           
(0.303) 
1***                
(0) 
-0.617          
(0.537) 
-0.463***             
(0.061) 
0**              
(0) 
-0.021           
(0.023) 
1.847            
(53320) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
0.269***           
(0.047) 
0.361            
(0.457) 
-0.055           
(0.293) 
0                
(0) 
26.87          
(35470) 
0.198*             
(0.077) 
0***              
(0) 
-0.212***           
(0.027) 
0.293            
(58960) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
0.121**           
(0.045) 
0.11            
(0.516) 
-0.136           
(0.401) 
0                
(0) 
-0.954          
(1.022) 
1.633***             
(0.074) 
0**              
(0) 
0.01           
(0.026) 
1.615            
(47280) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – domain names 
-0.535***           
(0.112) 
-0.126            
(0.946) 
-0.379           
(1.097) 
0                
(0) 
0.348          
(1.203) 
-0.013             
(0.182) 
1***              
(0) 
0.068           
(0.065) 
0.287            
(355500) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – enforcement 
-0.032           
(0.037) 
-0.028            
(0.513) 
-0.179           
(0.245) 
0                
(0) 
0.62          
(1.273) 
0.025             
(0.06) 
0              
(0) 
1.118***           
(0.022) 
0.778            
(23150) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – exhaustion 
-0.051           
(0.038) 
-0.076            
(0.386) 
-0.083           
(0.224) 
0                
(0) 
-0.123          
(0.585) 
-0.088             
(0.062) 
0              
(0) 
0.059**           
(0.022) 
29.3            
(52640) 
   
































Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.001           
(0.001) 
-0.039            
(0.041) 
0.012           
(0.042) 
0                
(0) 
0.008          
(0.05) 
-0.003             
(0.002) 
0              
(0) 
0           
(0.001) 
0.151            
(2968) 
Classic IP leaders 0.089**           
(0.028) 
-0.232            
(0.431) 
-0.291           
(0.339) 
0                
(0) 
1.404.          
(0.799) 
0.325***             
(0.045) 
0              
(0) 
0.018           
(0.016) 
-0.986            
(34410) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.007           
(0.018) 
-0.535            
(0.437) 
-0.183           
(0.357) 
0                
(0) 
0          
(0.883) 
0.082**             
(0.029) 
0              
(0) 
0           
(0.01) 
-1.93            
(24050) 
New IP producers and developers -0.011           
(0.019) 
0.298            
(0.258) 
-0.032           
(0.252) 
0                
(0) 
-0.079          
(0.338) 
0.054.             
(0.031) 
0              
(0) 
-0.004           
(0.011) 
-0.435            
(6682) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.004           
(0.006) 
0.131            
(0.181) 
0.076           
(0.129) 
0                
(0) 
0.003          
(0.314) 
-0.023*             
(0.01) 
0              
(0) 
-0.007.           
(0.004) 
0.291            
(6862) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.003           
(0.008) 
-0.258            
(0.247) 
-0.002           
(0.178) 
0                
(0) 
-0.441          
(0.372) 
-0.005             
(0.014) 
0              
(0) 
0.007           
(0.005) 
-0.678            
(6399) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.012           
(0.008) 
0.248            
(0.242) 
0.025           
(0.118) 
0                
(0) 
-0.151          
(0.347) 
0.012             
(0.013) 
0              
(0) 
0.007.           
(0.004) 
0.146            
(9137) 
Intercept 0.007     
(0.121) 
-27.62     
(5346) 
-25.98     
(3315) 
0*                 
(0) 
-21.86             
(14560) 
0.512**     
(0.197) 
0                
(0) 
0.061     
(0.07) 




















Observations 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 
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Appendix 22 Design Regression Table 15: Path Dependency (world, signature, TRIPS-plus) II 


















    
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.003           
(0.002) 
0.001          
(0.002) 
-0.119**           
(0.041) 
-1.03           
(9274) 
Veto Players 
    
Veto players (sum) -0.005*           
(0.002) 
-0.005**          
(0.002) 
0.097***           
(0.019) 
-0.168           
(8509) 
Endogeneity 
    
PTA depth -0.001           
(0.005) 
-0.007.          
(0.004) 
0.04           
(0.077) 
8.585           
(21570) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – – – – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.017***           
(0.005) 
0.02***          
(0.004) 
0.089*           
(0.043) 
-3.624           
(8444) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – – – – 
Regime Preference 
    
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) -0.001           
(0) 
0               
(0) 
0.005           
(0.004) 
0.01           
(258.3) 
Path Dependency 
    
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – copyrights 
0.034           
(0.023) 
0.018          
(0.019) 
0.403           
(0.376) 
14.14           
(71490) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – geographical indications 
-0.166**           
(0.051) 
-0.146***          
(0.043) 
-0.169           
(0.3) 
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Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – industrial designs 
0.044           
(0.038) 
0.087**          
(0.032) 
36.65           
(3166000) 
3.902           
(70720) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – patents 
-0.129**           
(0.04) 
-0.106**          
(0.034) 
-0.035           
(0.238) 
-3.943           
(102400) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – undisclosed information 
0.357***           
(0.042) 
0.093**          
(0.036) 
0.69*           
(0.304) 
-2.143           
(94760) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – layout-designs of integrated 
circuits 
0.025           
(0.029) 
-0.145***          
(0.025) 
0.142           
(0.208) 
-23.5           
(31950) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – new plant varieties 
-0.249***           
(0.032) 
-0.25***          
(0.028) 
-0.054           
(0.212) 
-2.242           
(30510) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
0.152***           
(0.041) 
0.349***          
(0.035) 
0.397.           
(0.232) 
10.15           
(46670) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
0.23***           
(0.039) 
0.086*          
(0.034) 
-0.298           
(0.277) 
22.62           
(54450) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – domain names 
0.468***           
(0.097) 
-0.399***          
(0.083) 
-0.038           
(0.521) 
20.1           
(342100) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – enforcement 
-0.009           
(0.032) 
-0.007          
(0.028) 
0.124           
(0.222) 
52.5           
(76780) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – exhaustion 
-0.241***           
(0.033) 
-0.026          
(0.028) 
-0.144           
(0.223) 
-31.52           
(37610) 
Control Variables 
    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0           
(0.001) 
0          
(0.001) 
0.016           
(0.027) 
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Classic IP leaders 0.023           
(0.024) 
0.082***          
(0.021) 
0.047           
(0.259) 
10.97           
(59390) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.014           
(0.015) 
0.004          
(0.013) 
0.055           
(0.243) 
-9.233           
(92770) 
New IP producers and developers -0.01           
(0.017) 
0.01          
(0.014) 
-0.188           
(0.191) 
-1.567           
(30140) 
ln GDP (mean) 0           
(0.005) 
-0.006          
(0.005) 
0.572***           
(0.111) 
-13.81           
(10350) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.009           
(0.007) 
-0.002          
(0.006) 
-0.69***           
(0.143) 
-0.454           
(29720) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.005           
(0.007) 
0.008          
(0.006) 
-0.197.           
(0.119) 
17           
(30730) 
Intercept 0.029     
(0.106) 
0.1     
(0.091) 
-44.37     
(3166000) 










Observations 529 529 529 529 
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PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.002            
(0.004) 
0.004             
(0.076) 
-0.041           
(0.046) 
-0.001          
(0.002) 
-0.145          
(0.129) 
-0.01*           
(0.005) 
-0.002**          
(0.001) 
-0.013***          
(0.004) 
1.247           
(4890) 
Veto Players   
        
Veto players (sum) 0.013**            
(0.004) 
-0.011             
(0.04) 
0.144***           
(0.035) 
0.006***          
(0.002) 
0.051          
(0.051) 
0.007.           
(0.004) 
-0.001          
(0.001) 
0.005          
(0.003) 
-0.033           
(1960) 
Endogeneity   
        
PTA depth -0.002            
(0.01) 
-0.133             
(0.181) 
-0.266*           
(0.121) 
-0.002          
(0.004) 
– – – -0.022**          
(0.008) 
-1.877           
(20650) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – – – – -3.748*          
(1.502) 
0.021           
(0.03) 
-0.008          
(0.006) 
– – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) -0.058***            
(0.015) 
0.101             
(0.168) 
0.647***           
(0.154) 
-0.002          
(0.006) 
-0.602.          
(0.352) 
-0.019           
(0.015) 
0.003          
(0.003) 
-0.024.          
(0.013) 
-20.64           
(13810) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – – – – – – – – – 
Regime Preference   
        
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) -0.005.            
(0.003) 
-0.019             
(0.026) 
0.06*           
(0.025) 
-0.003**          
(0.001) 
-0.122**          
(0.04) 
-0.012***           
(0.003) 
0          
(0.001) 
0.004.          
(0.003) 
4.391           
(4320) 
Path Dependency   
        
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – copyrights 
0.804***            
(0.074) 
0.863             
(0.806) 
1.385**           
(0.465) 
-0.001          
(0.031) 
2.395*          
(1.056) 
0.24**           
(0.079) 
-0.032*          
(0.014) 
0.009          
(0.064) 
































Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – trademarks 
-0.007            
(0.074) 
20.66             
(3270) 
-2.107***           
(0.526) 
-0.156***          
(0.031) 
-0.888          
(1.114) 
-0.046           
(0.079) 
0.004          
(0.014) 
-0.052          
(0.064) 
76.56           
(42260) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – geographical indications 
0.038            
(0.047) 
0.336             
(0.386) 
4.191***           
(0.532) 
0.051*          
(0.02) 
1.792*          
(0.727) 
0.28***           
(0.05) 
0.002          
(0.009) 
0.186***          
(0.041) 
11.84           
(25240) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – industrial designs 
-0.19*            
(0.079) 
-0.03             
(0.484) 
1.838**           
(0.567) 
0.781***          
(0.034) 
0.646          
(0.639) 
0.303***           
(0.084) 
0.058***          
(0.015) 
-0.069          
(0.068) 
56.61           
(95490) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – patents 
0.024            
(0.077) 
-0.272             
(0.454) 
-0.526           
(0.48) 
0.055.          
(0.032) 
1.126          
(0.935) 
-0.125           
(0.082) 
-0.037*          
(0.015) 
0.034          
(0.066) 
-99.66           
(52090) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f  – undisclosed information  
-0.268***            
(0.066) 
0.32             
(0.449) 
-0.54           
(0.422) 
-0.18***          
(0.028) 
0.398          
(0.616) 
0.521***           
(0.07) 
0.073***          
(0.013) 
0.076          
(0.057) 
-48.83           
(57900) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0.813***            
(0.116) 
1.189.             
(0.651) 
0.411           
(1.102) 
0.181***          
(0.049) 
2.152*          
(0.972) 
0.11           
(0.124) 
0.42***          
(0.023) 
0.446***          
(0.1) 
10.21           
(83800) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f  – new plant varieties 
-0.246**            
(0.08) 
-0.116             
(0.536) 
-1.867***           
(0.521) 
-0.009          
(0.034) 
0.017          
(0.772) 
-0.528***           
(0.085) 
-0.057***          
(0.015) 
0.571***          
(0.069) 
-10.92           
(50540) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
-0.096            
(0.071) 
0.951.             
(0.539) 
-1.656***           
(0.493) 
0.009          
(0.03) 
-2.14*          
(0.95) 
-0.003           
(0.076) 
0.04**          
(0.014) 
0.075          
(0.061) 
126.4           
(57480) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – encrypted program-carrying satel-
lite signals 
-0.432***            
(0.082) 
0.883.             
(0.471) 
-1.104.           
(0.653) 
0.134***          
(0.035) 
1.351          
(0.859) 
0.52***           
(0.087) 
0.112***          
(0.016) 
0.102          
(0.071) 
-64.41           
(64040) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – domain names 
0.88***            
(0.116) 
0.783             
(0.642) 
-2.68*           
(1.058) 
-0.238***          
(0.049) 
3.334**          
(1.12) 
1.203***           
(0.124) 
-0.006          
(0.023) 
0.057          
(0.1) 
146.7           
(134900) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pdw f 
(sum) 
0.186***            
(0.026) 
0.284             
(0.196) 
-0.639**           
(0.233) 
0.025*          
(0.011) 
0.851*          
(0.416) 
-0.009           
(0.027) 
-0.019***          
(0.005) 
0.099***          
(0.023) 
































Index IPR multilateral coherence pdw f 
(sum) 
0.03*            
(0.014) 
0.085             
(0.144) 
-0.196           
(0.126) 
0.017**          
(0.006) 
0.648**          
(0.207) 
0.051***           
(0.015) 
0.002          
(0.003) 
-0.003          
(0.012) 
-24.95           
(21810) 
Control Variables   
        
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.003            
(0.003) 
-0.006             
(0.046) 
0.028           
(0.051) 
-0.001          
(0.001) 
0.087          
(0.082) 
-0.005.           
(0.003) 
-0.001          
(0) 
-0.004.          
(0.002) 
-0.747           
(7248) 
Classic IP leaders -0.199***            
(0.046) 
-1.103.             
(0.59) 
-1.237*           
(0.514) 
-0.049*          
(0.019) 
0.133          
(0.851) 
0.068           
(0.049) 
0.022*          
(0.009) 
0.093*          
(0.04) 
28.66           
(76210) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.012            
(0.03) 
-0.407             
(0.516) 
1.002*           
(0.468) 
0.027*          
(0.013) 
-0.806          
(1.007) 
0.046           
(0.033) 
– 0.013          
(0.026) 
10.77           
(28580) 
New IP producers and developers -0.039            
(0.032) 
0.093             
(0.314) 
-0.947*           
(0.415) 
-0.001          
(0.014) 
0.571          
(0.611) 
-0.024           
(0.035) 
0.008          
(0.006) 
-0.011          
(0.028) 
7.179           
(17510) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.021*            
(0.01) 
-0.043             
(0.227) 
-0.296*           
(0.149) 
-0.006          
(0.004) 
0.396          
(0.295) 
0.009           
(0.011) 
0.003          
(0.002) 
0.004          
(0.009) 
-5.991           
(12540) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.014            
(0.014) 
0.219             
(0.26) 
1.123***           
(0.242) 
0.01.          
(0.006) 
0.337          
(0.378) 
-0.008           
(0.015) 
-0.001          
(0.003) 
0.025*          
(0.012) 
11.68           
(22980) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.031*            
(0.013) 
-0.213             
(0.287) 
-0.131           
(0.155) 
-0.008          
(0.005) 
-0.384          
(0.402) 
-0.027.           
(0.014) 
0.002          
(0.003) 
0.007          
(0.011) 
1.45           
(12040) 
Intercept -0.399.     
(0.209) 
-22.28     
(3270) 
– 0.113     
(0.089) 
– 0.039     
(0.221) 
-0.06     
(0.04) 
-0.306.     
(0.181) 




















Observations 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 
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Appendix 22 Design Regression Table 17: Path Dependency (world, force, specific) II 


















    
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.137           
(0.503) 
0           
(2899) 
-0.19**           
(0.058) 
1.692           
(18760) 
Veto Players 
    
Veto players (sum) 0.045           
(0.733) 
0           
(5504) 
0.246***           
(0.035) 
-1.326           
(4548) 
Endogeneity 
    
PTA depth 0.194           
(0.746) 
0           
(5953) 
-0.103           
(0.14) 
9.609           
(51240) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – – – – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) -0.058           
(0.605) 
0           
(2456) 
0.595***           
(0.165) 
-17.83           
(72350) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – – – – 
Regime Preference 
    
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.007           
(0.096) 
0           
(122.1) 
0.036           
(0.024) 
0.916           
(3164) 
Path Dependency 
    
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – copyrights 
20.4           
(15190) 
0           
(152100) 
1.874***           
(0.465) 
86.22           
(164500) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – trademarks 
18.98           
(15040) 
0           
(155100) 
-1.056*           
(0.526) 





- 305 - 









Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – geographical indications 
1.283           
(2.599) 
0           
(91180) 
1.045**           
(0.345) 
10.67           
(147600) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – industrial designs 
-0.132           
(4.016) 
0           
(121300) 
0.984*           
(0.461) 
69.4           
(182900) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – patents 
-0.498           
(3.681) 
0           
(131400) 
0.404           
(0.459) 
0.57           
(68540) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f  – undisclosed information  
-0.464           
(3.366) 
0           
(115500) 
-0.395           
(0.38) 
-25.05           
(75570) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
2.66           
(4.222) 
0           
(262100) 
-1.318*           
(0.651) 
-12.21           
(43530) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f  – new plant varieties 
-23.45           
(99880) 
0           
(130700) 
0.51           
(0.443) 
-6.623           
(69490) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
1.419           
(5.241) 
0           
(137700) 
-0.046           
(0.452) 
-31.28           
(58710) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – encrypted program-carrying satel-
lite signals 
2.543           
(2.752) 
0           
(93080) 
2.136***           
(0.483) 
3.339           
(82380) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – domain names 
2.712           
(5.463) 
27.3           
(104500) 
0.782           
(0.704) 
63.01           
(273000) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pdw f 
(sum) 
0.284           
(0.952) 
0           
(6475) 
-0.381.           
(0.218) 
14.29           
(88210) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pdw f 
(sum) 
-0.264           
(0.713) 
0           
(3456) 
-0.097           
(0.12) 
-2.05           
(7426) 
Control Variables 
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Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.022           
(0.141) 
0           
(98.11) 
-0.08.           
(0.044) 
1.477           
(33140) 
Classic IP leaders -5.758           
(8.507) 
0           
(55080) 
0.178           
(0.508) 
24.03           
(53040) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-1.204           
(2.388) 
0           
(67860) 
-0.533           
(0.458) 
-17.58           
(160200) 
New IP producers and developers 0.004           
(1.074) 
0           
(7769) 
-0.762.           
(0.435) 
24.29           
(110500) 
ln GDP (mean) 2.232           
(3.11) 
0           
(19270) 
0.832***           
(0.157) 
-10.1           
(27500) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -1.913           
(1.888) 
0           
(15500) 
-0.792***           
(0.216) 
-4.385           
(51720) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.29           
(1.227) 
0           
(1733) 
-0.536**           
(0.183) 
2.77           
(96540) 
Intercept -86.73     
(21370) 
-27.3     
(363400) 










Observations 484 484 484 484 
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PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.007*          
(0.003) 
0.087           
(0.081) 
-0.058.          
(0.032) 
0***             
(0) 
-0.191            
(0.266) 
0.001           
(0.003) 
0                
(0) 
0.005**           
(0.002) 
0.251           
(5962) 
Veto Players   
        
Veto players (sum) -0.014***          
(0.003) 
-0.025           
(0.038) 
0.108***          
(0.026) 
0                 
(0) 
-0.015            
(0.052) 
-0.01**           
(0.003) 
0               
(0) 
-0.006***           
(0.002) 
-0.179           
(6843) 
Endogeneity   
        
PTA depth – 0.236           
(0.168) 
-0.096          
(0.078) 
0.             
(0) 
0.188            
(0.285) 
-0.003           
(0.007) 
– -0.002           
(0.003) 
0.261           
(14640) 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) -0.015          
(0.018) 
– – – – – 0                
(0) 
– – 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.011*          
(0.006) 
– – – 0.12            
(0.162) 
0.01           
(0.006) 
0                 
(0) 
– -0.049           
(6589) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) – 0.165           
(0.156) 
-0.118          
(0.078) 
0                 
(0) 
– – – 0.004           
(0.006) 
– 
Regime Preference   
        
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0               
(0) 
-0.004           
(0.01) 
0.014**          
(0.004) 
0                
(0) 
-0.006            
(0.009) 
0              
(0) 
0              
(0) 
0               
(0) 
0.022           
(628.1) 
Path Dependency   
        
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – copyrights 
0.008          
(0.028) 
-1.693           
(1.081) 
-0.723          
(0.667) 
0                
(0) 
-0.257            
(0.583) 
0.035           
(0.03) 
0                
(0) 
0.007           
(0.016) 
































Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – geographical indications 
0.58***          
(0.064) 
0.024           
(0.786) 
-0.223          
(0.407) 
0***             
(0) 
0.883            
(1.186) 
-0.186**           
(0.071) 
0.                
(0) 
0.134***           
(0.037) 
-0.291           
(81730) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – industrial designs 
-0.139***          
(0.035) 
-0.704           
(16380) 
21.66          
(1230) 
0***             
(0) 
-0.828            
(38950) 
0.005           
(0.039) 
0                
(0) 
-0.039.           
(0.02) 
-1.778           
(66220) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – patents 
1.119***          
(0.052) 
-0.313           
(0.721) 
0.804*          
(0.358) 
0***             
(0) 
-0.105            
(1.272) 
-0.047           
(0.057) 
0***            
(0) 
0.057.           
(0.03) 
-0.912           
(27430) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – undisclosed information 
0.216***          
(0.053) 
24.55           
(15380) 
-1.281**          
(0.391) 
0***             
(0) 
0.077            
(1.199) 
0.097.           
(0.059) 
0***            
(0) 
0.071*           
(0.03) 
-0.102           
(38050) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – new plant varieties 
0.01          
(0.039) 
-0.511           
(0.505) 
0.464          
(0.284) 
1***             
(0) 
-0.638            
(0.612) 
-0.318***           
(0.043) 
0**            
(0) 
-0.023           
(0.023) 
2.548           
(68730) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
0.273***          
(0.05) 
0.319           
(0.468) 
0.175          
(0.293) 
0                 
(0) 
26.8            
(35830) 
0.15**           
(0.055) 
0***            
(0) 
-0.211***           
(0.028) 
1.512           
(80400) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
0.104*          
(0.047) 
0.262           
(0.517) 
0.675*          
(0.33) 
0                  
(0) 
-0.813            
(1.729) 
1.615***           
(0.053) 
0**            
(0) 
0.01           
(0.027) 
0.918           
(42020) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – domain names 
-0.555***          
(0.119) 
-0.002           
(0.92) 
0.931          
(1.117) 
0                 
(0) 
0.456            
(1.577) 
0.078           
(0.132) 
1***            
(0) 
0.069           
(0.068) 
-0.819           
(341100) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – enforcement 
-0.015          
(0.039) 
-0.018           
(0.509) 
-0.493.          
(0.256) 
0                 
(0) 
0.748            
(1.24) 
0.017           
(0.044) 
0                
(0) 
1.112***           
(0.023) 
-0.774           
(39570) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – exhaustion 
-0.022          
(0.043) 
0.021           
(0.418) 
0.136          
(0.253) 
0                 
(0) 
-0.16            
(0.641) 
-0.063           
(0.048) 
0               
(0) 
0.066**           
(0.025) 
29.01           
(61900) 
Control Variables   
        
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.001          
(0.002) 
-0.033           
(0.039) 
0.134**          
(0.044) 
0                 
(0) 
0.002            
(0.053) 
-0.002           
(0.002) 
0                
(0) 
0           
(0.001) 
































Classic IP leaders 0.086**          
(0.03) 
-0.535           
(0.645) 
-1.436***          
(0.369) 
0**             
(0) 
1.233            
(1.712) 
0.131***           
(0.033) 
0                
(0) 
0.019           
(0.017) 
-1.113           
(92570) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.008          
(0.02) 
-0.706           
(0.548) 
0.897**          
(0.33) 
0                 
(0) 
-0.415            
(1.805) 
0.015           
(0.022) 
0                
(0) 
0.001           
(0.011) 
-0.678           
(66800) 
New IP producers and developers -0.015          
(0.021) 
0.208           
(0.297) 
-0.438          
(0.279) 
0                 
(0) 
-0.082            
(0.4) 
-0.008           
(0.023) 
0                
(0) 
-0.006           
(0.012) 
-0.212           
(16510) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.001          
(0.007) 
0.155           
(0.182) 
-0.163          
(0.117) 
0                 
(0) 
0.075            
(0.304) 
-0.005           
(0.007) 
0                
(0) 
-0.007.           
(0.004) 
0.056           
(13690) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0          
(0.009) 
-0.201           
(0.227) 
0.477**          
(0.159) 
0                 
(0) 
-0.495            
(0.381) 
0           
(0.01) 
0                
(0) 
0.009.           
(0.005) 
-0.045           
(21000) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.009          
(0.009) 
0.219           
(0.259) 
0.07          
(0.108) 
0                 
(0) 
-0.172            
(0.355) 
0.007           
(0.009) 
0                
(0) 
0.008           
(0.005) 
0.099           
(9225) 
Intercept -0.063     
(0.132) 
-28.42     
(5620) 
-22.55     
(1230) 
0                 
(0) 
-23     
(15270) 
0.072     
(0.149) 
0.               
(0) 
0.065     
(0.077) 




















Observations 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 
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Appendix 22 Design Regression Table 19: Path Dependency (world, force, TRIPS-plus) II 


















    
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.002           
(0.002) 
0.001            
(0.002) 
-0.145**          
(0.046) 
-2.945           
(23860) 
Veto Players 
    
Veto players (sum) -0.004           
(0.003) 
-0.005*            
(0.002) 
0.111***          
(0.02) 
0.943           
(28880) 
Endogeneity 
    
PTA depth 0.002           
(0.005) 
-0.01*            
(0.004) 
– – 
Substantial tariff cuts (dummy) – – 0.253          
(0.731) 
-7.545           
(144200) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) – 0.025***            
(0.004) 
0.105*          
(0.044) 
-9.588           
(7519) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0.029**           
(0.009) 
– – – 
Regime Preference 
    
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0               
(0) 
0                 
(0) 
0.003          
(0.004) 
-0.011           
(819) 
Path Dependency 
    
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – copyrights 
0.037           
(0.023) 
0.021            
(0.021) 
0.622.          
(0.374) 
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Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – geographical indications 
-0.198***           
(0.055) 
-0.173***            
(0.048) 
-0.084          
(0.348) 
55.81           
(96710) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – industrial designs 
0.064*           
(0.029) 
-0.043            
(0.026) 
36.74          
(3309000) 
41.43           
(334000) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – patents 
-0.175***           
(0.044) 
-0.152***            
(0.039) 
-0.295          
(0.254) 
65.44           
(323600) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – undisclosed information 
0.389***           
(0.045) 
0.164***            
(0.04) 
0.7*          
(0.293) 
8.332           
(232900) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – new plant varieties 
-0.26***           
(0.035) 
-0.278***            
(0.029) 
-0.032          
(0.219) 
-19.71           
(131300) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
0.155***           
(0.042) 
0.349***            
(0.037) 
0.244          
(0.238) 
20.92           
(52080) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
0.23***           
(0.04) 
0.062.            
(0.036) 
-0.119          
(0.269) 
7.158           
(170700) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – domain names 
0.441***           
(0.102) 
-0.431***            
(0.089) 
0.264          
(0.584) 
104           
(489100) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – enforcement 
-0.021           
(0.034) 
0.014            
(0.03) 
0.166          
(0.217) 
43.48           
(136200) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – exhaustion 
-0.219***           
(0.037) 
-0.005            
(0.032) 
0.023          
(0.222) 
-57.78           
(120600) 
Control Variables 
    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.001           
(0.001) 
-0.001            
(0.001) 
0.034          
(0.026) 
13.15           
(54810) 
Classic IP leaders 0.002           
(0.026) 
0.084***            
(0.022) 
-0.638.          
(0.333) 
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Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.007           
(0.017) 
-0.013            
(0.015) 
-0.379          
(0.289) 
-12.48           
(83670) 
New IP producers and developers -0.01           
(0.018) 
0.008            
(0.016) 
-0.473*          
(0.21) 
26.07           
(45440) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.003           
(0.006) 
0            
(0.005) 
0.689***          
(0.112) 
-14.32           
(57580) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.009           
(0.008) 
-0.006            
(0.007) 
-0.61***          
(0.134) 
-26.95           
(148700) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.003           
(0.007) 
0.007            
(0.006) 
-0.25*          
(0.116) 
43.17           
(298700) 
Intercept -0.014     
(0.114) 
0.009     
(0.101) 
-47.57     
(3309000) 










Observations 484 484 484 484 
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Australia US AU-US 2004 2005 14 8 6 56 37 0 
Bahrain US BH-US 2004 2006 12 6 6 55 35 0 
Canada US CA-US 1988 1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canada US Automotive 
Products Trade Agreement 
(APTA) 
CA-US 1965 1966 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Central American Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 
CR-SV-GT-
HN-NI-US 
2004 2004 13 6 7 69 33 2 
Central American Free 





2004 2006 13 6 7 64 34 3 
Chile US CL-US 2003 2004 12 6 6 51 31 1 
Colombia US CO-US 2006 2012 12 6 6 66 34 1 
Colombia US environmental 
side agreement 
CO-US 2013 2013 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Israel US IL-US 1985 1985 0 0 0 40 0 0 
Jordan US JO-US 2000 2001 7 4 3 25 17 0 
Korea US KR-US 2007 2012 12 6 6 71 33 1 
Korea US environmental 
side agreement 
KR-US 2012 2012 2 2 0 2 0 0 
Laos US LA-US 2003 2005 12 7 5 31 25 0 
Morocco US MA-US 2004 2006 12 6 6 58 39 0 
North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) 
CA-MX-US 1992 1994 12 8 4 20 22 1 
Oman US OM-US 2006 2009 12 6 6 57 35 0 
Panama US PA-US 2007 2012 12 6 6 74 35 0 
Panama US environmental 
side agreement 
PA-US 2012 2012 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Peru US PE-US 2006 2009 12 6 6 74 36 1 








2016 NA 15 9 6 65 42 5 
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Australia US AU-US 2004 2005 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Bahrain US BH-US 2004 2006 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Canada US CA-US 1988 1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canada US Automotive 
Products Trade Agreement 
(APTA) 
CA-US 1965 1966 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Central American Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 
CR-SV-GT-
HN-NI-US 
2004 2004 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 
Central American Free 





2004 2006 1 1 1 0 1 0 3 
Chile US CL-US 2003 2004 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
Colombia US CO-US 2006 2012 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
Colombia US environmental 
side agreement 
CO-US 2013 2013 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Israel US IL-US 1985 1985 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jordan US JO-US 2000 2001 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Korea US KR-US 2007 2012 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
Korea US environmental 
side agreement 
KR-US 2012 2012 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Laos US LA-US 2003 2005 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
Morocco US MA-US 2004 2006 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) 
CA-MX-US 1992 1994 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Oman US OM-US 2006 2009 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Panama US PA-US 2007 2012 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Panama US environmental 
side agreement 
PA-US 2012 2012 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Peru US PE-US 2006 2009 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 








2016 NA 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 
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Australia US AU-US 2004 2005 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Bahrain US BH-US 2004 2006 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Canada US CA-US 1988 1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canada US Automotive 
Products Trade Agreement 
(APTA) 
CA-US 1965 1966 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Central American Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 
CR-SV-GT-
HN-NI-US 
2004 2004 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Central American Free 





2004 2006 0 0 0 1 1 3 
Chile US CL-US 2003 2004 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Colombia US CO-US 2006 2012 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Colombia US environmental 
side agreement 
CO-US 2013 2013 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Israel US IL-US 1985 1985 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jordan US JO-US 2000 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Korea US KR-US 2007 2012 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Korea US environmental 
side agreement 
KR-US 2012 2012 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Laos US LA-US 2003 2005 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Morocco US MA-US 2004 2006 0 0 0 1 1 0 
North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) 
CA-MX-US 1992 1994 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Oman US OM-US 2006 2009 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Panama US PA-US 2007 2012 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Panama US environmental 
side agreement 
PA-US 2012 2012 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Peru US PE-US 2006 2009 0 0 0 1 1 1 








2016 NA 0 0 1 1 1 5 
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Australia US AU-US 2004 2005 2 5 0 0 5 0 
Bahrain US BH-US 2004 2006 2 5 0 0 5 0 
Canada US CA-US 1988 1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canada US Automotive 
Products Trade Agreement 
(APTA) 
CA-US 1965 1966 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Central American Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 
CR-SV-GT-
HN-NI-US 
2004 2004 2 4 0 0 5 2 
Central American Free 





2004 2006 2 4 0 0 6 3 
Chile US CL-US 2003 2004 2 4 0 0 5 1 
Colombia US CO-US 2006 2012 2 4 0 0 6 1 
Colombia US environmental 
side agreement 
CO-US 2013 2013 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Israel US IL-US 1985 1985 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jordan US JO-US 2000 2001 1 0 0 0 3 0 
Korea US KR-US 2007 2012 2 5 0 0 4 1 
Korea US environmental 
side agreement 
KR-US 2012 2012 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Laos US LA-US 2003 2005 0 2 0 1 3 0 
Morocco US MA-US 2004 2006 2 5 0 0 6 0 
North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) 
CA-MX-US 1992 1994 0 2 1 1 3 1 
Oman US OM-US 2006 2009 2 5 0 0 4 0 
Panama US PA-US 2007 2012 2 4 0 0 6 0 
Panama US environmental 
side agreement 
PA-US 2012 2012 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Peru US PE-US 2006 2009 2 4 0 0 6 1 








2016 NA 2 4 1 0 5 5 
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Australia US AU-US 2004 2005 3 0 1 0 1 0 
Bahrain US BH-US 2004 2006 3 0 1 0 1 0 
Canada US CA-US 1988 1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canada US Automotive 
Products Trade Agreement 
(APTA) 
CA-US 1965 1966 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Central American Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 
CR-SV-GT-
HN-NI-US 
2004 2004 2 0 1 0 1 2 
Central American Free 





2004 2006 2 0 1 0 1 3 
Chile US CL-US 2003 2004 1 0 1 0 1 1 
Colombia US CO-US 2006 2012 2 0 1 0 1 1 
Colombia US environmental 
side agreement 
CO-US 2013 2013 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Israel US IL-US 1985 1985 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jordan US JO-US 2000 2001 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Korea US KR-US 2007 2012 3 0 1 0 1 1 
Korea US environmental 
side agreement 
KR-US 2012 2012 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Laos US LA-US 2003 2005 2 1 1 0 1 0 
Morocco US MA-US 2004 2006 3 0 1 0 1 0 
North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) 
CA-MX-US 1992 1994 2 1 1 0 1 1 
Oman US OM-US 2006 2009 3 0 1 0 1 0 
Panama US PA-US 2007 2012 2 0 1 0 1 0 
Panama US environmental 
side agreement 
PA-US 2012 2012 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Peru US PE-US 2006 2009 2 0 1 0 1 1 








2016 NA 6 0 1 0 1 5 
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Australia US AU-US 2004 2005 1 17 2 0 
Bahrain US BH-US 2004 2006 1 17 0 0 
Canada US CA-US 1988 1989 0 0 0 0 
Canada US Automotive 
Products Trade Agreement 
(APTA) 
CA-US 1965 1966 0 0 0 0 
Central American Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 
CR-SV-GT-
HN-NI-US 
2004 2004 1 17 0 2 
Central American Free 





2004 2006 1 17 0 3 
Chile US CL-US 2003 2004 1 16 0 1 
Colombia US CO-US 2006 2012 1 17 0 1 
Colombia US environmental 
side agreement 
CO-US 2013 2013 0 0 0 1 
Israel US IL-US 1985 1985 0 0 0 0 
Jordan US JO-US 2000 2001 0 11 0 0 
Korea US KR-US 2007 2012 1 16 0 1 
Korea US environmental 
side agreement 
KR-US 2012 2012 0 0 0 0 
Laos US LA-US 2003 2005 0 14 0 0 
Morocco US MA-US 2004 2006 1 20 0 0 
North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) 
CA-MX-US 1992 1994 0 10 0 1 
Oman US OM-US 2006 2009 1 18 0 0 
Panama US PA-US 2007 2012 1 18 0 0 
Panama US environmental 
side agreement 
PA-US 2012 2012 0 0 0 0 
Peru US PE-US 2006 2009 1 19 0 1 








2016 NA 1 21 0 5 
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Appendix 29: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific (sum)  Path Dependency (general) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.121**     
(0.041) 
-0.038     
(0.036) 
-0.2**     
(0.062) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) 0.015     
(0.058) 
0.025     
(0.076) 
0.032     
(0.068) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.354***     
(0.063) 
0.037     
(0.04) 
0.48***     
(0.094) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.021***     
(0.003) 
0.012***     
(0.002) 
0.026***     
(0.006) 
Path Dependency   
  
Index IPR general pd (sum) -0.012     
(0.016) 
0.006     
(0.009) 
0.011     
(0.024) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – copyrights 
-0.222     
(0.313) 
0.057     
(0.198) 
-0.477     
(0.41) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – trademarks 
-0.035     
(0.438) 
-0.991**     
(0.341) 
0.49     
(0.506) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – geographical indications 
0.582**     
(0.222) 
0.02     
(0.102) 
0.853*     
(0.367) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – industrial designs 
1.148*     
(0.5) 
-0.462     
(0.34) 
2.374***     
(0.664) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – patents 
-1.206*     
(0.505) 
1.125**     
(0.353) 
-2.942***     
(0.739) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – undisclosed information 
0.262     
(0.306) 
0.382*     
(0.192) 
-0.078     
(0.404) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
-0.414*     
(0.169) 
-0.07     
(0.099) 
-0.196     
(0.274) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – new plant varieties 
-0.003     
(0.049) 
-0.015     
(0.038) 
-0.051     
(0.071) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
0.065*     
(0.029) 
0.069**     
(0.025) 
-0.022     
(0.06) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – encrypted program-carrying sat-
ellite signals 
-0.13*     
(0.06) 
0.026     
(0.039) 
-0.157.     
(0.083) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
0.105     
(0.113) 
-0.073     
(0.048) 
0.006     
(0.222) 
Index IPR general enforcement pd (sum) 0.033     
(0.027) 
-0.008     
(0.016) 
0.081*     
(0.041) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pl 
(dummy sum) 
-0.003     
(0.004) 
-0.006     
(0.004) 
-0.008     
(0.006) 
Control Variables   
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.006     
(0.025) 
-0.011     
(0.015) 
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Classic IP leaders 1.243***     
(0.261) 
0.523***     
(0.119) 
0.657     
(0.417) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.347     
(0.222) 
-0.095     
(0.114) 
0.53     
(0.329) 
New IP producers and developers -0.15     
(0.219) 
0.113     
(0.11) 
-0.53     
(0.347) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.072     
(0.079) 
0.096*     
(0.04) 
-0.06     
(0.124) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.111     
(0.12) 
-0.171*     
(0.075) 
0.354.     
(0.186) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.284**     
(0.105) 
-0.039     
(0.06) 
0.469***     
(0.14) 
Intercept – 0.361     
(1.127) 
-8.338**     
(2.567) 






Observations 529 529 529 
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Appendix 30: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific (sum)  Path Dependency (specific) 









    
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.072.     
(0.04) 
-0.061.     
(0.037) 
-0.04     
(0.024) 
0.186*     
(0.076) 
Veto Players   
   
Veto players (sum) 0.014     
(0.054) 
-0.082     
(0.06) 
0.04     
(0.036) 
0.014     
(0.077) 
Endogeneity   
   
PTA depth 0.344***     
(0.065) 
0.359***     
(0.061) 
0.033     
(0.037) 
-0.467***     
(0.087) 
Regime Preference   
   
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.025***     
(0.003) 
0.021***     
(0.003) 
0.011***     
(0.002) 
-0.022***     
(0.005) 
Path Dependency   
   
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – copyrights 
0.158     
(0.153) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – trademarks 
-0.26     
(0.195) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – geographical indications 
0.296***     
(0.079) 
0.059.     
(0.036) 
-0.025     
(0.021) 
-0.112.     
(0.064) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – industrial designs 
0.251     
(0.202) 
-0.081.     
(0.044) 
-0.015     
(0.021) 
0.08     
(0.055) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – patents 
-0.041     
(0.24) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – undisclosed information 
-0.108*     
(0.053) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – layout-designs of integrated circuits 
0.005     
(0.058) 
-0.053     
(0.046) 
-0.002     
(0.017) 
0.293*     
(0.121) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – new plant varieties 
-0.174     
(0.137) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – traditional knowledge & genetic re-
sources 
-0.019     
(0.068) 
0.044     
(0.029) 
0.044***     
(0.013) 
0.24*     
(0.094) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – encrypted program-carrying satellite 
signals 
0.078     
(0.213) 
0.368*     
(0.147) 
0.1     
(0.071) 
0.037     
(0.223) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – domain names 
-0.141     
(0.205) 
-0.337.     
(0.174) 
-0.099     
(0.085) 
0.389     
(0.277) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pd (sum) 0.037*     
(0.017) 
0.014     
(0.011) 
-0.003     
(0.005) 
-0.086**     
(0.027) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pd (sum) -0.013**     
(0.005) 
– – – 
Control Variables   
   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.006     
(0.024) 
0.004     
(0.023) 
-0.003     
(0.014) 
-0.02     
(0.031) 
Classic IP leaders 1.269***     
(0.273) 
1.431***     
(0.259) 
0.506***     
(0.13) 
-0.667     
(0.421) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.284     
(0.229) 
0.269     
(0.229) 
-0.151     
(0.119) 
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New IP producers and developers -0.178     
(0.213) 
-0.161     
(0.208) 
0.045     
(0.11) 
0.321     
(0.296) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.053     
(0.082) 
0.017     
(0.078) 
0.078.     
(0.04) 
0.036     
(0.113) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.018     
(0.117) 
0.052     
(0.112) 
-0.169*     
(0.07) 
-0.182     
(0.161) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.29**     
(0.103) 
0.284**     
(0.1) 
-0.042     
(0.056) 
-0.456***     
(0.128) 
Intercept – – 0.891     
(1.096) 













Observations 529 529 529 529 
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Appendix 31: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific (sum)  Path Dependency (TRIPS-
plus) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.09*     
(0.039) 
-0.031     
(0.029) 
0.256**     
(0.082) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) -0.013     
(0.051) 
0.029     
(0.04) 
-0.024     
(0.067) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.366***     
(0.064) 
0.005     
(0.039) 
-0.543***     
(0.098) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.02***     
(0.003) 
0.013***     
(0.002) 
-0.022***     
(0.005) 
Path Dependency   
  
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – copyrights 
0.053     
(0.105) 
-0.152*     
(0.065) 
-0.523*     
(0.227) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – trademarks 
-0.075     
(0.127) 
-0.039     
(0.071) 
-0.07     
(0.224) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – geographical indications 
0.059     
(0.058) 
-0.035     
(0.052) 
0.03     
(0.071) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd –  industrial designs 
-0.057     
(0.128) 
-0.063     
(0.065) 
-0.176     
(0.195) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – patents 
-0.035     
(0.078) 
0.143***     
(0.035) 
0.611**     
(0.218) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – undisclosed information  
-0.001     
(0.052) 
0.062*     
(0.03) 
0.047     
(0.183) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0.39     
(0.254) 
0.243.     
(0.129) 
-0.104     
(0.439) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – new plant varieties 
0.125     
(0.133) 
0.147.     
(0.082) 
-0.207     
(0.194) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
0.051     
(0.041) 
0.007     
(0.015) 
-0.02     
(0.086) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
0.18     
(0.215) 
-0.013     
(0.127) 
-0.071     
(0.383) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – domain names 
-0.16     
(0.201) 
-0.057     
(0.113) 
0.218     
(0.313) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – enforcement 
-0.038     
(0.053) 
-0.075*     
(0.036) 
-0.057     
(0.063) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – exhaustion 
-0.037     
(0.061) 
-0.008     
(0.019) 
0.265     
(0.233) 
Control Variables   
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.004     
(0.024) 
0.004     
(0.014) 
-0.005     
(0.033) 
Classic IP leaders 1.213***     
(0.27) 
0.45**     
(0.141) 
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Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.23     
(0.227) 
-0.11     
(0.118) 
-0.742*     
(0.323) 
New IP producers and developers -0.144     
(0.211) 
0.065     
(0.115) 
0.252     
(0.309) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.01     
(0.081) 
0.038     
(0.045) 
0.129     
(0.121) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.068     
(0.115) 
-0.142*     
(0.07) 
-0.255     
(0.173) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.295**     
(0.101) 
-0.067     
(0.059) 
-0.444***     
(0.134) 
Intercept – 1.88     
(1.24) 













Observations 529 529 529 
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Appendix 32: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific (sum)  Path Dependency (world, 
signature, specific) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0                 (0) -0.015     
(0.022) 
-0.013     
(1618) 
Veto Players 
   
Veto players (sum) 0                  
(0) 
-0.012     
(0.011) 
0.004     
(1680) 
Endogeneity 
   
PTA depth 0                 (0) -0.041     
(0.046) 
0.1           
(2577) 
Regime Preference 
   
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0                    
(0) 
-0.006     
(0.007) 
-0.011     
(1130) 
Path Dependency 
   
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangi-
ble pdw s – copyrights 
1               
(0)*** 
0.181     
(0.155) 
12.81     
(17940) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangi-
ble pdw s – trademarks 
1                
(0)*** 
0.362     
(0.175)* 
-0.705     
(32420) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangi-
ble pdw s – geographical indications 
1              
(0)*** 
0.092     
(0.111) 
13.58     
(24620) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangi-
ble pdw s – industrial designs 
1               
(0)*** 
0.04     
(0.139) 
-26.2     
(54690) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangi-
ble pdw s – patents  
1                
(0)*** 
0.146     
(0.139) 
13.6     
(40890) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangi-
ble pdw s  – undisclosed information  
1             
(0)*** 
0.112     
(0.113) 
0.646     
(38780) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangi-
ble pdw s – layout-designs of integrated 
circuits 
1           (0)*** 0.221     
(0.191) 
1.078     
(611400) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangi-
ble pdw s  – new plant varieties 
1            
(0)*** 
0.253     
(0.128)* 
-38.77     
(498700) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangi-
ble pdw s – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
1            
(0)*** 
0.23     
(0.149) 
-0.206     
(493900) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangi-
ble pdw s – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
1            
(0)*** 
0.258     
(0.144). 
-39.67     
(616000) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangi-
ble pdw s – domain names 
1           (0)*** -0.243     
(0.211) 
-38.61     
(454300) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pdw s 
(sum) 
1           (0)*** 0.212     
(0.04)*** 
13.05     
(6022) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pdw s 
(sum) 
0                  
(0) 
0.04     
(0.036) 
0.056     
(5205) 
Control Variables 
   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0                     
(0) 
0.011     
(0.016) 
-0.005     
(683.7) 
Classic IP leaders 0                     
(0) 
0.099     
(0.143) 
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Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0                  
(0) 
0.007     
(0.134) 
0.126     
(10270) 
New IP producers and developers 0                      
(0) 
0.02     
(0.114) 
-0.074     
(9437) 
ln GDP (mean) 0                  
(0) 
-0.054     
(0.051) 
-0.038     
(2572) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0                    
(0) 
0.003     
(0.072) 
0.052     
(4296) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0                   
(0) 
-0.059     
(0.064) 
0.005     
(4007) 
Intercept – 2.217     
(1.287). 
-6.612     
(58570) 






Observations 529 529 529 
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Appendix 33: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific (sum)  Path Dependency (world, 
force, specific) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0              
(0) 
-0.012     
(0.022) 
-0.007     
(1875) 
Veto Players 
   
Veto players (sum) 0              
(0) 
-0.011     
(0.011) 
0.003     
(1991) 
Endogeneity 
   
PTA depth 0                
(0) 
-0.042     
(0.047) 
0.095     
(2974) 
Regime Preference 
   
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0*             
(0) 
-0.005     
(0.008) 
-0.012     
(1221) 
Path Dependency 
   
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – copyrights 
1***        
(0) 
0.198     
(0.156) 
12.89     
(20970) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – trademarks 
1***         
(0) 
0.359*     
(0.178) 
-0.623     
(30950) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – geographical indications 
1***         
(0) 
0.091     
(0.114) 
13.52     
(20500) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – industrial designs 
1***         
(0) 
0.041     
(0.139) 
-26.42     
(62860) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – patents 
1***         
(0) 
0.136     
(0.139) 
13.74     
(44600) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f  – undisclosed information  
1***        
(0) 
0.139     
(0.117) 
0.446     
(34210) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
1***         
(0) 
0.192     
(0.195) 
0.238     
(1605000) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f  – new plant varieties 
1***        
(0) 
0.224.     
(0.133) 
-27.07     
(2178000) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
1***        
(0) 
0.224     
(0.156) 
-11.82     
(2155000) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – encrypted program-carrying satel-
lite signals 
1***        
(0) 
0.258.     
(0.145) 
-38.78     
(1588000) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – domain names 
1***        
(0) 
-0.203     
(0.227) 
-39.49     
(490400) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pdw f 
(sum) 
1***         
(0) 
0.213***     
(0.04) 
13.15     
(7228) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pdw f 
(sum) 
0*            
(0) 
0.035     
(0.04) 
0.062     
(5646) 
Control Variables 
   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0              
(0) 
0.008     
(0.016) 
-0.006     
(823.4) 
Classic IP leaders 0              
(0) 
0.154     
(0.171) 





- 328 - 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0              
(0) 
0.059     
(0.155) 
0.088     
(12320) 
New IP producers and developers 0              
(0) 
0.059     
(0.124) 
-0.077     
(11260) 
ln GDP (mean) 0              
(0) 
-0.065     
(0.052) 
-0.035     
(3047) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0              
(0) 
0.007     
(0.073) 
0.051     
(5135) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0              
(0) 
-0.054     
(0.066) 
0.011     
(4679) 
Intercept – 2.393.     
(1.316) 













Observations 484 484 484 
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Appendix 34: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific (sum)  Path Dependency (world, 
force, TRIPS-plus) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.03     
(0.031) 
-0.02     
(0.019) 
-0.038     
(0.071) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) -0.059.     
(0.033) 
-0.012     
(0.012) 
-0.009     
(0.081) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.295***     
(0.073) 
0.042     
(0.041) 
0.413***     
(0.121) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.003     
(0.005) 
0.001     
(0.002) 
0.002     
(0.011) 
Path Dependency   
  
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – copyrights 
-0.685     
(0.716) 
0.027     
(0.239) 
-4.144     
(704) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – geographical indications 
0.645     
(0.553) 
0.022     
(0.215) 
0.971     
(6863) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – industrial designs 
2.386***     
(0.304) 
1.295***     
(0.333) 
8.011     
(1194) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – patents 
0.738.     
(0.405) 
0.161     
(0.153) 
0.529     
(6581) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – undisclosed information 
1.286**     
(0.421) 
0.553***     
(0.152) 
-0.542     
(2624) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – new plant varieties 
1.305***     
(0.341) 
0.335**     
(0.124) 
0.516     
(1495) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
0.195     
(0.392) 
0.007     
(0.147) 
1.838     
(3199) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
0.67.     
(0.379) 
-0.116     
(0.138) 
0.287     
(7823) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – domain names 
-0.249     
(0.912) 
-0.233     
(0.286) 
-2.023     
(6686) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – enforcement 
0.247     
(0.308) 
0.094     
(0.127) 
-0.451     
(2302) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – exhaustion 
0.339     
(0.352) 
0.109     
(0.132) 
-1.187     
(2428) 
Control Variables   
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.016     
(0.027) 
0.01     
(0.016) 
0.021     
(0.039) 
Classic IP leaders 1.071***     
(0.318) 
0.503**     
(0.163) 
0.03     
(0.664) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.126     
(0.291) 
-0.024     
(0.151) 
0.459     
(0.398) 
New IP producers and developers -0.043     
(0.235) 
0.051     
(0.114) 
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ln GDP (mean) 0.146     
(0.1) 
0.059     
(0.052) 
-0.183     
(0.165) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.142     
(0.137) 
-0.125.     
(0.067) 
0.254     
(0.25) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.348**     
(0.123) 
0.017     
(0.064) 
0.489*     
(0.209) 
Intercept – -0.895     
(1.436) 













Observations 484 484 484 
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Appendix 35: Design Regression – Index IPR Scope Tangible (sum)  Economic Power 
Asymmetry 






Economic Power Asymmetry 
   
GDP asymmetry (max/sum) 4.067     
(8.808) 
-26.232     
(90.189) 
7.531     
(15.515) 
GDPpc asymmetry (max/sum) -4.122     
(10.555) 
32.396     
(91.02) 
-11.118     
(16.865) 
GDP asymmetry * substantial tariff cuts 2.156     
(2.079) 
26.668     
(89.647) 
-1.34     
(2.976) 
GDPpc asymmetry * substantial tariff cuts -3.16     
(2.361) 
-28.361     
(90.337) 
1.392     
(3.966) 
GDP asymmetry * ln FDI -0.129     
(0.249) 
-0.107     
(0.384) 
0.231     
(0.521) 
GDPpc asymmetry * ln FDI 0.08     
(0.287) 
-0.023     
(0.425) 
-0.251     
(0.537) 
GDP asymmetry * lnofficial development 
assistance and official aid received 
-0.072     
(0.376) 
0.045     
(0.328) 
-0.463     
(0.642) 
GDPpc asymmetry * lnofficial develop-
ment assistance and official aid received 
0.198     
(0.469) 
-0.165     
(0.418) 
0.692     
(0.784) 
GDP asymmetry * (DAC aid received by 
PTA members/ DAC aid received) 
0.552     
(6.044) 
6.042     
(6.249) 
-0.697     
(23.137) 
GDPpc asymmetry * (DAC aid received by 
PTA members/ DAC aid received) 
-3.716     
(8.14) 
-6.842     
(7.326) 
-6.35     
(36.382) 
Political Pressure 
   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.076.     
(0.039) 
0.071*     
(0.028) 
0.072     
(0.074) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) -0.022     
(0.038) 
-0.085*     
(0.041) 
0.002     
(0.1) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.497***     
(0.093) 
0.256**     
(0.08) 
0.491**     
(0.19) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0.69***     
(0.087) 
0.311***     
(0.062) 
1.184***     
(0.275) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.009.     
(0.005) 
0.004     
(0.005) 
0.03**     
(0.011) 
Control Variables 
   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.009     
(0.035) 
-0.056     
(0.036) 
0.062     
(0.082) 
Classic IP leaders 0.479     
(0.388) 
0.184     
(0.364) 
0.599     
(0.788) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.568.     
(0.308) 
0.277     
(0.384) 
0.024     
(0.631) 
New IP producers and developers -0.8*     
(0.34) 
-0.24     
(0.302) 
-0.972     
(0.609) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.289.     
(0.16) 
0.075     
(0.182) 
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ln GDPpc (mean) 0.354.     
(0.204) 
-0.153     
(0.263) 
0.637     
(0.468) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.685***     
(0.185) 
-0.213     
(0.177) 
1.951***     
(0.55) 
Intercept – 0.955     
(6.076) 
-6.317     
(6.722) 






Observations 392 392 392 
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Appendix 36: Design Regression – Index IPR Scope Tangible (sum)  Path Dependency 
(general) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.03     
(0.049) 
0.044     
(0.054) 
-0.051     
(0.1) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) -0.09     
(0.089) 
0.009     
(0.146) 
-0.079     
(0.166) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.394***     
(0.073) 
0.165*     
(0.07) 
0.163     
(0.127) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0.689***     
(0.072) 
0.245***     
(0.053) 
0.88***     
(0.145) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.004     
(0.004) 
0.003     
(0.004) 
0.021*     
(0.008) 
Path Dependency   
  
Index IPR general pd (sum) 0.017     
(0.017) 
0.006     
(0.013) 
0.057     
(0.036) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – copyrights 
0.064     
(0.328) 
-0.033     
(0.277) 
0.157     
(0.552) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – trademarks 
-0.284     
(0.507) 
-0.781     
(0.525) 
-0.409     
(0.852) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – geographical indications 
0.094     
(0.222) 
-0.086     
(0.135) 
0.758     
(0.534) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – industrial designs 
0.48     
(0.555) 
-0.157     
(0.49) 
2.237*     
(0.933) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – patents 
-0.58     
(0.584) 
0.672     
(0.594) 
-2.374*     
(0.951) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – undisclosed information 
0.082     
(0.344) 
0.323     
(0.311) 
-0.312     
(0.588) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0.164     
(0.186) 
0.077     
(0.14) 
-0.228     
(0.354) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – new plant varieties 
0.03     
(0.053) 
0.032     
(0.064) 
0.08     
(0.096) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
-0.046     
(0.033) 
0.046     
(0.067) 
-0.154.     
(0.092) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – encrypted program-carrying sat-
ellite signals 
-0.064     
(0.064) 
0.013     
(0.064) 
-0.027     
(0.128) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
0.075     
(0.121) 
-0.048     
(0.072) 
0.547.     
(0.281) 
Index IPR general enforcement pd (sum) 0.002     
(0.029) 
0       
(0.023) 
-0.008     
(0.056) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pl 
(dummy sum) 
-0.001     
(0.004) 
-0.006     
(0.009) 
-0.002     
(0.008) 
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Control Variables 
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.006     
(0.028) 
-0.033     
(0.023) 
0.046     
(0.06) 
Classic IP leaders 0.309     
(0.294) 
0.203     
(0.182) 
-0.029     
(0.633) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.25     
(0.251) 
-0.049     
(0.169) 
-0.49     
(0.548) 
New IP producers and developers -0.478.     
(0.246) 
-0.154     
(0.174) 
-0.585     
(0.422) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.076     
(0.088) 
0.004     
(0.067) 
0.064     
(0.222) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.128     
(0.131) 
-0.283*     
(0.112) 
0.27     
(0.304) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.323**     
(0.116) 
-0.014     
(0.097) 
0.516**     
(0.181) 
Intercept – 2.252     
(1.851) 
-11.345*     
(4.942) 






Observations 529 529 529 
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Appendix 37: Design Regression – Index IPR Scope Tangible (sum)  Path Dependency 
(specific) 









    
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.103.     
(0.053) 
0.107*     
(0.051) 
0.062     
(0.084) 
0.013     
(0.09) 
Veto Players   
   
Veto players (sum) -0.122     
(0.097) 
-0.134     
(0.095) 
-0.04     
(0.205) 
-0.123     
(0.157) 
Endogeneity   
   
PTA depth 0.391***     
(0.075) 
0.39***     
(0.071) 
0.174**     
(0.066) 
0.167     
(0.118) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0.687***     
(0.074) 
0.695***     
(0.073) 
0.269***     
(0.08) 
0.87***     
(0.15) 
Regime Preference   
   
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.005     
(0.004) 
0.004     
(0.004) 
0       
(0.004) 
0.022**     
(0.008) 
Path Dependency   
   
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – copyrights 
0.018     
(0.166) 
-0.158.     
(0.086) 
-0.058     
(0.053) 
-0.277     
(0.306) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – trademarks 
-0.414.     
(0.227) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – geographical indications 
0.152.     
(0.083) 
0.062     
(0.055) 
-0.01     
(0.086) 
0.177     
(0.108) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – industrial designs 
-0.176     
(0.224) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – patents 
0.369     
(0.268) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – undisclosed information 
-0.088.     
(0.051) 
-0.088.     
(0.048) 
-0.014     
(0.032) 
-0.024     
(0.062) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – layout-designs of integrated circuits 
0.087     
(0.06) 
0.083     
(0.057) 
0.028     
(0.026) 
-0.132     
(0.249) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – new plant varieties 
0.058     
(0.152) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – traditional knowledge & genetic re-
sources 
-0.052     
(0.073) 
0.011     
(0.039) 
0.026     
(0.025) 
-0.061     
(0.148) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – encrypted program-carrying satellite 
signals 
0.407.     
(0.226) 
0.318.     
(0.166) 
0.03     
(0.118) 
0.063     
(0.303) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – domain names 
-0.345     
(0.219) 
-0.231     
(0.192) 
-0.028     
(0.146) 
0.019     
(0.317) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pd (sum) 0.01     
(0.018) 
0.011     
(0.017) 
-0.006     
(0.014) 
0.153**     
(0.057) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pd (sum) 0.002     
(0.005) 
0.003     
(0.005) 
0.003     
(0.011) 
-0.02.     
(0.011) 
Control Variables   
   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.005     
(0.026) 
-0.006     
(0.026) 
-0.035     
(0.022) 
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Classic IP leaders 0.455     
(0.303) 
0.525.     
(0.298) 
0.225     
(0.197) 
0.475     
(0.631) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.216     
(0.255) 
0.276     
(0.252) 
0.044     
(0.173) 
-0.164     
(0.512) 
New IP producers and developers -0.448.     
(0.253) 
-0.454.     
(0.246) 
-0.084     
(0.174) 
-0.466     
(0.382) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.139     
(0.089) 
-0.176*     
(0.086) 
-0.049     
(0.073) 
-0.154     
(0.179) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.042     
(0.128) 
0.012     
(0.123) 
-0.185.     
(0.099) 
0.251     
(0.261) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.345**     
(0.116) 
0.336**     
(0.113) 
-0.031     
(0.089) 
0.647***     
(0.181) 
Intercept – – 2.943     
(2.106) 













Observations 529 529 529 529 
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Appendix 38: Design Regression – Index IPR Scope Tangible (sum)  Path Dependency 
(TRIPS-plus) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.069     
(0.046) 
0.071     
(0.046) 
0.032     
(0.078) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) -0.075     
(0.07) 
0.033     
(0.057) 
-0.257     
(0.225) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.397***     
(0.074) 
0.144*     
(0.065) 
0.257*     
(0.127) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0.685***     
(0.071) 
0.219***     
(0.047) 
0.942***     
(0.153) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.006     
(0.004) 
0.005     
(0.004) 
0.017*     
(0.007) 
Path Dependency   
  
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – copyrights 
-0.225.     
(0.118) 
-0.193.     
(0.1) 
0.032     
(0.265) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – trademarks 
-0.092     
(0.145) 
0.12     
(0.111) 
-0.135     
(0.296) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – geographical indications 
0.022     
(0.061) 
-0.037     
(0.08) 
-0.072     
(0.076) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd –  industrial designs 
0.002     
(0.147) 
-0.166     
(0.103) 
0.489.     
(0.26) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – patents 
0.13     
(0.085) 
0.165*     
(0.07) 
-0.182     
(0.176) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – undisclosed information  
0.04     
(0.057) 
0.075     
(0.046) 
-0.025     
(0.143) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0.297     
(0.282) 
0.382*     
(0.192) 
-0.66     
(0.518) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – new plant varieties 
0.179     
(0.149) 
0.064     
(0.123) 
-0.03     
(0.286) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
-0.033     
(0.044) 
0       
(0.022) 
0.04     
(0.11) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
0.06     
(0.245) 
-0.274     
(0.185) 
0.72.     
(0.399) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – domain names 
-0.06     
(0.222) 
0.116     
(0.161) 
-0.185     
(0.385) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – enforcement 
-0.009     
(0.056) 
-0.062     
(0.068) 
0.113     
(0.088) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – exhaustion 
-0.001     
(0.064) 
-0.015     
(0.029) 
-0.092     
(0.234) 
Control Variables   
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0        
(0.026) 
-0.037.     
(0.021) 





- 338 - 
Classic IP leaders 0.298     
(0.303) 
0.25     
(0.211) 
0.6     
(0.629) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.253     
(0.252) 
0.078     
(0.171) 
-0.162     
(0.512) 
New IP producers and developers -0.575*     
(0.251) 
-0.021     
(0.184) 
-0.542     
(0.416) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.163.     
(0.091) 
-0.075     
(0.073) 
-0.182     
(0.189) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.034     
(0.128) 
-0.161     
(0.102) 
0.302     
(0.271) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.355**     
(0.116) 
-0.09     
(0.094) 
0.646***     
(0.182) 
Intercept – 3.941*     
(1.894) 













Observations 529 529 529 
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Appendix 39: Design Regression – Index IPR Scope Tangible (sum)  Path Dependency 
(world, signature, specific) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0               
(0) 
-0.006     
(0.03) 
0.007     
(2330) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) 0               
(0) 
-0.009     
(0.015) 
-0.027     
(2911) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0               
(0) 
-0.016     
(0.078) 
0.009     
(4129) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0               
(0) 
0.055     
(0.074) 
0.049     
(6765) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0*            
(0) 
-0.002     
(0.011) 
0.005     
(1596) 
Path Dependency   
  
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – copyrights 
1***        
(0) 
0.345     
(0.256) 
13.39     
(34210) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – trademarks 
1***        
(0) 
0.576.     
(0.296) 
11.87     
(69480) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – geographical indications 
1***        
(0) 
0.217     
(0.181) 
13.5     
(15130) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – industrial designs 
1***        
(0) 
0.084     
(0.202) 
12.7     
(36190) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – patents  
1***        
(0) 
0.396.     
(0.217) 
0.996     
(63230) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s  – undisclosed information  
1***        
(0) 
0.31.     
(0.178) 
-0.117     
(36810) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
1***         
(0) 
0.284     
(0.266) 
0.082     
(181100) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s  – new plant varieties 
1***        
(0) 
0.396*     
(0.189) 
-13.23     
(152500) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
1***         
(0) 
0.299     
(0.226) 
0.043     
(41590) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – encrypted program-carrying satel-
lite signals 
1***         
(0) 
0.424.     
(0.221) 
-12.32     
(87720) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – domain names 
1***        
(0) 
-0.183     
(0.317) 
-13.48     
(139900) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pdw s 
(sum) 
0               
(0) 
-0.001     
(0.097) 
0.056     
(11160) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pdw s 
(sum) 
0*            
(0) 
0.026     
(0.057) 
-0.011     
(7542) 
Control Variables   
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0              
(0) 
0.004     
(0.025) 
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Classic IP leaders 0              
(0) 
0.048     
(0.215) 
0.273     
(20600) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0               
(0) 
-0.155     
(0.204) 
0.142     
(15920) 
New IP producers and developers 0               
(0) 
0.044     
(0.18) 
-0.04     
(14590) 
ln GDP (mean) 0               
(0) 
-0.036     
(0.08) 
-0.065     
(5458) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0               
(0) 
-0.022     
(0.109) 
0.078     
(8687) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0               
(0) 
-0.096     
(0.099) 
0.058     
(6944) 
Intercept 0.             
(0) 
1.249     
(2.027) 













Observations 529 529 529 
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Appendix 40: Design Regression – Index IPR Scope Tangible (sum)  Path Dependency 
(world, signature, TRIPS-plus) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.099**     
(0.037) 
0.05.     
(0.026) 
0.609     
(0.559) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) -0.083*     
(0.034) 
-0.034*     
(0.017) 
-0.674     
(0.779) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.283**     
(0.092) 
0.128.     
(0.066) 
0.317     
(0.302) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0.316***     
(0.096) 
0.146**     
(0.056) 
0.135     
(0.35) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) -0.007     
(0.006) 
-0.003     
(0.004) 
0.013     
(0.022) 
Path Dependency   
  
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – copyrights 
-0.276     
(0.811) 
0.108     
(0.342) 
-2.908     
(3189) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – geographical indications 
0.156     
(0.548) 
-0.138     
(0.258) 
3.439     
(7043) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – industrial designs 
2.752***     
(0.458) 
0.701     
(0.73) 
3.476*     
(1.725) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – patents 
0.082     
(0.389) 
0.048     
(0.216) 
4.007     
(2881) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – undisclosed information 
1.588***     
(0.444) 
0.588*     
(0.25) 
3.43     
(1843) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – layout-designs of integrated 
circuits 
0.16     
(0.303) 
0.116     
(0.178) 
12.24     
(10240) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – new plant varieties 
0.734.     
(0.391) 
0.183     
(0.199) 
3.912     
(10100) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
-0.165     
(0.403) 
-0.077     
(0.215) 
-3.726     
(11410) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
0.813*     
(0.396) 
-0.026     
(0.214) 
-0.066     
(10750) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – domain names 
1.721.     
(0.968) 
0.186     
(0.422) 
-4.783     
(27410) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – enforcement 
0.283     
(0.326) 
0.231     
(0.196) 
4.268     
(1630) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – exhaustion 
1.307***     
(0.374) 
0.344.     
(0.19) 
3.189     
(2441) 
Control Variables   
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.019     
(0.037) 
-0.007     
(0.023) 
0.152     
(0.143) 
Classic IP leaders 0.877*     
(0.373) 
0.265     
(0.206) 
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Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.168     
(0.346) 
-0.136     
(0.211) 
-0.054     
(0.906) 
New IP producers and developers -0.22     
(0.282) 
-0.078     
(0.156) 
0.617     
(0.865) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.113     
(0.129) 
0.035     
(0.081) 
-0.038     
(0.592) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.22     
(0.176) 
-0.159     
(0.108) 
-0.005     
(0.771) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.438**     
(0.144) 
0.002     
(0.095) 
2.555**     
(0.92) 
Intercept – -0.574     
(2.095) 













Observations 529 529 529 
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Appendix 41: Design Regression – Index IPR Scope Tangible (sum)  Path Dependency 
(world, force, specific) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0                
(0) 
-0.002     
(0.031) 
0.007     
(2426) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) 0                
(0) 
-0.007     
(0.015) 
-0.019     
(3061) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0                
(0) 
-0.019     
(0.08) 
0.016     
(4129) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0               
(0) 
0.073     
(0.079) 
0.047     
(6736) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0                
(0) 
-0.001     
(0.012) 
0.002     
(1636) 
Path Dependency   
  
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – copyrights 
1***        
(0) 
0.359     
(0.257) 
13.42     
(39210) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – trademarks 
1***        
(0) 
0.56.     
(0.301) 
11.96     
(66230) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – geographical indications 
1***        
(0) 
0.217     
(0.188) 
13.51     
(15830) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – industrial designs 
1***        
(0) 
0.096     
(0.202) 
12.73     
(37600) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – patents 
1***        
(0) 
0.383.     
(0.217) 
0.935     
(58020) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f  – undisclosed information  
1***         
(0) 
0.34.     
(0.182) 
-0.107     
(41730) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
1***        
(0) 
0.257     
(0.275) 
0.223     
(181200) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f  – new plant varieties 
1***         
(0) 
0.364.     
(0.197) 
-13.39     
(151000) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
1***         
(0) 
0.287     
(0.235) 
0.131     
(52840) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – encrypted program-carrying satel-
lite signals 
1***         
(0) 
0.428.     
(0.222) 
-12.43     
(88510) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – domain names 
1***        
(0) 
-0.154     
(0.339) 
-13.44     
(139500) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pdw f 
(sum) 
0               
(0) 
-0.018     
(0.101) 
0.053     
(11360) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pdw f 
(sum) 
0                
(0) 
0.019     
(0.064) 
-0.002     
(7735) 
Control Variables   
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0                
(0) 
-0.001     
(0.025) 
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Classic IP leaders 0               
(0) 
0.12     
(0.268) 
0.259     
(22100) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0               
(0) 
-0.099     
(0.238) 
0.149     
(15540) 
New IP producers and developers 0                
(0) 
0.081     
(0.194) 
-0.056     
(14810) 
ln GDP (mean) 0               
(0) 
-0.054     
(0.084) 
-0.067     
(5529) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0               
(0) 
-0.018     
(0.111) 
0.084     
(8816) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0               
(0) 
-0.096     
(0.102) 
0.064     
(7103) 
Intercept 0                 
(0) 
1.607     
(2.109) 













Observations 484 484 484 
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Appendix 42: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific Enforcement (sum)  Path Depend-
ency (general) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.148***           
(0.043) 
-0.008          
(0.066) 
0.284**          
(0.089) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) 0.044           
(0.063) 
0.112          
(0.173) 
-0.015          
(0.08) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.243***           
(0.067) 
0.03          
(0.09) 
-0.358**          
(0.117) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.026***           
(0.004) 
0.005          
(0.005) 
-0.036**          
(0.012) 
Path Dependency   
  
Index IPR general pd (sum) -0.022           
(0.017) 
0.016          
(0.013) 
-0.017          
(0.034) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – copyrights 
-0.403           
(0.317) 
0.196          
(0.307) 
1.022.          
(0.619) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – trademarks 
-0.092           
(0.415) 
-0.79.          
(0.455) 
-0.715          
(0.987) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – geographical indications 
0.781***           
(0.23) 
0.109          
(0.156) 
-0.81.          
(0.453) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – industrial designs 
1.142*           
(0.516) 
-0.968          
(0.777) 
-2.333**          
(0.849) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – patents 
-0.937.           
(0.542) 
1.29          
(0.857) 
2.372*          
(0.978) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – undisclosed information 
0.308           
(0.3) 
0.225          
(0.298) 
-0.068          
(0.643) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
-0.661***           
(0.179) 
-0.158          
(0.152) 
0.449          
(0.414) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – new plant varieties 
-0.036           
(0.056) 
0.054          
(0.158) 
0.268.          
(0.157) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
0.099**           
(0.031) 
0.06          
(0.079) 
0.018          
(0.091) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – encrypted program-carrying sat-
ellite signals 
-0.131*           
(0.064) 
0.106          
(0.116) 
0.359*          
(0.172) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
0.01           
(0.117) 
-0.054          
(0.076) 
0.346          
(0.339) 
Index IPR general enforcement pd (sum) 0.035           
(0.029) 
-0.031          
(0.023) 
-0.17*          
(0.079) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pl 
(dummy sum) 
-0.002           
(0.004) 
-0.006          
(0.014) 
0.007          
(0.008) 
Control Variables   
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.005           
(0.027) 
0.014          
(0.033) 
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Classic IP leaders 1.09***           
(0.265) 
0.174          
(0.176) 
-0.83          
(0.537) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.235           
(0.237) 
0.012          
(0.242) 
-0.748.          
(0.395) 
New IP producers and developers 0.086           
(0.232) 
0.065          
(0.167) 
0.253          
(0.4) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.142.           
(0.084) 
0.146*          
(0.061) 
0.073          
(0.145) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.213.           
(0.127) 
0.256          
(0.156) 
-0.155          
(0.221) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.155           
(0.11) 
0.021          
(0.107) 
-0.269.          
(0.159) 
Intercept – -6.06*     
(2.502) 
4.448     
(3.372) 






Observations 529 529 529 
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Appendix 43: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific Enforcement (sum)  Path Depend-
ency (specific) 









    
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.13**     
(0.044) 
-0.1*     
(0.04) 
-0.084     
(0.078) 
-0.103*     
(0.05) 
Veto Players   
   
Veto players (sum) 0.057     
(0.055) 
0.039     
(0.054) 
0.115     
(0.208) 
0.037     
(0.06) 
Endogeneity   
   
PTA depth 0.223**     
(0.07) 
0.201**     
(0.066) 
0          
(0.081) 
0.286***     
(0.081) 
Regime Preference   
   
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.03***     
(0.004) 
0.029***     
(0.004) 
0.007*     
(0.003) 
0.029***     
(0.005) 
Path Dependency   
   
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – copyrights 
0.146     
(0.162) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – trademarks 
-0.224     
(0.209) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – geographical indications 
0.406***     
(0.122) 
0.315***     
(0.091) 
-0.018     
(0.12) 
0.31**     
(0.109) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – industrial designs 
0.286     
(0.217) 
-0.149     
(0.094) 
-0.009     
(0.039) 
-0.059     
(0.079) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – patents 
0.031     
(0.257) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – undisclosed information 
-0.168     
(0.109) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – layout-designs of integrated circuits 
-0.06     
(0.064) 
-0.046     
(0.064) 
-0.01     
(0.028) 
-0.146     
(0.23) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – new plant varieties 
-0.235     
(0.151) 
-0.112     
(0.083) 
0.013     
(0.107) 
-0.086     
(0.216) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – traditional knowledge & genetic re-
sources 
0.025     
(0.072) 
0.054     
(0.035) 
0.029     
(0.031) 
0.007     
(0.057) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – encrypted program-carrying satellite 
signals 
-0.242     
(0.238) 
-0.091     
(0.177) 
0.119     
(0.128) 
-0.332     
(0.309) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – domain names 
0.023     
(0.232) 
-0.097     
(0.199) 
-0.116     
(0.146) 
-0.087     
(0.297) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pd (sum) 0.063**     
(0.024) 
0.072***     
(0.019) 
0.011     
(0.018) 
0.105**     
(0.033) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pd (sum) -0.024***     
(0.006) 
-0.02***     
(0.005) 
-0.005     
(0.016) 
-0.024***     
(0.007) 
Control Variables   
   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.026     
(0.026) 
0.023     
(0.026) 
0.027     
(0.03) 
0.003     
(0.029) 
Classic IP leaders 1.03***     
(0.276) 
1.131***     
(0.261) 
0.243     
(0.237) 
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Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.134     
(0.247) 
0.124     
(0.243) 
-0.008     
(0.191) 
0.423     
(0.284) 
New IP producers and developers 0.032     
(0.231) 
0.101     
(0.224) 
0.015     
(0.18) 
0.014     
(0.284) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.181*     
(0.087) 
0.152.     
(0.083) 
0.133*     
(0.066) 
0.024     
(0.106) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.017     
(0.124) 
0.079     
(0.119) 
0.025     
(0.117) 
0.124     
(0.149) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.15         
(0.109) 
0.123     
(0.106) 
0.019     
(0.092) 
0.15     
(0.123) 
Intercept – – -3.495.     
(2.093) 













Observations 529 529 529 529 
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Appendix 44: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific Enforcement (sum)  Path Depend-
ency (TRIPS-plus) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.119**         
(0.041) 
-0.054     
(0.058) 
0.258**     
(0.095) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) -0.009         
(0.057) 
0.021     
(0.072) 
-0.041     
(0.093) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.244***         
(0.067) 
-0.014     
(0.06) 
-0.46***     
(0.11) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.023***         
(0.003) 
0.004     
(0.003) 
-0.033***     
(0.007) 
Path Dependency   
  
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – copyrights 
0.062         
(0.112) 
0.053     
(0.104) 
-0.364     
(0.261) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – trademarks 
-0.062         
(0.137) 
-0.188.     
(0.108) 
-0.453     
(0.403) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – geographical indications 
0.137.         
(0.083) 
0.034     
(0.11) 
-0.108     
(0.141) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd –  industrial designs 
-0.142         
(0.14) 
0.008     
(0.097) 
-0.006     
(0.235) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – patents 
-0.003         
(0.083) 
0.102.     
(0.055) 
0.853*     
(0.39) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – undisclosed information  
0.03         
(0.055) 
-0.026     
(0.049) 
-0.037     
(0.208) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0.164         
(0.274) 
-0.095     
(0.194) 
-0.874     
(0.569) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – new plant varieties 
0.155         
(0.142) 
0.041     
(0.153) 
-0.368.     
(0.222) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
0.049         
(0.042) 
0.002     
(0.024) 
-0.033     
(0.088) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
0.152         
(0.244) 
0.28     
(0.194) 
0.385     
(0.498) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – domain names 
-0.223         
(0.223) 
-0.235     
(0.173) 
-0.024     
(0.427) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – enforcement 
-0.118         
(0.073) 
-0.028     
(0.068) 
0.146     
(0.136) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – exhaustion 
-0.034         
(0.067) 
0.01     
(0.029) 
0.249     
(0.258) 
Control Variables   
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.018         
(0.026) 
0.04.     
(0.023) 
0.039     
(0.04) 
Classic IP leaders 0.997***         
(0.275) 
0.01     
(0.208) 
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Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.064         
(0.243) 
-0.175     
(0.184) 
-1.016*     
(0.425) 
New IP producers and developers 0.135         
(0.226) 
-0.081     
(0.175) 
-0.216     
(0.381) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.129         
(0.084) 
0.178**     
(0.069) 
0.194     
(0.139) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.088         
(0.12) 
0.099     
(0.111) 
-0.143     
(0.192) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.144         
(0.106) 
0.025     
(0.09) 
-0.201     
(0.142) 
Intercept – -5.225*     
(2.098) 













Observations 529 529 529 
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Appendix 45: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific Enforcement (sum)  Path Depend-
ency (world, signature, specific) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0                      
(0) 
-0.018     
(0.039) 
-0.016     
(3165) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) 0                      
(0) 
-0.009     
(0.017) 
0.003     
(3025) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0                      
(0) 
-0.047     
(0.069) 
0.088     
(3723) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0                      
(0) 
-0.008     
(0.01) 
-0.008     
(1723) 
Path Dependency   
  
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – copyrights 
0***                
(0) 
0.119     
(0.229) 
-19.63     
(1163000) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – trademarks 
0***                
(0) 
0.102     
(0.268) 
0.175     
(52210) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – geographical indications 
0***                
(0) 
-0.075     
(0.168) 
0.116     
(14960) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – industrial designs 
0***                
(0) 
-0.052     
(0.21) 
-6.174     
(1168000) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – patents  
0***                
(0) 
0.01     
(0.203) 
-6.697     
(1168000) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s  – undisclosed information  
0                      
(0) 
0.03     
(0.163) 
-7.364     
(1171000) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0*                      
(0) 
0.061     
(0.302) 
0.194     
(355300) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s  – new plant varieties 
0                      
(0) 
0.125     
(0.197) 
-6.909     
(1164000) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
0*                      
(0) 
0.003     
(0.234) 
19.73     
(1162000) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – encrypted program-carrying satel-
lite signals 
0                      
(0) 
0.097     
(0.22) 
0.31     
(179700) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – domain names 
0***                      
(0) 
-0.303     
(0.311) 
-26.51     
(2117000) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pdw s 
(sum) 
1***                      
(0) 
0.367***     
(0.069) 
13.39     
(9533) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pdw s 
(sum) 
0                      
(0) 
0.037     
(0.053) 
0.04     
(8429) 
Control Variables   
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0                      
(0) 
0.013     
(0.025) 
-0.008     
(1063) 
Classic IP leaders 0                      
(0) 
0.086     
(0.22) 
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Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0                      
(0) 
0.12     
(0.205) 
0.096     
(15410) 
New IP producers and developers 0                      
(0) 
0.045     
(0.17) 
-0.017     
(13870) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.                      
(0) 
-0.04     
(0.078) 
-0.04     
(4304) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0                      
(0) 
0.045     
(0.112) 
0.04     
(6729) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0                      
(0) 
0.005     
(0.102) 
0.009     
(5887) 
Intercept – 0.274     
(2.034) 













Observations 529 529 529 
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Appendix 46: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific Enforcement (sum)  Path Depend-
ency (world, signature, TRIPS-plus) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.1**     
(0.033) 
-0.064.     
(0.035) 
-0.028     
(0.057) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) 0.001     
(0.031) 
0.006     
(0.017) 
0.041     
(0.068) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.233**     
(0.074) 
0.03     
(0.06) 
0.336**     
(0.108) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.008.     
(0.005) 
-0.001     
(0.003) 
0.005     
(0.008) 
Path Dependency   
  
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – copyrights 
-0.638     
(0.661) 
-0.027     
(0.34) 
-4.477     
(1897) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – geographical indications 
0.292     
(0.528) 
0.156     
(0.291) 
5.218     
(2092) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – industrial designs 
1.986***     
(0.366) 
1.13*     
(0.485) 
1.817**     
(0.688) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – patents 
0.819*     
(0.371) 
0.188     
(0.206) 
5.576     
(1648) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – undisclosed information 
0.506     
(0.401) 
0.357     
(0.241) 
4.208     
(937.3) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – layout-designs of integrated 
circuits 
-0.428     
(0.284) 
-0.036     
(0.169) 
-0.971     
(0.72) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – new plant varieties 
1.354***     
(0.342) 
0.414*     
(0.179) 
7.538     
(1400) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
0.586     
(0.393) 
-0.045     
(0.204) 
0.541     
(4530) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
-0.143     
(0.382) 
-0.187     
(0.217) 
-1.084     
(4914) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – domain names 
-1.986*     
(0.928) 
-0.639     
(0.483) 
-5.656     
(7577) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – enforcement 
0.143     
(0.314) 
0.062     
(0.181) 
0.531     
(0.748) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – exhaustion 
-0.466     
(0.336) 
-0.182     
(0.197) 
5.195     
(1658) 
Control Variables   
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.021     
(0.028) 
0.029     
(0.024) 
-0.006     
(0.035) 
Classic IP leaders 0.819**     
(0.308) 
0.354.     
(0.201) 
-0.551     
(0.605) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0.114     
(0.285) 
0.041     
(0.212) 
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New IP producers and developers 0.147     
(0.236) 
0.036     
(0.153) 
0.114     
(0.338) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.104         
(0.1) 
0.101     
(0.08) 
0.076     
(0.151) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.07     
(0.142) 
-0.028     
(0.115) 
-0.026     
(0.212) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.193     
(0.122) 
0.099     
(0.095) 
0.109     
(0.186) 
Intercept – -3.825.     
(2.128) 













Observations 529 529 529 
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Appendix 47: Design Regression – Index IPR Specific Enforcement (sum)  Path Depend-
ency (world, force, specific) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0                      
(0) 
-0.017     
(0.04) 
-0.015     
(2730) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) 0                      
(0) 
-0.007     
(0.017) 
0.012     
(2150) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0                      
(0) 
-0.04     
(0.071) 
0.083     
(3810) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0                      
(0) 
-0.009     
(0.011) 
-0.011     
(1846) 
Path Dependency   
  
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – copyrights 
0***                      
(0) 
0.128     
(0.23) 
-19.65     
(1172000) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – trademarks 
0***                      
(0) 
0.092     
(0.273) 
0.161     
(50050) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – geographical indications 
0***                      
(0) 
-0.081     
(0.171) 
0.105     
(15690) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – industrial designs 
0***                      
(0) 
-0.053     
(0.209) 
-6.228     
(1182000) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – patents 
0**                      
(0) 
0.008     
(0.203) 
-6.672     
(1183000) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f  – undisclosed information  
0                      
(0) 
0.061     
(0.17) 
-7.237     
(1182000) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0.                      
(0) 
0.053     
(0.308) 
0.243     
(419000) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f  – new plant varieties 
0                      
(0) 
0.108     
(0.204) 
-6.976     
(1173000) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
0                      
(0) 
-0.021     
(0.245) 
19.79     
(1172000) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – encrypted program-carrying satel-
lite signals 
0                      
(0) 
0.103     
(0.22) 
0.244     
(206000) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – domain names 
0***                      
(0) 
-0.315     
(0.333) 
-26.46     
(2103000) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pdw f 
(sum) 
1***                      
(0) 
0.366***     
(0.07) 
13.4     
(9808) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pdw f 
(sum) 
0                      
(0) 
0.043     
(0.059) 
0.046     
(9037) 
Control Variables   
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0                      
(0) 
0.011     
(0.025) 
-0.008     
(1130) 
Classic IP leaders 0                      
(0) 
0.102     
(0.264) 
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Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
0                      
(0) 
0.126     
(0.242) 
0.103     
(15010) 
New IP producers and developers 0                      
(0) 
0.062     
(0.186) 
-0.022     
(14150) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.                      
(0) 
-0.051     
(0.081) 
-0.04     
(4368) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0                      
(0) 
0.036     
(0.114) 
0.044     
(7150) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0                      
(0) 
0.003     
(0.105) 
0.01     
(6169) 
Intercept – 0.589     
(2.066) 













Observations 484 484 484 
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Appendix 48: Design Regression – Index IPR Multilateral Coherence (sum)  Path Depend-
ency (general) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.137***     
(0.034) 
0.054***     
(0.008) 
-0.163**     
(0.06) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) -0.285***     
(0.068) 
-0.166***     
(0.019) 
0.182.     
(0.101) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.259***     
(0.049) 
0.104***     
(0.012) 
-0.277***     
(0.084) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.274***     
(0.029) 
0.114***     
(0.005) 
-1.167***     
(0.146) 
Path Dependency 
   
Index IPR general pd (sum) -0.003     
(0.012) 
-0.003     
(0.003) 
-0.017     
(0.021) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – copyrights 
-0.062     
(0.169) 
-0.045     
(0.044) 
-0.022     
(0.251) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – trademarks 
0.339     
(0.249) 
-0.095     
(0.072) 
-0.489     
(0.382) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – geographical indications 
-0.073     
(0.155) 
-0.038     
(0.034) 
0.237     
(0.318) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – industrial designs 
-0.011     
(0.277) 
-0.082     
(0.066) 
-0.058     
(0.39) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – patents 
-0.114     
(0.326) 
0.246**     
(0.084) 
0.475     
(0.482) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – undisclosed information 
-0.291     
(0.205) 
-0.204***     
(0.047) 
0.039     
(0.408) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0.269*     
(0.13) 
0.253***     
(0.028) 
-0.199     
(0.264) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – new plant varieties 
-0.068.     
(0.035) 
-0.036***     
(0.007) 
0.172**     
(0.062) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
-0.121***     
(0.026) 
-0.06***     
(0.004) 
0.013     
(0.053) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – encrypted program-carrying sat-
ellite signals 
-0.067     
(0.046) 
0.027**     
(0.008) 
0.267**     
(0.099) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
-0.058     
(0.1) 
0.082***     
(0.017) 
0.766**     
(0.243) 
Index IPR general enforcement pd (sum) -0.01     
(0.02) 
-0.005     
(0.004) 
-0.009     
(0.038) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pl 
(dummy sum) 
0.016***     
(0.003) 
0.007***     
(0.001) 
-0.017**     
(0.006) 
Control Variables   
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.056***     
(0.015) 
0.004     
(0.004) 
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Classic IP leaders -0.083     
(0.221) 
0.103**     
(0.038) 
-0.08     
(0.535) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.014     
(0.178) 
0.146***     
(0.038) 
0.33     
(0.301) 
New IP producers and developers -0.323.     
(0.167) 
-0.367***     
(0.036) 
-0.104     
(0.301) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.107.     
(0.057) 
-0.019     
(0.013) 
0.206*     
(0.097) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.167*     
(0.079) 
0.01     
(0.02) 
-0.194     
(0.121) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.105     
(0.066) 
-0.083***     
(0.017) 
-0.114     
(0.102) 
Intercept – 3.596***     
(0.268) 













Observations 529 529 529 
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Appendix 49: Design Regression – Index IPR Multilateral Coherence (sum)  Path Depend-
ency (specific) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.098**            
(0.035) 
0.066         
(0.043) 
-0.144*           
(0.065) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) -0.162***            
(0.048) 
-0.118*         
(0.052) 
0.093           
(0.072) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.295***            
(0.049) 
0.129*         
(0.061) 
-0.409***           
(0.102) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.29***            
(0.029) 
0.145***         
(0.028) 
-1.447***           
(0.278) 
Path Dependency 
   
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – copyrights 
-0.349*            
(0.139) 
-0.241.         
(0.139) 
0.089           
(0.42) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – trademarks 
0.121            
(0.189) 
0.007         
(0.193) 
0.307           
(0.508) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – geographical indications 
-0.277***            
(0.066) 
-0.135*         
(0.066) 
0.356           
(0.251) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – industrial designs 
0.146            
(0.156) 
-0.244         
(0.18) 
-0.543           
(0.486) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – patents 
0.081            
(0.179) 
0.513*         
(0.204) 
0.419           
(0.494) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – undisclosed information 
0.022            
(0.029) 
0.011         
(0.031) 
0.013           
(0.074) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – layout-designs of integrated circuits 
-0.054            
(0.056) 
0.008         
(0.055) 
0.321           
(0.428) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – new plant varieties 
0.039            
(0.124) 
-0.003         
(0.14) 
-0.316           
(0.381) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – traditional knowledge & genetic re-
sources 
0.089            
(0.062) 
0.077         
(0.065) 
-0.284           
(0.242) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – encrypted program-carrying satellite 
signals 
0.121            
(0.175) 
-0.069         
(0.2) 
-0.61           
(0.404) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – domain names 
-0.031            
(0.167) 
0.165         
(0.208) 
1.087**           
(0.409) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pd (sum) -0.025.            
(0.013) 
-0.015         
(0.016) 
0           
(0.057) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pd (sum) 0.016***            
(0.004) 
0.007         
(0.004) 
-0.018.           
(0.01) 
Control Variables   
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.029*            
(0.014) 
-0.015         
(0.02) 
-0.027           
(0.023) 
Classic IP leaders -0.12            
(0.224) 
0.477*         
(0.233) 
0.032           
(0.574) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.1            
(0.183) 
0.209         
(0.263) 
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New IP producers and developers -0.282            
(0.174) 
-0.431*         
(0.195) 
-0.67           
(0.431) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.091.            
(0.055) 
-0.011         
(0.071) 
0.209.           
(0.11) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.144.            
(0.077) 
-0.112         
(0.103) 
-0.167           
(0.138) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.051            
(0.066) 
-0.039         
(0.09) 
-0.2           
(0.123) 
Intercept – 3.853**     
(1.413) 
-0.365     
(1.989) 














Observations 529 529 529 
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Appendix 50: Design Regression – Index IPR Multilateral Coherence (sum)  Path Depend-
ency (TRIPS-plus) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
0.072*          
(0.032) 
0.01.          
(0.005) 
-0.157**          
(0.058) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) -0.083*          
(0.04) 
-0.062***          
(0.01) 
0.085          
(0.06) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.307***          
(0.049) 
0.122***          
(0.012) 
-0.336***          
(0.08) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.268***          
(0.029) 
0.107***          
(0.005) 
-1.049***          
(0.14) 
Path Dependency 
   
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – copyrights 
0.096          
(0.087) 
-0.016          
(0.015) 
-0.317          
(0.193) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – trademarks 
-0.244*          
(0.107) 
-0.077***          
(0.019) 
0.347          
(0.211) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – geographical indications 
0.057          
(0.039) 
0.015*          
(0.007) 
-0.066          
(0.079) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd –  industrial designs 
0.342***          
(0.097) 
0.028          
(0.02) 
-0.661***          
(0.177) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – patents 
-0.143*          
(0.073) 
-0.026*          
(0.01) 
0.133          
(0.316) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – undisclosed information  
-0.08.          
(0.044) 
-0.008          
(0.007) 
0.545.          
(0.305) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
-0.264          
(0.212) 
-0.23***          
(0.043) 
0.038          
(0.5) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – new plant varieties 
-0.036          
(0.108) 
0.12***          
(0.022) 
0.362.          
(0.203) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
0.024          
(0.037) 
-0.02***          
(0.006) 
-0.39          
(0.327) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
-0.001          
(0.171) 
-0.039          
(0.039) 
-0.639.          
(0.362) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – domain names 
0.149          
(0.161) 
0.146***          
(0.034) 
0.678.          
(0.366) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – enforcement 
0.02          
(0.036) 
-0.004          
(0.007) 
0.009          
(0.07) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – exhaustion 
-0.019          
(0.057) 
0.025**          
(0.008) 
0.242          
(0.323) 
Control Variables   
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.027.          
(0.014) 
0.001          
(0.004) 
-0.017          
(0.021) 
Classic IP leaders -0.184          
(0.221) 
0.093*          
(0.042) 





- 362 - 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.067          
(0.182) 
0.2***          
(0.04) 
0.526.          
(0.318) 
New IP producers and developers -0.369*          
(0.172) 
-0.313***          
(0.037) 
-0.013          
(0.303) 
ln GDP (mean) -0.059          
(0.056) 
0.014          
(0.013) 
0.145          
(0.09) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.106          
(0.078) 
-0.019          
(0.02) 
-0.106          
(0.114) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.086          
(0.066) 
-0.088***          
(0.017) 
-0.102          
(0.099) 
Intercept – 2.972***     
(0.268) 













Observations 529 529 529 
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Appendix 51: Design Regression – Index IPR Multilateral Coherence (sum)  Path Depend-
ency (world, signature) 








Political Pressure  
   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.001     
(0.025) 
0.076***     
(0.023) 
0.05.     
(0.029) 
0.085*     
(0.039) 
Veto Players     
  
Veto players (sum) -0.069**     
(0.021) 
-0.04.     
(0.024) 
-0.048     
(0.03) 
-0.016     
(0.041) 
Endogeneity     
  
PTA depth 0.266***     
(0.055) 
0.26***     
(0.048) 
0.16*     
(0.071) 
0.141.     
(0.076) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) -0.077     
(0.079) 
0.242***     
(0.042) 
0.063     
(0.047) 
1.127***     
(0.14) 
Path Dependency Specific     
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – copyrights 
-0.333     
(0.35) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – trademarks 
-1.029**     
(0.354) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – geographical indications 
-0.366     
(0.224) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – industrial designs 
-0.148     
(0.374) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – patents  
-0.562     
(0.352) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s  – undisclosed information  
0.777**     
(0.298) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
1.738**     
(0.542) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s  – new plant varieties 
0.583     
(0.383) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
-0.069     
(0.329) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – encrypted program-carrying satel-
lite signals 
0.539     
(0.398) 
– – – 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw s – domain names 
-3.532***     
(0.542) 
– – – 
Index IPR specific enforcement pdw s 
(sum) 
0.137     
(0.131) 
– – – 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pdw s 
(sum) 
1.21***     
(0.057) 
– – – 
Path Dependency TRIPS-plus  
   
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – copyrights 
– 0.458*     
(0.203) 
-0.114     
(0.222) 
0.511.     
(0.298) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – geographical indications 
– 0.321     
(0.453) 
0.344     
(0.535) 
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Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – industrial designs 
– -0.179     
(0.327) 
-0.096     
(0.338) 
4.082     
(1031.724) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – patents 
– -0.014     
(0.343) 
0.409     
(0.329) 
-1.363     
(1824.05) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – undisclosed information 
– 0.145     
(0.365) 
0.243     
(0.351) 
-2.122     
(1988.261) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – layout-designs of integrated 
circuits 
– 0.406     
(0.254) 
0.194     
(0.255) 
2.165     
(1085.613) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – new plant varieties 
– -0.402     
(0.284) 
-0.112     
(0.299) 
0.604     
(1323.894) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
– -0.7*     
(0.354) 
-0.213     
(0.335) 
-0.552     
(1444.736) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
– -0.491     
(0.341) 
-0.748*     
(0.326) 
-1.783     
(1608.233) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – domain names 
– -0.072     
(0.833) 
-0.75     
(0.829) 
-2.407     
(3198.234) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – enforcement 
– 1.146***     
(0.274) 
0.859**     
(0.263) 
0.42     
(725.376) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw s – exhaustion 
– 0.247     
(0.291) 
0.211     
(0.299) 
-2.642     
(1254.421) 
Control Variables    
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.047**     
(0.016) 
0.027*     
(0.014) 
-0.004     
(0.021) 
0.02     
(0.018) 
Classic IP leaders -0.791**     
(0.254) 
-0.163     
(0.23) 
0.583*     
(0.256) 
-0.249     
(0.446) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.151     
(0.2) 
-0.222     
(0.188) 
0.112     
(0.289) 
-0.348     
(0.285) 
New IP producers and developers -0.063     
(0.176) 
-0.312.     
(0.163) 
-0.591**     
(0.186) 
0.24     
(0.257) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.045     
(0.063) 
-0.051     
(0.057) 
-0.049     
(0.077) 
-0.143.     
(0.082) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.057     
(0.09) 
0.121     
(0.079) 
-0.121     
(0.113) 
0.09     
(0.107) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.084     
(0.074) 
-0.182**     
(0.066) 
-0.139     
(0.089) 
-0.071     
(0.093) 
Intercept – – 5.631***     
(1.515) 
1.854     
(1.577) 


















Observations 529 529 529 529 
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Appendix 52: Design Regression – Index TRIPS-plus (sum)  Path Dependency (general) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.087.           
(0.05) 
-0.043          
(0.04) 
0.181           
(0.228) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) -0.004           
(0.078) 
0.07          
(0.093) 
0.756           
(0.709) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.308***           
(0.075) 
0.104.          
(0.057) 
-0.605.           
(0.368) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0.671***           
(0.071) 
0.242***          
(0.049) 
-3.523**           
(1.216) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.009*           
(0.004) 
0.006*          
(0.003) 
-0.061*           
(0.026) 
Path Dependency   
  
Index IPR general pd (sum) 0.006           
(0.018) 
0.001          
(0.012) 
-0.236.           
(0.122) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – copyrights 
0.23           
(0.336) 
0.24          
(0.261) 
1.379           
(1.241) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – trademarks 
0.087           
(0.498) 
-0.735.          
(0.394) 
2.119           
(2.312) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – geographical indications 
0.226           
(0.225) 
-0.163          
(0.131) 
-4.789*           
(2.082) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – industrial designs 
1.125.           
(0.631) 
0.4          
(0.518) 
-7.64           
(4.878) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – patents 
-1.368*           
(0.642) 
-0.033          
(0.516) 
8.342           
(5.085) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – undisclosed information 
-0.443           
(0.327) 
0.136          
(0.247) 
-0.606           
(2.004) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
0.17           
(0.192) 
0.131          
(0.127) 
1.179           
(0.946) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – new plant varieties 
0.012           
(0.057) 
0.001          
(0.051) 
-0.489.           
(0.291) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
-0.047           
(0.033) 
-0.019          
(0.02) 
0.762*           
(0.369) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – encrypted program-carrying sat-
ellite signals 
0           
(0.065) 
0.011          
(0.052) 
-0.256           
(0.35) 
Index based on binary IPR scope men-
tioned pl – domain names 
0.351**           
(0.122) 
0.116.          
(0.07) 
-1.417*           
(0.68) 
Index IPR general enforcement pd (sum) 0.005           
(0.031) 
0.006          
(0.02) 
0.282           
(0.207) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pl 
(dummy sum) 
0           
(0.004) 
-0.001          
(0.003) 
0.007           
(0.021) 
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Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.001           
(0.028) 
-0.023          
(0.022) 
-0.254           
(0.157) 
Classic IP leaders 0.184           
(0.3) 
0.082          
(0.172) 
4.023.           
(2.079) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.156           
(0.271) 
-0.305.          
(0.17) 
3.755*           
(1.786) 
New IP producers and developers -0.415           
(0.257) 
-0.25          
(0.154) 
-0.69           
(0.871) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.169.           
(0.091) 
0.2**          
(0.061) 
-1.867*           
(0.923) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.329*           
(0.132) 
-0.476***          
(0.106) 
0.62           
(0.801) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.102           
(0.117) 
-0.102          
(0.081) 
-0.72           
(0.444) 
Intercept – 0.766     
(1.753) 
57.558*     
(26.157) 














Observations 529 529 529 
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Appendix 53: Design Regression – Index TRIPS-plus (sum)  Path Dependency (specific) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.064     
(0.05) 
-0.055     
(0.036) 
-0.05     
(0.096) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) 0.024     
(0.074) 
0.014     
(0.07) 
0.036     
(0.121) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.171*     
(0.08) 
0.062     
(0.051) 
0.027     
(0.14) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.422***     
(0.045) 
0.162***     
(0.028) 
0.481***     
(0.082) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.012**     
(0.004) 
0.003     
(0.003) 
0.024**     
(0.008) 
Path Dependency   
  
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – copyrights 
0.028     
(0.165) 
-0.045     
(0.089) 
0.423     
(0.427) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – trademarks 
-0.295     
(0.226) 
-0.039     
(0.123) 
-0.852*     
(0.405) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – geographical indications 
0.226*     
(0.104) 
-0.021     
(0.056) 
0.848**     
(0.296) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – industrial designs 
0.269     
(0.227) 
0.013     
(0.124) 
0.311     
(0.423) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – patents 
-0.048     
(0.276) 
0.089     
(0.164) 
-0.118     
(0.451) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – undisclosed information 
-0.2*     
(0.079) 
-0.028     
(0.033) 
-0.424     
(0.297) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – layout-designs of integrated circuits 
0.041     
(0.06) 
0.008     
(0.024) 
-0.088     
(0.403) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – new plant varieties 
-0.086     
(0.152) 
-0.039     
(0.085) 
-0.09     
(0.361) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – traditional knowledge & genetic re-
sources 
-0.017     
(0.074) 
0.019     
(0.041) 
-0.249     
(0.204) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – encrypted program-carrying satellite 
signals 
0.395.     
(0.237) 
0.23.     
(0.129) 
-0.194     
(0.539) 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pl – domain names 
-0.198     
(0.229) 
-0.183     
(0.123) 
0.328     
(0.432) 
Index IPR specific enforcement pd (sum) 0.029     
(0.019) 
-0.008     
(0.009) 
0.173*     
(0.07) 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pd (sum) -0.003     
(0.006) 
0.004     
(0.004) 
-0.034*     
(0.015) 
Control Variables   
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.018     
(0.028) 
-0.001     
(0.019) 
-0.016     
(0.046) 
Classic IP leaders 0.413         
(0.3) 
-0.099     
(0.167) 
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Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.131     
(0.28) 
-0.1     
(0.158) 
-0.172     
(0.55) 
New IP producers and developers -0.716**     
(0.271) 
-0.371*     
(0.153) 
-0.984*     
(0.497) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.147     
(0.096) 
0.202***     
(0.058) 
-0.032     
(0.181) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.165     
(0.137) 
-0.222*     
(0.087) 
0.056     
(0.251) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.148     
(0.118) 
-0.066     
(0.074) 
0.363*     
(0.184) 
Intercept – -2     (1.524) -5.674     
(3.623) 














Observations 529 529 529 
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Appendix 54: Design Regression – Index TRIPS-plus (sum)  Path Dependency (TRIPS-
plus) 







   
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.049     
(0.045) 
-0.04     
(0.033) 
-0.017     
(0.123) 
Veto Players   
  
Veto players (sum) 0.008     
(0.06) 
0.083.     
(0.05) 
1.036.     
(0.556) 
Endogeneity   
  
PTA depth 0.347***     
(0.078) 
0.079.     
(0.046) 
-0.6*     
(0.301) 
Index IPR specific enforcement (sum) 0.67***     
(0.069) 
0.172***     
(0.036) 
-2.636**     
(0.837) 
Regime Preference   
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.013***     
(0.004) 
0.012***     
(0.003) 
-0.028.     
(0.015) 
Path Dependency   
  
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – copyrights 
-0.076     
(0.121) 
-0.22*     
(0.087) 
0.45     
(0.492) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – trademarks 
-0.015     
(0.147) 
0.137     
(0.093) 
0.125     
(0.433) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – geographical indications 
-0.027     
(0.067) 
-0.153*     
(0.064) 
0.259     
(0.219) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd –  industrial designs 
0.263.     
(0.148) 
0.089     
(0.075) 
-1.016.     
(0.574) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – patents 
-0.06     
(0.081) 
0.023     
(0.037) 
0.382     
(0.345) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – undisclosed information  
0.015     
(0.058) 
0.082*     
(0.041) 
0.049     
(0.613) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
1.044**     
(0.323) 
0.79***     
(0.151) 
3.848*     
(1.627) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – new plant varieties 
-0.103     
(0.162) 
-0.01     
(0.104) 
-0.31     
(0.485) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
0.007     
(0.043) 
0.014     
(0.018) 
-0.007     
(0.672) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
-0.231     
(0.274) 
-0.305*     
(0.148) 
-1.794.     
(0.982) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – domain names 
0.475.     
(0.25) 
0.288*     
(0.13) 
0.924     
(0.837) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – enforcement 
0.038     
(0.057) 
0.027     
(0.036) 
-0.157     
(0.151) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pd – exhaustion 
0.016     
(0.064) 
-0.031     
(0.024) 
-0.376     
(0.532) 
Control Variables   
  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.014     
(0.027) 
-0.016     
(0.017) 
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Classic IP leaders 0.048     
(0.31) 
-0.011     
(0.166) 
0.288     
(1.115) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.347     
(0.281) 
-0.267.     
(0.137) 
0.17     
(0.966) 
New IP producers and developers -0.614*     
(0.257) 
-0.311*     
(0.152) 
0.335     
(1.111) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.089     
(0.094) 
0.063     
(0.059) 
-0.017     
(0.417) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.281*     
(0.13) 
-0.268***     
(0.078) 
0.153     
(0.574) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.196.     
(0.116) 
-0.069     
(0.07) 
-0.953*     
(0.376) 
Intercept – 2.231     
(1.572) 
12.055     
(8.575) 














Observations 529 529 529 
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Appendix 55: Design Regression – Index TRIPS-plus (sum)  Path Dependency (world, 
force) 









   
 
PTA members on Special 301 Reports 
(sum) 
-0.17***     
(0.039) 
-0.075***     
(0.02) 
-0.052     
(0.218) 
-0.047**     
(0.017) 
Veto Players   
  
  
Veto players (sum) 0.197***     
(0.029) 
0.064***     
(0.008) 
0.132     
(0.141) 
0.037***     
(0.008) 
Endogeneity   
  
  
PTA depth -0.071     
(0.097) 
-0.09*     
(0.042) 
0.553     
(0.444) 
0.184     
(0.317) 
Index IPR enforcement (sum) 0.332**     
(0.115) 
0.069.     
(0.041) 
0.312     
(0.481) 
0.05*     
(0.02) 
Regime Preference   
  
  
Index IPR multilateral coherence (sum) 0.02     
(0.019) 
0.011.     
(0.006) 
0.025     
(0.182) 
0.006***     
(0.002) 
Path Dependency Specific   
  
 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – copyrights 
2.554***     
(0.402) 
0.634***     
(0.135) 
8.254     
(1847) 
– 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – trademarks 
-0.648     
(0.425) 
0.101     
(0.15) 
-0.482     
(1.746) 
– 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – geographical indications 
2.761***     
(0.314) 
0.391***     
(0.102) 
5.313**     
(1.779) 
– 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – industrial designs 
1.545***     
(0.422) 
0.179.     
(0.105) 
13.37     
(1588) 
– 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – patents 
0.026     
(0.388) 
0.03     
(0.108) 
0.784     
(2032) 
– 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f  – undisclosed information  
-0.457     
(0.328) 
0.077     
(0.088) 
4.817     
(2642) 
– 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – layout-designs of integrated cir-
cuits 
1.056.     
(0.579) 
0.184     
(0.143) 
8.406     
(8751) 
– 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f  – new plant varieties 
-0.512     
(0.397) 
0.031     
(0.114) 
-5.547     
(7105) 
– 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – traditional knowledge & genetic 
resources 
0.092     
(0.378) 
0.122     
(0.116) 
3.406     
(2660) 
– 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – encrypted program-carrying satel-
lite signals 
1.591***     
(0.43) 
0.533***     
(0.114) 
-0.811     
(2871) 
– 
Indexes based on binary IPR scope tangible 
pdw f – domain names 
2.079**     
(0.668) 
0.396*     
(0.174) 
-4.393     
(5694) 
– 
Index IPR specific enforcement pdw f 
(sum) 
0.009     
(0.18) 
-0.057     
(0.051) 
-0.047     
(1.007) 
– 
Index IPR multilateral coherence pdw f 
(sum) 
-0.013     
(0.095) 
-0.017     
(0.032) 
-0.002     
(0.906) 
– 
Path Dependency TRIPS-plus     
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – copyrights 
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Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – geographical indications 
– – –   
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – industrial designs 
– – – 0.037***     
(0.008) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – patents 
– – –   
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – undisclosed information 
– – – 0.184     
(0.317) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – new plant varieties 
– – – 0.05*     
(0.02) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – traditional knowledge & ge-
netic resources 
– – –   
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – encrypted program-carrying 
satellite signals 
– – – 0.006***     
(0.002) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – domain names 
– – – -0.047**     
(0.017) 
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – enforcement 
– – –   
Indexes based on binary TRIPS-plus cate-
gories pdw f – exhaustion 
– – – 0.037***     
(0.008) 
Control Variables 
   
 
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.046     
(0.033) 
-0.012     
(0.012) 
-0.124     
(0.107) 
-0.001     
(0.011) 
Classic IP leaders -0.408     
(0.374) 
-0.079     
(0.14) 
-2.631     
(2.831) 
-0.132     
(0.147) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection 
-0.157     
(0.353) 
-0.074     
(0.132) 
-0.708     
(1.87) 
-0.207     
(0.137) 
New IP producers and developers -0.698*     
(0.331) 
-0.048     
(0.094) 
-0.157     
(1.426) 
-0.217*     
(0.09) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.361**     
(0.119) 
0.121**     
(0.045) 
0.631     
(0.678) 
0.171***     
(0.044) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.002     
(0.16) 
-0.075     
(0.062) 
-1.142     
(1.006) 
-0.219***     
(0.055) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.236.     
(0.131) 
-0.146**     
(0.054) 
-0.172     
(0.793) 
-0.062     
(0.052) 
Intercept – -0.291     
(1.097) 
-10.76     
(12.85) 
















Observations 484 484 484 484 
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Appendix 56: Regression Tables of the Index IPR General and Specific Enforcement (sum) 
 
Appendix 23 Design Regression Table 1: Index IPR General Enforcement (sum) 






Veto players (sum) -0.002     
(0.01) 




Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.049**     
(0.018) 
-0.064.     
(0.034) 
Classic IP leaders -0.099     
(0.137) 
-0.123     
(0.692) 
Countries with a high increase of patent  
protection 
-0.361*     
(0.162) 
0.586.     
(0.332) 
New IP producers and developers 0.024     
(0.112) 
-8.187     
(209.708) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.152**     
(0.048) 
-0.402**     
(0.123) 
ln GDPpc (mean) -0.058     
(0.075) 
-0.632**     
(0.197) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.366***     
(0.057) 
1.113***     
(0.193) 
Intercept -6.04***     
(0.908) 
6.989***     
(2.098) 






Observations 573 573 
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Appendix 23 Design Regression Table 2: Index IPR Specific Enforcement (sum) 







   
Veto players (sum) 0        
(0.014) 
0        
(0.008) 
0.006     
(0.016) 
Control Variables 
   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.027     
(0.019) 
0.032.     
(0.018) 
-0.016     
(0.022) 
Classic IP leaders 0.424*     
(0.21) 
0.334*     
(0.136) 
-0.215     
(0.25) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
 protection 
-0.062     
(0.186) 
0.042     
(0.165) 
-0.007     
(0.209) 
New IP producers and developers 0.103     
(0.173) 
0.046     
(0.132) 
-0.093     
(0.205) 
ln GDP (mean) 0.238***     
(0.066) 
0.146**     
(0.049) 
-0.163*     
(0.074) 
ln GDPpc (mean) 0.315**     
(0.098) 
0.104     
(0.086) 
-0.379***     
(0.111) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.341***     
(0.086) 
0.028     
(0.082) 
-0.367***     
(0.096) 
Intercept – -4.403**     
(1.349) 
11.44***     
(1.586) 






Observations 573 573 573 
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Appendix 57: Compliance per IPR Multilateral Coherence Agreements 










CBD 372 1 371 99.7% 
Paris 851 6 845 99.3% 
Berne 963 8 955 99.2% 
PCT 789 9 780 98.9% 
WIPO Convention 127 3 124 97.6% 
UCC Geneva 86 3 83 96.5% 
TRIPS 985 69 916 93.0% 
Budapest 678 53 625 92.2% 
Rome 835 68 767 91.9% 
Nice 704 64 640 90.9% 
IPPC 316 30 286 90.5% 
UCC Paris 49 5 44 89.8% 
Madrid Protocol 632 66 566 89.6% 
Phonograms Geneva 267 33 234 87.6% 
Nairobi 16 2 14 87.5% 
WPPT 450 57 393 87.3% 
WCT 466 73 393 84.3% 
Strasbourg 153 24 129 84.3% 
Locarno 133 21 112 84.2% 
UPOV 730 141 589 80.7% 
Hague 223 55 168 75.3% 
EPC 230 57 173 75.2% 
Madrid 348 109 239 68.7% 
TLT 261 83 178 68.2% 
Lisbon 14 5 9 64.3% 
Singapore 11 4 7 63.6% 
PLT 97 40 57 58.8% 
Brussels 164 78 86 52.4% 
Vienna 99 54 45 45.5% 
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Appendix 58: Effectiveness per IPR Multilateral Coherence Agreements 








Share of  
Effectiveness 
Madrid Protocol 632 459 173 27.4% 
PLT 97 77 20 20.6% 
WPPT 450 371 79 17.6% 
WCT 466 389 77 16.5% 
Nairobi 16 14 2 12.5% 
TLT 261 232 29 11.1% 
Budapest 678 607 71 10.5% 
Singapore 11 10 1 9.1% 
Vienna 99 91 8 8.1% 
Rome 835 775 60 7.2% 
Lisbon 14 13 1 7.1% 
Hague 223 208 15 6.7% 
CBD 372 351 21 5.6% 
Brussels 164 155 9 5.5% 
EPC 230 220 10 4.3% 
Nice 704 676 28 4.0% 
Strasbourg 153 147 6 3.9% 
UPOV 730 703 27 3.7% 
Locarno 133 129 4 3.0% 
PCT 789 767 22 2.8% 
IPPC 316 312 4 1.3% 
Phonograms Geneva 267 264 3 1.1% 
TRIPS 985 977 8 0.8% 
Berne 963 957 6 0.6% 
Paris 851 847 4 0.5% 
Madrid 348 348 0 0.0% 
WIPO Convention 127 127 0 0.0% 
UCC Geneva 86 86 0 0.0% 
UCC Paris 49 49 0 0.0% 
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Appendix 59: Model Fit of Legal-Institutional Effects Analysis (AIC & BIC) 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m1_ols 332.289 10 394.181 10 
m1_op 1770.91 9 1826.61 9 
m1_p 7200.35 9 7256.06 9 
m1_nb 7202.37 10 7264.26 10 
m1_zip 7218.35 18 7329.76 18 
m1_zinb 7220.36 19 7337.96 19 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m1.1_ols 233.094 10 294.986 10 
m1.1_op 1690.4 9 1746.1 9 
m1.1_p 7193.28 9 7248.99 9 
m1.1_nb 7195.3 10 7257.19 10 
m1.1_zip 7211.29 18 7322.69 18 
m1.1_zinb 7213.28 19 7330.88 19 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m1.2_ols 308.627 10 370.519 10 
m1.2_op 1755.64 9 1811.35 9 
m1.2_p 7198.68 9 7254.38 9 
m1.2_nb 7200.69 10 7262.59 10 
m1.2_zip 7216.68 18 7328.09 18 
m1.2_zinb 7218.69 19 7336.28 19 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m1.3_ols 339.188 10 401.081 10 
m1.3_op 1777.94 9 1833.64 9 
m1.3_p 7200.82 9 7256.52 9 
m1.3_nb 7202.83 10 7264.72 10 
m1.3_zip 7218.82 18 7330.22 18 
m1.3_zinb 9666.14 19 9783.74 19 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m1.4_ols 342.833 10 404.726 10 
m1.4_op 1792.05 9 1847.76 9 
m1.4_p 7201.06 9 7256.76 9 
m1.4_nb 7203.07 10 7264.96 10 
m1.4_zip 7219.06 18 7330.47 18 
m1.4_zinb 7221.06 19 7338.65 19 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m1.5_ols 341.076 10 402.969 10 
m1.5_op 1788.29 9 1843.99 9 
m1.5_p 7200.94 9 7256.64 9 
m1.5_nb 7202.95 10 7264.85 10 
m1.5_zip 7218.98 18 7330.39 18 
m1.5_zinb 7220.94 19 7338.54 19 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2ss_ols 4723.91 10 4774.84 10 
m2ss_op 4016.51 30 4169.29 30 
m2ss_p 4877.5 9 4923.34 9 
m2ss_nb 4879.52 10 4930.45 10 
m2ss_zip 4895.5 18 4987.17 18 
m2ss_zinb 4897.54 19 4994.3 19 
Models AIC df BIC df 
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m2ss.1_op 5594.86 30 5747.63 30 
m2ss.1_p 6596.39 9 6642.22 9 
m2ss.1_nb 6120.05 10 6170.98 10 
m2ss.1_zip 6616.79 18 6708.46 18 
m2ss.1_zinb 6138.06 19 6234.82 19 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2ss.2_ols 6620.73 10 6671.66 10 
m2ss.2_p 6317.82 9 6363.66 9 
m2ss.2_nb 5985.92 10 6036.85 10 
m2ss.2_zip 6356.74 18 6448.41 18 
m2ss.2_zinb 6003.92 19 6100.68 19 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2ss.3_ols 6737.33 10 6788.26 10 
m2ss.3_op 5611.33 30 5764.11 30 
m2ss.3_p 6605.7 9 6651.54 9 
m2ss.3_nb 6128.84 10 6179.77 10 
m2ss.3_zip 6640.6 18 6732.27 18 
m2ss.3_zinb 6146.84 19 6243.6 19 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2ss.4_ols 6514.58 10 6565.5 10 
m2ss.4_p 6303.66 9 6349.5 9 
m2ss.4_nb 6004.34 10 6055.26 10 
m2ss.4_zip 6322.39 18 6414.06 18 
m2ss.4_zinb 6022.34 19 6119.09 19 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2ss.5_ols 6190.14 10 6241.07 10 
m2ss.5_p 5853.69 9 5899.52 9 
m2ss.5_nb 5750.32 10 5801.25 10 
m2ss.5_zip 5891.52 18 5983.19 18 
m2ss.5_zinb 5768.32 19 5865.08 19 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2ssm_ols -681.61 10 -630.68 10 
m2ssm_op 4602.81 56 4887.99 56 
m2ssm_p Inf 9 Inf 9 
m2ssm_nb 2350.11 10 2401.03 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2ssm.1_ols -720.33 10 -669.41 10 
m2ssm.1_op 4606.16 56 4891.34 56 
m2ssm.1_p Inf 9 Inf 9 
m2ssm.1_nb 2348.68 10 2399.61 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2ssm.2_ols -681.59 10 -630.66 10 
m2ssm.2_op 4614.94 56 4900.12 56 
m2ssm.2_p Inf 9 Inf 9 
m2ssm.2_nb 2350.11 10 2401.03 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2ssm.3_ols -684.66 10 -633.73 10 
m2ssm.3_op 4619.75 56 4904.93 56 
m2ssm.3_p Inf 9 Inf 9 
m2ssm.3_nb 2349.99 10 2400.92 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2ssm.4_ols -687.4 10 -636.47 10 
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m2ssm.4_p Inf 9 Inf 9 
m2ssm.4_nb 2349.9 10 2400.82 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2ssm.5_ols -685.26 10 -634.33 10 
m2ssm.5_op 4619.08 56 4904.27 56 
m2ssm.5_p Inf 9 Inf 9 
m2ssm.5_nb 2349.97 10 2400.9 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2bs_ols 6849.79 10 6902.75 10 
m2bs_p 6377.89 9 6425.55 9 
m2bs_nb 6379.89 10 6432.85 10 
m2bs_zip 6411.79 18 6507.11 18 
m2bs_zinb 6397.91 19 6498.53 19 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2bs.1_ols 8912 10 8964.96 10 
m2bs.1_p 8782.65 9 8830.31 9 
m2bs.1_nb 7938.09 10 7991.05 10 
m2bs.1_zip 8814.88 18 8910.2 18 
m2bs.1_zinb 7956.13 19 8056.75 19 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2bs.2_ols 8918.26 10 8971.22 10 
m2bs.2_p 8795.23 9 8842.89 9 
m2bs.2_nb 7941.64 10 7994.6 10 
m2bs.2_zip 8829.58 18 8924.9 18 
m2bs.2_zinb 7959.64 19 8060.26 19 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2bs.3_ols 8875.38 10 8928.34 10 
m2bs.3_p 8720.06 9 8767.73 9 
m2bs.3_nb 7906.59 10 7959.54 10 
m2bs.3_zip 8754.54 18 8849.86 18 
m2bs.3_zinb 8439.64 19 8540.26 19 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2bs.4_ols 8793.95 10 8846.91 10 
m2bs.4_p 8600.78 9 8648.44 9 
m2bs.4_nb 7868.84 10 7921.8 10 
m2bs.4_zip 8635.07 18 8730.4 18 
m2bs.4_zinb 7886.86 19 7987.48 19 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2bs.5_ols 8373.09 10 8426.04 10 
m2bs.5_p 7814.48 9 7862.15 9 
m2bs.5_nb 7488.62 10 7541.57 10 
m2bs.5_zip 7848.11 18 7943.43 18 
m2bs.5_zinb 7506.63 19 7607.25 19 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2bsm_ols -754.95 10 -701.99 10 
m2bsm_op 8929.96 114 9533.67 114 
m2bsm_p Inf 9 Inf 9 
m2bsm_nb 2867.97 10 2920.92 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2bsm.1_ols -724.68 10 -671.72 10 
m2bsm.1_op 8945.34 114 9549.06 114 
m2bsm.1_p Inf 9 Inf 9 
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Models AIC df BIC df 
m2bsm.2_ols -724.45 10 -671.49 10 
m2bsm.2_op 8934.23 114 9537.95 114 
m2bsm.2_p Inf 9 Inf 9 
m2bsm.2_nb 2869.18 10 2922.14 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2bsm.3_ols -710.07 10 -657.11 10 
m2bsm.3_op 8964.97 114 9568.69 114 
m2bsm.3_p Inf 9 Inf 9 
m2bsm.3_nb 2869.77 10 2922.73 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2bsm.4_ols -710.73 10 -657.77 10 
m2bsm.4_op 8963.16 114 9566.87 114 
m2bsm.4_p Inf 9 Inf 9 
m2bsm.4_nb 2869.74 10 2922.7 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2bsm.5_ols -750.52 10 -697.56 10 
m2bsm.5_op 8936.5 114 9540.21 114 
m2bsm.5_p Inf 9 Inf 9 
m2bsm.5_nb 2868.19 10 2921.15 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3ss_ols 3143.81 10 3194.74 10 
m3ss_p 2047.77 9 2093.6 9 
m3ss_nb 1957.86 10 2008.79 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3ss.1_ols 3201.38 10 3252.31 10 
m3ss.1_op 1942.35 14 2013.65 14 
m3ss.1_p 2108.8 9 2154.64 9 
m3ss.1_nb 1997.23 10 2048.15 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3ss.2_ols 3136.54 10 3187.46 10 
m3ss.2_p 1933 9 1978.83 9 
m3ss.2_nb 1890.77 10 1941.69 10 
df AIC df BIC df 
m3ss.3_ols 3210.72 10 3261.64 10 
m3ss.3_p 2117 9 2162.84 9 
m3ss.3_nb 2001.01 10 2051.94 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3ss.4_ols 2953.5 10 3004.43 10 
m3ss.4_p 1958.09 9 2003.92 9 
m3ss.4_nb 1877.57 10 1928.49 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3ss.5_ols 3208 10 3258.92 10 
m3ss.5_p 2112.93 9 2158.77 9 
m3ss.5_nb 1999.1 10 2050.02 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3sm_ols -1876.6 10 -1825.6 10 
m3sm_p Inf 9 Inf 9 
m3sm_nb 445.017 10 495.943 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3sm.1_ols -1882.2 10 -1831.3 10 
m3sm.1_p Inf 9 Inf 9 
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Models AIC df BIC df 
m3sm.2_ols -1925.7 10 -1874.7 10 
m3sm.2_p Inf 9 Inf 9 
m3sm.2_nb 429.872 10 480.798 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3sm.4_ols -1953.7 10 -1902.7 10 
m3sm.4_p Inf 9 Inf 9 
m3sm.4_nb 436.233 10 487.159 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3sm.5_ols -1899.7 10 -1848.8 10 
m3sm.5_p Inf 9 Inf 9 
m3sm.5_nb 439.608 10 490.534 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3bs_ols 4246.12 10 4299.08 10 
m3bs_p 2817.66 9 2865.33 9 
m3bs_nb 2626.13 10 2679.09 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3bs.1_ols 4284.33 10 4337.29 10 
m3bs.1_p 2862.47 9 2910.13 9 
m3bs.1_nb 2648.68 10 2701.64 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3bs.2_ols 4209.96 10 4262.92 10 
m3bs.2_p 2629.31 9 2676.97 9 
m3bs.2_nb 2530.32 10 2583.28 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3bs.3_ols 4278.33 10 4331.29 10 
m3bs.3_p 2854.91 9 2902.57 9 
m3bs.3_nb 2644.4 10 2697.36 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3bs.4_ols 3980.22 10 4033.18 10 
m3bs.4_p 2636.23 9 2683.89 9 
m3bs.4_nb 2493.8 10 2546.76 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3bs.5_ols 4265.66 10 4318.62 10 
m3bs.5_p 2824.83 9 2872.49 9 
m3bs.5_nb 2628.75 10 2681.71 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3bm.1_ols -2679.2 10 -2626.3 10 
m3bm.1_p Inf 9 Inf 9 
m3bm.1_nb 519.669 10 572.626 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3bm.2_ols -2746.9 10 -2694 10 
m3bm.2_p Inf 9 Inf 9 
m3bm.2_nb 499.184 10 552.141 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3bm.3_ols -2679.7 10 -2626.8 10 
m3bm.3_p Inf 9 Inf 9 
m3bm.3_nb 519.537 10 572.494 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3bm.4_ols -2785.3 10 -2732.3 10 
m3bm.4_p Inf 9 Inf 9 
m3bm.4_nb 509.379 10 562.336 10 
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Models AIC df BIC df 
m3bm.5_ols -2734.3 10 -2681.4 10 
m3bm.5_p Inf 9 Inf 9 







- 384 - 
Appendix 60: Descriptive Statistics for the Economic Effects Data – Binary & Additive Var-
iables of Indexes 
Variables N Min Max Median Mean Std.Dev. 
Independent Variables       
Binary & Additive Variables of Indexes       
Index IPR general (sum)       
ipr_mentioned  3833 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.56 0.50 
ipr_1_article  3833 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.52 0.50 
ipr_more_than_1_article  3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.46 0.50 
ipr_mfn  3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.16 0.37 
ipr_nt  3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.10 0.30 
ipr_as_investment  3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.08 0.27 
ipr_investment_mfn  3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.06 0.24 
ipr_investment_nt  3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.07 0.25 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination  3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.44 0.50 
ipr_general_enforcement  3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.39 0.49 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism  3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.04 0.20 
ipr_investment_dispute_settle-
ment_mechanism  
3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.07 0.25 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception  3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.05 0.22 
ipr_implementation  3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.18 0.38 
ipr_border_measures 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.23 0.42 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.37 0.48 
ipr_m_trademarks 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.39 0.49 
ipr_m_geo_indications 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.38 0.49 
ipr_m_industrial_designs 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.35 0.48 
ipr_m_patents 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.38 0.48 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.32 0.47 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.34 0.47 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.21 0.41 
ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources 
3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.08 0.28 
ipr_m_encrypted_program_carrying_sat-
ellite_signals 
3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.04 0.19 
ipr_m_domain_names 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.12 
Index IPR specific (sum)       
ipr_special_requirements_related_bor-
der_measures 
3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.16 0.37 
ipr_civil_administrative_procedures_rem-
edies 
3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.18 0.38 
ipr_provisional_measure 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.17 0.38 
ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.13 0.34 
ipr_service_provider_liability 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.05 0.23 
ipr_committee 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.11 0.31 
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Variables N Min Max Median Mean Std.Dev. 
Index IPR specific (sum) (cont.)       
ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.14 0.34 
ipr_t_trademarks 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.18 0.38 
ipr_t_geo_indications 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.20 0.40 
ipr_t_industrial_designs 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.13 0.34 
ipr_t_patents 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.14 0.35 
ipr_t_undisclosed_information 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.06 0.25 
ipr_t_layout_design_integ_circuits 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.02 0.15 
ipr_t_new_plant_varieties 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.04 0.20 
ipr_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.04 0.21 
ipr_t_encrypted_program_carrying_satel-
lite_signals 
3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.02 0.14 
ipr_t_domain_names 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.11 
Index IPR TRIPS-plus (sum)       
ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights 3833 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.19 0.59 
ipr_tripsplus_trademarks 3833 0.00 5.00 0.00 0.21 0.67 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications 3833 0.00 7.00 0.00 0.82 1.98 
ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.12 0.33 
ipr_tripsplus_patents 3833 0.00 6.00 0.00 0.21 0.71 
ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information 3833 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.12 0.46 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 
ipr_tripsplus_new_plant_varieties 3833 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.19 0.41 
ipr_tripsplus_trad_knowledge_ge-
netic_resources 
3833 0.00 7.00 0.00 0.16 0.81 
ipr_tripsplus_encrypted_program_carry-
ing_satellite_signals 
3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.02 0.14 
ipr_tripsplus_domain_names 3833 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.11 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement 3833 0.00 21.00 0.00 1.89 5.06 
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Appendix 61: Model Fit of Economic Effect Analysis (AIC & BIC) 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m1_df10l_gi 1427.84 10 1468.547 10 
m1_df10l_si 1432.096 10 1472.804 10 
m1_df10l_ti 1432.199 10 1472.906 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m1_dft_gi -448.8307 10 -401.7743 10 
m1_dft_si -451.4926 10 -404.4362 10 
m1_dft_ti -450.7723 10 -403.7159 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m1_fc_df_gi 906.115 10 954.3913 10 
m1_fc_df_si 904.0196 10 952.2959 10 
m1_fc_df_ti 909.488 10 957.7643 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m1_fc_df3l_gi 1552.09 10 1598.476 10 
m1_fc_df3l_si 1555.384 10 1601.77 10 
m1_fc_df3l_ti 1555.539 10 1601.925 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m1_fc_df5l_gi 400.3407 10 445.6203 10 
m1_fc_df5l_si 402.8941 10 448.1737 10 
m1_fc_df5l_ti 404.9234 10 450.2029 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m1_fc_dft_gi -454.7744 10 -407.718 10 
m1_fc_dft_si -452.0178 10 -404.9614 10 
m1_fc_dft_ti -449.4861 10 -402.4297 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m1_bv_df_gi 921.8842 35 1090.8512 35 
m1_bv_df_si 888.8078 27 1019.1538 27 
m1_bv_df_ti 884.3723 22 990.5802 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m1_bv_df5l_gi 418.6607 34 572.6113 34 
m1_bv_df5l_si 413.9678 27 536.2226 27 
m1_bv_df5l_ti 404.3499 22 503.965 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m1_bv_df10l_gi 1435.315 34 1573.72 34 
m1_bv_df10l_si 1454.329 22 1543.885 22 
m1_bv_df10l_ti 1453.235 21 1538.72 21 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m1_bv_dft_gi -458.8022 35 -294.1048 35 
m1_bv_dft_si -439.9058 27 -312.8536 27 
m1_bv_dft_ti -445.3561 22 -341.832 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m1_bv_fc_df_gi 943.338 34 1107.4774 34 
m1_bv_fc_df_si 932.301 26 1057.8194 26 
m1_bv_fc_df_ti 865.8497 21 967.2299 21 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m1_bv_fc_df5l_gi 401.2946 34 555.2452 34 
m1_bv_fc_df5l_si 418.7462 26 536.4731 26 
m1_bv_fc_df5l_ti 400.9655 21 496.0526 21 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m1_bv_fc_df10l_gi 1451.993 31 1578.186 31 
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m1_bv_fc_df10l_ti 1451.923 20 1533.338 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m1_bv_fc_dft_gi -485.987 34 -325.9953 34 
m1_bv_fc_dft_si -441.0506 26 -318.704 26 
m1_bv_fc_dft_ti -443.9896 21 -345.1711 21 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2.2_df3l_gi 14703.78 10 14755.68 10 
m2.2_df3l_si 14706.93 10 14758.83 10 
m2.2_df3l_ti 14706.98 10 14758.88 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2.2_dft_gi 9235.506 10 9287.629 10 
m2.2_dft_si 9238.573 10 9290.696 10 
m2.2_dft_ti 9238.61 10 9290.733 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2.2_fc_df5l_gi 14358.1 10 14409.2 10 
m2.2_fc_df5l_si 14361.69 10 14412.79 10 
m2.2_fc_df5l_ti 14361.51 10 14412.61 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2.2_bv_df_gi 10067.49 35 10254.42 35 
m2.2_bv_df_si 10076.46 27 10220.66 27 
m2.2_bv_df_ti 10073.79 22 10191.29 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2.2_bv_df5l_gi 14392.04 35 14570.88 35 
m2.2_bv_df5l_si 14393.48 27 14531.45 27 
m2.2_bv_df5l_ti 14384.23 22 14496.65 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2.2_bv_df10l_gi 13476.72 35 13646.36 35 
m2.2_bv_df10l_si 13475.07 26 13601.09 26 
m2.2_bv_df10l_ti 13467.17 22 13573.8 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2.2_bv_dft_gi 9251.86 35 9434.291 35 
m2.2_bv_dft_si 9255.965 27 9396.697 27 
m2.2_bv_dft_ti 9254.555 22 9369.225 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2.2_bv_fc_df_gi 10054.76 35 10241.68 35 
m2.2_bv_fc_df_si 10089.3 27 10233.51 27 
m2.2_bv_fc_df_ti 10078.54 22 10196.04 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2.2_bv_fc_df5l_gi 14361.32 35 14540.16 35 
m2.2_bv_fc_df5l_si 14394.98 27 14532.95 27 
m2.2_bv_fc_df5l_ti 14385.06 22 14497.47 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2.2_bv_fc_df10l_gi 13422.49 35 13592.14 35 
m2.2_bv_fc_df10l_si 13473.54 25 13594.71 25 
m2.2_bv_fc_df10l_ti 13467.63 22 13574.27 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m2.2_bv_fc_dft_gi 9242.367 35 9424.797 35 
m2.2_bv_fc_dft_si 9269.12 27 9409.852 27 
m2.2_bv_fc_dft_ti 9257.463 22 9372.134 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.1_df_gi -391.2584 10 -344.5888 10 
m3.1_df_si -405.5308 10 -358.8612 10 
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Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.1_df3l_gi 389.4852 10 434.0999 10 
m3.1_df3l_si 384.6037 10 429.2184 10 
m3.1_df3l_ti 386.2292 10 430.8439 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.1_df5l_gi 649.6676 10 693.3323 10 
m3.1_df5l_si 653.8422 10 697.5069 10 
m3.1_df5l_ti 655.6726 10 699.3373 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.1_dft_gi -130.4502 10 -85.18523 10 
m3.1_dft_si -144.9588 10 -99.69389 10 
m3.1_dft_ti -141.5245 10 -96.25952 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.1_fc_df_gi -363.2005 10 -316.5309 10 
m3.1_fc_df_si -373.0245 10 -326.3549 10 
m3.1_fc_df_ti -387.9492 10 -341.2797 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.1_fc_df3l_gi 395.8468 10 440.4615 10 
m3.1_fc_df3l_si 389.7625 10 434.3772 10 
m3.1_fc_df3l_ti 388.2802 10 432.8949 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.1_fc_df5l_gi 653.4016 10 697.0664 10 
m3.1_fc_df5l_si 656.3158 10 699.9805 10 
m3.1_fc_df5l_ti 655.7678 10 699.4325 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.1_fc_df10l_gi 693.0194 10 731.7968 10 
m3.1_fc_df10l_si 696.4403 10 735.2177 10 
m3.1_fc_df10l_ti 690.994 10 729.7713 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.1_fc_dft_gi -126.526 10 -81.26105 10 
m3.1_fc_dft_si -127.8923 10 -82.62734 10 
m3.1_fc_dft_ti -131.0239 10 -85.75898 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.1_bv_df_gi -379.3952 35 -216.0517 35 
m3.1_bv_df_si -388.831 27 -262.8231 27 
m3.1_bv_df_ti -389.756 22 -287.083 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.1_bv_df3l_gi 395.3075 34 546.9974 34 
m3.1_bv_df3l_si 397.3648 27 517.8245 27 
m3.1_bv_df3l_ti 392.7188 22 490.8711 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.1_bv_df5l_gi 670.7908 34 819.2507 34 
m3.1_bv_df5l_si 658.8844 27 776.7791 27 
m3.1_bv_df5l_ti 652.2341 22 748.2965 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.1_bv_df10l_gi 694.0824 33 822.0477 33 
m3.1_bv_df10l_si 709.1134 22 794.4236 22 
m3.1_bv_df10l_ti 700.2826 20 777.8374 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.1_bv_dft_gi -133.5461 35 24.881212 35 
m3.1_bv_dft_si -118.3703 27 3.845058 27 
m3.1_bv_dft_ti -128.4866 22 -28.90371 22 
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m3.1_bv_fc_df_gi -435.904 34 -277.2275 34 
m3.1_bv_fc_df_si -359.8771 26 -238.5362 26 
m3.1_bv_fc_df_ti -385.0262 21 -287.0201 21 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.1_bv_fc_df3l_gi 395.1039 34 546.7938 34 
m3.1_bv_fc_df3l_si 407.2764 25 518.8131 25 
m3.1_bv_fc_df3l_ti 394.0922 21 487.7831 21 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.1_bv_fc_df5l_gi 661.4097 34 809.8697 34 
m3.1_bv_fc_df5l_si 662.443 26 775.9712 26 
m3.1_bv_fc_df5l_ti 645.4274 21 737.1232 21 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.1_bv_fc_df10l_gi 648.0386 28 756.6152 28 
m3.1_bv_fc_df10l_si 669.0145 19 742.6915 19 
m3.1_bv_fc_df10l_ti 691.2686 19 764.9456 19 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.1_bv_fc_dft_gi -172.2427 34 -18.341922 34 
m3.1_bv_fc_dft_si -108.4596 26 9.229233 26 
m3.1_bv_fc_dft_ti -120.6552 21 -25.598789 21 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.3_df_gi 15517.07 10 15573.07 10 
m3.3_df_si 15524.16 10 15580.16 10 
m3.3_df_ti 15524.59 10 15580.59 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.3_df3l_gi 16340.58 10 16395.52 10 
m3.3_df3l_si 16343.98 10 16398.92 10 
m3.3_df3l_ti 16344.58 10 16399.52 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.3_df5l_gi 16977.86 10 17032.15 10 
m3.3_df5l_si 16981.68 10 17035.97 10 
m3.3_df5l_ti 16982.18 10 17036.47 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.3_df10l_gi 16248.23 10 16300.34 10 
m3.3_df10l_si 16256.5 10 16308.6 10 
m3.3_df10l_ti 16256.65 10 16308.75 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.3_dft_gi 15337.57 10 15392.61 10 
m3.3_dft_si 15336.8 10 15391.83 10 
m3.3_dft_ti 15335.79 10 15390.83 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.3_bv_df_gi 15510.31 35 15706.31 35 
m3.3_bv_df_si 15554.99 27 15706.18 27 
m3.3_bv_df_ti 15546.68 22 15669.88 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.3_bv_df3l_gi 16351.9 35 16544.19 35 
m3.3_bv_df3l_si 16374.21 27 16522.55 27 
m3.3_bv_df3l_ti 16365.38 22 16486.24 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.3_bv_df5l_gi 17001.97 35 17191.98 35 
m3.3_bv_df5l_si 17010.25 27 17156.83 27 
m3.3_bv_df5l_ti 17001.03 22 17120.46 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
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m3.3_bv_df10l_si 16284.54 26 16420 26 
m3.3_bv_df10l_ti 16278.16 22 16392.78 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.3_bv_dft_gi 15317.21 35 15509.82 35 
m3.3_bv_dft_si 15354.36 27 15502.95 27 
m3.3_bv_dft_ti 15336.24 22 15457.31 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.3_bv_fc_dft_gi 15376.88 35 15569.49 35 
m3.3_bv_fc_dft_si 15353.12 27 15501.7 27 
m3.3_bv_fc_dft_ti 15341.2 22 15462.27 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.4_df5l_gi 13121.27 10 13176.77 10 
m3.4_df5l_si 13123.14 10 13178.64 10 
m3.4_df5l_ti 13123.55 10 13179.05 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.4_df10l_gi 12823.85 10 12877.36 10 
m3.4_df10l_si 12827 10 12880.51 10 
m3.4_df10l_ti 12827.49 10 12881 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m3.4_bv_df10l_gi 12857.44 35 13044.73 35 
m3.4_bv_df10l_si 12857.3 26 12996.43 26 
m3.4_bv_df10l_ti 12850.4 22 12968.12 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.3_df5l_gi 3615.373 10 3657.638 10 
m4.3_df5l_si 3612.691 10 3654.957 10 
m4.3_df5l_ti 3613.007 10 3655.272 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.3_df10l_gi 2620.253 10 2659.142 10 
m4.3_df10l_si 2613.223 10 2652.112 10 
m4.3_df10l_ti 2610.729 10 2649.618 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.3_fc_df_gi 4444.021 10 4490.288 10 
m4.3_fc_df_si 4442.662 10 4488.929 10 
m4.3_fc_df_ti 4440.881 10 4487.148 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.3_fc_df10l_gi 2616.543 10 2655.432 10 
m4.3_fc_df10l_si 2620.177 10 2659.066 10 
m4.3_fc_df10l_ti 2620.32 10 2659.209 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.3_fc_dft_gi 4653.51 10 4694.148 10 
m4.3_fc_dft_si 4660.114 10 4700.751 10 
m4.3_fc_dft_ti 4660.608 10 4701.246 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.3_bv_df_gi 4360.512 34 4517.821 34 
m4.3_bv_df_si 4343.871 27 4468.793 27 
m4.3_bv_df_ti 4230.564 22 4332.352 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.3_bv_df3l_gi 3925.02 34 4072.652 34 
m4.3_bv_df3l_si 3832.046 27 3949.283 27 
m4.3_bv_df3l_ti 3810.244 22 3905.77 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.3_bv_df5l_gi 3557.162 34 3700.864 34 
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m4.3_bv_df5l_ti 3436.639 21 3525.396 21 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.3_bv_df10l_gi 2475.591 34 2607.813 34 
m4.3_bv_df10l_si 2411.79 25 2509.012 25 
m4.3_bv_df10l_ti 2477.035 20 2554.813 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.3_bv_dft_gi 4686.831 34 4825 34 
m4.3_bv_dft_si 4670.265 27 4779.987 27 
m4.3_bv_dft_ti 4669.781 22 4759.185 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.3_bv_fc_df_gi 4445.516 34 4602.825 34 
m4.3_bv_fc_df_si 4428.813 27 4553.734 27 
m4.3_bv_fc_df_ti 4431.918 22 4533.706 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.3_bv_fc_df3l_gi 4026.816 34 4174.448 34 
m4.3_bv_fc_df3l_si 4021.602 27 4138.84 27 
m4.3_bv_fc_df3l_ti 4015.098 22 4110.625 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.3_bv_fc_df5l_gi 3622.859 34 3766.561 34 
m4.3_bv_fc_df5l_si 3623.555 27 3737.671 27 
m4.3_bv_fc_df5l_ti 3621.844 22 3714.828 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.3_bv_fc_df10l_gi 2648.476 32 2772.92 32 
m4.3_bv_fc_df10l_si 2639.99 23 2729.434 23 
m4.3_bv_fc_df10l_ti 2636.169 21 2717.836 21 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.3_bv_fc_dft_gi 4659.145 22 4748.549 22 
m4.3_bv_fc_dft_si 4645.737 23 4739.204 23 
m4.3_bv_fc_dft_ti 4678.144 21 4763.483 21 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.4_df_gi 12812.54 10 12861.42 10 
m4.4_df_si 12811.45 10 12860.32 10 
m4.4_df_ti 12808.39 10 12857.26 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.4_df3l_gi 8873.096 10 8919.892 10 
m4.4_df3l_si 8872.157 10 8918.953 10 
m4.4_df3l_ti 8868.853 10 8915.649 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.4_df5l_gi 8651.723 10 8697.53 10 
m4.4_df5l_si 8640.867 10 8686.673 10 
m4.4_df5l_ti 8620.385 10 8666.191 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.4_df10l_gi 4857.044 10 4899.601 10 
m4.4_df10l_si 4829.654 10 4872.212 10 
m4.4_df10l_ti 4748.708 10 4791.266 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.4_dft_gi 8415.336 10 8459.665 10 
m4.4_dft_si 8415.075 10 8459.404 10 
m4.4_dft_ti 8414.15 10 8458.48 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.4_fc_df_gi 12811.99 10 12860.86 10 
m4.4_fc_df_si 12811.72 10 12860.59 10 
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Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.4_fc_df3l_gi 8872.058 10 8918.853 10 
m4.4_fc_df3l_si 8872.079 10 8918.875 10 
m4.4_fc_df3l_ti 8867.571 10 8914.367 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.4_fc_df5l_gi 8650.785 10 8696.591 10 
m4.4_fc_df5l_si 8650.421 10 8696.227 10 
m4.4_fc_df5l_ti 8647.521 10 8693.327 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.4_bv_df_gi 12682.38 34 12848.55 34 
m4.4_bv_df_si 12697.27 27 12829.24 27 
m4.4_bv_df_ti 12633.49 22 12741.01 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.4_bv_df3l_gi 8767.369 34 8926.475 34 
m4.4_bv_df3l_si 8783.646 27 8909.995 27 
m4.4_bv_df3l_ti 8692.423 22 8795.374 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.4_bv_df5l_gi 8548.955 34 8704.697 34 
m4.4_bv_df5l_si 8556.705 27 8680.383 27 
m4.4_bv_df5l_ti 8479.269 22 8580.043 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.4_bv_df10l_gi 4677.045 34 4821.74 34 
m4.4_bv_df10l_si 4615.125 25 4721.519 25 
m4.4_bv_df10l_ti 4498.755 21 4588.126 21 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.4_bv_dft_gi 8270.862 34 8421.582 34 
m4.4_bv_dft_si 8386.982 27 8506.671 27 
m4.4_bv_dft_ti 8436.373 22 8533.897 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.4_bv_fc_df3l_gi 8910.814 34 9069.921 34 
m4.4_bv_fc_df3l_si 8898.793 27 9025.142 27 
m4.4_bv_fc_df3l_ti 8887.261 21 8985.53 21 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.4_bv_fc_df5l_gi 8691.948 34 8847.689 34 
m4.4_bv_fc_df5l_si 8678.242 27 8801.919 27 
m4.4_bv_fc_df5l_ti 8667.054 21 8763.247 21 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.4_bv_fc_df10l_gi 4889.575 33 5030.014 33 
m4.4_bv_fc_df10l_si 4876.208 23 4974.09 23 
m4.4_bv_fc_df10l_ti 4871.208 20 4956.32 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.5_df5l_gi -9834.701 10 -9797.303 10 
m4.5_df5l_si -9833.756 10 -9796.358 10 
m4.5_df5l_ti -9836.481 10 -9799.084 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.5_df10l_gi -6321.652 10 -6288.52 10 
m4.5_df10l_si -6321.475 10 -6288.343 10 
m4.5_df10l_ti -6326.706 10 -6293.574 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.5_dft_gi -5878.647 10 -5846.607 10 
m4.5_dft_si -5875.583 10 -5843.543 10 
m4.5_dft_ti -5875.671 10 -5843.631 10 
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m4.5_fc_df3l_gi -9939.469 10 -9902.266 10 
m4.5_fc_df3l_si -9941.59 10 -9904.387 10 
m4.5_fc_df3l_ti -9938.588 10 -9901.385 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.5_bv_df_gi 3466.647 35 3621.857 35 
m4.5_bv_df_si 3451.273 27 3571.006 27 
m4.5_bv_df_ti 3442.966 22 3540.526 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.5_bv_df3l_gi -9925.167 34 -9798.677 34 
m4.5_bv_df3l_si -9914.066 27 -9813.617 27 
m4.5_bv_df3l_ti -9921.366 22 -9839.519 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.5_bv_df5l_gi -9811.683 34 -9684.53 34 
m4.5_bv_df5l_si -9811.795 27 -9710.82 27 
m4.5_bv_df5l_ti -9822.614 22 -9740.338 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.5_bv_df10l_gi -6313.744 34 -6201.095 34 
m4.5_bv_df10l_si -6309.541 25 -6226.711 25 
m4.5_bv_df10l_ti -6320.516 22 -6247.625 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.5_bv_dft_gi -5864.927 34 -5755.991 34 
m4.5_bv_dft_si -5847.882 27 -5761.374 27 
m4.5_bv_dft_ti -5854.135 22 -5783.647 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.5_bv_fc_df_gi 3456.41 34 3607.185 34 
m4.5_bv_fc_df_si 3441.185 27 3560.918 27 
m4.5_bv_fc_df_ti 3431.853 22 3529.413 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.5_bv_fc_df3l_gi -10127.979 34 -10001.488 34 
m4.5_bv_fc_df3l_si -9915.26 27 -9814.812 27 
m4.5_bv_fc_df3l_ti -9922.466 22 -9840.619 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.5_bv_fc_df5l_gi -10040.428 34 -9913.275 34 
m4.5_bv_fc_df5l_si -9809.668 27 -9708.694 27 
m4.5_bv_fc_df5l_ti -9818.884 22 -9736.609 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.5_bv_fc_df10l_gi -6399.565 34 -6286.916 34 
m4.5_bv_fc_df10l_si -6318.177 25 -6235.347 25 
m4.5_bv_fc_df10l_ti -6321.635 22 -6248.745 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.5_bv_fc_dft_gi -5861.717 26 -5778.413 26 
m4.5_bv_fc_dft_si -5855.426 23 -5781.733 23 
m4.5_bv_fc_dft_ti -5857.686 21 -5790.402 21 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.6_bv_df_gi 11203.56 35 11358.77 35 
m4.6_bv_df_si 11198.84 27 11318.57 27 
m4.6_bv_df_ti 11189.01 22 11286.57 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.6_bv_df3l_gi -15677.64 35 -15527.37 35 
m4.6_bv_df3l_si -15684.53 27 -15568.6 27 
m4.6_bv_df3l_ti -15694.34 22 -15599.88 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
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m4.6_bv_df5l_si -14035.96 27 -13923.04 27 
m4.6_bv_df5l_ti -14045.66 22 -13953.65 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.7_df5l_gi -16892.34 10 -16850.56 10 
m4.7_df5l_si -16907.19 10 -16865.41 10 
m4.7_df5l_ti -16901.11 10 -16859.34 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.7_dft_gi -9955.568 10 -9919.256 10 
m4.7_dft_si -9956.531 10 -9920.219 10 
m4.7_dft_ti -9956.812 10 -9920.5 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.7_fc_df3l_gi -17899.71 10 -17857.06 10 
m4.7_fc_df3l_si -17902.97 10 -17860.32 10 
m4.7_fc_df3l_ti -17903.13 10 -17860.48 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.7_fc_df5l_gi -16895.26 10 -16853.48 10 
m4.7_fc_df5l_si -16904.11 10 -16862.33 10 
m4.7_fc_df5l_ti -16904.64 10 -16862.86 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.7_bv_df_gi 1028.287 35 1183.496 35 
m4.7_bv_df_si 1029.442 27 1149.174 27 
m4.7_bv_df_ti 1016.901 22 1114.461 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.7_bv_df5l_gi -16891.95 35 -16745.72 35 
m4.7_bv_df5l_si -16879.29 27 -16766.48 27 
m4.7_bv_df5l_ti -16885.36 22 -16793.45 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.7_bv_dft_gi -9921.106 34 -9797.645 34 
m4.7_bv_dft_si -9930.483 27 -9832.44 27 
m4.7_bv_dft_ti -9936.161 22 -9856.275 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.7_bv_fc_df_gi 1029.966 34 1180.741 34 
m4.7_bv_fc_df_si 1026.547 27 1146.28 27 
m4.7_bv_fc_df_ti 1016.191 22 1113.751 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.7_bv_fc_df5l_gi -16982.01 34 -16839.96 34 
m4.7_bv_fc_df5l_si -16875.07 27 -16762.27 27 
m4.7_bv_fc_df5l_ti -16885.57 22 -16793.65 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.7_bv_fc_dft_gi -9934.936 33 -9815.106 33 
m4.7_bv_fc_dft_si -9935.034 27 -9836.991 27 
m4.7_bv_fc_dft_ti -9944.329 22 -9864.442 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.8_bv_df_gi 10607.75 35 10752.5 35 
m4.8_bv_df_si 10611.89 27 10723.55 27 
m4.8_bv_df_ti 10612.09 22 10703.07 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.8_bv_fc_df_gi 10612.29 34 10752.9 34 
m4.8_bv_fc_df_si 10627.37 27 10739.03 27 
m4.8_bv_fc_df_ti 10617.92 22 10708.9 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.9_bv_df3l_gi 20975.39 35 21124 35 




- 395 - 
m4.9_bv_df3l_ti 20975.61 22 21069.02 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.9_bv_df5l_gi 18693.7 35 18838.75 35 
m4.9_bv_df5l_si 18661.8 27 18773.69 27 
m4.9_bv_df5l_ti 18689.18 22 18780.36 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.9_bv_dft_gi 23022.86 35 23175.32 35 
m4.9_bv_dft_si 23012.77 27 23130.39 27 
m4.9_bv_dft_ti 23026.75 22 23122.59 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.9_bv_fc_df5l_gi 18744.16 34 18885.07 34 
m4.9_bv_fc_df5l_si 18730.16 27 18842.06 27 
m4.9_bv_fc_df5l_ti 18699.56 22 18790.73 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.10_bv_df_gi 11262.14 35 11414.54 35 
m4.10_bv_df_si 11291.17 27 11408.74 27 
m4.10_bv_df_ti 11286.09 22 11381.89 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.10_bv_df3l_gi 17450.78 35 17599.59 35 
m4.10_bv_df3l_si 17442.97 27 17557.77 27 
m4.10_bv_df3l_ti 17436.05 22 17529.59 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.10_bv_dft_gi 18815.77 35 18968.42 35 
m4.10_bv_dft_si 18817.87 27 18935.62 27 
m4.10_bv_dft_ti 18811.81 22 18907.76 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.11_bv_df_gi 13401.22 35 13554.52 35 
m4.11_bv_df_si 13410.68 27 13528.95 27 
m4.11_bv_df_ti 13408.92 22 13505.29 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.11_bv_fc_df_gi 13406.27 34 13555.2 34 
m4.11_bv_fc_df_si 13421.64 27 13539.9 27 
m4.11_bv_fc_df_ti 13412.03 22 13508.39 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.12_df10l_gi -10585.39 10 -10548.39 10 
m4.12_df10l_si -10582.2 10 -10545.2 10 
m4.12_df10l_ti -10582.17 10 -10545.16 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.12_dft_gi -11173.66 10 -11136.99 10 
m4.12_dft_si -11174.97 10 -11138.3 10 
m4.12_dft_ti -11174.76 10 -11138.1 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.12_fc_df_gi 1068.067 10 1112.413 10 
m4.12_fc_df_si 1070.874 10 1115.219 10 
m4.12_fc_df_ti 1070.945 10 1115.291 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.12_fc_df3l_gi -19772.79 10 -19730.02 10 
m4.12_fc_df3l_si -19775.49 10 -19732.73 10 
m4.12_fc_df3l_ti -19775.12 10 -19732.35 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.12_fc_df5l_gi -19348.97 10 -19306.96 10 
m4.12_fc_df5l_si -19355.7 10 -19313.7 10 
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Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.12_fc_dft_gi -11171.75 10 -11135.09 10 
m4.12_fc_dft_si -11181.03 10 -11144.37 10 
m4.12_fc_dft_ti -11179.59 10 -11142.92 10 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.12_bv_df_gi 1088.001 35 1243.211 35 
m4.12_bv_df_si 1096.962 27 1216.695 27 
m4.12_bv_df_ti 1083.716 22 1181.276 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.12_bv_df5l_gi -19342.26 35 -19195.24 35 
m4.12_bv_df5l_si -19326.21 27 -19212.8 27 
m4.12_bv_df5l_ti -19333.84 22 -19241.43 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.12_bv_fc_df_gi 1099.139 34 1249.913 34 
m4.12_bv_fc_df_si 1094.232 27 1213.964 27 
m4.12_bv_fc_df_ti 1084.943 22 1182.503 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.12_bv_fc_df5l_gi -19363.25 34 -19220.44 34 
m4.12_bv_fc_df5l_si -19327.04 27 -19213.62 27 
m4.12_bv_fc_df5l_ti -19334.41 22 -19242 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m4.12_bv_fc_dft_gi -11200.78 33 -11079.79 33 
m4.12_bv_fc_dft_si -11152.92 27 -11053.93 27 
m4.12_bv_fc_dft_ti -11161.04 22 -11080.38 22 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.1_df_gi 1237.885 8 1285.856 8 
m5.1_df_si 1199.411 8 1247.381 8 
m5.1_df_ti 1185.949 8 1233.919 8 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.1_df3l_gi 5470.547 8 5517.942 8 
m5.1_df3l_si 5417.791 8 5465.187 8 
m5.1_df3l_ti 5424.354 8 5471.75 8 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.1_df5l_gi 8456.172 8 8503.24 8 
m5.1_df5l_si 8437.901 8 8484.969 8 
m5.1_df5l_ti 8445.022 8 8492.089 8 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.1_dft_gi 1926.627 8 1974.086 8 
m5.1_dft_si 2000.669 8 2048.128 8 
m5.1_dft_ti 2001.351 8 2048.81 8 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.1_fc_df_gi 1195.845 8 1243.816 8 
m5.1_fc_df_si 1239.456 8 1287.426 8 
m5.1_fc_df_ti 1237.27 8 1285.24 8 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.1_fc_df3l_gi 5374.379 8 5421.775 8 
m5.1_fc_df3l_si 5469.335 8 5516.731 8 
m5.1_fc_df3l_ti 5460.791 8 5508.186 8 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.1_fc_df5l_gi 8396.31 8 8443.377 8 
m5.1_fc_df5l_si 8455.036 8 8502.104 8 
m5.1_fc_df5l_ti 8452.408 8 8499.475 8 
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m5.1_fc_df10l_gi 12228.33 8 12274.26 8 
m5.1_fc_df10l_si 12236.17 8 12282.1 8 
m5.1_fc_df10l_ti 12236.22 8 12282.15 8 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.1_fc_dft_gi 1933.286 8 1980.745 8 
m5.1_fc_dft_si 1997.194 8 2044.653 8 
m5.1_fc_dft_ti 1996.677 8 2044.135 8 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.1_bv_df_gi 1078.215 33 1276.093 33 
m5.1_bv_df_si 1175.114 25 1325.022 25 
m5.1_bv_df_ti 1162.24 20 1282.167 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.1_bv_df3l_gi 5325.476 33 5520.982 33 
m5.1_bv_df3l_si 5421.955 25 5570.066 25 
m5.1_bv_df3l_ti 5423.77 20 5542.259 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.1_bv_df5l_gi 8393.48 33 8587.634 33 
m5.1_bv_df5l_si 8455.215 25 8602.301 25 
m5.1_bv_df5l_ti 8452.287 20 8569.956 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.1_bv_df10l_gi 12270.81 33 12460.27 33 
m5.1_bv_df10l_si 12264.65 24 12402.44 24 
m5.1_bv_df10l_ti 12256.88 20 12371.7 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.1_bv_dft_gi 1717.786 33 1913.554 33 
m5.1_bv_dft_si 1992.187 25 2140.496 25 
m5.1_bv_dft_ti 1984.319 20 2102.966 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.1_bv_fc_df_gi 922.131 33 1120.009 33 
m5.1_bv_fc_df_si 1245.272 25 1395.18 25 
m5.1_bv_fc_df_ti 1232.298 20 1352.224 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.1_bv_fc_df3l_gi 5262.637 33 5458.144 33 
m5.1_bv_fc_df3l_si 5482.099 25 5630.21 25 
m5.1_bv_fc_df3l_ti 5450.003 20 5568.492 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.1_bv_fc_df5l_gi 8337.631 33 8531.785 33 
m5.1_bv_fc_df5l_si 8471.925 25 8619.012 25 
m5.1_bv_fc_df5l_ti 8463.955 20 8581.624 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.1_bv_fc_df10l_gi 12260.09 33 12449.55 33 
m5.1_bv_fc_df10l_si 12266.48 24 12404.27 24 
m5.1_bv_fc_df10l_ti 12257.4 20 12372.22 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.1_bv_fc_dft_gi 1705.663 33 1901.431 33 
m5.1_bv_fc_dft_si 2001.34 25 2149.649 25 
m5.1_bv_fc_dft_ti 1993.657 20 2112.305 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.2_df_gi 792.0778 8 840.0484 8 
m5.2_df_si 759.1076 8 807.0782 8 
m5.2_df_ti 743.1731 8 791.1436 8 
Models AIC df BIC df 
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m5.2_df3l_si 4642.001 8 4689.397 8 
m5.2_df3l_ti 4647.694 8 4695.089 8 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.2_df5l_gi 7169.042 8 7216.109 8 
m5.2_df5l_si 7145.893 8 7192.961 8 
m5.2_df5l_ti 7154.527 8 7201.595 8 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.2_dft_gi 1577.669 8 1625.128 8 
m5.2_dft_si 1655.578 8 1703.037 8 
m5.2_dft_ti 1655.802 8 1703.261 8 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.2_fc_df_gi 756.7521 8 804.7226 8 
m5.2_fc_df_si 795.2528 8 843.2233 8 
m5.2_fc_df_ti 793.5133 8 841.4838 8 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.2_fc_df3l_gi 4609.485 8 4656.881 8 
m5.2_fc_df3l_si 4695.999 8 4743.394 8 
m5.2_fc_df3l_ti 4686.61 8 4734.006 8 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.2_fc_df5l_gi 7110.178 8 7157.246 8 
m5.2_fc_df5l_si 7167.977 8 7215.044 8 
m5.2_fc_df5l_ti 7164.375 8 7211.442 8 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.2_fc_df10l_gi 9809.371 8 9855.296 8 
m5.2_fc_df10l_si 9819.95 8 9865.875 8 
m5.2_fc_df10l_ti 9820.061 8 9865.986 8 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.2_fc_dft_gi 1597.294 8 1644.753 8 
m5.2_fc_dft_si 1653.262 8 1700.721 8 
m5.2_fc_dft_ti 1653.03 8 1700.489 8 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.2_bv_df_gi 633.7339 33 831.6124 33 
m5.2_bv_df_si 730.6541 25 880.5621 25 
m5.2_bv_df_ti 720.1682 20 840.0946 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.2_bv_df3l_gi 4533.469 33 4728.976 33 
m5.2_bv_df3l_si 4643.393 25 4791.504 25 
m5.2_bv_df3l_ti 4648.016 20 4766.504 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.2_bv_df5l_gi 7075.124 33 7269.278 33 
m5.2_bv_df5l_si 7158.475 25 7305.561 25 
m5.2_bv_df5l_ti 7157.753 20 7275.422 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.2_bv_df10l_gi 9838.259 33 10027.701 33 
m5.2_bv_df10l_si 9843.339 24 9981.115 24 
m5.2_bv_df10l_ti 9835.937 20 9950.75 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.2_bv_dft_gi 1370.04 33 1565.808 33 
m5.2_bv_dft_si 1651.866 25 1800.175 25 
m5.2_bv_dft_ti 1645.965 20 1764.612 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.2_bv_fc_df_gi 502.0754 33 699.9538 33 
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m5.2_bv_fc_df_ti 789.4731 20 909.3994 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.2_bv_fc_df3l_gi 4512.283 33 4707.789 33 
m5.2_bv_fc_df3l_si 4709.697 25 4857.808 25 
m5.2_bv_fc_df3l_ti 4676.01 20 4794.499 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.2_bv_fc_df5l_gi 7048.966 33 7243.12 33 
m5.2_bv_fc_df5l_si 7180.946 25 7328.032 25 
m5.2_bv_fc_df5l_ti 7172.778 20 7290.447 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.2_bv_fc_df10l_gi 9827.616 33 10017.058 33 
m5.2_bv_fc_df10l_si 9848.181 24 9985.957 24 
m5.2_bv_fc_df10l_ti 9837.17 20 9951.984 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.2_bv_fc_dft_gi 1386.307 33 1582.075 33 
m5.2_bv_fc_dft_si 1661.556 25 1809.865 25 
m5.2_bv_fc_dft_ti 1654.033 20 1772.68 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.3_df5l_gi 22584.51 8 22631.24 8 
m5.3_df5l_si 22588.56 8 22635.3 8 
m5.3_df5l_ti 22588.48 8 22635.21 8 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.3_bv_df_gi 22265.62 33 22462.3 33 
m5.3_bv_df_si 22269.19 25 22418.19 25 
m5.3_bv_df_ti 22258.49 20 22377.69 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.3_bv_df5l_gi 22618.92 33 22811.69 33 
m5.3_bv_df5l_si 22618.67 25 22764.71 25 
m5.3_bv_df5l_ti 22609.98 20 22726.81 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.3_bv_dft_gi 22085.75 33 22280.29 33 
m5.3_bv_dft_si 22086.97 25 22234.34 25 
m5.3_bv_dft_ti 22079.8 20 22197.7 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.3_bv_fc_df_gi 22280.04 33 22476.72 33 
m5.3_bv_fc_df_si 22260.06 25 22409.05 25 
m5.3_bv_fc_df_ti 22260.15 20 22379.35 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.3_bv_fc_dft_gi 22095.58 33 22290.12 33 
m5.3_bv_fc_dft_si 22080.99 25 22228.37 25 
m5.3_bv_fc_dft_ti 22077.09 20 22194.99 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.4_bv_df3l_gi 22663.64 33 22857.89 33 
m5.4_bv_df3l_si 22635.07 25 22782.23 25 
m5.4_bv_df3l_ti 22627.18 20 22744.91 20 
Models AIC df BIC df 
m5.4_bv_fc_df3l_gi 22627.36 33 22821.61 33 
m5.4_bv_fc_df3l_si 22651.46 25 22798.62 25 
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Appendix 62: Economic Effect Regression Tables of the Binary Variables for IPR General 
 
Investment in R&D I Overall IPR 









IPR General Binary Variables     
ipr_mentioned -0.012                     
(0.069) 
-0.028                  
(0.066) 
0.116                  
(0.277) 
-0.008                     
(0.032) 
ipr_1_article -0.019                     
(0.076) 
0.099                  
(0.07) 
0.365                  
(0.489) 
-0.027                     
(0.035) 
ipr_more_than_1_article 0.026                     
(0.064) 
-0.041                  
(0.059) 
-0.606                  
(0.489) 
0.03                     
(0.03) 
ipr_mfn 0.161***                     
(0.047) 
0.085                  
(0.055) 
0.773**                  
(0.285) 
0.046.                     
(0.026) 
ipr_nt -0.099                     
(0.06) 
0                  
(0.071) 
-0.502                  
(0.479) 
-0.056.                     
(0.03) 
ipr_as_investment 0.131                     
(0.246) 
0.147                  
(0.223) 
-0.024                  
(1.802) 
0.058                     
(0.113) 
ipr_investment_mfn 0                     
(0.122) 
-0.089                  
(0.124) 
0.507                  
(0.792) 
0.008                     
(0.056) 
ipr_investment_nt -0.127                     
(0.278) 
NA NA -0.113                     
(0.128) 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination 0.033                     
(0.05) 
-0.045                  
(0.048) 
-0.523.                  
(0.268) 
0.05*                     
(0.023) 
ipr_general_enforcement 0.042                     
(0.049) 
0.034                  
(0.045) 
0.344                  
(0.229) 
0.008                     
(0.023) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism 0.029                     
(0.056) 
0.112.                  
(0.067) 
0.071                  
(0.549) 




-0.03                     
(0.176) 
-0.123                  
(0.187) 
-0.054                  
(1.561) 
-0.009                     
(0.081) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception 0.01                     
(0.103) 
-0.048                  
(0.109) 
-0.281                  
(0.854) 
-0.002                     
(0.047) 
ipr_implementation -0.026                     
(0.038) 
0.062.                  
(0.035) 
0.761***                  
(0.185) 
-0.031.                     
(0.018) 
ipr_border_measures -0.19***                     
(0.051) 
-0.07                  
(0.059) 
-0.326                  
(0.397) 
-0.006                     
(0.028) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights -0.043                     
(0.088) 
-0.267**                  
(0.101) 
-0.17                  
(0.747) 
-0.032                     
(0.047) 
ipr_m_trademarks 0.069                     
(0.132) 
0.388**                  
(0.137) 
-0.141                  
(0.916) 
0.017                     
(0.062) 
ipr_m_geo_indications 0.015                     
(0.081) 
-0.127                  
(0.081) 
0.476                  
(0.434) 
-0.03                     
(0.037) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs -0.117                     
(0.131) 
-0.111                  
(0.122) 
0.094                  
(0.753) 
-0.031                     
(0.061) 
ipr_m_patents 0.004                     
(0.124) 
0.098                  
(0.126) 
0.215                  
(0.7) 
0.036                     
(0.057) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information -0.061                     
(0.066) 
0.043                  
(0.092) 
0.177                  
(0.616) 
-0.035                     
(0.039) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits 0.073                     
(0.09) 
-0.037                  
(0.095) 
-0.469                  
(0.823) 
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ipr_m_new_plant_varieties 0.121**                     
(0.045) 
-0.007                  
(0.049) 
0.665**                  
(0.241) 




-0.019                     
(0.057) 
0.06                  
(0.068) 
0.225                  
(0.796) 




0.128                     
(0.079) 
0.073                  
(0.073) 
0.455                  
(0.851) 
0.146***                     
(0.037) 
ipr_m_domain_names 0.026                     
(0.157) 
-0.169                  
(0.159) 
0.088                  
(1.006) 
-0.052                     
(0.075) 
Control Variables     
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.006.                     
(0.003) 
0.008*                  
(0.003) 
-0.032.                  
(0.018) 
0.002                     
(0.002) 
Classic IP leaders 0.162***                     
(0.047) 
0.188***                  
(0.05) 
0.357                  
(0.254) 
0.041.                     
(0.022) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.005                     
(0.042) 
0.036                  
(0.038) 
0.314                  
(0.192) 
-0.026                     
(0.019) 
New IP producers and developers 0.065                     
(0.041) 
0.186***                  
(0.046) 
-0.033                  
(0.308) 
0.047*                     
(0.019) 
ln GDP -0.006                     
(0.009) 
0.002                  
(0.009) 
-0.099*                  
(0.048) 
0.001                     
(0.005) 
ln GDPpc -0.035*                     
(0.018) 
-0.081***                  
(0.018) 
-0.084                  
(0.105) 
-0.023**                     
(0.009) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.029                     
(0.02) 
0.036.                  
(0.021) 
-0.249*                  
(0.101) 
0.035***                     
(0.009) 
Intercept 0.266     
(0.236) 
0.389                       
(0.255) 
5.301***                  
(1.332) 










Observations 923 684 433 817 
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Investment in R&D II First-comer IPR 







IPR General Binary Variables    
ipr_mentioned -0.081                  
(0.108) 
-0.733                     
(0.473) 
-0.024                     
(0.057) 
ipr_1_article 0.218.                  
(0.119) 
0.902                     
(0.623) 
0.043                     
(0.064) 
ipr_more_than_1_article -0.204                  
(0.153) 
-0.566                     
(0.731) 
-0.01                     
(0.083) 
ipr_mfn 0.108                  
(0.154) 
-0.011                     
(0.996) 
-0.028                     
(0.07) 
ipr_nt -0.134                  
(0.115) 
-0.665                     
(0.552) 
-0.034                     
(0.036) 
ipr_as_investment 0.269                  
(0.385) 
0.142                     
(1.3) 
-0.051                     
(0.143) 
ipr_investment_mfn 0.295                  
(0.199) 
-0.201                     
(1.421) 
0.035                     
(0.109) 
ipr_investment_nt NA NA NA 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination -0.193                  
(0.136) 
-0.887                     
(0.664) 
0.031                     
(0.067) 
ipr_general_enforcement -0.533**                  
(0.175) 
-0.769                     
(1.557) 
-0.108                     
(0.084) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism 0.048                  
(0.069) 
-0.031                     
(0.338) 




-0.657*                  
(0.326) 
NA -0.029                     
(0.097) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception 0.355**                  
(0.135) 
0.342                     
(0.738) 
0.007                     
(0.067) 
ipr_implementation 0.202**                  
(0.077) 
-0.138                     
(0.459) 
-0.078.                     
(0.044) 
ipr_border_measures 0.241*                  
(0.113) 
-0.455                     
(2.187) 
-0.019                     
(0.052) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights -0.137                  
(0.167) 
0.137                     
(1.074) 
0.012                     
(0.078) 
ipr_m_trademarks 0.16                  
(0.225) 
1.825                     
(1.999) 
-0.147                     
(0.093) 
ipr_m_geo_indications -0.145                  
(0.224) 
0.947                     
(2.561) 
0.202.                     
(0.113) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs -0.504.                  
(0.257) 
-2.789                     
(2.597) 
-0.485***                     
(0.104) 
ipr_m_patents 0.462.                  
(0.259) 
NA 0.153                     
(0.11) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information 0.486*                  
(0.232) 
0.763                     
(3.04) 
-0.032                     
(0.097) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits -0.182                  
(0.137) 
NA 0.252***                     
(0.071) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties 0.05                  
(0.079) 
1.463**                     
(0.455) 




0.018                  
(0.059) 
0.759                     
(0.737) 
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ipr_m_encrypted_program_carrying_sat-
ellite_signals 
0.125                  
(0.095) 
-0.139                     
(1.308) 
0.266***                     
(0.051) 
ipr_m_domain_names -0.19                  
(0.207) 
-0.247                     
(0.891) 
0.064                     
(0.079) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.003                  
(0.003) 
-0.04*                     
(0.019) 
0.001                     
(0.002) 
Classic IP leaders 0.21***                  
(0.046) 
0.142                     
(0.242) 
0.033.                     
(0.02) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.032                  
(0.034) 
0.078                     
(0.184) 
-0.028                     
(0.018) 
New IP producers and developers 0.167***                  
(0.043) 
-0.17                     
(0.318) 
0.016                     
(0.018) 
ln GDP 0.007                  
(0.009) 
-0.063                     
(0.048) 
0.003                     
(0.004) 
ln GDPpc -0.085***                  
(0.018) 
0.005                     
(0.106) 
-0.014.                     
(0.009) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.013                  
(0.019) 
-0.202*                     
(0.097) 
0.017*                     
(0.008) 
Intercept 0.513*                       
(0.236) 
3.677**                     
(1.257) 








Observations 684 433 817 
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Licensing I Overall IPR 









IPR General Binary Variables     
ipr_mentioned 2.439**                     
(0.821) 
-10.717                  
(11.794) 
167.133***                  
(46.59) 
2.673**                     
(0.955) 
ipr_1_article -2.467**                     
(0.921) 
-6.011                  
(13.097) 
-156.224**                  
(58.123) 
-2.479*                     
(1.07) 
ipr_more_than_1_article 0.881                     
(0.829) 
8.299                  
(12.36) 
25.295                  
(56.761) 
0.819                     
(0.972) 
ipr_mfn 0.835                     
(0.638) 
4.541                  
(11.745) 
-14.875                  
(51.173) 
0.644                     
(0.865) 
ipr_nt 1.159                     
(0.805) 
-5.823                  
(15.25) 
-11.299                  
(75.059) 
1.158                     
(1.025) 
ipr_as_investment -4.614.                     
(2.508) 
-36.173                  
(36.23) 
-129.778                  
(202.37) 
-5.741*                     
(2.917) 
ipr_investment_mfn 0.651                     
(1.543) 
-5.489                  
(23.549) 
-14.807                  
(137.741) 
0.735                     
(1.837) 
ipr_investment_nt 2.62                     
(3.201) 
39.984                  
(47.126) 
118.982                  
(287.018) 
3.555                     
(3.755) 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination -0.688                     
(0.67) 
2.727                  
(9.842) 
-54.045                  
(49.066) 
-0.591                     
(0.788) 
ipr_general_enforcement 0.952                     
(0.703) 
1.933                  
(10.547) 
10.126                  
(41.32) 
1.199                     
(0.826) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism -0.709                     
(0.878) 
-5.306                  
(16.48) 
-46.888                  
(88.07) 




0.455                     
(1.811) 
-4.115                  
(30.654) 
0.576                  
(156.468) 
0.382                     
(2.11) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception 1.072                     
(1.224) 
-4.299                  
(21.58) 
13.388                  
(121.818) 
0.817                     
(1.501) 
ipr_implementation 0.24                     
(0.51) 
-8.459                  
(8.082) 
7.893                  
(34.836) 
-0.62                     
(0.632) 
ipr_border_measures -1.366*                     
(0.613) 
-13.805                  
(11.611) 
31.497                  
(55.766) 
-0.953                     
(0.842) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights -0.672                     
(1.049) 
-6.697                  
(20.288) 
-8.686                  
(90.904) 
-0.82                     
(1.386) 
ipr_m_trademarks -1.375                     
(1.198) 
5.876                  
(26.821) 
-23.261                  
(112.063) 
-1.794                     
(1.551) 
ipr_m_geo_indications 0.205                     
(0.988) 
1.008                  
(15.546) 
-33.929                  
(69.85) 
0.199                     
(1.179) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs 2.599.                     
(1.464) 
16.699                  
(22.276) 
30.336                  
(92.894) 
3.045.                     
(1.758) 
ipr_m_patents 0.817                     
(1.307) 
22.526                  
(21.657) 
-41.775                  
(86.522) 
1.124                     
(1.528) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information 0.245                     
(0.776) 
13.65                  
(16.547) 
69.268                  
(80.745) 
1.008                     
(1.253) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits -2.609*                     
(1.191) 
-58.323**                  
(18.287) 
21.854                  
(85.376) 
-2.439.                     
(1.4) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties 0.247                     
(0.6) 
12.311                  
(10.719) 
-10.543                  
(44.661) 
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ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources 
-0.407                     
(0.652) 
14.094                  
(13.825) 
101.922                  
(95.075) 




1.795.                     
(0.928) 
2.716                  
(15.283) 
-3.244                  
(83.426) 
1.996.                     
(1.113) 
ipr_m_domain_names -1.398                     
(1.899) 
1.311                  
(32.279) 
131.502                  
(151.36) 
-1.35                     
(2.258) 
Control Variables     
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.13**                     
(0.048) 
0.383                  
(0.718) 
-6.89*                  
(2.992) 
-0.105.                     
(0.056) 
Classic IP leaders -0.1                     
(0.486) 
-10.608                  
(7.176) 
-15.912                  
(28.979) 
-0.473                     
(0.579) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.083                     
(0.448) 
19.211**                  
(6.308) 
29.321                  
(27.042) 
-0.178                     
(0.524) 
New IP producers and developers -0.044                     
(0.47) 
-4.481                  
(6.656) 
-38.16                  
(35.97) 
0.124                     
(0.552) 
ln GDP -0.272*                     
(0.118) 
-5.85**                  
(1.815) 
-7.762                  
(7.841) 
-0.301*                     
(0.146) 
ln GDPpc 0.09                     
(0.214) 
10.756***                  
(3.226) 
6.293                  
(14.523) 
0.008                     
(0.259) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.124                     
(0.238) 
2.561                  
(3.547) 
-5.283                  
(14.986) 
-0.042                     
(0.285) 
Intercept 7.097*     
(2.917) 
51.861                       
(45.442) 
253.273                  
(194.356) 










Observations 1542 1224 941 1356 
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Licensing II First-comer IPR 









IPR General Binary Variables     
ipr_mentioned 9.353***                     
(1.507) 
-61.303**                  
(21.166) 
741.187***                  
(88.481) 
9.503***                     
(1.752) 
ipr_1_article -6.49***                     
(1.656) 
42.783.                  
(23.316) 
-574.481***                  
(93.606) 
-7.069***                     
(1.921) 
ipr_more_than_1_article -0.919                     
(2.097) 
14.804                  
(31.084) 
-47.473                  
(126.471) 
-1.024                     
(2.46) 
ipr_mfn -1.421                     
(1.552) 
-32.713                  
(24.681) 
42.362                  
(99.88) 
-1.178                     
(1.81) 
ipr_nt 2.096.                     
(1.123) 
-14.16                  
(23.838) 
-73.074                  
(99.202) 
2.081                     
(1.314) 
ipr_as_investment -7.639*                     
(3.723) 
-7.328                  
(52.711) 
-300.962                  
(206.982) 
-8.022.                     
(4.327) 
ipr_investment_mfn -1.266                     
(2.612) 
4.236                  
(36.754) 
-132.948                  
(161.116) 
-1.282                     
(3.089) 
ipr_investment_nt 8.891.                     
(5.109) 
-29.19                  
(70.678) 
520.841.                  
(309.764) 
10.145.                     
(5.931) 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination -4.919**                     
(1.509) 
28.586                  
(21.464) 
-481.111***                  
(104.399) 
-5.178**                     
(1.774) 
ipr_general_enforcement 1.895                     
(2.073) 
11.515                  
(30.595) 
199.762                  
(138.782) 
2.514                     
(2.433) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism -0.385                     
(1.34) 
-0.626                  
(19.513) 
-26.473                  
(82.927) 




-1.411                     
(2.594) 
13.962                  
(36.36) 
-124.354                  
(185.087) 
-1.885                     
(3.044) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception 0.847                     
(1.415) 
-17.219                  
(23.938) 
19.613                  
(134.778) 
0.921                     
(1.893) 
ipr_implementation -0.083                     
(1.009) 
-5.19                  
(15.246) 
74.178                  
(66.095) 
-0.167                     
(1.257) 
ipr_border_measures -1.928                     
(1.262) 
-1.151                  
(19.973) 
-54.097                  
(104.411) 
-3.782*                     
(1.625) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights 0.241                     
(2.157) 
32.649                  
(31.225) 
97.745                  
(130.244) 
0.055                     
(2.538) 
ipr_m_trademarks -1.359                     
(2.594) 
-16.239                  
(37.11) 
-103.933                  
(160.515) 
-1.479                     
(3.029) 
ipr_m_geo_indications 0.821                     
(2.419) 
23.938                  
(36.857) 
-26.291                  
(170.564) 
1.202                     
(2.831) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs 0.862                     
(2.438) 
34.642                  
(37.459) 
316.471                  
(195.705) 
0.653                     
(2.872) 
ipr_m_patents 1.102                     
(2.632) 
16.521                  
(37.455) 
-193.657                  
(189.154) 
1.741                     
(3.068) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information 1.345                     
(2.148) 
28.393                  
(36.677) 
172.756                  
(179.076) 
0.675                     
(2.553) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits -0.656                     
(1.663) 
-136.141***                  
(28.978) 
11.912                  
(150.761) 
-0.102                     
(1.994) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties 1.826.                     
(1.078) 
29.92.                  
(16.447) 
-50.949                  
(67.195) 
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ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources 
-0.705                     
(0.905) 
14.844                  
(13.392) 
101.275                  
(98.973) 




1.207                     
(1.388) 
-1.445                  
(20.628) 
18.026                  
(114.423) 
3.852*                     
(1.674) 
ipr_m_domain_names -0.541                     
(2.422) 
3.417                  
(34.238) 
4.531                  
(152.727) 
-1.258                     
(2.867) 
Control Variables     
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.12*                     
(0.047) 
0.529                  
(0.703) 
-5.629*                  
(2.868) 
-0.097.                     
(0.055) 
Classic IP leaders -0.284                     
(0.452) 
-13.949*                  
(6.809) 
-4.571                  
(28.016) 
-0.539                     
(0.545) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.221                     
(0.436) 
21.952***                  
(6.095) 
34.892                  
(25.576) 
-0.331                     
(0.51) 
New IP producers and developers -0.286                     
(0.448) 
-3.297                  
(6.307) 
-43.605                  
(32.877) 
-0.203                     
(0.521) 
ln GDP -0.241*                     
(0.113) 
-4.929**                  
(1.737) 
-7.738                  
(7.362) 
-0.295*                     
(0.141) 
ln GDPpc 0.093                     
(0.198) 
8.704**                  
(2.964) 
14.21                  
(12.605) 
0.154                     
(0.241) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.134                     
(0.22) 
2.335                  
(3.306) 
-6.987                  
(14.082) 
-0.154                     
(0.26) 
Intercept 6.427*                    
(2.698) 
39.935                       
(41.692) 
185.556                  
(180.08) 










Observations 1542 1224 941 1356 
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Innovation: Researchers in R&D I Overall IPR 











IPR General Binary Variables      
ipr_mentioned -0.015                     
(0.04) 
-0.12                  
(0.075) 
-0.114                     
(0.103) 
-0.102                     
(0.17) 
-0.015                     
(0.046) 
ipr_1_article 0.033                     
(0.042) 
0.003                  
(0.077) 
0.106                     
(0.107) 
0.339                     
(0.383) 
0.032                     
(0.049) 
ipr_more_than_1_article -0.018                     
(0.034) 
0.018                  
(0.065) 
-0.009                     
(0.091) 
-0.35                     
(0.38) 
-0.026                     
(0.041) 
ipr_mfn 0.042.                     
(0.024) 
0.094.                  
(0.056) 
0.083                     
(0.077) 
0.153                     
(0.159) 
0.022                     
(0.033) 
ipr_nt -0.034                     
(0.03) 
0.056                  
(0.069) 
0.099                     
(0.098) 
0.167                     
(0.266) 
-0.08*                     
(0.038) 
ipr_as_investment 0.112                     
(0.232) 
-0.115                  
(0.204) 
-0.173                     
(0.301) 
-0.636                     
(0.465) 
0.001                     
(0.268) 
ipr_investment_mfn -0.051                     
(0.065) 
-0.286*                  
(0.119) 
-0.101                     
(0.173) 
0.319                     
(0.442) 
-0.032                     
(0.076) 
ipr_investment_nt -0.12                     
(0.206) 
NA NA NA -0.116                     
(0.237) 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination -0.026                     
(0.027) 
-0.02                  
(0.05) 
-0.118.                     
(0.07) 
0.037                     
(0.168) 
-0.023                     
(0.031) 
ipr_general_enforcement 0.041                     
(0.025) 
0.038                  
(0.047) 
0.07                     
(0.064) 
0.131                     
(0.127) 
0.049                     
(0.03) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism 0.003                     
(0.029) 
-0.069                  
(0.069) 
-0.11                     
(0.092) 
-0.654.                     
(0.349) 




-0.003                     
(0.092) 
0.244                  
(0.172) 
0.208                     
(0.252) 
NA 0.046                     
(0.106) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception -0.051                     
(0.053) 
0.021                  
(0.111) 
-0.063                     
(0.156) 
0.289                     
(0.602) 
-0.01                     
(0.061) 
ipr_implementation -0.014                     
(0.019) 
0.084*                  
(0.036) 
0.048                     
(0.05) 
0.224*                     
(0.102) 
-0.025                     
(0.023) 
ipr_border_measures -0.037                     
(0.026) 
-0.042                  
(0.061) 
-0.054                     
(0.084) 
0.035                     
(0.224) 
0.08*                     
(0.036) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights 0.03                     
(0.045) 
0.007                  
(0.114) 
-0.051                     
(0.156) 
-0.601                     
(0.553) 
0.15*                     
(0.064) 
ipr_m_trademarks -0.11                     
(0.071) 
-0.11                  
(0.148) 
0.121                     
(0.208) 
0.417                     
(0.619) 
-0.227**                     
(0.086) 
ipr_m_geo_indications -0.019                     
(0.042) 
0.077                  
(0.08) 
-0.106                     
(0.118) 
-0.571*                     
(0.284) 
-0.016                     
(0.049) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs -0.048                     
(0.073) 
0.064                  
(0.141) 
0.068                     
(0.19) 
0.224                     
(0.441) 
0.006                     
(0.087) 
ipr_m_patents 0.122.                     
(0.069) 
0.08                  
(0.147) 
0.03                     
(0.194) 
0.208                     
(0.376) 
0.131                     
(0.08) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information -0.025                     
(0.033) 
-0.071                  
(0.103) 
0.019                     
(0.139) 
1.092**                     
(0.386) 
-0.078                     
(0.052) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits 0.013                     
(0.057) 
-0.134                  
(0.113) 
-0.203                     
(0.157) 
-1.084.                     
(0.593) 
0.038                     
(0.065) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties 0.004                     
(0.023) 
-0.031                  
(0.05) 
-0.057                     
(0.068) 
0.11                     
(0.129) 





- 409 - 
ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources 
-0.066*                     
(0.029) 
-0.073                  
(0.067) 
0.015                     
(0.097) 
0.719                     
(0.53) 




-0.006                     
(0.039) 
-0.028                  
(0.074) 
-0.04                     
(0.098) 
-0.556                     
(0.537) 
-0.02                     
(0.046) 
ipr_m_domain_names -0.052                     
(0.081) 
0.069                  
(0.163) 
0.141                     
(0.221) 
0.973                     
(0.614) 
-0.04                     
(0.099) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.003                     
(0.002) 
0                
(0.005) 
0.017**                     
(0.007) 
-0.02                    
(0.016) 
0.003                     
(0.003) 
Classic IP leaders 0.042.                     
(0.025) 
0.16**                  
(0.05) 
0.176*                     
(0.072) 
0.036                     
(0.154) 
0.035                     
(0.031) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.033                     
(0.023) 
-0.019                  
(0.042) 
-0.025                     
(0.056) 
-0.004                     
(0.115) 
-0.041                     
(0.026) 
New IP producers and developers 0.056**                     
(0.021) 
0.061                  
(0.042) 
0.307***                     
(0.069) 
-0.02                   
(0.21) 
0.054*                     
(0.026) 
ln GDP -0.001                     
(0.005) 
-0.012                  
(0.01) 
-0.011                     
(0.013) 
-0.039                     
(0.027) 
-0.004                     
(0.006) 
ln GDPpc -0.021*                     
(0.01) 
-0.092***                  
(0.02) 
-0.1***                     
(0.029) 
-0.05                     
(0.069) 
-0.026*                     
(0.013) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.055***                     
(0.011) 
0.066**                  
(0.022) 
0.06.                     
(0.033) 
0.119.                     
(0.061) 
0.05***                     
(0.013) 
Intercept -0.133     
(0.131) 
0.94***                       
(0.271) 
0.962*                     
(0.385) 
1.485.                     
(0.798) 












Observations 786 640 582 357 683 
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Innovation: Researchers in R&D II First-comer IPR 











IPR General Binary Variables      
ipr_mentioned -0.316**                     
(0.102) 
-0.107                  
(0.173) 
0.04                     
(0.225) 
-1.266**                     
(0.438) 
-0.282*                     
(0.12) 
ipr_1_article 0.242*                     
(0.105) 
0.077                  
(0.188) 
0.189                     
(0.244) 
2.062***                     
(0.578) 
0.223.                    
(0.125) 
ipr_more_than_1_article 0.115                     
(0.145) 
0.031                  
(0.255) 
-0.159                     
(0.314) 
-0.58                     
(0.655) 
0.156                     
(0.175) 
ipr_mfn 0.039                     
(0.074) 
0.002                  
(0.159) 
-0.01                     
(0.209) 
0.095                     
(0.462) 
0.022                     
(0.088) 
ipr_nt -0.058                     
(0.039) 
0.084                  
(0.133) 
-0.092                     
(0.19) 
-0.402                     
(0.34) 
-0.077.                     
(0.045) 
ipr_as_investment -0.218                     
(0.178) 
-0.491                  
(0.312) 
-0.251                     
(0.556) 
0.246                     
(0.808) 
-0.146                     
(0.209) 
ipr_investment_mfn -0.048                     
(0.156) 
-0.05                  
(0.229) 
-0.035                     
(0.282) 
-1.253                     
(0.888) 
-0.063                     
(0.184) 
ipr_investment_nt NA NA NA NA NA 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination -0.136                     
(0.087) 
-0.107                  
(0.165) 
0.142                     
(0.221) 
2.639***                     
(0.543) 
-0.212*                     
(0.106) 
ipr_general_enforcement 0.022                     
(0.118) 
-0.379.                  
(0.209) 
0.113                     
(0.285) 
-0.438                     
(0.891) 
-0.012                     
(0.148) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism 0.019                     
(0.04) 
-0.027                  
(0.071) 
-0.078                     
(0.091) 
-0.026                     
(0.159) 




0.239*                     
(0.111) 
0.342                  
(0.239) 
-0.147                     
(0.49) 
NA 0.165                     
(0.131) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception -0.057                     
(0.078) 
0.092                  
(0.136) 
-0.323.                     
(0.186) 
-3.497***                     
(0.68) 
-0.062                     
(0.093) 
ipr_implementation -0.117**                     
(0.043) 
-0.186*                  
(0.083) 
-0.189.                     
(0.108) 
-0.504*                     
(0.214) 
-0.126*                     
(0.057) 
ipr_border_measures 0.003                     
(0.06) 
0.004                  
(0.122) 
-0.024                     
(0.166) 
NA 0.071                     
(0.073) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights 0.26*                     
(0.104) 
0.34                  
(0.279) 
-0.242                     
(0.387) 
-8.242***                     
(1.742) 
0.203                   
(0.126) 
ipr_m_trademarks -0.666***                     
(0.108) 
-0.561*                  
(0.24) 
-0.698*                     
(0.318) 
4.76***                     
(1.051) 
-0.718***                     
(0.128) 
ipr_m_geo_indications 0.686***                     
(0.161) 
0.878**                  
(0.298) 
0.97**                     
(0.368) 
0.844                     
(1.49) 
0.625***                     
(0.188) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs -0.097                     
(0.127) 
-0.685**                  
(0.239) 
-0.371                     
(0.381) 
NA -0.339*                     
(0.153) 
ipr_m_patents -0.09                     
(0.118) 
-0.123                  
(0.239) 
-0.052                     
(0.377) 
NA 0.139                     
(0.15) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information -0.092                     
(0.116) 
0.092                  
(0.332) 
-0.149                     
(0.479) 
NA 0.056                     
(0.147) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits 0.14                     
(0.092) 
0.348*                  
(0.17) 
0.523*                     
(0.225) 
NA 0.22*                     
(0.108) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties -0.007                     
(0.044) 
-0.004                  
(0.088) 
-0.282*                     
(0.118) 
0.112                     
(0.237) 




-0.054.                     
(0.032) 
-0.076                  
(0.059) 
-0.099                     
(0.082) 
0.753.                     
(0.417) 
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ipr_m_encrypted_program_carrying_sat-
ellite_signals 
-0.008                     
(0.053) 
-0.071                  
(0.095) 
-0.12                     
(0.126) 
-0.846                     
(0.654) 
0.103                     
(0.063) 
ipr_m_domain_names -0.118                     
(0.088) 
-0.077                  
(0.222) 
0.644*                     
(0.274) 
3.124***                     
(0.545) 
0.039                     
(0.12) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.001                     
(0.002) 
-0.006                  
(0.005) 
0.015*                     
(0.007) 
-0.044**                     
(0.017) 
0.003                    
(0.003) 
Classic IP leaders -0.002                     
(0.022) 
0.071                  
(0.046) 
0.108                     
(0.069) 
0.024                     
(0.134) 
0                   
(0.027) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.015                     
(0.02) 
-0.007                  
(0.039) 
-0.015                     
(0.051) 
-0.135                     
(0.101) 
-0.028                     
(0.024) 
New IP producers and developers 0.018                     
(0.02) 
0.014                  
(0.039) 
0.318***                     
(0.066) 
-0.197                    
(0.207) 
0.021                     
(0.023) 
ln GDP 0                     
(0.005) 
-0.006                  
(0.01) 
0.003                     
(0.013) 
-0.027                     
(0.025) 
-0.002                     
(0.006) 
ln GDPpc -0.005                     
(0.01) 
-0.063**                  
(0.021) 
-0.107***                     
(0.03) 
-0.018                     
(0.063) 
-0.001                     
(0.013) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.019*                     
(0.009) 
0.052**                  
(0.019) 
0.072*                     
(0.028) 
0.127*                     
(0.056) 
0.011                     
(0.011) 
Intercept -0.016                  
(0.118) 
0.624*                       
(0.251) 
0.55                     
(0.356) 
1.004                     
(0.706) 












Observations 786 640 582 357 683 
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Innovation: Resident Applications for 
Industrial Designs I 
Overall IPR 











IPR General Binary Variables      
ipr_mentioned 4.467***                     
(1.346) 
4.046                  
(2.659) 
4.035                     
(4.46) 
-6.461                     
(12.542) 
2.751                     
(1.905) 
ipr_1_article -6.849***                     
(1.462) 
-9.435**                  
(2.865) 
-11.265*                     
(4.789) 
-2.188                     
(14.68) 
-5.913**                     
(2.061) 
ipr_more_than_1_article 0.09                     
(1.265) 
2.406                  
(2.499) 
3.25                     
(4.292) 
-18.112                     
(13.826) 
2.349                    
(1.785) 
ipr_mfn -0.613                     
(1.036) 
-0.796                  
(2.402) 
-1.01                     
(4.203) 
1.201                     
(12.774) 
-1.496                     
(1.643) 
ipr_nt 1.957                     
(1.311) 
2.214                  
(2.908) 
1.464                     
(5.508) 
4.386                     
(18.662) 
3.013                     
(1.981) 
ipr_as_investment -6.733                     
(4.104) 
-12.997                  
(8.083) 
-18.245                     
(13.372) 
-67.957                     
(50.049) 
-8.949                     
(5.789) 
ipr_investment_mfn 2.152                     
(2.699) 
2.986                  
(5.629) 
3.964                     
(9.629) 
40.683                     
(41.122) 
1.774                     
(3.883) 
ipr_investment_nt 4.084                     
(5.536) 
NA 11.641                     
(18.859) 
19.84                     
(79.609) 
3.942                     
(7.848) 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination 5.589***                     
(1.045) 
9.784***                  
(2.086) 
13.278***                     
(3.565) 
47.467***                     
(12.03) 
8.863***                     
(1.491) 
ipr_general_enforcement -1.445                     
(1.067) 
-2.471                  
(2.155) 
-4.559                     
(3.663) 
-17.231.                     
(10.312) 
-4.565**                     
(1.507) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism -2.254                     
(1.388) 
-5.342.                  
(2.804) 
-11.284*                     
(5.711) 
-3.406                     
(21.581) 




0.145                     
(3.316) 
0.477                  
(7.077) 
-0.146                     
(12.966) 
-9.488                     
(47.764) 
0.567                     
(4.673) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception -1.3                     
(2.068) 
-3.19                  
(4.738) 
-3.104                     
(8.309) 
-10.27                     
(31.332) 
-0.203                     
(3.029) 
ipr_implementation -0.246                     
(0.8) 
-1.949                  
(1.669) 
-3.298                     
(2.887) 
-11.225                     
(8.9) 
-3.055*                     
(1.192) 
ipr_border_measures -0.521                     
(0.996) 
-2.889                  
(2.348) 
-3.931                     
(4.204) 
-9.475                     
(13.885) 
0.152                     
(1.593) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights -0.933                     
(1.658) 
-2.798                  
(3.864) 
-0.472                     
(7.054) 
-8.851                     
(21.446) 
2.958                     
(2.606) 
ipr_m_trademarks -1.708                     
(1.946) 
3.21                 
(5.654) 
1.086                     
(9.756) 
7.872                     
(29.321) 
-2.018                     
(3.044) 
ipr_m_geo_indications -0.67                     
(1.53) 
-0.93                  
(3.168) 
0.05                     
(5.46) 
9.361                     
(17.828) 
-2.933                     
(2.204) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs 0.192                     
(2.292) 
1.561                  
(4.727) 
2.857                     
(7.92) 
-12.345                     
(23.21) 
4.843                    
(3.302) 
ipr_m_patents 0.262                     
(2.077) 
-2.712                  
(4.484) 
0.254                     
(7.819) 
17.967                     
(22.704) 
-1.624                     
(2.934) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information -0.901                     
(1.291) 
-2.895                  
(2.936) 
-6.138                     
(6.049) 
-24.405                     
(19.888) 
-4.951*                     
(2.393) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits 0.742                     
(1.786) 
-1.253                  
(3.567) 
-5.184                     
(6.233) 
-9.571                     
(21.471) 
2.28                    
(2.518) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties 0.172                     
(0.965) 
-1.076                  
(2.202) 
-1.295                     
(3.938) 
-5.215                     
(11.67) 
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ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources 
-0.053                     
(1.082) 
3.058                  
(2.683) 
3.377                     
(5.164) 
3.718                     
(24.846) 




0.549                     
(1.497) 
2.166                  
(3.149) 
3.158                     
(5.622) 
23.499                     
(20.821) 
0.854                     
(2.157) 
ipr_m_domain_names 2.489                     
(3.032) 
4.288                  
(6.487) 
5.961                     
(11.613) 
-15.999                     
(38.222) 
4.989                    
(4.356) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.025                     
(0.064) 
-0.288*                  
(0.128) 
-0.628**                     
(0.215) 
-1.709**                     
(0.65) 
-0.029                     
(0.09) 
Classic IP leaders 0.002                     
(0.851) 
2.124                  
(1.748) 
3.571                     
(2.988) 
11.684                     
(8.78) 
1.229                     
(1.22) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-1.024                     
(0.646) 
-1.194                  
(1.285) 
-1.816                     
(2.139) 
-16.155*                     
(6.815) 
-0.676                     
(0.914) 
New IP producers and developers 1.256                     
(0.764) 
2.78.                  
(1.52) 
5.929*                     
(2.537) 
46.858***                     
(9.831) 
1.27                     
(1.085) 
ln GDP 0.058                     
(0.181) 
-0.179                  
(0.37) 
-0.494                     
(0.629) 
-2.414                     
(1.884) 
-0.364                     
(0.266) 
ln GDPpc 0.181                     
(0.316) 
0.882                  
(0.643) 
2.018.                     
(1.089) 
7.16*                     
(3.365) 
0.909*                     
(0.458) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.546                     
(0.379) 
-1.01                  
(0.775) 
-1.54                     
(1.319) 
-3.186                     
(3.984) 
-0.765                     
(0.548) 
Intercept 3.061     
(4.506) 
10.591                       
(9.255) 
17.86                     
(15.9) 
54.6                     
(49.353) 












Observations 1998 1797 1684 1353 1814 
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Innovation: Resident Applications for 





IPR General Binary Variables  
ipr_mentioned -2.388                     
(3.262) 
ipr_1_article 1.315                     
(3.269) 
ipr_more_than_1_article 1.755                     
(4.323) 
ipr_mfn 1.978                     
(3.182) 
ipr_nt -5.077.                     
(2.701) 
ipr_as_investment 4.684                     
(8.131) 
ipr_investment_mfn -2.412                     
(6.475) 
ipr_investment_nt -5.03                     
(11.877) 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination -2.678                     
(3.064) 
ipr_general_enforcement 0.339                     
(4.342) 




2.377                     
(6.588) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception 0.356                     
(3.577) 
ipr_implementation -1.977                     
(2.386) 
ipr_border_measures 4.626                     
(3.258) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights 1.117                     
(4.32) 
ipr_m_trademarks -0.516                     
(5.692) 
ipr_m_geo_indications -1.699                     
(4.753) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs 0.995                     
(5.07) 
ipr_m_patents -0.124                     
(5.72) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information 0.675                     
(4.836) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits 0.584                     
(3.557) 
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ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources 




3.662                     
(3.218) 
ipr_m_domain_names -2.243                     
(4.903) 
Control Variables  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.064                     
(0.09) 
Classic IP leaders 1.991.                     
(1.145) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.174                     
(0.895) 
New IP producers and developers 0.243                     
(1.051) 
ln GDP -0.406                     
(0.268) 
ln GDPpc 0.907.                     
(0.47) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -1.298*                     
(0.522) 
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IPR General Binary Variables  
ipr_mentioned -0.321                     
(1.773) 
ipr_1_article -0.996                     
(2.115) 
ipr_more_than_1_article -2.126                     
(2.009) 
ipr_mfn 0.064                     
(1.811) 
ipr_nt -1.391                     
(2.715) 
ipr_as_investment -14.297*                     
(6.359) 
ipr_investment_mfn 3.808                     
(6.165) 
ipr_investment_nt 10.137                     
(11.009) 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination 3.501*                     
(1.758) 
ipr_general_enforcement 0.454                     
(1.533) 




-2.331                     
(6.658) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception -0.028                     
(4.615) 
ipr_implementation -0.794                     
(1.281) 
ipr_border_measures -1.284                     
(2.011) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights -1.406                     
(3.039) 
ipr_m_trademarks 3.61                     
(4.212) 
ipr_m_geo_indications -2.345                     
(2.559) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs -0.417                     
(3.362) 
ipr_m_patents 2.673                     
(3.355) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information -0.645                     
(2.895) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits -3.95                     
(3.048) 
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ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources 




-0.521                     
(3.005) 
ipr_m_domain_names 0.271                     
(5.631) 
Control Variables  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.726***                     
(0.087) 
Classic IP leaders -1.057                     
(1.204) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-2.019*                     
(0.955) 
New IP producers and developers 1.892                     
(1.387) 
ln GDP -0.716**                     
(0.265) 
ln GDPpc 2.044***                     
(0.456) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.495                     
(0.543) 
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Technology Transfer: PTA Member 
Applications for Industrial Designs I 
Overall IPR 











IPR General Binary Variables      
ipr_mentioned 1.282                     
(0.973) 
2.605                  
(1.855) 
2.879                     
(2.08) 
1.211                     
(2.062) 
-11.554                     
(16.12) 
ipr_1_article 0.764                     
(0.938) 
1.52                  
(1.712) 
1.685                     
(1.809) 
-0.72                     
(2.303) 
6.298                     
(14.563) 
ipr_more_than_1_article -0.154                     
(0.899) 
0.108                  
(1.673) 
-0.491                     
(1.959) 
3.771                     
(2.573) 
5.72                     
(15.947) 
ipr_mfn -1.266*                     
(0.594) 
-5.243**                  
(1.607) 
-4.351*                     
(1.963) 
-4.256*                     
(2.021) 
-12.468                     
(13.371) 
ipr_nt 0.575                     
(0.787) 
7.315***                  
(1.955) 
10.086***                     
(2.662) 
22.174***                     
(3.678) 
6.976                     
(16.004) 
ipr_as_investment -3.423                     
(2.515) 
-5.712                  
(5.197) 
-3.128                     
(5.959) 
-1.266                     
(7.377) 
-50.218                     
(63.811) 
ipr_investment_mfn -2.93*                     
(1.438) 
-3.718                  
(2.965) 
-5.967.                     
(3.298) 
-27.4***                     
(5.086) 
-21.865                    
(33.366) 
ipr_investment_nt NA NA NA NA NA 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination -1.669*                     
(0.694) 
-4.012**                  
(1.337) 
-3.584*                     
(1.503) 
-8.243***                     
(2.234) 
-6.954                     
(11.781) 
ipr_general_enforcement 2.499***                     
(0.717) 
1.704                  
(1.397) 
0.582                     
(1.615) 
-0.406                     
(1.795) 
6.403                     
(11.465) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism 0.123                     
(0.765) 
-1.169                  
(1.497) 
-1.386                     
(2.339) 
-16.547***                     
(4.846) 




3.081.                     
(1.781) 
9.266*                  
(4.266) 
6.019                     
(5.301) 
-3.385                     
(6.202) 
20.867                     
(37.595) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception 2.199                     
(1.366) 
-1.668                  
(3.323) 
-1.886                     
(4.096) 
16.211***                     
(4.848) 
17.834                     
(36.587) 
ipr_implementation 0.696                     
(0.508) 
0.218                  
(1.073) 
0.433                     
(1.225) 
4.692**                     
(1.502) 
5.434                     
(9.322) 
ipr_border_measures 1.465**                     
(0.502) 
3.508*                  
(1.358) 
2.946.                     
(1.696) 
8.18***                     
(2.191) 
18.358                     
(11.319) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights -0.547                     
(1.124) 
4.232.                  
(2.5) 
7.4.                     
(4.391) 
28.66**                     
(9.194) 
-25.907                     
(25.929) 
ipr_m_trademarks 13.319***                     
(1.664) 
20.835***                  
(4.87) 
11.425*                     
(5.75) 
25.294**                     
(9.724) 
54.24.                   
(32.712) 
ipr_m_geo_indications -12.565***                     
(1.548) 
-28.675***                  
(3.334) 
-21.196***                     
(3.35) 
-42.666***                     
(4.988) 
-43.062                     
(27.154) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs -1.812                     
(1.6) 
2.731                  
(3.843) 
4.501                     
(4.704) 
4.946                     
(6.876) 
-26.674                     
(30.251) 
ipr_m_patents 0.09                     
(1.652) 
-3.41                  
(3.142) 
0.588                     
(3.745) 
-0.142                     
(5.698) 
-33.766                     
(31.795) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information 0.403                     
(0.763) 
-2.113                  
(1.781) 
-5.091                     
(3.475) 
-13.843.                     
(7.134) 
31.817                    
(23.909) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits -0.926                     
(1.267) 
4.884.                  
(2.495) 
1.666                     
(3.091) 
-1.939                     
(5.221) 
35.923                     
(31.509) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties 0.226                     
(0.559) 
-2.654.                  
(1.443) 
-1.467                     
(1.553) 
3.307.                     
(1.902) 
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ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources 
-1.969**                     
(0.629) 
-2.801.                 
(1.55) 
-1.417                     
(2.021) 
-3.298                     
(5.645) 




1                     
(0.747) 
4.876**                  
(1.524) 
4.802**                     
(1.76) 
-10.052**                     
(3.688) 
-3.655                     
(11.958) 
ipr_m_domain_names -2.976                     
(1.857) 
-6.469                  
(4.138) 
-7.426                     
(5.225) 
0.582                     
(8.686) 
13.279                     
(34.672) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.002                     
(0.056) 
-0.084                  
(0.123) 
-0.035                     
(0.126) 
-0.307*                     
(0.156) 
-5.877***                     
(1.237) 
Classic IP leaders -0.762                     
(0.626) 
-1.303                  
(1.343) 
-1.608                     
(1.526) 
-6.869***                     
(1.735) 
-7.755                     
(13.023) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.358                     
(0.644) 
-1.294                  
(1.226) 
-1.144                     
(1.306) 
0.567                     
(1.447) 
18.613                     
(12.88) 
New IP producers and developers -0.713                     
(0.561) 
-0.403                  
(1.127) 
-0.296                     
(1.178) 
-4.644*                     
(2.032) 
-23.376*                     
(10.366) 
ln GDP 0.232.                     
(0.123) 
0.53*                  
(0.249) 
0.567*                     
(0.274) 
0.44                     
(0.314) 
8.327***                     
(2.157) 
ln GDPpc -0.532*                     
(0.236) 
-0.495                  
(0.482) 
-0.907.                     
(0.524) 
0.983                    
(0.619) 
-10.555*                     
(4.988) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 1.113***                     
(0.328) 
2.449***                  
(0.702) 
2.284**                     
(0.789) 
3.317***                     
(0.898) 
16.373*                     
(6.918) 
Intercept -9.124*     
(3.703) 
-25.354**                       
(7.841) 
-21.669*                     
(8.941) 
-37.022***                     
(11.011) 












Observations 755 568 506 361 430 
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Technology Transfer: PTA Member 
Applications for Industrial Designs II 
First-comer IPR 











IPR General Binary Variables      
ipr_mentioned -1.229                     
(2.085) 
0.747                  
(5.055) 
2.859                     
(5.433) 
-1.253                     
(5.825) 
-115.69***                     
(34.297) 
ipr_1_article 1.916                     
(2.617) 
-0.57                  
(5.626) 
-1.647                     
(7.515) 
-1.263                     
(9.902) 
NA
ipr_more_than_1_article -1.367                     
(3.666) 
8.919                  
(12.353) 
12.265                     
(13.627) 
-16.574                     
(25.052) 
-106.618.                     
(63.226) 
ipr_mfn 3.553.                     
(2.068) 
-0.469                  
(5.933) 
0.902                     
(7.547) 
-5.363                     
(9.997) 
-1.196                     
(64.714) 
ipr_nt -1.244                     
(1.127) 
-1.372                  
(2.115) 
-1.278                     
(5.526) 
3.596                     
(7.658) 
-8.247                     
(15.34) 
ipr_as_investment -9.365*                     
(4.66) 
-5.056                  
(11.181) 
-0.806                     
(10.487) 
-13.282                     
(18.642) 
NA
ipr_investment_mfn 7.529*                     
(3.497) 
1.245                  
(8.796) 
-2.892                     
(9.131) 
-2.631                     
(12.336) 
NA
ipr_investment_nt NA NA NA NA NA 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination -0.52                     
(3.18) 
-21.591                  
(14.988) 
-31.008.                     
(15.914) 
6.799                   
(25.176) 
NA
ipr_general_enforcement -6.34*                     
(3.107) 
-4.717                  
(7.403) 
-3.521                     
(7.588) 
-14.975                     
(10.387) 
NA
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism 0.195                     
(1.166) 
-0.349                  
(1.975) 
-0.378                     
(1.993) 
-1.116                     
(2.927) 




5.428                     
(3.682) 
27.385*                  
(12.779) 
28.2*                     
(12.247) 
22.567                     
(22.37) 
NA
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception -3.873.                     
(2.183) 
-15.466**                  
(5.616) 
-16.12**                     
(5.812) 
-12.39                     
(11.965) 
-13.178                     
(55.404) 
ipr_implementation -0.685                     
(1.066) 
-0.075                  
(2.418) 
0.197                     
(2.532) 
-5.767                     
(4.345) 
-10.263                     
(33.768) 
ipr_border_measures -0.457                     
(1.314) 
-0.289                  
(2.818) 
-0.668                     
(3.135) 
2.977                     
(4.24) 
-1.815                     
(26.939) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights 1.277                     
(3.795) 
23.825                  
(19.203) 
36.001.                     
(19.655) 
6.328                    
(24.49) 
NA
ipr_m_trademarks 5.011                     
(4.066) 
7.24                  
(13.701) 
7.174                     
(14.229) 
NA NA 
ipr_m_geo_indications 2.769                     
(3.253) 
-13.634                  
(14.437) 
-20.066                     
(15.525) 
16.312                     
(19.934) 
NA
ipr_m_industrial_designs 7.218                     
(5.816) 
19.217                  
(13.356) 
30.045*                     
(14.063) 
-13.19                    
(29.068) 
-160.804.                     
(89.935) 
ipr_m_patents -11.404.                     
(6.633) 
-50.389*                  
(25.444) 
-74.246**                     
(26.436) 
NA NA 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information 6.624.                     
(3.517) 
35.745                  
(21.879) 
56.627*                     
(23.119) 
20.423                     
(30.475) 
NA
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits -5.298*                     
(2.307) 
-9.689                  
(7.438) 
-19.62*                     
(8.162) 
-19.041                     
(14.68) 
NA
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties -0.551                     
(1.043) 
0.118                  
(2.378) 
0.427                     
(2.553) 
5.517                     
(3.699) 




-1.316                     
(0.857) 
-3.503.                  
(1.829) 
-3.254.                     
(1.896) 
-1.434                     
(6.678) 
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ipr_m_encrypted_program_carrying_sat-
ellite_signals 
1.825                     
(1.23) 
3.798                  
(2.361) 
3.381                     
(2.474) 
-2.43                     
(6.103) 
-7.323                     
(16.282) 
ipr_m_domain_names 9.221***                     
(2.625) 
18.434***                  
(5.184) 
17.252**                     
(5.349) 
2.006                     
(9.322) 
-6.674                     
(40.155) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.024                     
(0.063) 
-0.052                  
(0.153) 
0.023                     
(0.145) 
-0.422.                     
(0.236) 
-7.442***                     
(1.19) 
Classic IP leaders 0.305                     
(0.602) 
-0.076                  
(1.339) 
-0.437                     
(1.488) 
-3.898.                     
(2.281) 
6.843                    
(11.695) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.969                     
(0.627) 
-1.058                  
(1.241) 
-1.909                     
(1.289) 
-2.819.                     
(1.606) 
11.759                     
(11.483) 
New IP producers and developers -0.213                     
(0.565) 
-0.539                  
(1.192) 
-0.012                     
(1.2) 
-2.24                     
(2.168) 
-23.346**                     
(8.135) 
ln GDP 0.323*                     
(0.127) 
0.671*                  
(0.268) 
0.643*                     
(0.289) 
1.128**                     
(0.394) 
8.461***                     
(2.046) 
ln GDPpc -0.77**                     
(0.259) 
-0.502                  
(0.557) 
-0.782                     
(0.585) 
-0.827                     
(0.857) 
-19.167***                     
(5.137) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 1.325***                     
(0.296) 
2.62***                  
(0.616) 
3.27***                     
(0.744) 
6.27***                     
(1.052) 
10.503*                     
(4.617) 
Intercept -10.521**     
(3.398) 
-30.467***                       
(7.432) 
-32.234***                   
(8.204) 
-59.679***                     
(12.481) 












Observations 755 568 506 361 430 
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Technology Transfer: PTA Member 
Applications for Patents I 
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IPR General Binary Variables      
ipr_mentioned -6.771                     
(28.966) 
2.535                  
(11.37) 
4.757                     
(17.478) 
1.439                     
(4.58) 
42.349                     
(43.509) 
ipr_1_article 35.062                     
(29.251) 
4.822                  
(11.217) 
5.112                     
(16.883) 
3.164                     
(5.264) 
31.864                     
(40.808) 
ipr_more_than_1_article -7.769                     
(27.262) 
4.247                  
(10.805) 
13.947                     
(17.779) 
3.329                     
(5.782) 
179.268***                     
(43.836) 
ipr_mfn -26.401                     
(20.424) 
-8.834                  
(10.131) 
-7.188                     
(16.762) 
-5.627                     
(5.264) 
8.645                     
(35.957) 
ipr_nt 20.656                     
(25.572) 
3.507                  
(12.475) 
-3.792                     
(25.273) 
-8.615                     
(9.438) 
1.767                     
(44.907) 
ipr_as_investment -85.368                     
(76.249) 
-36.417                  
(31.8) 
-76.693                     
(50.687) 
-35.948*                     
(17.843) 
-125.94                     
(154.458) 
ipr_investment_mfn -67.912                     
(48.027) 
-32.814                  
(20.391) 
-39.709                     
(31.522) 
-43.573***                     
(13.161) 
96.351                  
(96.554) 
ipr_investment_nt NA NA NA NA NA 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination -72.544***                     
(21.75) 
-18.761*                 
(8.541) 
-23.205.                     
(13.275) 
-15.176**                     
(5.212) 
-107.58**                     
(33.954) 
ipr_general_enforcement 16.586                     
(22.061) 
2.208                  
(9.011) 
-2.223                     
(14.863) 
1.483                     
(4.146) 
-90.817**                     
(30.986) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism -19.531                     
(24.48) 
-7.975                  
(10.093) 
-18.44                     
(22.084) 
-28.747**                     
(10.799) 




89.636.                     
(54.046) 
36.083                  
(24.314) 
94.629*                     
(43.622) 
57.898***                     
(13.473) 
16.28                     
(92.506) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception -11.736                     
(42.827) 
-12.003                  
(21.198) 
-49.202                     
(35.224) 
-28.391*                     
(13.237) 
76.998                    
(89.691) 
ipr_implementation 14.951                     
(16.484) 
3.838                  
(6.903) 
8.23                     
(10.866) 
7.036.                     
(3.676) 
-45.517.                     
(24.475) 
ipr_border_measures 22.687                     
(16.255) 
6.638                  
(8.678) 
10.783                     
(14.627) 
12.218*                     
(5.128) 
-5.027                    
(31.112) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights 39.313                     
(33.229) 
-9.166                  
(17.156) 
-55.91                     
(40.385) 
41.89*                     
(20.002) 
-
504.869***                     
(68.791) 
ipr_m_trademarks 51.809                     
(43.946) 
65.043*                  
(28.323) 
131.056**                     
(47.961) 
26.081                     
(20.512) 
367.164***                     
(81.406) 
ipr_m_geo_indications 2.169                     
(38.779) 
-2.901                  
(15.781) 
-15.513                     
(24.314) 
-1.131                     
(8.684) 
-
361.304***                     
(60.704) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs -
173.994***                     
(47.169) 
-75.331**                  
(23.722)
-124.528**                     
(38.452) 
-48.1**                     
(15.843) 
43.349                     
(82.443) 
ipr_m_patents 168.561***                     
(47.256) 
43.398*               
(21.179) 
68.232.                     
(34.755) 
68.814***                     
(18.345) 
434.143***                     
(86.851) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information 46.75*                     
(23.31) 
22.855.                  
(11.786) 
67.35*                     
(30.996) 
-15.618                     
(14.749) 
666.07***                     
(65.763) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits -118.722**                     
(39.002) 
-42.501*                  
(17.511) 
-70.715*                     
(29.829) 
-72.119***                     
(17.334) 
-
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ipr_m_new_plant_varieties 3.996                     
(17.322) 
-4.326                  
(8.716) 
-20.309                     
(14.248) 
7.025                    
(4.878) 




-38.03.                     
(19.784) 
-9.364                  
(10.334) 
-1.25                     
(18.954) 
-8.542                     
(13.357) 




-0.145                     
(24.28) 
4.082                  
(10.247) 
-3.529                     
(17.074) 
-24.466**                     
(8.992) 
-11.799                     
(33.584) 
ipr_m_domain_names 202.797***                     
(55.554) 
77.615**                  
(25.327) 
162.53***                     
(45.26) 
57.78**                     
(17.574) 
-103.365                     
(106.361) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.78                     
(1.899) 
0.026                  
(0.819) 
0.443                     
(1.235) 
0.181                     
(0.372) 
-1.52                     
(3.692) 
Classic IP leaders 9.82                     
(20.72) 
0.68                  
(8.414) 
-12.294                     
(13.269) 
-5.073                     
(3.793) 
-59.435                     
(36.56) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-8.842                     
(18.354) 
-7.481                  
(7.604) 
-11.11                     
(11.402) 
-3.799                     
(3.406) 
4.919                     
(30.029) 
New IP producers and developers -38.134*                     
(17.286) 
-11.243                  
(7.031) 
-13.987                     
(10.705) 
-13.292**                     
(4.556) 
-18.102                     
(28.408) 
ln GDP 9.272*                     
(3.621) 
4.283**                  
(1.52) 
5.998*                     
(2.445) 
0.795                     
(0.698) 
15.255**                     
(5.445) 
ln GDPpc 5.736                     
(7.002) 
2.874                  
(2.889) 
5.308                     
(4.571) 
1.201                     
(1.426) 
10.541                     
(12.105) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 24.488**                     
(9.389) 
14.26***                  
(4.153) 
19.486**                     
(6.331) 
7.366***                     
(1.977) 
19.702                     
(15.227) 
Intercept -
463.727***     
(110.85) 
-
241.082***                       
(50.006) 
-
343.346***                     
(76.745) 
-81.47**                     
(24.929)












Observations 980 796 721 521 622 
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Technology Transfer: PTA Member 
Applications for Patents II 
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IPR General Binary Variables    
ipr_mentioned 7.62                     
(42.85) 
-3.323                  
(58.059) 
-7.267                     
(15.78) 
ipr_1_article 7.283                     
(47.734) 
12.496                  
(68.415) 
13.044                     
(20.702) 
ipr_more_than_1_article -7.445                     
(53.117) 
-7.479                  
(90.152) 
1.261                     
(53.532) 
ipr_mfn -1.297                     
(30.977) 
-15.871                  
(52.484) 
-7.3                     
(25.127) 
ipr_nt -21.507                     
(14.308) 
-2.151                  
(46.502) 
-7.273                     
(17.971) 
ipr_as_investment -13.084                     
(62.302) 
-11.03                  
(97.023) 
-22.231                     
(52.518) 
ipr_investment_mfn -28.143                     
(45.235) 
-43.867                  
(69.838) 
-28.817                     
(23.051) 
ipr_investment_nt NA NA NA 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination 9.265                     
(48.321) 
23.271                  
(78.369) 
27.048                     
(29.171) 
ipr_general_enforcement -2.548                     
(39.206) 
-10.361                  
(61.065) 
-8.841                     
(26.814) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism -5.424                     
(13.817) 
-12.311                  
(21.25) 




25.594                     
(64.173) 
22.507                  
(102.341) 
29.1                     
(45.954) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception -27.262                     
(26.703) 
-42.722                  
(41.716) 
-38.567.                     
(20.646) 
ipr_implementation -8.436                     
(16.922) 
-17.039                  
(27) 
-7.009                     
(12.431) 
ipr_border_measures 11.632                     
(20.055) 
2.183                  
(33.587) 
14.631                     
(11.582) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights 19.412                     
(50.001) 
7.123                  
(82.011) 
-0.265                     
(29.355) 
ipr_m_trademarks 18.314                     
(54.406) 
40.281                  
(91.94) 
28.358                     
(30.59) 
ipr_m_geo_indications 0.729                     
(62.328) 
-7.137                  
(103.573) 
-21.807                     
(55.072) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs -1.142                     
(56.542) 
-18.408                  
(112.297) 
-28.393                     
(42.181) 
ipr_m_patents -15.936                     
(56.906) 
-8.958                  
(96.91) 
NA 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information -17.207                     
(37.136) 
-10.4                  
(75.886) 
80.321                     
(60.96) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits -9.269                     
(42.895) 
-13.221                  
(84.494) 
-83.536.                     
(43.017) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties 2.31                     
(15.392) 
8.237                  
(25.988) 




-22.39.                     
(12.914) 
-34.536.                  
(19.472) 





- 425 - 
ipr_m_encrypted_program_carrying_sat-
ellite_signals 
-3.445                     
(16.486) 
-6.58                  
(26.797) 
-26.214                     
(17.245) 
ipr_m_domain_names -7.449                     
(34.716) 
-7.111                  
(53.571) 
15.847                     
(20.09) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.15                     
(0.902) 
-0.172                  
(1.381) 
0.013                     
(0.484) 
Classic IP leaders 8.4                     
(8.246) 
6.46                  
(13.49) 
-1.131                     
(4.674) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-17.824*                     
(7.739) 
-27.423*                  
(11.81) 
-12.528**                     
(3.849) 
New IP producers and developers -5.959                     
(7.072) 
-13.702                  
(11.084) 
-9.124.                     
(4.793) 
ln GDP 7.652***                     
(1.63) 
10.723***                  
(2.681) 
2.604**                     
(0.85) 
ln GDPpc -0.296                     
(3.248) 
-0.356                  
(5.183) 
0.06                     
(1.806) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 21.868***                     
(3.817) 
32.271***                  
(6.195) 
14.067***                     
(2.128) 
Intercept -
358.681***     
(48.766) 
-
507.026***                       
(74.729) 
-








Observations 796 721 521 
 











- 426 - 
Technology Transfer: Total htp Im-
ports I 
Overall IPR 











IPR General Binary Variables      
ipr_mentioned -0.432                     
(1.029) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_1_article -0.191                     
(1.049) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_more_than_1_article -0.07                     
(0.734) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_mfn -0.31                     
(0.652) 
0*                
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_nt 0.645                     
(0.757) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_as_investment -0.524                     
(2.126) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_investment_mfn -1.865.                     
(1.034) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_investment_nt 1.965                     
(2.347) 
NA NA NA NA 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination -0.205                     
(0.577) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_general_enforcement -0.141                     
(0.645) 
0*               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism -0.524                     
(0.801) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0.                     
(0) 




-0.075                     
(1.107) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception 0.022                     
(0.789) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_implementation 0.106                     
(0.481) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_border_measures 0.228                     
(0.684) 
0**                 
(0) 
0.                     
(0) 
0*                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights -0.097                     
(1.3) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_trademarks -0.156                     
(1.339) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0.                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_geo_indications 0.195                     
(0.699) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0.                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs 0.197                     
(1.217) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0*                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_patents 0.48                     
(1.024) 
0                
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information -0.333                     
(0.846) 
0.               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits -0.048                     
(0.907) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties 0.299                     
(0.618) 
0*                
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 





- 427 - 
ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources 
0.589                     
(0.591) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 




-0.193                     
(0.91) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0*                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_domain_names 0.232                     
(1.3) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.07*                     
(0.031) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Classic IP leaders -0.279                     
(0.542) 
0***                 
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.485                     
(0.367) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0.                     
(0) 
New IP producers and developers 0.798*                     
(0.355) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0*                     
(0) 
ln GDP 0.26*                     
(0.106) 
0***                  
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
ln GDPpc -0.528**                     
(0.176) 
0***               
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.095                     
(0.206) 
0**                
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Intercept -0.927     
(2.325) 
-1***                       
(0) 
-1***                     
(0) 
-1***                     
(0) 












Observations 623 305 311 203 182 
 








- 428 - 
Technology Transfer: Total htp Im-
ports II 
First-comer IPR 











IPR General Binary Variables      
ipr_mentioned -0.359                     
(1.403) 
0***                 
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_1_article -0.072                     
(1.346) 
0***                 
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
NA
ipr_more_than_1_article -0.545                     
(1.296) 
0***                 
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_mfn -0.251                     
(1.232) 
0**                
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_nt -0.327                     
(1.204) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_as_investment -0.872                     
(2.438) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_investment_mfn 1.156                     
(1.957) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
NA 
ipr_investment_nt NA NA NA NA NA 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination -0.333                     
(0.93) 
0              
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
NA
ipr_general_enforcement 0.737                     
(1.345) 
0.                  
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism -0.918                     
(1.242) 
0*               
(0) 
0.                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 




-1.178                     
(1.533) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception 2.594**                     
(0.912) 
0             
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_implementation 1.974*                     
(0.792) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_border_measures -0.767                     
(1.001) 
0.               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
NA 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights 0.804                     
(1.447) 
0***                  
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
NA
ipr_m_trademarks 0.012                     
(1.627) 
0               
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
0*                     
(0) 
NA 
ipr_m_geo_indications -0.511                     
(1.45) 
0*               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
NA 
ipr_m_industrial_designs -0.439                     
(1.576) 
0***                 
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_patents 0.762                     
(1.54) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information 0.188                     
(1.53) 
0               
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
0.                    
(0) 
NA 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits -0.768                     
(1.184) 
0***                 
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties 0.112                     
(0.871) 
0**                 
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 




1.095                     
(0.668) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
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ipr_m_encrypted_program_carrying_sat-
ellite_signals 
0.813                     
(1.229) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0*                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_domain_names -0.209                     
(1.32) 
0*               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0*                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.055.                     
(0.03) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Classic IP leaders -0.462                     
(0.476) 
0***                 
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.219                     
(0.333) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
New IP producers and developers 0.934**                     
(0.332) 
0             
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0*                     
(0) 
ln GDP 0.256*                     
(0.103) 
0***                 
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
ln GDPpc -0.521**                     
(0.178) 
0*             
(0) 
0*                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.027                     
(0.185) 
0*               
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Intercept -1.907            
(2.115) 
-1***                       
(0) 
-1***                     
(0) 
-1***                     
(0) 












Observations 623 305 311 203 182 
 











- 430 - 
Technology Transfer: Total mhtp Im-
ports 
Overall IPR 







IPR General Binary Variables    
ipr_mentioned 30.344                     
(511.767) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_1_article 36.979                     
(521.895) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_more_than_1_article 25.284                     
(365.217) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_mfn -316.896                     
(324.172) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_nt 22.239                     
(376.607) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_as_investment -471.729                     
(1057.293) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_investment_mfn 53.27                     
(514.22) 
0                
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_investment_nt 113.056                     
(1167.52) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination 115.51                     
(286.997) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_general_enforcement 128.678                     
(320.589) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism -6.326                     
(398.4) 
0                  
(0) 




52.356                     
(550.757) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception -90.803                     
(392.422) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_implementation -110.469                     
(239.48) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_border_measures -117.536                     
(340.198) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights 40.583                     
(646.424) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_trademarks 254.07                     
(666.067) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_geo_indications -27.664                     
(347.671) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs -429.315                     
(605.425) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_patents 95.495                     
(509.273) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information 6.178                     
(420.998) 
0                
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits -38.857                     
(451.336) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties 682.929*                     
(307.213) 
0.                  
(0) 
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ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources 
-268.347                     
(294.004) 
0                  
(0) 




-113.691                     
(452.723) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_domain_names 16.073                     
(646.435) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 11.196                     
(15.557) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Classic IP leaders -280.168                     
(269.824) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-5.685                     
(182.363) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
New IP producers and developers -35.209                     
(176.632) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ln GDP 1.068                     
(52.567) 
0                
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ln GDPpc 42.984                     
(87.354) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -71.585                     
(102.425) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Intercept 150.31     
(1156.213) 
-1***                       
(0) 








Observations 623 541 464 
 










- 432 - 
Technology Transfer: Total mltp Im-
ports 
Overall IPR First-comer IPR 









IPR General Binary Variables     
ipr_mentioned 0.022                     
(0.145) 
0                
(0) 
0**                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_1_article 0.013                     
(0.148) 
0                
(0) 
0*                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_more_than_1_article 0.035                     
(0.104) 
0                
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_mfn 0.021                     
(0.092) 
0                
(0) 
0*                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_nt -0.042                     
(0.107) 
0                  
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_as_investment 0.232                     
(0.3) 
0                
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_investment_mfn -0.205                     
(0.146) 
0                  
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
NA 
ipr_investment_nt -0.122                     
(0.332) 
0                  
(0) 
NA NA 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination -0.14.                     
(0.082) 
0                
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0*                     
(0) 
ipr_general_enforcement 0.027                     
(0.091) 
0**                  
(0) 
0**                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism -0.155                     
(0.113) 
0                  
(0) 
0                  
(0) 




-0.079                     
(0.156) 
0                  
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception -0.041                     
(0.111) 
0                  
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_implementation 0.005                     
(0.068) 
0                
(0) 
0.                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_border_measures 0.051                     
(0.097) 
0***                  
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights 0.041                     
(0.184) 
0                
(0) 
0**                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_trademarks -0.069                     
(0.189) 
0                  
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_geo_indications -0.005                     
(0.099) 
0                  
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs 0.038                     
(0.172) 
0                
(0) 
0*                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_patents 0.194                     
(0.145) 
0                
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information -0.028                     
(0.12) 
0                  
(0) 
0*                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits -0.171                     
(0.128) 
0                  
(0) 
0*                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties 0.12                     
(0.087) 
0*                  
(0) 
0                  
(0) 





- 433 - 
ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources 
0.006                     
(0.084) 
0                
(0) 
0                  
(0) 




-0.106                     
(0.129) 
0                  
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_domain_names 0.228                     
(0.184) 
0                
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Control Variables     
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.012**                     
(0.004) 
0              
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Classic IP leaders -0.087                     
(0.077) 
0***                  
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
0*                     
(0) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.014                     
(0.052) 
0.                
(0) 
0*                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
New IP producers and developers 0.076                     
(0.05) 
0                
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ln GDP 0.015                     
(0.015) 
0***                  
(0) 
0***                  
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
ln GDPpc -0.071**                     
(0.025) 
0**                  
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.04                     
(0.029) 
0**                  
(0) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Intercept 0.07                
(0.328) 
-1***                       
(0) 
-1***                       
(0) 










Observations 623 482 482 279 
 








- 434 - 
Technology Transfer: Total ltp Im-
ports 






IPR General Binary Variables   
ipr_mentioned 11315.6                     
(7144.3) 
-2670.5                     
(9197.3) 
ipr_1_article -9437.8                     
(7124.9) 
4252.1                     
(9235.1) 
ipr_more_than_1_article 404.7                     
(5727.2) 
1633.8                     
(9687.8) 
ipr_mfn -6208.6                     
(4766.8) 
-135.3                     
(9828.4) 
ipr_nt 476.3                     
(5948.4) 
-9464.3                     
(8474.4) 
ipr_as_investment -31388.2.                     
(18318.6) 
-26473.2.                     
(15382.3) 
ipr_investment_mfn 4105.4                     
(7248) 
-233.5                     
(12055.7) 
ipr_investment_nt 21087.8                     
(18414.6) 
NA
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination -2082                     
(4441.5) 
-918.8                     
(5947.5) 
ipr_general_enforcement 2407.8                     
(5019.6) 
-8099.3                     
(9352.8) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism 796.2                     
(6662.6) 




11616.8                     
(8999.2) 
23343.9*                     
(10075.4) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception -11673.4.                     
(5976.4) 
-6682.7                     
(6361) 
ipr_implementation -6921.                     
(3840.8) 
2719.9                     
(5962.1) 
ipr_border_measures 11102.3*                     
(5481.8) 
4109                   
(7720.4) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights 7025.4                     
(10383) 
5936.6                     
(9778.8) 
ipr_m_trademarks 3390.8                     
(12334.7) 
-12389                     
(11737.4) 
ipr_m_geo_indications -4780.1                     
(5199) 
5979.4                     
(11590.1) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs 5679                     
(8793.4) 
-14201.2                     
(10942) 
ipr_m_patents 1460.2                     
(8724.8) 
29122.9**                     
(10578.3) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information 622.5                     
(6935.6) 
-17620.6                     
(12797.8) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits -4689.5                     
(7546.7) 
-2436.1                     
(9103.4) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties -2007                     
(4430.1) 





- 435 - 
ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources 
-5174.3                     
(4678.4) 




-15744.2.                     
(8069.4) 
7127.3                     
(9050.6) 
ipr_m_domain_names 2075.7                     
(9871.8) 
-7259.5                     
(8516.4) 
Control Variables   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 199.3                     
(233.1) 
156.2                     
(228.7) 
Classic IP leaders -1663.9                     
(4306.7) 
-552.3                     
(3677.1) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
547.8                     
(2458.1) 
-1102.3                     
(2265.7) 
New IP producers and developers 1086.7                     
(2464.9) 
-702.4                     
(2335.1) 
ln GDP 1233.8.                     
(729.4) 
1416.1.                     
(731.6) 
ln GDPpc 653                     
(1227) 
1450.7                     
(1278.2) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -3065.8*                     
(1481.5) 
-3204.6*                     
(1319.3) 
Intercept -14035.9     
(16231.7) 






Observations 462 462 
 











- 436 - 
Technology Transfer: PTA Member 
htp Imports 
Overall IPR 
df3l df5l dft 






IPR General Binary Variables    
ipr_mentioned -5361104                     
(43658706) 
-13964439                  
(36763759) 
27062732                     
(30717169) 
ipr_1_article 21499886                     
(45248500) 
26793323                  
(37860621) 
-8467403                     
(31236256) 
ipr_more_than_1_article -68958522*                     
(32958992) 
-21270654                  
(28624279) 
-50525577*                     
(22538157) 
ipr_mfn 1075537                     
(31994955) 
-2099581                  
(26953535) 
3178114                     
(19980880) 
ipr_nt -52185402                     
(36520795) 
-44220614                  
(31047309) 
-39362924.                     
(23101720) 
ipr_as_investment -93648573                     
(82157029) 
-129218166                  
(78489693) 
-71708321                     
(63462114) 
ipr_investment_mfn 20962664                     
(46448849) 
26331663                  
(40162743) 
13644141                     
(30843692) 
ipr_investment_nt -2191869                     
(95637615) 
33267141                  
(95925982) 
13483128                     
(69522356) 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination 61334723*                     
(26120596) 
33192311                  
(22119064) 
30369551.                     
(17385277) 
ipr_general_enforcement 68975413*                     
(30301090) 
47916087.                  
(28138948) 
57557472**                     
(19728338) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism -46563861                     
(39966659) 
-51406178                  
(33125733) 




91379173.                     
(54345299) 
87453275.                  
(50136635) 
44346181                     
(32874601) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception -59756650                     
(38881880) 
-63157939.                  
(33324269) 
-28339958                     
(23590008) 
ipr_implementation 15471605                     
(23943546) 
1123582                  
(20289552) 
7749450                     
(15185501) 
ipr_border_measures 58710931.                     
(33595656) 
87475126**                  
(30220936) 
44922247*                     
(21189312) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights -73699689                     
(75999499) 
-29247540                  
(51274136) 
-10718405                     
(38250628) 
ipr_m_trademarks -53442511                     
(83784396) 
-92324300                  
(63929541) 
-78091687*                     
(39397305) 
ipr_m_geo_indications 64647026*                     
(30968779) 
56821235*                  
(25514402) 
40376150.                     
(21137984) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs 44271276                     
(59932572) 
100232834.                  
(53301642) 
53608067                     
(41956330) 
ipr_m_patents -2316391                     
(54645719) 
-30957418                  
(54831114) 
-14125535                     
(31136898) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information 5095038                     
(40513539) 
-16917303                  
(36551253) 
6826356                     
(27693036) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits -4448144                     
(42065756) 
-7853176                  
(36935409) 
-16171350                     
(28678169) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties -50420946.                     
(29246596) 
-44708179.                  
(24053484) 





- 437 - 
ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources 
30530847                     
(29459946) 
40065244                  
(25559575) 




12012177                     
(44366021) 
-15880789                  
(40756110) 
2367980                     
(27172518) 
ipr_m_domain_names 61616533                     
(60841448) 
99431537.                  
(55350493) 
45686934                     
(39996232) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -3065183*                     
(1517841) 
-3730553**                  
(1177264) 
-2021517*                     
(976771) 
Classic IP leaders -50563748.                     
(26388467) 
-26132327                  
(22695943) 
-21234653                     
(16731182) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-3729704                     
(16126032) 
4636291                  
(13338434) 
-4208411                     
(11042594) 
New IP producers and developers -34352657*                     
(15409341) 
-19877554                  
(13697137) 
-22209497*                     
(10671154) 
ln GDP 22114809***                     
(4749833) 
12502854**                  
(3833658) 
11713774***                     
(3223347) 
ln GDPpc -19214997*                     
(7920917) 
-6194843                  
(6296512) 
-5495033                     
(5274363) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 23942390*                     
(9341784) 
12659317.                  
(7617838) 
12085017.                     
(6267160) 
Intercept -545740558***     
(106488532) 
-343133438***                       
(84520345) 







Observations 516 466 576 
 








- 438 - 
Technology Transfer: PTA Member 
mhtp Imports 
Overall IPR 







IPR General Binary Variables    
ipr_mentioned -339.75                     
(1152.89) 
-99372                  
(1299884) 
369118                     
(731574) 
ipr_1_article 1203.53                     
(1166.3) 
284271                  
(1347324) 
-25871                     
(744229) 
ipr_more_than_1_article -3802.71***                     
(858.58) 
-1590338                  
(988352) 
-1343289*                     
(539755) 
ipr_mfn -593.46                     
(747.49) 
-662953                  
(939197) 
-335843                     
(470390) 
ipr_nt 323.54                     
(872.43) 
-18994                  
(1081600) 
-13994                     
(548565) 
ipr_as_investment 797.23                     
(2361.52) 
-192388                  
(2447272) 
-162377                     
(1510994) 
ipr_investment_mfn 200.92                     
(1149.01) 
274471                  
(1383295) 
60194                     
(733564) 
ipr_investment_nt -2212.42                     
(2606.12) 
-995565                  
(2851310) 
-624320                     
(1656592) 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination 2033.19**                     
(657.17) 
787381                  
(780388) 
867672*                     
(415189) 
ipr_general_enforcement 3475.45***                     
(746.84) 
1496626.                  
(896045) 
1135708*                     
(468103) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism -762.27                     
(892.06) 
-353212                  
(1158611) 




1931.47                     
(1238.96) 
956923                  
(1618753) 
574541                     
(783576) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception -1187.61                     
(882.99) 
-637773                  
(1152372) 
-638872                     
(561305) 
ipr_implementation 1091.8*                     
(550.19) 
606305                  
(700165) 
542900                     
(357053) 
ipr_border_measures -520.84                     
(773.54) 
-61921                  
(990569) 
-127033                     
(501928) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights 3038.07.                     
(1600.96) 
-2988237                  
(2262479) 
-627044                     
(909719) 
ipr_m_trademarks -3833.29*                     
(1591.08) 
3547834                  
(2473024) 
733953                     
(935662) 
ipr_m_geo_indications 161.58                     
(793.28) 
173253                  
(915856) 
65284                     
(500649) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs 31.59                     
(1461.71) 
-930554                  
(1684689) 
-1133936                     
(937572) 
ipr_m_patents -436.91                     
(1163.28) 
-520302                  
(1591084) 
136082                     
(736311) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information 300.46                     
(964.28) 
657976                  
(1173024) 
533671                     
(635171) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits -1087.7                     
(1053.37) 
253671                  
(1223978) 
148953                     
(667164) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties -527.79                     
(723.29) 
-575649                  
(868193) 





- 439 - 
ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources 
-472.86                     
(670.73) 
-715270                  
(874081) 




-674.85                     
(1020.23) 
-107302                  
(1301729) 
82526                     
(640670) 
ipr_m_domain_names 336.06                     
(1460.93) 
-589862                  
(1775721) 
-544902                     
(931481) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 10.37                     
(37.22) 
22985                  
(45162) 
11302                     
(23389) 
Classic IP leaders -462.71                     
(618.87) 
-1231709                  
(789312) 
-1045470**                     
(401089) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-407.26                     
(418.88) 
-245872                  
(479973) 
-283877                     
(262576) 
New IP producers and developers -372.17                     
(403.15) 
-619520                  
(459006) 
-468975.                     
(253917) 
ln GDP 123.4                     
(121.2) 
254918.                  
(142458) 
199085*                     
(77065) 
ln GDPpc 10.99                     
(199.04) 
2436                  
(238336) 
43810                     
(126878) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 490.65*                     
(239.67) 
237873                  
(279609) 
194115                     
(149211) 
Intercept -6733.19*     
(2657.89) 
-7460198*                       
(3177558) 








Observations 575 519 579 
 








- 440 - 
Technology Transfer: PTA Member 
mltp Imports 






IPR General Binary Variables   
ipr_mentioned 7471.93                     
(5492.88) 
-1816.18                     
(8004.33) 
ipr_1_article -6061.36                     
(5573.22) 
3039.95                     
(7880.45) 
ipr_more_than_1_article -2321.81                     
(4053.57) 
223.52                     
(7925.93) 
ipr_mfn -3653.19                     
(3532.33) 
-213.68                     
(7122.59) 
ipr_nt -825.32                     
(4069.05) 
-5825.8                     
(6985.07) 
ipr_as_investment -14958.62                     
(11272.85) 
-23961.29.                     
(13204) 
ipr_investment_mfn 1250.86                     
(5484.88) 
-47.01                     
(10541.95) 
ipr_investment_nt 11242.93                     
(12437.58) 
NA
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination 50.45                     
(3119.57) 
-1582.64                     
(5123.28) 
ipr_general_enforcement 5931.55.                     
(3545.56) 
-3810.38                     
(7434.07) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism -1111.73                     
(4262.23) 




8037.02                     
(5891.2) 
23066.84**                     
(8408.83) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception -10362.22*                     
(4201.22) 
-3881.68                     
(4907.03) 
ipr_implementation -5577.27*                     
(2614.31) 
1966.29                     
(4503.69) 
ipr_border_measures 5550.41                     
(3687.62) 
2383.92                     
(5426.92) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights 2781.15                     
(7226.44) 
4758.88                     
(8295) 
ipr_m_trademarks 3273.4                     
(7343.59) 
-5688.8                     
(8897.05) 
ipr_m_geo_indications -2109.11                     
(3773.95) 
466.56                     
(8269.43) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs 3548.43                     
(6977.63) 
-14216.16.                     
(8521.35) 
ipr_m_patents 3188.05                     
(5538.36) 
21885.52**                     
(8408.15) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information -1597.52                     
(4600.85) 
-12314.22                     
(8606.63) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits -3564.48                     
(5024.09) 
1718.46                     
(6456.78) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties -2420.11                     
(3381.7) 





- 441 - 
ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources 
-3546.33                     
(3172.93) 




-6679.1                     
(4859.78) 
3429.39                     
(6641.53) 
ipr_m_domain_names -1464.97                     
(6975.27) 
-6365.15                     
(7103.6) 
Control Variables   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 196.43                     
(174.98) 
134.21                     
(172.58) 
Classic IP leaders -1957.92                     
(2940.4) 
-244.26                     
(2618.59) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-159.07                     
(1982.77) 
-713.71                     
(1817.61) 
New IP producers and developers 848.16                     
(1911.15) 
-540.81                     
(1802.47) 
ln GDP 859.64                     
(570.86) 
986.36.                     
(564.05) 
ln GDPpc 314.32                     
(944.61) 
796.28                     
(972.74) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -1793.16                     
(1126.29) 
-2767.66**                     
(1013.98) 
Intercept -11244.74     
(12562.92) 






Observations 590 590 
 








- 442 - 
Technology Transfer: PTA Member 
ltp Imports 
Overall IPR First-comer IPR 











IPR General Binary Variables      
ipr_mentioned 0.11                     
(0.153) 
0                
(0) 
-0.001                     
(0.212) 
0              
(0) 
0*                     
(0) 
ipr_1_article 0                     
(0.156) 
0                  
(0) 
-0.013                     
(0.203) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_more_than_1_article 0.142                     
(0.109) 
0               
(0) 
0.084                     
(0.195) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_mfn 0.001                     
(0.097) 
0               
(0) 
-0.128                     
(0.186) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_nt -0.08                     
(0.112) 
0               
(0) 
-0.004                     
(0.182) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_as_investment 0.271                     
(0.315) 
0               
(0) 
-0.286                     
(0.368) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_investment_mfn -0.124                     
(0.153) 
0              
(0) 
0.211                     
(0.295) 
0               
(0) 
NA 
ipr_investment_nt -0.21                     
(0.348) 
0.                
(0) 
NA NA NA 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination -0.18*                     
(0.086) 
0              
(0) 
-0.045                     
(0.14) 
0              
(0) 
0*                     
(0) 
ipr_general_enforcement -0.057                     
(0.096) 
0              
(0) 
0.219                     
(0.203) 
0               
(0) 
0.                     
(0) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism -0.16                     
(0.119) 
0               
(0) 
0.013                     
(0.187) 
0               
(0) 




-0.104                     
(0.164) 
0.               
(0) 
-0.129                     
(0.231) 
0.               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception -0.06                     
(0.117) 
0               
(0) 
0.087                     
(0.138) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_implementation -0.027                     
(0.071) 
0              
(0) 
-0.022                     
(0.119) 
0*               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_border_measures 0.106                     
(0.101) 
0*                
(0) 
-0.028                     
(0.151) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights -0.015                     
(0.193) 
0              
(0) 
0.198                     
(0.218) 
0.                  
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
ipr_m_trademarks -0.043                     
(0.198) 
0              
(0) 
0.041                     
(0.245) 
0               
(0) 
0*                     
(0) 
ipr_m_geo_indications -0.046                     
(0.104) 
0              
(0) 
-0.063                     
(0.219) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs 0.117                     
(0.18) 
0               
(0) 
-0.015                     
(0.238) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_patents 0.214                     
(0.152) 
0               
(0) 
0.176                     
(0.232) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information -0.054                     
(0.125) 
0              
(0) 
-0.067                     
(0.231) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits -0.246.                     
(0.134) 
0.              
(0) 
-0.112                     
(0.178) 
0              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties 0.136                     
(0.092) 
0*                
(0) 
0.017                     
(0.131) 
0               
(0) 





- 443 - 
ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources 
0.028                     
(0.088) 
0.                  
(0) 
0.198*                     
(0.101) 
0              
(0) 




-0.142                     
(0.135) 
0              
(0) 
-0.13                     
(0.185) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_m_domain_names 0.342.                     
(0.193) 
0.               
(0) 
0.126                     
(0.199) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.015**                     
(0.005) 
0.                  
(0) 
0.013**                     
(0.005) 
0*              
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Classic IP leaders -0.091                     
(0.08) 
0***                 
(0) 
-0.088                     
(0.072) 
0***                 
(0) 
0.                     
(0) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.007                     
(0.054) 
0              
(0) 
0.006                     
(0.05) 
0*                
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
New IP producers and developers 0.052                     
(0.053) 
0               
(0) 
0.047                     
(0.05) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ln GDP 0.014                     
(0.016) 
0***                  
(0) 
0.018                     
(0.016) 
0***                  
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
ln GDPpc -0.06*                     
(0.026) 
0.               
(0) 
-0.055*                     
(0.027) 
0             
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.018                     
(0.031) 
0               
(0) 
0.001                     
(0.028) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Intercept 0.14     
(0.345) 
-1***                       
(0) 
0.118   
(0.319) 
-1***                       
(0) 












Observations 623 493 623 493 289 
 











- 444 - 
Growth: GDP I Overall IPR 











IPR General Binary Variables      
ipr_mentioned 0.082**                     
(0.028) 
0.111.                 
(0.062) 
0.104                     
(0.116) 
0.045                     
(0.363) 
0.091**                     
(0.032) 
ipr_1_article 0.007                     
(0.033) 
0.012                  
(0.073) 
-0.042                     
(0.138) 
-0.156                     
(0.477) 
-0.014                     
(0.038) 
ipr_more_than_1_article -0.027                     
(0.03) 
-0.024                  
(0.067) 
0                    
(0.129) 
-0.179                     
(0.46) 
0.019                     
(0.034) 
ipr_mfn -0.028                     
(0.025) 
0.092                  
(0.063) 
0.236.                     
(0.124) 
-0.085                     
(0.42) 
0.017                     
(0.031) 
ipr_nt -0.086**                     
(0.031) 
-0.288***                  
(0.078) 
-0.263                     
(0.165) 
-0.216                     
(0.624) 
-0.19***                     
(0.038) 
ipr_as_investment -0.29***                     
(0.075) 
-0.28.                
(0.167) 
-0.54.                     
(0.311) 
-0.898                     
(1.29) 
-0.399***                     
(0.085) 
ipr_investment_mfn -0.087                     
(0.065) 
-0.203                  
(0.153) 
-0.157                     
(0.296) 
0.103                     
(1.42) 
-0.054                     
(0.076) 
ipr_investment_nt 0.373**                     
(0.12) 
0.6*                  
(0.276) 
0.83                     
(0.528) 
0.91                     
(2.434) 
0.407**                     
(0.138) 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination -0.156***                     
(0.024) 
-0.18***                  
(0.054) 
-0.137                     
(0.105) 
0.198                     
(0.388) 
-0.152***                     
(0.028) 
ipr_general_enforcement 0.068**                     
(0.026) 
0.147*                  
(0.059) 
0.267*                     
(0.112) 
0.39                     
(0.356) 
0.092**                     
(0.029) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism -0.025                     
(0.034) 
-0.141.                  
(0.077) 
-0.184                     
(0.176) 
-0.104                     
(0.741) 




-0.049                     
(0.079) 
-0.033                  
(0.189) 
-0.074                     
(0.388) 
-0.175                     
(1.549) 
-0.045                     
(0.09) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception 0.007                     
(0.05) 
-0.12                  
(0.127) 
-0.102                     
(0.253) 
0.156                     
(1.073) 
0.016                     
(0.059) 
ipr_implementation -0.055**                     
(0.019) 
-0.113**                  
(0.044) 
-0.141.                     
(0.085) 
-0.31                    
(0.293) 
-0.123***                     
(0.023) 
ipr_border_measures -0.023                     
(0.024) 
-0.43***                  
(0.061) 
-0.724***                     
(0.123) 
-0.411                     
(0.454) 
0.041                     
(0.03) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights 0.004                     
(0.039) 
0.084                  
(0.101) 
0.225                     
(0.206) 
0.193                     
(0.705) 
0.044                     
(0.049) 
ipr_m_trademarks 0.008                     
(0.046) 
0.471**                  
(0.151) 
0.523.                     
(0.293) 
0.435                     
(0.98) 
0.004                     
(0.059) 
ipr_m_geo_indications -0.001                     
(0.036) 
0.006                  
(0.084) 
-0.017                     
(0.163) 
-0.243                     
(0.592) 
-0.048                     
(0.042) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs 0.01                     
(0.055) 
-0.172                  
(0.127) 
-0.201                     
(0.24) 
-0.477                     
(0.797) 
0.054                     
(0.064) 
ipr_m_patents 0.228***                     
(0.05) 
-0.044                
(0.121) 
-0.186                     
(0.237) 
-0.112                     
(0.77) 
0.25***                     
(0.057) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information 0.187***                     
(0.031) 
0.239**                  
(0.079) 
0.223                     
(0.182) 
0.189                     
(0.668) 
0.26***                     
(0.046) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits -0.294***                     
(0.041) 
-0.46***                 
(0.093) 
-0.574**                     
(0.182) 
-0.117                     
(0.706) 
-0.314***                     
(0.047) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties -0.026                     
(0.023) 
0.183**                  
(0.057) 
0.505***                     
(0.114) 
0.839*                     
(0.373) 





- 445 - 
ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources 
0.068**                     
(0.026) 
0.202**                  
(0.072) 
0.183                     
(0.155) 
0.484                     
(0.865) 




-0.067.                     
(0.036) 
-0.083                  
(0.085) 
-0.158                     
(0.17) 
-0.371                     
(0.696) 
-0.098*                     
(0.042) 
ipr_m_domain_names -0.013                     
(0.073) 
0.283                  
(0.175) 
0.45                     
(0.351) 
0.343                     
(1.304) 
0.103                     
(0.085) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.001                     
(0.001) 
-0.008***                  
(0.002) 
-0.017***                     
(0.004) 
-0.053***                     
(0.014) 
0              
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders -0.007                     
(0.015) 
0.04                 
(0.033) 
0.032                     
(0.062) 
-0.254                     
(0.195) 
-0.034*                     
(0.017) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.018                     
(0.013) 
0.058*                  
(0.029) 
0.101.                     
(0.054) 
0.007                     
(0.191) 
0.026.                     
(0.015) 
New IP producers and developers -0.027.                     
(0.016) 
0.002                 
(0.036) 
-0.063                     
(0.068) 
-0.152                     
(0.278) 
-0.043*                     
(0.019) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.004                     
(0.007) 
-0.061***                  
(0.016) 
-0.113***                     
(0.031) 
-0.37***                     
(0.1) 
-0.019*                     
(0.008) 
Intercept 0.156**     
(0.056) 
0.926***                       
(0.126) 
1.665***                     
(0.238) 
4.792***                     
(0.767) 












Observations 2970 2764 2653 2301 2786 
 








- 446 - 
Growth: GDP II First-comer IPR 











IPR General Binary Variables      
ipr_mentioned -0.152***                     
(0.042) 
-0.033                  
(0.094) 
-0.223                     
(0.176) 
0.288                     
(0.557) 
-0.176***                     
(0.049) 
ipr_1_article 0.147***                     
(0.045) 
0.152                  
(0.1) 
0.457*                     
(0.187) 
-0.032                     
(0.584) 
0.087.                     
(0.052) 
ipr_more_than_1_article -0.025                     
(0.064) 
-0.075                  
(0.147) 
-0.07                     
(0.275) 
0.212                     
(0.885) 
-0.002                     
(0.076) 
ipr_mfn -0.305***                     
(0.05) 
-0.614***                  
(0.118) 
-1.012***                     
(0.226) 
-1.241.                   
(0.749) 
-0.243***                     
(0.059) 
ipr_nt -0.005                     
(0.043) 
-0.064                  
(0.097) 
0.069                     
(0.242) 
-0.119                     
(0.83) 
-0.03                     
(0.05) 
ipr_as_investment -0.296***                     
(0.09) 
-0.535**                  
(0.2) 
-0.723.                     
(0.373) 
-0.926                     
(1.149) 
-0.31**                     
(0.105) 
ipr_investment_mfn 0.113                     
(0.101) 
0.298                  
(0.234) 
0.326                     
(0.434) 
0.289                     
(1.721) 
0.184                     
(0.121) 
ipr_investment_nt 0.195                     
(0.165) 
0.075                  
(0.369) 
-0.03                     
(0.688) 
-0.59                     
(2.636) 
0.191                     
(0.193) 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination -0.07                     
(0.043) 
0.084                  
(0.097) 
0.35.                     
(0.18) 
0.463                     
(0.628) 
-0.068                     
(0.051) 
ipr_general_enforcement 0.206**                     
(0.068) 
0.491**                  
(0.159) 
0.541.                     
(0.297) 
1.083                     
(1.026) 
0.253**                     
(0.081) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism -0.058                     
(0.049) 
-0.023                  
(0.112) 
-0.009                     
(0.209) 
-0.393                     
(0.758) 




-0.04                     
(0.105) 
0.128                  
(0.235) 
0.303                     
(0.44) 
0.926                     
(1.763) 
-0.037                     
(0.123) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception -0.024                     
(0.052) 
-0.06                  
(0.139) 
-0.154                     
(0.258) 
0.171                     
(1.062) 
-0.022                     
(0.069) 
ipr_implementation -0.084*                     
(0.035) 
-0.12                  
(0.079) 
-0.196                     
(0.15) 
-0.088                     
(0.517) 
-0.051                     
(0.043) 
ipr_border_measures -0.089.                     
(0.047) 
-0.224*                  
(0.11) 
-0.32                     
(0.214) 
-0.365                     
(0.973) 
-0.154*                     
(0.06) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights -0.024                     
(0.064) 
0.054                  
(0.143) 
0.05                     
(0.269) 
0.24                     
(0.858) 
0.03                     
(0.076) 
ipr_m_trademarks 0.141                     
(0.089) 
-0.045                  
(0.206) 
0.319                     
(0.384) 
0.006                     
(1.283) 
0.113                     
(0.104) 
ipr_m_geo_indications 0.027                     
(0.073) 
0.154                  
(0.169) 
0.019                     
(0.317) 
-0.595                     
(1.194) 
-0.058                     
(0.086) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs 0.23**                     
(0.08) 
0.227                  
(0.18) 
-0.225                     
(0.347) 
-0.506                     
(1.366) 
0.195*                     
(0.094) 
ipr_m_patents -0.005                     
(0.093) 
0.186                  
(0.21) 
0.036                     
(0.395) 
-0.069                     
(1.561) 
0.089                     
(0.108) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information 0.265***                     
(0.076) 
0.295.                
(0.178) 
0.572                     
(0.352) 
0.24                     
(1.383) 
0.302***                     
(0.091) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits -0.55***                     
(0.055) 
-0.649***                  
(0.13) 
-0.555*                     
(0.257) 
0.464                    
(1.113) 
-0.512***                     
(0.065) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties 0.146***                     
(0.037) 
0.222**                  
(0.084) 
0.458**                     
(0.162) 
0.496                     
(0.523) 





- 447 - 
ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources 
0.223***                     
(0.034) 
0.324***                  
(0.079) 
0.239                     
(0.15) 
0.364                     
(0.907) 




0.018                     
(0.051) 
-0.021                  
(0.116) 
-0.137                     
(0.221) 
0.186                     
(1.021) 
0.211***                     
(0.061) 
ipr_m_domain_names 0.154.                     
(0.081) 
0.2                
(0.183) 
0.241                     
(0.341) 
0.086                     
(1.183) 
0.149                     
(0.095) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0                     
(0.001) 
-0.004.                  
(0.002) 
-0.011*                     
(0.004) 
-0.047***                     
(0.013) 
0.002.                  
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders -0.024.                     
(0.013) 
-0.082**                  
(0.03) 
-0.141*                     
(0.057) 
-0.44*                     
(0.185) 
-0.007                     
(0.016) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.012                     
(0.012) 
0.046.                  
(0.028) 
0.085                     
(0.052) 
0.001                     
(0.184) 
0.016                     
(0.014) 
New IP producers and developers -0.006                     
(0.015) 
0.048                  
(0.034) 
-0.004                     
(0.065) 
-0.074                     
(0.265) 
-0.019                     
(0.018) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.018**                     
(0.007) 
-0.093***                  
(0.016) 
-0.154***                     
(0.03) 
-0.436***                     
(0.099) 
-0.038***                     
(0.008) 
Intercept 0.268***     
(0.053) 
1.178***                       
(0.12) 
1.983***                   
(0.231) 
5.263***                     
(0.757) 












Observations 2970 2764 2653 2301 2786 
 











- 448 - 
Growth: GDPpc I Overall IPR 











IPR General Binary Variables      
ipr_mentioned 0.086***                     
(0.026) 
0.12*                  
(0.053) 
0.122                     
(0.091) 
0.065                     
(0.214) 
0.096**                     
(0.03) 
ipr_1_article 0.001                     
(0.031) 
-0.02                  
(0.063) 
-0.103                     
(0.107) 
-0.309                     
(0.282) 
-0.022                     
(0.036) 
ipr_more_than_1_article -0.027                     
(0.028) 
0.006                  
(0.058) 
0.066                     
(0.101) 
0.083                     
(0.272) 
0.019                     
(0.032) 
ipr_mfn -0.024                     
(0.023) 
0.103.                  
(0.055) 
0.252**                     
(0.097) 
-0.007                    
(0.248) 
0.015                     
(0.029) 
ipr_nt -0.072*                     
(0.029) 
-0.245***                  
(0.067) 
-0.193                     
(0.129) 
-0.101                     
(0.368) 
-0.168***                     
(0.036) 
ipr_as_investment -0.256***                     
(0.07) 
-0.243.                
(0.144) 
-0.484*                     
(0.243) 
-0.565                     
(0.761) 
-0.358***                     
(0.08) 
ipr_investment_mfn -0.094                     
(0.061) 
-0.194                  
(0.132) 
-0.127                     
(0.231) 
0.15                    
(0.838) 
-0.063                     
(0.071) 
ipr_investment_nt 0.37***                     
(0.112) 
0.603*                  
(0.239) 
0.835*                     
(0.412) 
0.773                     
(1.436) 
0.409**                     
(0.13) 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination -0.156***                     
(0.023) 
-0.18***                  
(0.047) 
-0.162*                     
(0.082) 
0.03                   
(0.229) 
-0.153***                     
(0.026) 
ipr_general_enforcement 0.061*                     
(0.024) 
0.117*                  
(0.051) 
0.209*                     
(0.088) 
0.308                     
(0.21) 
0.087**                     
(0.028) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism -0.023                     
(0.032) 
-0.144*                  
(0.067) 
-0.176                     
(0.137) 
-0.178                     
(0.437) 




-0.062                     
(0.074) 
-0.061                  
(0.164) 
-0.131                     
(0.303) 
-0.345                     
(0.914) 
-0.067                     
(0.085) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception 0.007                     
(0.046) 
-0.122                  
(0.11) 
-0.107                     
(0.197) 
0.163                     
(0.633) 
0.019                     
(0.055) 
ipr_implementation -0.051**                     
(0.017) 
-0.097*                  
(0.038) 
-0.113.                     
(0.067) 
-0.286.                     
(0.173) 
-0.119***                     
(0.021) 
ipr_border_measures -0.018                     
(0.022) 
-0.406***                  
(0.053) 
-0.67***                     
(0.096) 
-0.41                     
(0.268) 
0.031                     
(0.029) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights 0.002                     
(0.036) 
0.074                  
(0.088) 
0.183                     
(0.161) 
0.19                     
(0.416) 
0.032                     
(0.046) 
ipr_m_trademarks 0.031                     
(0.043) 
0.542***                  
(0.131) 
0.679**                     
(0.228) 
0.669                     
(0.578) 
0.031                     
(0.055) 
ipr_m_geo_indications -0.009                     
(0.034) 
-0.018                  
(0.073) 
-0.078                     
(0.127) 
-0.31                     
(0.349) 
-0.053                     
(0.04) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs -0.01                     
(0.051) 
-0.221*                  
(0.11) 
-0.259                     
(0.188) 
-0.526                     
(0.47) 
0.026                     
(0.06) 
ipr_m_patents 0.197***                     
(0.046) 
-0.128                
(0.105) 
-0.332.                     
(0.185) 
-0.368                     
(0.454) 
0.215***                     
(0.053) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information 0.178***                     
(0.029) 
0.216**                  
(0.069) 
0.214                     
(0.142) 
0.218                     
(0.394) 
0.254***                     
(0.043) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits -0.24***                     
(0.038) 
-0.318***                  
(0.08) 
-0.347*                     
(0.142) 
0.206                    
(0.416) 
-0.254***                     
(0.044) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties -0.034                     
(0.021) 
0.128**                  
(0.049) 
0.359***                     
(0.089) 
0.503*                     
(0.22) 





- 449 - 
ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources 
0.069**                     
(0.024) 
0.214***                  
(0.062) 
0.242*                     
(0.121) 
0.587                     
(0.51) 




-0.068*                     
(0.033) 
-0.082                  
(0.074) 
-0.163                     
(0.133) 
-0.329                     
(0.41) 
-0.1*                     
(0.039) 
ipr_m_domain_names -0.021                     
(0.068) 
0.245                  
(0.151) 
0.398                     
(0.274) 
0.256                     
(0.769) 
0.083                     
(0.08) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.001                     
(0.001) 
-0.001                  
(0.002) 
-0.003                     
(0.003) 
-0.009                     
(0.008) 
0.002.                     
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders -0.004                     
(0.014) 
0.04                 
(0.029) 
0.022                     
(0.049) 
-0.274*                     
(0.115) 
-0.035*                     
(0.016) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.024*                     
(0.012) 
0.06*                  
(0.025) 
0.098*                     
(0.042) 
0.025                     
(0.113) 
0.031*                     
(0.014) 
New IP producers and developers -0.021                     
(0.015) 
0.012                  
(0.031) 
-0.036                     
(0.053) 
-0.07                     
(0.164) 
-0.035*                     
(0.017) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.012.                     
(0.007) 
-0.076***                  
(0.014) 
-0.132***                     
(0.024) 
-0.385***                     
(0.059) 
-0.028***                     
(0.008) 
Intercept 0.174***     
(0.052) 
0.918***                       
(0.109) 
1.603***                     
(0.186) 
4.307***                     
(0.453) 












Observations 2970 2764 2653 2300 2786 
 








- 450 - 
Growth: GDPpc II First-comer IPR 











IPR General Binary Variables      
ipr_mentioned -0.126**                     
(0.039) 
0.046                
(0.082) 
-0.051                     
(0.138) 
0.501                     
(0.328) 
-0.15**                     
(0.046) 
ipr_1_article 0.117**                     
(0.042) 
0.05                  
(0.087) 
0.207                     
(0.146) 
-0.484                     
(0.345) 
0.059                     
(0.049) 
ipr_more_than_1_article -0.031                     
(0.06) 
-0.094                  
(0.128) 
-0.093                     
(0.216) 
0.2                   
(0.522) 
-0.012                     
(0.072) 
ipr_mfn -0.268***                     
(0.047) 
-0.504***                  
(0.103) 
-0.817***                     
(0.178) 
-0.918*                     
(0.442) 
-0.211***                     
(0.056) 
ipr_nt 0.007                     
(0.04) 
-0.028                  
(0.084) 
0.108                     
(0.19) 
0.076                     
(0.49) 
-0.017                     
(0.048) 
ipr_as_investment -0.279***                     
(0.084) 
-0.502**                  
(0.175) 
-0.696*                     
(0.292) 
-0.887                     
(0.678) 
-0.294**                     
(0.099) 
ipr_investment_mfn 0.087                     
(0.094) 
0.247                  
(0.204) 
0.248                     
(0.341) 
0.133                     
(1.016) 
0.155                     
(0.114) 
ipr_investment_nt 0.214                     
(0.154) 
0.156                  
(0.323) 
0.159                     
(0.54) 
-0.07                     
(1.555) 
0.213                     
(0.183) 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination -0.069.                     
(0.04) 
0.034                 
(0.084) 
0.189                     
(0.141) 
0.14                     
(0.37) 
-0.064                     
(0.048) 
ipr_general_enforcement 0.19**                     
(0.063) 
0.45**                  
(0.139) 
0.518*                     
(0.233) 
0.948                     
(0.606) 
0.232**                     
(0.076) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism -0.063                     
(0.046) 
-0.046                  
(0.098) 
-0.042                     
(0.164) 
-0.437                     
(0.447) 




-0.047                     
(0.098) 
0.114                  
(0.205) 
0.258                     
(0.345) 
0.734                     
(1.04) 
-0.046                     
(0.116) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception -0.011                     
(0.049) 
-0.015                  
(0.121) 
-0.088                     
(0.203) 
0.192                     
(0.627) 
0.004                     
(0.065) 
ipr_implementation -0.08*                     
(0.032) 
-0.085                  
(0.069) 
-0.106                     
(0.117) 
0.084                     
(0.305) 
-0.06                     
(0.04) 
ipr_border_measures -0.082.                     
(0.044) 
-0.231*                  
(0.096) 
-0.355*                     
(0.167) 
-0.393                     
(0.574) 
-0.159**                     
(0.057) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights -0.022                     
(0.059) 
0.048                  
(0.125) 
0.07                     
(0.211) 
0.25                     
(0.506) 
0.033                     
(0.071) 
ipr_m_trademarks 0.165*                     
(0.083) 
0.037                  
(0.18) 
0.402                     
(0.301) 
0.176                     
(0.757) 
0.152                     
(0.099) 
ipr_m_geo_indications -0.003                     
(0.068) 
0.082                  
(0.147) 
-0.091                     
(0.249) 
-0.696                     
(0.704) 
-0.081                     
(0.081) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs 0.204**                     
(0.075) 
0.186                  
(0.157) 
-0.18                     
(0.272) 
-0.311                     
(0.806) 
0.167.                     
(0.089) 
ipr_m_patents -0.028                     
(0.087) 
0.091                  
(0.184) 
-0.093                     
(0.31) 
-0.265                     
(0.921) 
0.051                     
(0.102) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information 0.253***                     
(0.071) 
0.303.                
(0.156) 
0.544*                     
(0.276) 
0.27                     
(0.816) 
0.287***                     
(0.086) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits -0.495***                     
(0.051) 
-0.527***                  
(0.113) 
-0.407*                     
(0.202) 
0.556                    
(0.657) 
-0.456***                     
(0.061) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties 0.13***                     
(0.034) 
0.166*                  
(0.073) 
0.334**                     
(0.127) 
0.283                     
(0.309) 
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ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources 
0.217***                     
(0.031) 
0.302***                  
(0.069) 
0.223.                     
(0.118) 
0.292                     
(0.535) 




0.016                     
(0.047) 
-0.014                  
(0.101) 
-0.099                     
(0.174) 
0.119                     
(0.602) 
0.195***                     
(0.057) 
ipr_m_domain_names 0.134.                     
(0.076) 
0.14                 
(0.16) 
0.151                     
(0.267) 
0.046                     
(0.698) 
0.11                     
(0.09) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.002*                     
(0.001) 
0.003                  
(0.002) 
0.002                     
(0.003) 
-0.004                     
(0.008) 
0.004***                     
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders -0.017                     
(0.012) 
-0.066*                  
(0.026) 
-0.124**                     
(0.045) 
-0.414***                     
(0.109) 
-0.008                     
(0.015) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.018                     
(0.011) 
0.05*                  
(0.024) 
0.087*                     
(0.041) 
0.022                     
(0.108) 
0.02                     
(0.013) 
New IP producers and developers -0.001                     
(0.014) 
0.05.                 
(0.03) 
0.008                     
(0.051) 
-0.01                     
(0.156) 
-0.013                     
(0.017) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.024***                     
(0.006) 
-0.105***                  
(0.014) 
-0.171***                     
(0.024) 
-0.442***                     
(0.058) 
-0.046***                     
(0.008) 
Intercept 0.275***     
(0.049) 
1.153***                       
(0.105) 
1.908***                     
(0.181) 
4.728***                     
(0.447) 












Observations 2970 2764 2653 2300 2786 
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Growth: GDP Growth Rate Overall IPR First-comer IPR 











IPR General Binary Variables      
ipr_mentioned -0.349                     
(1.156) 
0.17                 
(2.076) 
-0.412                     
(1.456) 
-0.086                     
(1.796) 
-1.511                  
(2.255) 
ipr_1_article 1.702                     
(1.369) 
1.757                  
(2.444) 
1.733                     
(1.722) 
-0.816                     
(1.897) 
0.645                  
(2.388) 
ipr_more_than_1_article -2.65*                     
(1.234) 
-4.113.                  
(2.281) 
-3.025.                     
(1.553) 
-0.478                     
(2.709) 
0.186                  
(3.439) 
ipr_mfn -1.278                     
(1.01) 
-1.869                  
(2.207) 
-0.183                     
(1.423) 
-1.421                     
(2.114) 
2.136                  
(2.662) 
ipr_nt 1.877                     
(1.29) 
2.874                  
(2.918) 
2.881.                     
(1.743) 
1.325                     
(1.841) 
-0.379                  
(2.337) 
ipr_as_investment -0.364                     
(3.098) 
-1.796                  
(5.543) 
0.005                     
(3.903) 
0.911                     
(3.886) 
2.592                  
(4.888) 
ipr_investment_mfn -1.515                     
(2.658) 
-1.924                  
(5.188) 
-2.393                     
(3.425) 
-9.594*                     
(4.227) 
-9.814.                  
(5.461) 
ipr_investment_nt 0.769                     
(4.918) 
4.443                  
(9.286) 
1.849                     
(6.251) 
8                  
(6.993) 
7.445                  
(8.822) 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination 0.734                     
(1) 
1.305                  
(1.856) 
0.526                     
(1.274) 
-1.172                     
(1.8) 
-3.434                  
(2.29) 
ipr_general_enforcement -0.068                     
(1.061) 
1.038                  
(2) 
0.399                     
(1.338) 
1.275                     
(2.866) 
1.659                  
(3.676) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism -0.932                     
(1.398) 
0.977                  
(3.112) 
0.651                     
(1.781) 
-1.415                     
(2.093) 




-0.183                     
(3.23) 
-1.136                  
(6.798) 
-0.454                     
(4.066) 
-0.324                     
(4.4) 
-0.379                  
(5.551) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception 1.378                     
(2.024) 
-0.343                  
(4.436) 
0.984                     
(2.647) 
1.23                     
(2.186) 
1.549                  
(3.115) 
ipr_implementation -0.91                     
(0.772) 
-1.358                  
(1.526) 
-1.498                     
(1.037) 
0.415                     
(1.454) 
0.035                  
(1.947) 
ipr_border_measures 0.152                     
(0.978) 
-1.232                  
(2.21) 
-1.627                     
(1.393) 
1.678                     
(1.963) 
1.329                  
(2.712) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights -0.268                     
(1.607) 
-1.084                  
(3.63) 
-0.347                     
(2.219) 
0.471                     
(2.663) 
0.581                  
(3.422) 
ipr_m_trademarks 0.378                     
(1.899) 
1.079                  
(5.136) 
-0.311                     
(2.642) 
-0.915                     
(3.738) 
-0.957                  
(4.723) 
ipr_m_geo_indications 0.709                     
(1.473) 
1.315                  
(2.865) 
1.151                     
(1.898) 
-0.361                     
(3.054) 
-0.534                  
(3.899) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs 0.361                     
(2.214) 
0.627                  
(4.136) 
0.964                     
(2.841) 
1.277                     
(3.252) 
2.657                  
(4.091) 
ipr_m_patents 0.378                     
(2.017) 
-0.426                  
(4.144) 
0.709                     
(2.548) 
0.674                     
(3.851) 
1.332                  
(4.846) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information 0.683                     
(1.279) 
1.183                  
(3.194) 
0.473                     
(2.08) 
0.693                     
(3.176) 
0.408                  
(4.115) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits 0.827                     
(1.685) 
2.301                  
(3.184) 
1.586                     
(2.124) 
-0.652                     
(2.301) 
-0.341                  
(2.921) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties -2.36*                     
(0.94) 
-4.186*                  
(2.026) 
-3.287*                     
(1.323) 
-0.611                     
(1.539) 
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ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources 
-0.329                     
(1.065) 
3.212                  
(2.747) 
0.26                     
(1.547) 
-0.495                     
(1.416) 




-1.52                     
(1.479) 
0.067                  
(3.045) 
-0.554                     
(1.908) 
-0.994                     
(2.131) 
-0.918                  
(2.736) 
ipr_m_domain_names 0.585                     
(2.988) 
-2.96                  
(6.156) 
-0.559                     
(3.829) 
-1.071                     
(3.408) 
-1.432                  
(4.308) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.048                     
(0.043) 
-0.004                  
(0.077) 
-0.057                     
(0.054) 
-0.043                     
(0.042) 
-0.046                  
(0.052) 
Classic IP leaders 0.968                     
(0.61) 
0.83                  
(1.111) 
1.465.                     
(0.772) 
0.791                     
(0.55) 
1.421*                  
(0.718) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.508                     
(0.54) 
-2.979**                  
(0.972) 
-0.391                     
(0.682) 
-0.479                     
(0.528) 
-0.347                  
(0.663) 
New IP producers and developers 0.769                     
(0.674) 
2.967*                  
(1.22) 
0.565                     
(0.854) 
0.772                     
(0.65) 
0.441                  
(0.817) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.15                     
(0.303) 
-0.149                  
(0.557) 
0.251                     
(0.387) 
-0.022                     
(0.294) 
0.06                 
(0.373) 
Intercept -1.345     
(2.336) 
0.208                       
(4.278) 
-2.212                    
(2.977) 
0.138     
(2.269) 












Observations 2864 2544 2684 2864 2684 
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Growth: GDPpc Growth Rate Overall IPR FC IPR 





IPR General Binary Variables   
ipr_mentioned 1.464                     
(1.692) 
4.138                     
(2.595) 
ipr_1_article -0.921                     
(1.998) 
-8.035**                     
(2.746) 
ipr_more_than_1_article 0.242                     
(1.819) 
1.642                     
(4.001) 
ipr_mfn 0.418                     
(1.729) 
4.277                     
(3.189) 
ipr_nt -3.159                     
(2.122) 
-4.86.                     
(2.69) 
ipr_as_investment -0.301                     
(4.569) 
-21.236***                     
(5.606) 
ipr_investment_mfn 1.116                     
(4.124) 
3.381                     
(6.333) 
ipr_investment_nt -2.546                     
(7.485) 
14.279                     
(10.118) 
ipr_assistance_coop_coordination -0.695                     
(1.485) 
0.344                     
(2.633) 
ipr_general_enforcement 0.465                     
(1.606) 
1.332                     
(4.345) 
ipr_dispute_settlement_mechanism -0.323                     
(2.104) 




1.367                     
(5.096) 
3.364                     
(6.368) 
ipr_investment_expropriation_exception 1.18                     
(3.44) 
1.853                     
(3.768) 
ipr_implementation 1.402                     
(1.201) 
8.376***                     
(2.147) 
ipr_border_measures 3.014.                     
(1.693) 
-2.122                     
(3.044) 
ipr_m_copyrights_related_rights 0.278                     
(2.765) 
0.417                     
(3.888) 
ipr_m_trademarks -3.477                     
(4.074) 
4.136                     
(5.587) 
ipr_m_geo_indications 0.359                     
(2.267) 
-4.759                     
(4.595) 
ipr_m_industrial_designs -3.128                     
(3.376) 
10.026*                     
(4.717) 
ipr_m_patents 2.56                     
(3.254) 
-1.161                     
(5.654) 
ipr_m_undisclosed_information 1.575                     
(2.16) 
-7.913                     
(4.834) 
ipr_m_layout_design_integ_circuits 0.441                     
(2.497) 
-6.244.                     
(3.501) 
ipr_m_new_plant_varieties 0.373                     
(1.561) 
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ipr_m_trad_knowledge_genetic_re-
sources 
-2.358                     
(1.957) 




3.211                     
(2.32) 
-0.035                     
(3.155) 
ipr_m_domain_names -3.932                     
(4.714) 
1.017                     
(4.956) 
Control Variables   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.009                     
(0.063) 
-0.016                     
(0.061) 
Classic IP leaders -0.211                     
(0.905) 
0.807                     
(0.824) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.341                     
(0.797) 
-0.166                     
(0.77) 
New IP producers and developers 0.284                     
(0.998) 
0.086                     
(0.953) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.891*                     
(0.452) 
-0.769.                     
(0.433) 
Intercept 6.305.     
(3.476) 






Observations 2661 2661 
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Appendix 63: Economic Effect Regression Tables of the Binary Variables for IPR Specific 
 
Investment in R&D I Overall IPR 







IPR Specific Binary Variables    
ipr_special_requirements_related_bor-
der_measures 
-0.313**                     
(0.107) 
0.137                 
(0.18) 




0.347*                     
(0.169) 
-0.74**                  
(0.254) 
0.025                     
(0.115) 
ipr_provisional_measure 0.072                     
(0.157) 
0.301                  
(0.224) 
0.035                     
(0.083) 
ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies -0.157                     
(0.131) 
0.197                  
(0.148) 
-0.078                     
(0.095) 
ipr_service_provider_liability 0.037                     
(0.092) 
-0.015                  
(0.366) 
-0.032                     
(0.065) 
ipr_committee -0.024                     
(0.059) 
-0.017                  
(0.065) 
0.033                     
(0.03) 
ipr_transparency 0.054                     
(0.082) 
-0.016                  
(0.137) 
0.017                     
(0.047) 
ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights 0.002                     
(0.077) 
-0.02                  
(0.15) 
0.004                     
(0.046) 
ipr_t_trademarks -0.017                     
(0.085) 
0.277**                  
(0.097) 
0.055                     
(0.042) 
ipr_t_geo_indications 0.097                     
(0.063) 
-0.17.                  
(0.087) 
0.002                     
(0.034) 
ipr_t_industrial_designs -0.049                     
(0.145) 
0.103                  
(0.199) 
0.121                     
(0.077) 
ipr_t_patents -0.03                     
(0.119) 
0.14                  
(0.204) 
-0.074                     
(0.074) 
ipr_t_undisclosed_information 0.021                     
(0.068) 
-0.062                  
(0.151) 
-0.036                     
(0.041) 
ipr_t_layout_design_integ_circuits 0.021                     
(0.342) 
-0.528                  
(0.349) 
-0.19                     
(0.168) 
ipr_t_new_plant_varieties -0.034                     
(0.089) 
-0.214                  
(0.169) 
-0.094.                     
(0.056) 
ipr_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources -0.068                     
(0.09) 
0.18                  
(0.195) 




0.023                     
(0.193) 
-0.032                  
(0.272) 
0.141                     
(0.111) 
ipr_t_domain_names -0.123                     
(0.237) 
-0.173                  
(0.483) 
-0.001                     
(0.125) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.006.                     
(0.003) 
0.009**                  
(0.003) 
0.002                     
(0.002) 
Classic IP leaders 0.123**                     
(0.042) 
0.176***                  
(0.045) 
0.07***                     
(0.021) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.005                     
(0.039) 
0.013                  
(0.035) 
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New IP producers and developers 0.04                     
(0.041) 
0.165***                  
(0.044) 
0.036.                     
(0.02) 
ln GDP -0.005                     
(0.009) 
0.008                  
(0.009) 
0.002                     
(0.005) 
ln GDPpc -0.039*                     
(0.017) 
-0.08***                  
(0.018) 
-0.026**                     
(0.009) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.023                     
(0.019) 
0.044*                  
(0.021) 
0.03**                     
(0.009) 
Intercept 0.319                     
(0.23) 
0.195                  
(0.251) 








Observations 923 684 817 
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Investment in R&D II First-comer IPR 





IPR Specific Binary Variables   
ipr_special_requirements_related_bor-
der_measures 
0.207                  
(0.245) 




-0.237                  
(0.546) 
0.192                     
(0.181) 
ipr_provisional_measure 0.12                  
(0.461) 
0.045                     
(0.112) 
ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies -0.438*                  
(0.216) 
0.038                     
(0.072) 
ipr_service_provider_liability -0.144                  
(0.325) 
-0.08                     
(0.071) 
ipr_committee 0.061                  
(0.076) 
0.079*                     
(0.04) 
ipr_transparency -0.086                  
(0.218) 
0.056                     
(0.067) 
ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights -0.003                  
(0.151) 
-0.127                     
(0.09) 
ipr_t_trademarks 0.45*                  
(0.21) 
-0.042                     
(0.084) 
ipr_t_geo_indications -0.025                  
(0.081) 
-0.033                     
(0.042) 
ipr_t_industrial_designs 0.156                  
(0.538) 
-0.076                     
(0.083) 
ipr_t_patents 0.12                  
(0.507) 
0.005                     
(0.1) 
ipr_t_undisclosed_information -0.038                  
(0.087) 
-0.066.                     
(0.038) 
ipr_t_layout_design_integ_circuits NA NA 
ipr_t_new_plant_varieties -0.305                  
(0.23) 
0.072                     
(0.092) 
ipr_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources 0.02                  
(0.078) 




-0.4                  
(0.458) 
-0.074                     
(0.177) 
ipr_t_domain_names 0.151                  
(0.506) 
0.179                     
(0.136) 
Control Variables   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.007*                  
(0.003) 
0.002                     
(0.002) 
Classic IP leaders 0.164***                  
(0.045) 
0.071***                     
(0.021) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.023                  
(0.035) 
-0.021                     
(0.018) 
New IP producers and developers 0.164***                  
(0.043) 
0.028                     
(0.02) 
ln GDP 0.01                  
(0.009) 
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ln GDPpc -0.074***                  
(0.018) 
-0.021*                     
(0.009) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.019                  
(0.019) 
0.024**                     
(0.008) 
Intercept 0.266                  
(0.232) 






Observations 684 817 
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Licensing Overall IPR 





IPR Specific Binary Variables   
ipr_special_requirements_related_bor-
der_measures 
-2.776*                     
(1.284) 




1.059                     
(2.063) 
-0.687                     
(2.887) 
ipr_provisional_measure -0.934                     
(1.878) 
-1.229                     
(2.369) 
ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies -0.962                     
(1.396) 
-1.799                     
(1.905) 
ipr_service_provider_liability -0.077                     
(0.832) 
0.589                     
(1.542) 
ipr_committee 0.062                     
(0.719) 
0.126                     
(0.91) 
ipr_transparency -1.283                     
(1.124) 
-1.183                     
(1.497) 
ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights 1.671                     
(1.07) 
2.271                     
(1.401) 
ipr_t_trademarks 0.837                     
(0.918) 
2.217.                     
(1.209) 
ipr_t_geo_indications -0.221                     
(0.701) 
-0.511                     
(0.889) 
ipr_t_industrial_designs 2.321.                     
(1.217) 
3.217.                     
(1.853) 
ipr_t_patents -0.043                     
(1.115) 
0.172                     
(1.544) 
ipr_t_undisclosed_information 0.611                     
(0.896) 
-0.389                     
(1.302) 
ipr_t_layout_design_integ_circuits 0.134                     
(1.107) 
0.249                     
(2.041) 
ipr_t_new_plant_varieties -1.891.                     
(1.133) 
-3.538*                     
(1.616) 
ipr_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources -0.311                     
(0.921) 




-0.184                     
(1.613) 
-0.226                     
(1.981) 
ipr_t_domain_names 2.366                     
(2.189) 
1.249                     
(2.828) 
Control Variables   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.139**                     
(0.047) 
-0.118*                     
(0.055) 
Classic IP leaders -0.4                     
(0.469) 
-0.626                     
(0.555) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.173                     
(0.445) 
-0.233                     
(0.52) 
New IP producers and developers -0.247                     
(0.474) 
-0.224                     
(0.556) 
ln GDP -0.218.                     
(0.119) 
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ln GDPpc 0.101                     
(0.203) 
0.155                     
(0.243) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.282                     
(0.235) 
-0.045                     
(0.278) 
Intercept 4.968.                     
(2.912) 






Observations 1542 1356 
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Innovation: Researchers in R&D I Overall IPR 









IPR Specific Binary Variables     
ipr_special_requirements_related_bor-
der_measures 
-0.114*                     
(0.056) 
-0.233                  
(0.15) 
-0.16                     
(0.241) 




-0.049                     
(0.083) 
-0.402.                  
(0.223) 
-1.045**                     
(0.336) 
NA
ipr_provisional_measure 0.115                     
(0.078) 
0.358.                  
(0.199) 
1.105***                     
(0.296) 
0.798                     
(1.417) 
ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies 0.029                     
(0.067) 
0.254*                  
(0.129) 
0.194                     
(0.197) 
NA
ipr_service_provider_liability 0.006                     
(0.046) 
-0.196                  
(0.193) 
0.144                     
(0.476) 
0.423                     
(1.105) 
ipr_committee -0.016                     
(0.03) 
0.04                  
(0.067) 
0.036                     
(0.09) 
0.388                     
(0.321) 
ipr_transparency -0.002                     
(0.041) 
0.051                  
(0.131) 
0.337.                     
(0.179) 
0.245                     
(0.538) 
ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights -0.036                     
(0.039) 
0.134                  
(0.13) 
0.115                     
(0.196) 
-0.497                     
(0.68) 
ipr_t_trademarks -0.023                     
(0.042) 
-0.034                  
(0.09) 
0.319*                     
(0.134) 
0.712.                     
(0.391) 
ipr_t_geo_indications -0.015                     
(0.032) 
-0.044                  
(0.077) 
-0.364**                     
(0.121) 
-0.891*                     
(0.357) 
ipr_t_industrial_designs -0.002                     
(0.074) 
0.041                  
(0.18) 
-0.255                     
(0.261) 
-0.807                     
(0.895) 
ipr_t_patents 0.016                     
(0.059) 
-0.058                  
(0.168) 
0.385                     
(0.266) 
0.609                     
(0.859) 
ipr_t_undisclosed_information 0.003                     
(0.034) 
-0.146                  
(0.131) 
-0.159                     
(0.198) 
0.497                     
(0.706) 
ipr_t_layout_design_integ_circuits -0.138                     
(0.166) 
-0.178                  
(0.345) 
-0.825.                     
(0.455) 
-0.773                     
(1.336) 
ipr_t_new_plant_varieties 0                     
(0.045) 
0.056                  
(0.162) 
-0.145                     
(0.223) 
NA 
ipr_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources -0.053                     
(0.045) 
-0.039                  
(0.176) 





-0.019                     
(0.095) 
-0.079                  
(0.269) 
-0.324                     
(0.356) 
-0.605                     
(1.111) 
ipr_t_domain_names -0.101                     
(0.116) 
0.157                  
(0.325) 
-0.653                     
(0.629) 
NA 
Control Variables     
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.002                     
(0.002) 
-0.001                  
(0.005) 
0.015*                     
(0.006) 
-0.027.                     
(0.015) 
Classic IP leaders 0.067**                     
(0.023) 
0.15***                  
(0.045) 
0.131*                     
(0.064) 
0.074                     
(0.144) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.031                     
(0.021) 
-0.004                  
(0.04) 
-0.016                     
(0.052) 
-0.035                     
(0.111) 
New IP producers and developers 0.046*                     
(0.022) 
0.044                  
(0.048) 
0.253***                     
(0.066) 
-0.191                    
(0.185) 
ln GDP 0                     
(0.005) 
-0.003                  
(0.01) 
-0.001                     
(0.013) 
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ln GDPpc -0.025*                     
(0.01) 
-0.092***                  
(0.02) 
-0.101***                     
(0.028) 
-0.069                     
(0.067) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.053***                     
(0.011) 
0.083***                  
(0.022) 
0.116***                     
(0.032) 
0.154*                     
(0.062) 
Intercept -0.119                     
(0.126) 
0.503.                  
(0.259) 
0.239                     
(0.364) 










Observations 786 640 582 357 
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Innovation: Researchers in R&D II First-comer IPR 











IPR Specific Binary Variables      
ipr_special_requirements_related_bor-
der_measures 
-0.113                     
(0.099) 
-0.272                  
(0.247) 
-0.05                     
(0.321) 
1.319                     
(1.279) 




0.081                     
(0.158) 
0.266                  
(0.36) 
-0.173                     
(0.721) 
NA 0.367                     
(0.239) 
ipr_provisional_measure -0.049                     
(0.113) 
-0.144                  
(0.257) 
0.23                     
(0.615) 
NA -0.021                     
(0.164) 
ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies -0.069                     
(0.071) 
-0.069                  
(0.123) 
-0.206                     
(0.326) 
NA -0.046                     
(0.088) 
ipr_service_provider_liability -0.14.                     
(0.072) 
-0.225                  
(0.154) 
-0.351                     
(0.422) 
-0.051                     
(0.95) 
-0.077                     
(0.097) 
ipr_committee -0.064                     
(0.043) 
-0.15.                  
(0.082) 
-0.143                     
(0.109) 
-0.538                     
(0.33) 
-0.015                     
(0.051) 
ipr_transparency 0.029                     
(0.068) 
0.006                  
(0.145) 
0.202                     
(0.286) 
-0.475                     
(0.717) 
-0.012                     
(0.094) 
ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights 0.028                     
(0.067) 
-0.118                  
(0.132) 
-0.22                     
(0.201) 
-0.77                     
(0.648) 
-0.002                     
(0.119) 
ipr_t_trademarks 0.021                     
(0.08) 
0.133                  
(0.149) 
0.151                     
(0.281) 
-0.865                     
(1.126) 
-0.057                     
(0.124) 
ipr_t_geo_indications 0.029                     
(0.045) 
-0.027                  
(0.081) 
-0.024                     
(0.109) 
-0.22                     
(0.181) 
0.016                     
(0.053) 
ipr_t_industrial_designs -0.009                     
(0.097) 
-0.107                  
(0.164) 
-2.019**                     
(0.706) 
-5.41***                     
(1.268) 
-0.221                     
(0.147) 
ipr_t_patents -0.001                     
(0.115) 
NA 2.099**                     
(0.66) 
3.607**                     
(1.134) 
0.21                     
(0.169) 
ipr_t_undisclosed_information 0.006                     
(0.039) 
0.044                  
(0.086) 
0.064                     
(0.114) 
0.029                     
(0.173) 
-0.038                     
(0.047) 
ipr_t_layout_design_integ_circuits NA NA NA NA NA 
ipr_t_new_plant_varieties -0.049                     
(0.086) 
-0.052                  
(0.187) 
-0.252                     
(0.321) 
NA -0.01                     
(0.139) 
ipr_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources -0.095*                     
(0.042) 
-0.004                  
(0.076) 
-0.109                     
(0.104) 




-0.225                     
(0.178) 
0.026                  
(0.397) 
-0.05                     
(0.596) 
NA 0.324                     
(0.249) 
ipr_t_domain_names 0.032                     
(0.144) 
-0.002                  
(0.338) 
-0.109                     
(0.657) 
NA -0.132                     
(0.187) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.001                     
(0.002) 
0               
(0.004) 
0.015*                     
(0.006) 
-0.039**                     
(0.015) 
0.004                   
(0.003) 
Classic IP leaders 0.068**                     
(0.024) 
0.162***                  
(0.046) 
0.129.                     
(0.066) 
0.039                     
(0.136) 
0.07*                     
(0.029) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.012                     
(0.021) 
0.004                  
(0.039) 
-0.008                     
(0.05) 
-0.068                     
(0.103) 
-0.022                     
(0.024) 
New IP producers and developers 0.068**                     
(0.022) 
0.125**                  
(0.045) 
0.308***                     
(0.064) 
-0.04                  
(0.174) 
0.058*                     
(0.027) 
ln GDP -0.003                     
(0.005) 
-0.01                  
(0.01) 
-0.004                     
(0.013) 
-0.018                     
(0.026) 
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ln GDPpc -0.029**                     
(0.011) 
-0.098***                  
(0.02) 
-0.098***                     
(0.028) 
-0.03                     
(0.063) 
-0.027*                     
(0.013) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.028**                     
(0.01) 
0.06**                 
(0.02) 
0.077**                     
(0.028) 
0.127*                     
(0.056) 
0.018                     
(0.012) 
Intercept 0.183                     
(0.121) 
0.883***                  
(0.243) 
0.584.                     
(0.343) 
0.785                     
(0.71) 












Observations 786 640 582 357 683 
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Technology Transfer: PTA Member 
Applications for Industrial Designs I 
Overall IPR 











IPR Specific Binary Variables      
ipr_special_requirements_related_bor-
der_measures 
4.636***                     
(1.205) 
6.611.                
(3.437) 
11.148*                     
(5.09) 
1.957                     
(7.714) 




-3.669.                     
(2.111) 
-5.89                 
(5.727) 
-16.575*                     
(7.028) 
-26.37                     
(30.464) 
-54.03                     
(57.603) 
ipr_provisional_measure 3.756.                     
(1.934) 
1.801                  
(4.3) 
10.109*                     
(5.076) 
51.269***                     
(12.405) 
103.164*                     
(43.936) 
ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies -4.504**                     
(1.402) 
-1.47               
(3.204) 
-14.099***                     
(3.848) 
-26.387                     
(27.641) 
3.077                    
(33.287) 
ipr_service_provider_liability -2.62***                     
(0.715) 
-8.348***                  
(2.019) 
-7.614                     
(5.384) 
-
149.634***                     
(23.784) 
-39.931                     
(28.862)
ipr_committee -1.51*                     
(0.617) 
-1.292                  
(1.607) 
1.333                     
(1.866) 
-13.398***                     
(3.24) 
9.037                 
(12.884) 
ipr_transparency 4.813***                     
(1.112) 
6.376**                  
(2.398) 
17.798***                     
(3.168) 
58.754***                     
(5.261) 
9.829                     
(23.238) 
ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights -3.559***                     
(0.962) 
-7.775***                  
(1.91) 
-5.349                     
(3.75) 
-17.638*                     
(6.905) 
-15.825                     
(23.494) 
ipr_t_trademarks 2.617***                     
(0.756) 
14.287***                  
(2.251) 
4.646.                     
(2.572) 
5.059                     
(4.146) 
4.872                     
(14.266) 
ipr_t_geo_indications -0.89                     
(0.653) 
-15.069***                  
(2.035) 
-7.415***                     
(2.208) 
-7.579*                   
(3.526) 
-12.172                     
(14.191) 
ipr_t_industrial_designs 4.265***                     
(1.068) 
19.752***                  
(2.969) 
-1.58                    
(5.428) 
-50.872***                     
(10.87) 
61.047.                  
(32.767) 
ipr_t_patents -5.114***                     
(0.893) 
-14.899***                  
(2.408) 
10.5**                     
(4.044) 
56.774**                     
(18.828) 
18.779                     
(19.709) 
ipr_t_undisclosed_information 3.269***                     
(0.814) 
3.017.                
(1.737) 
2.612                     
(3.668) 
17.005*                     
(7.201) 
-8.468                    
(20.673) 
ipr_t_layout_design_integ_circuits 5.162***                     
(0.893) 
17.92***                  
(2.924) 
-6.629                     
(4.348) 
-55.598**                     
(18.923) 
-12.284                     
(24.327) 
ipr_t_new_plant_varieties -1.138                     
(0.996) 
-5.144*                  
(2.084) 
-6.507                     
(4.327) 
-1.864                     
(10.933) 
-72.867*                     
(29.359) 
ipr_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources -2.157**                     
(0.777) 
1.639                
(1.935) 
-1.091                     
(4.461) 




9.456***                     
(1.559) 
32.621***                  
(3.948) 
76.183***                     
(9.006) 
78.035***                     
(19.321) 
-7.004                  
(28.812) 
ipr_t_domain_names -2.529                     
(1.731) 
-6.557                  
(4.913) 
-73.093***                     
(11.964) 
NA -47.471                     
(31.301) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.097.                     
(0.055) 
0.078                  
(0.115) 
0.05                     
(0.108) 
-0.204                     
(0.139) 
-6.436***                     
(1.212) 
Classic IP leaders 0.423                     
(0.57) 
-1.163                  
(1.096) 
-1.831                     
(1.13) 
-6.319***                     
(1.441) 
5.667                  
(12.423) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.804                     
(0.6) 
-2.589*                  
(1.067) 
-2.89**                     
(1.043) 
-2.534*                     
(1.157) 
14.519                     
(11.791) 
New IP producers and developers 1.102.                     
(0.565) 
2.547*                  
(1.058) 
1.614                     
(1.118) 
4.391**                     
(1.537) 
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ln GDP 0.182                     
(0.122) 
0.358                  
(0.232) 
0.22                     
(0.238) 
0.327                     
(0.285) 
7.727***                     
(2.129) 
ln GDPpc -0.557*                     
(0.231) 
-0.34                  
(0.44) 
-0.396                     
(0.451) 
1.034.                     
(0.551) 
-12.451**                     
(4.781) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 1.062***                     
(0.312) 
2.202***                  
(0.575) 
1.63**                     
(0.605) 
3.797***                     
(0.768) 
5.743                     
(6.472) 
Intercept -7.858*                     
(3.54) 
-20.872**                  
(6.724) 
-11.975.                     
(6.944) 
-39.236***                     
(9.126) 












Observations 755 568 506 361 430 
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Technology Transfer: PTA Member 
Applications for Industrial Designs II 
First-comer IPR 











IPR Specific Binary Variables      
ipr_special_requirements_related_bor-
der_measures 
-0.363                     
(3.348) 
0.347                  
(6.245) 
0.477                     
(6.508) 





0.804                     
(4.59) 
-8.185                  
(10.213) 
-12.703                     
(11.276) 
15.833                     
(25.094) 
NA
ipr_provisional_measure -0.643                     
(3.139) 
8.364                  
(8.386) 
15.496                     
(9.727) 
-2.243                     
(22.859) 
312.436***                     
(53.488) 
ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies -1.573                     
(1.753) 
-1.229                  
(3.385) 
1.623                     
(3.669) 
NA -4.781                     
(26.103) 
ipr_service_provider_liability -3.608*                     
(1.518) 
-10.112*                  
(4.102) 
-10.983*                     
(4.756) 
-1.34                     
(16.071) 
-37.791                     
(41.709) 
ipr_committee -0.814                     
(0.85) 
0.536                  
(1.746) 
1.347                     
(1.855) 
-0.327                     
(2.778) 
0.025                     
(13.678) 
ipr_transparency 2.128                     
(1.59) 
8.018.                  
(4.24) 
11.546*                     
(5.021) 
-6.84                   
(18.525) 
68.526                     
(45.646) 
ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights -0.97                     
(1.543) 
-1.252                  
(3.308) 
-1.061                     
(3.739) 
-6.693                     
(8.038) 
79.995                     
(78.367) 
ipr_t_trademarks 1.381                     
(1.83) 
-0.043                  
(3.756) 
-6.615                     
(4.691) 
3.623                     
(7.366) 
15.241                     
(41.759) 
ipr_t_geo_indications -1.112                     
(1.111) 
-2.9                  
(2.496) 
-2.505                     
(2.696) 
-1.75                     
(3.186) 
-1.971                     
(19.452) 
ipr_t_industrial_designs -7.37**                     
(2.738) 
-6.854                  
(5.119) 
-24.409*                     
(11.212) 
-3.468                     
(6.838) 
-3.399                     
(38.845) 
ipr_t_patents 8.523**                     
(3.144) 
6.614                  
(5.828) 
19.424.                     
(9.938) 
NA NA 
ipr_t_undisclosed_information -1.387                     
(0.988) 
-1.753                  
(1.846) 
-2.535                     
(2.436) 
0.014                     
(2.794) 
-2.057                     
(13.646) 
ipr_t_layout_design_integ_circuits 2.454.                     
(1.302) 
-3.615                  
(7.79) 
-5.332                     
(8.346) 
-3.584                     
(13.618) 
NA
ipr_t_new_plant_varieties -1.593                     
(1.66) 
1.766                  
(3.735) 
12.175*                     
(5.817) 
4.775                     
(9.116) 
-8.854                     
(34.513) 
ipr_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources -1.005                     
(1.075) 
-3.58.                  
(2.157) 
-4.708.                     
(2.525) 




2.033                     
(2.986) 
16.374*                  
(8.165) 
23.13**                     
(8.841) 
2.378                     
(15.402) 
-
304.717***                     
(85.957) 
ipr_t_domain_names 9.634**                     
(3.215) 
6.462                  
(7.407) 
0.282                     
(7.776) 
NA 329.968***                     
(85.299) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.035                     
(0.059) 
0.055                  
(0.137) 
0.026                     
(0.134) 
-0.262                     
(0.191) 
-5.935***                     
(1.145) 
Classic IP leaders 0.344                     
(0.594) 
0.322                  
(1.302) 
-0.52                     
(1.406) 
-5.872**                     
(2.02) 
-5.139                     
(11.74) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-1.145.                     
(0.615) 
-1.416                  
(1.226) 
-2.43.                     
(1.271) 
-2.51                     
(1.557) 
15.753                     
(10.948) 
New IP producers and developers 0.102                     
(0.607) 
0.409                  
(1.359) 
-0.401                     
(1.38) 
-2.052                     
(1.928) 
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ln GDP 0.304*                     
(0.125) 
0.679*                  
(0.267) 
0.687*                     
(0.289) 
1.099**                     
(0.392) 
7.166***                     
(2) 
ln GDPpc -0.686**                     
(0.248) 
-0.71                  
(0.53) 
-0.785                     
(0.567) 
-0.017                     
(0.758) 
-11.489*                     
(4.813) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 1.361***                     
(0.289) 
2.448***                  
(0.597) 
2.964***                     
(0.712) 
5.158***                     
(0.944) 
4.657                     
(4.657) 
Intercept -11.193***                     
(3.357) 
-28.515***                  
(7.279) 
-30.852***                     
(8.116) 
-58.676***                     
(11.899) 












Observations 755 568 506 361 430 
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Technology Transfer: PTA Member 
Applications for Patents I 
Overall IPR 











IPR Specific Binary Variables      
ipr_special_requirements_related_bor-
der_measures 
-1.462                     
(38.618) 
-19.399                  
(25.063) 
-56.488                     
(41.992) 
-4.494                     
(15.986) 




-81.708                     
(63.379) 
-15.712                  
(37.964) 
-25.668                     
(61.034) 
-
231.243***                     
(36.471) 
-209.295                     
(180.267)
ipr_provisional_measure 75.982                     
(57.941) 
43.378.                  
(26.092) 
120.566**                     
(45.489) 
201.136***                     
(23.153) 
106.815                     
(121.998) 
ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies -42.903                     
(43.484) 
-22.766                  
(21.201) 
-61.118                     
(38.048) 
99.073***                     
(21.884) 
127.516                     
(103.338) 
ipr_service_provider_liability 4.269                     
(23.171) 
9.981                  
(13.702) 
12.513                     
(49.846) 
-87.088***                     
(21.968) 
84.195                  
(79.396) 
ipr_committee -3.9                     
(19.999) 
-0.753                  
(10.712) 
4.218                     
(19.684) 
-18.27*                     
(7.984) 
-82.099*                     
(37.329) 
ipr_transparency 89.701**                     
(34.384) 
45.088**                  
(15.937) 
131.058***                     
(34.434) 
141.692***                     
(15.17) 
-38.944                  
(74.851) 
ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights 8.989                     
(29.013) 
0.539                  
(12.789) 
-20.641                     
(33.009) 
17.766.                     
(10.04) 
-140.495*                     
(64.977) 
ipr_t_trademarks -20.15                     
(24.458) 
-20.195                  
(14.689) 
-28.574                     
(25.285) 
0.404                    
(8.871) 
0.198                     
(45.065) 
ipr_t_geo_indications 15.056                     
(20.293) 
17.581                  
(12.818) 
15.544                     
(21.406) 
-6.856                     
(7.67) 
54.755                     
(41.799) 
ipr_t_industrial_designs -25.761                     
(33.571) 
-31.874                  
(20.359) 
-134.98**                     
(45.721) 
-
118.358***                     
(15.065) 
-273.226**                     
(92.56)
ipr_t_patents -15.384                     
(29.616) 
5.527                 
(17.18) 
89.854*                     
(40.39) 
89.442***                     
(14.504) 
-44.756                   
(65.474) 
ipr_t_undisclosed_information 4.693                     
(25.831) 
8.735                  
(11.784) 
28.851                     
(33.471) 
-25.436*                     
(10.247) 
389.778***                     
(58.395) 
ipr_t_layout_design_integ_circuits -5.245                     
(30.127) 
-16.221                  
(21.27) 
-111.193**                     
(42.287) 
-91.189***                     
(14.597) 
45              
(78.387) 
ipr_t_new_plant_varieties 42.206                     
(31.247) 
28.067.                  
(14.878) 
52.727                     
(39.819) 
34.932*                     
(14.553) 
273.88***                     
(76.919) 
ipr_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources -21.929                     
(25.445) 
-23.538.                  
(14.212) 
-38.255                     
(41.77) 




82.206.                     
(48.885) 
38.011                  
(25.832) 
90.811                     
(56.413) 
-75.069***                     
(18.151) 
-12.945                     
(86.088) 
ipr_t_domain_names 338.054***                     
(56.598) 
76.776*                  
(30.75) 
-1.632                     
(78.997) 
NA 45.693                     
(106.881) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.19                     
(1.905) 
0.141                  
(0.81) 
-0.127                     
(1.215) 
0.227                     
(0.337) 
7.703.                     
(4.038) 
Classic IP leaders 24.086                     
(19.269) 
9.788                  
(7.698) 
0.953                     
(12.332) 
-0.901                     
(3.434) 
30.627                     
(37.13) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-2.271                     
(17.985) 
-4.644                  
(7.269) 
-7.762                     
(10.965) 
-2.842                     
(2.919) 
4.049                     
(31.231) 
New IP producers and developers -13.755                     
(17.457) 
-1.76                  
(6.997) 
-10.103                     
(11.391) 
-4.306                     
(3.642) 
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ln GDP 8.598*                     
(3.678) 
4.235**                  
(1.544) 
5.381*                     
(2.468) 
0.463                     
(0.66) 
20.041***                     
(6.003) 
ln GDPpc -0.413                     
(6.991) 
-0.668                  
(2.909) 
2.44                     
(4.6) 
1.156                     
(1.307) 
-2.025                     
(13.146) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 17.042.                     
(9.427) 
8.266*                  
(3.966) 
10.02                     
(6.153) 
7.645***                     
(1.845) 
11.283                     
(16.738) 
Intercept -365.505**                     
(112.553) 
-
172.262***                  
(48.935) 
-234.091**                     
(74.348) 
-77.599***                     
(22.564) 












Observations 980 796 721 521 622 
 










- 472 - 
Technology Transfer: PTA Member 







IPR Specific Binary Variables   
ipr_special_requirements_related_bor-
der_measures 
19.216                     
(39.866) 




-40.558                     
(57.042) 
-27.869                  
(98.296) 
ipr_provisional_measure 27.259                     
(35.913) 
29.621                  
(63.482) 
ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies 2.07                     
(23.628) 
4.009                  
(38.29) 
ipr_service_provider_liability -15.625                     
(27.78) 
-14.586                  
(46.924) 
ipr_committee -1.308                     
(12.106) 
-4.022                  
(19.133) 
ipr_transparency 4.958                     
(27.042) 
4.344                  
(46.563) 
ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights -0.678                     
(21.781) 
-7.907                  
(37.71) 
ipr_t_trademarks 25.087                     
(26.775) 
20.965                  
(48.849) 
ipr_t_geo_indications -8.831                     
(14.346) 
-17.918                  
(22.865) 
ipr_t_industrial_designs 4.407                     
(30.847) 
20.866                  
(92.121) 
ipr_t_patents -15.823                     
(37.287) 
-42.071                  
(81.623) 
ipr_t_undisclosed_information -7.371                     
(12.937) 
-13.07                  
(24.595) 
ipr_t_layout_design_integ_circuits -22.3                     
(53.04) 
-39.913                  
(85.682) 
ipr_t_new_plant_varieties -9.06                     
(24.66) 
13.984                  
(61.991) 
ipr_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources -30.031*                     
(14.874) 




-7.212                     
(40.48) 
21.337                  
(76.301) 
ipr_t_domain_names -25.052                     
(40.874) 
-55.898                  
(71.198) 
Control Variables   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.045                     
(0.866) 
0.044                  
(1.329) 
Classic IP leaders 10.777                     
(8.227) 
9.736                  
(13.292) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-16.412*                     
(7.595) 
-26.215*                  
(11.619) 
New IP producers and developers -1.428                     
(7.627) 
-9.115                  
(12.004) 
ln GDP 7.551***                     
(1.615) 





- 473 - 
ln GDPpc -0.369                     
(3.177) 
0.416                  
(5.091) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 20.256***                     
(3.739) 
31.051***                  
(6.045) 
Intercept -
347.852***                     
(47.798) 
-






Observations 796 721 
 







- 474 - 
Technology Transfer: Total htp Im-
ports 
Overall IPR First-comer IPR 









IPR Specific Binary Variables     
ipr_special_requirements_related_bor-
der_measures 
-1.703.                     
(0.956) 
0                  
(0) 
-0.956                     
(1.859) 




-0.53                     
(1.62) 
0                     
(0) 
-1.425                     
(2.693) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_provisional_measure -0.003                     
(1.313) 
0.                   
(0) 
-0.825                     
(1.492) 
0**                     
(0) 
ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies 1.6                     
(1.141) 
NA 1.691                     
(1.91) 
NA
ipr_service_provider_liability -0.109                     
(1.083) 
0                     
(0) 
-0.098                     
(1.647) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_committee -0.098                     
(0.677) 
0                     
(0) 
-1.293                     
(0.826) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_transparency 0.197                     
(0.828) 
0                   
(0) 
-0.4                     
(1.088) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights 0.542                     
(0.902) 
0                   
(0) 
-0.071                     
(1.346) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_t_trademarks 0.347                     
(1.023) 
0                   
(0) 
-1.547                     
(1.434) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_t_geo_indications 0.287                     
(0.561) 
0                   
(0) 
3.205***                     
(0.956) 
0                
(0) 
ipr_t_industrial_designs 0.015                     
(1.094) 
0                   
(0) 
-0.108                     
(1.373) 
0**                     
(0) 
ipr_t_patents -0.169                     
(1.043) 
0                     
(0) 
0.764                     
(1.677) 
0                   
(0) 
ipr_t_undisclosed_information -0.544                     
(0.92) 
0                     
(0) 
0.02                     
(1.343) 
0                    
(0) 
ipr_t_layout_design_integ_circuits 0.56                     
(2.24) 
0                    
(0) 
1.323                     
(3.046) 
0                   
(0) 
ipr_t_new_plant_varieties -0.133                     
(1.236) 
0                     
(0) 
-0.155                     
(1.34) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources 0.967                     
(1.033) 
0                   
(0) 
2.675**                     
(1.008) 




-0.706                     
(1.2) 
0                     
(0) 
0.663                     
(1.7) 
0                   
(0) 
ipr_t_domain_names 0.172                     
(1.562) 
NA 0                     
(2.25) 
NA 
Control Variables     
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.048                     
(0.03) 
0                   
(0) 
0.056.                     
(0.03) 
0                     
(0) 
Classic IP leaders -0.11                     
(0.535) 
0***                     
(0) 
-0.437                     
(0.479) 
0***                     
(0) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.12                     
(0.337) 
0                     
(0) 
-0.246                     
(0.326) 
0                     
(0) 
New IP producers and developers 0.677.                     
(0.346) 
0                     
(0) 
0.804*                     
(0.33) 
0                  
(0) 
ln GDP 0.275**                     
(0.106) 
0***                    
(0) 
0.291**                     
(0.104) 





- 475 - 
ln GDPpc -0.537**                     
(0.172) 
0**                     
(0) 
-0.513**                     
(0.171) 
0***                     
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.045                     
(0.186) 
0**                     
(0) 
-0.091                     
(0.18) 
0*                     
(0) 
Intercept -2                     
(2.201) 
-1***                     
(0) 
-2.288                     
(2.062) 










Observations 623 203 623 203 
 










- 476 - 
Technology Transfer: Total mltp Im-
ports 






IPR Specific Binary Variables   
ipr_special_requirements_related_bor-
der_measures 
0                     
(0) 




0                     
(0) 
-0.061                     
(0.388) 
ipr_provisional_measure 0                     
(0) 
-0.136                     
(0.215) 
ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies 0                     
(0) 
0.114                     
(0.275) 
ipr_service_provider_liability 0                     
(0) 
-0.087                     
(0.237) 
ipr_committee 0.                     
(0) 
-0.17                     
(0.119) 
ipr_transparency 0                     
(0) 
0.033                     
(0.157) 
ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights 0                     
(0) 
0.011                     
(0.194) 
ipr_t_trademarks 0                     
(0) 
-0.055                     
(0.207) 
ipr_t_geo_indications 0                     
(0) 
0.23.                     
(0.138) 
ipr_t_industrial_designs 0                     
(0) 
-0.086                     
(0.198) 
ipr_t_patents 0                     
(0) 
0.156                     
(0.241) 
ipr_t_undisclosed_information 0                     
(0) 
0.077                     
(0.193) 
ipr_t_layout_design_integ_circuits 0                     
(0) 
-0.264                     
(0.439) 
ipr_t_new_plant_varieties 0                     
(0) 
-0.151                     
(0.193) 
ipr_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources 0                     
(0) 




0                     
(0) 
0.056                     
(0.245) 
ipr_t_domain_names 0                     
(0) 
0.063                     
(0.324) 
Control Variables   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0                     
(0) 
0.01*                     
(0.004) 
Classic IP leaders 0**                     
(0) 
-0.039                     
(0.069) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0                     
(0) 
0.005                     
(0.047) 
New IP producers and developers 0                     
(0) 
0.059                     
(0.048) 
ln GDP 0***                     
(0) 





- 477 - 
ln GDPpc 0                     
(0) 
-0.079**                     
(0.025) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.                     
(0) 
0.024                     
(0.026) 
Intercept -1***                     
(0) 






Observations 279 623 
 







- 478 - 






IPR Specific Binary Variables  
ipr_special_requirements_related_bor-
der_measures 




8934.7                     
(15879.1) 
ipr_provisional_measure -20386.4.                     
(11083.7) 
ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies -12285.4                     
(11050) 
ipr_service_provider_liability -23964.7                     
(16724.5) 
ipr_committee 2932.7                     
(5238.3) 
ipr_transparency -4381.5                     
(7052.6) 
ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights 5477.4                     
(9590) 
ipr_t_trademarks 2771.6                     
(9192.7) 
ipr_t_geo_indications -6398.8                     
(4671.8) 
ipr_t_industrial_designs 20262.7.                     
(12072.6) 
ipr_t_patents -8916.5                     
(12068.9) 
ipr_t_undisclosed_information -7132.4                     
(10192.7) 
ipr_t_layout_design_integ_circuits -3181                     
(16037.6) 
ipr_t_new_plant_varieties -24180.4.                     
(13132.1) 




-7169.5                     
(11629.4) 
ipr_t_domain_names 35448.1                     
(22523.2) 
Control Variables  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 217.7                     
(227.6) 
Classic IP leaders 2628.1                     
(4100) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-1746.3                     
(2275.8) 
New IP producers and developers 890.8                     
(2442.1) 





- 479 - 
ln GDPpc 1068                     
(1209.4) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -3270.5*                     
(1338.7) 
















- 480 - 
Technology Transfer: PTA Member 
htp Imports 
Overall IPR 
d3l df5l dft 






IPR Specific Binary Variables    
ipr_special_requirements_related_bor-
der_measures 
129091285**                     
(49060265) 
128993805**                  
(42242343) 




56127598                     
(90419400) 
116849721                  
(77298114) 
62305631                     
(50171825) 
ipr_provisional_measure -82804794                     
(63516561) 
-108929927*                  
(53004247) 
-66355499                     
(40582763) 
ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies -72713738                     
(64596909) 
-88156578.                  
(53321513) 
-50781558                     
(36562357) 
ipr_service_provider_liability -42342750                     
(65484496) 
-110224159                  
(67864779) 
-28683640                     
(35233747) 
ipr_committee -1075771                     
(32437167) 
-14844654                  
(25602750) 
-6111340                     
(20739707) 
ipr_transparency 54601924                     
(40417220) 
73418745.                  
(37589118) 
47269883.                     
(25152584) 
ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights -81077803                     
(51303514) 
-112344783**                  
(41975585) 
-57188919*                     
(27001025) 
ipr_t_trademarks -36358111                     
(51167806) 
-33961839                  
(42953325) 
-32068790                     
(30448469) 
ipr_t_geo_indications 4646064                     
(27604433) 
-98899                  
(21938802) 
2001935                     
(16763017) 
ipr_t_industrial_designs 61128829                     
(64291942) 
10901004                  
(61198901) 
55928059                     
(37910998) 
ipr_t_patents -33720655                     
(62029151) 
-21440864                  
(63097598) 
-17986632                     
(33981847) 
ipr_t_undisclosed_information -17526666                     
(50487318) 
34603405                  
(46677215) 
-9990175                     
(30722048) 
ipr_t_layout_design_integ_circuits -10538704                     
(93388455) 
-3358200                  
(75673339) 
-18964598                     
(62182369) 
ipr_t_new_plant_varieties -37604446                     
(64844732) 
-71558179                  
(60163196) 
-26375120                     
(39389588) 
ipr_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources 127186236*                     
(54265011) 
182118325***                  
(53757271) 




34712659                     
(62368176) 
51749280                  
(61010870) 
32643046                     
(36317942) 
ipr_t_domain_names 60035873                     
(83765590) 
95707635                  
(100748891) 
27774636                     
(48438528) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -1622803                     
(1457846) 
-2212636*                  
(1108490) 
-1143653                     
(952097) 
Classic IP leaders -22037598                     
(25143313) 
2310638                  
(19909873) 
-5903989                     
(16558008) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-6578935                     
(14562309) 
-4133531                  
(11843610) 
-6465344                     
(10117790) 
New IP producers and developers -29776675*                     
(15057944) 
-16306636                  
(13085419) 
-17698470.                     
(10484227) 
ln GDP 19540593***                     
(4761966) 
9037603*                  
(3746670) 





- 481 - 
ln GDPpc -17567302*                     
(7697656) 
-1595961                  
(5998422) 
-4145628                     
(5182541) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 9850427                     
(8566787) 
-1059104                  
(6753114) 
5193975                     
(5686844) 
Intercept -386262548***                     
(101258014) 
-184536286*                  
(78983744) 







Observations 516 466 576 
 










- 482 - 
Growth: GDP I Overall IPR 







IPR Specific Binary Variables    
ipr_special_requirements_related_bor-
der_measures 
0.039                     
(0.053) 
0.064                  
(0.168) 




-0.233**                     
(0.086) 
-0.132                  
(0.26) 
-0.171                     
(0.123) 
ipr_provisional_measure 0.003                     
(0.077) 
-0.189                  
(0.197) 
0.066                     
(0.097) 
ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies 0.089                     
(0.057) 
0.097                  
(0.148) 
0.076                     
(0.077) 
ipr_service_provider_liability 0.048                     
(0.035) 
-0.13                  
(0.111) 
-0.105.                     
(0.064) 
ipr_committee -0.047                     
(0.029) 
-0.156*                  
(0.078) 
-0.088*                     
(0.036) 
ipr_transparency -0.001                     
(0.045) 
0.096                  
(0.115) 
0.087                     
(0.06) 
ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights -0.068                     
(0.045) 
-0.005                  
(0.114) 
-0.124*                     
(0.059) 
ipr_t_trademarks 0.036                     
(0.039) 
0.019                  
(0.117) 
0.098.                     
(0.051) 
ipr_t_geo_indications -0.039                     
(0.028) 
-0.061                  
(0.089) 
-0.017                     
(0.036) 
ipr_t_industrial_designs -0.044                     
(0.049) 
0.027                  
(0.158) 
0.084                     
(0.076) 
ipr_t_patents 0.062                     
(0.046) 
-0.233.                  
(0.141) 
-0.085                     
(0.064) 
ipr_t_undisclosed_information 0.012                     
(0.038) 
0.048                  
(0.098) 
0.023                     
(0.055) 
ipr_t_layout_design_integ_circuits -0.065                     
(0.046) 
0.05                  
(0.159) 
0.077                     
(0.08) 
ipr_t_new_plant_varieties 0.089.                     
(0.046) 
0.028                  
(0.123) 
0.027                     
(0.066) 
ipr_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources 0.033                     
(0.039) 
0.03                  
(0.111) 




0.045                     
(0.065) 
0.12                  
(0.176) 
0.178*                     
(0.081) 
ipr_t_domain_names 0.063                     
(0.091) 
0.412                  
(0.269) 
0.148                     
(0.119) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0                     
(0.001) 
-0.007**                  
(0.002) 
0.001                     
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders 0.017                     
(0.014) 
0.039                  
(0.031) 
0.017                     
(0.016) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.005                     
(0.013) 
0.013                  
(0.029) 
0.007                     
(0.015) 
New IP producers and developers -0.011                     
(0.017) 
0.052                  
(0.037) 
-0.021                     
(0.02) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.002                     
(0.007) 
-0.037*                  
(0.016) 
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Intercept 0.16**                     
(0.056) 
0.797***                  
(0.126) 








Observations 2970 2764 2786 
 










- 484 - 
Growth: GDP II First-comer IPR 









IPR Specific Binary Variables     
ipr_special_requirements_related_bor-
der_measures 
-0.032                     
(0.112) 
0.032                  
(0.247) 
0.05                     
(0.489) 




-0.183                     
(0.153) 
-0.091                  
(0.348) 
-0.233                     
(0.666) 
-0.128                     
(0.191) 
ipr_provisional_measure 0.116                     
(0.098) 
-0.122                  
(0.227) 
-0.036                     
(0.457) 
0.123                     
(0.119) 
ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies 0.108                     
(0.077) 
0.109                  
(0.176) 
0.069                     
(0.329) 
0.115                     
(0.101) 
ipr_service_provider_liability -0.094                     
(0.075) 
-0.509**                  
(0.189) 
-0.952**                     
(0.357) 
-0.204*                     
(0.096) 
ipr_committee -0.027                     
(0.04) 
-0.199*                  
(0.094) 
-0.278                     
(0.175) 
-0.04                     
(0.047) 
ipr_transparency 0.046                     
(0.064) 
0.161                  
(0.154) 
0.268                     
(0.289) 
0.097                     
(0.08) 
ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights -0.098                     
(0.074) 
-0.039                  
(0.174) 
0.068                     
(0.33) 
-0.107                     
(0.101) 
ipr_t_trademarks 0.065                     
(0.082) 
-0.06                  
(0.19) 
-0.279                     
(0.362) 
0.042                     
(0.098) 
ipr_t_geo_indications 0.034                     
(0.045) 
0.09                  
(0.113) 
0.138                     
(0.208) 
0.01                     
(0.054) 
ipr_t_industrial_designs -0.127                     
(0.091) 
-0.11                  
(0.202) 
-0.244                     
(0.485) 
-0.123                     
(0.11) 
ipr_t_patents 0.12                     
(0.104) 
0.134                  
(0.231) 
0.238                     
(0.469) 
0.202                     
(0.125) 
ipr_t_undisclosed_information -0.047                     
(0.049) 
-0.085                  
(0.113) 
0.106                     
(0.254) 
-0.09                     
(0.059) 
ipr_t_layout_design_integ_circuits -0.163*                     
(0.068) 
-0.032                  
(0.237) 
-0.148                     
(0.457) 
-0.08                     
(0.131) 
ipr_t_new_plant_varieties 0.07                     
(0.072) 
-0.065                  
(0.17) 
0.029                     
(0.393) 
0.041                     
(0.09) 
ipr_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources -0.014                     
(0.048) 
-0.151                  
(0.112) 
-0.381.                     
(0.21) 




0.081                     
(0.1) 
0.183                  
(0.227) 
0.288                     
(0.461) 
0.408***                     
(0.118) 
ipr_t_domain_names 0.071                     
(0.128) 
0.45                  
(0.287) 
0.603                     
(0.58) 
-0.054                     
(0.153) 
Control Variables     
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.001                     
(0.001) 
-0.008***                  
(0.002) 
-0.016***                     
(0.004) 
0.001                   
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders -0.008                     
(0.013) 
-0.013                  
(0.03) 
0.001                     
(0.057) 
0.007                     
(0.016) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.01                     
(0.013) 
0.018                  
(0.029) 
0.03                     
(0.054) 
0.009                     
(0.015) 
New IP producers and developers -0.014                     
(0.017) 
0.058                  
(0.037) 
0.033                     
(0.069) 
-0.021                     
(0.019) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.009                     
(0.007) 
-0.054***                  
(0.016) 
-0.085**                     
(0.03) 
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Intercept 0.206***                     
(0.055) 
0.923***                  
(0.123) 
1.502***                     
(0.232) 










Observations 2970 2764 2653 2786 
 







- 486 - 
Growth: GDPpc I Overall IPR 







IPR Specific Binary Variables    
ipr_special_requirements_related_bor-
der_measures 
0.049                     
(0.049) 
0.102                  
(0.146) 




-0.228**                     
(0.08) 
-0.126                  
(0.226) 
-0.163                     
(0.116) 
ipr_provisional_measure 0.001                     
(0.071) 
-0.202                  
(0.171) 
0.056                     
(0.092) 
ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies 0.091.                     
(0.052) 
0.095                  
(0.128) 
0.068                     
(0.072) 
ipr_service_provider_liability 0.045                     
(0.033) 
-0.128                  
(0.096) 
-0.097                     
(0.06) 
ipr_committee -0.043                     
(0.027) 
-0.15*                  
(0.068) 
-0.075*                     
(0.034) 
ipr_transparency 0                     
(0.041) 
0.099                  
(0.1) 
0.088                     
(0.056) 
ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights -0.072.                     
(0.042) 
-0.028                  
(0.099) 
-0.122*                     
(0.056) 
ipr_t_trademarks 0.035                     
(0.036) 
0.039                  
(0.102) 
0.095.                     
(0.048) 
ipr_t_geo_indications -0.032                     
(0.026) 
-0.06                  
(0.077) 
-0.013                     
(0.034) 
ipr_t_industrial_designs -0.05                     
(0.046) 
0.03                  
(0.137) 
0.072                     
(0.071) 
ipr_t_patents 0.064                     
(0.043) 
-0.229.                  
(0.122) 
-0.064                     
(0.06) 
ipr_t_undisclosed_information 0.016                     
(0.035) 
0.057                  
(0.085) 
0.018                     
(0.052) 
ipr_t_layout_design_integ_circuits -0.068                     
(0.043) 
0.047                  
(0.138) 
0.052                     
(0.076) 
ipr_t_new_plant_varieties 0.095*                     
(0.042) 
0.035                  
(0.107) 
0.024                     
(0.062) 
ipr_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources 0.036                     
(0.036) 
0.046                  
(0.097) 




0.042                     
(0.06) 
0.092                  
(0.153) 
0.149*                     
(0.076) 
ipr_t_domain_names 0.039                     
(0.084) 
0.375                  
(0.233) 
0.11                     
(0.112) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.002.                     
(0.001) 
0.001                  
(0.002) 
0.003**                     
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders 0.018                     
(0.013) 
0.036                  
(0.027) 
0.011                     
(0.015) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.011                     
(0.012) 
0.021                  
(0.025) 
0.013                     
(0.014) 
New IP producers and developers -0.005                     
(0.015) 
0.056.                  
(0.032) 
-0.014                     
(0.018) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.011                     
(0.007) 
-0.058***                  
(0.014) 
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Intercept 0.186***                     
(0.052) 
0.826***                  
(0.109) 








Observations 2970 2764 2786 
 










- 488 - 
Growth: GDPpc II First-comer IPR 









IPR Specific Binary Variables     
ipr_special_requirements_related_bor-
der_measures 
-0.026                     
(0.104) 
0.031                  
(0.215) 
0.082                     
(0.384) 




-0.175                     
(0.142) 
-0.1                  
(0.302) 
-0.246                     
(0.523) 
-0.141                     
(0.18) 
ipr_provisional_measure 0.106                     
(0.091) 
-0.117                  
(0.197) 
-0.056                     
(0.358) 
0.106                     
(0.112) 
ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies 0.093                     
(0.071) 
0.087                  
(0.153) 
0.024                     
(0.258) 
0.089                     
(0.095) 
ipr_service_provider_liability -0.074                     
(0.07) 
-0.449**                  
(0.165) 
-0.858**                     
(0.28) 
-0.169.                     
(0.091) 
ipr_committee -0.019                     
(0.037) 
-0.174*                  
(0.082) 
-0.239.                     
(0.137) 
-0.022                     
(0.044) 
ipr_transparency 0.039                     
(0.059) 
0.144                  
(0.134) 
0.247                     
(0.227) 
0.081                     
(0.075) 
ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights -0.095                     
(0.069) 
-0.036                  
(0.151) 
0.054                     
(0.258) 
-0.1                     
(0.095) 
ipr_t_trademarks 0.071                     
(0.076) 
-0.039                  
(0.165) 
-0.242                     
(0.284) 
0.057                     
(0.093) 
ipr_t_geo_indications 0.046                     
(0.041) 
0.097                  
(0.098) 
0.151                     
(0.163) 
0.023                     
(0.051) 
ipr_t_industrial_designs -0.104                     
(0.085) 
-0.075                  
(0.175) 
-0.174                     
(0.38) 
-0.085                     
(0.104) 
ipr_t_patents 0.092                     
(0.097) 
0.1                  
(0.201) 
0.192                     
(0.368) 
0.166                     
(0.118) 
ipr_t_undisclosed_information -0.039                     
(0.045) 
-0.063                  
(0.098) 
0.095                     
(0.199) 
-0.079                     
(0.055) 
ipr_t_layout_design_integ_circuits -0.154*                     
(0.063) 
-0.032                  
(0.206) 
-0.118                     
(0.358) 
-0.101                     
(0.123) 
ipr_t_new_plant_varieties 0.073                     
(0.067) 
-0.047                  
(0.148) 
0.037                     
(0.308) 
0.041                     
(0.084) 
ipr_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources -0.001                     
(0.045) 
-0.113                  
(0.097) 
-0.307.                     
(0.165) 




0.071                     
(0.093) 
0.156                  
(0.197) 
0.266                     
(0.361) 
0.359**                     
(0.111) 
ipr_t_domain_names 0.053                     
(0.119) 
0.37                  
(0.25) 
0.493                     
(0.455) 
-0.071                     
(0.144) 
Control Variables     
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.001                     
(0.001) 
0                
(0.002) 
-0.002                     
(0.003) 
0.003**                     
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders -0.004                     
(0.013) 
-0.011                  
(0.026) 
-0.012                     
(0.045) 
0.003                     
(0.015) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.017                     
(0.012) 
0.026                  
(0.025) 
0.04                     
(0.042) 
0.015                     
(0.014) 
New IP producers and developers -0.009                     
(0.015) 
0.06.                  
(0.032) 
0.045                     
(0.054) 
-0.016                     
(0.018) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.016*                     
(0.007) 
-0.073***                  
(0.014) 
-0.114***                     
(0.024) 
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Intercept 0.225***                     
(0.051) 
0.935***                  
(0.107) 
1.504***                     
(0.182) 










Observations 2970 2764 2653 2786 
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Growth: GDP Growth Rate First-comer IPR 





IPR Specific Binary Variables   
ipr_special_requirements_related_bor-
der_measures 
-2.803                     
(4.438) 




-4.92                     
(6.035) 
-6.06                  
(8.16) 
ipr_provisional_measure 1.998                     
(3.872) 
1.377                  
(5.069) 
ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies 6.016*                     
(3.046) 
7.433.                  
(4.313) 
ipr_service_provider_liability -6.041*                     
(2.982) 
-7.062.                  
(4.137) 
ipr_committee -0.422                     
(1.579) 
-0.292                  
(2.006) 
ipr_transparency -0.359                     
(2.532) 
-1.854                  
(3.4) 
ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights 3.37                     
(2.926) 
4.265                  
(4.313) 
ipr_t_trademarks 2.156                     
(3.253) 
2.219                  
(4.217) 
ipr_t_geo_indications 0.474                     
(1.804) 
0.516                  
(2.382) 
ipr_t_industrial_designs 0.343                     
(3.599) 
0.184                  
(4.709) 
ipr_t_patents -2.185                     
(4.119) 
-1.666                  
(5.356) 
ipr_t_undisclosed_information -1.274                     
(1.954) 
-1.864                  
(2.542) 
ipr_t_layout_design_integ_circuits -2.496                     
(2.673) 
-0.939                  
(5.591) 
ipr_t_new_plant_varieties -0.839                     
(2.846) 
-2.138                  
(3.825) 
ipr_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources 0.332                     
(1.935) 




-1.221                     
(3.947) 
-1.998                  
(5.062) 
ipr_t_domain_names 5.033                     
(5.08) 
6.283                  
(6.552) 
Control Variables   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.044                     
(0.041) 
-0.043                  
(0.052) 
Classic IP leaders 0.938.                     
(0.541) 
1.524*                  
(0.699) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.621                     
(0.531) 
-0.526                  
(0.668) 
New IP producers and developers 1.089                     
(0.664) 
0.853                  
(0.838) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.021                     
(0.288) 
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Intercept 0.083                     
(2.228) 






Observations 2864 2684 
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Growth: GDPpc Growth Rate Overall IPR FC IPR 





IPR Specific Binary Variables   
ipr_special_requirements_related_bor-
der_measures 
1.255                     
(4.425) 




1.445                     
(6.866) 
-0.5                     
(9.106) 
ipr_provisional_measure 4.224                     
(5.192) 
3.381                     
(5.957) 
ipr_criminal_procedures_remedies -5.542                     
(3.907) 
-2.9                     
(4.618) 
ipr_service_provider_liability 2.77                     
(2.955) 
-0.383                     
(5.014) 
ipr_committee 0.558                     
(2.071) 
8.047**                     
(2.457) 
ipr_transparency 2.897                     
(3.041) 
0.059                     
(4.059) 
ipr_t_copyrights_related_rights 0.279                     
(3.037) 
2.644                     
(4.558) 
ipr_t_trademarks 1.974                     
(3.12) 
-2.814                     
(4.985) 
ipr_t_geo_indications -0.799                     
(2.34) 
0.928                     
(2.99) 
ipr_t_industrial_designs -9.483*                     
(4.181) 
-1.089                     
(5.297) 
ipr_t_patents 3.477                     
(3.734) 
-1.17                     
(6.041) 
ipr_t_undisclosed_information 1.512                     
(2.617) 
-0.46                     
(3.017) 
ipr_t_layout_design_integ_circuits 3.512                     
(4.201) 
-0.979                     
(6.234) 
ipr_t_new_plant_varieties 3.079                     
(3.278) 
2.8                     
(4.478) 
ipr_t_trad_knowledge_genetic_resources -4.92.                     
(2.971) 




-2.469                     
(4.665) 
1.285                     
(5.951) 
ipr_t_domain_names -9.152                     
(7.095) 
-0.057                     
(7.534) 
Control Variables   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.005                     
(0.061) 
0.003                     
(0.061) 
Classic IP leaders 0.047                     
(0.829) 
0.421                     
(0.808) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.468                     
(0.792) 
-0.282                     
(0.783) 
New IP producers and developers 0.653                     
(0.994) 
0.303                     
(0.986) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.857.                     
(0.442) 
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Intercept 6.014.                     
(3.402) 






Observations 2661 2661 
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Appendix 64: Economic Effect Regression Tables of the Additive Variables for the TRIPS-
plus Categories 
 
Investment in R&D I Overall IPR 







IPR TRIPS-plus Additive Variables    
ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights -0.152*                     
(0.059) 
-0.006                  
(0.13) 
-0.034                     
(0.041) 
ipr_tripsplus_trademarks 0.076*                     
(0.038) 
0.138***                  
(0.042) 
0.013                     
(0.019) 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications 0.045***                     
(0.012) 
-0.004                 
(0.019) 
0.017.                     
(0.009) 
ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design -0.219**                     
(0.076) 
0.087                 
(0.114) 
0.065                     
(0.049) 
ipr_tripsplus_patents 0.014                     
(0.051) 
-0.012                  
(0.063) 
0.019                     
(0.028) 
ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information 0.078                     
(0.073) 
-0.056                  
(0.09) 
0.009                     
(0.041) 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design 0.039                     
(0.361) 
-0.253                  
(0.389) 
-0.209                     
(0.181) 
ipr_tripsplus_new_plant_varieties -0.013                     
(0.071) 
-0.217*                  
(0.091) 




-0.021                     
(0.018) 
-0.067                  
(0.092) 




-0.206                     
(0.179) 
-0.035                  
(0.229) 
0.054                     
(0.101) 
ipr_tripsplus_domain_names -0.2                     
(0.295) 
-0.293                  
(0.388) 
-0.037                     
(0.166) 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement 0.011*                     
(0.005) 
0.006                  
(0.011) 
0                     
(0.006) 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion -0.029                     
(0.019) 
-0.065                  
(0.129) 
-0.079                     
(0.086) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.005.                     
(0.003) 
0.008*                  
(0.003) 
0.002                     
(0.002) 
Classic IP leaders 0.128**                     
(0.042) 
0.205***                  
(0.044) 
0.067**                     
(0.021) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.008                     
(0.038) 
0.019                  
(0.035) 
-0.023                     
(0.018) 
New IP producers and developers 0.064                     
(0.04) 
0.17***                  
(0.043) 
0.035.                     
(0.019) 
ln GDP -0.009                     
(0.009) 
0.007                  
(0.009) 
-0.001                     
(0.005) 
ln GDPpc -0.038*                     
(0.017) 
-0.084***                  
(0.018) 
-0.022**                     
(0.009) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.008                     
(0.018) 
0.038.                  
(0.02) 
0.031***                     
(0.009) 
Intercept 0.51*                     
(0.221) 
0.295                  
(0.243) 












Observations 923 684 817 
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Investment in R&D II First-comer IPR 







IPR TRIPS-plus Additive Variables    
ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights -0.052                     
(0.057) 
-0.174                  
(0.174) 
0.009                     
(0.029) 
ipr_tripsplus_trademarks -0.057                     
(0.043) 
0.163***                  
(0.039) 
0.001                     
(0.023) 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications 0.151***                     
(0.022) 
-0.02                
(0.024) 
0.022.                     
(0.012) 
ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design -0.145                     
(0.108) 
0.076                  
(0.136) 
0.009                     
(0.056) 
ipr_tripsplus_patents 0.138*                     
(0.054) 
0.004                  
(0.085) 
0.014                     
(0.031) 
ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information -0.291*                     
(0.121) 
-0.105                  
(0.18) 
-0.082                     
(0.066) 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design NA NA NA 
ipr_tripsplus_new_plant_varieties -0.193*                     
(0.087) 
-0.027                  
(0.097) 




-0.02                     
(0.016) 
-0.187.                  
(0.097) 




0.017                     
(0.332) 
0.239                  
(0.461) 
-0.016                     
(0.178) 
ipr_tripsplus_domain_names -0.044                     
(0.308) 
-0.236                  
(0.378) 
0.144                     
(0.166) 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement 0.012*                     
(0.005) 
0.014                  
(0.012) 
0.004                     
(0.008) 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion -0.028.                     
(0.017) 
-0.147                  
(0.139) 
-0.063                     
(0.086) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.006.                     
(0.003) 
0.008*                  
(0.003) 
0.002                     
(0.002) 
Classic IP leaders 0.125**                     
(0.042) 
0.179***                  
(0.044) 
0.07***                     
(0.021) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.003                     
(0.038) 
0.022                  
(0.034) 
-0.019                     
(0.018) 
New IP producers and developers 0.06                     
(0.041) 
0.163***                  
(0.042) 
0.04*                     
(0.02) 
ln GDP -0.007                     
(0.009) 
0.006                  
(0.009) 
-0.002                     
(0.005) 
ln GDPpc -0.031.                     
(0.017) 
-0.078***                  
(0.018) 
-0.021*                     
(0.009) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.001                     
(0.017) 
0.03                  
(0.019) 
0.025**                     
(0.009) 
Intercept 0.469*                     
(0.214) 
0.317                  
(0.228) 








Observations 923 684 817 
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Licensing Overall IPR 





IPR TRIPS-plus Additive Variables   
ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights -1.023.                     
(0.527) 
-0.463                     
(0.94) 
ipr_tripsplus_trademarks 0.068                     
(0.391) 
-0.187                     
(0.493) 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications -0.031                     
(0.116) 
-0.063                     
(0.185) 
ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design 1.042                     
(0.928) 
1.942                     
(1.594) 
ipr_tripsplus_patents 1.343*                     
(0.651) 
1.472                     
(0.912) 
ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information -0.152                     
(0.795) 
0.138                     
(1.01) 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design -5.325                     
(3.767) 
-4.619                     
(4.432) 
ipr_tripsplus_new_plant_varieties 0.778                     
(0.732) 




0.14                     
(0.254) 




0.748                     
(1.649) 
1.026                     
(2.145) 
ipr_tripsplus_domain_names -3.127                     
(3.076) 
-2.738                     
(4.297) 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement -0.158*                     
(0.071) 
-0.25.                     
(0.139) 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion -0.019                     
(0.216) 
-0.482                     
(1.258) 
Control Variables   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.13**                     
(0.047) 
-0.101.                     
(0.055) 
Classic IP leaders -0.341                     
(0.469) 
-0.634                     
(0.552) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.165                     
(0.443) 
-0.287                     
(0.516) 
New IP producers and developers -0.245                     
(0.455) 
-0.223                     
(0.539) 
ln GDP -0.261*                     
(0.117) 
-0.318*                     
(0.144) 
ln GDPpc 0.141                     
(0.202) 
0.199                     
(0.243) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.181                     
(0.227) 
-0.037                     
(0.274) 
Intercept 6.355*                     
(2.833) 
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Innovation: Researchers in R&D I Overall IPR 











IPR TRIPS-plus Additive Variables      
ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights -0.004                     
(0.03) 
-0.002                  
(0.079) 
-0.022                     
(0.17) 
-3.755*                     
(1.525) 
0.023                     
(0.053) 
ipr_tripsplus_trademarks 0.025                     
(0.019) 
0.085*                  
(0.035) 
0.152**                     
(0.054) 
0.573**                     
(0.21) 
0.01                     
(0.023) 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications 0.017**                     
(0.006) 
-0.011                  
(0.019) 
-0.014                     
(0.025) 
0.006                     
(0.058) 
0.013                     
(0.011) 
ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design -0.017                     
(0.037) 
-0.064                  
(0.105) 
0.001                     
(0.149) 
-0.157                     
(0.472) 
0.011                     
(0.06) 
ipr_tripsplus_patents -0.03                     
(0.026) 
0.084                  
(0.059) 
0.131                     
(0.081) 
-0.097                     
(0.348) 
-0.032                     
(0.037) 
ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information 0.05                     
(0.036) 
-0.085                  
(0.084) 
-0.145                     
(0.117) 
1.739*                     
(0.724) 
0.049                     
(0.05) 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design 0.079                     
(0.177) 
-0.342                  
(0.386) 
-0.798                     
(0.506) 
0.195                     
(1.978) 
0.129                     
(0.223) 
ipr_tripsplus_new_plant_varieties -0.099**                     
(0.035) 
-0.081                  
(0.083) 
-0.29*                     
(0.119) 
-0.363                     
(0.524) 




-0.028**                     
(0.009) 
0.097                 
(0.077) 
-0.096                     
(0.12) 




-0.132                     
(0.087) 
0.108                  
(0.226) 
0.032                     
(0.299) 
-2.881*                     
(1.253) 
-0.08                     
(0.123) 
ipr_tripsplus_domain_names -0.014                     
(0.144) 
-0.299                  
(0.338) 
-0.622                     
(0.506) 
3.847*                     
(1.818) 
0.041                     
(0.201) 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement 0.002                     
(0.003) 
-0.021*                  
(0.009) 
0.002                     
(0.014) 
0.181.                     
(0.108) 
-0.001                     
(0.007) 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion -0.022*                     
(0.01) 
-0.085                  
(0.126) 
-0.202                     
(0.167) 
NA -0.026                     
(0.104) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.002                     
(0.002) 
0                
(0.004) 
0.016**                     
(0.006) 
-0.03*                     
(0.015) 
0.004                     
(0.003) 
Classic IP leaders 0.06**                     
(0.023) 
0.146**                  
(0.045) 
0.15*                     
(0.064) 
0.122                     
(0.141) 
0.071*                     
(0.028) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.019                     
(0.021) 
-0.002                  
(0.039) 
-0.006                     
(0.051) 
-0.045                     
(0.11) 
-0.029                     
(0.025) 
New IP producers and developers 0.043*                     
(0.021) 
0.064                  
(0.046) 
0.276***                     
(0.064) 
-0.133                    
(0.173) 
0.054*                     
(0.025) 
ln GDP -0.001                     
(0.005) 
-0.005                  
(0.01) 
-0.004                     
(0.013) 
-0.015                     
(0.027) 
-0.005                     
(0.006) 
ln GDPpc -0.023*                     
(0.01) 
-0.09***                  
(0.02) 
-0.105***                     
(0.028) 
-0.086                     
(0.065) 
-0.026*                     
(0.013) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.042***                     
(0.01) 
0.076***                  
(0.021) 
0.096**                     
(0.03) 
0.126*                     
(0.059) 
0.036**                     
(0.012) 
Intercept -0.025                     
(0.122) 
0.591*                  
(0.254) 
0.49                     
(0.354) 
1.12                     
(0.745) 
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Innovation: Researchers in R&D II First-comer IPR 









IPR TRIPS-plus Additive Variables     
ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights 0.021                     
(0.03) 
-0.042                  
(0.061) 
-0.067                     
(0.226) 
0.021                     
(0.03) 
ipr_tripsplus_trademarks 0.028                     
(0.022) 
0.082*                  
(0.034) 
0.136**                     
(0.052) 
0.028                     
(0.022) 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications 0.004                     
(0.012) 
0.003                  
(0.024) 
-0.008                     
(0.032) 
0.004                     
(0.012) 
ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design -0.05                     
(0.06) 
-0.161                  
(0.131) 
-0.304                     
(0.186) 
-0.05                     
(0.06) 
ipr_tripsplus_patents -0.081**                     
(0.027) 
0.049                 
(0.069) 
0.366**                     
(0.111) 
-0.081**                     
(0.027) 
ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information 0.04                     
(0.062) 
-0.191                  
(0.131) 
-0.255                     
(0.233) 
0.04                     
(0.062) 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design NA NA NA NA 
ipr_tripsplus_new_plant_varieties -0.012                     
(0.046) 
-0.054                  
(0.093) 
-0.086                     
(0.126) 




-0.028***                     
(0.008) 
0.052                
(0.087) 
-0.197                     
(0.127) 




-0.209                     
(0.176) 
0.696                  
(0.441) 
-0.384                     
(0.599) 
-0.209                     
(0.176) 
ipr_tripsplus_domain_names 0.109                     
(0.152) 
-0.438                  
(0.354) 
-0.536                     
(0.492) 
0.109                     
(0.152) 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement -0.006*                     
(0.003) 
-0.022*                  
(0.011) 
0.001                     
(0.016) 
-0.006*                     
(0.003) 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion -0.017*                     
(0.008) 
-0.043                  
(0.127) 
-0.375*                     
(0.181) 
-0.017*                     
(0.008) 
Control Variables        
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.002                     
(0.002) 
-0.001                  
(0.004) 
0.016**                     
(0.006) 
0.002                     
(0.002) 
Classic IP leaders 0.077***                     
(0.023) 
0.153***                  
(0.046) 
0.111.                     
(0.064) 
0.077***                     
(0.023) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.013                     
(0.021) 
0.005                  
(0.039) 
0.002                     
(0.05) 
-0.013                     
(0.021) 
New IP producers and developers 0.054*                     
(0.022) 
0.084.                  
(0.045) 
0.28***                     
(0.062) 
0.054*                     
(0.022) 
ln GDP -0.006                     
(0.005) 
-0.007                  
(0.01) 
-0.005                     
(0.013) 
-0.006                     
(0.005) 
ln GDPpc -0.027*                     
(0.01) 
-0.094***                  
(0.02) 
-0.094***                     
(0.028) 
-0.027*                     
(0.01) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.034***                     
(0.01) 
0.062**                  
(0.019) 
0.076**                     
(0.028) 
0.034***                     
(0.01) 
Intercept 0.193                     
(0.12) 
0.775**                  
(0.242) 
0.545                     
(0.334) 










Observations 786 640 582 786 
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Innovation: Resident Applications for 
Industrial Designs 






IPR TRIPS-plus Additive Variables   
ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights 0.097                     
(1.925) 
1.126                     
(2.059) 
ipr_tripsplus_trademarks -0.432                     
(1.035) 
-0.754                     
(1.221) 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications -0.767.                     
(0.396) 
-0.72                     
(0.711) 
ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design 0.301                     
(3.127) 
1.564                     
(3.834) 
ipr_tripsplus_patents -0.108                     
(1.745) 
-1.866                     
(1.807) 
ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information -1.284                     
(2.075) 
-1.681                     
(3.284) 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design -0.42                     
(9.107) 
NA 
ipr_tripsplus_new_plant_varieties -1.497                     
(1.977) 




0.29                     
(0.643) 




2.25                     
(4.444) 
2.838                     
(7.417) 
ipr_tripsplus_domain_names -0.315                     
(8.408) 
6.717                     
(9.498) 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement 0.043                     
(0.284) 
0.081                     
(0.493) 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion 6.975**                     
(2.409) 
6.495*                     
(2.736) 
Control Variables   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.053                     
(0.089) 
-0.055                     
(0.089) 
Classic IP leaders 2.657*                     
(1.096) 
2.469*                     
(1.087) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.236                     
(0.891) 
-0.211                     
(0.889) 
New IP producers and developers 0.37                     
(1.063) 
0.602                     
(1.077) 
ln GDP -0.418                     
(0.267) 
-0.439.                     
(0.266) 
ln GDPpc 0.937*                     
(0.449) 
0.85.                     
(0.448) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.947.                     
(0.53) 
-1.175*                     
(0.515) 
Intercept 11.558.                     
(6.427) 
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Technology Transfer: PTA Member 
Applications for Industrial Designs I 
Overall IPR 











IPR TRIPS-plus Additive Variables      
ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights 0.491                     
(0.408) 
-0.467                  
(1.486) 
0.486                     
(1.743) 
-0.655                     
(3.552) 
-11.148                     
(14.059) 
ipr_tripsplus_trademarks -0.676*                     
(0.316) 
-0.726                  
(0.77) 
0.125                     
(0.894) 
3.294.                     
(1.761) 
5.737                     
(6.866) 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications 0.296***                     
(0.086) 
-0.046                
(0.328) 
-0.841.                     
(0.468) 
-0.472                     
(0.736) 
-1.099                     
(1.864) 
ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design 1.456*                     
(0.681) 
-1.769                  
(2.501) 
0.619                     
(3.313) 
-2.127                     
(4.486) 
-15.494                     
(21.869) 
ipr_tripsplus_patents -3.034***                     
(0.526) 
-0.799                
(1.206) 
-1.967                     
(1.526) 
-5.418*                     
(2.711) 
-36.691*                     
(16.564) 
ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information 4.755***                     
(0.687) 
3.427*                  
(1.558) 
6.515**                     
(2.384) 
20.785***                     
(4.112) 
23.519                     
(15.797) 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design 37.127***                     
(3.089) 
76.403***                  
(6.724) 
73***                     
(6.925) 
62.324***                     
(9.394) 
116.929.                    
(63.607) 
ipr_tripsplus_new_plant_varieties -0.277                     
(0.56) 
1.013                  
(1.627) 
-0.743                     
(2.045) 
-1.779                     
(3.653) 




-0.808***                     
(0.208) 
-0.237                  
(0.485) 
-5.858                     
(3.818) 




-0.194                     
(1.457) 
-0.02                  
(4.765) 
-11.287                     
(8.101) 
-26.04                     
(17.016) 
-6.032                     
(27.11) 
ipr_tripsplus_domain_names 7.172**                     
(2.24) 
-0.066                 
(5.729) 
NA NA 9.926                     
(46.317) 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement 0.054                     
(0.055) 
0.057                  
(0.127) 
0.619                     
(0.408) 
0.397                     
(0.529) 
7.165*                     
(2.788) 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion -0.312.                     
(0.161) 
0.207                 
(0.472) 
-7.111.                     
(4.001) 
-19.689***                     
(5.157) 
-19.505                     
(29.463) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.141**                     
(0.05) 
0.153                  
(0.112) 
0.126                     
(0.111) 
-0.089                     
(0.148) 
-5.749***                     
(1.158) 
Classic IP leaders -1.137*                     
(0.54) 
-1.688                  
(1.114) 
-1.78                     
(1.179) 
-6.422***                     
(1.574) 
0.734                  
(13.157) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-1.247*                     
(0.547) 
-2.359*                  
(1.04) 
-2.45*                     
(1.075) 
-2.915*                     
(1.252) 
17.967                     
(11.647) 
New IP producers and developers 0.142                     
(0.493) 
0.829                  
(1.102) 
1.082                     
(1.148) 
0.608                     
(1.549) 
-23.43*                     
(9.295) 
ln GDP 0.229*                     
(0.113) 
0.388.                  
(0.225) 
0.373                     
(0.242) 
0.632*                     
(0.312) 
7.047***                     
(2.112) 
ln GDPpc -0.48*                     
(0.216) 
-0.362                  
(0.438) 
-0.658                     
(0.465) 
0.532                     
(0.61) 
-11.471*                     
(4.749) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.97***                     
(0.274) 
1.588**                  
(0.548) 
1.378*                     
(0.62) 
3.588***                     
(0.829) 
0.78                     
(6.237) 
Intercept -8.415**                     
(3.154) 
-17.232**                  
(6.416) 
-12.213.                     
(7.074) 
-41.694***                     
(10.084) 
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Technology Transfer: PTA Member 
Applications for Industrial Designs II 
First-comer IPR 











IPR TRIPS-plus Additive Variables      
ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights -0.056                     
(0.585) 
-1.304                  
(1.438) 
-0.983                     
(1.585) 
1.137                     
(4.705) 
-3.417                     
(11.087) 
ipr_tripsplus_trademarks 0.517                     
(0.525) 
0.645                  
(0.997) 
0.844                     
(1.239) 
1.486                     
(2.081) 
0.75                     
(9.583) 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications -0.234                     
(0.234) 
-0.272                  
(0.542) 
-0.355                     
(0.753) 
-0.573                     
(0.985) 
-2.313                     
(5.503) 
ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design -0.404                     
(1.417) 
-2.2                  
(2.749) 
-3.484                     
(3.741) 
-0.094                     
(5.225) 
-13.948                     
(28.247) 
ipr_tripsplus_patents -0.968.                     
(0.568) 
-0.945                  
(1.521) 
0.509                     
(1.964) 
-0.076                     
(3.639) 
5.802                     
(12.904) 
ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information 1.555                     
(1.178) 
2.432                  
(3.176) 
1.662                     
(3.75) 
0.328                     
(5.225) 
20.044                     
(29.569) 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design -5.443                     
(5.074) 
-22.361.                  
(12.908) 
-20.743                     
(13.774) 
-16.779                     
(16.725) 
NA
ipr_tripsplus_new_plant_varieties -0.93                     
(0.968) 
0.216                  
(1.928) 
0.957                     
(2.604) 
1.033                     
(3.329) 




-0.339.                     
(0.2) 
-0.058                  
(0.411) 
1.193                     
(4.863) 




6.208.                     
(3.545) 
21.619*                  
(10.403) 
19.416.                     
(11.006) 
15.572                     
(20.121) 
-27.985                     
(58.623) 
ipr_tripsplus_domain_names 4.74                     
(3.802) 
-2.219                  
(8.963) 
-6.514                     
(9.807) 
-13.051                     
(12.217) 
-10.42                     
(74.005) 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement -0.093                     
(0.06) 
-0.226.                  
(0.118) 
-0.396                     
(0.561) 
-0.532                     
(0.814) 
-2.845                     
(3.849) 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion 0.019                     
(0.205) 
0.514                  
(0.386) 
-4.535                     
(4.508) 
-7.629                     
(5.085) 
-22.886                     
(29.002) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.023                     
(0.058) 
0.044                  
(0.135) 
0.03                     
(0.134) 
-0.21                     
(0.189) 
-5.763***                     
(1.146) 
Classic IP leaders 0.856                     
(0.601) 
0.414                  
(1.294) 
-0.153                     
(1.397) 
-6.001**                     
(2) 
0.255                   
(12.272) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.854                     
(0.614) 
-1.183                  
(1.22) 
-2.163.                     
(1.272) 
-2.788.                     
(1.555) 
13.478                     
(11.439) 
New IP producers and developers -0.235                     
(0.616) 
0.149                  
(1.322) 
-0.119                     
(1.358) 
-2.053                     
(1.907) 
-26.109**                     
(9.934) 
ln GDP 0.303*                     
(0.125) 
0.697**                  
(0.264) 
0.735*                     
(0.287) 
1.087**                     
(0.383) 
7.751***                     
(2.086) 
ln GDPpc -0.827***                     
(0.249) 
-0.817                  
(0.526) 
-1.005.                     
(0.555) 
0.058                    
(0.763) 
-11.226*                     
(4.956) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 1.384***                     
(0.296) 
2.415***                  
(0.605) 
2.913***                     
(0.721) 
5.588***                     
(0.978) 
10.299*                     
(5.058) 
Intercept -10.202**                     
(3.381) 
-27.805***                  
(7.266) 
-30.029***                     
(8.295) 
-62.579***                     
(12.242) 
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Technology Transfer: PTA Member 
Applications for Patents 
Overall IPR 











IPR TRIPS-plus Additive Variables      
ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights -61.729***                     
(13.904) 
-46.587***                  
(9.1) 
-54.777***                     
(15.546) 
22.511***                     
(5.896) 
-11.889                   
(42.784) 
ipr_tripsplus_trademarks 19.218.                     
(11.252) 
23.048***                  
(5.465) 
41.132***                     
(9.815) 
23.454***                     
(3.354) 
-10.867                   
(24.502) 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications -6.704*                     
(2.978) 
-3.182                  
(2.309) 
-10.946*                     
(4.659) 
0.406                   
(1.522) 
-2.51                     
(6.365) 
ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design -28.476                     
(23.063) 
-68.862***                  
(15.089) 
-76.489**                     
(29.093) 
-21.742**                     
(7.235) 
-6.063                     
(68.533) 
ipr_tripsplus_patents 81.083***                     
(18.163) 
48.555***                  
(8.231) 
75.328***                     
(15.235) 
46.37***                     
(6.044) 
25.335                     
(47.775) 
ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information 87.915***                     
(23.467) 
51.677***                  
(10.408) 
65.44**                     
(20.493) 
69.74***                     
(8.883) 
-23.666                    
(46.154) 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design -467.618**                     
(163.816) 
-234.36***                  
(63.946) 
-
369.408***                     
(107.206) 
-238.01***                     
(31.479)
-145.83                     
(241.739) 
ipr_tripsplus_new_plant_varieties 19.825                     
(18.262) 
23.969*                  
(10.023) 
17.962                     
(18.056) 
-26.808***                     
(6.658) 




6.356                     
(7.059) 
-0.889                  
(3.423) 
-42.37                     
(33.828) 




2.203                     
(43.88) 
-58.902*                  
(26.222) 
-116.27.                     
(60.887) 
-15.666                     
(19.645) 
2.756                    
(93.657) 
ipr_tripsplus_domain_names -9.179                     
(78.493) 
-
150.547***                  
(40.064) 
-270.145**                     
(87.522) 
-
319.467***                     
(35.151) 
19.649                     
(169.874)
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement -5.568**                     
(1.91) 
0.08                 
(0.911) 
3.429                     
(3.737) 
-3.426**                     
(1.26) 
-5                
(7.056) 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion -1.567                     
(5.542) 
-3.468                  
(3.386) 
-74.939**                     
(22.876) 
-63.68***                     
(5.809) 
0.165                  
(66.441) 
Control Variables      
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.249                     
(1.821) 
-0.294                  
(0.759) 
-0.042                     
(1.15) 
0.041                     
(0.301) 
3.176                     
(4.091) 
Classic IP leaders 3.063                     
(18.963) 
0.956                  
(7.391) 
-8.015                     
(11.743) 
1.184                     
(3.072) 
35.856                     
(40.546) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-7.087                     
(17.247) 
-5.752                  
(6.838) 
-10.922                     
(10.341) 
-2.358                     
(2.627) 
-19.355                     
(32.558) 
New IP producers and developers -30.983.                     
(15.888) 
-12.494.                  
(6.629) 
-20.711.                     
(10.648) 
-5.872.                     
(3.097) 
53.673.                     
(29.596) 
ln GDP 7.656*                     
(3.544) 
3.375*                  
(1.448) 
4.357.                     
(2.336) 
0.689                     
(0.595) 
22.46***                     
(6.244) 
ln GDPpc 6.626                     
(6.827) 
2.737                  
(2.766) 
4.969                     
(4.359) 
0.431                     
(1.163) 
1.896                     
(13.675) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 21.541*                     
(8.624) 
9.316*                  
(3.63) 
12.573*                     
(5.641) 
7.475***                     
(1.558) 
38.582*                     
(16.898) 
Intercept -
417.726***                     
(105.602) 
-
178.472***                  
(45.238) 
-
241.973***                     
(69.44) 
-75.683***                     
(19.735)
-
















Observations 980 796 721 521 622 
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Technology Transfer: Total htp Im-
ports  
Overall IPR 







IPR TRIPS-plus Additive Variables    
ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights 0.097                     
(0.609) 
0                
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_tripsplus_trademarks 0.785**                     
(0.287) 
0              
(0) 
0*                     
(0) 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications -0.048                     
(0.164) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design -0.186                     
(0.989) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_tripsplus_patents 0.155                     
(0.421) 
0                
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information 0.044                     
(0.586) 
0                
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design -0.235                     
(2.896) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_tripsplus_new_plant_varieties -0.566                     
(0.681) 
0                  
(0) 




-0.103                     
(0.244) 
0                  
(0) 




-1.496                     
(1.155) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_tripsplus_domain_names -2.516                     
(2.041) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement 0.001                     
(0.079) 
0.                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion -0.128                     
(0.601) 
0                  
(0) 
0*                     
(0) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.055.                     
(0.03) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Classic IP leaders -0.07                     
(0.527) 
0***                  
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.171                     
(0.331) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
New IP producers and developers 0.791*                     
(0.332) 
0               
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ln GDP 0.242*                     
(0.103) 
0***                  
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
ln GDPpc -0.509**                     
(0.171) 
0***                  
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.002                     
(0.186) 
0***                  
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
Intercept -1.792                     
(2.112) 
-1***                  
(0) 
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Technology Transfer: Total htp Im-
ports II 
First-comer IPR 







IPR TRIPS-plus Additive Variables    
ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights 0.845                     
(0.727) 
0                   
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_tripsplus_trademarks 1.392***                     
(0.35) 
0                
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications -0.069                     
(0.209) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design 0.242                     
(1.123) 
0                   
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_tripsplus_patents -0.126                     
(0.563) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information -1.03                     
(1.022) 
0.                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design -1.314                     
(5.118) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_tripsplus_new_plant_varieties -0.002                     
(1.001) 
0                     
(0) 




-0.113                     
(0.342) 
0                     
(0) 




0.62                     
(1.906) 
0                    
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_tripsplus_domain_names -3.052                     
(2.778) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement -0.086                     
(0.113) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion -0.059                     
(0.627) 
0                     
(0) 
0.                     
(0) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.054.                     
(0.03) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
Classic IP leaders -0.214                     
(0.477) 
0***                     
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.162                     
(0.325) 
0                     
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
New IP producers and developers 0.743*                     
(0.326) 
0                  
(0) 
0                     
(0) 
ln GDP 0.232*                     
(0.103) 
0***                     
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
ln GDPpc -0.495**                     
(0.169) 
0**                  
(0) 
0***                     
(0) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.001                     
(0.182) 
0**                     
(0) 
0**                     
(0) 
Intercept -1.674                     
(2.037) 
-1***                     
(0) 
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IPR TRIPS-plus Additive Variables  
ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights 0.014                     
(0.105) 
ipr_tripsplus_trademarks 0.121*                     
(0.05) 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications -0.04                     
(0.03) 
ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design 0.023                     
(0.162) 
ipr_tripsplus_patents -0.015                     
(0.081) 
ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information 0.056                     
(0.147) 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design -0.575                     
(0.736) 








-0.02                     
(0.274) 
ipr_tripsplus_domain_names -0.22                     
(0.4) 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement -0.017                     
(0.016) 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion 0.007                     
(0.09) 
Control Variables  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.01*                     
(0.004) 
Classic IP leaders -0.013                     
(0.069) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.011                     
(0.047) 
New IP producers and developers 0.051                     
(0.047) 
ln GDP 0.01                     
(0.015) 
ln GDPpc -0.078**                     
(0.024) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.034                     
(0.026) 
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IPR TRIPS-plus Additive Variables  
ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights -8039.3                     
(6608.8) 
ipr_tripsplus_trademarks 753.9                     
(2620.8) 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications 642.8                     
(2115.2) 
ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design -8037.7                     
(9218.8) 
ipr_tripsplus_patents -3085.6                     
(3304.3) 
ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information -1155.1                     
(4893.7) 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design 5802.9                     
(22081.8) 








-13032.9                     
(12956.2) 
ipr_tripsplus_domain_names 10002.5                     
(17194.6) 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement 1674.7.                     
(917.2) 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion -1146.4                     
(4109.8) 
Control Variables  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 108.7                     
(224.3) 
Classic IP leaders 3821.3                     
(4068) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-1147.3                     
(2260.9) 
New IP producers and developers 575                     
(2401.4) 
ln GDP 1342.                     
(739.6) 
ln GDPpc 788.7                     
(1205.6) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -3447.3*                     
(1337.4) 
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Technology Transfer: PTA Member 
htp Imports I 
Overall IPR 
df3l df5l dft 






IPR TRIPS-plus Additive Variables    
ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights -60237129                     
(40579114) 
-49893623                  
(33829915) 
-38745368*                     
(19536748) 
ipr_tripsplus_trademarks 5556942                     
(15065110) 
8195977                  
(12949822) 
-826709                     
(8870796) 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications 14819177                     
(12268301) 
25881794*                  
(11019240) 
6565249                     
(5643931) 
ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design -100676627.                     
(55994402) 
-110316441*                  
(47985048) 
-58832402.                     
(34647656) 
ipr_tripsplus_patents -1052482                     
(19282259) 
-5605332                  
(16063608) 
-2519667                     
(13327468) 
ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information 6217906                     
(28642145) 
-13156024                  
(25433020) 
7285791                     
(18558052) 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design -38829420                     
(118383201) 
2458063                  
(102225377) 
-19711810                     
(78996504) 
ipr_tripsplus_new_plant_varieties 88912230**                     
(33719919) 
96898048***                  
(28502455) 




-2403839                     
(13904221) 
5922199                  
(18608168) 




-41077623                     
(66927333) 
-40265348                  
(63864997) 
-24741208                     
(36796969) 
ipr_tripsplus_domain_names 2991585                     
(94509460) 
10114760                  
(88595446) 
17736942                     
(63867617) 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement 2389892                     
(4487983) 
3814539                  
(4060132) 
1267518                     
(3026558) 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion -38385692                     
(57282881) 
-29717616                  
(43655260) 
-24776667                     
(40549721) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -1954908                     
(1460890) 
-2879740*                  
(1125511) 
-1584995.                     
(955485) 
Classic IP leaders -36299425                     
(25013629) 
-16489134                  
(19880940) 
-16428023                     
(16385180) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-3681580                     
(14628681) 
1893117                  
(12064067) 
-4227917                     
(10142034) 
New IP producers and developers -29033092*                     
(14765348) 
-19446882                  
(13131224) 
-19260511.                     
(10209932) 
ln GDP 19285889***                     
(4709421) 
10109844**                  
(3780889) 
10652542***                     
(3196113) 
ln GDPpc -18487116*                     
(7767678) 
-4732834                  
(6154985) 
-5830661                     
(5239199) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 12529339                     
(8721923) 
1335475                  
(6971426) 
4694808                     
(5856349) 
Intercept -390836725***                     
(99265085) 
-201176721*                  
(79246047) 
-230939151***                     
(66247371) 
Model m4.9_bv_df3l_ti m4.9_bv_df5l_ti m4.9_bv_dft_ti 
Observations 516 466 576 
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Technology Transfer: PTA Member 
htp Imports II 
FC IPR 
df5l 
Variables Estimates  
(Std. Error) 
IPR TRIPS-plus Additive Variables  
ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights 25825910                     
(34199259) 
ipr_tripsplus_trademarks -3964724                     
(13531108) 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications 1399012                     
(16224880) 
ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design -11671659                     
(51876493) 
ipr_tripsplus_patents 17475172                     
(20181225) 
ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information 1807693                     
(38003865) 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design -53346385                     
(129911131) 








52343703                     
(75144793) 
ipr_tripsplus_domain_names -67697148                     
(100088273) 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement -5905356                     
(4681336) 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion -28197664                     
(44379020) 
Control Variables  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -3371959**                     
(1143650) 
Classic IP leaders -4519544                     
(17716523) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
2245471                     
(12133480) 
New IP producers and developers -33223795*                     
(13003334) 
ln GDP 12360482**                     
(3834942) 
ln GDPpc -3402584                     
(6243862) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 4957362                     
(6933886) 
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Growth: GDP I Overall IPR 





IPR TRIPS-plus Additive Variables   
ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights -0.071**                     
(0.022) 
-0.064                     
(0.04) 
ipr_tripsplus_trademarks 0.026                     
(0.016) 
0.017                     
(0.021) 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications -0.02***                     
(0.005) 
-0.025**                     
(0.008) 
ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design 0.031                     
(0.038) 
0.095                     
(0.063) 
ipr_tripsplus_patents 0.079**                     
(0.026) 
0.033                     
(0.035) 
ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information 0.034                     
(0.033) 
0.058                     
(0.042) 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design -0.191                     
(0.15) 
0.056                     
(0.178) 
ipr_tripsplus_new_plant_varieties 0                     
(0.029) 




0.017                     
(0.011) 




-0.076                     
(0.068) 
0.069                     
(0.09) 
ipr_tripsplus_domain_names -0.141                     
(0.125) 
-0.064                     
(0.17) 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement -0.011***                     
(0.003) 
-0.006                     
(0.006) 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion -0.001                     
(0.01) 
0.004                     
(0.049) 
Control Variables   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0                     
(0.001) 
0.002                     
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders 0.02                     
(0.014) 
0.017                     
(0.016) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.007                     
(0.013) 
0.006                     
(0.015) 
New IP producers and developers -0.013                     
(0.016) 
-0.02                     
(0.019) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0                     
(0.007) 
-0.021*                     
(0.009) 
Intercept 0.146**                     
(0.056) 






Observations 2970 2786 
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Growth: GDP II First-comer IPR 







IPR TRIPS-plus Additive Variables    
ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights -0.055*                     
(0.026) 
0.049                  
(0.065) 
-0.045                     
(0.042) 
ipr_tripsplus_trademarks 0.054**                     
(0.021) 
-0.005                  
(0.046) 
0.049*                     
(0.024) 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications -0.015                     
(0.011) 
-0.004                  
(0.032) 
-0.023                     
(0.015) 
ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design 0.012                     
(0.059) 
-0.003                  
(0.132) 
0.076                     
(0.077) 
ipr_tripsplus_patents 0.008                     
(0.027) 
-0.114.                  
(0.068) 
-0.009                     
(0.036) 
ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information 0.036                     
(0.051) 
-0.048                  
(0.119) 
-0.033                     
(0.067) 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design 0.005                     
(0.187) 
0.552                  
(0.422) 
0.121                     
(0.226) 
ipr_tripsplus_new_plant_varieties 0.015                     
(0.044) 
-0.054                  
(0.1) 




-0.009                     
(0.01) 
-0.08***                  
(0.024) 




-0.052                     
(0.113) 
0.206                  
(0.252) 
0.234                     
(0.147) 
ipr_tripsplus_domain_names 0.094                     
(0.153) 
0.798*                  
(0.352) 
0.047                     
(0.189) 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement -0.009**                     
(0.003) 
-0.011                  
(0.008) 
0.005                     
(0.01) 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion -0.021.                     
(0.012) 
-0.09***                  
(0.027) 
0.001                     
(0.056) 
Control Variables    
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.001                     
(0.001) 
-0.008***                  
(0.002) 
0.001                     
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders -0.004                     
(0.014) 
0.007                  
(0.031) 
0.008                     
(0.016) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.012                     
(0.013) 
0.022                  
(0.029) 
0.01                     
(0.015) 
New IP producers and developers -0.019                     
(0.016) 
0.042                  
(0.036) 
-0.023                     
(0.019) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.006                     
(0.007) 
-0.048**                  
(0.016) 
-0.027**                     
(0.008) 
Intercept 0.186***                     
(0.055) 
0.875***                  
(0.123) 








Observations 2970 2764 2786 
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Growth: GDPpc I Overall IPR 





IPR TRIPS-plus Additive Variables   
ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights -0.069***                     
(0.02) 
-0.065.                    
(0.037) 
ipr_tripsplus_trademarks 0.027.                     
(0.015) 
0.02                     
(0.02) 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications -0.018***                     
(0.005) 
-0.022**                     
(0.008) 
ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design 0.033                     
(0.035) 
0.086                     
(0.06) 
ipr_tripsplus_patents 0.072**                     
(0.024) 
0.027                     
(0.033) 
ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information 0.028                     
(0.03) 
0.043                     
(0.039) 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design -0.175                     
(0.139) 
0.042                     
(0.167) 
ipr_tripsplus_new_plant_varieties 0.004                     
(0.027) 




0.016                     
(0.01) 




-0.072                     
(0.063) 
0.046                     
(0.085) 
ipr_tripsplus_domain_names -0.137                     
(0.116) 
-0.054                     
(0.16) 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement -0.01***                     
(0.003) 
-0.005                     
(0.006) 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion -0.001                     
(0.009) 
-0.003                     
(0.046) 
Control Variables   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.002*                     
(0.001) 
0.004***                     
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders 0.021.                     
(0.013) 
0.012                     
(0.015) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.013                     
(0.012) 
0.012                     
(0.014) 
New IP producers and developers -0.007                     
(0.015) 
-0.014                     
(0.018) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.009                     
(0.007) 
-0.031***                     
(0.008) 
Intercept 0.169**                     
(0.052) 






Observations 2970 2786 
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Growth: GDPpc II First-comer IPR 









IPR TRIPS-plus Additive Variables     
ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights -0.055*                     
(0.024) 
0.045                  
(0.057) 
0.003                     
(0.127) 
-0.039                     
(0.04) 
ipr_tripsplus_trademarks 0.055**                     
(0.019) 
0.001                  
(0.04) 
-0.052                     
(0.068) 
0.05*                     
(0.023) 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications -0.012                     
(0.01) 
0.001                  
(0.028) 
-0.007                     
(0.056) 
-0.019                     
(0.014) 
ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design 0.009                     
(0.055) 
-0.004                  
(0.115) 
0.056                     
(0.229) 
0.078                     
(0.073) 
ipr_tripsplus_patents 0.013                     
(0.025) 
-0.093                  
(0.059) 
-0.054                     
(0.109) 
-0.001                     
(0.034) 
ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information 0.027                     
(0.048) 
-0.068                  
(0.104) 
-0.332.                     
(0.199) 
-0.048                     
(0.063) 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design -0.014                     
(0.173) 
0.512                  
(0.367) 
0.464                     
(0.641) 
0.061                     
(0.213) 
ipr_tripsplus_new_plant_varieties 0.019                     
(0.041) 
-0.05                  
(0.087) 
-0.081                     
(0.159) 




-0.006                     
(0.01) 
-0.072***                  
(0.021) 
-0.083                     
(0.137) 




-0.05                     
(0.105) 
0.18                  
(0.219) 
0.744.                     
(0.43) 
NA 
ipr_tripsplus_domain_names 0.046                     
(0.142) 
0.648*                  
(0.306) 
0.786                     
(0.549) 
-0.002                     
(0.178) 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement -0.008**                     
(0.003) 
-0.009                  
(0.007) 
-0.015                     
(0.018) 
0.004                     
(0.009) 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion -0.02.                     
(0.011) 
-0.084***                  
(0.024) 
-0.105                     
(0.156) 
-0.019                     
(0.053) 
Control Variables     
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.001                     
(0.001) 
0                
(0.002) 
-0.002                     
(0.003) 
0.004**                     
(0.001) 
Classic IP leaders -0.001                     
(0.013) 
0.007                  
(0.027) 
-0.009                     
(0.045) 
0.004                     
(0.015) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
0.018                     
(0.012) 
0.029                  
(0.025) 
0.048                     
(0.042) 
0.016                     
(0.014) 
New IP producers and developers -0.013                     
(0.015) 
0.047                  
(0.032) 
0.026                     
(0.054) 
-0.016                     
(0.018) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.014*                     
(0.007) 
-0.067***                  
(0.014) 
-0.113***                     
(0.024) 
-0.036***                     
(0.008) 
Intercept 0.206***                     
(0.051) 
0.891***                  
(0.107) 
1.501***                     
(0.182) 










Observations 2970 2764 2653 2786 
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Growth: GDP Growth Rate FC IPR 
Variables Estimates 
(Std. Error) 
IPR TRIPS-plus Additive Variables  
ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights 1.544                  
(1.823) 
ipr_tripsplus_trademarks 0.913                  
(1.049) 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications -0.371                  
(0.627) 
ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design 1.243                  
(3.309) 
ipr_tripsplus_patents -0.155                  
(1.553) 
ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information -5.046.                  
(2.859) 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design -0.892                  
(9.666) 








6.936                  
(6.272) 
ipr_tripsplus_domain_names -1.831                  
(8.1) 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement 0.01                  
(0.43) 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion -1.188                  
(2.392) 
Control Variables  
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) -0.043                  
(0.052) 
Classic IP leaders 1.46*                  
(0.699) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.483                  
(0.666) 
New IP producers and developers 0.74                  
(0.833) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) 0.093                  
(0.367) 
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Growth: GDPpc Growth Rate Overall IPR FC IPR 





IPR TRIPS-plus Additive Variables   
ipr_tripsplus_copyrights_related_rights 2.433                     
(1.674) 
-0.713                     
(1.721) 
ipr_tripsplus_trademarks -0.733                     
(1.09) 
-1.15                     
(1.204) 
ipr_tripsplus_geo_indications -0.071                     
(0.53) 
-0.222                     
(0.882) 
ipr_tripsplus_industrial_design -6.617*                     
(2.964) 
-4.627                     
(3.46) 
ipr_tripsplus_patents -1.163                     
(1.658) 
0.037                     
(1.797) 
ipr_tripsplus_undisclosed_information -0.68                     
(2.217) 
-0.185                     
(3.138) 
ipr_tripsplus_layout_design 4.412                     
(9.355) 
-4.393                     
(11.097) 
ipr_tripsplus_new_plant_varieties 7.281***                     
(2.085) 




-0.436                     
(0.745) 




0.577                     
(5.367) 
0.825                     
(6.641) 
ipr_tripsplus_domain_names -1.612                     
(8.843) 
1.337                     
(9.297) 
ipr_tripsplus_enforcement -0.039                     
(0.2) 
-0.089                     
(0.203) 
ipr_tripsplus_exhaustion -0.366                     
(0.841) 
-0.147                     
(0.734) 
Control Variables   
Democratisation (Polity 2) (mean) 0.001                     
(0.061) 
0.009                     
(0.06) 
Classic IP leaders 0.333                     
(0.821) 
0.346                     
(0.815) 
Countries with a high increase of patent 
protection  
-0.311                     
(0.782) 
-0.409                     
(0.777) 
New IP producers and developers 0.291                     
(0.975) 
0.45                     
(0.975) 
ln Geographic distance (mean) -0.95*                     
(0.438) 
-0.895*                     
(0.429) 
Intercept 6.663*                     
(3.375) 






Observations 2661 2661 
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Appendix 65: Significant Models of High-income Countries (HIC) 
HIC Model Significant IPR Indexes Estimates 
(Std. Error) 
m1_df_si ipr_specific_sum -0.003.              
(0.001) 
m1_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.006*              
(0.002) 
m1_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.006.              
(0.003) 
m1_dft_gi ipr_general_sum 0.003*              
(0.001) 
m1_fc_df_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -0.011*              
(0.005) 
m1_fc_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.003*              
(0.001) 
m2.1_dft_gi ipr_general_sum 1.325.              
(0.749) 
m2.2_df_si ipr_specific_sum -0.042***              
(0.012) 
m2.2_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.01*              
(0.004) 
m2.2_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum -0.104***              
(0.02) 
m2.2_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.038***              
(0.007) 
m2.2_df5l_si ipr_specific_sum -0.15***              
(0.036) 
m2.2_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.067***              
(0.016) 
m2.2_dft_gi ipr_general_sum 0.042***              
(0.012) 
m2.2_dft_si ipr_specific_sum -0.035*              
(0.017) 
m2.2_fc_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.06**              
(0.02) 
m2.2_fc_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.084**              
(0.029) 
m3.1_df_si ipr_specific_sum -0.007***              
(0.001) 
m3.1_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.002***              
(0) 
m3.1_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum -0.014***              
(0.003) 
m3.1_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.005***              
(0.001) 
m3.1_df5l_si ipr_specific_sum -0.014*              
(0.005) 
m3.1_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.005*              
(0.002) 
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HIC Model Significant IPR Indexes Estimates 
(Std. Error) 
m3.1_dft_gi ipr_general_sum 0.004*              
(0.001) 
m3.1_dft_si ipr_specific_sum -0.005*              
(0.002) 
m3.1_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.002*              
(0.001) 
m3.1_fc_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.004**              
(0.001) 
m3.1_fc_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -0.018*              
(0.008) 
m3.1_fc_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.005*              
(0.002) 
m3.1_fc_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc -0.016.              
(0.009) 
m3.1_fc_df5l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -0.018.              
(0.01) 
m3.1_fc_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.005.              
(0.003) 
m3.2_df_gi ipr_general_sum -0.015***              
(0.003) 
m3.2_df_si ipr_specific_sum -0.021***              
(0.004) 
m3.2_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.006***              
(0.001) 
m3.2_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.037*              
(0.015) 
m3.2_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.052.              
(0.029) 
m3.2_dft_gi ipr_general_sum 0.015**              
(0.005) 
m3.2_fc_df_gi ipr_general_sum_fc -0.026**              
(0.01) 
m3.2_fc_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.011*              
(0.005) 
m3.2_fc_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.034.              
(0.019) 
m3.2_fc_dft_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0.074***              
(0.018) 
m3.3_df_gi ipr_general_sum -0.217**              
(0.077) 
m3.3_df_si ipr_specific_sum -0.19.              
(0.1) 
m3.3_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.066.              
(0.035) 
m3.3_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.365*              
(0.155) 
m3.3_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum -0.363.              
(0.215) 
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HIC Model Significant IPR Indexes Estimates 
(Std. Error) 
m3.4_df_gi ipr_general_sum -0.01**              
(0.003) 
m3.4_df_si ipr_specific_sum -0.02***              
(0.004) 
m3.4_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.006***              
(0.001) 
m3.4_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.024**              
(0.009) 
m3.4_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum -0.029*              
(0.013) 
m3.4_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.012*              
(0.005) 
m3.4_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.029.              
(0.017) 
m3.4_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.245*              
(0.097) 
m3.4_dft_gi ipr_general_sum 0.022***              
(0.005) 
m3.4_fc_df_gi ipr_general_sum_fc -0.016.              
(0.009) 
m3.4_fc_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.008.              
(0.004) 
m3.4_fc_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.025*              
(0.012) 
m3.4_fc_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.378*              
(0.173) 
m3.4_fc_dft_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.034*              
(0.015) 
m3.4_fc_dft_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0.08***              
(0.017) 
m3.4_fc_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc 0.016.              
(0.009) 
m4.1_df_gi ipr_general_sum -0.007*              
(0.003) 
m4.1_df_si ipr_specific_sum -0.012***              
(0.003) 
m4.1_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.004***              
(0.001) 
m4.1_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.019**              
(0.007) 
m4.1_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum -0.016.              
(0.009) 
m4.1_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.007*              
(0.003) 
m4.1_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.024*              
(0.012) 
m4.1_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.099*              
(0.048) 
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HIC Model Significant IPR Indexes Estimates 
(Std. Error) 
m4.1_fc_dft_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.031.              
(0.017) 
m4.1_fc_dft_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0.088***              
(0.02) 
m4.1_fc_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc 0.017.              
(0.01) 
m4.2_df_gi ipr_general_sum -0.003**              
(0.001) 
m4.2_df_si ipr_specific_sum -0.003*              
(0.001) 
m4.2_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.014*              
(0.007) 
m4.2_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.021.              
(0.012) 
m4.2_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.05*              
(0.022) 
m4.2_dft_gi ipr_general_sum 0.003*              
(0.001) 
m4.2_fc_df_gi ipr_general_sum_fc -0.006*              
(0.003) 
m4.2_fc_dft_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0.016***              
(0.004) 
m4.2_fc_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc 0.006**              
(0.002) 
m4.3_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.187*              
(0.082) 
m4.3_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.215*              
(0.091) 
m4.3_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.226*              
(0.109) 
m4.3_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.275*              
(0.115) 
m4.3_fc_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.108*              
(0.054) 
m4.3_fc_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -0.798.              
(0.435) 
m4.3_fc_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.178.              
(0.106) 
m4.3_fc_df5l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -0.803.              
(0.471) 
m4.3_fc_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.275*              
(0.13) 
m4.3_fc_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc -0.841.              
(0.467) 
m4.3_fc_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -0.962.              
(0.574) 
m4.3_fc_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.558.              
(0.32) 
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HIC Model Significant IPR Indexes Estimates 
(Std. Error) 
m4.4_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 2.597***              
(0.713) 
m4.4_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum 2.177***              
(0.57) 
m4.4_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 3***              
(0.298) 
m4.4_dft_gi ipr_general_sum -4.624*              
(1.873) 
m4.4_dft_si ipr_specific_sum -8.211**              
(2.733) 
m4.4_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -3.772***              
(1.087) 
m4.4_fc_df_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -14.099.              
(7.736) 
m4.4_fc_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -6.704***              
(1.825) 
m4.4_fc_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -5.44.              
(2.993) 
m4.4_fc_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -2.781***              
(0.713) 
m4.4_fc_df5l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -10.07*              
(4.83) 
m4.4_fc_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -4.999***              
(1.247) 
m4.4_fc_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -2.643.              
(1.452) 
m4.4_fc_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -1.781**              
(0.582) 
m4.4_fc_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -8.92*              
(4.026) 
m4.5_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0*                 
(0) 
m4.5_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0*                  
(0) 
m4.5_dft_si ipr_specific_sum 0.                  
(0) 
m4.5_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0.                  
(0) 
m4.5_fc_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.                  
(0) 
m4.5_fc_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0.                  
(0) 
m4.5_fc_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc 0.                  
(0) 
m4.5_fc_df5l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0**              
(0) 
m4.5_fc_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc 0**              
(0) 
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HIC Model Significant IPR Indexes Estimates 
(Std. Error) 
m4.5_fc_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc 0*                  
(0) 
m4.6_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0*                  
(0) 
m4.7_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0.                  
(0) 
m4.7_fc_df_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0.018.              
(0.01) 
m4.8_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -658.21*              
(276.41) 
m4.8_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum -3331332*              
(1662991) 
m4.8_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -1863838**              
(563603) 
m4.8_df5l_si ipr_specific_sum -2876723.              
(1536855) 
m4.8_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -1618789**              
(510330) 
m4.8_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -1243606*              
(554744) 
m4.8_dft_si ipr_specific_sum -2738425.              
(1417937) 
m4.8_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -1552711**              
(475121) 
m4.8_fc_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -2924389.              
(1670443) 
m4.9_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -403.6.              
(205.7) 
m4.9_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -1821086**              
(664231) 
m4.9_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -2055171**              
(732197) 
m4.9_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -2168622.              
(1093741) 
m4.9_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -1543699**              
(533351) 
m4.10_fc_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 187771*              
(75480) 
m4.10_fc_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 181334.              
(104918) 
m4.10_fc_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 147800*              
(63473) 
m4.10_fc_dft_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 104101.              
(58755) 
m4.11_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -349.9*              
(162.6) 
m4.11_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum -2000047.              
(1044178) 
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HIC Model Significant IPR Indexes Estimates 
(Std. Error) 
m4.11_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -1082825**              
(400823) 
m4.11_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -1092277*              
(483312) 
m4.11_dft_si ipr_specific_sum -1880012*              
(932927) 
m4.11_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -997847**              
(344001) 
m4.11_fc_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -2617626.              
(1453719) 
m4.12_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum 0.                  
(0) 
m4.12_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0*                  
(0) 
m4.12_fc_df_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0.019.              
(0.011) 
m5.1_df_gi ipr_general_sum -0.002*              
(0.001) 
m5.1_df_si ipr_specific_sum -0.012***              
(0.001) 
m5.1_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.005***              
(0) 
m5.1_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.012***              
(0.002) 
m5.1_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum -0.035***              
(0.003) 
m5.1_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.012***              
(0.001) 
m5.1_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.024***              
(0.003) 
m5.1_df5l_si ipr_specific_sum -0.052***              
(0.006) 
m5.1_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.019***              
(0.003) 
m5.1_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.05***              
(0.006) 
m5.1_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum -0.073***              
(0.014) 
m5.1_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.033***              
(0.008) 
m5.1_dft_gi ipr_general_sum 0.007***              
(0.001) 
m5.1_dft_si ipr_specific_sum -0.01***              
(0.002) 
m5.1_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.004***              
(0.001) 
m5.1_fc_df_gi ipr_general_sum_fc -0.006.              
(0.003) 
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HIC Model Significant IPR Indexes Estimates 
(Std. Error) 
m5.1_fc_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -0.017*              
(0.008) 
m5.1_fc_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.017***              
(0.003) 
m5.1_fc_df5l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -0.04**              
(0.012) 
m5.1_fc_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.024***              
(0.005) 
m5.1_fc_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc -0.034.              
(0.018) 
m5.1_fc_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -0.057**              
(0.022) 
m5.1_fc_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.038**              
(0.013) 
m5.2_df_gi ipr_general_sum -0.002*              
(0.001) 
m5.2_df_si ipr_specific_sum -0.012***              
(0.001) 
m5.2_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.005***              
(0) 
m5.2_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.012***              
(0.002) 
m5.2_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum -0.033***              
(0.003) 
m5.2_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.012***              
(0.001) 
m5.2_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.025***              
(0.003) 
m5.2_df5l_si ipr_specific_sum -0.05***              
(0.006) 
m5.2_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.019***              
(0.003) 
m5.2_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.049***              
(0.004) 
m5.2_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum -0.061***              
(0.011) 
m5.2_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.026***              
(0.006) 
m5.2_dft_gi ipr_general_sum 0.006***              
(0.001) 
m5.2_dft_si ipr_specific_sum -0.009***              
(0.002) 
m5.2_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.004***              
(0.001) 
m5.2_fc_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.003*              
(0.002) 
m5.2_fc_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -0.018*              
(0.008) 
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HIC Model Significant IPR Indexes Estimates 
(Std. Error) 
m5.2_fc_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc -0.017.              
(0.009) 
m5.2_fc_df5l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -0.039***              
(0.011) 
m5.2_fc_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.023***              
(0.005) 
m5.2_fc_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc -0.031*              
(0.014) 
m5.2_fc_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -0.044**              
(0.017) 
m5.2_fc_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.026**              
(0.01) 
m5.3_df3l_g ipr_general_sum 0.209*              
(0.096) 
m5.3_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.331**              
(0.124) 
m5.3_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.215**              
(0.083) 
m5.3_fc_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.835*              
(0.325) 
m5.3_fc_dft_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.624*              
(0.314) 
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Appendix 66: Significant Models of Upper-middle-income Countries (UMIC) 
UMIC Model Significant IPR Indexes Estimates 
(Std. Error) 
m1_fc_df_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -0.086*              
(0.038) 
m1_fc_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc -0.025*              
(0.012) 
m1_fc_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc -0.036*              
(0.016) 
m1_fc_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc -0.118***              
(0.034) 
m1_fc_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -0.261*              
(0.131) 
m2.2_fc_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 9.691*              
(4.561) 
m3.1_df_gi ipr_general_sum -0.013***              
(0.003) 
m3.1_df_si ipr_specific_sum -0.018**              
(0.006) 
m3.1_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.006**              
(0.002) 
m3.1_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.017**              
(0.006) 
m3.1_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0.017*              
(0.008) 
m3.1_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0.046*              
(0.019) 
m3.1_dft_gi ipr_general_sum -0.01**              
(0.003) 
m3.1_dft_si ipr_specific_sum -0.016*              
(0.006) 
m3.1_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.006*              
(0.003) 
m3.1_fc_df_gi ipr_general_sum_fc -0.025.              
(0.015) 
m3.1_fc_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.01*              
(0.004) 
m3.1_fc_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -0.061.              
(0.036) 
m3.1_fc_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc 0.14***              
(0.034) 
m3.2_dft_gi ipr_general_sum 0.016*              
(0.007) 
m3.3_df_gi ipr_general_sum -0.097.              
(0.054) 
m3.3_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.633.              
(0.328) 
m3.3_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum -1.261**              
(0.481) 
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UMIC Model Significant IPR Indexes Estimates 
(Std. Error) 
m3.3_fc_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc -1.211.              
(0.711) 
m3.4_df_si ipr_specific_sum -0.009*              
(0.004) 
m3.4_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.003.              
(0.002) 
m3.4_dft_gi ipr_general_sum 0.012**              
(0.004) 
m4.1_df_gi ipr_general_sum 0.01.              
(0.005) 
m4.1_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0.01*              
(0.004) 
m4.1_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.027*              
(0.012) 
m4.1_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0.016.              
(0.01) 
m4.1_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.046*              
(0.018) 
m4.1_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0.042*              
(0.017) 
m4.1_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.099**              
(0.036) 
m4.1_dft_gi ipr_general_sum 0.034***              
(0.009) 
m4.1_dft_si ipr_specific_sum 0.048**              
(0.018) 
m4.1_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0.03***              
(0.008) 
m4.1_fc_df_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0.04*              
(0.019) 
m4.1_fc_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc 0.043***              
(0.007) 
m4.1_fc_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0.089*              
(0.043) 
m4.1_fc_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc 0.068***              
(0.016) 
m4.1_fc_df5l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0.119.              
(0.065) 
m4.1_fc_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc 0.088***              
(0.024) 
m4.1_fc_dft_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0.128***              
(0.036) 
m4.1_fc_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc 0.112***              
(0.014) 
m4.2_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.009.              
(0.005) 
m4.2_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0.042*              
(0.02) 
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UMIC Model Significant IPR Indexes Estimates 
(Std. Error) 
m4.2_fc_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc -0.053.              
(0.031) 
m4.2_fc_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc 0.012.              
(0.007) 
m4.3_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum 0.282.              
(0.154) 
m4.3_fc_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0.341.              
(0.178) 
m4.4_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.619.              
(0.316) 
m4.5_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0*                 
(0) 
m4.5_fc_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0.                   
(0) 
m4.6_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum 0.                   
(0) 
m4.6_fc_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0*                   
(0) 
m4.6_fc_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0.                   
(0) 
m4.6_fc_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc 0.                   
(0) 
m4.7_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum 0*                   
(0) 
m4.7_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0*                   
(0) 
m4.7_df5l_si ipr_specific_sum 0**              
(0) 
m4.7_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0*                   
(0) 
m4.7_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum 0.                   
(0) 
m4.7_fc_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0.                   
(0) 
m4.7_fc_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc 0*                   
(0) 
m4.7_fc_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0***              
(0) 
m4.7_fc_df5l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0*                   
(0) 
m4.7_fc_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc 0*                   
(0) 
m4.7_fc_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.                   
(0) 
m4.7_fc_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0.                   
(0) 
m4.7_fc_dft_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0*                   
(0) 
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UMIC Model Significant IPR Indexes Estimates 
(Std. Error) 
m4.10_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum 81134*              
(40210) 
m4.10_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum 87421*              
(40510) 
m4.10_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum 252905***              
(72857) 
m4.10_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 120990***              
(33147) 
m4.12_df_gi ipr_general_sum -0.011.              
(0.007) 
m4.12_df_si ipr_specific_sum -0.023.              
(0.014) 
m4.12_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0*                   
(0) 
m4.12_dft_gi ipr_general_sum 0.                   
(0) 
m4.12_fc_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0**              
(0) 
m4.12_fc_df5l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0*                   
(0) 
m4.12_fc_dft_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0*                   
(0) 
m5.1_df_si ipr_specific_sum -0.009.              
(0.005) 
m5.1_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum -0.024*              
(0.009) 
m5.1_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.009*              
(0.004) 
m5.1_dft_gi ipr_general_sum 0.009**              
(0.003) 
m5.1_fc_df_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.013*              
(0.006) 
m5.1_fc_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.04***              
(0.011) 
m5.1_fc_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.063***              
(0.017) 
m5.1_fc_dft_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.027***              
(0.007) 
m5.1_fc_dft_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0.028*              
(0.012) 
m5.1_fc_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc 0.015**              
(0.005) 
m5.2_df_si ipr_specific_sum -0.008.              
(0.005) 
m5.2_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum -0.023*              
(0.009) 
m5.2_df3l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.008*              
(0.004) 
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UMIC Model Significant IPR Indexes Estimates 
(Std. Error) 
m5.2_dft_gi ipr_general_sum 0.01**              
(0.003) 
m5.2_fc_df_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.013*              
(0.006) 
m5.2_fc_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.035**              
(0.011) 
m5.2_fc_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.055***              
(0.016) 
m5.2_fc_dft_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.025***              
(0.007) 
m5.2_fc_dft_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0.025*              
(0.012) 
m5.2_fc_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc 0.012*              
(0.005) 
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Appendix 67: Significant Models of Lower-middle-income Countries (LMIC) 
LMIC Model Significant IPR Indexes Estimates 
(Std. Error) 
m1_df_gi ipr_general_sum 0.006*                    
(0.002) 
m1_df_si ipr_specific_sum 0.031***                    
(0.008) 
m1_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0.012***                    
(0.003) 
m1_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.102.                    
(0.054) 
m1_dft_gi ipr_general_sum 0.007**                    
(0.003) 
m1_dft_si ipr_specific_sum 0.029**                    
(0.009) 
m1_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0.012*                    
(0.005) 
m1_fc_df_gi ipr_general_sum_fc -0.011*                    
(0.005) 
m1_fc_dft_gi ipr_general_sum_fc -0.01.                    
(0.006) 
m1_fc_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc 0.012.                    
(0.006) 
m3.1_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.015*                    
(0.007) 
m3.3_fc_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.594.                    
(0.35) 
m3.3_fc_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 1.182*                    
(0.499) 
m3.4_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.234.                    
(0.129) 
m3.4_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.418.                    
(0.218) 
m4.2_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.435.                    
(0.242) 
m4.3_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.121.                    
(0.067) 
m4.3_fc_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc -0.353.                    
(0.203) 
m4.5_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.                    
(0) 
m4.5_df5l_si ipr_specific_sum 0**                    
(0) 
m4.5_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0***                    
(0) 
m4.5_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum 0*                    
(0) 
m4.5_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum 0***                    
(0) 
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LMIC Model Significant IPR Indexes Estimates 
(Std. Error) 
m4.5_fc_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0*                    
(0) 
m4.5_fc_df5l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0**                    
(0) 
m4.6_df5l_si ipr_specific_sum 0.                    
(0) 
m4.6_df5l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0***                    
(0) 
m4.6_dft_gi ipr_general_sum 0.                    
(0) 
m4.9_df_gi ipr_general_sum 1.256*                    
(0.506) 
m4.12_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum 0*                    
(0) 
m4.12_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.                    
(0) 
m5.1_df_gi ipr_general_sum 0.007*                    
(0.003) 
m5.1_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.015*                    
(0.007) 
m5.1_dft_gi ipr_general_sum 0.012***                    
(0.003) 
m5.1_fc_df_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.018***                    
(0.005) 
m5.1_fc_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.034**                    
(0.013) 
m5.1_fc_dft_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.019**                    
(0.006) 
m5.2_df_gi ipr_general_sum 0.007**                    
(0.003) 
m5.2_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.018**                    
(0.006) 
m5.2_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.027*                    
(0.012) 
m5.2_dft_gi ipr_general_sum 0.012***                    
(0.003) 
m5.2_fc_df_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.017***                    
(0.005) 
m5.2_fc_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.032**                    
(0.011) 
m5.2_fc_dft_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.017**                    
(0.005) 
m5.3_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0.133.                    
(0.079) 
 






- 533 - 
Appendix 68: Significant Models of Low-income Countries (LIC) 
LIC Model Significant IPR Indexes Estimates 
(Std. Error) 
m1_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.03.                    
(0.016) 
m1_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.052*                    
(0.021) 
m1_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum 0.704***                    
(0.06) 
m1_fc_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 2.112***                    
(0.179) 
m2.2_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum 5.687*                    
(2.804) 
m2.2_fc_df3l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 5.687*                    
(2.804) 
m3.4_fc_dft_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.052.                    
(0.03) 
m4.2_df_gi ipr_general_sum -0.016*                    
(0.007) 
m4.2_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.045*                    
(0.019) 
m4.2_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.08*                    
(0.033) 
m4.3_df_gi ipr_general_sum 0.509.                    
(0.201) 
m4.4_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum 1.152***                    
(0) 
m4.4_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.887***                    
(0) 
m4.4_fc_df_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 1.732***                    
(0) 
m4.4_fc_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 1.152***                    
(0) 
m4.4_fc_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.887***                    
(0) 
m4.5_df_si ipr_specific_sum -0.106**                    
(0.037) 
m4.5_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.043**                    
(0.016) 
m4.5_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum 0.                    
(0) 
m4.5_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0.                    
(0) 
m4.5_fc_df_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -0.138**                    
(0.047) 
m4.5_fc_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.054**                    
(0.018) 
m4.5_fc_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0.                    
(0) 
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LIC Model Significant IPR Indexes Estimates 
(Std. Error) 
m4.6_df_si ipr_specific_sum -0.092*                    
(0.045) 
m4.6_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.034.                    
(0.019) 
m4.6_fc_df_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -0.117*                    
(0.057) 
m4.6_fc_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.043.                    
(0.022) 
m4.6_fc_dft_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.                    
(0) 
m4.7_df_si ipr_specific_sum -0.097**                    
(0.033) 
m4.7_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.038*                    
(0.014) 
m4.7_fc_df_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -0.126**                    
(0.042) 
m4.7_fc_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.048**                    
(0.016) 
m4.8_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum -95054.                    
(47007) 
m4.8_fc_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc 350630.                    
(198472) 
m4.10_df_gi ipr_general_sum -0.786*                    
(0.383) 
m4.10_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum -9140*                    
(3803) 
m4.10_fc_df_gi ipr_general_sum_fc -1.08*                    
(0.505) 
m4.11_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum -229964*                    
(97364) 
m4.12_df_si ipr_specific_sum -0.101*                    
(0.04) 
m4.12_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta -0.04*                    
(0.017) 
m4.12_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.                    
(0) 
m4.12_fc_df_si ipr_specific_sum_fc -0.129*                    
(0.051) 
m4.12_fc_df_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc -0.05*                    
(0.02) 
m5.1_df_gi ipr_general_sum 0.019***                    
(0.005) 
m5.1_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.038***                    
(0.01) 
m5.1_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.049**                    
(0.016) 
m5.1_df5l_si ipr_specific_sum -0.08.                    
(0.047) 
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LIC Model Significant IPR Indexes Estimates 
(Std. Error) 
m5.1_dft_gi ipr_general_sum 0.021***                    
(0.005) 
m5.1_dft_si ipr_specific_sum 0.025.                    
(0.013) 
m5.1_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0.011.                    
(0.006) 
m5.1_fc_df_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.032***                    
(0.005) 
m5.1_fc_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.066***                    
(0.012) 
m5.1_fc_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.089***                    
(0.02) 
m5.1_fc_dft_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.035***                    
(0.006) 
m5.1_fc_dft_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0.042**                    
(0.016) 
m5.1_fc_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc 0.017*                    
(0.007) 
m5.2_df_gi ipr_general_sum 0.018***                    
(0.004) 
m5.2_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.034***                    
(0.008) 
m5.2_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.042***                    
(0.012) 
m5.2_dft_gi ipr_general_sum 0.02***                    
(0.004) 
m5.2_dft_si ipr_specific_sum 0.026*                    
(0.012) 
m5.2_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0.012*                    
(0.006) 
m5.2_fc_df_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.028***                    
(0.005) 
m5.2_fc_df3l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.055***                    
(0.01) 
m5.2_fc_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.07***                    
(0.015) 
m5.2_fc_dft_gi ipr_general_sum_fc 0.031***                    
(0.005) 
m5.2_fc_dft_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 0.04**                    
(0.014) 
m5.2_fc_dft_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta_fc 0.016*                    
(0.007) 
m5.3_df10l_si ipr_specific_sum 1.745.                    
(0.91) 
m5.3_df10l_ti ipr_tripsplus_per_pta 0.882*                    
(0.4) 
m5.3_fc_df_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 1.4.                    
(0.791) 
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LIC Model Significant IPR Indexes Estimates 
(Std. Error) 
m5.3_fc_dft_si ipr_specific_sum_fc 1.386.                    
(0.791) 
m5.4_df5l_gi ipr_general_sum -0.679*                    
(0.264) 
m5.4_df10l_gi ipr_general_sum 0.573.                    
(0.303) 
 
Significance codes: *** p<0, ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, . p<0.05 
 
 
 
